Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION THEODORE D. CHUANG, United States District Judge Plaintiff Mannie Garcia, an award-winning photojournalist, alleges that, in June 2011, he was arrested by Montgomery County Police Department officers for disorderly conduct solely because he was video recording them as they effected the arrest of two other people. He was later found not guilty of that offense. Garcia asserts that by arresting him for filming, the officers violated his rights under the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution, Garcia also contends that the video card in his camera, which contains the record of the events of that night, was unlawfully seized by one of the officers and never returned. In response to these events, Garcia filed suit against the officers involved in his arrest, the Montgomery County Police Department (“MCPD”), and various other MCPD officials, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged First and Fourth Amendment violations relating to his arrest; a First Amendment retaliation claim, based on his belief that various police officers were trying to intimidate him out of pursuing legal action; several other statutory and common law actions; and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the MCPD for unconstitutional policies, customs, and practices. Defendants paint a very different picture of the events leading to Garcia’s arrest, asserting that Garcia was arrested not because he was video recording the police, but because, after a police officer approached him to ask benign questions about what he was doing, Garcia began to yell and curse, and continued to do so despite being asked repeatedly to quiet down. Defendants also deny taking Garcia’s video card. From their perspective, Garcia’s arrest does not raise First Amendment issues about the right to film police officers, but is instead an attempt to recast a routine arrest for disorderly conduct as a case of constitutional significance. Presently pending before the Court are Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 62, and Garcia’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 63. The Court heard oral argument on the motions on September 9, 2015. For the reasons outlined below, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Garcia’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. BACKGROUND I. Video Recording of Police Activity At about 7:30 p.m. on the evening of June 16, 2011, Garcia and his wife, Vicky Allen, met a friend for dinner at Woomi, a restaurant in Wheaton, Maryland near Georgia Avenue and Hickerson Drive. Nearby, at about 8:30 p.m., Carlos Grajeda and Lee Williams, members of Montgomery County’s Civilian Alcohol Enforcement squad, witnessed a man buying alcohol for a minor. Grajeda and Williams put out a call for police officers to assist them in citing the two individuals involved in the alcohol purchase. Officer Kevin Baxter and Officer Michael Graves, each in his own patrol car, responded to the call. Soon after Officers Baxter and Graves arrived, between 8:40 and 9:00 p.m., Garcia and Allen left Woomi and headed back to their car, which was parked across the street from the restaurant. As Garcia crossed the street, he noticed the police officers and the alcohol suspects, who were about 100 feet, or a block and a half, away. Garcia saw one of the officers get “a little rough” with one of the men — the officer “sort of ... push[ed] him” — so Garcia took out his camera and began video recording. Cross Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 2 (Garcia Deposition) at 30, ECF No. 63-4; Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 4 (Garcia Deposition) at 27, ECF No. 62-7. Garcia was video recording the scene with his Nikon Coolpix 7000, a camera capable of shooting both still photographs and video. Garcia caught Grajeda’s attention. Grajeda could see that Garcia had something in his hands, but could not identify what it was, and, in Grajeda’s estimation, Garcia was “acting erratically.” Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 2 (Grajeda Deposition) at 5, ECF No. 62-5. Garcia’s supposed strange behavior “really concerned” Grajeda, in part because they were in a high-crime area. Id.' Garcia, for his part, maintains that he was behaving normally. Grajeda pointed Garcia out to Officer Baxter, who had not noticed him because he was in the middle of writing a citation for one of the suspects. When Officer Baxter caught sight of him, Garcia-was in a “very dark” section of the street, near an- alleyway. Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 1 (Baxter'Deposition) at 16, ECF No. 62-4. Garcia appeared to Officer Baxter to be trying to hide, behavior that Officer Baxter thought was “suspicious” Id. at 16-17. By this point, it was getting dark. Officer Baxter, wanting to get a better view of Garcia, flashed his police cruisers spotlight in Garcia’s direction. Once Garcia was illuminated, Officer Baxter could see that he was holding what appeared to be a camera. Officer Baxter kept the spotlight on Garcia for about 10 seconds, while he evaluated whether Garcia posed a threat to the officers or nearby civilians. Officer Baxter determined that Garcia was not doing anything threatening, so he turned off the spotlight and returned to writing the citation. After being spotlighted, Garcia went back across the street, in front of Woomi. According to Grajeda, as Garcia ran across the street he was “belligerent” and was yelling. Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 2 at 10. Outside Woomi, Garcia put his camera down on a newspaper box — hoping for a more stable image — and continued to film; At that time, Malik and Efigenia Rashid were, sitting in a nearby parked car with the windows rolled up. Malik Rashid rolled down his window and politely asked Garcia what he was doing, to which Garcia responded, “keeping [them], honest.” Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 4 at 32-33. By that point, the arrest seemed like a “routine” detention: the two alcohol suspects were seated on the curb, and the officers were no longer in physical , contact with them. Id. at 40-43. Garcia stayed near the newspaper box, outside Woomi, for two to three minutes before he walked up the street towards the officers, stopping when he was directly across from them. Garcia continued to record what was happening, narrating the events into his camera. Officer Graves, however, asserts that Garcia was yelling at both the officers and the Civilian Alcohol Enforcement team, an assertion Garcia denies. According to Officer Baxter, when Garcia set up across the street from them, he was standing in another dark area, prompting Officer Baxter to again shine - his spotlight on Garcia to see what he was doing. Garcia then moved to a third location up the block, about 35 feet away from the officers. As this was happening, Officer Graves began to feel that “something was [not] right.” Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 8 (Grayes Deposition) at 14. ECF No. 62-11. Garcia was drawing “all of our attention,” leaving the officers “distracted” from the task of processing the alcohol suspects. Id. at 9. Officer Graves accordingly, called for backup. IÍ. The Arrest of Garcia In response, Officer Christopher Malouf arrived on the scene. He spoke briefly with Officer Baxter, who informed him that there was “a subject across the street standing in the shadows” who “was possibly filming.” Mot. Sum. 1. Ex. 14 (Malguf Deposition) at 5, ECF No. 62-17. Officer Baxter remarked that he could not see Garcia clearly, so was not sure if he “posed a threat or not,” and that Garcia was “deterring” him from processing the alcohol suspects. Id. Officer Malouf walked in Garcia’s direction, but because of the darkness, he could not actually see Garcia until he was about three to four feet away from him. Once he was. near Garcia, Officer Malouf tried to ascertain what was going on, asking him, “Can I help you with anything?” and “Is there any way I can assist you?” Id. at 15. Garcia asserts that when Officer Malouf approached him and asked him what he was doing, he promptly let go of his camera — which he had on a strap around his neck — opened-up his hands to show Officer Malouf that he was not holding anything, and stated, in a normal tone of voice, “My name is Mannie Garcia and I’m.with the press.” Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 4 at 48, 50. Although Garcia let go of his camera, it was still recording. In response, Officer Malouf promptly declared, “That’s it, you’re under arrest.” Id. at 50-51. Officer Malouf, however, tells a very different story. He asserts that Garcia never identified himself as a member of the press. Instead, Garcia said “I have a right to be here” and “you can’t tell me to move.” Cross-Mot. Sum. 1. Ex 14 (Trial Transcript) at 55, EOF No. 63-16. Garcia then, “became disorderly,” yelling curse words and refusing to answer questions. Mot. Sum. 1. Ex. 14 at 12. At that point, Officer Malouf moved closer to Garcia and warned him that if he did not calm down, he would arrest him for disorderly conduct. Rather than calming down, Garcia continued to yell and curse, at one point gesturing towards Officer Baxter while yelling, “This fucking guy.” Id. at 17-18. After trying to calm Garcia down for several minutes without success, Officer Mal-ouf decided to arrest him for disorderly conduct, noting that everyone in the vicinity was now focused on Garcia. At some point — whether before Officer Malouf decided to arrest Garcia or after is unclear — others also heard Garcia begin to yell. Efigenia Rashid heard Garcia yell so loudly that, although her car windows were rolled up, it distracted her from the game she was playing on her tablet. Officer Baxter heard Garcia yell, “And this fucking guy” while gesturing in his direction, Mot. Sum. 1. Ex. 1 at 19, while Grajeda heard Garcia yell, “[a]nd tell those fuckers to leave me alone, or I’m going to ■,id. Ex. 2- at 12. Officer Graves also heard Garcia yelling. Grajeda remembers. Garcia “screaming and yelling” that he was with the press, id. Ex. 2 at 13, while Williams heard Garcia yelling something about his First- Amendment rights and identifying himself as a member of the press. According to Garcia, when.Officer Mal-ouf arrested him, he promptly put Garcia into a choke hold and began to drag him across the street, towards his police cruiser, an assertion Officer Malouf disputes. While they were in the middle of the street, Officer Baxter came up pulled Garcia’s arms behind his back, and handcuffed him. As a result of the choke hold and being pulled by both officers, Garcia tripped over the curb, falling on his left knee and tearing his pants. As he was being held by the neck and dragged across the street, Garcia called out for his wife and also yelled that Internal Affairs was “going to have a field day.” Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 4 at 59,65. Garcia further alleges that once they reached the cruiser, Officer Malouf shoved him against the side of the car, causing him to hit the cruiser with a “hard impact.” Cross-Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 2 at 58-59. Officer Malouf then patted Garcia down. As part of that process, Officer Malouf .instructed Garcia to spread his legs. When Garcia did so, Officer Malouf kicked out Garcia’s right foot, causing him to lose his balance and hit his head against the side of the cruiser. before falling to the ground. While this was happening, Officer Malouf was mocking him, asking him why he was falling down, and then laughing at him with the other officers. The officers dispute Garcia’s allegations relating to the use of force. Specifically, Officer Malouf denies that he placed Garcia in a choke hold. Officer Baxter acknowledges that Garcia fell as the officers took him across the street, but asserts that Garcia deliberately went limp, in an effort to “fall to the ground unprompted” Mot. Sum. 1. Ex. 1 at 21. Officer Baxter further contends that once back at the cruiser, Garcia was “thrashing his body back and forth” against the cruiser, in an attempt to injure himself, prompting Officer Malouf to subdue Garcia by applying force to a pressure point on Garcia’s neck. Id. at 22. Meanwhile, Allen, Garcia’s wife, began to approach the scene. Officer Baxter warned her to stay back or she would be arrested. Garcia claims that, in response to Allen’s approach, Officer Baxter said, “If that fucking bitch takes one more step, I’m going to arrest her ass.” Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 4 at 68. In response, Garcia yelled to Allen to stay back, prompting Officer Malouf to again apply force to a pressure point, pressing his thumb into Garcia’s neck for about 10-15 seconds, causing Garcia to contort in pain and forcing, his head into the side of the cruiser. At some point during the arrest process, Garcia’s camera was removed from around Garcia’s neck, and Officer Baxter took control of it. Pursuant to department policy, Officer Baxter turned the camera off. He then placed it either in or on top of the cruiser. Eventually, Officer Malouf placed Garcia in the cruiser and transported him to the police station. According to Garcia, while in the station parking lot, before taking Garcia inside, Officer Malouf was “fiddling” with Garcia’s camera, pressing various' buttons and opening various compartments, until he eventually found the video card. Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 4 at 70-71. Garcia contends that Officer Malouf removed the video card and placed it in his shirt pocket. Officer Malouf denies doing so. Officer Malouf took Garcia into the police station, then to the Central Processing Unit, where his belongings were inventoried, he was fingerprinted, and his mug shot was taken. At about 3:30 a.m., Garcia was released from custody and picked up by his wife at the Central Processing Unit. While all of Garcia’s other property was returned to him, the video card from his camera was not. Although Garcia contends that he was injured, he did not immediately seek medical attention. Instead, he went home because, at that point, all he wanted to do was shower and go to bed. In the days after his arrest, Garcia had bruising on his left knee as a result of the incident, but did not have bruises on his neck. III. Post-Arrest Events On December 16, 2011, Garcia proceeded to a bench trial in the District Court for Montgomery County, Maryland on the charge of disorderly conduct. He was found hot guilty. Prior to that trial, Garcia filed a complaint with the MCPD Internal Affairs Division against Officers Baxter and Malouf about the events of June 16, 2011. After an investigation into Garcia’s allegations, the MCPD took no disciplinary action against either officer, Garcia contends that after he filed his Internal Affairs complaint various MCPD officers began periodically to park near his house to observe and intimidate him. Specifically, Garcia alleges that during the week of December 6, 2011, the week preceding his trial on the disorderly conduct charge, he twice saw Officer Mal-ouf parked in front of a house across the street from Garcia’s home. That house had the same house number that Officer Mal-ouf mistakenly entered as Garcia’s address on the June 16, 2011 incident report. Both times, Garcia saw Officer Malouf remain there for . 2-3 minutes, parked in such a way that his cruiser would not be visible to those inside of the house. ■ On March 19,. 2013, Garcia saw another such police cruiser, this one parked across and one house over from Garcia’s home. Garcia began, to video record the occupant, Officer Douglas. Barros, because he believed the officer was there to observe him. Officer Barros contends that he was there doing paperwork, having just dealt with a disorderly conduct incident on a bus nearby. Officer Barros eventually noticed that Garcia was video recording him, which he thought was suspicious, since he had never before had someone film him doing paperwork. Officer Barros went over to Garcia to “check up” on him and asked Garcia if he needed any help. Cross Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 19 (Barros Deposition) at 10, ECF No. 63-21. In response, Garcia told Officer Bar-ros that he did not need any help and accused him of harassment. Officer Barros gave Garcia the name and phone number of his supervisor, then, departed. Garcia-never contacted the supervisor because he “did not want to have any more contact with the Police.” Cross Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 2 at 14. Defendants deny’that there was a police department campaign to observe and intimidate Garcia. According to Officers Baxter and Malouf, Garcia’s street is a shortcut to University Boulevard, a major road, and Garcia’s house is near a nursing home to which MCPD officers are frequently called. If there was any regular police presence on Garcia’s street, they contend, it was not because officers were there to intimidate Garcia, but because officers were using the shortcut or responding to nursing home calls. Garcia was, however, a topic of conversation among officers. In the days prior to and during Garcia’s disorderly conduct trial, Officers Baxter and Graves exchanged a series of text-messages about those proceedings. Prior to the trial they discussed whether Garcia would take a guilty plea, with Officer Graves remarking that he “hope[d]” Garcia would “take community service,” to.- which Officer Baxter replied that he though they “ha[d] a solid case.” Cross Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 22 at 2, ECF No.-63-24. During the trial, Officer Graves texted Officer Baxter that Officer Malouf, after seeing a “liquor guy” testify, declared that the case was “all bullshit.” Id. At some point, Officers Baxter and Graves joked about going drinking with Garcia, with Officer Baxter suggesting they “[d]o a couple saki bombs then go be disorderly,” and Officer Graves adding that they could then “make up a story to make millions and never work again.” Id. at 3. After Garcia filed his civil suit, Officers Baxter and Graves again exchanged messages, with Officer Graves informing Officer Baxter that the suit had been filed and, in response to Officer Baxter’s request, that he had emailed him a link to a news story about the case. Id. at 4. IV. Procedural History On December 7,2012, Garcia filed suit in this Court against Officers Baxter, Graves, and Malouf, Montgomery County, Police Chief Thomas Manager, and Lieutenant Mark Sheelor, alleging eight causes of action: (I) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) claim for violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on his allegation that he was arrested for video recording police activity; (II) a § 1983 claim for First Amendment retaliation; (III) a § 1983 claim for violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on the allegation that he was arrested and had his property seized without probable cause; (IV) a § 1983 claim pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), against Montgomery County only; (V) a claim under the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa et seq.-, (VI) a common law false arrest and false imprisonment claim; (VII) a common law malicious prosecution claim;- and (VIII) a common law battery claim against Officer Malouf only. All individual defendants were sued in both their individual and official capacities, with the exception of Chief Manager and Officer Graves, who were sued in their official capacities only. On August 23, 2013, after Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint, the Court (Motz, J.) issued a Memorandum Opinion dismissing' various defendants' and claims, and bifurcating some claims. ECF No. 15. Specifically, the Court dismissed (1) all claims against Officer Graves and Lt. Sheelor; (2) all claims against Officer Baxter, except the First Amendment and retaliation claims; (3) the false arrest/false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims against Montgomery County and Chief Manager; (4) the Privacy Protection Act claim against all defendants except Montgomery County; and (5) all claims against officers in their official capacity, except for Chief Manager. The Court bifurcated for purposes of discovery (1) all remaining claims against Montgomery County, with the exception of the Privacy Protection Act claim, and (2) all claims against Chief Manager. On January 20/2015, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 62. On February 19, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, to which Defendants responded on March 24,' 2015. ECF Ños. 63 & 64. Plaintiffs filed a Reply Memorandum' on April 23, 2015. ECF No. 65. The Court heard oral argument on September 9,2015. DISCUSSION For purposes of the pending summaiy judgment motions, the claims and defendants at issue are: (1) the First Amendment claims in Count I against Officer Baxter and Officer Malouf; (2) the First Amendment retaliation claim in Count II against Officer Baxter and Officer Malouf; (3) the ‘Fourth Amendment claim in Count III against Officer Malouf; (4) the Privacy Protection Act claim in Count V- against Montgomery County; (5) the false -arrest and false imprisonment claim in Count VI against Officer Malouf; (6) the malicious prosecution claim in Count VII against Officer' Malouf; and (7) the battery claim in Count VIII against Officer Malouf. Defendants seek summary judgment on all of these claims. Garcia, in his cross motion, seeks summary judgment on Counts I (First Amendment), III (Fourth Amendment), VI (false' arrest/false imprisonment), and VII (malicious prosecution). I. Legal Standards A. Summary Judgment Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Court grants summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In assessing the Motion, the Court must believe the evidence of the non-moving party, view the facts in the light most favorable to’ the nonmoving party, and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The nonmoving party has the burden to show a genuine dispute on a material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). “A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 183 (4th Cir.2001) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505) (internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute of material fact is only “genuine” if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-19, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must review each motion separately on its own merits ‘to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir.2003) (quoting Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 62 n. 4 (1st Cir.1997)). B. Qualified Immunity Officers Baxter and Malouf move for summary judgment on the basis that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Government officials sued in their individual capacities, as these officers' are here, may invoke the protection of qualified immunity to bar a claim for civil damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity shields government' officials from liability for conduct that “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutioiial rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. The doctrine “balances two important interests — the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). Because of the latter interest, qualified immunity protects police officers and public officials from claims of constitutional violations- that arise from “reasonable mistakes as to the legality of their actions.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). It leaves unprotected only “the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)). The qualified immunity analysis can be separated into two inquiries: (1) whether the facts alleged, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, ... show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right,” and (2) whether the right at issue “was clearly established in the specific context of the case — that is, whether 'it was clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct in which he allegedly engaged was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Merchant v. Bauer, 677 F.3d 656, 662 (4th Cir.2012) (citations and brackets omitted). Although courts may consider the two inquiries in whatever sequence best suits the “circumstances in the particular case at hand,” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, it is preferable to consider first whether the conduct at issue violated a constitutional right because such determinations advance “the law’s elaboration from case to case” by setting forth principles that can later become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly established. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808 (stating that the Saucier approach, though not mandatory, “is often beneficial”). As for the second prong, “[a] right is clearly established only if its contours are sufficiently clear that ‘a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ ” Carroll v. Carman, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 348, 350, 190 L.Ed.2d 311 (2014) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). “In other words, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)). In determining whether a right is clearly established, it is not necessary for a court to have previously considered the exact facts at issue, or that there be a case involving “fundamentally similar” facts, so long as “in light of the pre-existing law the unlawfulness [is] apparent.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). Thus, “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances,” as long as the law gave the defendant official “fair warning” that the conduct was unconstitutional. Id. at 740-41, 122 S.Ct. 2508. Furthermore, because the issue is whether an official should have known that his conduct violated a constitutional right, whether a right is “clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity must be determined in light of the law at the time the contested action was taken. Messerschmidt v. Millender, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1245, 182 L.Ed.2d 47 (2012). II. First Amendment Claims In Count I of his Complaint, Garcia asserts that Officers Baxter and Malouf violated his First Amendment rights in two ways: (1) by arresting him for video recording police in the public performance of their duties; and (2) by confiscating his video card and never returning it. Garcia seeks compensatory damages and a declaratory judgment that his First Amendment rights were violated. Officers Baxter and Malouf move for summary judgment on Count I on the basis qualified immunity. For his part, Garcia cross-moves for summary judgment on Count I, claiming that his arrest and the seizure of his video card violated the First Amendment as a matter of law. A. Arrest for Video Recording Police Activity Officers Baxter and Malouf claim qualified immunity from a damages claim relating to the alleged arrest of Garcia for video recording police activity because, they assert, (1) they did not -violate any constitutional right to video record police activity; or. (2) even if there was such a violation, the right to record public police activity was not “clearly established” at the time of the incident on June 16, 2011. Although the Court finds that there is a constitutional right to video record public police activity, it concludes that the right was not clearly established in this jurisdiction at the time of the incident, and so grants qualified immunity to the officers on the First Amendment damages claim. 1. Violation of the First Amendment Garcia asserts that the officers violated his First Amendment right to video record police officers in the routine public performance of their duties. The United States Supreme Court has not yet spoken on whether this is a right protected by the First Amendment, but two lines of Supreme Court precedent, read together, make clear that journalists and citizens alike have such a right. First, the Supreme Court has stated, in the context of journalists seeking access to nonpublic government information, that “[t]here is an undoubted [First Amendment] right to gather news ‘from any source by.means within the law.’ ” Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S.Ct. 2588, 57 L.Ed.2d 553 (1978) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681-82, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972)). In Houchins, an inmate at a local prison committed suicide, a newsworthy event, which prompted journalists to seek information about conditions inside the facility. Id. at 3, 98 S.Ct. 2588. The. right to film police officers in the public performance of their duties is certainly suggested, but not wholly established, by the First Amendment right to gather news. Here, the right at issue is of a broader scope than the right of journalists to follow a newsworthy story. It is the right to record something that is not itself newsworthy — police officers in the routine performance of their duties — but that may become newsworthy. This latter aspect of the right implicates a second line of Supreme Court cases. The Supreme Court has held that the protection and promotion of “the free discussion of governmental affairs” is a paramount First Amendment interest. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966). Significant to that right, indeed of “highest importance,” are the aims of “preventing corruption and sustaining the active alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788-89, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). Thus, recording governmental activity, even if that activity is not immediately newsworthy, has the potential to prevent government abuses through scrutiny or to capture those abuses should they occur. As Garcia stated, recording police activity enables citizens to “keep them honest,” an undertaking protected by the First Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not addressed in a published opinion whether there is a First Amendment right to record public police activity. However, other circuits confirm that this right exists. In a case with similar facts, the United States Courts of Appeals for the First Circuit relied on these two strands of Supreme Court precedent to hold that a citizen who recorded on his cell phone both video and audio of police officers arresting an individual on the Boston Common, the nation’s oldest public park, had a First Amendment right to record the arrest. Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir.2011). The First Circuit reasoned that, “[gathering information' about government officials in a form that can readily be disseminated to others serves a cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and promoting the free discussion of governmental affairs.”.Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir.2014) (holding that an arrest of a citizen for illegal wiretapping when she recorded a traffic stop without interfering with the police activity violated her First Amendment rights). Likewise, in American Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir.2012), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enjoined the enforcement of a state anti-eavesdropping statute against the audiovisual recording of police officers performing their duties in public because “[ajudio recording is entitled to First Amendment protection,” and such protection includes “prohibiting] government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.” Id. at 597 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978)). Other circuits, too, have found a general Fust Amendment right to record the public activities of police officers and government officials. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (holding that plaintiffs “had a First Amendment right, subject to reasonable time, manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police conduct”); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir.1995) (recognizing a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest” in a case where police officers interfered with a citizen seeking to film a public demonstration directed in part against the police). But see Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262-63 (3d Cir.2010) (holding, for purposes of qualified immunity, that it was not clearly established that citizens have a First Amendment right to videotape a traffic stop). Thus, based on the Supreme Court precedent finding First Amendment rights to gather the news and to engage in free discussion-of governmental affairs to advance the wise and honest conduct of government, as well as the precedent from other circuits explicitly finding a First Amendment right to record public police activities, this Court finds that video recording of police activity, if done peacefully and without interfering with the performance of police duties, is protected by the First Amendment. As discussed below, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Officers Baxter and Malouf violated that right when' they arrested Garcia. See infra Part II.C. 2. Clearly Established Right Although the Court finds a constitutional right to video record public" police activities, Officers Baxter and Malouf would still be entitled to qualified immunity if that right was not clearly established at the time of the incident in June 2011. The Fourth Circuit has held that to determine whether a right was clearly established at the time of the alleged wolation, courts “need not look beyond the decisions of the Supreme Court, this court of appeals, and the highest court of the state'in which the case arose.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th Cir.1999). Thus, “[i]f a right is recognized in some other circuit, but hot in this one, an official will ordinarily retain the immunity defense.” Id. Here, none of delineated controlling sources clearly establish that, as of 2011, citizens had a right to record police officers in the routine public performance of their duties. As explained above, the Supreme Court has not spoken directly on the issue. The Fourth - Circuit, in its only foray into this area, affirmed in,an unpublished opinion a district court’s determination that “the right to record police activities on public property was not clearly established in this circuit-at the time of the alleged' conduct” and did-not opine one way or the other on whether such a First Amendment right exists. Szymecki v. Houck, 353 Fed.Appx. 852, 853 (4th Cir.2009). -Thus, as of the incident in 2011, and even today, the Fourth Circuit has not provided police officers with fair warning that it is unconstitutional to stop someone from video recording the police in the routine public performance of their duties. Nor has the Maryland Court of Appeals weighed in on the issue. Despite this dearth of controlling case law, Garcia argues that the right was clearly established at the time of the events at issue because the right is self-evident from existing Supreme Court case law. In particular, he invokes the First Circuit’s opinion in Glik, which concluded that a First Amendment right to film public police activities was clearly established, based in part on the two lines of Supreme Court - cases discussed above. Crucially, however, the First Circuit did not base its conclusion solely on its analysis of general Supreme Court principles; rather, it also relied heavily on its own prior case, Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14 (1st Cir.1999), in which the court found that a journalist who was arrested for disorderly conduct after refusing to stop filming a meeting of a historic district commission had been acting “in the exercise of his First Amendment right,” and that the officer “lacked any authority to stop” the filming. Glik, 655 F.3d at 83 (citing Iacobucci, 193 F.3d at 25). Thus, by the time of Glik, the First Circuit had laid the groundwork for the determination that the right to film police officers in the public performance of their duties is a clearly established right under the First Amendment. No such legal trail exists in Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit precedent. The fact that, in 2011, the Montgomery County Police Department had a policy on media relations directing that “to the extent possible, members of the media should be treated as invited guests at incident scenes,” and that “no police officer shall take any action' to prevent or interfere with the news media in photographing or televising an event,” does not alter the analysis. Cross-Mot. Sum. 1. Ex. 11 at 1-2, EOF No. 63-13. A public relations mandate from one’s employer, designed to “enhance [the Department’s] image and reputation,” is not the same as a constitutional right. Id, While Officers Baxter and Mal-ouf might have been aware of what the media could be invited to do, that knowledge is not a substitute for a clear understanding of what the media or individual citizens have a right to do in terms of recording police activity. As discussed above, based on the fairest reading of Supreme Court precedent; and the great weight of authority from other circuits, it seems fairly well-settled in 2015 that there is a First Amendment right to video record police officers as they carry out their public duties. But.the Fourth Circuit has specifically identified the sources from which a clearly established right can be identified, and as of 2011— and still today — nene of the three identified courts has held that citizens have a right to record police officers as they perform their routine duties. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit, albeit in an unpublished opinion, expressly stated that this.right is not clearly established. Szymecki, 353 Fed.Appx. at 853. Thus, the Court must conclude that the right to record police officers in the routine, public performance of their duties was not clearly established in this Circuit at the time of the events at issue in this. case. Officers Baxter and Mal-ouf are therefore entitled to qualified immunity from a suit for damages on this aspect of .Garcia’s First Amendment claim. B. Seizure of the Video Card Garcia also . alleges that his First Amendment rights were violated because Officer Malouf removed Garcia’s video card from his camera, presumably in order to - prevent disclosure of its contents, and never returned it. Garcia’s First Amendment claim is alleged against both Officers Baxter and Malouf. However, when the facts are construed in Garcia’s favor, they establish that Officer Malouf alone purposefully examined Garcia’s camera to try to locate the video card, that- he found the video card and removed it, and that he then never returned that,video card to Garcia. There are no facts connecting Officer Baxter to seizure of the video card. Officer Baxter is therefore entitled to summary judgment on this aspect of Garcia’s First Amendment claim. ' Officer Malouf seeks summary judgment on this aspect of Garcia’s claim, again on the basis of qualified immunity. He does not offer an independent basis for this contention, instead recycling his assertion that, at the time of the incident, there was no clearly established First Amendment right to record police “in a manner which interfered with police operations.” Mot. Sum. J. at 29. Officer Malouf proceeds as'if the questions whether there is a First Amendment right to record police activity, and whether there is a First Amendment right not to have any such recording seized in order to prevent the dissemination of its content, are effectively the same. These questions, however, are distinct enough to require separate consideration of whether Officer Malouf has qualified immunity for Garcia’s First Amendment claim relating to the seizure of the video card. As set forth below, the Court finds that the First Amendment protects against the seizure of a recording of police activity in order to prevent its public dissemination, but concludes that the right was not clearly established in this jurisdiction at the time of the incident, and so grants qualified immunity to Officer Malouf on this aspect of Garcia’s First Amendment damages claim. 1. Violation of the First Amendment In Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 93 S.Ct. 2796, 37 L.Ed.2d 757 (1972), the Supreme Court navigated the intersection between the First and Fourth Amendments and determined that when an officer seizes material that “arguably” falls within First Amendment protection, and does so “without the authority of a constitutionally sufficient warrant,” then that seizure is “plainly a form of prior restraint.” Id. at 504, 93 S.Ct. 2796 (finding that police seizure of an adult film believed to be obscene was an unconstitutional prior restraint). A prior restraint of “speech [or] publication” is the “most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights. Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976). In Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516 (4th Cir.2003), the Fourth Circuit applied this principle to ‘the context of police activity. In Rossignol, Sheriff’s Department deputies, on the eve of an election, purchased all available copies of a newspaper that had been critical of the Sheriffs Department. Id. at 519-21. The Fourth Circuit held that the deputies’ “seizure” of the newspaper had “clearly contravened the most elemental tenets of First Amendment law.” Id. at 521. The deputies had “suppressed]” the páper because “they disagreed with its viewpoint,” making their violation of the First Amendment “all the moré blatant.” Id. Here, as discussed above, the video recording of public police actions is an activity protected by the First Amendment, so it follows that the recording itself is First Amendment-protected material akin to a film or written publication. Following the reasoning of Roaden and Ros-signol, the seizure of the recording, if done for the purpose of preventing the dissemination of the information on the recording, would constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint. See Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504, 93 S.Ct. 2796; Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 521. The Court therefore holds that the First Amendment protects against the seizure and retention of a video recording of public police activities if the seizure was for the purpose of preventing the public dissemination of the contents ~of that recording. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Garcia, a reasonable jury eould conclude that Officer Malouf. engaged in just such an unlawful prior restraint. Garcia asserts that Officer Malouf, after observing Garcia taking video of the police action of arresting two suspects, removed the video card from Garcia’s camera, put it in his pocket, and never returned it. There is also evidence, from Garcia’s testimony and that of Grajeda .and Williams, that Garcia informed the officers that he was a member of the press. These two facts together support the inference that Officer Malouf, knowing Garcia was a journalist, saw the potential for the recording to be circulated and thus séized and kept the video card to ensure that such circulation could not occur. If true, such a seizure would constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint and would violate the First Amendment. 2. Clearly Established Right As noted above, based on Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent predating 2011, it was clearly established that government officials, including police officers, violate the First Amendment if they seize newspapers, films, or other First Amendment-protected materials in order to prevent the.dissemination of their content. See Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504, 93 S.Ct. 2796; Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 521. However, under this precedent, the Court cannot conclude that Officer Malouf had “fair warning” that his actions violated Garcia’s First Amendment rights. Both Roaden, which involved police seizing an adult film to prevent its public showing, and Rossignol, which involved a law enforcement effort to prevent the distribution on Election Day of newspapers containing information critical of candidates supported by the sheriffs department, involved quintessential First Amendment material. See Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504, 93 S.Ct. 2796; Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 521. In fact, the films in Roaden and the newspapers in Rossignol were items already intended for and in public circulation, but which were taken out of circulation by law enforcement. Here, however, Garcia’s recording was not of something newsworthy — the kind of recording almost certain to enter public circulation — but q recording made on the chance that something newsworthy might happen. There is therefore no easy analogy to be drawn between Roaden and Ros-signol and the facts in this case. Although a right- may be clearly established even in the absence of case law involving the exact or ‘-fundamentally similar” facts, Hope, 536 U.S. at 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, and “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates- established law even in novel factual circumstances,” id. at 740-41, 122 S.Ct. 2508, the scenario at issue here differs from the controlling case law in one material way: the seized item was not one that was clearly protected by the First Amendment. Because it was not clearly established in the Fourth Circuit in 2011 that recording routine police activity was protected by the First Amendment, it also could not have been clearly established in 2011 that the product of that recording was entitled to the same First Amendment protections applicable to newspapers and films sold or displayed to the public. To be sure, under Garcia’s version of events, it would be difficult to justify the seizure and retention of the video card as constitutional. But, as discussed below, the well-traveled path to that conclusion runs through the. Fourth Amendment, not the First Amendment. See infra Part IV.B. Thus, the Court grants qualified immunity to Officer Malouf on the First. Amendment damages claim relating to the seizure of the video card. Because the Court finds that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity on Count I, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claim for damages is granted, and Garcia’s cross. motion for summary judgment on the same issue is denied. C. Declaratory Judgment In Count I, Garcia also seeks a declaratory judgment that his'arrest “for video-recording police activity in a public location” and “the permanent deprivation of the video card” violated his First Amendment rights. Compl. at 22; Cross Mot. Sum. J. at 10. The Court’s finding that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity does not resolve this issue because qualified immunity protects government officials only from claims for damages. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 819 n. 34, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (holding that qualified immunity shields government officials from “liability for civil damages” and “expressing] no view as to the conditions in which injunc-tive or declaratory relief might be available”); see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (stating that the defense of qualified immunity is “not available” in “§ 1983 cases where injunctive relief is sought instead of or in addition to damages”); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (noting, in the context of absolute immunity in a § 1983 case, that “immunity from, damages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well”); Young v. Lynch, 846 F.2d 960, 962 (4th Cir.1988) (noting, in deciding whether an order denying qualified immunity is immediately appealable, that “an official who is granted qualified immunity from liability from damages probably will remain Tn the case as trial proceeds on the equitable issués”). Claims in federal court for a declaratory judgment are governed by the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. “[District courts have 'discretion in determining whether and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995) (citing Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 494, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 86 L.Ed. 1620 (1942)). There is “nothing automatic or obligatory about the assumption of jurisdiction by a federal court to hear a declaratory judgment action.” Id. at 288, 115 S.Ct. 2137 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, a district court should hear a declaratory judgment action “when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue,” Centennial Life Ins. Co. v. Poston, 88 F.3d 255, 256 (4th Cir.1996), but only when doing so is the prudent course in light of “considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration” Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288, 115 S.Ct. 2137. Here, resolving Garcia’s declaratory judgment claim serves a useful purpose. A finding whether the officers’ actions violated the First Amendment may facilitate the resolution of the bifurcated claim against. Montgomery County in which Garcia seeks injunctive relief requiring a new policy to prevent First Amendment violations. At the'same time, practicality and wise judicial administration also weigh in favor of hearing Garcia’s declaratory judgment claim. Certainly, if this were the only remaihing claim, or’ if it were expected that other related claims would be resolved in a different forum, it may not be appropriate to expend judicial resources to conduct a trial to resolve it. See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 495, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 86 L.Ed. 1620 (1942) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act because “another proceeding was pending in a state court in which all the matters in controversy between the parties could be fully adjudicated”);. Centennial, 88 F.3d at 256 (noting that a declaratory judgment action should “not be used to try a controversy by piecemeal, or to try particular issues without settling the entire controversy”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But, as discussed below, all of Garcia’s other claims will need to go before a trier of fact for resolution. Because the ensuing litigation on those claims involves the -same parties and evidence at issue in Garcia’s First Amendment claims, the additional resources required to resolve the declaratory judgment claim at the same time would be quite limited. The Court, in an exercise of its discretion, thus chooses to entertain Garcia’s declaratory judgment claim contained in Count I of the Complaint. Having determined that it is appropriate to hear Garcia’s declaratory judgment claim, the Court turns to whether summary judgment on that claim is appropriate. Although the Court has held that citizens have a First Amendment right to video record public police activities, and that confiscation of a video card or other recording of such police activity would violate the First Amendment, there remain several genuine issues of material fact relating to Garcia’s specific claim that, in this- case, Officers Baxter and Malouf violated those rights. Garcia asserts that up until -his arrest, he was calm and cooperative and so concludes that Officer Mal-ouf must have arrested him because he was recording police activity, in violation of his. First Amendment rights. Officer Mal-ouf asserts that when he approached Garcia, Garcia immediately became belligerent and, despite Officer Malouf s repeated efforts and warnings to get him to calm down, only became more disruptive and combative. According to Officer Malouf, he arrested Garcia not for filming police activity, but for disturbing others around him. Likewise, although Garcia asserts that Officer Baxter’s spotlighting of him multiple times, including after he had determined that Garcia was holding a camera and posed no threat to him or the other officers on the scene, interfered with his First Amendment right to' record the police activity, Officer Baxter maintains that he trained his spotlight on Garcia out of safety concerns. According to Baxter, Garcia repeatedly positioned himself in dark areas, making it difficult, if not' impossible, for Baxter- or other officers to see what he was doing or what he was holding. Thus, there are genuine issues of material fact relating to whether Officers Baxter and Malouf interfered with Garcia’s First Amendment rights. To make a determination on whether the officers violated Garcia’s First Amendment rights before and during his arrest would require a trier of fact to sift through and weigh these opposing factual accounts. ’ As for Garcia’s First Amendment claim relating to the seizure of the video card, little needs to be said. Garcia insists that Officer Malouf took the card and did not return it. Officer Malouf denies the allegation. If the card was not seized, there would be no First Amendment violation. Plainly, no declaratory judgment is possible without presenting that .issue to a trier of fact. Because of these genuine issues of material fact, the Court denies summary judgment to Defendants and Garcia on the claim for a declaratory judgment that the arrest of Garcia and the seizure of his video, card violated his First Amendment rights. III. First Amendment Retaliation Claim In Count II, Garcia alleges that Officers Baxter and Malouf retaliated against him for filing a complaint with the MCPD Internal Affairs Division and for filing this lawsuit, in violation of Garcia’s First Amendment rights. The officers seek summary judgment on this claim, asserting that (1) Garcia does not have a First Amendment right to file an Internal Affairs complaint or this lawsuit; (2) Garcia has failed to allege facts sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor on a retaliation claim; and (3) any right was not adversely impacted because Garcia was not deterred from filing his Internal Affairs complaint or this lawsuit. The First Amendment right of free speech “includes not only the affirmative right to speak, but also the right to be free from retaliation by a public official for the exercise of that right.” Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685 (4th Cir.2000). “Retaliation, though it is not expressly referred to in the Constitution, is nonetheless actionable because retaliatory actions may tend to chill individuals’ exercise of constitutional rights.” Am. Civil Liberties Union of Md., Inc. v. Wicomico Cnty., 999 F.2d 780, 785 (4th Cir.1993). A plaintiff seeking to recover on a First Amendment retaliation claim must prove the following: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the defendants took some action that adversely affected the plaintiffs First Amendment rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between the protected activity and the defendants’ conduct. Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 499 (4th Cir.2005). The first element presents a pure question of law. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, Garcia’s filing of an Internal Affairs complaint and this lawsuit are activities protected by the First Amendment. Citizens have a First Amendment right “to appeal to courts and other forums established by the government for resolution of legal disputes.” Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 131 S.Ct. 2488, 2494, 180 L.Ed.2d 408 (2011). This right of private citizens to petition for the redress of grievances “extends to all departments of the Government,” particularly, as here, when the grievance is a matter of public concern because it involves allegedly unlawful actions of police officers. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972); see Constantine, 411 F.3d at 499 (holding that the plaintiffs complaints about her exams to administrators at her public law school, which she later reiterated in the law school newspaper, were protected First Amendment activity); see also Gable v. Lewis, 201 F.3d 769, 771 (6th Cir.2000) (citing California Motor Transport in determining that a tow truck company owner had a First Amendment right to file a complaint with “nonjudicial public agencies like a police department,” specifically with the state Highway Patrol, regarding sex discrimination in the assignment of towing jobs). Garcia thus satisfies the first element. On the second element, Defendants assert that Garcia “has developed no facts to support his theory of retaliation.” Mot. Sum 1. at 32. Garcia, however, has presented such facts as to Officer Malouf. In his response to Defendants’ interrogatories, Garcia stated that during a one-week period in early December 2011, which was around the time of his trial on the disorderly conduct charge, he twice saw Officer Malouf parked across the street from his home, in front of the house that Officer Malouf had “mistakenly entered as [Garcia’s] address” on the June 16, 2011 police report. Cross-Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 5 at 7-8. While Officer Malouf points out that Garcia’s street is a frequently used shortcut and also that officers are regularly called to a nearby nursing home, those responses do not explain why Officer Malouf parked on Garcia’s street, rather than driving through or parking at the nursing home. Nor do they explain why, as Garcia alleges, Officer Malouf would be twice parked in the same spot, a spot right outside the address he had recorded as Garcia’s. Garcia also asserts that since he began pursuing his complaints related -to this incident, he has seen other police cruisers parked in front of his home on more than one occasion. For example, he has video evidence that on March 19, 2013, Officer Barros was parked on his street, in a location near where he had seen Officer Malouf. Officer Barros has stated that he was there to do paperwork, but he told Garcia that he wanted to “check up on” him. Cross Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 19 at 8-9. Although Garcia has no evidence specifically linking Officer Malouf to Officer Barros, his interaction with Officer Barros provides additional support for his claim that Officer Malouf, with the help of other MCPD officers, engaged in a coordinated effort to intimidate him. Officer Malouf may well contend that he never parked on Garcia’s street, or that he had a reason to park there unrelated to Garcia, but it is for a trier of fact to determine who is credible on that score. The second element also requires that the alleged retaliatory action adversely affect the plaintiffs First Amendment rights. Defendants assert that because Garcia actually filed his Internal Affairs complaint and the instant lawsuit, he