Full opinion text
ORDER R. Bryan Harwell, United States District Judge Three motions to dismiss are before the Court in this case. See ECF Nos. 20, 21, & 22. Defendants CVS Health Corporation, South Carolina CVS Pharmacy, LLC, and CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (collectively, “the Corporate Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to CVS Health Corporation and for failure to state a claim as to all three defendants, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 20. Defendants John Brescia, Joseph Cessna, Harris Chisholm, Travis Combs, Ashley Gates, Jim Keeler, Ginny McClure, Ida Pendergrass, Bill Poland, Xiomata Sosa, Susan Webb, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 1, and Jane Doe # 2 (collectively, “the Store-Level Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 21. Defendants Paul Anderson, Mark Cosby, Shelly Edge, Ronald Elliot, Matt Lesniak, David Purdy, John Robinson, and Darren, Twe-dell (collectively, “the Above-Store Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to Mark Cosby and for failure to state a claim as to all eight defendants, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 22. The Court held a heamg on the motions on September 10, 2015. See ECF Nos. 45 & 46. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motions to dismiss; Background Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on August 28, 2014, and an amended complaint on September 17, 2014. See ECF Nos. 1 & 9." Plaintiffs amended complaint asserted the following claims: violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1986, and 2000d, et seq.; violation of Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116; and various state common law torts. See Amended Complaint, ECF No. 9. Plaintiff also sought .declaratory and injunctive relief. See id. On November 13, 2014, the Corporate Defendants, Store-Level Defendants, and Above-Store, Defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing Plaintiffs amended complaint failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted and that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over two of the defendants, CVS Health Corporation and Mark Cosby. See ECF Nos. 20, 21, & 22. The facts, as alleged in Plaintiffs amended complaint, are as follows. I. Plaintiffs Military Service and Related Disabilities Plaintiff, an African-American male, joined the United States Marine Corps in 2001 after the events of September 11. Amended Complaint at 2; id. at ¶,45. In 2002, he was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and the Marine Corps discharged him with a service-related disability. Id. at ¶ 47. Plaintiffs PTSD symptoms include extreme agoraphobia, for which he wears a sports towel draped over his head as; a psychological coping mechanism. Id. at ¶ 47-48. When Plaintiff encounters- multiple unknown persons, he experiences anxiety and panic attacks. Id. at ¶ 55. By 2010, circumstances required Plaintiff to accépt Veterans Administration benefits for service-connected disabilities. Id. at ¶49. He also was diagnosed with major depression, severe anxiety, and suicidal ideation. Id. at ¶ 50. Plaintiffs medical doctors chose a course of treatment for Plaintiffs conditions that would allow him to “gradually regain his place in society” and “reacquaint him with social interaction and/or improve his social skills.” Id. at ¶¶ 52-53. - Doctors believed places of public accommodation would allow Plaintiff to 'enter the establishment during non-business hours -so that he could avoid other customers. Id; Doctors chose this course of treatment so that Plaintiff would be able to request modest accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. II. Initial Requests for Accommodation In or around February 2012, based on his Veterans Administration diagnosis of PTSD with accompanying extreme agoraphobia, Plaintiff requested reasonable accommodation from the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (SCDMV) so that he could renew his driver’s license. Id. at ¶ 56. The SCDMV accommodated Plaintiff and allowed him to renew his driver’s license during non-business hours at an office located in Kingstree, South Carolina. Id. at ¶ 57. Based on the SCDMV’s “warm” response to his request for accommodation, Plaintiff and his doctors agreed Plaintiff should request similar accommodations from a “grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, or other sales or rental establishment.” Id. at ¶ 59. Sometime between August and September 2013, Plaintiff requested permission to shop after hours at a Best Buy electronics store located in North Charleston, South Carolina. Id. at ¶¶ 60-61. Best Buy permitted Plaintiff to shop after hours, asking that he provide an advance notice of one day to ensure store personnel would be available to fulfill his requested accommodation. Id. at ¶ 61. Besides the SCDMV and Best Buy, Plaintiff requested and received accommodations from grocery stores and pharmacies located in other parts of South Carolina, including Columbia, Myrtle Beach, Charleston, Summerville, and North Charleston. Id. at ¶ 62. Those retail establishments included Publix Food and Pharmacy, Food Lion, Delta Pharmacy, Costco, Sam’s Club, and Family Dollar. Id. III. Requests for Accommodation at CVS Stores On or around August 27, 2013, Plaintiff contacted CVS Store #7159, spoke with store manager Defendant Bill Poland, explained to Poland the nature of his disability and need for reasonable accommodation, and requested permission to shop after hours. Id. at ¶65. Plaintiff asked if CVS would lock the door at closing time to prevent other customers from entering the store while he was shopping. Id. He also asked if store employees could divert other customers to a portion of the store so that he could “exit and escape the situation of being around too many customers.” Id. Citing store policy, Poland denied Plaintiffs requests. Id. The next day, August 28, Plaintiff again contacted CVS Store # 7159, spoke to Defendant John Doe # 1, and explained his PTSD diagnosis and related agoraphobia symptoms. Id. at ¶ 66. John Doe # 1 “giggled” and asserted store policy prohibited customers from shopping after hours and required all employees to exit the store at closing. Id. Plaintiff later obtained video evidence showing customers shopping after hours and managers present in various CVS stores for over twenty minutes after closing time. Id. Also on August 28, Plaintiff contacted CVS Store # 7568 in Goose Creek, South Carolina, spoke with store manager Defendant- Travis Combs, explained the nature of his PTSD-related disability, and requested permission to shop and fill his prescriptions after hours. Id. at ¶ 67. Combs denied Plaintiffs request, citing company policy, loss prevention, and safety concerns. Id. On August 29, 2013, Plaintiff submitted a complaint to CVS Customer Care via a 1-800 telephone number and spoke to a representative named Abby. Id. at 68. Plaintiff explained his disability to Abby and asked her if CVS policy permitted him to shop for approximately ten minutes after the store closed and after the front doors are locked so that other customers could not enter the store while he was shopping. Id. Abby informed Plaintiff that each store manager had the authority to grant his request and that he needed to contact the managers individually to seek reasonable accommodation. Id. On September 4, 2013, Plaintiff contacted CVS Store # 563, spoke to store manager Defendant Ginny McClure, explained his disability, and requested permission to shop after, hours. Id. at ¶ 70. McClure refused the request for accommodation. Id. The same day, Plaintiff contacted CVS Store # 7305 and spoke to store manager Defendant Ashley Gates. Id. at ¶ 71. He informed Gates of his disability, stated he would like to shop in the CVS, and explained he needed prescriptions 'filled. Id. Defendant Gates denied Plaintiffs request for accommodation, citing “ ‘safety reasons’ ” as the basis for denial. Id. Also on September 4, Plaintiff contacted CVS Store #563 for a second time and spoke with Defendant Xio Sosa, who identified herself as the manager. Id, at ¶ 72. He explained his disability and requested accommodation, which Sosa refused. Id. Sosa asserted she could not help Plaintiff and that she would not be paid “ ‘to stay here after 10 o’clock.’ ” Id. Defendant Sosa asked Plaintiff, “ ‘[A]re you the same black guy that contacted us before?’ ” Id. After Plaintiff answered in the affirmative, Defendant Sosa stated, “ T don’t trust you and your request seems suspicious.’ ” Id. On September 5, 2013, Plaintiff and an acquaintance went to CVS Store # 7697 to request accommodations. Id. at ¶ 73. Plaintiff and his acquaintance- met with Defendant Jane Doe # 1, a shift supervisor, and the acquaintance explained to Jane Doe # 1 the nature of Plaintiffs disability and need for accommodation. Id. Jane Doe # 1 stated she could not accommodate Plaintiff due to CVS policies. Id. Plaintiff and his acquaintance later spoke with the store manager, Defendant Susan Webb, who informed Plaintiff that no CVS would accommodate his request. Id. The same day, Plaintiff contacted CVS Store #8492 and spoke with Defendant Joe Cessna, who identified himself as the manager. Id. at ¶ 74. Plaintiff explained his disability to Cessna and requested a reasonable accommodation, but Cessna stated the alarm activates when the door closes and locks, so he could not allow Plaintiff to shop after hours. Id. Plaintiff informed Cessna that, as manager, he had the authority to accommodate Plaintiff and that other, non-CVS stores had provided Plaintiff the requested accommodation: to shop after store hours. Id. Cessna replied, “ Why do so many blacks think they are entitled to special treatment so often?’ ” and informed Plaintiff that he could not help him. Id. Also on September 5, Plaintiff contacted CVS Store # 7386 and spoke to Defendant Jim Keeler, who identified himself as the manager. Id. at ¶ 75. Plaintiff explained his disability and requested accommodations for it. Id. Keeler laughed and made the following statements: (1) “ ‘I am not allowed to break CVS policies because of your PTSD, regardless if you’re a Marine or not,, and our whole district and other districts know some black guy wearing a towel was trying to get a special accommodation but none of .them are going to help you”’; and (2) “‘[Y]ou should choose a different chain store.’” Id. Plaintiff informed Keeler that CVS allows managers to grant Plaintiffs request., “because it’s the law” and because “CVS store personnel are supposed to comply with the law and help people like [Plaintiff].” Id, Keel-er became agitated, talking in a loud and aggressive tone, and admitted the existence of a conspiracy—-within Keeler’s district and other districts—to discriminate against Plaintiff. Id. Defendant Keeler used a racial slur' to refer to Plaintiff and threatened to call the police. Id. After his experience with Defendants Cessna and Keeler, and after consulting with his doctors, Plaintiff decided to request accommodations only from CVS managers who had stores located outside the greater Myrtle Beach area and who were either females or non-white males. Id. at ¶ 76. Between mid-September to mid-October 2013, Plaintiff contacted CVS Store # 4399 and spoke to Defendant Jane Doe #2, who identified herself as the store manager. Id. at 77. Plaintiff explained his disability and requested an accommodation. Id. Jane Doe # 2 explained that “ ‘because of the area the store is in, I won’t accommodate you,’ ” and she cited CVS policies prohibiting any customer from remaining in the store past closing time. Id. Plaintiff contacted CVS Store #4114 and spoke with Defendant Harris Chisholm, who identified himself as the store manager. Id. at ¶ 78. Plaintiff explained his disability to Chisholm and requested an accommodation to shop after closing time, but Chisholm denied Plaintiffs request, citing safety reasons-. Id. Plaintiff then attempted to obtain reasonable accommodation by making a request in person. Id. at ¶ 79. He drove to CVS Store # 3199 in Columbia, South Carolina, and while outside the CVS, asked a passerby if they would ask the manager to exit the store and meet with him outside. Id. The manager, Defendant Natasha Pen-dergrass, came outside, met with Plaintiff beside his vehicle, and identified herself. Id. Plaintiff explained his disability, offered medical documents as proof, and asked Pendergrass if the location would allow him to- shop after hours for approximately ten minutes. Id. at ¶ 80. Pender-grass denied Plaintiffs request, citing CVS policy. Id. Plaintiff informed Pendergrass that she had the authority to accommodate his request' because1 she was the store manager. Id. Pendergrass responded that while she may have the authority, she did not feel comfortable or safe allowing Plaintiff to shop after hours with the doors locked while he was wearing a sports towel draped over his head. Id. Plaintiff explained what living with his disability was like and expressed frustration with the fact that nobody at CVS was willing to help him. Id. Pendergrass began questioning Plaintiff about his disability and the sports towel that he was wearing on his head. Id. at ¶81. She reached for the towel, saying, “‘What’s up with the towel? It’s kinda searing me.’” Id, She attempted to remove the towel from Plaintiffs head, commented on his physique, said “‘toughen up, boy, you have all those big muscles,’ ” and shook him by the shoulder. Id. at ¶ 81-82. Pendergrass called over a group of four or more people who were approaching the CVS store. Id. at ¶ 82. Plaintiff begged her to stop, explaining he may suffer an anxiety attack or worse and was embarrassed by his reactions to crowds. Id. Pendergrass remarked, “ ‘Listen here, boy, you need to toughen up. Why are you so nervous?’ ” Id. Plaintiff told her, “ T don’t think your boss would like what you’re doing.’ ” Id. She replied, “ Well, our district manager already knows about your contact with other stores and we already discussed what I was going to do if you came to my store.’ ” Id. Despite Plaintiffs continued pleas, Pen-dergrass requested that the group of people gather around his car. Id. Plaintiff tried to enter his car and leave, but Pen-dergrass stood on the inside of the driver’s side door, preventing him from closing the door and leaving. Id. Plaintiff began to suffer a severe panic attack. Id. Pender-grass disclosed Plaintiffs medical condition to the group of people gathered around the car and explained why she had called them over. Id. After some time, a person in the group suggested they leave Plaintiff alone because “ ‘he appears to be pretty shaken up.’ ” Id. After Pendergrass stepped away from the vehicle, Plaintiff was able to close the car door and leave. Id. After the incident with Pendergrass, Plaintiff lodged a complaint with CVS Customer Relations via a 1-800 telephone number. Id. at ¶ 83. Plaintiff spoke to a customer relations representative and described how CVS personnel had treated him. Id. The representative apologized and offered Plaintiff a $25 gift card. Id. Plaintiff told the representative that the gift card was an insult, so the representative said a “ ‘team’ ” of people would review Plaintiffs complaint and contact him soon; as of the filing date of the amended complaint, Plaintiff had received no contact. Id. Since the incident with Pendergrass, Plaintiff has experienced a multitude of feelings including humility, anger, and endured traumatic stress manifesting in flashbacks. Id. at ¶ 85. Plaintiff has also experienced tension headaches, insomnia, panic attack, nervousness, nausea, and dizziness, and has been prescribed multiple medications. Id. A white female friend of Plaintiffs was outraged by CVS’s treatment of him, so she decided to help him test the veracity of CVS’s purported inability to make reasonable accommodations. Id. at ¶86. On October 16, 2013, the friend called CVS Store # 7305 and spoke to the store manager, Defendant Gates. Id. at ¶ 87. The friend told Gates she had been diagnosed with agoraphobia and had anxiety issues, and she asked, to shop for approximately fifteen minutes after ■ closing time. Id. Gates permitted Plaintiffs white, female friend to enter the store after it was closed and locked. Id. On October 17, 2013, the white female friend called CVS Store # 3199 and spoke to Pendergrass. Id. at ¶88. She informed Pendergrass that she had a severe case of anxiety and agoraphobia. Id. The fidend requested permission to shop for ten to thirty minutes after hours. Id. Defendant Pendergrass stated, “ Tes, you sound like a sweet girl so, yes, that’s not a problem; we will gladly accommodate you. Just call before you come so that I could inform other staff members, and be here right at closing time.’ ” Id. Additionally, Plaintiffs white female friend called CVS Store # 563 and spoke with Sosa, and also called Store # 7386 and spoke with Keeler; she requested permission from Sosa and Keeler to shop after hours with the doors locked to prevent other customers from entering the store. Id. at ¶¶ 89-90. Sosa and Keeler both stated they would accommodate her. Id. On or about April 9, 2014, Plaintiff sent a letter to CVS General Counsel, Thomas Moriarty, and Poland- (manager of CVS Store #7159) in which-he discussed his requests for accommodation and repeated denials of accommodation by CVS personnel. Id. at ¶ 91. Defendant John Robinson responded to Plaintiffs letter. Id. at ¶ 92. In his written response, Defendant Robinson identified himself as a district manager and stated Plaintiffs request that the store remain open so that he could shop without other customers present was “ ‘not a necessary or reasonable accommodation, would impose an undue hardship on employees, and is’a fundamental alteration of the goods and services CVS provides.’ ” Id. On or about May 19, 2014, a gray truck flashing its headlights pursued Plaintiff while he was driving near his home. Id. at ¶ 95. Thinking something was wrong with his vehicle, Plaintiff pulled to the side of the road. Id. The truck parked behind Plaintiffs car. Id. A white male driver exited the truck and began threatening Plaintiff about the complaints Plaintiff had lodged with CVS. Id. The driver warned, “ T promise you will get hurt if you file a lawsuit.’” Id. Plaintiff filed a police report after the incident but was unable to identify the driver. Id. at ¶ 96. Finally, Plaintiff alleges the Above-Store. Defendants—President Mark Cosby, Vice President David Purdy, Regional Managers Darren Twedell and Shelly Edge, and District Managers Robinson, Paul Anderson, Ronald Elliot, and Matt Lesniak—cultivated a climate of hostility and discrimination directed against a disabled African-American male seeking reasonable accommodation. Id. at ¶ 98. IV. Plaintiffs Causes of Action Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: (1) discrimination and failure to accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., as to all Defendants; (2) racial discrimination- in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as to all Defendants; (3) conspiracy to interfere with civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), as to all Defendants; (4) failure to prevent deprivation . of rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986, as to all Defendants; (5) discrimination in a. program or activity that re-^ ceives federal financial assistance in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq., as to the Corporate Defendants; (6) discrimination based on race, gender, and disability in violation of Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116, as to the Corporate Defendants; (7)' assault as to the Corporate Defendants, Defendant Pendergrass, and one or more John and Jane Doe defendants; (8)'battery as to the Corporate Defendants, Defendant Pendergrass, and one or more John And Jane Doe defendants; (9) false imprisonment as to the Corporate Defendants, Defendant Pendergrass, and one or more John and Jane Doe defendants; • (10) intentional infliction of emo-tionál distress as to the Corporate Defendants, Pendergrass, Keeler, and at least some of the John and Jane Doe defendants; (11) civil conspiracy as to all Defendants; • (12) negligence as to all Defendants; (13) negligent supervision and/or retention as to all Defendants; (14) intentional interference with contract and/or intentional' interference with prospective contractual relations as to all Defendants; (15) unfair trade practices as to the Corporate Defendants; (16) request for declaratory relief as to all Defendants; and (17) request for injunctive relief as to all Defendants. See Amended Complaint at 49-101. Standdrds of Review I. Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction When a defendant challenges a court’s personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff has “the burden of proving” jurisdiction exists “by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 628 (4th Cir.1997). “[W]hen, as here, a district court rules on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing or without deferring ruling pending receipt at trial of evidence relevant to the jurisdictional issue, but rather relies on the complaint and affidavits alone, the burden on the plaintiff is simply to make a prima facie showing of sufficient jurisdictional basis in order to survive the jurisdictional challenge.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also New Wellington Fin. Corp. v. Flagship Resort Dev., Corp., 416 F.3d 290, 294 (4th Cir.2005) (noting a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction when the court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing). In deciding whether the plaintiff has met this burden, the court must construe all disputed facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of jurisdiction. Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir.2003); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir.1993). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court may consider evidence outside of the pleadings, such as affidavits and other evidentiary materials, without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Se. Toyota Distributors, Inc., 784 F.Supp. 306, 310 (D.S.C.1992). II. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim When deciding a motion to dismiss made under Federal Rule of CM Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pled facts alleged-in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir.2009). A complaint must state a ‘“plausible claim for relief” to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir.2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). The Court will not dismiss the plaintiffs complaint so long as he provides adequate detail about his claims to show he has a “more-than-conceivable chance of success on the merits.” Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 396 (4th Cir.2014) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains “enough facts to state a. claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. However, when a plaintiffs assertions “amount to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation 'of -the elements’” of a cause of action, the-Court may deem such allegations conclusory and not entitled to an assumption of veracity. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Discussion I. Personal Jurisdiction Over CVS Health Corporation and Mark Cosby Defendants CVS Health Corporation and Mark Cosby move to dismiss Plaintiffs claims on the basis that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. See ECF Nos. 20 & 22. They argue they do not have sufficient minimum contacts with South Carolina and contend maintenance of the suit here would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ECF No. 20-1 at 3-6; ECF No. 22-2 at 4-8. They assert Plaintiff cannot, carry his burden to establish specific or general personal jurisdiction. Id. A. Applicable Law Two conditions must be satisfied for a plaintiff to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Christian Sci. Bd. of Directors of First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Nolan, 259 F.3d 209, 215 (4th Cir.2001). “First, the exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized by the long-arm statute of the forum state, and, second, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must also comport with Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements.” Id. South Carolina’s long-arm statute has been' construed to be coextensive with, and reach the outer limits allowed by, the Due Pro cess Clause. ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 391 (4th Cir.2012) (citing Cockrell v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 363 S.C. 485, 491, 611 S.E.2d 505, 508 (2005) (construing S.C.Code Ann. § 36-2-803 (2003))). Therefore, “the statutory inquiry necessarily merges with the constitutional inquiry, and. the two inquiries essentially become one.” Stover v. O’Connell Assocs., Inc., 84 F.3d 132, 135-36 (4th Cir.1996). Accordingly, the scope of the inquiry is whether a defendant has “certain minimum contacts” with the forum “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted). The analytical framework for determining whether minimum contacts exist differs according to which type of personal jurisdiction—general or specific—is alleged. See generally ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623-24 (4th Cir.1997). If the defendant’s contacts with the forum state provide the basis for the suit, those contacts may establish specific jurisdiction. Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 397 (4th Cir.2003). Under the Fourth Circuit’s three-prong test for specific jurisdiction, a court must consider “(1) the extent to which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in-the State; (2) whether the plaintiffs]' claims arise out of those activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable.” Consulting Eng’rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 278 (4th Cir.2009). South Carolina courts' may exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant pursuant to the state long-arm statute, depending upon the defendant’s contacts with South Carolina. Cribb v. Spatholt, 382 S.C. 490, 498, 676 S.E.2d 714, 718 (Ct.App.2009). Because the South Carolina long-arm statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause, the sole question on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate due process. Tuttle Dozer Works, Inc. v. Gyro-Trac (USA), Inc., 463 F.Supp.2d 544, 547 (D.S.C.2006); see also Cockrell, 363 S.C. at 491, 611 S.E.2d at 508 (“Because South Carolina treats its long-arm statute as coextensive with the due process clause, the sole question becomes whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate due process.”). When the defendant’s contacts with the forum state do not form the basis for the suit, personal jurisdiction over the defendant must arise from the defendant’s general, more persistent, but unrelated contacts with the state—known as general jurisdiction. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir.2002). For general jurisdiction to exist, the defendant’s activities in the state must have been “continuous and systematic.” Id. The threshold level of minimum contacts required for general jurisdiction is significantly higher than the level needed for specific jurisdiction. Id. “[Tjhe defendant must be engaged in longstanding business in the forum state, such as marketing or shipping products, or performing services or maintaining one or more offices there; activities that are less extensive than that will not qualify for general in personam jurisdiction.” 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1067.5 (3d ed.2002). “For an individual, the paradigm fórum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2853-54, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011), The party, seeking to invoke personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant bears the burden of proving the existence of personal jurisdiction. ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F.Supp.2d 323, 328 (D.S.C.1999). At the pretrial stage, the burden of proving personal jurisdiction over a nonresident is met by a prima facie showing of jurisdiction either in the complaint or-in affidavits. Id. In determining whether ,a prima facie showing has been made,-the court may consider the uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiffs complaint. Wolf v. Richmond Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 745 F.2d 904, 908 (4th Cir.1984). However, whenever a defendant’s sworn affidavit contests the allegations in the complaint, the -plaintiff can no longer rest on those allegations. See id. Instead, the plaintiff bears the burden to present an affidavit or other' evidénce showing jurisdiction exists’over the nonresident defendant. See id.'; Clark v. Remark, 993 F.2d 228, 1993 WL 134616, at *2 (4th Cir.1993) (unpublished table decision). B. Analysis For the reasons stated below, the Court finds it lacks- personal jurisdiction over Defendants CVS Health. Corporation and Mark Cosby. 1. CVS Health Corporation In support of its motion to dismiss, Defendant CVS Health Corporation (also referred to as “CVS Health”) submitted an affidavit from Thomas S. Moffatt, who is the vice president, corporate secretary, and assistant general counsel of the corporate services division of CVS Pharmacy, Inc. See ECF No. 20-2. Moffatt states in his affidavit that he' is familiar with the corporate structure of CVS Health Corporation, its wholly-owned subsidiary, Defendant CVS Pharmacy, Inc., and Defendant South Carolina CVS Pharmacy, LLC, a South Carolina limited liability company and subsidiary of CVS Pharmacy, Inc., that directly owns and operates the stores located in South Carolina. Id. at 2-8. Moffat claims CVS Health Corporation (1) is a holding company that has the primary functions of issuing stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange and filing reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission; (2) is organized under the laws of the State of Delaware and has its principal place of business in Rhode Island; (3) neither qualifies as a foreign corporation under South Carolina law nor has a registered agent for service of process in South Carolina; and (4) has no direct involvement in directing, managing, or supervising the operations or the employees of any of its subsidiary companies. Id. at 3. Plaintiff contends the Court has personal jurisdiction over CVS Health Corporation pursuant to the South Carolina long-arm statute. ECF No. 39 at 4. He argues the long-arm statute applies because CVS Health transacts business in South Carolina, has an interest in real property in this state, contracts to insure people and property located within this state, and derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff claims CVS Health’s (a) guaranty of certain leases on property in South Carolina and (b) payment of settlement proceeds to the State of South Carolina qualify as sufficient minimum contacts with this state. Id. at 4-6. Plaintiff also argues CVS Health is not merely a holding company because it entered into a corporate integrity agreement in which it agreed to monitor day-to-day compliance activities engaged in by CVS. Id. at 6. Plaintiff submitted various exhibits in support of these arguments. See ECF Nos. 39-1 to 39-17. The Court finds it has neither specific nor general personal jurisdiction over CVS Health Corporation. Regarding specific jurisdiction, the Court must consider (1) the extent to which CVS Health purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in South Carolina; (2) whether Plaintiff’s claims arose out of those activities; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable. See Consulting Eng’rs Corp., 561 F.3d at 279. Because CVS Health’s contacts with South Carolina are sporadic and Plaintiffs claims do not arise from CVS Health’s contacts with this state, the Court does not have specific personal jurisdiction over CVS Health. Although Plaintiff maintains the activities purportedly supporting personal jurisdiction include the guaranty of a lease on property located in South Carolina and the payment of a settlement to the State of South Carolina, the Court notes both activities are sporadic by their very nature and do not amount to purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities within South .Carolina. Moreover, Plaintiffs causes of action have no relationship to CVS Health’s sporadic contact, and he has failed to rebut Moffatt’s affidavit with sufficient evidence. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over CVS Health. Although Plaintiff does not. argue the Court has general personal jurisdiction over CVS Health, the Court has conducted the appropriate inquiry and finds no such jurisdiction exists. Moffatt’s affidavit establishes CVS Health is a holding company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Rhode Island. Plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence showing CVS Health has an enduring relationship with South Carolina, as indicated by contacts that are substantial, continuous and systematic, so as to render it essentially at home in this forum. See Daimler AG, 134 S.Ct. at 761. The Court therefore concludes it lacks general personal jurisdiction over CVS Health Corporation. 2. Mark Cosby In support of his motion to dismiss, Defendant Mark Cosby submitted an affidavit in which he states he (1) is currently a resident of Massachusetts; (2) was a resident of Massachusetts and had an office located in Rhode Island when'he was president of CVS Pharmacy; (3) may have visited South Carolina for business purposes on rare and isolated instances but cannot specifically recall if or when he made any such visits; (4) has never resided in South Carolina and has never owned ahy real estate here; and (5) has never had any contact with the Plaintiff and had never heard of him until being named a defendant in the lawsuit. ECF No. 22-3 at 2-3. Plaintiff does not rebut Cosby’s affidavit with any affidavits or other admissible evidence. Instead, Plaintiff relies on his amended eohiplaint and asserts he has alleged sufficient facts demonstrating Cosby is subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. ECF No. 29-1 at 4-6.' Plaintiff also contends the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act confers personal jurisdiction over Cósby. Id. at 5. The Court finds Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over Cosby because Plaintiff has presented no evidence to rebut Cosby’s sworn affidavit indicating the requisite minimum contacts do not exist. See Wolf, 745 F.2d at 908 (explaining that when a defendant’s sworn affidavit contests the allegations in the complaint, the plaintiff can no longer rest on those allegations and must instead present an affidavit or other evidence showing personal jurisdiction is proper). Cosby’s contact with South Carolina is remote at best and does not satisfy the minimum contacts standard, and Plaintiffs argument regarding the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act is meritless. The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant must comport with due process, and in the absence of. minimum contacts with the South Carolina, a due process violation occurs. Nolan, 259 F.3d at 215. As to specific jurisdiction, Cosby’s contact with South CarQlina is virtually nonexistent, has no connection to the allegations in Plaintiffs amended complaint, and cannot reasonably be considered purposeful activity directed toward this state. See Consulting Eng’rs Corp., 561 F.3d at 279. Plaintiff cannot-establish general jurisdiction because.Cosby lacks substantial contact with South Carolina so as to render him essentially at home here. . Consequently, the Court cannot exercise either specific or general personal jurisdiction over Cosby. For the. foregoing reasons, the Court grants CVS Health Corporation’s and Cosby’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and dismisses them from all causes of - action in the amended complaint. 11. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (Denial of Public Accommodations) Plaintiff asserts a claim against all defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 12182 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) based on their alleged failure or refusal to allow him to shop after hours with the door locked to ensure that other customers would not enter the store while he was shopping. Amended" Complaint at ¶¶ 114-39." Defendants argue Plaintiffs ADA claim should be dismissed because (1) Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts showing he suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) Plaintiff lacks standing under Article I'll of the -United States Constitution because he was not actually denied the full and equal enjoyment of CVS’s goods and services and therefore has not suffered an injury in fact; (3) even if Plaintiff had standing, no barrier obstructed his ability to access CVS’s goods and services based on his alleged disability; (4) Plaintiffs request for segregated accommodation is inconsistent with the ADA; and (5) CVS provided Plaintiff with reasonable alternatives (to his request to shop after hours) that would have allowed him to shop at CVS stores. ECF No. 20-1 at 7-12; ECF No. 21-1 at 3-4; ECF No. 22-1 at 2-4. Defendants contend Plaintiffs complaint should be construed either (1) as a challenge to the sufficiency of the goods and services provided by CVS—not as a challenge alleging "a denial of goods and services—:or (2) as a complaint that CVS did not provide Plaintiff with his preferred accommodation; Defendants máintain neither claim is sufficient to state a claim under the ADA. ECF No. 20-1 at 11-12. A. The ADA Congress enacted Title III of the ADA to facilitate disabled individuals’ access to places of public accommodation. Montalvo v. Radcliffe, 167 F.3d 873, 876 (4th Cir.1999); see 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)-(b) (containing the congressional findings and purpose for the ADA). Consistent with this goal, the Act contains the following broad statement: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Title III defines discrimination to include “a failure to make reasonable modifications ... unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of [the public accommodation].” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) To state a claim under Title III, a plaintiff must allege (1) he is disabled within the- meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private- entity that owns, leases, or. operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the defendant denied the plaintiff public accommodations because .of his disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a)-(b); see Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir.2010); Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir.2008). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered an injury in fact, that the injury is traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct, and - that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision. Norkunas v. Park Rd. Shopping Ctr., Inc., 777 F.Supp.2d 998, 1001 (W.D.N.C.2011) (case involving the ADA), aff'd, 474 Fed.Appx. 369 (4th Cir.2012). Monetary damages are not available under Title III, but injunctive relief is available. Gregory v. Otac, Inc., 247 F.Supp.2d 764, 770 (D.Md.2003). To have standing to obtain injunctive relief, a plaintiff must “demonstrate a likelihood that he will suffer future discrimination at the hands of the defendant.” Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated the following subsections of 42 U.S.C. § 12182: (1) § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i), by denying him the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity; (2) § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii), by denying Plaintiff, on the basis of his disability, the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation equal to that afforded other individuals; (3) § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii), by providing Plaintiff, on the basis of his disability, with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is different or separate from that provided to other individuals; (4) § 12182(b)(1)(B), by not providing Plaintiff an accommodation in the most integrated setting appropriate for his needs; (5) § 12182(b)(1)(D), by utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability or that perpetuate the discrimination of others who' are subject to common administrative control; (6) § 12182(b)(1)(E), by denying goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, or other opportunities to Plaintiff—with whom Defendants have a relationship or association—because of his known disability; (7) § 12182(b)(2)(A), by engaging in the specific prohibitions of § 12182 and other provisions of the ADA; and (8) § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v), by failing to demonstrate the removal of any barrier is not readily achievable. Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 128-135. Having thoroughly reviewed the facts alleged in the complaint, the Court does not see how subsections 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v) (denial of access based on architectural barriers) apply to Plaintiffs factual allegations. His allegations instead suggest a narrower claim based on Defendants’ alleged failure to provide a reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff--namely, not allowing him to shop after hours with the door locked outside the presence of other customers—so that he could enjoy CVS’s goods and services without experiencing the anxiety and panic attacks that occur when he confronts crowds of people. This aspect of Plaintiffs claim appears to fall under § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), which provides “discrimination includes ... a failure to make reasonable modifications • in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making’ such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). “To recover under section 12182(b)(2) (A) (ii) in a retail sale case, a plaintiff must show that he comes within the protections of the ADA as a person with a disability and that the defendant’s establishment is subject to the mandates of Title III as a place of public accommodation.” Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 333 F.3d 299, 307 (1st Cir.2003) (internal citation omitted). The plaintiff must also show four additional requirements, including that the defendant has a discriminatory policy or practice in effect; that he (the plaintiff) requested a reasonable modification in that policy or practice which, if granted, would have afforded him access to the desired goods; that the requested modification—or a modification like it— was necessary to afford that access; and that the defendant nonetheless refused to modify the policy or practice. Id. (citing PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 n. 38, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.2d 904 (2001)). If the plaintiff makes this six-part showing, the defendant must make the modification unless it proves either that doing so would alter the fundamental nature of its business, see PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 683 & 683 n. 38, 121 S.Ct. 1879, or that the requested modification poses a direct threat to the, health or safety of others, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 648-49, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998). The ADA does not require a public entity to provide a disabled individual with the accommodation of his choice. McElwee v. Cnty. of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 641 (2d Cir.2012). Regarding Defendants’ alleged failure to make reasonable accommodations so that Plaintiff could use CVS’s goods and services, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving a modification was requested and is reasonable. Johnson v. Gambrinus Company/Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir.1997). The plaintiff satisfies this burden if he introduces evidence showing the requested modification is reasonable in the general sense—“that is, reasonable in the run of cases.”. Id. Although the defendant may introduce evidence showing the plaintiff’s requested modification is not reasonable,- the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proof on the issue of reasonableness. Id. B. Whether Individuals Can Be Sued Under Title III Besides the five arguments summarized at the beginning of section (II) of this order, Defendants argue the Above-Store Defendants and Store-Level Defendants, who are individuals, are not proper defendants under Title III. ECF No. 21-1 at 3-4; ECF No. 22-1 at 2. Although the Fourth Circuit has not decided whether individuals may be sued under Title III, “[n]early every court that has, decided the issue of individual liability under Title III has found that individuals can be held responsible for violations of these prohibitions against discrimination if they own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation.” Clement v. Satterfield, 927 F.Supp.2d 297, 313 (W.D.Va.2013) (alteration in original). “[T]he question of whether a person is a proper defendant under [Title III] turns not on.whether the defendant is a person, partnership, corporation or other entity but,- instead, whether the defendant owns, leases or operates a place of public accommodation within the meaning of the ADA.” Id. at 313-14 (alterations in original) (emphasis added). Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether the individual defendants operated the CVS stores that allegedly denied Plaintiffs request for reasonable accommodations under the ADA. Under Title III, the term “operate” means “to put or keep in operation,” “to control or direct the functioning of,” or “to conduct the affairs of; manage.” Id. at 314. “[C]ourts have focused on the issue of control in determining whether an individual defendant ‘operated’ a place of public accommodation.” Id. Courts have interpreted the phrase “to operate” to mean “being in a position of authority and having the power and discretion to perform . potentially discriminatory acts[,] where the discriminatory acts are the result of exercise of the individual’s own discretion, and not merely the implementation of institutional policies or, the mandates of superiors.” IcL (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 314-15 (stating that in other.words, operate “implies the performance of some sort of function, in conjunction with a degree of sanctioned authority”). An individual may be liable as an operator of a public accommodation if (1) he or she is in a position of authority; (2) within the scope of this authority, the individual has both the power and discretion to perform potentially discriminatory acts; and (3) the discriminatory acts result from individual exercising his or her own discretion, not from the implementation of institutional policy or a superior’s mandate. Id. at 315. C. The Court’s Ruling At this early stage of the proceedings, the Court finds Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for discrimination under Title III that is plausible on its face against the remaining Corporate Defendants (South Carolina CVS Pharmacy, LLC and CVS Pharmacy, Inc.) and the Store-Level Defendants who denied Plaintiffs request for accommodations. Plaintiff has alleged that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, that the remaining Corporate Defendants and the Store-Level Defendants own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation, and that these defendants denied him public accommodations and access to CVS’s goods and services because of his disability. Whether Plaintiffs requested modification was reasonable, and whether it was appropriate to the extent it required segregated accommodation, are issues more properly reserved for summary judgment, at which stage Plaintiff will bear the burden to prove reasonableness. See Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059. As to the Above-Store Defendants, however, Plaintiffs allegations do not indicate any of them had direct contact with him. Besides the sole reference to Defendant Robinson, who simply authored a letter explaining the reasons for CVS’s .refusal to accommodate Plaintiffs. after-hours shopping request, Plaintiff has alleged no plausible-facts, creating a reasonable inference that the Above-Store Defendants engaged in any discriminatory .conduct violating the ADA. Plaintiff’s ADA claim against the Above-Store Defendants warrants dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). In light of the foregoing, the Court denies the remaining Corporate Defendants’ and Store-Level Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs ADA claim, but grants the Above-Store Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs ADA claim. III. Racial Discrimination, 42 U.S.C. . § 1981 Plaintiff brings a claim against all defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which allows claims’ by individuals who are discriminated against because of their race. Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 140-64. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in a § .1981 cause of action- relating to the purchase of goods or services, Plaintiff, an-African-American, must establish he (1) belongs to a protected class of people; (2) sought to enter into a contractual relationship with Defendants; (3) met Defendants’ ordinary requirements to pay for and to receive goods or services ordinarily provided by Defendants to other similarly situated customers; and (4) was denied the opportunity to contract for goods or services that was otherwise afforded to white customers. Williams v. Staples, Inc., 372 F.3d 662, 667 (4th Cir.2004); cf. Gilyard v. Northlake Foods, Inc., 367 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1013-15 (E.D.Va.2005) (applying the Williams test in the context of a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)). Defendants in a § 1981 lawsuit can be held personally hable in their individual capacities “when they intentionally cause a corporation to infringe the rights secured by” § 1981. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, Inc., 517 F.2d 1141, 1146 (4th Cir.1975); see also Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis Coll., 784 F.2d 505, 518 (3d Cir.1986) (citing the holding in Tillman and stating “directors, officers, and employees of a corporation may become personally liable when they intentionally cause an infringement of rights protected- -by Section 1981, regardless of whether the corporation may also be held liable”), aff'd, 481 U.S. 604, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987). Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot state a claim under § 1981 because he was not denied the ability to purchase CVS’s goods and services. EOF No. 20-1 at 12-14; EOF No. 21-1 at 5; EOF No. 22-1 at 2. They also argue Plaintiffs complaint does not contain allegations sufficient to hold the Store-Level or Above-Store Defendants liable under § 1981. EOF No. 21-1 at 5-6; ECF No. 22-1 at 2-4. The Court finds that at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to state a plausible claim under § 1981 against the remaining Corporate Defendants and the following Store-Level Defendants: Gates, Pender-grass, Sosa, and Keeler. First, Plaintiff is African-American and therefore is a member of a protected class. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (granting all people within the United States “the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens”). Second, .Plaintiff sought to enter into a contractual relationship with CVS when he attempted to shop there and have prescriptions filled. Third, Plaintiffs allegations indicate he met the ordinary requirements to pay for and receive goods, such as his prescription refills, at any one of the CVS retail establishments. Finally, the remaining Corporate Defendants, Gates, Pendergrass, Sosa, and Keeler denied Plaintiff the opportunity to enter into a contract with CVS even though four CVS stores afforded such an opportunity—in actuality, opportunities— to Plaintiffs white female friend. See Williams, 372 F.3d at 667-68. The Court therefore denies the motions to dismiss Plaintiffs § 1981 claim against the remaining Corporate Defendants (South Carolina CVS Pharmacy, LLC and CVS Pharmacy, Inc.), Gates, Pendergrass, Sosa,, and Keel-er. However, regarding the Above-Store Defendants and the, remaining Store-Level Defendants (Brescia, Cessna, Chisholm, Combs, McClure, Poland, Webb, John Doe # 1, Jane Doe # 1, and Jane Doe #2), the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that these particular defendants committed any actions in violation § 1981. Plaintiffs allegations relating to these defendants do not fulfill the fourth prong of the Williams test because he does not allege any of them treated him differently from white customers.. The Court therefore grants these defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff s § 1981 claim. IV. Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) Plaintiff brings a claim against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 165-87. Defendants argue Plaintiff has neither sufficiently pled the prima facie elements of a § 1985(3) claim, nor alleged a meeting of the minds to state a claim for conspiracy. ECP No. 20-1 at 15, 17-18. They also argue the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars Plaintiffs .§ 1985(3) claim. ECP No. 20-1 at 15-17. A. § 1985(3) Conspiracy Claim Section 1985(3) permits claims by plaintiffs who are injured by a conspiracy formed “for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must prove (1) a conspiracy by two or more persons, (2) who are motivated by a specific, class-based, invidiously discriminatory purpose to (3) deprive the plaintiff of the equal, enjoyment of rights secured by law to all, (4) that results in injury to the plaintiff as (5) a consequence of an overt act committed by the defendants in connection with the conspiracy. A Society Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir.2011). “Moreover, the law is well settled that to prove a section 1985 ‘conspiracy,’ a claimant must show an agreement or a ‘meeting of the minds’ by defendants to violate the claimant’s constitutional rights.” Simmons v. Poe, 47-F.3d 1370, 1377 (4th Cir.1995). B. Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, also known as the intracorporate immunity doctrine, “recognizes that a corporation cannot conspire with its agents because the agents’ acts are the corporation’s own.” Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 352 (4th Cir.2013) (applying the doctrine in the .context of a § 1985(3) action).. “As such, suing the agents individually does not destroy the immunity granted under the doctrine.” Id. at 353 (internal quotation marks, omitted). The doctrine does not apply if a coconspirator has a personal stake independent of his relationship to the corporation or if the corporation did not authorize the agent’s acts. Id. Plaintiff contends the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply in this case because of the allegations concerning non-CVS individuals, namely the group of four or more people who allegedly surrounded him at the behest of 'Defendant Pendergrass and the white male truck driver who accosted ánd threatened him. ECF No. 39 at 14-16. Plaintiff also argues the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is inapplicable because he has alleged the CVS employees were dominated by personal motives or acted outside the scope of their corporate duties. Id. at 16. C. Analysis The Court finds Plaintiff has alleged a prima facie claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) against the. remaining Corporate Defendants and the Store-Level Defendants, but not against the Above-Store Defendants. The complaint contains sufficient facts alleging the remaining Corporate Defendants and the Store-Level Defendants overtly acted together to impede Plaintiff, an African-American, from shopping in CVS stores, which all people can patronize by law, and caused him to suffer physical and mental, anguish. These defendants may very well be entitled' to summary judgment based on the intracor-porate conspiracy doctrine, failure to establish a meeting of the minds, or- some other available defense. Yet, at the pleading stage of this litigation, the Court concludes Plaintiffs allegations are adequate to state a § 1985(3) claim for conspiracy that is plausible on its face against the remaining Corporate Defendants and the Store-Level Defendants. Plaintiff has, however, failed to plead any facts creating a reasonable inference that the Above-Store Defendants participated in a conspiracy against him with a class-based discriminatory motive. Thus, the complaint does not contain sufficient facts alleging the Above-Store Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights under § 1985(3). In conclusion, the Court denies the motions to dismiss the § 1985(3) claim filed by the remaining Corporate Defendants and the Store-Level Defendants. The Court grants the Above-Store Defendants’ motion to dismiss the § 1985(3) conspiracy claim. V. Failure to Prevent Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1986 Plaintiff brings a claim against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, which provides a cause of action against anyone who has “knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in [42 U.S.C. § 1985], are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do.” 42 U.S.C. § 1986; see Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 188-95. “A cause of action based upon § 1986 is dependent upon the existence of a claim under § 1985.” Trerice v. Summons, 755 F.2d 1081, 1085 (4th Cir.1985). Defendants argue Plaintiffs § 1986