Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION JAMES C. CACHERIS, District Judge. This case involves Virginia’s hotly contested “Public-Private” toll lane scheme. Plaintiffs in this case seek class action status, and are all users of the High-Occupancy Toll Roads operated by Defendants in Northern Virginia. This matter is before the Court on three motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, filed by (1) Defendants Transurban (USA), Inc., Transurban (USA) Operations, Inc., Capital Beltway Express, LLC, 95 Express Lanes, LLC (the “Transurban” Defendants) [Dkt. 41]; (2) Defendant Faneuil, Inc. (“Faneuil”) [Dkt. 44]; and (3) Defendant Law Enforcements Systems, LLC (“LES”) [Dkt. 49]. For the following reasons, the Court grants Transurban, Fa-neuil, and LES’s motions with respect to Plaintiffs’ substantive due process and unjust enrichment claims; grants Faneuil and LES’s motions with respect to Plaintiffs’ Maryland Consumer Protection Act and Virginia Consumer Protection Act claims; and denies Transurban, Faneuil, and LES’s motions with respect to Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment, procedural due process, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and tortious interference with contract claims. I. Background At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must read the amended complaint as a whole, construe the amended complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept the facts alleged in the amended complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Thus, the following facts taken from the amended complaint are only accepted as true for purposes of the three motions now before the Court. Pursuant to the Public-Private Transportation Act (“PPTA”), passed by the Virginia General Assembly in 1995, Tran-surban contracted with the Commonwealth of Virginia to maintain and operate high-occupancy toll lanes (“HOT lanes”) on the Capital Beltway, Interstate 495 (“1-495”), which opened on November 17, 2012, and on Interstate 95 (“1-95”) and Interstate 395 (“1-395”), which opened on December 29, 2014. (Am. Compl. [Dkt. 36] ¶¶ 24-27.) The HOT lanes on 1-495 are colloquially known as the “495 Express Lanes” and the HOT lanes on 1-95 and 1-395 are colloquially known as the “95 Express Lanes.” (Id. at ¶ 25.) Both the 495 Express Lanes and the 95 Express Lanes collect HOT lane tolls through the use of an E-ZPass transponder mounted on the inside of the vehicle’s windshield, which is linked to the driver’s bank account or credit card; no cash toll booths are offered and instead, an E-ZPass transponder is required. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-27.) HOT lane prices on the 495 Express Lanes and the 95 Express Lanes vary dynamically “according to real-time traffic conditions: the more drivers using the HOT Lanes, the more expensive the toll, and vise-versa.” (Id. at ¶ 26.) When an E-ZPass account is out of money to pay tolls, the bank account or credit card is automatically charged to reload the E-ZPass account. (Id. at ¶ 27.) An E-ZPass account can become inadequately funded if the linked credit card expires or is otherwise cancelled. (Id. at ¶ 59.) A. Virginia’s HOT Lanes Law Virginia law governs the creation of HOT lanes (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “HOT lanes law”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 42 (citing Va.Code Ann. §§ 33.2-502, 503).) The operator of a motor vehicle “shall make arrangements with the HOT lanes operator for payment of the required toll prior to entering such HOT lanes.” Va.Code Ann. § 33.2-503. Failure to make such arrangements, ie., failure to pay the required toll, violates Virginia law and such a violation is subject to civil penalties, including payment of the unpaid toll, fines, fees, and costs. Id. Enforcement of this statutory provision is accomplished by issuance of a summons for a civil violation, which can occur one of two ways. First, if a law-enforcement officer observes an HOT lane violation, the officer may execute a summons for the violation. Va.Code Ann. § 33.2-503(1). Second, a summons may be executed if a violation is evidenced by information obtained from a photo-enforcement system, which the HOT lane operator is required to install and operate at all toll-collection locations. Id. §§ 33.2-503(2)(a)-(b). “A certificate, sworn to or affirmed by a technician employed or authorized by the HOT lanes operator, or a facsimile of such certificate, based on inspection of photographs, micro-photographs, videotapes, or other recorded images produced by a photo-enforcement system, shall be prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.” Id. § 33.2-503(2)(b). This second enforcement mechanism, whereby a summons is issued based on evidence obtained from a photo-enforcement system, is the enforcement mechanism primarily at issue in this litigation. The summons shall provide the registered owner of the vehicle with “reasonable notice” that the vehicle was used in violation of this statute, and provide “notice of the time and place of the hearing and notice of the civil penalty and costs for such offense.” Va.Code Ann. § 33.2-503(2)(d). The HOT lanes operator may impose an administrative fee in addition to the unpaid toll, “so as to recover the expenses of collecting the unpaid toll, [but the] administrative fee shall be reasonably related to the actual cost of collecting the unpaid toll.” Id. § 33.2-503(3)(a). The summons shall contain an option for the driver or registered owner of the vehicle to prepay the unpaid toll and all penalties, administrative fees, and costs. Id. § 33.2-503(2)(c). If the operator of the vehicle pays the administrative fee and unpaid tolls within 30 days of notification, the administrative fee shall not exceed $25. Id. § 33.2-503(3)(a). Otherwise, the administrative fee shall not exceed $100. Id. If the operator of the vehicle contests the violation but a court of competent jurisdiction finds that the operator of the vehicle did violate the statute, the court shall impose a civil penalty payable to the HOT lanes operator as follows: “for a first time offense, $50; for a second offense, $250; for a third offense within a period of two years of the second offense, $500; and for a fourth and subsequent offense within a period of three years of the second offense, $1,000, together with, in each case, the unpaid toll, all accrued administrative fees imposed by the HOT lanes operator ... and applicable court costs.” Id. § 33.2-503(3)(b). Failure to pay the required penalties, fees, and costs can result in suspension of the operator’s vehicle registration and license. Id. § 33.2 — 503(3)(c). B. Defendants’ Alleged Enforcement Procedure As the HOT lanes operator, Transurban enforces civil violations of the HOT lanes law and attempts to collect payment for unpaid tolls by providing notice to the registered operator of the motor vehicle. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45, 59.) Once an alleged “violation” occurs, the operator of the motor vehicle does not immediately receive notice of the infraction. (Id. at ¶¶ 57-58.) Instead, an operator of a motor vehicle in violation of the HOT lanes law “may not find out for months (or even over a year)” until Transurban mails the notice or summons. (Id. at ¶ 58.) “If a driver somehow ‘knows’ that she has committed a toll violation, within 5 days of that violation, she can pay the toll and a[n administrative] fee of $1.50 per trip through the ‘Missed a Toll’ process on Defendant Transurban’s website.” (Id. at ¶ 60.) Otherwise, the unknowing violator will not become aware of the violation until Transurban issues a notice through the mail. (Id.) Specifically, Transurban will first mail an “unpaid toll notice” to the registered owner of the motor vehicle requesting payment of the unpaid tolls, plus a $12.50 administrative fee that is assessed for each violation (hereinafter “the first notice”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 60.) The first notice requests payment or notice that the driver disputes the violation within 30 days. (Id.) If the toll remains unpaid after 30 days, Transurban issues a “final toll invoice” that requests payment of the unpaid tolls, plus a $25 administrative fee for each violation (hereinafter “the final notice”). (Id. at ¶ 61; see also Transurban’s Mem. [Dkt. 42] Ex. C.) The final notice requests payment within 30 days and states that Tran-surban will refer any failure to pay to its debt collection agency, LES. (Id.) Transur-ban takes “no efforts to ensure or confirm that the invoices they mail actually reach their intended recipients ... even when these invoices are returned as undeliverable.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 71.) If Transurban refers the account for debt collection, LES will issue a collection notice to the driver that requests payment of the unpaid tolls, plus a $100 administrative fee for each violation (“the collection notice”). (Id. at ¶¶ 74-84.) “LES regularly tells consumers in correspondence that ‘this is an attempt to collect a debt and any information obtained will be used for that purpose’ and/or that the communication is from a debt collector.” (Id. at ¶75.) LES attempts to make debt validation disclosures in the collection notice pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), but “does not comply with the FDCPA in several respects.” (Id. at ¶¶ 77-84 (alleging that LES fails to identify the creditor, Transurban, fails to include any of the statutory disclosures, and falsely represents the character and amount of the debt).) If the toll is still unpaid, Transurban engages the services of Faneuil, which initiates collection lawsuits by executing a summons through first-class mail to the registered owner of the motor vehicle. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 85.) Either Transurban or Faneuil issues “electronically-produced summonses robo-signed by machines. They do not issue summonses sworn to or affirmed by humans, as required by Virginia law.” (Id. at ¶¶ 86, 88-89,118.) Moreover, it is alleged that Transurban or Fa-neuil issues summonses that “include an identical pre-printed signature, placed and proportioned on the forms in the same manner for all summonses.” (Id. at ¶ 89.) And in some cases, Transurban or Faneuil issues summonses more than one year after the purported toll violation, in violation of Virginia law. (Id. at ¶¶ 92-94.) Plaintiffs also allege that Transurban has failed to appear in court, but instead sends a non-lawyer independent contractor for Fa-neuil to make court appearances. (Id. at ¶¶ 95-96 (“Defendant Transurban sent Alexis Brach (a non-lawyer) to appear on its behalf. Because Ms. Brach is an independent contractor for Defendant Faneuil, [the court] ruled she could not and cannot represent the Transurban Defendants in court.”).) On October 27, 2014, approximately two years after the opening of the 495 Express Lanes and prior to the opening of the 95 Express Lanes, Transurban announced the implementation of a “First-Time Forgiveness” program for HOT lane violations. (Am. Compl. ¶ 97.) This program includes: (a) If a consumer contacts Defendant Transurban within 60 days of toll violation, the company will remove automatically-assessed administrative fees, where toll violation arose from insufficient funds in an E-ZPass account, failure to link a license plate to the E-ZPass account or an incorrectly mounted E-ZPass; (b) In the event that Defendant Tran-surban sends an E-ZPass customer an invoice and the letter is returned with an unknown address, Defendant Tran-surban will send the invoice to a debt collection agency but will .waive all fees if the customer contacts it and provide[s] evidence the customer has resolved the account issues with E-ZPass and has paid his tolls; and (c) Defendant Transurban will continue to collect through court action, but “will put a cap on the number of trips sent to court and pursue a maximum of $2,220 (which includes the administrative fee + civil penalties), plus tolls and court fees, regardless of the number of violations. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that this new policy nonetheless fails to resolve the problem of “excessive, illegal, and unreasonable fees and fines” for various reasons. (Id. at ¶¶ 98-102.) C. Class Representatives Seven individual 'Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit against Defendants and claim, generally, that they were assessed massive fees and penalties for minor toll violations on the 495 Express Lanes and 95 Express Lanes that were unreasonable and improper. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 109-219.) At all relevant times, each Plaintiff had previously signed up for an E-ZPass account, his or her E-ZPass transponder was mounted on the windshield of the vehicle, and the E-ZPass account was linked to a valid payment method for automatic replenishment. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 109, 124, 138, 152, 175, 191, 204.) Each Plaintiff also alleges that at the time he or she entered the HOT lanes, no indication was given that the E-ZPass was unread or maintained an insufficient balance. (Id. at ¶¶ 111, 126, 140, 154, 177, 193, 206.) Moreover, each Plaintiff alleges that any eventual summons he or she received was “signed” by an automated computer program, in violation of Virginia law. (Id. at ¶¶ 119, 133, 147, 159, 186, 199, 214.) Each Plaintiff, and the facts specific to his or her claim, is summarized briefly below. 1. Plaintiff Jo-Ann Brown Between October 4 and October 12, 2013, Transurban determined that Plaintiff Jo-Ann Brown (“Brown”) violated the HOT lanes law on five separate occasions, totaling $4.15 in toll violations. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 110-114.) Brown did not receive notice of the toll violations until sixty (60) days later, when she received a letter from “495 Express Lanes” stating that she owed $4.15 in tolls and $100 in administrative fees. (Id. at ¶ 115.) Brown protested but nonetheless agreed to pay the amount due, but 495 Express Lanes declined to accept Brown’s payment. (Id. at ¶¶ 116— 117.) In October of 2014, Transurban served Brown with several summonses, which indicated that it was seeking $3,413.75 in total as a result of the $4.15 cumulative toll violation. (Id. at ¶ 118 (breaking down the administrative fee, cost amount, and civil penalty sought for each violation).) Transurban assessed a $100 administrative fee and $72 in costs for each of the five toll violations. (Id.) The first toll violation was accompanied by a $50 civil penalty; the second toll violation was accompanied by a $250 civil penalty; and the third toll violation was accompanied by a $500 civil penalty; and the fourth and fifth toll violations were each accompanied by a separate $1,000 civil penalty. (Id.) Prior to the issuance of the summons, Brown had no meaningful or adequate means to contest the fines and fees, and no judgment has been entered against her to date. (Id. at ¶¶ 122-123.) 2. Plaintiff Anna Stanfield Between June 18 and July 3, 2013, Tran-surban determined that Plaintiff Anna Stanfield (“Stanfield”) violated the HOT lanes law on ten separate occasions, totaling $32.70 in toll violations. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 126-128.) In October of 2014, Transur-ban served Stanfield with several summonses, which indicated that it was seeking $8,380.70 in total as a result the total $32.70 toll violation. (Id. at ¶ 129 (breaking down the administrative fee, cost amount, and civil penalty sought for each violation).) Transurban assessed a $100 administrative fee and $72 in costs for each of the ten toll violations. (Id.) And as with Brown, Transurban assessed escalating civil penalties, starting at $50 for the first violation, rising to $250 for the second violation, $500 for the third violation, and $1,000 for each of the subsequent violations. (Id.) Transurban issued all of the summonses more than one year after the date of the purported toll violations. (Id. at ¶ 134.) Prior to the issuance of the summons, Stanfield had no meaningful or adequate means to contest the fines and fees. (Id. at ¶ 135.) After receiving the summonses, Stanfield contacted Transur-ban, and after feeling enormous pressure to resolve the matter, Stanfield was pressured into paying Transurban $2,200. (Id. at ¶¶ 136-137.) S. Plaintiff Rachel Amarti Between June 3 and July 22, 2013, Tran-surban determined that Plaintiff Rachel Amarti (“Amarti”) violated the HOT lanes law on twenty-six separate occasions, with total toll violations in excess of $100. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 139-142.) In 2014, Transurban served Amarti with several summonses, which indicated that it was seeking over $25,000 as a result these toll violations. (Id. at ¶ 143 (breaking down the administrative fee, cost amount, and civil penalty sought for each violation).) Transurban assessed a $100 administrative fee and $72 in costs for each of the ten toll violations. (Id.) And as with Brown and Stanfield, Transurban assessed escalating civil penalties, starting at $50 for the first violation, rising to $250 for the second violation, $500 for the third violation, and $1,000 for each of the subsequent violations. (Id.) Tran-surban issued all of the summonses more than one year after the date of the purported toll violations. (Id. at ¶ 148.) Prior to the issuance of the summons, Amarti had no meaningful or adequate means to contest the fines and fees. (Id. at ¶ 149.) After receiving the summonses, Amarti contacted Transurban, and after feeling enormous pressure to resolve the matter, Amarti was pressured into paying Tran-surban $3,600. (Id. at ¶¶ 150-151.) Ip. Plaintiff Mary Elise Pizarro Between May 8 and May 28, 2013, Tran-surban determined that Plaintiff Mary Elise Pizarro (“Pizarro”) violated the HOT lanes law on seven separate occasions, totaling $20.50 in toll violations. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 153-156.) Pizarro received additional notices of violations in July. (Id. at ¶ 156.) Pizarro first received notice of purported toll violations one month after the alleged violation, when she received four “Final Notices” stating that she owed tolls and associated fees. {Id. at ¶ 157.) Pizarro regularly used the 495 Express Lanes to commute to and from work, but the invoices indicated violations for only part of a round trip, allegedly a clear indication that some sort of equipment failure was to blame for the violations. {Id. at ¶ 158.) Pizarro immediately contacted Transurban to challenge the violations, and the Transurban representative stated that the toll violations may have resulted from how the E-ZPass transponder was mounted on the windshield. {Id. at ¶ 159.) Pizarro requested that Transurban debit the toll amounts from her E-ZPass account and understood that the tolls and fees would be assessed in this manner. {Id.) After this telephone call, Pizarro received two additional “Final Notices” from Tran-surban. {Id. at ¶ 160.) Pizarro immediately disputed these and all other violations on the Transurban website. {Id. at ¶ 161.) On July 18, 2013, Transurban e-mailed Pizarro and denied her request due to insufficient funds, even though Pizarro maintained a sufficient balance on her E-ZPass account. (Am. Compl. ¶ 162.) In January of 2014, Pizarro ceased using the 495 Express Lanes and closed her account. {Id. at ¶ 163.) Shortly théreafter, E-ZPass refunded her approximately $83, which was the positive balance on her account. {Id. at ¶ 164.) In September of 2014, Transurban served Pizarro with ten summonses, ■ which indicated that it was seeking $9,440.90 for ten purported toll violations totaling approximately $20. {Id. at ¶¶ 165-166 (breaking down the administrative fee, cost amount, and civil penalty sought for each violation).) Transurban assessed a $100 administrative fee and $72 in costs for each of the ten toll violations. {Id.) And as with the previously mentioned Plaintiffs, Transurban assessed escalating civil penalties, starting at $50 for the first violation, rising to $250 for the second violation, $500 for the third violation, and $1,000 for each of the subsequent violations. {Id.) Transurban issued all of the summonses more than one year after the date of the purported toll violations. {Id. at ¶ 170.) Prior to the issuance of the summons, Pizarro had no meaningful or adequate means to contest the fines and fees. {Id. at ¶ 171.) After receiving the summonses, Pizarro contacted Transurban, and after feeling enormous pressure to resolve the matter, Pizarro was pressured into paying Transurban $1,513.90. {Id. at ¶¶ 172-174.) 5. Plaintiff Duane Hale Between July 6 and November 11, 2013, Transurban determined that Plaintiff Duane Hale (“Hale”) violated the HOT lanes law on sixteen separate occasions, totaling $30.65 in toll violations. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 176-179.) Hale received notices demanding payment for unpaid tolls, despite having a positive balance on his E-ZPass account, and promptly disputed these initial notices but Transurban “persisted.” {Id. at ¶ 181.) In October of 2014, Transurban served Hale with sixteen summonses, which indicated that it was seeking over $15,000 for toll violations totaling $30.65. {Id. at ¶¶ 182-183 (breaking down the administrative fee, cost amount, and civil penalty sought for each violation).) Transurban assessed a $100 administrative fee and $72 in costs for each of the sixteen toll violations. {Id.) And as with the previously mentioned Plaintiffs, Transurban assessed escalating civil penalties, starting at $50 for the first violation, rising to $250 for the second violation, $500 for the third violation, and $1,000 for each of the subsequent violations. (Id.) Tran-surban issued all of the summonses more than one year after the date of the purported toll violations. (Id. at ¶ 187.) Prior to the issuance of the summons, Hale had no meaningful or adequate means to contest the fines and fees. (Id. at ¶ 171.) Hale had a court date in Fairfax County General District Court on March 16, 2014 at which all of the summonses were “null processed.” (Id. at ¶ 189.) No judgment has been entered against Hale to date. (Id. at ¶ 190.) 6. Plaintiff Michelle Osborne Between November 13 and November 21, 2013, Transurban determined that Plaintiff Michelle Osborne (“Osborne”) violated the HOT lanes law on four separate occasions, totaling $16.75 in toll violations. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 192-196.) Four months later, Osborne first received notice of the purported violations through a “Demand for Payment and Credit Bureau Warning Letter” from LES, stating that she owed $312.20 for three toll violations. (Id. at ¶ 197.) In December of 2014, Transurban served Osborne with summonses, which indicated that it was seeking $2,293.30 for toll violations totaling $16.75. (Id. at ¶ 198 (breaking down the administrative fee, cost amount, and civil penalty sought for each violation).) Transurban assessed a $100 administrative fee and $77 in costs for each of the four toll violations. (Id.) And as with the prior Plaintiffs, Transurban also assessed escalating civil penalties, starting at $50 for the first violation, rising to $250 for the second violation, $500 for the third violation, and $1,000 for the fourth violation. (Id.) Prior to the issuance of the summons, Osborne had no meaningful or adequate means to contest the fines and fees. (Id. at ¶202.) No judgment has been entered against Osborne to date. (Id. at ¶ 203.) 7. Plaintiff Jocelyn Chase ' Between June 23 and September 4, 2014, Transurban determined that Plaintiff Jocelyn Chase (“Chase”) violated the HOT lanes law on twenty-nine separate occasions, totaling $30.95 in toll violations. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 205-209.) Chase did not receive a notice until more than two months after the first purported toll violation, when she received an “Unpaid Toll Invoice” letter from Capital Beltways Express, LLC. (Id. at ¶ 210.) Between September and November of 2014, Chase received a total of six of these “Unpaid Toll Invoice” letters seeking payment for twenty-three of the twenty-nine toll violations, but never received this initial notice for six of the violations. (Id.) The first time Chase received notice of these six additional violations was on March 3, 2015, when LES sent a credit bureau warning letter for two of the violations, and on December 11, 2014, when LES sent a notice of assignment on the remaining four violations. (Id. at ¶ 211.) By March 3, 2015, LES was seeking a total of $1,817.85 for eighteen alleged toll violations, but by the time LES reported these violations to the credit bureaus, the total had grown to $1,919.10. (Id. at ¶ 212.) On May 25, 2015, Transur-ban served Chase with summonses-, which indicated that it was seeking $2,512.10 for only four toll violations totaling $4.10. (Id. at ¶ 213 (breaking down the administrative fee, cost amount, and civil penalty sought for each violation).) Transurban assessed a $100 administrative fee and $77 in costs for each of the four toll violations. (Id.) And just as with the prior Plaintiffs, Tran-surban also assessed escalating civil penalties, starting at $50 for the first violation, rising to $100 for the second violation, $250 for the third violation, and $500 for the fourth violation. (Id.) Prior to the issuance of the summons, Chase had no meaningful or adequate means to contest the fines and fees. (Id. at ¶ 217.) Chase had a court date in Fairfax County General District Court on June 24, 2015, but no judgment has been entered against her to date. (Id. at ¶¶ 218-219.) D. Claims Raised in the Amended Complaint The seven individual Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Am. Compl. ¶ 220.) Plaintiffs set forth eight claims for relief, and ultimately ask the Court to (1) declare Defendants’ fee policies and collection methods to be wrongful, unfair, and unconscionable, and enjoin any such future collections; (2) order restitution of fees and penalties paid by Plaintiffs to Defendants; (3) order disgorgement of ill-gotten gains derived from Defendants’ conduct; (4) award actual damages; (5) award punitive and exemplary damages; and (6) award pre-judgment interest and costs as applicable. (Id. at ¶¶ 235-312.) Specifically, Plaintiffs, by their applicable classes, bring the following claims against the following Defendants, which have been grouped into three categories for ease. 1. Constitutional Claims against only Transurban Claims One, Two, and Three, brought only against the Transurban Defendants, allege that Transurban has violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the United States Constitution, and the Virginia Constitution. Specifically, in Claim One, Plaintiffs allege that Transurban violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by levying excessive fines in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 235-241.) Separately, Claim One also sets forth a violation of Article I, Section 9 of the Virginia Constitution, which also prohibits excessive bail and excessive fines. (Id.) In Claim Two, Plaintiffs again allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but based upon alleged infringements of their procedural due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. And again, separately, Plaintiffs also allege a violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution. (Id. at ¶¶ 242-248.) In Claim Three, also brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs allege that Transurban violated their substantive due process rights by collecting excessive and unreasonable fees and penalties, contrary to Virginia law and to Plaintiffs’ contract with the non-party E-ZPass entities. (Id. at ¶¶ 249-257.) 2. State Laiv Claims against All Defendants Plaintiffs assert four claims under state law against all named Defendants. In Claim Four, entitled “Unjust Enrichment,” Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants knowingly received and retained wrongful benefits as a result of their wrongful conduct in conscious disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 258-267.) In Claim Six, Maryland Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants violated the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md.Code Com. Law §§ 13-101 et seq., by engaging in unlawful, unfair, and deceptive trade practices. (Id. at ¶¶ 272-282.) Similarly, in Claim Seven, Virginia Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants violated the Virginia Consumer Protection Act, Va.Code Ann. §§ 59.1-196 et seq., by engaging in unlawful, unfair, and deceptive trade practices. (Id. at ¶¶ 283-296.) And in Claim Eight, entitled “Tortious Interference with Contract,” Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants knowingly interfered with Plaintiffs’ contractual relationship with the E-ZPass entities under the E-ZPass contracts. (Id. at ¶¶ 297-312.) 3. FDCPA Claim against only Collection Defendants Lastly, in Claim Five, Plaintiffs allege that Faneuil and LES, the Collection Defendants, violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by making false and misleading representations, and by engaging in unfair and abusive debt collection practices in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. (Am. Compl. IT 269.) Plaintiffs also allege that the Collection Defendants attempted to collect knowingly excessive and inflated fines and fees in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2), 1692f(l).' (Id. at ¶ 270.) E. Motions Now Before the Court Transurban, Faneuil, and LES each filed a motion to dismiss with a memorandum in support. (Transurban’s Mot. [Dkt. 41]; Transurban’s Mem. in Supp. [Dkt. 42]; Faneuil’s Mot. [Dkt. 44]; Faneuil’s Mem. in Supp. [Dkt. 45]; LES’s Mot. [Dkt. 49]; LES’s Mem. in Supp. [Dkt. 50] (collectively “the motions”).) The motions raise four general issues that the Court must address. First, whether the Plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable and properly before this Court of limited jurisdiction. (See Transurban’s Mem. at 4-6.) Second, whether Plaintiffs sufficiently stated a claim for relief for their constitutional claims against Transurban. (See Transur-ban’s Mem. at' 8-21.) Third, whether Plaintiffs adequately state a claim for relief against the Collection Defendants under the FDCPA (See Faneuil’s Mem. at 9-19; LES’s Mem. at 6-16.) Fourth, whether Plaintiffs state proper claims for relief under Virginia and Maryland law against all named Defendants. (See Transurban’s Mem. at 21-30; Faneuil’s Mem. at 8-9, 20-28; LES’s Mem. at 18-27.) Fully briefed and argued, these issues are now properly before the Court for disposition. II. Legal Standard “[I]n passing on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). A motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenges the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the pending action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and we presume that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction. The burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc., 683 F.3d 577, 583-84 (4th Cir.2012) (citation omitted). Relevant here, “[a] Court is deprived of jurisdiction over a case when the case becomes moot.” Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 809 (4th Cir.2013) (citing Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70, 104 S.Ct. 373, 78 L.Ed.2d 58 (1983)) (additional citation omitted). And while the court must accept well-pleaded allegations as true when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679-81, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Therefore, a pleading that offers only a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Nor will a complaint that tenders mere “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, [a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir.1999) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the instance where sufficient facts are alleged in the complaint to rule on an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, the defense may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6). This principle only applies, however, if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense “clearly appear[] on the face of the complaint.” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir.2007) (emphasis in original); see also 5B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (“A complaint showing that the governing statute of limitations has run on the plaintiffs claim for relief is the most common situation in which the affirmative defense appears on the face of the pleading and provides a basis for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”). III. Analysis A. Justiciability Defendants assert a potpourri of challenges to Plaintiffs’ Article III standing in this case. Collection Defendants argue that none of the named plaintiffs have standing to sue for violations of the FDCPA. (LES’s Mem. at 11; Faneuil’s Mem. at 10.) Transurban argues that Plaintiffs Browne, Osborne, Chase, and Hale’s claims are moot, and therefore they have no standing to sue for either damages or injunctive relief. (Transurban’s Mem. at 6.) Additionally, Transurban urges the Court to find that none of the named plaintiffs has standing to seek injunctive relief against Transurban. (Id. at 7.) The Court addresses each of these issues in turn, ultimately finding that each named plaintiff has standing to assert each of their claims, before turning to the sufficiency of the facts alleged with regards to those claims. The Court begins with an analysis of the Plaintiffs’ standing to bring an action against the Collection Defendants under the FDCPA. 1. Justiciability of FDCPA Claims Article III standing requires, at a bare minimum, that a plaintiff allege “(1) an injury in fact (i.e'., a ‘concrete and particularized’ invasion of a ‘legally protected interest’); (2) causation (i.e., a ‘fairly ... trace[able]’ connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant); and (3) redressability (i.e., it is ‘likely’ and not merely ‘speculative’ that the plaintiffs injury will be remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing suit).” David v. Alphin, 704 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir.2013) (citing Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Serv., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273-74, 128 S.Ct. 2531, 171 L.Ed.2d 424 (2008)). The Collection Defendants assert that Plaintiffs here “have not suffered actual harm” as a result of Faneuil and LES’s alleged FDCPA violations. (LES’s Mem. at 11.) They argue that Plaintiffs “are seeking remedies for mere statutory violations of the FDCPA”, and they therefore fall at the first prong of the standing inquiry, lacking any “injury in fact”. (Fa-neuil’s mem. at 9). Plaintiffs respond that due to the FDCPA’s provision for statutory damages even in the absence of an actual economic injury, Plaintiffs do not need to suffer an economic injury in order to bring suit under the FDCPA. (Pis.’ Opp’n. at 17.) The Fourth Circuit has yet to address the issue of whether a plaintiff must suffer an actual economic loss to bring suit under the FDCPA, but several circuits which have considered the issue have found that no actual economic loss is required in order to have standing under the FDCPA. See Keele v. Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 593-94 (7th Cir.1998) (“The FDCPA does not require proof of actual damages as a precursor to the recovery of statutory damages”); Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs., Inc., 755 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir.2014); Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 307 (2d Cir.2003); Robey v. Shapiro, Marianos & Cejda, L.L.C., 434 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir.2006); Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir.1982). The Court agrees that it would be impractical to require that Plaintiffs suffer an actual economic injury before they have standing to sue under the FDCPA, particularly as the FDCPA “is designed to protect consumers from the unscrupulous antics of debt collectors, irrespective of whether a valid debt actually exists.” Keele, 149 F.3d at 594. The “injury in fact” suffered by Plaintiffs under the FDCPA is not any actual economic loss, but rather being subjected to the allegedly “unfair and abusive practices” of the Collection Defendants. (Am. Compl. ¶ 269.) The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their FDCPA claims against the Collection Defendants. 2. Justiciability of Claims Against Transurban Transurban also challenges the justicia-bility of this case under Article III, arguing that all of Plaintiffs Browne, Osborne, Chase, and Hale’s claims are moot, and that none of the named Plaintiffs has standing to seek prospective relief. The two questions of mootness and standing to seek prospective relief are closely intertwined in this case, but the Court addresses Transurban’s mootness argument first. An actual controversy must exist at all stages of federal court proceedings. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974). “The inability of the federal judiciary to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Art. Ill of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Essentially, a case can become moot if there is a change in the facts that ends the controversy between the parties to the extent that one or both parties no longer have a material incentive to pursue or defend the action. A case only truly becomes moot “when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 2287, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012) (omitting internal quotations and citations). A case is not mooted if the Court can offer effective prospective, injunctive relief. McLean v. City of Alexandria, 86 F.Supp.3d 475, 478-79 (E.D.Va.2015). Nor is a case mooted if compensatory or even nominal damages are still available. Rock for Life-UMBC v. Hrabowski, 411 Fed.Appx. 541, 550 (4th Cir.2010). Courts are especially wary of attempts to force mootness on an unwilling plaintiff by the defendant taking unilateral, voluntary action. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170-71, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (“A defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged practice ordinarily does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice.”). When the defendant voluntarily has voluntarily ceased the conduct which has created the controversy, “the heavy burden of persuading the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur lies with the party asserting mootness.” Id. This is especially true when, as here, the defendant maintains the legality of the challenged practice despite then-voluntary abandonment of a course of conduct. Knox 132 S.Ct. at 2287. Transurban argues that Plaintiffs Brown, Osborne and Hale’s claims are moot as a result of Transurban’s dismissals of its state court actions against these Plaintiffs. (Transurban’s Mem. at 6.) Plaintiffs point out that “these ‘dismissals’ were all ‘voluntary’ and occurred after Plaintiffs filed the instant action.” (Pis.’ Opp’n. at 11.) In light of the voluntary nature of Transurban’s dismissals, the “heavy burden of persuading the Court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur” lies on Transur-ban. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170-71, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). Transurban does not carry its heavy burden in attempting to persuade the court that it will not resume the challenged toll violation enforcement scheme with regards to either its specific claims against Plaintiffs Osborne, Chase, and Hale, let alone with regards to its general toll enforcement practices. While Tran-surban has voluntarily dismissed its state-court enforcement actions against Plaintiffs Osborne, Chase, and Hale, Transur-ban’s claim against Chase was clearly dismissed without prejudice, and it is unclear if Transurban’s claim against Hale has been dismissed with or without prejudice. (Transurban’s Mem. at Ex. H & G.) The Court is therefore not satisfied that Tran-surban is precluded from bringing these claims again. Absent an order to the contrary in this case, Transurban could simply renew its actions for penalties against Chase and Hale at any time. The dismissal with prejudice of Transur-ban’s state court claims against Brown and Osborne does preclude Transurban from resurrecting that particular claim for damages, but for the reasons laid down below, Brown and Osborne still have standing to sue for injunctive relief from Transurban’s enforcement policies. This potential prospective relief, in addition to the possibility that Brown and Osborne could receive at least nominal damages from Transurban on a section 1983 suit for alleged violations of their due process rights, is enough to establish that the Court can still grant “effective relief’ to Brown and Osborne despite the fact that they no longer face prosecution by Transurban for the previously alleged toll violations which have been dismissed in state court. Finally, Transurban contends that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek prospective, injunctive relief against future collections by Transurban. (Transurban’s Mem. at 7.) Standing to sue for past damages does not necessarily grant standing to sue for prospective relief, rather “plaintiffs] must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006). When seeking prospective future relief, such as an injunction, it is insufficient to merely allege past harm. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210-11, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). However, Plaintiffs here need not meet the general “actual and imminent harm” standard first articulated by the Supreme Court in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009), later developed in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1147, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013) and suggested here by Transurban. Instead, Plaintiffs fall neatly within the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to the general “actual and imminent harm” rule. Two criteria must be met for a plaintiff to have standing under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception. First, the injury must be likely to happen to Plaintiffs again. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975). Specifically, there must be a “reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Id. The Court will refer to this as the “reasonable expectation” requirement. Second, the injury must be of inherently limited duration so that it is likely to always become moot before any litigation can be completed. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007) (citations omitted). The Court shall refer to this second requirement as the “limited duration” requirement. Plaintiffs allege facts in the amended complaint that, if true, squarely place this case in the “capable of repetition yet capable of evading review” exception to the general rule on standing to seek prospective relief. On the first requirement of the capable of repetition yet evading review doctrine, the “reasonable expectation” requirement, Transurban contends that a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities” must occur before Plaintiffs would be likely to suffer the same harm. (Transurban’s Mem. at 7-8 (quoting Clapper, 133 S.Ct. at 1147-48).) But construing all alleged facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, as the Court must at this stage, it is not unreasonable to conclude that Plaintiffs and the other unidentified members of the proposed classes will be subject to Tran-surban’s toll collection practices if left unabated. Only one Plaintiff, Pizarro, has allegedly stopped using the HOT lanes. (Am. Compl. ¶ 163.) Otherwise, Plaintiffs generally allege that “[tjhousands of Virginia, Maryland, and DC residents have been subject to the Transurban Defendants’ excessive fines and fees.” (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 102 (“An average of 23,308 vehicles took the [HOT] lanes every day in the first six weeks [they were in operation].”).) They further allege that in the course of one calendar year Transurban files roughly 26,000 toll violation lawsuits, or just over 71 per day on average. (Id. at ¶ 225.) Each of the named Plaintiffs also alleges that Transurban has accused him or her of multiple toll violations spanning periods of at least several days and in some cases several months, further suggesting that the alleged issues are not isolated incidents but rather a pattern of alleged illegality. (Id. at ¶¶ 112-219.) At this stage, Plaintiffs need only allege facts sufficient to demonstrate .a “reasonable expectation that [they] will again be subjected to the alleged illegality, ox will be subject to the threat of prosecution under the challenged law.” Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 463, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (citations and internal punctuation omitted). Based on the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, it is not unreasonable for them to expect to be submitted to Transurban’s toll enforcement policies again, so they easily clear this standard. Turning to the second requirement of capable of repetition yet evading review, the “limited duration” requirement, Plaintiffs again allege facts that easily satisfy this requirement. The Fourth Circuit has held that the protracted proceeding of garnishing a bank account, Harris v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 614, 616 (4th Cir.1982), and the presumably longer negotiations involved in a labor contract dispute, Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc. v. Horvitz, 621 F.2d 1267, 1269 n. 3 (4th Cir.1980), both satisfy this “limited duration” requirement. The factual circumstances underlying this proceeding illustrate just how short-lived Transurban’s collection process can be. The huge economic pressure and potential legal ramifications of non-payment of the fines sought by Transurban were sufficient to induce Plaintiffs Pizarro, Stanfield, and Amarti to pay a portion of the fines claimed by Transurban despite the fact that those Plaintiffs still strenuously contest the legality of those penalties. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 137, 151, 174.) This kind of economic pressure is directly analogous to the kind of economic pressure which motivates quick resolution of labor contract disputes, which the Fourth Circuit held satisfied the “limited duration” requirement in Sinai Hospital. Additionally, Transurban has dismissed toll collection actions against the named Plaintiffs who resisted its demands for payment only after this complaint was filed. (Pis.’ Opp. at 11-12.) If the Court accepted Transurban’s argument in this regard, the toll collection process could theoretically evade judicial review for perpetuity, assuming Transur-ban simply pressured prospective plaintiffs into quickly settling and then voluntarily dismissed its suits against prospective plaintiffs with the resolve or financial means to resist settlement. This is precisely the kind of jurisprudential catch-22 the capable of repetition yet evading review and voluntary cessation of illegal activities doctrines were created to address. Accordingly, the Court finds that this case properly fits within the capable of repetition yet evading review exception to the general rule on standing to pursue prospective relief and Plaintiffs have standing to assert the claims in the amended complaint on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated. The Court will now address one final set of initial inquiries regarding Transurban’s claims that certain named Plaintiffs are barred from pursuing their instant claims against Transurban by either settlement or res judicata before turning to the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6). 3. Res Judicata and Alleged Settlement The Court begins by noting that both res judicata and the existence and scope of a settlement or release agreement, are affirmative defenses. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 410, 120 S.Ct. 2304, 147 L.Ed.2d 374 supplemented 531 U.S. 1, 121 S.Ct. 292, 148 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000) (classifying res judicata as an affirmative defense); Millner v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 643 F.2d 1005, 1007 (4th Cir.1981) (characterizing alleged existence of a settlement agreement as an affirmative defense); Parker v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 900 F.2d 772, 776 (4th Cir.1990) (“Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense .... ”). Accordingly, in order for the court to dismiss on any of these bases at this stage, all facts necessary to the affirmative defense must “clearly appear[ ] on the face of the complaint.” Goodman, 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir.2007) (emphasis in original). In support of their motion to dismiss, Transurban alleges that Plaintiffs Stanfield, Amarti, and Pizarro are precluded from pursuing their claims against Transurban here because they have “resolved the summons by settlement”. (Transurban’s Mem. at 5 (citing Am. Comp. ¶¶ 137, 151, 221).) Plaintiffs respond that any “settlements” are in fact a unilateral release of Transurban’s claims for fines against Plaintiffs, but absent any “evidence of any settlement agreement or any release executed by any Plaintiff’ the proposed settlements do not release Plaintiffs’ claims against Transurban. (Pis.’ Opp’n. at 8.) Generally, “once a competent party makes a settlement and acts affirmatively to enter such a settlement, her second thoughts at a later time upon the wisdom of the settlement do not constitute good cause for setting it aside”. Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 249 Va. 376, 457 S.E.2d 36, 39 (1995). However, “the scope of a release agreement, like the terms of any contract, is generally governed by the expressed intention of the parties.” Richfood, Inc. v. Jennings, 255 Va. 588, 499 S.E.2d 272, 275 (1998) (quoting First Security Federal Savings Bank, Inc. v. McQuilken, 253 Va. 110, 480 S.E.2d 485, 487 (1997)). While there does not need to be a signed and executed written release for a settlement agreement to be valid, the parties must be “fully agreed upon the terms of the settlement and intend to be bound thereby.” Snyder-Falkinham, 457 S.E.2d at 39. Where, as here, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs or Transurban contemplated a release of Plaintiffs’ claims as consideration for Transurban’s acceptance of a payment less than what they claimed was owed, the Court will not imply a release of those claims. It would certainly be improper to do so at the 12(b)(6) stage, where the Court must interpret all alleged facts in the light -most favorable to the plaintiff. Without evidence demonstrating that Plaintiffs and Transurban agreed that Plaintiffs would release any potential claims against Transurban in return for Transurban’s acceptance of less than it claimed was owed, the “settlement” alleged by Transurban is better understood as an accord and satisfaction on the fines originally claimed by Transurban. Accord and satisfaction can serve to discharge a contract or a cause of action where a partial payment is offered and accepted as satisfaction for the full amount initially demanded. See Virginia-Carolina Elec. Works v. Cooper, 192 Va. 78, 63 S.E.2d 717, 718 (1951). Accord and satisfaction, like any other written or implied release agreement, requires an agreement as to the specific terms and scope of the release. Id. at 719. This Court can find no case where accord and satisfaction of a debt alone, without some further agreement by the parties, has been held to moot or release other claims by the debtor or paying party against the creditor or receiving party. In fact, an accord and satisfaction on one debt is generally not even held to release the creditor’s other claims against the debtor, unless there is some indication that the parties intended to settle those claims. See Brucato v. Ezenia! Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 464, 470 (E.D.Va.2004). The payments offered by Plaintiffs Stanfield, Amarti, and Pizarro and accepted by Tran-surban therefore at most constitute an accord and satisfaction on Transurban’s original claim for fines against Plaintiffs. They do not preclude Plaintiffs from bringing the present action challenging the legality of both the fines themselves and the means by which Defendants have pursued the fines. Finally, Transurban argues that because Plaintiff Amarti has already been found liable in state court for her first five alleged toll violations, her present claims against Transurban ought to be barred by res judicata. (Transurban’s Mem. at 5) However, this argument profoundly overstates the breadth and effect of res judica-ta in Virginia. This Court gives the same preclusive effect to prior state-court judge-ments as they would receive under the law of the state in which the judgment was rendered. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984). In Virginia, the claim preclusive, res ju-dicata effect of judgments on actions commenced after July 1, 2006 is governed by Virginia Supreme Court Rule 1:6, which reads, in relevant part: A party whose claim for relief arising from identified conduct, a transaction, or an occurrence, is decided on the merits by a final judgment, shall be forever barred from prosecuting any second or subsequent civil action against the same opposing party or parties on any claim or cause of action that arises from that same conduct, transaction or occurrence, whether or not the legal theory or rights asserted in the second or subsequent action were raised in the prior lawsuit, and regardless of the legal elements or the evidence upon which any claims in the prior proceeding depended, or the particular remedies sought. A claim for relief pursuant to this rule includes those set forth in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party pleading. Va. Sup.Ct. R. 1:6. The Supreme Court of Virginia has been reluctant to interpret the finer points of Rule 1:6, particularly its interplay with Virginia’s longstanding rule that all counterclaims are permissive rather than compulsory. See Va.Code Ann. § 16.1-88.01; Va. Sup.Ct. R. 3:9; Tyler v. Berger; No. Civ.A. 605cv00030, 2005 WL 2596164, at *3 n. 7 (W.D.Va. Oct. 13, 2005). Taken to the extreme interpretation proposed by Defendants in this case, Rule 1:6 would rip the heart out of Virginia’s permissive counterclaim rule by barring any later claims by any party to the first case, including claims that the defendant in the first case elected not to raise as counterclaims. Such a result would run afoul of the general rule that “where a party ‘may interpose a claim as a counterclaim,’ but fails to do so, that party ordinarily will not be ‘precluded from subsequently maintaining an action on that claim.’ ” Marbury Law Grp., PLLC v. Carl, 799 F.Supp.2d 66, 74 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22(l))(Holding Rule 1:6 did not prevent a party from raising later claims where the party could have, but did not, raise counterclaims in a prior proceeding stemming from the same transaction or occurrence). The plain language of Rule 1:6 is readily compatible with the voluntary counterclaim rule, as it limits the application of res judicata to bar future claims only by a “party whose claim for relief ... is decided on the merits”. Va. Sup.Ct. R. 1:6. If, in the prior ease, no counterclaim was raised by the prior defendant, she cannot fairly be said to have been a “party whose claim for relief ... [was] decided on the merits,” as she has made no claim for relief in the previous case. Id. Defendants’ reliance on Winchester Neurological Consultants, Inc. v. Landrio, 74 Va.Cir. 480 (2008) is misplaced, as in Landrio the prior defendant had “asserted a counterclaim against WNC [the current defendant] in the First Arbitration.” The present case is more analogous to the situation addressed in Marbury Law Grp., PLLC v. Carl, where the party raising the claims being evaluated in a later federal .court action “never filed a counterclaim in the [prior] Virginia action.” Marbury Law Grp., PLLC, 799 F.Supp.2d at 74. In jurisdictions like Virginia where there is no compulsory counterclaim rule, there is one widely recognized exception to the general rule that res judicata will not preclude a subsequent claim by a defendant who did not file a counterclaim in the original action. These are cases where “[t]he relationship between the counterclaim and the plaintiffs claim [in the prior action] is such that [the] successful prosecution of the second action would nullify the initial judgment or would impair rights established in the initial action.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22(2)(b). This exception extends to cover both cases where one party seeks an injunction against enforcement of a judgement against him in a prior case. See Valley View Angus Ranch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Field Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 1096, 1102 (10th Cir.2007) (applying Oklahoma’s permissive counterclaim law). It has also been applied to cases where one party simply seeks the return of a monetary award already granted by the prior decision. See A.B.C.G. Enterprises, Inc. v. First Bank Se., N.A., 184 Wis.2d 465, 515 N.W.2d 904, 911 (1994). Thus, Amarti and any other prospective class members who have had judgments entered against them in state court proceedings may be precluded from pursuing the recovery of any money awarded to Transurban in a state-court proceeding, but they are certainly not precluded from raising any of the distinct constitutional, federal, or state law claims presented in the amended complaint. As all named plaintiffs have standing to pursue each of their claims, the Court will now address the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6). B. Constitutional Claims The first three claims in the amended complaint allege violations of the state and federal constitution against only Transur-ban. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 235-257.) Tran-surban argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state, and indeed cannot state, claims of federal constitutional violations because Transurban is not a state actor. (Transur-ban’s Mem. at 8-11.) Alternatively, Tran-surban argues that even if the Court finds it is a state actor, Plaintiffs’ state and federal constitutional claims are insufficient for a variety of reasons. (Id. at 12-21.) Each argument is addressed in turn. 1. State Action Plaintiffs bring Claims One, Two, and Three pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and in part allege violations of rights under the United States Constitution. “Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a federal statutory remedy available to those deprived of rights secured to them by the Constitution.... ” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir.2009). To state a claim for relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant “(1) deprived plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was performed under color of the referenced sources of state law found in the statute.” Id. (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26