Full opinion text
OPINION & ORDER KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge: Plaintiff Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. (“Mosdos”) brought this Complaint against Defendants RBS Citizens, N.A. (“Citizens”), Avon Group LLC (“Avon”) and its Managing Member Abraham Grunwald (“Grunwald”) (collectively, “Avon Defendants”), and the Villages of Wesley Hills, Pomona, and Chestnut Ridge (“Village Defendants”) alleging various causes of action arising out of a mortgage and related foreclosure proceeding. Before the Court are Defendants’ Motions To Dismiss and for Summary Judgment on various causes of action. For the reasons stated herein, these motions are granted in part and denied in part. I. Background A Factual Background The following facts are drawn from Plaintiffs Complaint and documents incorporated by reference therein and are taken as true for the purposes of resolving the instant Motion. 1. The Loan Agreement with Citizens Mosdos is a religious corporation organized under New York Religious Corporations Law, N.Y. Relig. Corp. Law §§ 1 et seq. (See Compl. ¶ 10.) On December 14, 2005, Yeshiva Chofetz Chaim Kiryas Ra-din, Inc. (“YCCKR”), another religious corporation organized under New York Religious Corporations Law, conveyed a five-acre parcel of land situated in the Town of Ramapo, Rockland County, New York, to Yeshiva Chofetz Chaim, Inc. (“YCC”), a third religious corporation organized under New York Religious Corporations Law. (See Decl. in Supp. of the Avon Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss & for Summ. J. (“Avon Defs.’ Deck”) (Dkt. No. 38), Ex. I (Warranty Deed).) That same day, YCC conveyed that property to Mosdos. (See id. Ex. J (Warranty Deed).) Mosdos intended to use this land “for the purposes of creating an adult religious studies institution and student housing [ Qcommonly referred to as a ‘Kollel’) for adult students, their spouses and children in a campus-like environment.” (Compl. ¶ 11.) Mosdos’s specific plans included a project to construct sixty units of “residential student housing” and one “religious instruction/educational building.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Months before it purchased the property, Mosdos sought financing from “numerous potential lenders,” ultimately selecting Citizens. (Id.) Thereafter, on or about September 15, 2005, Mosdos received a “Commitment Letter” from Citizens promising to loan $14,523,000 to Mosdos on November 4, 2005. (See id. ¶¶ 13, 77-80.) Citizens subsequently extended the closing date twice, such that the loan finally closed on December 20, 2005. (See id. ¶¶ 80, 82.) In reliance on the Commitment Letter but before the final closing date, Mosdos “proceeded to commence work on the project and engage contractors to perform the initial phases of the construction work based on the understanding that these contractors would be paid when the loan closed.” (Id. ¶ 81.) Mosdos also complied with all of its obligations under the Commitment Letter, including “timely paying Citizens a $67,000.00 non-refundable Loan Commitment Fee and other substantial pre-closing costs,” such that it paid, in total, “approximately $100,000.00 in nonrefundable up-front loan fees.” (Id. ¶¶ 15, 79.) However, prior to the closing date, “Citizens unilaterally altered its commitment and reduced the amount of the loan from $14,523,000.00 to $12,800,000.00.” (Id. ¶ 14.) The final loan consisted of three documents relevant to the Complaint: (1) the Building Loan Agreement; (2) the Promissory Note; and (3) the Mortgage and Security Agreement. (See id. ¶ 18; Decl. of Riyaz G. Bhimani in Supp. of Mot. To Dismiss (“Citizens’ Decl.”) (Dkt. No. 35), Exs. B (“Building Loan Agreement”), C (“Promissory Note”), D (“Mortgage and Security Agreement”).) In general, and as relevant here, these agreements provide that (1) “Citizens would furnish $12,800,000.00 in construction financing,” (Compl. ¶ 19); (2) “Citizens would disburse loan proceeds to Mosdos as the project progressed,” (id. ¶ 20); (3) Citizens would “make timely inspections of the work performed on the project and timely fund loan advances for the project,” (id. ¶ 21); and (4) Citizens would “h[o]ld in trust certain funds for the benefit of Mosdos as borrower,” (id. ¶ 54). Certain of the Complaint’s causes of action arise out of two provisions of these agreements that merit a more detailed discussion. First, for purposes of calculating the loan’s interest rate, the Promissory Note defines two time periods. During the “Construction Period,” which began on the “Funding Date” (December 20, 2005), the Promissory Note classified the loan as a “LIBOR Rate Loan,” whereby interest on the outstanding principal would accrue “by reference to the [London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) ] Rate.” (Promissory Note 1-2.) Then, “upon completion of construction of the project as determined pursuant to the provisions of the ‘Building Loan Agreement,’ ” the “Permanent Period” would commence, at which time the loan would convert to a “permanent amortizing loan.” (Id. at 1.) During this period, interest on any outstanding principal classified as a LIBOR Rate Loan would continue to accrue at a rate based on the LIBOR, and interest on any outstanding principal classified as a “Prime Rate Loan” — i.e., any outstanding principal loaned during the Permanent Period— would accrue at a rate “equal to the Prime Rate.” (Id.) The Promissory Note also specified that, “[a]s a condition to this conversion, the Borrower shall enter into a forward starting Interest Rate Swap transaction (‘Swap’) for ten (10) years with the Bank,” and that the loan would be “cross collateralized and cross defaulted with the Swap.” (Id.) Based on Mosdos’s allegation that construction was never completed, (see Compl. ¶¶ 28-30), the Complaint alleges that the loan “at all times was in the construction phase and never converted to a Permanent Loan,” (id. ¶ 88). Mosdos also alleges, however, that it “now fully occupies] the site” and uses it as a school, place of worship, and residential facility. (Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Mots, of Avon Group, LLC (“Pl.’s Opp’n to Avon Defs.”) (Dkt. No. 43) 4, 12.) Second, in Article IX, titled “Assignments, Sale and Encumbrances,” the Building Loan Agreement outlines the terms governing the “Lender’s right to assign” the agreement. (See Building Loan Agreement 32 (alterations omitted).) Specifically, paragraph 9.1 under Article IX provides that “Lender may assign, negotiate, pledge or otherwise hypothecate th[e] Agreement or any of its rights and security hereunder, including the Note, and any of the other Loan Documents to any bank, participant or financial institution.” (Id.) When so assigned, Borrower agrees to “accord full recognition” to the assignment, and further agrees that “all rights and remedies of Lender in connection with the interest so assigned shall be enforceable against Borrower by such bank, participant or financial institution with the same force and effect and to the same extent as the same would have been enforceable by Lender but for such assignment.” (Id.) 2. The Article 78 Lawsuit In 2004, the Town of Ramapo “enacted a Local Law to amend its Zoning Code to permit Adult Student Housing, a permitted land use which among other reasons inspired Mosdos to develop the real property which is the subject of this action.” (Compl. ¶ 130.) That same year, before YCC conveyed the property to Mosdos, Village Defendants, among other parties, “filed suit in New York State Court” under New York C.P.L.R. Article 78 “to stop the promulgation of the Adult Student Housing Law [ (“ASHL”) ].” (Id. ¶ 131.) See also Vill. of Chestnut Ridge v. Town of Ramapo, No. 16876/2004 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. verified Dec. 23, 2004) (“Village Litigation”). Undeterred, Mosdos ultimately purchased the property, procured the loan, and commenced the construction project. (See id. ¶¶ 17, 25, 30.) Then, in September 2007, the New York court “issued an [i]n-junction against the Town of Ramapo which prohibited the Town from issuing a Certificate of Occupancy for the project.” (Id. ¶ 26.) But Mosdos alleges that it “was never enjoined from completing construction.” (Id. ¶ 27.) And “[t]he project has since been issued a Temporary Certificate of Occupancy.” (Id. ¶ 26.) The Complaint alleges that “[a]t all relevant times herein Citizens was aware of the Village Litigation and proceeded to close on the loan despite its awareness of the litigation.” (Id. ¶ 25.) Nevertheless, after it had funded “an amount approximating [only] 62% of its commitment,” and while it “held the approximate sum of $800,000.00 as retainage for work on the project that [it had] approved,” “Citizens ceased funding the project in the midst of construction” and “[used] the Village Litigation as ‘justification’ to avoid its obligation to fund the project.” (Id. ¶¶ 28-29, 32.) Consequently, “Mosdos was unable to pay project contractor[s] and vendors,” and “[o]ne or more mechanics lienors commenced an action against Mosdos.” (Id. ¶¶ 31, 34.) Citizens thereafter “utilized] undisbursed loan proceeds or the [$800,-000] retainage ... to pay the Mechanics Lienors and substitute itself as plaintiff in the [action].” (Id. ¶ 35.) 3. The Assignment to Avon Defendants and the Foreclosure Action In April 2011, Avon Defendants “purchased the Mosdos/Citizens Note and Mortgage for the sum of $4,000,000.00” and “accepted] an Assignment of the Mos-dos/Citizens Note and Mortgage from Citizens.” (Id. ¶¶ 36, 108-09.) Almost one year later, in February 2012, Avon Defendants “commenced a foreclosure action against Mosdos seeking to foreclose on the December 20, 2005 Mosdos/Citizens mortgage.” (Id. ¶ 112; see also Avon Defs.’ Deck, Ex. F (Foreclosure Summons & Verified Complaint).) The Complaint alleges that Avon Defendant Grunwald’s “motivation for commencing the foreclosure action was ... his disapproval of the religious lifestyle and education of the Mosdos Kollel students and his desire to close down the Mosdos Kollel and replace it with an institution consistent with [Grunwald’s] own religious values.” (Compl. ¶ 113.) The Complaint further alleges that, “[u]pon ... commencement of its foreclosure action, an agent of Avon and Grunwald ... engaged in a campaign to injure Mosdos, including, but not limited to calling Mosdos’s students and telling them that they are going to shut down the school, and communicating with donors suggesting that they should not donate because the school is not viable.” (Id. ¶ 119.) Avon Defendants named Village Defendants as defendants in the' foreclosure action “because of an alleged undertaking on the subject property apparently reflected in a title report utilized by [Avon Defendants] for purposes of generating a complaint in the ... foreclosure action.” (Id. ¶ 135.) The Complaint alleges, however, that “the alleged undertaking on the subject property was in reality an Insurance Company Bond posted by Mosdos relative to State Court litigation pending between Mosdos” and Village Defendants, among other parties. (Id. ¶ 136.) According to Mosdos, Village Defendants “have no legally cognizable interest in the State Court foreclosure litigation due to ... their lack of any interest in the subject property that could have been affected or foreclosed upon by [Avon Defendants].” (Id.) Accordingly, Village Defendants “were improperly named as defendants in the State Court foreclosure action.” (Id.) Nevertheless, “[ijnstead of taking a passive position in the State Court foreclosure litigation ... [Village Defendants] proceeded to take an active role in the litigation,” which decision “was motivated by [a] desire ... to deprive Mosdos ... of [its] Constitutional and Civil Rights,” including a desire to “ ‘shut[ ] Mosdos down’ and stop[ ] the spread of the Orthodox and Hasidic communities.” (Id. ¶¶ 137-38,140.) B. Procedural History Mosdos filed the instant Action in September 2012, alleging seventeen causes of action and seeking monetary and declaratory relief. (See id. at 22-24.) The Complaint contains eight claims against Citizens, including (1) breach of the Building Loan Agreement, where Citizens failed to inspect and to fund the loan in a timely manner, (see id. ¶¶ 37-47 (First Cause of Action)); (2) breach of the Building Loan Agreement, where Citizens improperly refused to fund the loan, (see id. ¶¶ 48-52 (Second Cause of Action)); (3) breach of the Building Loan Agreement, where Citizens improperly assigned the loan to Avon, (see id. ¶¶ 64-72 (Fourth Cause of Action)); (4) breach of fiduciary duty, where Citizens “improperly utilized the funds it held in trust for Mosdos for its own benefit without the permission or consent of Mosdos,” (see id. ¶ 57; id. ¶¶ 53-63 (Third Cause of Action)); (5) fraudulent inducement to borrow, where Citizens unilaterally reduced the final loan amount from the amount specified in the Commitment Letter, (see id. ¶¶ 76-85 (Sixth Cause of Action)); (6) conversion, where Citizens converted part of Mosdos’s funds held in escrow as a “swap fee” to effectuate the forward swap triggered by conversion of the loan from a Construction Loan to a Permanent Loan, (see id. ¶¶ 86-90 (Seventh Cause of Action)); (7) “LIBOR manipulation,” where Citizens “manipulated the LIBOR rate for its own benefit” and “failed to adequately disclose to Mos-dos the risks associated with the SWAP agreement,” (see id. ¶¶ 94, 97, 91-102 (Eighth Cause of Action)); and (8) unjust enrichment, where Citizens “wrongful[ly] regained] ... the funds relative to the ‘forward SWAP’ fee and LIBOR manipulation,” (see id. ¶¶ 103-05 (Ninth Cause of Action)). The Complaint further contains four claims against Avon Defendants, including: (1) abuse of process, where Avon Defendants’ “stated motivations for commencing the foreclosure action constitute an ulteri- or motive or purpose for the use of the legal process,” (see id. ¶¶ 115, 114-16 (Tenth Cause of Action)); (2) slander per se, where Avon Defendants and/or their agents improperly communicated with Mosdos’s students and donors, thereby “injurfing] Mosdos in its ability to operate its school by creating an environment of instability,” (see id. ¶¶ 120, 117-23 (Eleventh Cause of Action)); (3) champerty, where Avon Defendants commenced the foreclosure action “not as a legitimate debt collection effort but instead to close down the operations of Mosdos,” (see id. ¶¶ 125, 124-28 (Twelfth Cause of Action)); and (4) a claim for declaratory relief, where Mos-dos seeks a judgment “declaring that Avon is without authority to enforce the Building Loan Agreement and its associated Note and Mortgage,” (see id. ¶¶ 74, 73-75 (Fifth Cause of Action)). Finally, the Complaint contains five claims against Village Defendants, including (1) abuse of process, where Village Defendants “actively participated] in the State Court foreclosure litigation” due to “an ulterior motive or purpose for the use of the legal process,” (see id. ¶¶ 142, 141— 43 (Thirteenth Cause of Action)); (2) violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, where Village Defendants’ active participation in the foreclosure action “was motivated by their desire to deprive Mosdos of its right to use its property on the basis of race, national origin and familial status,” (see id. ¶¶ 144-45 (Fourteenth Cause of Action)); (3) violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where Village Defendants’ active participation in the foreclosure action “was motivated by their desire to deprive Mosdos and its Kollel students of their right to equal access to housing under color of law,” (see id. ¶¶ 146-47 (Fifteenth Cause of Action)); (4) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, where Village Defendants’ active participation in the foreclosure action “was motivated by their desire to deprive Mosdos and its Kollel students of their [Fourteenth Amendment] rights ... with regard to practicing their religion,” (see id. ¶¶ 148-49 (Sixteenth Cause of Action)); and (5) violation of the First Amendment’s free-exercise clause, as incorporated against Village Defendants through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), where Village Defendants’ active participation in the foreclosure action “was motivated by their desire to deprive Mosdos and its Kollel students of their rights to the Free Exercise of Religion,” (see Compl. ¶¶ 150-51 (Seventeenth Cause of Action)). The Court held a pre-motion conference on March 13, 2013, (see Dkt. (minute entry for proceedings held on March 13, 2013)), after which the Court issued a Motion Scheduling Order, (see Dkt. No. 20), and a Memorandum Order, (see Dkt. No. 22), wherein the Court adopted a briefing schedule and modified the Complaint in three ways. First, because Mosdos withdrew its champerty claim against Avon Defendants at the pre-motion conference, the Court dismissed that claim with prejudice. (See Dkt. No. 22 at 2.) Second, the Court ordered that the Complaint “be deemed amended to include an allegation under New York’s Religious Corporation Law § 12 ... that the subject mortgage referred to in the Complaint was invalid at its inception due to the failure to comply with the provisions of the New York Religious Corporation Law § 12, and that therefore, said mortgage may not be enforced by” Avon. (Id. at 1.) Third, the Order withdrew in part the reference to the related case proceeding in Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), such that the Court “shall determine any such claims pertaining to or related to the request for declaratory relief,” which the Order specified to include “any claim under the Religious Corporation Law § 12(9) regarding nunc pro tunc approval of the ... mortgage , the assignment of said mortgage to [Avon], [and] the bankruptcy trustee’s ... authority to avoid the mortgage under 11 U.S.C. § 544.” (Id. at 1-2.) Defendants submitted Motions To Dismiss in May 2013. (See Notice of Mot. To Dismiss (“Village Defs.’ Mot.”) (Dkt. No. 25); Notice of Mot. To Dismiss & for Summ. J. (“Avon Defs.’ Mot.”) (Dkt. No. 32); Notice of Mot. To Dismiss (“Citizens’ Mot.”) (Dkt. No. 33).) Mosdos submitted its opposition Memoranda of Law in June 2013. (See PI.’s Opp’n to Avon Defs.; Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Mot. of RBS Citizens To Dismiss the Compl. (“Pl.’s Opp’n to Citizens”) (Dkt. No. 45); Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Mot. of Villages of Wesley Hills, Pomona & Chestnut Ridge To Dismiss the Compl. (“PL’s Opp’n to Village Defs.”) (Dkt. No. 46).) Defendants submitted reply Memoranda of Law one month later. (See Reply Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of RBS Citizens, N.A.’s Mot. To Dismiss (“Citizens’ Reply Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 48); Reply Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of Municipal Defs.’ Joint Mot. To Dismiss (“Village Defs.’ Reply Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 50); Defs. Avon Group LLC’s & Abraham Grunwald’s Reply Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of Their Mot. To Dismiss Mosdos’ Claims (“Avon Defs.’ Reply Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 51).) The Court held oral argument on February 11, 2014. (See Dkt. No. 61 (“Hr’g Tr.”).) II. Discussion A Standard of Review The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiffs obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his [or her] ‘entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). Instead, the Court has emphasized that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” id., and that “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Plaintiffs must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. But if a plaintiff has “not nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not ‘show[n]’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))). In considering Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss, the Court is required to consider as true the factual allegations contained in the Complaint. See Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir.2008) (“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gonzalez v. Caballero, 572 F.Supp.2d 463, 466 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (same). Moreover, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Avon Defendants also moved for summary judgment on Mosdos’s claim for declaratory relief based on its argument that the mortgage is invalid under New York state law governing Religious Corporations. Summary judgment shall be granted where the movant shows that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.” Dall. Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir.2003); see also Tufariello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 458 F.3d 80, 85 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that a court must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor). A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. CSX Lines, L.L.C., 432 F.3d 428, 433 (2d Cir.2005). A fact is material when “it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The role of the court is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried.” See Brod v. Omya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a court’s goal should be to “isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. B. Claims Against Village Defendants (Thirteenth Through Seventeenth Causes of Action) Mosdos alleges five causes of action against Village Defendants, all of which stem from Village Defendants’ alleged participation in the state-court foreclosure litigation brought by Avon Defendants against Mosdos. Having reviewed these claims, the Court dismisses them. But to understand why, it is first necessary to understand exactly what Mosdos alleged in the Complaint. The Complaint essentially makes only two allegations. First, Village Defendants “were named as defendants in the New York State foreclosure litigation brought by defendant Avon.” (Compl. ¶ 134.) Second, Village Defendants “proceeded to take an active role in the litigation.” (Id. ¶ 137; see also id. ¶ 140 (alleging that Village Defendants have “participated] in a foreclosure action in which [they] have no legally cognizable interest”); id. ¶ 142 (alleging that Village Defendants have “actively participated] in the State Court foreclosure litigation.”)-) The Complaint then relies entirely on these allegations to support five causes of action based on Village Defendants’ motive for “participating” in the foreclosure litigation. Initially, Mosdos generally alleges that Village Defendants’ actions “[were] motivated by [a] desire of the municipal defendants to deprive Mosdos ... of their Constitutional and Civil Rights.” (Id. ¶ 138; see also id. ¶ 139 (alleging that Village Defendants’ actions “were undertaken with an improper motive and as such are not legally privileged”); id. ¶ 140 (alleging that Village Defendants “are acting in furtherance of their desire to violate the Constitutional and Civil Rights of Mosdos”).) Then, it alleges that Village Defendants’ “motivation for actively participating in the State Court foreclosure litigation as alleged above constitutes an ulterior motive or purpose for the use of the legal process,” (id. ¶ 142 (emphasis added) (abuse-of-process claim)); that Village Defendants “conduct ... as described herein above was motivated by their desire to deprive Mosdos of its right to use property on the basis of race, national origin and familial status,” (id. ¶ 145 (emphasis added) (§ 1982 claim)); that Village Defendants’ “conduct ... as described herein above was motivated by their desire to deprive Mosdos and its Kollel students of their right to equal access to housing under color of law,” (id. ¶ 147 (emphasis added) (§ 1983 claim)); that Village Defendants’ “conduct ... as described herein above was motivated by their desire to deprive Mosdos and its Kollel students of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause ... with regard to practicing their religion,” (id. ¶ 149 (emphasis added) (equal-protection claim)); and that Village Defendants’ “conduct ... as described herein above was motivated by their desire to deprive Mosdos and its Kollel students of their rights to the Free Exercise of Religion,” (id. ¶ 151 (emphasis added) (First Amendment claim)). Based on these allegations, the Court dismisses these claims. Allegations of mere “participation” in a lawsuit are insufficient to state a plausible claim for any of Mosdos’s. causes of action. It is true that the Complaint alleges that Village Defendants took an “active role” instead of a “passive position” in the foreclosure litigation. (See id. ¶ 137.) But this amounts to no more than an allegation that Village Defendants did “something” instead of “nothing.” Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for Mosdos conceded that the only actions Village Defendants took were to file an answer to the complaint and to appear in court. (See Hr’g Tr. (Feb. 11, 2014) 62-63.) There is no allegation that they took any action against Mosdos or did anything that remotely affected Mosdos’s legal interests. They simply answered the allegations, which they had a right to do. See Mosdos Chofetz Chaim, Inc. v. Vill. of Wesley Hills, 701 F.Supp.2d 568, 601-03 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (finding a Village’s participation in litigation protected under the First Amendment right to petition and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine where the participation was not “objectively baseless,” defendants did not “intend! ] to cause harm ... through the use of governmental process,” and defendants’ conduct did not otherwise violate the Constitution (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); see also Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972) (“The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right to petition.”); Freeman v. Lasky, Haas & Cohler, 410 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir.2005) (“Noerr-Pennington immunity, and the sham exception, also apply to defensive pleadings, because asking a court to deny one’s opponent’s petition is also a form of petition _” (internal citation omitted)). To do anything less would have risked default. The Complaint’s allegations are thus exactly the kind of “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” that cannot survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Although the Court, in considering Village Defendants’ Motion, must rely entirely on the allegations made in the Complaint and documents incorporated by reference therein, it notes that the allegations made in Mosdos’s Memorandum of Law, if considered, would not save the Complaint. Those allegations include that Village Defendants “have oddly inserted themselves in the Foreclosure Action and have acted adversarial to Mos-dos,” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Village Defs. 2); that their “actions in a Foreclosure Action rise to the level of extraordinary, and are a resurgence of their bad behavior in the Ramapo Action,” (id.); that they took “an active position in a case where they have no cognizable interest,” (id. at 3); that their actions “represent new episodes of a continuing bad behavior,” (id. at 4); that their “active participation in a case where they have no interest is a unique act directed at Mosdos,” (id.); and that they have “aet[ed] in a foreclosure case directed at Mosdos,” (id. at 5). Notably, the Memorandum also makes the new allegation — entirely absent from the Complaint — that Village Defendants are “acting in concert with Avon” in the foreclosure litigation. (Id. at 3; see also id. at 4 (“It appears as if [Village Defendants] were acting in concert with Avon in their united attempt to shut down the Kiryas Radin religious studies campus.”); id. at 5 (alleging that Village Defendants “actively workfed] in concert with a predator who purchased a loan for the expressed purposes of shutting down the Yeshiva at Mosdos’ property”); id. (alleging that Village Defendants “are teaming up with Avon to continue their quest to destroy Mosdos”).) However, even those allegations — which, to be clear, the Court does not consider to be part of the Complaint — would not be enough to survive a motion to dismiss because they simply do not explain what Village Defendants were supposed to do to defend themselves in litigation they did not initiate. Nor do these allegations explain how the mere filing of an answer violated Mosdos’s constitutional rights. Mosdos appears to rely implicitly on the history of the litigation between it and Village Defendants to inform the facts underlying the instant Complaint, noting that “the history is an integral part of [this] case.” (Id. at 3.) It even admits, candidly, that “[p]erhaps the new causes of action should have been set forth as an amendment” to the related action pending on this Court’s docket. (Id.) Without commenting on whether Mosdos should have brought the claims in a different action, the Court holds that Mosdos did not sufficiently allege the claims in this Action. It thus grants Village Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss in full and dismisses the thirteenth through seventeenth causes of action. C. Claims Against Citizens Citizens has moved to dismiss causes of action three through nine. (See Mem. of Law in Supp. of RBS Citizens, N.A.’s Mot. To Dismiss (“Citizens’ Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 36) 1.) Because the fourth and fifth causes of action relate to claims alleged against Avon Defendants, the Court will address these issues at the end of the Opinion. 1. Fraudulent Inducement To Borrow (Sixth Cause of Action) Under New York law, in “an action based upon fraud[,] the time within which the action must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff ... discovered the fraud....” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(8). Given that Mosdos alleges that the fraud occurred, at the latest, in December 2005, and that Mosdos filed the Complaint in September 2012 — over six years later— Citizens argues that this claim is time barred. (See Citizens’ Mem. 19.) Upon further consideration, Mosdos agrees. (See PL’s Opp’n to Citizens 6-7 (“Upon further review of the chronology of events, Mosdos does not challenge Citizens’ motion addressing this cause of action and consents to the dismissal of this cause of action.”).) The Court thus grants Citizens’ Motion to dismiss the Sixth Cause of Action with prejudice. 2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Third Cause of Action) In its Third Cause of Action, Mosdos alleges that Citizens breached its fiduciary duty to Mosdos by “improperly utilizing] the funds it held in trust for Mosdos for its own benefit without the permission or consent of Mosdos.” (Compl. ¶ 57.) To state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under New York law, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) misconduct by the defendant, and (3) damages directly caused by the defendant’s misconduct.” Varveris v. Zacharakos, 110 A.D.3d 1059, 973 N.Y.S.2d 774, 775 (2013); see also United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F.Supp.2d 593, 630-32 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (same). “A fiduciary relationship arises between two persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation.” Roni LLC v. Arfa, 18 N.Y.3d 846, 939 N.Y.S.2d 746, 963 N.E.2d 123, 124 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The core of a fiduciary relationship is a higher level of trust than normally present in the marketplace between those involved in arm’s length business transactions.” Faith Assembly v. Titledge of N.Y. Abstract, LLC, 106 A.D.3d 47, 961 N.Y.S.2d 542, 553 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, although “New York courts have held that a fiduciary duty generally does not exist between mortgage brokers and borrowers,” Iannuzzi v. Am. Mortg. Network, Inc., 727 F.Supp.2d 125, 138 (E.D.N.Y.2010); see also Indep. Order of Foresters v. Donald, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 157 F.3d 933, 940 (2d Cir.1998) (“Under New York law, as generally, there is no general fiduciary duty inherent in an ordinary broker/customer relationship.”), a plaintiff may successfully allege a fiduciary duty between such parties if it “show[s] special circumstances that transformed the parties’ business relationship to a fiduciary one,” Legend Autorama, Ltd. v. Audi of Am., Inc., 100 A.D.3d 714, 954 N.Y.S.2d 141, 144 (2012). “Generally, where parties have entered into a contract, courts look to that agreement to discover the nexus of the parties’ relationship and the particular contractual expression establishing the parties’ interdependency.” EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. 5 N.Y.3d 11, 799 N.Y.S.2d 170, 832 N.E.2d 26, 31 (2005) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). But “it is fundamental that fiduciary ‘liability is not dependent solely upon an agreement or contractual relation between the fiduciary and the beneficiary but results from the relation.’ ” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 cmt. b (1979)). That said, “[i]t is well settled that the same conduct which may constitute the breach of a contractual obligation may also constitute the breach of a duty arising out of the relationship created by contract but which is independent of the contract itself.” Mandelblatt v. Devon Stores, Inc., 132 A.D.2d 162, 521 N.Y.S.2d 672, 676 (1987). In particular, and as relevant here, “New York case law recognizes a fiduciary duty where specific language in the contract obligates a creditor to make payments out of an escrow account on behalf of the debtor.” Casey v. Citibank, N.A, 915 F.Supp.2d 255, 265 (N.D.N.Y.2013); see also Dolan v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 930 F.Supp.2d 396, 422 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (denying summary judgment where mortgage-agreement language establishing duty to make payments from escrow funds “[gave] rise to a fiduciary duty”); Davis v. Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., FSB, 158 A.D.2d 50, 557 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (1990) (“[T]he complaint, alleging facts arising out of the escrow arrangement for the payment of taxes, describes a fiduciary obligation.... ”). In this context, “[a]n escrow agent owes the parties to the transaction a fiduciary duty, and therefore the agent .... has a duty not to deliver the monies in escrow except upon strict compliance with the conditions imposed by the controlling agreement.” Greenapple v. Capital One, N.A., 92 A.D.3d 548, 939 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352-53 (2012) (citation omitted). Here, the Complaint alleges that “[t]he Building Loan Agreement and the loans made thereunder provided for numerous escrow type accounts whereunder Citizens held in trust certain funds for the benefit of Mosdos as borrower.” (See Compl. ¶ 54.) It further alleges that Citizens held more than $3 million in trust for Mosdos. (See id. ¶ 56.) It further alleges that “Citizens improperly utilized [those] funds ... for its own benefit without the permission or consent of Mosdos,” including using the funds “to extinguish various liens on the property,” and “to make interest payments allegedly due under the Building Loan Agreement, Note and Mortgage.” (See id. ¶¶ 57, 59, 61; see also Pl.’s Opp’n to Citizens 3 (alleging that “Citizens used hundreds of thousands of Mosdos’s dollars for ‘forward swap’ expenditures .... to unwind the ‘Swap Transaction’ associated with the Building Loan Agreement”).) And it specifically alleges that these uses breached Citizens’ fiduciary duty to Mosdos. (See id. ¶ 60 (“Citizens proceeded to assign Lien(s) to Avon in contravention of its fiduciary duty to Mos-dos.”); id. ¶ 61 (“[Without the permission or consent of Mosdos, Citizens proceeded to use escrow funds held in trust for Mosdos_”).) Finally, it alleges damages and seeks an accounting due to the breach. (See id. ¶¶ 62-63.) Because New York courts have recognized that “[ascertaining the existence of a fiduciary relationship inevitably requires a fact-specific inquiry,” Roni LLC, 939 N.Y.S.2d 746, 963 N.E.2d at 125, “a claim alleging the existence of a fiduciary duty usually is not subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Abercrombie v. Andrew College, 438 F.Supp.2d 243, 274 (S.D.N.Y.2006); see also Wells Fargo Bank, 972 F.Supp.2d at 630-32 (same). Here, in light of the Court’s obligation to draw all reasonable inferences in Mosdos’s favor, it finds that Mosdos has plausibly alleged that the Parties’ agreements created a fiduciary relationship to the extent that they caused Citizens to establish escrow funds wherein Citizens held Mosdos’s money in trust. Additionally, Mosdos plausibly alleges that the fiduciary duty was established “[w]hen Citizens pulled the plug on the loan” and “did not stop exercising control over the funds in the Mosdos account.” (See PL’s Opp’n to Citizens 3 (“In exerting this control over Mosdos’s accounts, Citizens assumed a fiduciary duty with Mos-dos. It subsequently breached that duty by using the funds for its own purposes.”).) Citizens argues that “none of the collective loan documents contain language that establishes a fiduciary duty in this fact-specific context,” and that “Plaintiffs allegations fail to implicate the actual use of escrow/trust funds required to demonstrate a fiduciary duty.” (Citizens’ Mem. 8.) In particular, Citizens argues that “the Building Loan Agreement [and the Note] do[ ] not contain any provisional establishing or referencing any ‘escrow type accounts’ or funds to be ‘held in trust’ for Plaintiffs benefit that would support a fiduciary duty claim.” (Id. at 10.) And it argues that the Building Loan Agreement authorized it to undertake the specific conduct alleged in the Complaint. (Id. at 10-12 (“[Mosdos’s] allegations ignore that Citizens had the right under the Building Loan Agreement to satisfy these obligations in order to protect its security interest when Plaintiff failed to resolve liens or make interest payments.”).) In general, therefore, Citizens asks the Court to dismiss the claim based on its interpretation of the Building Loan Agreement. However, although “the Court may resolve issues of contract interpretation when the contract is properly before the Court, [it] must resolve all ambiguities in the contract in Plaintiffs’ favor.” Serdarevic v. Centex Homes, LLC, 760 F.Supp.2d 322, 328 (S.D.N.Y.2010); see also Int’l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir.1995) (“[A court is] not constrained to accept the allegations of the complaint in respect of the construction of a contract, although — at [the motion-to-dismiss stage] — [it] will strive to resolve any contractual ambiguities in [plaintiffs] favor.”). In addition to challenging the existence of a fiduciary duty, Citizens argues that Mosdos cannot prove “misconduct” because the agreements authorized it to use the funds to undertake the complained-of actions. Specifically, Citizens identifies various provisions of the Building Loan Agreement that purportedly authorized Citizens to use funds to extinguish liens and to make interest payments, which use “would have been charged as loan advances,” and would not have “originate[d] from a particular escrow account.” (See Citizens’ Mem. 10-12; see also Citizens’ Reply Mem. 3 n. 3.) These arguments might be persuasive if the Court did not accept Mosdos’s contrary allegations as true, or if Mosdos alleged a fiduciary relationship existing only while the contract was in effect. However, in alleging that a fiduciary duty was established “[w]hen Citizens pulled the plug on the loan” and “did not stop exercising control over the funds in the Mosdos account,” (see Pl.’s Opp’n to Citizens 3), Mosdos effectively argues that Citizens’ actions rendered the agreements ineffective. In other words, where Citizens claims that the Agreement authorized its actions, Mosdos claims that, when the Agreement ceased to be effective, Citizens’ actions were outside the scope of its fiduciary authority. Such an action, if proven, constitutes a breach of a fiduciary duty. See Greenapple, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 353 (recognizing an escrow agent’s “duty not to deliver the monies in escrow except upon strict compliance with the conditions imposed by the controlling agreement”). In light of Mosdos’s allegations and the Court’s duty, at this stage, to accept them as true, the Court finds that Mosdos has plausibly alleged that a fiduciary relationship existed, that Citizens breached that duty, and that Mosdos suffered damages and/or deserves an accounting. See Varveris, 973 N.Y.S.2d at 775; Benedict v. Whitman Breed Abbott & Morgan, 110 A.D.3d 935, 973 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (2013) (“To obtain an accounting a plaintiff must show that there was some wrongdoing on the part of a defendant with respect to the fiduciary relationship.”). The Court thus denies Citizens’ Motion To Dismiss the third cause of action. S. Conversion (Seventh Cause of Action) Mosdos next claims that Citizens “improperly withdrew approximately $600,000.00 in unused loan proceeds from the Escrow account maintain[ed] by [Citizens] for Mosdos as a purported ‘swap fee,’ ” and that this action “amount[ed] to an improper conversion of Mosdos[’s] fund[s] held in escrow ... by Citizens.” (Compl. ¶¶ 89-90.) Under New York law, “Conversion claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, which begins running when the alleged conversion takes place.” Ferring B.V. v. Allergan, Inc., 932 F.Supp.2d 493, 510 (S.D.N.Y.2013); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3); Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, Tex., 87 N.Y.2d 36, 637 N.Y.S.2d 342, 660 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (1995). Although the Complaint does not specify the date when the conversion allegedly occurred, Citizens argues that the claim “arises from the automatic conversion of the loan to a permanent amortizing loan and the commencement of the Swap transaction,” which it argues “occurred on June 20, 2007” — more than three years before Mosdos filed its Complaint in September 2012. (See Citizens’ Mem. 24.) In response, Mosdos does not specifically allege that the conversion occurred within the three-year limitations period, (see Pl.’s Opp’n to Citizens 7 (“What Mosdos knows is that at some time Citizens unilaterally took $600,000.00.... ”)), and in fact it candidly admits that “[u]nder the known facts, we don’t know whether this argument will ultimately succeed,” (Id. at 8). “[BJecause the defendants bear the burden of establishing the expiration of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, a pre-answer motion to dismiss on this ground may be granted only if it is clear on the face of the complaint that the statute of limitations has run.” Fargas v. Cincinnati Mach., LLC, 986 F.Supp.2d 420, 427, 2013 WL 6508863, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2013); see also Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir.2008) (“[A] defendant may raise an affirmative defense in a pre-answer Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the defense appears on the face of the complaint.”); cf. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (“A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. If the allegations, for example, show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.... ”). Accordingly, Mosdos “need not allege a specific ... date to survive a motion to dismiss.” Pearce v. Manhattan Ensemble Theater, Inc., 528 F.Supp.2d 175, 182 (S.D.N.Y.2007); see also Fargas, 986 F.Supp.2d at 427, 2013 WL 6508863, at *7 (denying motion to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds where “the Complaint contained] no information as to the [relevant dates]” and the dates were not otherwise referenced in properly considered documents). Citizens is correct that the Promissory Note — which the Court may consider in evaluating the Motion — defined the “Construction Maturity Date” to be June 20, 2007, and provided that the Swap transaction was a “condition to th[e] conversion” from the Construction Period to the Permanent Period. (See Promissory Note 1.) Indeed, if Citizens ultimately proves that the alleged conversion actually happened on June 20, 2007, then Mosdos’s claim might be time-barred. However, Mosdos disputes that the conversion happened on that date, alleging that “the conditions precedent for the conversion to permanent financing never happened,” and thus that the Swap transaction was not necessarily triggered in June 2007. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Citizens 7.) Drawing all reasonable inferences in Mosdos’s favor, it is at least plausible that Mosdos is correct that Citizens converted the money in or after September 2009 — i.e., three years before it filed this Complaint. The Court thus declines to grant Citizens’ Motion on statute-of-limitations grounds at this time. In the alternative, Citizens argues that Mosdos fails to plead facts supporting a claim of conversion. Under New York law, “[a] conversion takes place when someone, intentionally and without authority, assumes or exercises control over personal property belonging to someone else, interfering with that person’s right to possession.” Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 43, 827 N.Y.S.2d 96, 860 N.E.2d 713, 717 (2006). But “New York case law is clear that ‘an action for conversion cannot be validly maintained where damages are merely being sought for breach of contract.’ ” In re JMK Constr. Grp., Ltd,., 502 B.R. 396, 414 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2013) (quoting Peters Griffin Woodward, Inc. v. WCSC, Inc., 88 A.D.2d 883, 452 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600 (1982)); see also In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944, 958 (2d Cir.1993) (“It is also settled under New York law that a tort claim will not arise where plaintiff is essentially seeking enforcement of the bargain.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, where an agreement exists between two parties, “[t]hat agreement governs the parties’ transaction and thus precludes recovery based on a cause of action for conversion.” Schmidt v. Lorenzo, 70 A.D.3d 1362, 894 N.Y.S.2d 641, 642 (2010). Thus, “[a] conversion claim must be dismissed when it does not stem from a wrong independent of the alleged breach of contract.” Kalimantano GmbH v. Motion in Time, Inc., 939 F.Supp.2d 392, 416 (S.D.N.Y.2013); see also E. End Labs., Inc. v. Sawaya, 79 A.D.3d 1095, 914 N.Y.S.2d 250, 251 (2010) (dismissing conversion claim where “the complaint failed to set forth allegations which would constitute a wrong separate and distinct from an alleged breach of contract which could give rise to independent tort liability”). Mosdos alleges that Citizens’ use of $600,000 “for the purpose of unwinding [the] Swap agreement .... was not ... provided for under the [B]uilding [L]oan [A]greement,” and thus that it could not have constituted a breach of contract. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Citizens 7.) But it also alleges that the money was used “as a transactional fee for a transaction which should not have occurred,” (id.), and it specifically challenges Citizens’ claim that the “loan converted to permanent financing,” (id. (stating that “this never happened”)), as the basis for its argument that Citizens “exercised control” over its property “without authority.” In this sense, Mosdos’s conversion claim is actually a claim that Citizens breached the Promissory Note’s terms authorizing Citizens to pay the Swap transaction fee. As such, the Court must dismiss this cause of action. See Wolf v. Nat’l Council of Young Isr., 264 A.D.2d 416, 694 N.Y.S.2d 424, 425 (1999) (“The appellant’s conversion counterclaim is essentially based upon allegations that the plaintiff improperly deducted late fees from its monthly mortgage payments in a manner not authorized by the mortgage agreements. However, a claim to recover damages for conversion cannot be predicated on a mere breach of contract. Since the appellant’s conversion counterclaim does not stem from a wrong which is independent of the alleged breach of the mortgage agreements, it was properly dismissed.”) k. Unjust Enrichment (Ninth Cause of Action) Mosdos’s unjust-enrichment claim arises out of the same events underlying its conversion claim. In short, Mosdos alleges that “[t]he wrongful retention by Citizens of the funds relative to the ‘forward SWAP’ fee and LIBOR manipulation constitute an unjust enrichment of Citizens at the expense of Mosdos.” (Compl. ¶ 104.) To plead an unjust-enrichment claim under New York law, “the plaintiff must allege that (1) the other party was enriched, (2) at that party’s expense, and (3) that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the other party to retain what is sought to be recovered.” Ga. Malone & Co. v. Rieder, 19 N.Y.3d 511, 950 N.Y.S.2d 333, 973 N.E.2d 743, 746 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). But, as is true with a conversion claim, “[wjhere the parties executed a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter, recovery on a theory of unjust enrichment for events arising out of that subject matter is ordinarily precluded.” IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 N.Y.3d 132, 879 N.Y.S.2d 355, 907 N.E.2d 268, 274 (2009); see also Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190, 193 (1987) (“The existence of a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter.”). Mosdos does not dispute this or otherwise argue that its claim should not be precluded. Instead, it “respectfully submit[s] that th[e] facts [in the Complaint] are sufficient to make out a cause of action for unjust enrichment.” (PL’s Opp’n to Citizens 8.) The Court disagrees, and therefore it grants Citizens’ Motion To Dismiss this claim. 5. Libor Manipulation (Eighth Cause of Action) Mosdos next alleges “LIBOR Manipulation.” As Citizens points out, “there [is] no cause of action under New York law for ‘LIBOR manipulation.’ ” (Citizens’ Mem. 24.) Mosdos responds that “[t]his cause of action is an extension of the cause of action for unjust enrichment,” specifically alleging that “Citizens effectuated the Swap when it did to increase the interest rate on the loan and thereby benefit itself.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to Citizens 8.) Mosdos thus effectively concedes that this claim arises out of the same contractual dispute as its conversion and unjust-enrichment claims, which the Court has dismissed as precluded by the contract. Accordingly, the Court grants Citizens’ Motion To Dismiss this claim for the same reasons it dismissed Mosdos’s unjust-enrichment claim. D. Claims Against Avon Defendants Mosdos also alleges a number of claims against Avon Defendants, most of which are related to Avon Defendants’ pending foreclosure action against Mosdos. Avon Defendants move to dismiss the tenth and eleventh causes of action, alleging abuse of process and slander per se, respectively, and they move for summary judgment on the fifth cause of action, wherein Mosdos requests a declaration that the mortgage is invalid under two legal theories. The Court will address each argument in turn. 1. Abuse of Process (Tenth Cause of Action) Mosdos alleges that Avon Defendants’ “motivations for commencing the foreclosure action constitute an ulterior motive for the use of the legal process and as such constitute an abuse of process.” (Compl. ¶ 115.) “A plaintiff asserting a cause of action for abuse of process must plead and prove that there was (1) regularly issued [civil] process ..., (2) an intent to do harm without excuse, or justification, ... (3) use of the process in a perverted manner to obtain a collateral objective.... [, and (4)] actual or special damages.” Liss v. Forte, 96 A.D.3d 1592, 947 N.Y.S.2d 270, 271 (2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff alleges that Grunwald’s “motivation for commencing the foreclosure action was not economic gain but instead his disapproval of the religious lifestyle and education of the Mosdos Kollel students and his desire to close down the Mosdos Kollel and replace it with an institution consistent with Mr. Grunwald’s own religious values.” (Compl. ¶ 113.) Plaintiff further alleges that this “constitute^] an ulterior motive or purpose for the use of the legal process and as such constitute^] an abuse of process.” (Id. ¶ 115.) Avon Defendants argue that this claim fails to satisfy the third element — which has alternatively been framed as use of process to “seek[] some collateral advantage ... outside the legitimate ends of the process,” Bd. of Educ. of Farmingdale Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass’n, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 397, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 343 N.E.2d 278, 283 (1975) — because “commencing a foreclosure action is not outside of the legitimate end of the process,” which is “to realize upon the property securing the debt in order to satisfy the same.” (Avon Defs.’ Mem. 30.) However, to satisfy the third element, a plaintiff must allege only that a defendant “aimed to achieve a collateral purpose beyond or in addition to ” the use of process. Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 77 (2d Cir.2003) (emphasis added). The Complaint specifically alleges that Avon Defendant Grunwald commenced the foreclosure action based, at least in part, on “his desire to close down the Mosdos Kollel and replace it with an institution consistent with [his] own religious values.” (Compl. ¶ 113.) Avon Defendants dispute this allegation, (see Avon Defs.’ Mem. 30-31), but the Court may not resolve that dispute at this stage. Taking the Complaint’s allegation as true, the Court finds that the Complaint has stated a sufficient collateral objective. Avon Defendants’ citation to Key Bank of Northern New York, N.A. v. Lake Placid Co., 103 A.D.2d 19, 479 N.Y.S.2d 862 (1984), does not suggest a different result. There, the Appellate Division dismissed an abuse-of-process claim resulting from commencement of a foreclosure action, holding that the allegation “[could not] be the basis of an abuse of process claim since it [was] clear that plaintiff held mortgages which became in default and [a foreclosure] action is the proper legal means to litigate such matter.” Id. at 867. However, unlike Mosdos, the plaintiff in that case failed to allege that the defendants commenced the foreclosure proceeding for any purpose other than to recover assets in the wake of the default. Id. Here, Mosdos sufficiently alleges an objective collateral to the use of a foreclosure action as “the proper legal means” to resolve a default. But alleging a sufficient collateral objective is not enough, by itself, to satisfy the third element. “The traditional rule in New York has been that the pursuit of a collateral objective must occur after the process is issued; the mere act of issuing process does not give rise to a claim.” Gilman v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 868 F.Supp.2d 118, 131 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Curiano v. Suozzi, 63 N.Y.2d 113, 480 N.Y.S.2d 466, 469 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (1984) (“[Plaintiffs] do not contend that the summons issued by defendants was improperly used after it was issued but only that defendants acted maliciously in bringing the action. A malicious motive alone, however, does not give rise to a cause of action for abuse of process.”); Liss, 947 N.Y.S.2d at 271 (“[Defendants established that defendant did not use process in a pei-verted manner to obtain a collateral objective, which generally requires the improper use of process after it is issued.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). It is true that the New York Court of Appeals has recognized that “nothing in [that] Court’s holdings would seem to preclude an abuse of process claim based on the issuance of the process itself.” Parkin v. Cornell Univ., Inc., 78 N.Y.2d 523, 577 N.Y.S.2d 227, 583 N.E.2d 939, 943 (1991). However, the Second Circuit has held, subsequent to Par-kin, that “[t]he gist of abuse of process is the improper use of process after it is regularly issued.” Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir.1994) (emphasis added). Because this Court “is bound by the law of the Circuit,” it agrees with other courts in this district that “the dicta ... from Parkin does not alter the established law governing malicious abuse of process claims.” Richardson v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 05-CV-6278, 2009 WL 804096, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2009); see also Gilman, 868 F.Supp.2d at 131 (same). Here, the abuse-of-process claim, as pleaded in the Complaint, relies solely on the allegation that Avon Defendants “commenced] the foreclosure action.” (Compl. ¶ 115.) It is true that the Complaint does reference post-commencement activity when it alleges that Avon Defendant Grunwald “disclosed his true perverse motivations” “[subsequent to Avon’s commencement of the foreclosure action.” (Id. ¶ 113.) However, this allegation does not concern a post-commencement use of process, but rather describes facts that relate to the commencement itself. The Complaint might have stated a claim for abuse of process if it alleged that Avon Defendants commenced the foreclosure action and then subsequently used that action in some way to pursue the collateral objective. See Cook, 41 F.3d at 80. But the Complaint does not do so. Thus, the Court grants Avon Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss this claim. 2. Slander Per Se (Eleventh Cause of Action) Mosdos next alleges that Avon Defendants made comments that “have injured Mosdos in its ability to operate its school by creating an environment of instability in both its student body and its donors,” and that such comments therefore “constitute a slander per se.” (Compl. ¶¶ 120, 122.) To plead a claim of slander per se under New York law, a plaintiff must allege, “(i) a defamatory statement of fact, (ii) that is false, (iii)