Full opinion text
OPINION & ORDER KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge. Irma Y. Drace (“Drace”), Dhyalma N. Vazquez (“Vazquez”), Sam Zherka (“Zher-ka”), and Dr. Giulio Cavallo (“Cavallo”) (collectively, the “Individual Plaintiffs”), and The Westchester County Independence Party (the “Independence Party” or the “Party”) (together, with the Individual Plaintiffs, “Plaintiffs”) bring suit against 90 Defendants, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt ■ Organizations. Act (“RICO”),' 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated and conspired to violate 18 U.S.C § 1962(b) and § 1962(c). Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants individually violated and conspired to violate the constitutional protections of the Due Process Clause, the First Amendment, and • the Equal Protection Clause, and that Defendants Westchester County Board of Elections (“Board of Elections”) and Douglas A. Colety (“Colety”) committed the state tort of breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them. For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motions To Dismiss are granted. I. Background A. Factual Background The following factual summary is derived from Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), which is assumed to be true for the purposes of these Motions. 1. The Parties The Independence Party is a political third party located in the County of West-chester. (SAC ¶ 1.) Plaintiff Drace was an employee in the Westchester County Attorney’s Office Law Department and is the Treasurer of the Westchester County Independence ’ Party. (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff Vazquez is the Vice-Chair of the Independence Party, an Executive Committee member of the New York State Independence Party, a County Committee member, a District Leader and a Judicial Delegate. (Id. ¶ 3.) Zherka is a member of the Independence Party, and a District Leader. (Id. ¶ 4.) Cavallo is the Chairman of the Independence Party and the New York State Executive Committee Vice Chairman, as well as a Westchester County Judicial Delegate, County Committee Member, and District Leader. (Id. ¶ 5.) A full description of the more than 90 Defendants is unnecessary, with the exception of Robert' P. Astorino (“Astorino”). Astorino was elected Westchester County Executive in 2009." (See, e.g., id. ¶ 100.) Plaintiffs allege that all other Defendants were connected to Astorino in some way, for example, that they were employed by him, friends with him, related to him, or related to, friends with, or employed by people connected to him. (See id. ¶¶7-95.) 2. The Alleged Scheme As alleged by Plaintiffs, this case concerns a scheme to raid the Independence Party in anticipation of the September 2013 primary election in order to ensure that Astorino, a Republican, would win the Independence Party nomination for County Executive, whereby more than 4,000 people who were not truly in sympathy with the principles of the Independence Party enrolled in' the Party “at the midnight hour” in order to vote in the primary. (See id. at 9-10; ¶¶71, 603-04.) Under New York election law, individuals must register in a party well in advance of a primary election; thus, the deadline for registering in the Independence Party for the primary election held on September 10, 2013 was October 12, 2012 at 5 p.m. (Id. ¶¶ 71,120.) Plaintiffs allege that in 2010, Astorino “began an elaborate scheme to infiltrate and raid the Independence Party in a bid to rig the puteóme of the September 10, 2013, countywide Independence Party primary elections.” (Id. ¶ 225.) As evidence of this, Plaintiffs point to a phone call between Astorino and Zherka that occurred in March 2013, wherein Astorino allegedly stated that “he and his cohorts essentially raided the Independence Party to ‘buy insurance’ in an attempt to rig and manipulate the outcome of the Independence Primary Election and to ‘decapitate’ duly elected, Independence Party Chairman Giulio Cavallo and Vice Chairperson Dhyalma Vazquez, rendering them politically irrelevant So that ho one [would] ever need their support or endorsement.” (See id. ¶¶ 226, 231.) In this phone call, Astori-no allegedly stated that “he knew immediately after getting elected in 2009 that he would not be re-endorsed by the West-chester County Independence Party chairman Dr. Giulio Cavallo,” and therefore decided on the course of action to raid the party. (Id. ¶ 226.) According to Plaintiffs, Defendants “used phones, email, fax, mail, and other forms of electronic communications, in order to scheme and' defraud others, by falsely representing that these individuals were in sympathy with the principles of the Independence Party or in related efforts to raid the Independence Party,” (SAC ¶¶ 46-47, 51, 54, 56-58, 60, 61, 63, 65-66, 72-73, 75-77, 79-91, 93, 95, 271, 374, 384, 394, 397, 410, 414, 417-21, 425-27, 430, 432-33, 438-39, 447-49, 452, 454-56, 458-60, 462, . 502-03, 518, 520), and that they actively participated in registering friends, family, and acquaintances into the Independence Party in efforts to raid the Independence Party, (id. ¶¶ 6-7, 14, 16-17, 22, 24-51, 53-55, 57-58, 60-61, 63, 65-67, 69-70, 72-93, 95, 99, 223, 271, 310, 341, 344, 374, 384-85, 387, 394, 397, 414, 416-2Q, 424-26, 430, 432-34, 438-40, 442, 447-49, 452, 455-60, 462, 465, 468-70, 477, 502-03, 510, 512, 515, 517-18, 520, 529, 534). As noted, one purpose of the scheme was rigging the outcome of the Independence Party’s Primary Election.. (See id. ¶100 (alleging that Robert P. Astorino “organized an illicit, fraudulent scheme to rig the outcome of the September 10, .2013, countywide Independence party primary election by inducing and coercing individuals to switch their party affiliations and enlist in the Independence Party”); id. ¶ 103 (alleging that “numerous Defendants enrolled in the Independence Party .... for the sole purpose of assisting the Candidate for County Executive, Co-Conspirator Defendant Robert P. Astorino in his plan to ‘raid’ and take over the Independence Party .and rig the outcome of its Primary Election” (emphasis omitted)); id. ¶ 108 (“Each and every defendant, with intent to deceive, participated in an illicit, organized[,] and fraudulent scheme to rig the outcome of the September 10, 2013, county-wide Independence Party primary election by inducing and coercing individuals to switch their party affiliations and enlist in the Independence Party.”); id. ¶ 227 (“This course of action included an illicit and fraudulent scheme designed to induce and/or coerce his family members, County employees directly under his control, close associates, and others easily linked to him into an organized campaign to register new voters and change party affiliation of other voters to the Westches-ter County Independence Party for the sole purpose of rigging and manipulating the outcome of the Party’s primary election.” (emphasis added)); id. ¶241 (describing the scheme’s purpose as to “rig the primary election process”); id. ¶282 (describing the “fraudulent scheme to rig the primary election and secure the nomination of the Westchester Independence Party Line”); id. ¶ 402 (“Upon information and belief, all the raiders of the Independence Party had a single aim in mind: to manipulate and rig the outcome of the primary election in favor of the coconspira-tors.”); id. ¶ 569 (“Each Defendant worked together continuously, methodically to achieve the Scheme—to raid and injure the Independence Party by taking it over and making it their Party.”); id. ¶ 570 (“As .to the mail and wire fraud being related:- both were engaged in for the same purpose to take active steps to raiding the Independence Party by registering in the Independence Party and making phone calls, sending emails and the like to spread instructions on when, where[,] and how to join the party.”). There are also some, but (comparatively very few, allegations that certain Defendants’ goals were to rig the primary and/or the general. election, and future elections. (See, e.g., id. ¶314 (alleging that Defendant Alberty intended to manipulate the September 10, 2013 primary and future elections); id. ¶330 (same with respect to Defendant .Arnold); .id. ¶¶351, 409 (same with respect, to Defendant Christopher Caputo); id. ¶ 408 (same with respect to Defendant Natasha Caputo).) The only other references to use of the mail or wires in the SAC is with reference to the mailings of registration:applications in September and October 2012 with allegedly fraudulent information., (See SAC ¶¶ 179-81,183.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants violated numerous state election laws in carrying out this scheme. For example, Plaintiffs allege that many of the Defendants were nptaries and mpde false statements, (id. ¶ 547), that Defendants registered people despite knowing that., they were ineligible to vote, (id. ¶ 541), that certain Defendants had registration cards that were backdated and submitted after the deadline to register individuals to vote, (see id. ¶ 475), and that certain Defendants allowed petitions to be filed after the deadlines had passed, (see id. ¶ 495). The latest that Plaintiffs allege a registration application was postmarked but still accepted was October 19, 2012. . (See id. If 183.) 3. Related Lawsuits On July 31, 2013, an action, Rhoades v. The Westchester County Board of Elec- turns, No. 3001/13 (Sup.Ct. Aug. 12, 2013) (“Rhoades I ”), was brought in New York State Court by Richard Rhoades (“Rhoades”) by order to show cause, “seeking to declare invalid the Opportunity to Ballot petition for' a write-in candidate for the Public Office of Westchester County in the Independence Party Primary Election to be held on September 10, 2013.” (Id. ¶ 116.) On August 12, 2013, the Supreme Court cancelled the enrollment of several of the respondents in that action, which resulted in the Opportunity to Ballot petition for a write-in candidate being invalidated. (Id. ¶¶ 154-55.) A second law suit, Rhoades v. The Westchester County Board of Elections, No. 3268/2013- (Sup.Ct.) (“Rhoades II”), was commenced on- August 10, 2013, when Rhoades sent a letter to Cavallo, challenging the enrollment of party enrollees. (Id. ¶ 159.) Cavallo appointed a subcommittee to investigate, (id. ¶ 160), conducted hearings, determined that the individuals were not in sympathy with the Party, and sought to cancel their enrollment, (id. ¶ 162). This cancellation was refused by the New York Supreme Court in February 2014, (id. ¶ 165; see also SAC Ex. H3 (Westchester County Supreme Court Decision) 49, 53), which decision was then overturned by the Appellate Division, which granted the request to “disenroll nearly 4000 voters from the Independence Party” in March 2014, (id. ¶ 166-69). 4. Plaintiffs Claims a. Injuries to Plaintiffs The SAC alleges the following injuries: (1) that the Independence Party “has been unable to earn the money donations it normally secures to elect candidates of their [sic] choice”; (2) “the Independence Party’s business of choosing and securing candidates of their [sic] choice that are in sympathy with the principles of the Independence Party has been injured,” (3) “[i]ndividual Independence voters were injured when their vote did not count as a result of this Scheme,” (4) “jobs were lost on a county level as ... at least three County Legislators who normally would not have secured the Independence vote, did so and were elected,” and (5) Plaintiffs’ right to association was impaired. (Id. ¶¶ 581-85.) ■ The SAC also repeatedly alleges “the Independence Party of West-chester County has been damaged by this raid in its ability to raise funds, maintain its integrity and reputation in Westchester County, and be an integral part of the election process in properly nominating candidates for public office.” (See, e.g., ¶ 114 (emphasis omitted).) The SAC also alleges that Drace and Vazquez lost their jobs, and that Cavallo was not reappointed to a volunteer position on the Westchester County Police Advisory Board. Plaintiffs allege that Drace was fired because of “her role in the sub-committee hearing held to dis-enroll thousands of newly added voters to the Independence Party,” under the pretextual excuse that she was fired because she failed a civil service exam. (SAC ¶ 305-08.) With respect to Vazquez, Plaintiffs allege that Vazquez opposed a plan by Astorino and Gille to demote minority Department of Social Services workers. (Id. ¶ 293.) Additionally, the SAC alleges that “by late December 2012, Vazquez made it clear that the Independence Party would not re-endorse [Astorino] for re-election to the County Executive’s Office.” (Id. ¶296.) In retaliation, Astorino transferred Vazquez to a “non-existent position,” and she was terminated thereafter. (See id. ¶¶ 297, 302.) With respect to Cavallo, the SAC alleges that in retaliation for Cavallo not endorsing Astorino for the 2013 County Executive Office position, Astorino blocked Cavallo’s reappointment to the Westchester County Police ■ Advisory Board, a non-compensated position. (Id. ¶¶ 276-78.) The SAC does not allege any specific injury to Zherka, who, in any event, will be dropping out from the case. b. Benefits to Defendants Plaintiffs also allege that many Defendants benefited by virtue of their participation in the scheme. For example, Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of their participation in the scheme to raid the Independence Party, numerous Defendants were given raises or peculiarly high salaries, (see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 358, 361, 454, 513— 18), that some Defendants or their family members were rewarded by being offered employment with the County, (see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 523, 525-26, 529), and that some -Defendants were given.unusually large sums of money from Astorino’s political fund, (see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 532-38). B. Procedural Background Plaintiffs filed a Complaint on October 31, -2013. (See Dkt. No. 1.) On January 15, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, adding and dropping some Defendants. (See Dkt. No. 3.) On March , 13, 2014, the Court held a.pre-motion conference, where the Parties discussed Defendants’ letters seeking leave to file motions to dismiss. (See Dkt. (minute entry for Mar. ■ 13, 2014).) On April 2, 2014, the Court held a'second pre-motion conference and granted Plaintiffs leave to further amend their Complaint. (See Dkt. (minute entry for Apr. 2, 2014).) On May 7, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ request to begin “nonparty discovery.” (See Dkt. No. 174.) Plaintiffs filed the SAC on June 24, 2014. (See Dkt. No. 182.) The SAC dropped approximately 30 Defendants, and on August 13, 2014, the Court so ordered a stipulation of dismissal- of those Parties. (See Dkt. No. 196.) ' - Pür'suant tó a scheduling order entered by the Court on' July 18, 2014, (see Dkt. No. 184), Defendants filed their Motions To Dismiss no later than September 12, 2014. (See Dkt. Nos. 207-09, 220-22, 227, 229-30, 232-34, 236-38, 240-41, 244-46, 250-52.) On November 10, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a consolidated opposition to all of the Motions To Dismiss. (See Dkt. No. 264.) On November 21, 2014 Elisabeth Alberty, Robert A., Astorino, Christopher S. Capu-to, Frank Catalina, Theodora Cerino, Diana McCaughey, Felicia McCloskey, Phi-lomena McCloskey, Evelyn McCormack, Henry Neubeck, Christina Oros, Moses Pabon, Kathryn C. Plunkett, Thomas M. Reddy, Victoria Roach, Margaret M. Scul-,ti, and Javier Vincens filed a letter correcting a point of law in their Memorandum of Law. (Dkt. No. 265.) Defendants then filed Reply papers between December 10, 2014 and December 12, 2014. (See Dkt. Nos. 277, 279, 280-52, 286.) In September 2014, numerous Defendants requested permission to file motions for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11. (See Dkt. Nos. 257-59.) The Court determined that it would defer any Rule 11 litigation until the Motions To Dismiss were resolved. (See Dkt. No. 261.) The Court heard oral, argument on all Motions To Dismiss on June 9, 2015. (See Dkt. (minute entry for June 9, 2015).) II. Discussion A. Standard of Review Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ SAC under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (brackets, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).'" Instead, a complaint’s “[factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level....” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Although “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. át 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and a plaintiff must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, if a plaintiff has not “nudged [his or her] claim! ] across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed,” id; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“Determining whether a .complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit- the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but'it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” (citation omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))); id. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”). - “[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s -motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); see also Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir.2014) (“In addressing the sufficiency of-a complaint we accept as true all factual allegations (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dixon v. United States, No. 13-CV-2193, 2014 WL 23427, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2014) (“For the purpose of this motion to' dismiss, we assume that the facts alleged in [the plaintiffs] complaint are true.”). Further, “[f]or the purpose of resolving [a] rpotion to dismiss, the Court ... draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Daniel v. T & M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F.Supp.2d 302, 304 n. 1 (S,D.N.Y.2014) (citing Koch v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.2012)). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, ... a court may consider the complaint as well as any instrument attached to the com-, plaint as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in * it by reference,” as well as “matters of which judicial notice may be taken, and documents either in plaintiffs’ possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.” Kalyanaram v. Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors at N.Y. Inst. of Tech., Inc., 742 F.3d 42, 44 n. 1 (2d Cir.2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.1999) (“In adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.”, (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hendrix v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-5011, 2013 WL 6835168, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013) (same). B. Analysis 1. RICO Claims Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and § 1962(b)), and conspired to violate RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)), Defendants move to dismiss these claims. a. RICO Claim Under. § 1962(c) In their First Cause of Action, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). While the Supreme Court has* noted that RICO is to “be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes,” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted), courts have cautioned that, because “the ‘mere assertion of a RICO claim has an almost inevitable stigmatizing effect on those named as defendants, courts should strive to flush out frivolous RICO allegations at an early stage of the litigation,’ ” Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 655 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (alterations omitted) (quoting Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegria, 896 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir.1990)), aff'd sub. nom. Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, Div. of The Ltd., Inc., 113 F.3d 1229 (2d Cir.1997); see also Aronov v. Mersini, No. 14-CV-7998, 2015 WL 1780164, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2015) (same); Turner v. N.Y. Rosbruch/Harnik, Inc., 84 F.Supp.3d 161, 167-68 (E.D.N.Y.2015) (same); Ferro v. Metro. Ctr. for Mental Health, No. 13-CV-2347, 2014 WL 1265919, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014) (same), reconsideration denied, 2014 WL 2039132 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2014). “A private cause of action under RICO requires that the plaintiff allege: ‘(1) the . defendant’s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, (2) an injury to the plaintiffs business or property, and (3) causation of the injury by the defendant’s violation.’ ” Fertitta v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC, No. 14-CV-2259, 2015 WL 374968, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2015) (quoting Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F.3d 273, 283 (2d Cir.2006)). Turning to the first requirement, to establish a defendant’s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, .a plaintiff must allege “the existence of seven constituent .elements: (1) that the defendant (2) through the commission of two or more acts (3) constituting a ‘pattern’ (4) of ‘racketeering activity' (5) directly or indirectly invests in,. or maintains an interest in, or participates ip (6) an ‘enterprise’ (7) the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.” Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir.1983); see also Aronov, 2015 WL 1780164, at *3 (same). With regard to the racketeering activity requirement, the statute provides a list of criminal acts that can constitute predicate acts of racketeering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (defining “racketeering activity”). Notably, mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 are predicate acts of racketeering activity, but crimes related to state election fraud are not. See id. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not adequately pled most of these requirements. The Court agrees. i. Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Any RICO Predicates In response to Defendants’ claim that Plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient, Plaintiffs argue only that they have adequately pleaded RICO predicates of mail and wire fraud. (See Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss (“Pls.' Mem.”) 17-19 (Dkt. No. 264).) “The" elements of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 are (i) a scheme to defraud (ii)' to get money or'property, (iii) furthered by the use of interstate wires.” Tymoshenko v. Firtash, 57 F.Supp.3d 311, 321 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir.2000)); see also Azkour v. Haouzi, No. 11-CV-5780, 2012 WL 3667439, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2012) (same). “The elements of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 are identical, except that mail fraud must be furthered by use of the mails.” Tymoshenko, 57 F.Supp.3d at 321; see also S.Q.K.F.C., Inc. v. Bell Atl. TriCoh Leasing Corp., 84 F.3d 629, 633 (2d Cir.1996) (“A complaint alleging mail and wire fraud must show (1) the existence of a scheme to defraud, (2) defendant’s knowing or intentional participation in the scheme, and (3) the use of interstate mails or transmission facilities in furtherance of the scheme.”); Mayfield v. Asta Funding, Inc., 95 F.Supp.3d 685, 697 (S.D.N.Y.2015) (same); Delgado v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 13-CV-4427, 2014 WL 4773991, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2014) (same). For both wire and mail fraud, the object of the scheme to defraud must be money or property. See Pierce, 224 F.3d at 165 (“In the context of mail fraud and wire fraud, the words ‘to defraud’ commonly refer to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes, and usually signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching. A scheme to deceive, however dishonest the methods employed, is not a scheme to defraud in the absence of a property right for the scheme to interfere with.” (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted)); Tymoshenko, 57 F.Supp.3d at 321 (“[T]o violate either the wire fraud or mail fraud statute, ‘the object of the fraud’ must ‘be [money or] property in the victim’s hands.’ ” (quoting Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 & n. 2, 125 S.Ct. 1766, 161 L.Ed.2d 619 (2005) (alteration in original))); United States v. Martin, 411 F.Supp.2d 370, 373 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (“The wire fraud statute ... requires that money or property be the object of the defendant’s ‘scheme to defraud.’ ”); cf. United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the government, to substantiate a mail fraud or wire fraud charge, must “prove that [the] defendants contemplated some actual harm or injury to their victims” (emphasis omitted)). To understand what schemes are covered by these statutes, it is helpful to briefly consider the history of their interpretation by the Supreme Court. First, in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987), superseded in part by statute as stated in Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010), the Supreme Court considered the conviction of a state actor and a private individual'for mail fraud for their “participation in a self-dealing patronage scheme [that] defrauded the citizens and government of Kentucky of certain ‘intangible rights,’ such as the right to have the Commonwealth’s affairs conducted honestly.” Id. at 352, 107 S.Ct. 2875. The Supreme Court overturned the mail fraud convictions, reasoning that the “mail fraud statute clearly protects property rights, but does not refer to the intangible right of the citizenry to good government.” Id. at 356, 107 S.Ct. 2875. Later that year, the Supreme Court clarified that the mail fraud statute still covered intangible property rights. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25, 108 S.Ct. 316 (affirming a conviction for mail fraud for a scheme with an object of confidential business information, reasoning that its “intangible nature does not make it any less ‘property’ protected by the mail and wire fraud statutes”). Congress responded to McNally by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1346; the Honest Services Fraud ' Statute, which ‘is a “definitional statute, providing that, ‘[f]or the'purposés of this chapter’—a chapter that includes the Wire Fraud [and Mail Fraud] Statute[s]—‘the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.’ ” United States v. Smith, 985 F.Supp.2d 547, 590 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (first ‘ alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1346); see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 402, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (explaining that Congress passed § 1346 in response to the McNally decision “specifically to cover one of the intangible rights that lower courts had protected prior to McNally ” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Rybicki, 287 F.3d 257, 261 (2d Cir.2002) (same), on reh’g in banc, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.2003);. United States v. Silver, 117 F.Supp.3d 461, 468-70, 2015 WL 4496295, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2015) (same). Over a decade after § 1346 was enacted, in Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 121 S.Ct. 365, 148 L.Ed.2d 221 (2000), the Supreme Court considered a mail fraud conviction based on false state-merits in an application for a. state license. Id. at 15, 121 S.Ct. 365. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Honest Services Fraud Statute was not implicated, holding that “[it] does not suffice ... that the object of the fraud may become property in the recipient’s hands,” but rather that, “for purposes of the mail fraud statute, the thing obtained must be property in the hands of the victim," and that the licenses were not property in the. hands of the state,. Id. (emphasis added). Another decade later, in Skilling v. United States, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the Honest Services Fraud Statute, holding that it only covered quid pro quo arrangements,, namely kickbacks or bribes, in violation of a fiduciary duty. See 561 U.S. at 407, 411, 130 S.Ct. 2896; Smith, 985 F.Supp.2d at 590. Together, these cases establish that the object of mail or wire fraud must be the deprivation of money or tangible or intangible property in the hands of the victim, and for honest services to be such property, there must be a bribe or kickback and a violation of a fiduciary duty. With that backdrop, the Court now turns to Plaintiffs’ claims in this case. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “used phones, email, fax, mail, and other forms of electronic communications, in order to scheme and defraud others, by falsely representing that these individuals were in sympathy with the principles of the Independence Party or in related efforts to raid the Independence Party,” (SAC ¶¶ 46-47, 51, 54, 56-58, 60, 61, 63, 65-66, 72-73, 75-77, 79-91, 93, 95, 271, 374, 384, 394,. 397, 410, 414, 417-21, 425-27, 430, 432-33, 438-39, 447-49, 452, 454-56, 458-60, 462, 502-03, 518, 520), and that they actively participated in registering friends, family, and acquaintances into the Independence Party in efforts to raid the Independence Party, (id. ¶¶ 6-7, 14, 16-17, 22, 24-51, 53-55, 57-58, 60-61, 63, 65-67, 69-70, 72-93, 95, 99, 223, 271, 310, 341, 344, 374, 384-85, 387, 394, 397,. 414, 416-20, 424-26, 430, 432-34, 438-40, 442, 447-49, 452, 455-60, 462, 465, 468-70, 477, 502-03, 510, 512, 515, 517-18, 520, 529, 534). Plaintiffs describe one . purpose of the scheme as rigging the outcome of the Independence Party’s 2013 Primary Election. (See id. ¶¶ 100, 103,108, 187, 225, 227, 241, 282, 402,. 425, 569, 570.) There are also some, but comparatively very few, general allegations that certain Defendants’ goals were to rig the primary and/or the general election, and future elections. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 314, 330,351, 408, 409.) The scheme to raid the Independence Party, or to rig the outcome of the primary or general election, cannot serve as the foundation of a RICO predicate because the object of the scheme was neither the deprivation of honest services nor of money or property. With respect to the honest services, Plaintiffs allege that some Defendants were rewarded for participation in the alleged scheme, for example by receiving raises, but Plaintiffs fail to allege that any Defendant was acting in violation of a fiduciary duty. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not make any effort to include allegations that explain how or why Astori-no, a Republican, had a fiduciary duty to the Independence Party. Nor are there an allegations that Defendants sought to have Independence Party members breach, their fiduciary duty to their party. Therefore, under Skilling, Plaintiffs fail to allege the deprivation of honest services. See Perryman v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, No. 14-CV-2261, 2014 WL 4954674, at *15 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 1, 2014) (holding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege honest services fraud under Skilling because they had not alleged the existence of a fiduciary relationship and therefore that such fraud could not serve as RICO predicates in a civil RICO case). Next, the object of the scheme, as alleged, was control over the Independence Party, which cannot be considered property in the hands of the victim. In McNally, the Supreme Court cited United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir.1984), and United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir.1973), aS examples of courts previously reading the wire fraud and mail fraud statutes to include “schemes to defraud ... designed to deprive individuals, the people, or the government of intangible rights, such as the right to have public officials perform their duties honestly,” which reading the Court rejected in McNally. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 358-59, 107 S.Ct. 2875 (citing Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152; States, 488 F.2d at 764). In Clapps, the Third Circuit affirmed a mail fraud conviction that involved the fraudulent procurement and marking of absentee ballots in two primary elections and a general election, reasoning that the statute included a “scheme to deprive an electoral body of its political rights to fair elections free from dilution from, the intentional easting and tabulation of false, fictitious or spurious ballots.” 732 F.2d at 1149, 1153. Similarly, in States, the Eighth Circuit upheld a mail fraud conviction based on a “scheme to defraud the voters ... by the use of fraudulent voter registrations and applications for absentee ballots,” where the alleged “purpose of the scheme to defraud was to influence the outcome of the election of the Republican Committeeman for the nineteenth ward and the Democratic Committeeman for the third ward for the purpose of securing and controlling said political offices and the political influence and financial benefits of said offices.” 488 F.2d at 762 (internal quotation marks omitted). It .is worth noting that in both Clapps and States, the courts upheld, these convictions not based on the theory that the victims of the schemes somehow had a property right of which they were deprived, but rather based on the theory that the scheme deprived people of intangible non-property rights, that is, the intangible right to an honest election. Cf. United States v. Turner, 465 F.3d 667, 672-73 (6th Cir.2006) (“A review of the prominent pre-McNally election fraud eases ... reveals that none referred to the harm flowing from election fraud as a deprivation of a right to ‘honest services.’ Indeed, most of these cases recognized that the application of the statute to election fraud was a modification of the intangible right of honest services, defined as a right to an honest election.”). And, although Congress reinvigorated some of the pre-McNally case law by enacting the Honest Services Fraud Statute, it is clear- in the wake of Skilling that deprivations of intangible rights, such as the right to a free and fair election, cannot constitute wire fraud or mail fraud without a quid pro- quo bribery scheme and a breach of a fiduciary duty. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 407, 411, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (limiting § 1346 to conduct that involved quid pro quo arrangements in violation of a fiduciary duty). That is to say; while the passage of § 1346 covered some of the schemes covered by-the mail.fraud and wire fraud statutes pre-McNally, nothing in § 1346, especially as interpreted by Skilling, can be read to bring the type of scheme alleged here back within the purview of the mail and wire fraud statutes. Indeed, following McNally, no court has held that a scheme to rig an election itself constitutes money or property fraud. See, e.g., United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1304 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding that, under McNally and Carpenter, the right to fair elections is “a[n] ... ‘ethereal’ interest that does not constitute ‘property' under section 1341,” reasoning that “it [was] particularly instructive that, in explaining the types of schemes that could not properly support a conviction under section 1341, the McNally Court referred to two election fraud cases as examples”); United States v. Gordon, 836 F.2d 1312, 1314 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that the Supreme Court’s references to Clapps and States in McNally “seem[ed] to have repudiated the argument that election fraud cases involve more than an intangible right”); Ingber v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450, 451, 453, 456 (2d Cir.1988) (vacating the conviction of a defendant who falsified voting documents, including absentee ballots, and who thereby “obtained through fraud the salary, powers[,] and privileges of the Office of Supervisor,” because the government’s theory of “deprivation of the right to fair and impartial elections” was “impermissible under McNally ” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Schermerhorn, 713 F.Supp. 88, 89 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (noting that the Second Circuit has “held that the citizenry’s intangible right to free and fair elections falls within the good-government intangible held by the McNally Court to be beyond the statute’s reach” (citing Ingber v. Enzor, 664 F.Supp. 814, 820 (S.D.N.Y.1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.1988))). Proponents of a broad reading of “money or property” have had some—but still, extremely limited—success advocating a theory that election fraud can constitute money or property fraud when the object of the scheme is to obtain the salary that comes with elected office, the “salary theory” of election fraud. See Schermerhorn, 713 F.Supp. at 92 (accepting the salary theory); United States v. Webb, 689 F.Supp. 703, 707 (W.D.Ky.1988) (same). This theory has been accepted where the government is acting as an employer and thus has a property interest in choosing how to spend its money on its employees. See United States v. Granberry, 908 F.2d 278, 280 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that a school bus driver who received a school bus operator permit by falsifying an application and concealing that he had been convicted of first-degree murder committed money or property fraud because the “School District ha[d] been deprived of money in the very elementary sense that its money [went] to a person who would not have received it if all of the facts had been known”); United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47, 60 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that a fraudulent scheme to obtain promotions by cheating on exams counted as money or property fraud because “[g]etting jobs by false pretenses ... ‘deprived’ the Commonwealth ‘of control over how its money was spent’ ” (quoting McNally, 483 U.S. at 360, 107 S.Ct 2875)). However, the salary theory is an imperfect fit in the election context because the government has no choice in who is to be elected. It is the electorate that decides who receives the salary, and the government simply is required to pay the salary to the winner. Thus, the cases discussing the property interest the government holds in choosing how to spend its money “address the government’s role as employer, where job qualifications can be economically quantified, are not analogous to an election fraud case, where the government’s role is purely administrative and the public’s role is a political one.” Tur ner, 465 F.3d at 682. Indeed, most courts to have considered this issue have concluded that a scheme to obtain a salary that comes with elected office cannot be the basis for money or property fraud. See United States v. Ratcliff, 488 F.3d 639, 645 (5th Cir.2007) (“Although the charged scheme involves [the defendant] ultimately receiving money from the parish, it cannot be said that the parish would be deprived of this money.by means of [the defendant’s] misrepresentations, as the financial benefits budgeted for the parish president go to the winning candidate regardless of who that person is. Nor would the parish be deprived of its control over the money by means of [the defendant’s] fraud, as the parish has no such control other than ensuring that the benefits are paid to the duly elected candidate.”);. Turner, 465 F.3d at 680 (“In the context of .election fraud, the government and citizens have not been deprived of any money or property because the relevant salary would be paid to someone regardless of the fraud. In such a case, the citizens have simply lost the intangible right to elect the official who will receive the salary.”); United States v. Goodrich, 871 F.2d 1011, 1013-14 (11th Cir.1989) (“[T]he property' interest alleged to have been denied the victim here—what the government contends Hillsborough County paid salaries for but did not get—is the ‘honest and faithful services’ of the County Commissioners, an interest McNally held to be unprotected by the mail fraud statute. Thus, this ‘property interest’ is indistinguishable from the intangible right to good government described in McNally and cannot sustain the mail fraud count.”); United States v. George, No. 86-CR-123, 1987 WL 48848, at *2 (W.D.Ky. Oct. 20, 1987) (“Had the schemes succeeded, the taxpayers and voters of Marion County would not. have been deprived of any money or property. They would have been deprived of the right to determine to whom the money was to be paid. Without regard to the outcome of the election, the County Judge/Executive by statute was to be paid a salary and reimbursed for expenses. Simply put, the citizenry lost no money or property but only the intangible right legally to elect their' County Judge/Executive.”). In the Second Circuit, the precedent on the salary theory is mixed. In Ingber v. Enzor, 664 F.Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y.1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.1988), a court in this district considered whether a mail fraud conviction based on election tampering should be overturned after McNally. The court concluded both that (1) the conviction based on “tampering with the election process, [and theréby] depriving the voters of their right to honest elections,” was no longer “within the reach of § 1341” after McNally, and that (2) “the scheme to get the salary and perquisites of office was essentially the same thing as the scheme to defraud the public of its right to a fair election,”, and that the “payment of the Supervisor’s salary, a routine and ¡budgeted Town expenditure, to [the defendant] rather than to his opponent ... does not constitute a loss of money or property as contemplated by McNally and the mail fraud statute.” Id. at 820-21. The Second Circuit affirmed. However, in so doing, the Second Gircuit relied on just the first- ground, reasoning that because the jury reached a general verdict on the relevant count, it was not possible to determine if the jury reached the verdict on an impermissible ground. Ingber, 841 F.2d at 456. Based on this decision, at least two lower courts within the Second Circuit have suggested that the Second Circuit had implicitly accepted the salary theory. See Schermerhorn, 713 F.Supp. at 90-91 (“Although not free from doubt, we think that pregnant in the above conclusion is the implicit belief that the alternative charge, based on the fraudulent attainment of a public salary, survived McNally and was a legitimate, ground for the jury’s decision.”); United States v. Myerson, No. 87-CR-796, 1988 WL 68143, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1988) (“By implication, the Second Circuit considered the deprivation of the position and salary of. Supervisor to be a property right protected by the mail fraud statute.”). However, the Second Circuit more recently has noted that it has had “no occasion to determine whether, as the government urges” it had “implicitly accepted” the salary theory. United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 237 n. 11 (2d Cir.2012); see also Stinn v. United States, 856 F.Supp.2d 531, 543 n. 12 (E.D.N.Y.2012) -(noting that the Second Circuit “has yet to decide this issue” (citing Coppola, 671 F.3d at, 237 n. 11)), ajfd, 515 Fed.Appx. 4 (2d Cir.2013). . Because the Second Circuit has yet to address this issue and because' the Court is persuaded by the reasoning'of other circuits discussed above, it joins the majority of courts in holding that a person who has committed election fraud in order to obtain the normal salary given to the person holding that elected office has hot committed money or property fraud, because the victim—the government—has not been deprived either of any money or property or of the choice in how to spend money. Rather, it is the public that is deprived of an intangible right to a free election, which cannot support a money or property fraud conviction and, in the absence of a quid pro quo and a violation of a fiduciary duty, cannot support an honest services fraud conviction. However, even if the Court were to decide otherwise and find that the. salary theory was valid with respect to election fraud, Plaintiffs still would not have adequately alleged such a theory in the SAC. As alleged, the object of the scheme was not to get a salary; rather, it was to rig elections. This claimed objective is insufficient because it does not suggest that the purpose of the fraud was to obtain salary. Indeed, the bulk of Plaintiffs’ allegations, which merely claim that the object of the fraud was to' rig the primary election, are even less sufficient because there is no salary to be directly obtained by virtue of winning a primary. See Webb, 689 F.Supp. at 708 (noting, after accepting the validity of the salary theory in an election fraud case, that “[i]t is now the responsibility of the United States to prove that these defendants intended to acquire this tangible property of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,” that is, the salary); Schermerhorn, 713 F.Supp. at 93 (“Whether the Government can actually prove in this case that the object of the defendant’s alleged scheme was to take the salary and monetary benefits that inure with election as a state senator is a matter that will take some work.”); see also Turner, 465 F.3d at 680 (“Interestingly, the two district courts that accepted the salary theory in an election fraud setting both explicitly recognized the difficulty of procuring a conviction based on an intent to obtain a salary.”). Thus, even were the Court to accept this dubious 'theory, Plaintiffs have not alleged that the object of the scheme was to obtain tangible property—the salaries at issue. Cf. Tymoshenko, 57 F.Supp.3d at 321-22 (“At this stage, the [cjourt accepts as true [the] [plaintiffs’ claim that property owners wasted their time and money by treating the defendants’ sham proposals as legitimate. But that fact alone is insufficient to establish that the property owners’ money was the object of. the defendants’ fraudulent conduct, as required by the wire and mail, fraud statutes.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). ■ Similarly, to the extent that Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were rewarded for participation in the scheme, by being given raises or other money or property, this is insufficient for the same reason: Plaintiffs do not allege that obtaining that money or property was each Defendant’s reason for participating in the alleged scheme. ■ ii. Plaintiffs Fail to Plead a Pattern of Racketeering Even assuming that‘Plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged RICO predicates, the § 1962(c) claim should still be dismissed because Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege a pattern of racketeering activity. RICO itself provides that a "'pattern of racketeering activity requires at-least two acts of racketeering activity, ... the last of which occurred within ten years ... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The racketeering acts must be from the crimes-listed in § 1961(1) and they must be “related, and [either] ... amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” Cofacredit, S.A. v. Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., 187 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). The continuity requirement can be shown, in two ways: a closed-ended pattern or an open-ended pattern. See Spool v. World Child Int’l Adoption Agency, 520 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir.2008). A “closed-ended pattern” is “a series of related predicate acts extending over a substantial period of time,” while an “open-ended pattern” is a “pattern of racketeering activity that poses a threat of continuing criminal conduct beyond the period during which the predicate acts were performed.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that the scheme at issue here qualifies as both a closed-ended and an open-ended pattern of racketeering activity. {See SAC ¶ 571 (“Here the Scheme can be deemed a close ended, continuous criminal Scheme as -the Defendants engaged in the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud beginning in or about the year 2010 and the Scheme involves thousands of participants with thousands of victims with one Scheme in mind, that is to take over and raid the Independence Party.”); id. ¶ 572 (“Further the Scheme herein' can also be' described as an open ended continuity in that there is a,threat that .the conduct of raiding a party will recur in the future. So that the conduct of the Defendants, raiding the Independence Party can actually occur again by persons continuing to join in the Independence Party when their motives are not to join because they are in sympathy with the principles of the Party, but because they are interested in rigging elections.”).) However, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege either an open-ended or a closed-ended pattern of racketeering activity. “To satisfy closed-ended continuity, the plaintiff must prove ‘a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time.’ ” Cofacredit, 187 F.3d at 242 (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989)). “[C]losed-ended continuity is primarily a temporal concept.” Spool, 520 F.3d at 184 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Aronov, 2015 WL 1780164, at *5 (“The Second Circuit has identified several non-disposi-tive factors considered by courts in determining whether closed-ended continuity exists, including, inter alia, the length of time over which the alleged predicate acts took place, the number and variety of acts, the number of participants, the number of victims, and the presence of separate schemes. Notwithstanding-this list of factors, the Second Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that closed-ended continuity is primarily a temporal concept....” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Although there is not a bright line for what constitutes a “substantial period of time,” since the Supreme Court set forth that requirement in H.J., the Second Circuit has “never held a period of less than two years to constitute a substantial period of time,” Spool, 520 F.3d at 184 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lefkowitz v. Reissman, No. 12-CV-8703, 2014 WL 925410, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014) (same); Li Jun An v. Hui Zhang, No. 13-CV-5064, 2013 WL 6503513, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2013) (same); Boritzer v. Calloway, No. 10-CV-6264, 2013 WL 311013, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013) (same); Kilkenny v. Law Office of Cushner & Garvey, L.L.P., No. 08-CV-588, 2012 WL 1638326, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2012) (same); Purchase Real Estate Grp. Inc. v. Jones, No. 05-CV-10859, 2010 WL 3377504, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2010) (same); cf. City of New York v. LaserShip, Inc., 33 F.Supp.3d 303, 311 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (“More recently, the Second Circuit clarified that it has ‘not viewed two years as a bright-line requirement,’ although ‘it will be rare that conduct persisting for a shorter period of time establishes closed-ended continuity.’” (quoting Spool, 520 F.3d at 184)). . Importantly, the “relevant time period ... is the time during which RICO predicate activity occurred, not the time during which the underlying scheme operated or the underlying dispute took place.” Spool, 520 F.3d at 184; see also H.J., 492 U.S. at 242, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (“A party alleging; a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time.” (emphasis added)); Cofacredit, 187 F.3d at 243 (“[T]he duration of a pattern of racketeering activity is measured by the RICO predicate acts the defendants commit.”); Aronov, 2015 WL 1780164, at *5 (same); Li Jun An, 2013 WL 6503513, at *8 (same). Plaintiffs’ arguments in opposition to the Motions rely on the statements As-torino allegedly made while on the phone with Zherka, and summarily allege that “[t]his massive effort on the part of the Defendant co-conspirators did not occur in a single month or over the course of one short year but was planned and executed for over four years.” (Pls.’ Mem. 25.) Plaintiffs apparently derive this time period by assuming that the closed-ended pattern began .in 2010, (see SAC ¶ 568), and was completed in 2013 at the time of the primary election, (see SAC ¶ 108). It is worth noting that the only citation to the SAC in this portion of Plaintiffs’ Opposition is to a discussion of the 2013 Astorino tape. (See Pis.’ Mem. 25-26 (citing SAC ¶ 568).) However, as noted above, the duration of a pattern of racketeering activity is measured by the RICO predicates alleged by Plaintiffs, and the only allegations in the SAC that could conceivably be considered mail fraud took place in September and October 2012—the mailings of registration forms with allegedly fraudulent information. (See SAC ¶¶ 179-81, 183.) And although the SAC contains con-clusory assertions that the mail and wire fraud began in 2010, (see SAC ¶ 225 (alleging that Astorino “took office in or about January 2010 and upon information and belief, immediately thereafter, began an elaborate scheme to infiltrate and raid the Independence Party in a bid to rig the outcome of the September 10, 2013, countywide. Independence Party primary eléc-tions.”); id. ¶554 (alleging that “this scheme was hatched in or about the year 2010”); id. ¶ 571 (“[T]he Scheme can be deemed a close ended, continuous criminal Scheme as the Defendants engaged in the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud beginning in or about the year 2010____”); id. ¶580 (“We submit the acts of mail and wire fraud began in the later part of the year 2010 and continued unabated until. 2013 without interruption of any kind .... ”); id. ¶ 598 (“Said scheme has been ongoing since the year 2010 when calls, emails[,] meetings[,] and other evidence of the meeting of the minds on this scheme! ] began.”), such .general assertions are insufficient to support a plausible inference that mail and wire fraud predicates occurred beginning in 2010. That is, the combination of Rule-9(b) and Twombly’s plausibility requirement means that Plaintiffs cannot merely rely on these concluso-ry assertions. See Spool, 520 F.3d at 184-85 (noting that “the defendants’ alleged overcharging of [certain] fees,in late 2002 [could not] begin the reference period [for closed-ended continuity under RICO]” because “[e]ven if .[the court] [were to] assume, that these activities could constitute mail fraud or wire fraud if proved ..., the amended complaint [would] still [be] legally insufficient because the allegations regarding the ... fees [were not] pled with the requisite particularity” under Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b).); Kalimantano GmbH v. Motion in Time, Inc., 939 F.Supp.2d 392, 412 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (noting that “[a]l-though [the plaintiffs] allegations nominally are consistent with a period of .., just under three years [or more] ..., the allegations as to the [first predicate acts] are too blurry and inexact to qualify as RICO predicates,” because “[a]llegations of predicate acts sounding in fraud, including claims of mail or wire fraud, must be pled with the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)”); Grimes v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 785 F.Supp.2d 269, 301 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (“Although [the] [plaintiffs assert that the enterprise operated for over two years, and that the illegal activities persisted from in or before 2005 until mid-2006, they provide no basis for that belief, or any facts regarding when the enterprise began, or other specific predicate acts' of mail and wire fraud.” (citations omitted)); Purchase Real Estate Grp., 2010 WL 3377504, at *8 (“While courts have made an exception to the particularity requirements and have allowed allegations to be based on information and belief when facts are peculiarly within the opposing party’s knowledge, this exception must not be mistaken for license to base claims of fraud on speculation and conclusory allegations, especially in the context of RICO claims.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). At oral argument, Plaintiffs argued for the first time that the voter registration information annexed to the SAC was sufficient to establish a pattern over a sufficiently long time period. In particular, Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the cards annexed to the SAC indicated that some people who registered in 2010 and 2011 were among those voters purged from the ranks of the Independence Party as part of the Rhoades II decision. (See June 9, 2015 Oral Argument Tr. 77-83; see also SAC Exs. B, B2.) However, as acknowledged by counsel at argument, there is no allegation in the SAC that these 2010 and 2011 registrations were mailed, or that the registrants were not bona fide Independence Party members, especially given Plaintiffs’ counsel’s admission that some disenrolled members might have been legitimate Party mémbers. (See June 9, 2015 Oral Argument Tr. 69, 81-83.) Thus, Plaintiffs do not plausibly plead that any racketeering activity occurred in 2010 or 2011.. The SAC also fails to sufficiently allege an open-ended pattern. “To satisfy open-ended continuity, the plaintiff need not show that the predicates extended over a substantial period of time but must show that, there, was a threat of continuing criminal activity beyond the period during which the predicate acts were performed.” Cofacredit, 187 F.3d at 242. “In assessing whether or not the plaintiff has shown open-ended continuity, the-nature-of the RICO enterprise and of the predicate acts are relevant.” Id. For example, “[w]here-the enterprise is engaged primarily in racketeering activity, and the predicate' acts are inherently unlawful, there is a threat of continued criminal activity, and thus open-ended continuity.” Id. at 242-43; see also Spool, 520 F.3d at 185 (holding that a threat of continuing criminal activity is “generally presumed when the enterprise’s business is primarily or inherently unlawful”). Here, the SAC does not allege that the alleged enterprise is primarily engaged in racketeering activity. Indeed, the primary activities of Defendants are to run a political party and to support Astorino’s candidacy. (See SAC 4-10.) Moreover, the conduct alleged in the SAC does not fall within the “inherently unlawful” category, because “fraud (the object of which is by definition to obtain money or property from others) has been held not to be 'inherently unlawful’ in the RICO continuity context.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Carey, 297 F.Supp.2d 706, 715 (S.D.N.Y.2004), aff'd sub nom. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Blitz, 124 Fed.Appx. 41 (2d Cir.2005); see also Kalimantano, 989 F.Supp.2d at 408 (holding that “fraudulent practices ... do not imply a threat of continuing criminal activity over time”); Ho Myung Moolsan Co. v. Manitou Mineral Water, Inc., 665 F.Supp.2d 239, 261 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“[F]raud is not inherently unlawful in the RICO context.” (internal- quotation marks omitted)); World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc. v. Jakks Pac., Inc., 530 F.Supp.2d 486, 516 (S.D.N.Y.2007)