Full opinion text
ORDER SPATT, District Judge. This is a consolidated proceeding involving two actions arising from the decision by the Defendant United States Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) to build a reinforced sand dune on the beach in Montauk, New York with the stated purpose of “addressing the immediate need to reduce risk to life and property that resulted from Hurricane Sandy” (the “Project”). The Project was scheduled to commence on October 1, 2015 and to conclude in February 2016. In the first action bearing docket number, 15-cv-2349 (the “Removal Action”), the Plaintiffs Defend H20, Kevin McAllister (“McAllister”), Michael Bottini (“Bottini”), Rav Freidel (“Friedel”), Jay Levine (“Levine”), Thomas Muse (“Muse”), Conrad Costanzo (“Costanzo”), Daniel Lester, Paul Lester, and Nat Miller (“Miller”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) seek to nullify the decision to approve the Project .under Articles 30 and 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”). In the second action bearing docket number, 15-cv-5735 (the “Federal Action”), the Plaintiffs also seek to nullify the decision to approve the Project under the Federal Administrative Procedure Action, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (the “APA”). On October 1, 2015, the day that construction on the Project was scheduled to commence, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 65 to halt construction on the Project until February 15, 2016. By order to show cause, the Plaintiffs also filed a request for a preliminary injunction, also pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, -seeking essentially the same relief as the TRO. On October 1, 2015, the Court held a hearing during which it denied the Plaintiffs’ request for a TRO and requested further briefing as to whether a preliminary injunction should issue. On October 2, 2015, the Court referred the matter to United States Magistrate Judge Anne Y. Shields to hold a hearing, if necessary, and for a recommendation as to whether the Court should grant the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. On October 15, 2015, Judge Shields issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) finding that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary and recommending that the Court deny the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Presently before the Court are the Plaintiffs’ objections to the R&R. The Court notes that it has received a number of calls and letters from purported residents of Montauk expressing their opposition to the Project. While the Project has given rise to strong sentiment among some members of the Montauk community,- the Court must decide the Plaintiffs’ present motion for a preliminary injunction according to the evidence presented by the represented parties in this action. Based on that evidence, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a preliminary injunction. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, the Court overrules .the Plaintiffs’ objections and adopts the well-reasoned R&R issued by Judge Shields in its entirety. I. BACKGROUND Familiarity with the R&R is presumed. However, the Court finds it necessary to provide a brief overview of the statutory and regulatory framework governing federal activity in coastal zones, such as Mon-tauk, as well as the process followed by the Corps prior to starting construction on the Project. A. The Project ■ The “unincorporated hamlet of Montauk ... is a major tourist destination with many hotels, restaurants and shops in the downtown area.” (Cortes Decl., 15-cv-2349 Dkt. No.. 58-2,- at 5.). Historically, the “downtown area of the hamlet of Montauk is vulnerable to nor’ easters and hurricanes which produce storm surges and waves that historically have caused erosion to the beach and dunes in the ... [ajrea.” (Id. at 10.) To' address this problem, on July 14, 1960, as part of Section 101 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, P.L. 86-645, Congress authorized, the Corps to undertake certain coastal storm risk management projects, including the “Fire Island Inlet to Mon-tauk Point, New York, Combined Beach Erosion Control and Hurricane Protection Project” (“FIMP Project”), (Vargas Deck, 15-cv-2349 Dkt. No. 58-8, at ¶ 3.) In 1978, the Corps reformulated the FIMP Project (the “FIMP Reformulation Project”), which included a plan to conduct a Reformulation Study (the “FIMP Reformulation Study”) to “select the.optirpqm approach to long-term (50-year) storm damage reduction” in the FIMP area. . (Id. at ¶ 5; see also Cortes Decl., Dkt. No. 25-3, Ex. 3.) However, the Corps has yet to complete the FIMP Reformulation Project “primarily due to local sponsors’ reluctance to commit to payment of their required share of project costs.” (Id. at ¶ 5.) On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy hit New York, causing “severe coastal erosion in the shoreline of downtown Mon-tauk” and damage to commercial buildings in downtown Montauk. (Id. at ¶6.) On January 29, 2013, in order to address the damage caused by Hurricane Sandy, Congress passed the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, P.L. 113-2, which provided one hundred percent federal funding to the FIMP Reformulation Project. (Vargas Decl., 15-cv-2349 Dkt. No. 58-8, at ¶7.) Subsequently, the Corps determined that in addition to the long-term FIMP Reformulation Study, short-term measures were necessary to address the immediate threat posed by future hurricanes to the coastline area from the Fire Island Inlef;to Montauk Point. (See Cortes Decl., 15-cv-2349 Dkt. No. 58-2, at i.) One of the short-term projects proposed by the Corps was the construction of a 3,100 foot “reinforced dune,” which was'to extend “from South Emery Street to Atlantic Terrace motel in downtown Montapk and tapering into existing high dunes at both ends of the project area.” (Id, at ii.) The Corps planned to construct the dune using “14,175 Geotextile Sand Containers (“GSCs”) with filled dimensions of about 5.5 ft long, 3.5 ft wide, and 1.5 ft tall, each weighing 1.7 tons.” (Id.) Once filled, the GSCs would be covered by an additional three feet of sand to “provide protection to the toe of the structure and decrease the likelihood of exposure of the GSCs during small storm events.” (Id.) The Corps estimated that the Project would provide immediate protection to the Downtown .Montauk area for a period of twenty-five years and that the structure itself would have a “project life” of fifteen years. (See id at 30.) The Court will now discuss the various statutory and regulatory approvals that the Corps was required to comply with according to federal and state law prior to commencing construction on the' Project. B. The Statutory and Regulatory Framework 1. The Coastal Zone Management Act .. In 1972, Congress passed the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (“CZMA”), to “encourage and assist the states to ..develop[] and implement[] ... management programs to achieve wise use of the land and water resources of the coastal zone.” . To achieve this goal, Congress developed “a system of grants and other incentives” to encourage states to develop coastal management programs .(“CMP’s”). Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 316, 104 S.Ct. 656, 659, 78 L.Ed.2d 496 (1984); see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454, 55. Under the CZMA, a CMP can include “a comprehensive statement in words, maps, illustrations, or other media of communication, prepared and adopted by the state in accordance with the provisions of this chapter,. setting forth objectives, policies, and standards to guide public and private uses of lands and waters in the coastal zone.” 16 U.S.C.A. § 1453. Relevant here, once the Secretary of Commerce approves a state’s CMP, the CZMA requires that “[e]ach Federal agency activity within or outside the coastal zone that affects any land or water' use or natural resource of the coastal zone — be carried out in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved State management programs.” 16 U.S.Ci § 1456(c)(1)(A). An agency ensures the consistency of its proposed actions with state approved CMPs by submitting a “consistency determination to the relevant State agency .. no ... later that 90 days before final approval of the Federal activity, unless both the Federal Agency and the State agency agree to a different schedule.” 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(1)(C). Federal regulation, in turn, defines the term, “consistent to the maximum extent practicable,” as “fully consistent with the enforceable policies of management programs unless full consistency is prohibited by existing law applicable to the Federal agency.” 15 C.F.R. § 930.32. In that regard: If a Federal agency asserts that full consistency with the management program is prohibited, it shall clearly describe, in writing, to the State agency the statutory provisions, legislative history, or other legal authority which limits the Federal agency’s discretion to be fully consistent with the enforceable policies of the management program. . Id. at § 930.32(a)(2). In addition, a federal agency “may deviate from full consistency with an approved management program when such deviation is justified because of an emergency or other similar unforeseen circumstance (‘exigent circumstance’), which presents the Federal agency with a substantial obstacle; that prevents complete adherence to the approved program.” Id. § 930.32(b). However, “[o]nce the exigent circumstances have passed, and if the Federal Agency is still carrying out an activity with coastal effects, Federal Agencies shall ... ensure that the activity is consistent to the maximum extent practicable -with the enforceable policies of management programs.” Id. Once a federal agency has issued its consistency determination, the relevant state agency may concur or object to it. Id. at § 930.41(a). If the state objects to the federal agency’s consistency determination,' the federal agency can still proceed with the challenged activity so long As “the Federal agency has concluded that its proposed action is fully consistent with the enforceable policies of the management program” and notifies the state agency in writing before it commences with the project. Id. at § 930.43 2. The New York State Coastal and Waterways Act In 1981, the New York State Legislature enacted the Waterfront' Revitalization- of Coastal Areas and Inland Waterways Act, N.Y. Exec. Law § 910, et seq. (the “NYS Coastal and Waterways Act”), which authorized the New York Department of State (“DOS”) to establish a CMP pursuant to the CZMA. See also Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC v. New York State Dep’t of State, 41 Misc.3d 1237(A), 983 N.Y.S.2d 202 (Sup.Ct. Albany County 2013). On August' 13,1982, the DOS submitted a proposed CMP to the U.'S. Department of Commerce for approval. See New York State Coastal Management Program and Final Environmental Impact (“NY CMP”), available at 1http://www.dos.ny.gov/opd/ programs; see also Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC v. New York State Dep’t of State, 41 Misc.3d 1237(A), 983 N.Y.S.2d 202 (Sup.Ct.2013). On September 30, 1982, the U.S. Department of Commerce approved the New York CMP. (See Am. Compl., 15-cv-2349, at ¶ 148.) The New York CMP contains a list of forty-four policy statements intended to “promote[ ] the beneficial use of ■ coastal resources, preventt ] their impairment, [and] dealt ] with major activities'that substantially affect numerous resources.” In addition, the NYS Coastal and Waterways Act also encourages local governments to participate in the State’s coastal management efforts by submitting local waterfront revitalization . ^programs (“LWRPs”) to the Secretary of the DOS for approval. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 915(1). If an LWRP is approved by the’Seeretary ■ of the DOS, state agency actions must also “be consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the local program.” Id. at § 915(8). In addition, the U.S. Department of Commerce may approve an LWRP “as a refinement of and means to further implement the CMP at the local government level.” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 19, § 600.2. Thus, once an LWRP is approved at the federal and state level, all federal and state actions must “be consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the local program.” See id. On December 3,1999, the Town of East Hampton approved an LWRP covering a coastal area in the Town, which includes an area “along Town’s Peconic Estuary shore to Montauk ’ Point.” See Town 'of East Hampton Local Waterfront Revitalization Program (“East Hampton LWRP”), at v-9, available at http://docs.dos.ny.ffov/ communitieswaterfronts/LWRP. On December 20, 2008, the DOS approved- the East Hampton LWRP, and on August 25, 2008, the U.S. Office of Ocean and Coastal Resources Management also approved the program. See id. Thus, it is undisputed that any federal activity in the coastal area along the Mon-tauk shore is required under the CZMA to be undertaken “in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable” with the East Hampton LWRP. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A). 3. The National Environmental Policy Act In 1970, Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (“NEPA”) to “promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man[.]” 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321. To achieve this goal, NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) for any major federal action “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C., § 4332(C). The EIS must address: (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local and short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Id. In addition, the NEPA created- the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) to promulgate regulations, that supplement the statutory requirements of NEPA. See id. at § 4344; see also Nat’l Audubon Soc. v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7; 12 (2d Cir.1997) (“The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), created under NEPA, is responsible for promulgating regulations that supplement NEPA’s statutory requirements.”). The CEQ regulations provide that if an agency is uncertain as to whether the environmental impact of a proposed action rises to the level of “a major federal action” requiring an EIS, the agency must prepare an Environmental Assessment (“EA”). See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1501.4, 1508.9; see also Hoffman, 132 F.3d at 12. An EA is a shorter and more concise document than an EIS. The CEQ regulations define an EA as a “concise public document” that “[bjriefly provide[s] sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant impact.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9. If an agency determines that an EIS is not required, it must also issue a “finding of no impact” statement (“FONSI”), which “briefly presents] the reasons why an action ... will not have a significant effect on the human environment and for which an environmental impact statement therefore will not be prepared.” See id. at §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13. C. The Approval Process For the Project 1. Consistency Determination On August 11, 2014, Peter Weppler (“Weppler”), Chief of the Environmental Section of the Corps, sent a letter to Jeffrey Zappieri (“Zappieri”), an official at the DOS, stating that the Corps had determined that construction of the Project was consistent with the East Hampton LWRP and the New York CMP. Weppler attached to. the letter two separate documents which set forth what the Corps determined were the applicable policies in the LWRP and the New York CMP, and explained how the Project met or advanced those policies. (Cortes Deck, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 25-3.) 2. The Draft EA and FONSI Statement On August 26, 2014, the Corps released a draft EA and FONSI statement and made them available for public comment for a period of thirty days. (Cortes Reply Deck, 157cv-2349, Dkt. No. 41, at ¶¶ 3-4.) The Draft EA noted that prior to Hurricane Sandy, the Corps, as part of the FIMP Reformulation Study, undertook an initial screening of projects intended to address erosion along Montauk Beach. (See id., Ex. 2, at 6-8.) In particular, the Corps considered “nori-structural measures, beachfill with structures, and beach-fill” and analyzed each measure based on “general design requirements, costs, and local acceptability.” (Id. at 8.) At that time, the Corps recommended a “small scale beach nourishment project, or feeder beách.” (Id.) However, after Hurricane Sandy, the Corps revisited its plan to “determine if the eroded beach condition and updated costs and benefits warranted selection of a larger alternative plan.” (Id.) In so doing, the Corps considered five alternatives: (i) “Beach Restoration”; (ii) “Beach Restoration and Buried Seawall”; (iii) “Feeder Beach”; (iv) “Dune Reinforcement”; and (v) Dune Reinforcement and Feeder Beach.” (Id.) In addition to studying the long-term benefits of these five alternatives, the Corps also considered whether any .of these plans could address the short-term need to repair damage caused by Hurricane Sandy. (Id.) The Corps concluded that Dune Reinforcement, Alternative 4, was the only viable option for a short-term project because: Due to the large quantities of sand fill required for construction of Alternatives 1, 2, 3, and 5 dredging of an offshore borrow area would be required. Dune Reinforcement (Alternative 4) requires significantly less sand, approximately 51,000 cy, than other four alternatives. Therefore, it is feasible and expectéd to be less costly to obtain the necessary sand fill material from upland sediment sources____Alternatives 1, 2, 3, and 5 all have very high costs, and can only perform as designed if done in conjunction with a long-term plan for renouHshment. (Id. at 8-9.) In addition to the five alternatives discussed above, the Corps also considered a “No Action Alternative,” under which, the Corps and the Federal Government “would take no action to reduce storm damages in the study area,” and instead rely on local governments and non-governmental groups to “take actions to protect themselves by undertaking their own construction projects to build up the beach ánd dune profiles.” (Id. at 9.) The Corps found this alternative to be insufficient because the “extent and details of the actions” that local actors might take to address potential storm damages were not known. (See id. at 9-10.) On August 26, 2014, the Corps also released a draft FONSI statement on its website for public comment which concluded that the Project did not constitute “a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” ánd therefore, did not require the preparation of a detailed EIS under NEPA § 102(2)(C). (Cortes Deck, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 41-5, at 3.) 3. The Public Comments and the Final EA and FONSI Statements During the thirty-day public comment period, the Corps received comments on its draft EA and FONSI statement from: (i) the Historic Preservation Technician; (ii) Yogi Harper, President of Erosion Control Specialists of North Carolina, Inc.; (iii) several former environmental planners and longtime residents of East Hampton; (iv) the Concerned Citizens of Montauk; and (v) the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). (Cortes Deck, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 41-5.) Notably, it is undisputed that the Plaintiffs did not submit written comments. In October 2014, the Corps finalized the EA, and on November 12, 2014, it finalized the FONSI statement. (Cortes Deck, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 41, at ¶¶ 4-5.) On December 8, 2014, the Corps released both documents on its website. See Downtown Montauk Stabilization Project, Final Environmental Assessment, available at http:// ioww.nan.usace, army.mil. In the finalized drafts, the Corps made revisions to the EA and FONSI statement based on some of the comments it received on the drafts. (See ick) For example, in a September 24, 2014 letter, Grace Musume-ci (“Musumeci”), Chief of the Environmental Review Section of the EPA, asked the Corps to provide more detail explaining (i) the reasons that it selected the reinforced dune option over the no action alternative; and (ii) “the expected fate of the geotextile bags at the end of the project life, or in the event that they prematurely become unearthed as a result of another super-storm.” (Cortes Deck, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 41-5.) In response, the final draft EA explains in more detail why the “No Action Alternative” was not a viable option: The minimum beach and dune condition that is currently maintained merely helps to provide continued access to the beach; it provides only limited protection against severe storms. A more robust dune and beach is required to provide adequate protection from severe storms and address the vulnerability of the pro* ject area. ■- (Cortes Deck, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 41-6, at 8.) ' ’ ■' In addition, the Corps added a more thorough discussion of what might result if the GSCs deteriorate and the steps the Corps plans to take to “avoid and/or minimize some of the project’s impacts to fish and wildlife resources,” including: • The GSCs will be'buried with sand to provide suitable dune habitat. • The grain size of the sand used to bury the GSCs is the same or slightly larger than the native sediment. • The project is designed to, maximize the stability of the GSCs and reduce the potential for undermining and exposure of the GSC which would diminish habitat suitability for affected species. • 45,000 cy of sand will be obtained from upland sediment sources and will avoid off-shore borrow ' area "ocean bottom disturbances. (Id. at 46.) 4. The Concurrence of the DOS and the Town In an October 24, 2014 letter to Wep-pler, Matthew Millea (“Millea”), the New York Deputy Secretary of State, indicated that the DOS concurred with the Corps’ determination that the Project is consistent with the New York CMP and the East Hampton LWRP. (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 5, Ex. 2.) On November 3, 2014, Brian Frank (“Frank”), Chief Environmental Analyst for the Town of. East Hampton (“East Hampton”), sent a letter to Weppler indicating that the Town also concluded that the Project does not conflict, with the East Hampton LWRP. (Id. at Ex. 6) . D. The Project In March 2015, the Corps entered into an agreément with H&L Contracting LLC (“H&L Contracting”) to construct the Project. (Verga Deck, 15-CV-2349, Dkt. No. 58-8, at ¶ 11.) Under the agreement, H&L Contracting received a total of $8.4 million, of ' whióh *$600,000 was devoted to costs related to “mobilization” and “de-mobilization.” (Id. at ¶ 11; Meranda Deck, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 58-9, at ¶ 7.) According to the Corps, “[mjobilization is the process by which H&L would set up their equipment, machinery, office trailers and everything else needed to commence construction.” (Meranda Deck, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 58-9, at ¶ 5.) De-mobilization is “the process by which H&L would remove all of their equipment.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) In order to minimize disruption to the beach season, the Corps and H&L planned to commence mobilization for the project on October 1, 2015 and to begin construction on October 13, 2015. (Verga Deck, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 58-8, at ¶ 12.) The Project was scheduled to be completed by the end of February 2016 before the start of the 2016 beach season. (Id.) E. The Procedural History 1. The Removed Action. On March 19,2015, the Plaintiffs Defend H20,‘ McAllister, Bottini, Freidel, Levine, and Muse (collectively, the “Original Plaintiffs”) commenced the Removal Action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Suffolk County seeking a judgment pursuant to Articles 30 and 78 of the CPLR nullifying the decision to approve the Project by the Respondents East Hampton, the County of Suffolk (the “County”), the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”), and the Corps (collectively, the “Removed Defendants”). On April -24, 2015, the Corps removed this action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). On April 29, 2015, the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in the Removed Action, which added Costanzo, Daniel Lester, Paul Lester, and Miller (together with the “Original Plaintiffs,” the “Plaintiffs”). The amended complaint describes the Plaintiff Defend H20 as a non-profit organization whose membership consists of individuals who “live, work, or recreate near or at the [Pjroject site.” (Am. Compl., Í5-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 5, at ¶ 12.) The eight individual Plaintiffs are members of H2Ó who live in the Montauk area. (Id. at ¶¶ 52-126.) On May 23, 2015, the Court so-ordered a stipulation permitting Royal Atlantic Corporation, Royal Atlantic East Condominium Owners Association, Inc., and Montauk Beach Preservation Association, Inc. (collectively, the “Intervenors”) to intervene as Defendants in the Removed A'dtion. The Intervenors represent three groups comprised of 110 cooperative unit owners' and 5 hotel and motel owners who own á combined “2,900 lineal feet of oceanfront property directly affected by the [Project].” (Intervenors5 Answer, 15-cv-2349, Dkt.'No. 15, atHl.) On June 1, 2015, the Intervenors filed an answer to the amended complaint and a purported counterclaim against the Plaintiffs seeking a judgment dismissing the amended complaint and holding the Plaintiffs “personally liable for any damages that occur, both physical and monetary as a result of loss of income should the planned [Pjroject not proceed.” (Id. at ¶ 8.) From June 23,2015 to July 23, 2015, the Removed Defendants filed four-separate motions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 to dismiss the amended complaint. As noted, on October 1, 2015, the day that the Corps and H&L were scheduled to begin mobilizing construction equipment, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a TRO pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 to prevent construction on the Project from commencing until February 15, 2015. By order to show cause, the Plaintiffs also filed a request for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 seeking essentially the same relief as the TRO. On October 1, 2015, the Court held a hearing during which it denied the Plaintiffs’ request for a. TRO and requested further briefing as to whether a preliminary injunction should issue. On October 2, 2015, the Court referred the matter to United States Magistrate Judge Anne Y. Shields to hold a hearing, if necessary, and for a recommendation as to whether the Court should grant the Plaintiffs’ motion for a,preliminary injunction. 2. The Federal Action On October 2, 2015, the Plaintiffs Defend H20, Costanzo, Daniel and Paul Lester, and Miller commenced the Federal Action against the Removed Defendants, as well as Col. David Caldwell, in his official capacity as Commander of the New York District, of the Corps, and Commissioner Marc Gerstman, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the DEC (together with the Removed Defendants, the “Defendants”). On October 5, 2015, the Plaintiffs in the Federal Action filed an amended complaint incorporating the same facts alleged in the amended complaint filed in the Removed Action. However, they added new. claims pursuant to the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701-06 (the “APA”). (See Am. Compl., 15-cv-5735, Dkt. No. 2, at ¶¶ 76-111.) On October 9,2015, Judge Shields held a status conference to discuss the most procedurally efficient manner to move forward with the Removed and Federal Actions. At the conference, the Plaintiffs made clear that the Federal Action incorporates all of the claims alleged in the first filed Removed Action and adds federal APA claims based on the same allegations. (See Oct, 9,2015 Minute Order, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No 66.) They also made it clear that the only party from whom they are seeking preliminary relief is the Corps because the Corps is solely responsible for scheduling and overseeing the construction of the Project. (See id.) Based on these representations, Judge Shields proposed, and the parties agreed to stipulate to the following: • The Removed Action shall be closed, and the motions pending in that action be terminated without prejudice to renewing those motions in the Federal Action following the disposition of the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction; • The preliminary injunction motion, which was briefed in the context of the Removed Action, shall proceed under the docket number assigned to the Federal Action; • The Corps was granted additional time to submit papers in further sup- ' port of its opposition to the Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction so that it could address whether the Plaintiffs would be entitled to injunc-. tive relief pursuant to the new federal claims asserted against it in the Federal Action; • While the Plaintiffs supplied the Defendants with courtesy copies of the amended complaint in the Federal Action, the provision of such papers was not deemed service of those papers; and • The Defendants were not required to file an answer or otherwise move in the Federal Action until 30 days after service was made, or 30 days after a decision on the motion for preliminary injunction, whichever is later. (See id.) On October 13, 2015, in compliance with the above-Order, the Corps submitted a letter to the Court supplementing its opposition to the Plaintiffs’ motion and addressing the Plaintiffs’ newly asserted federal APA claims. (Corps’ Oct. 13, 2015 Ltr., 15-cv-5735, Dkt. No. 13.) 3. The Report and Recommendation On October 15, 2015, Judge Shields issued a report and recommendation recommending that the Court (i) direct the Clerk of the Court to close the Removed Action under docket number 15-cv-2349, and terminate, without prejudice, the pending motions to dismiss under docket numbers 19, 21, 25, 26, and 29; (ii) deny the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction under docket number 54 in the Removed Action; and (iii) deny fhe Plaintiffs’ request for an evidentiary hearing. (October 15, 2015 Report & Recommendation, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 72 (“R&R”), at 34.) Judge Shields recommended that the Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction be denied based on the following findings: (i) the doctrine of laches barred the Plaintiff from seeking preliminary relief, id. at 29-30; (ii) the Plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm, id. at 31-33; (in) the balance of equities and the public interest weighed heavily against an order enjoining construction on the Project, id. at 33-34; and (iv) the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on their Article 78 and APA claims, id. at 23-29. Presently before - the Court»' are thé Plaintiffs’ objections to Judge Shields’ recommendations that the Court should deny the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and request for an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds the Plaintiffs’ objections -to be without merit and adopts the R&R in its entirety. ■ . II. DISCUSSION A. The Legal Standards 1. Standard of Review In reviewing a Report and Recommeh-dation, the district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C.' § 636(b)(1)(C). ' ' ’ The district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, “[t]he district court is ‘permitted to - adtfpt those sections of a magistrate judge’s report to which no specific objection is made, so long as those sections are not facially erroneous.’ ” Sasmor v. Powell, No. 11 CIV. 4645 KAM JO, 2015 WL 5458020, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015) (quoting Batista v. Walker, No. 94-CV-2826, 1995 WL 453299, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1995)); see also Zaretsky v. Maxi-Aids, Inc., No. 10-CV-3771 (SJF) (ETB), 2012 WL 2345181, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2012) aff'd, 529 Fed.Appx. 97 (2d Cir.2013) (“To accept the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge to which no timely objection has been made, the district judge need only be satisfied that there is -no clear error apparent on the face of the record.”). 2. The Preliminary Injunction Standard A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 must establish that: (i) “he is likely to succeed on the merits”; (ii) “he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief’; (iii) “the balance of equities tips in his favor”; and (iv) “an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) As to the first factor, the Second Circuit has adopted a ' somewhat more flexible standard than “likely to succeed on the merits”—namely, that a party seeking a preliminary injunction must show “(1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.” Citigroup Glob. Markets, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir.2010); see also UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. W. Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 660 F.3d 643, 648 (2d Cir.2011) (same). The latter “fair ground -for litigation” standard is more flexible than the former “likelihood of success” standard because it “permits a district court to grant a preliminary injunction in situations where it cannot determine with certainty that the moving party is more likely than not to prevail on the merits of the underlying claims, but where the costs outweigh the benefits of not granting the injunction.” VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d at 35. However, as Judge Shields correctly noted, the Second Circuit has held that the less rigorous “fair ground for litigation” standard is not available where, as here, “the moving party seeks to stay gov-eminent action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme.” Id. at n. 4; see also Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. New York State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 769 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir.2014) (“A- plaintiff cannot rely on the ‘fair-ground-for-litigation’ alternative • to challenge ‘governmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme.’”) (quoting Plaza Health Labs., Inc. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir.1989)). That is because “ ‘governmental policies implemented through legislation or regulations developed through presumptively reasoned democratic processes are entitled .to a higher degree of deference and should not be enjoined lightly.” Id. (quoting Able v. United States, 44 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir.1995)). Thus, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the Plaintiffs, must show that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their ■ claims, in addition to the other three elements of the preliminary injunction standard. , B. As to the Recommendation to Close the Removal Action As an initial matter, the Court notes that at the October 7, 2015 conference, Judge Shields proposed, and the parties agreed to: (i) close the Removed Action, 15-cv-2349; (ii) terminate without-prejudice the Defendants’ motions to dismiss pending in the Removal Action; and (iii) - stay the time in which the Defendants were required to file an answer or otherwise move in the Federal Action until thirty days after service was made, or thirty days after a' decision on the motion for preliminary injunction, whichever is later. (See Oct. 9, 2015 Minute Order, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No 66.) The reason that Judge Shields proposed this stipulation-was to avoid the unnecessary cost and delay that would likely result fróm proceeding with both the Federal Action and the Removal Actions when the Federal Action alleges APA claims based on the exact same set facts that the Plaintiffs allege in the Removal- Action. ■ In light of the parties’ stipulation and in the interest of efficiency, the Court finds no clear error in the recommendation by Judge Shields to close the Removal Action and terminate the pending motions to dismiss without prejudice and with leave to refile in the Federal Action. Accordingly, the Court adopts this recommendation in its entirety. The Court further notes that the termination of, .the Removal action will also result in the dismissal without prejudice of the counterclaim filed by the Intervenors against the Plaintiffs. (See Verified Answer, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 15.) If the In-tervenors wish to re-assert their counterclaim, they may move to intervene in the Federal Action. C. As to the Request for an Evidentia-ry Hearing Judge Shields also found that no eviden-tiary hearing was necessary because the Plaintiffs failed to raise a dispute of fact as to any of the four elements of the preliminary injunction standard. (See R&R at 5-6.) The Court agrees. “On a motion for preliminary injunction, where ‘essential facts are in dis-puté, there must be a hearing ... and appropriate findings of fact must be made.’” Republic of Philippines v. New York Land Co., 852 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir.1988) (quoting Fengler v. Numismatic Americana, Inc., 832 F.2d 745, 747 (2d Cir.1987) (alteration omitted). However,-“[i]t is not a rigid requirement that oral testimony be taken on a motion for a preliminary injunction.” Id. (citing Redac Project 6426, Inc. v, Allstate Ins. Co., 402 F.2d 789, 790 (2d Cir.1968)). Significantly, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is not required when the relevant facts either are not in dispute or have been clearly demon-* strated at prior stages of the case ... or when the disputed facts are amenable to complete resolution on a paper record.” Charette v. Town of Oyster Bay, 159 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir.1998); see also Dress for Success Worldwide v. Dress 4 Success, 589 F.Supp.2d 351, 357 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (“There .is no hard and fast rule in this circuit that oral testimony must be taken on a motion for a preliminary injunction or 'that the court can in no circumstances dispose of the motion on the papers before it.”) (quoting Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 256 (2d Cir.1989) (alteration omitted)). Here, the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is premised5 on their claims that the Corps violated the APA in determining that (i) the Project was “consistent to the maximum extent practicable” with the East Hampton LWRP and (ii) issuing a FONSI statement under NEPA in which it concluded that the construction of the Project would result in no significant adverse environmental impacts. (See Pis.’ Mem. of Law, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 15, at 1-2.) The only evidence that the Plaintiffs offered in support of their motion for preliminary relief was an affidavit by Kevin McAllister (“McAllister”), an individual who has a Master’s Degree of Science degree in Coastal Zone Management and “contributed to the drafting of the [East Hampton] LWRP.” (McAllister Deck, 15: cv-2349, Dkt. No. 54-3, at ¶ 6.) On the other hand, the Corps offered documentary evidence, including, drafts and final versions of the EA and FONSI statements; copies of the public comments to those documents; and the determinations by the Corps, the DEC, and East Hampton that the Project was consistent with the East Hampton LWRP. As is explained in detail below, the Court finds that these documents elearly show that the Corps followed the required procedures under the CZMA and NEPA. (See Cortes Deck, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 41, Exs. 1-5.) In addition, the Corps offered the declarations of (i) Frank Verga (“Verga”), a Project Manager at the Corps responsible for the Project; (ii) Kevin Merenda (“Mer-enda”), a Resident Engineer at the Corps who also works on 'the Project; and (iii) Susan D. McCormick, P.E., (“McCormick”), the Chief of the Coastal Erosion Management Program" for the DEC) (See Cortes Deck, 15-cv-23"49, Dkt. No. 58.) Judge Shields concluded that the Corps’ determination that the Project was consistent with the East Hampton LWRP and did not result in significant impacts to the environment. As explained below, the Court finds this conclusion to be well-supported by the undisputed documentary evidence in the record. Thus, the Court agrees with the conclusion by Judge Shields that the Plaintiffs’ allegations, supported only by the McAllister affidavit, were not sufficient to create a dispute of fact as to any of the elements of the preliminary injunction standard, and thus did not merit a separate evidentiary hearing. In their objections, the Plaintiffs attempt to create an issue of fact by offering additional evidénce in the form of (i) an unsworn letter by Steven Resler (“Res-ler”), a Coastal Resource Specialist at the DOS and purported expert in “coastal management”; and (ii).what the Plaintiffs call “pre-filed” testimony by Resler from a 1995 case, which the Plaintiffs contend is “factually similar” to the instant case. (See Irace Deck, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 76, Exs, A, B.) As is explained more fully below, the Court finds this additional evidence to be improper and not persuasive when viewed in light of the undisputed documentary evidence before the Court and the independent defense of laches. Accordingly, the Court, upon a de novo review of the evidence, finds the decision by Judge Shields to deny an evidentiary hearing to be entirely correct, and adopts her recommendation on that issue. See, e.g., Drywall Tapers & Pointers of Greater New York, Local 1974 of I.B.P.A.T., AFL-CIO v. Local 530 of Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons Int’l Ass’n, 954 F.2d 69, 76-77 (2d Cir.1992) (“No hearing was necessary here because ‘the prior hearings and affidavits, and the court’s findings supporting the earlier injunction, provided an adequate basis for the court’s decision. The most significant factors [on which the injunction was based] ... would have remained essentially unchanged by any additional evidence.’ ”) (quoting Republic of the Philippines, 852 F.2d at 37); Hybred Int’l v. Thorne Legal, Inc., No. CV-08-4343 (CPS) (KAM), 2008 WL 5068896, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2008) (“A [preliminary injunction evidentiary] hearing is not necessary, however, when a movant does not make a sufficient showing of irreparable harm, when credibility is at issue, when the right to a hearing has been waived, and when additional evidence will not change the court’s finding .... In this case, even accepting plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, they are not entitled to relief as a matter of law.”) (emphasis added) (citing Dodge v. County of Orange, 208 F.R.D. 79, 86 (S.D.N.Y.2002)); Brownell v. City of Rochester, 190 F.Supp.2d 472, 483 (W.D.N.Y.2001) (“I agree that no hearing [on a preliminary injunction motion] is necessary here. The essential facts of these cases are not in dispute.”). D. As to the Doctrine of Laches The Plaintiffs object to Judge Shields’ finding that laches bars their claim for preliminary relief. “Laches is an equitable defense Which bars injunctive relief where a plaintiff unreasonably delays in commencing an action.” Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Leisure Time Prods., B.V., 17 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Stone v. Williams, 873 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir.1989)). “A party asserting the defense of laches must establish that: (1) the plaintiff knew of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the plaintiff inexcusably delayed in taking action; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced by the delay.” Ikelionwu v. United States, 150 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.1998). In cases where a plaintiff alleges that a defendant failed to comply with NEPA, courts have stated that “laches is a doctrine of equity that is only rarely invoked in environmental cases, on account of the strong public interest in effecting compliance with NEPA.” Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 399 F.Supp.2d 386, 402 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (Rochester v. United States Postal Service, 541 F.2d 967, 977 (2d Cir.1976)). In such cases, “[t]he Second Circuit test is whether the plaintiffs delay in bringing the suit has resulted in construction proceeding ‘to a point where any significant environmental damage has already been done’ and whether, in the alternative, ‘construction may have gone so far that for economic reasons it would be impracticable or impossible to alter much of the basic plan.’” Riverdale Envtl. Action Comm. Along the Hudson—R.E.A.C.H. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 638 F.Supp. 99, 102-03 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (quoting Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir.1975)). For example in Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, supra at 377-88, the plaintiffs, a group of environmentalists and concerned citizens, challenged the Corps’ decision to deepen shipping channels in the New. York-New Jersey harbor, alleging that the Corps was arbitrary and capricious in failing to prepare a supplemental EIS relating to the possible effects of its project on a recently announced study by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). Although the plaintiffs waited a year after the EPA announced the study to initiate their lawsuit, the court found that the delay was not unreasonable because during that period, “plaintiffs repeatedly attempted to resolve their concerns with the Army Corps and the EPA through negotiation.” Id. at 402. In addition, given that construction on the facility had not yet begun, the court did not find that the Corps was prejudiced in delaying the project further. See id. Accordingly, the court found the doctrine of laches was inapplicable to the plaintiffs’ case. Id.; see also Steubing v. Brinegar, 511 F.2d 489, 496 (2d Cir.1975) (“[Bjecause the bridge was such a large project and in such an early stage of construction, the possible environmental savings resulting from requiring an EIS seemed to outweigh the detriment defendants and third parties might suffer as a result of any delay on the part of plaintiffs in bringing this action.”). By contrast, in Riverdale Envtl. Action Comm. Along the Hudson—R.E A.C.H. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., supra at 100-101, the plaintiffs, also a group of individuals and community organizations, sought to preliminarily enjoin the construction of metro commuter line power substations based on their claim that the decision by the defendant-transportation authority, .to issue a FONSI statement was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of the APA. In considering the viability of a laches defense, the court found that the plaintiffs evidenced a lack of diligence because'f they “were fully aware of and participated in planning discussions regarding these substations, yet.they ha[d] waited eighteen months to bring this suit.” Id. at 103. In addition, the court found that the defendant was prejudiced by the plaintiffs’ delay because “over $67 million has already been invested in- the project; $56 million of which has been spent.” Id. Had the plaintiffs brought suit immediately after the defendant had issued an EA, the court found that “the planning and construction would not have progressed so far as to make it impracticable to delay the development of the site and other sites until an EIS, if needed, could be prepared.” Id. Accordingly, the court found laches to be applicable and denied the plaintiffs’ request for preliminary relief. Id. Similarly in City of Rochester v. U.S. Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967, 976 (2d Cir.1976), the Second Circuit found that laches precluded the requests by a group of plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction to halt construction by the postal service of a new facility. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs had waited more than a year after they became aware of the project to commence a lawsuit and by that time “construction was 18 percent completed.” Id. at 977. As such, the court found that “construction has proceeded to a point where it is impractical for economic reasons to enjoin further development of the Henrietta site.” Id.; see also L.S.S. Leasing Corp. v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 579 F.Supp. 1565, 1572 n. 8 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (finding laches precluded injunctive relief in an environmental suit where the plaintiffs waited over three years from the date when the final impact statement was published -to initiate suit, failed to lodge their objections in the administrative process, and caused undue prejudice to the defendants because they had spent 5% of a $93 million and would incur “additional shut-down and .start-up costs ... if the project were forced to stop”). Here, Judge Shields' found that the Plaintiffs were aware as early as April 2015 that the Corps was going to commence construction on the Project in October 2015, and yet decided to wait until October 1, 2015, after preparations for the project were well underway, to file a motion for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs do not appear, to object to this finding, and the Court finds, even under a de novo review, that it is supported by the record in this case. On April 24, 2015, the Corps filed a letter with, the Court on ECF clearly representing, “The construction work on the Beach Stabilization Project is not scheduled to commence until the Fall of 2015.” (Apr. 24, 2015 Ltr., Dkt.' No. 2.) Further, on August 24, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 for leave to amend the Removal Action’ complaint for a second time. (See- the Pis.’ Mem. of Law, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 29.) In their memorandum, they also clearly indicated an awareness of the construction schedule set by the Corps — “.the Corps has agreed that construction is not scheduled to begin until early October 2015.” (Id. at 7.) Based on this evidence, the Plaintiffs satisfied the first element .of laches— namely, that the Plaintiffs knew, as early as April 2015 that the Project was going to commence in October 2015, . Judge Shields’ finding as to the second element- of -laches — namely, the plaintiff inexcusably delayed in taking action — is also well-supported by the record. There is no question that the Plaintiffs’ sat on their rights for at least five months and waited until October 1, 2015, the day that-construction on the Project was scheduled to commence, to -make a motion for preliminary injunction. . . In that regard, the Court finds significant the undisputed fact that the Plaintiffs failed to make their objections to the Project known to the Corps by participating in the administrative approval process in September -2014, when the Corps released the draft-EA and FONSI for public review. Had they done so, it is possible that the Corps could have addressed some of the Plaintiffs’ objections prior to undertaking the extensive preparation efforts described below. Instead, the Plaintiffs did not participate in the public comment period or try to resolve their objections without. litigation; waited six months to initiate suit against the Corps; and' then waited another five months to request preliminary relief. These undisputed facts weigh heavily in favor a finding of laches. See L.S.S. Leasing Corp., 579 F.Supp. at 1573 (“The defendants also claim that the laundry list of objections to the FEIS should properly have béen raised during the administrative phase of the proceedings and that the failure to raise them then, bars the plaintiffs from raising them now. If these alleged omissions are indeed significant, as the plaintiffs contend, they should certainly have been raised during the administrative process.”). The Plaintiffs made various assertions béfore Judge Shields to excuse their delay. They asserted, without providing any evidence, that “the first time! [the] Plaintiffs received the Corps’ Consistency Statement using the LWRP policies was on July 23, 2015.” (Id. at 5.) However, the August 11, 2014 consistency statement was referenced in and attached as Attachment E to the draft EA, which as noted above, was made publicly available by the Corps on August 26, 2014. (See Cortes Deck, 15-W-2349, Dkt. No. 41.) Further, their contention is contradicted by the fact that their March 19, 2015 complaint explicitly references the consistency determination. (See Verified Petition, Dkt. No. 1, at ¶ 130.) Thus, at the very least, the Corps was aware of the determination as early as March 19, 2015, and still waited almost six months to file a motion for a preliminary injunction. - They also attempted to excuse their delay by making unsupported statements in their legal memorandum that the Defendants failed to properly respond to their apparent November 24, 2014 requests'under the Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”) for information related to the Project. (See the Pis.’ Reply Mem. of Law at 4-5.) However, the Plaintiffs1 do not annex these supposed FOIL requests arid fail to explain how the information sought in those requests was relevant1 to their claims for preliminary relief. Indeed, the Court notes that the documents that form the basis of their claims — the EA, the FONSI statement, and the consistency determination — were already publicly available as of August 26, 2014. (See Cortes Deck, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 41.) Thus, the Court finds the Plaintiffs’ claim that the Defendants’ responses to their FOIL requests were necessary for them to initiate their lawsuit to be speculative and unsupported. ■.*'■ In their objections, the Plaintiffs also attempt to excuse their delay because they assert that “[t]his is a complicated matter involving four distinct government agencies, at four different levels of government ... [and] has required significant litigation to fend off Motions to Dismiss from each of the four agencies.” (The Pis.’ Objections, Dkt. No. 75, at 18-19.) The Plaintiffs cite to no legal authority holding that a litigant can be .absolved from the consequences of a significant delay in requesting preliminary relief because the matter is “complicated,” and" the Court declines to adopt such an argument. Almost every litigation involves complicated questions. Were the Court to recognize the supposed complicated nature of a case as an excuse for a plaintiff to make an eleventh hour request for preliminary relief, it would render laches inapplicable in almost every case and severely prejudice defendants who may have already taken costly actions to proceed "with the challenged activity during the period of the plaintiffs delay. Thus, the Court finds the excuse offered by Plaintiffs to be unpersuasive. Finally, the Plaintiffs assert that their delay should be excused because they “were still trying to resolve this at the administrative level in later September, through the County Legislature.” (The Pis.’ Objections, Dkt. No. 75, at 18-19.) Again, the Court declines to find this unsupported and vague allegation to be a valid excuse for the Plaintiffs’ delay. Accordingly, the Court concludes, upon a de novo review, that Judge Shields’ finding that the Plaintiffs satisfied the first two elements of laches — namely, that they knew of the defendant’s misconduct and inexcusably delayed in taking action — to be well-supported by the record in this case. The Plaintiffs do not- object to the finding by Judge Shields that the Defendants were prejudiced by the Plaintiffs’ delay and therefore, satisfied the third element of the Laches defense. Thus, the Corps contends that the Plaintiffs waived any objections to this finding. (See the Corps’ Opp’n to the Pis.’ Objections Mem. of Law, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 79, at 8.) The Court need not decide the question of waiver as it finds that even under de novo review, Judge Shields’ finding of prejudice was clearly supported by the record. Specifically, the Defendants offer a declaration by Meranda, who, as noted above is the Resident Engineer and Administrative Contracting Officer for the Project, in which he stated that H&L Contracting has already mobilized its equipment and begun construction on the Project. As such, the Corps is obligated to pay H&L Contracting $600,000 under the agreement, which is non-refundable. (Mer-anda Decl., 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 58, at ¶ 8.) Further, since H&L has already mobilized its equipment and personnel, the Corps is obligated to pay H&L an additional $6,700 per day as of October 1, 2015 for labor and costs associated with the Construction. (Meranda Decl., 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 58, at ¶ 8.) Therefore, any attempt to stop construction at this point would potentially waste the more than $600,000 the Corps has already spent to date on the Project. (Id.) In addition, Meranda estimated that if construction . were delayed until February 2015 to resolve the Plaintiffs’ objections to the Project, H&L would have to"de-mobi-lize and re-mobilize its equipment, which would cost the Corps another $500,000. (Meranda Deck, 15-cv-2349, Dkt. No. 58, at ¶8.) Had the Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary relief prior to the Corps mobilizing its equipment and beginning construction on the Project, all of these costs, which-could exceed more than $1.1 million, may have-been avoided. Based on this undisputed evidence, the Court finds that construction on the Project has gone far enough that for economic reasons, it would be impractical and wasteful to delay it any further by granting the Plaintiffs’ request. See City of Rochester, 541 F.2d at 976 (finding prejudice where “construction was 18 per cent completed”); L.S.S. Leasing Corp., 579 F.Supp. at 1573 (finding that the plaintiffs’ delay in seeking preliminary relief resulted in prejudice to the defendant because “approximately 5% of the total $93 million budget for the new building has been spent and might be wasted if construction were forced to stop” and “there are the additional shut-down and start-up costs .that would be incurred if the project were forced to stop”). In sum,, the Court concludes that (i) the Plaintiffs were aware as early as April 2015 that construction on the Project was scheduled to commence in October 2015 and waited until October 1, 2015 to make their motion for a preliminary injunction to stop construction; (ii) the Plaintiffs offered no legitimate excuse for their delay; and (iii) the .Corps was unduly prejudiced by the Plaintiffs’ delay because by the time the Plaintiffs moved for preliminary relief, the Corps had entered into an agreement with a contractor; the contractor had mobilized their construction equipment on the beach; and the Corps has paid the contractor more than $600,000 which is not refundable. Therefore, the Court adopts Judge Shields’ recommendation and finds that the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is barred by laches. É. As to Irreparable Harm and the Public Interest As noted earlier, in deciding a motion for a preliminary injunction, “the court must consider whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction, and the court must assess the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant.” Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir.2010) “A showing of irreparable harm is ‘the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction,’” Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 234 (2d Cir.1999)). Accordingly, ‘-‘ ‘the moving party must first demonstrate .that such injury is likely before the other requirements for the issuance of an injunction will be considered.’ ” Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 234 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir.1990)). In that regard, “[t]he movant must demonstrate an injury that is neither remote nor speculative,