Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION RANDOLPH D. MOSS, United States District Judge The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA” or the “Act”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq,, was enacted to promote transparency and accountability in how the federal government discharges its numerous and far-ranging responsibilities. This case raises a variety of questions relating to how FOIA applies to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) discharge of one of those duties — its responsibility to comply with FOIA itself. This is, in short, a case about how the FBI applies FOIA to FOIA. Plaintiffs are several nonprofit organizations and journalists who filed multiple FOIA requests with the FBI seeking the processing documents associated with dozens of prior FOIA requests that they or others had submitted. The FBI produced some responsive documents, but redacted or withheld pages from those documents, and issued categorical denials in response to many of the plaintiffs’ requests, refusing to produce any responsive documents at all. Most broadly, the agency declined to produce any of the processing records routinely generated in responding to FOIA requests submitted in the’ last 25 years for material contained in investigative flies. The FBI explained that producing these records might allow a savvy FOIA requester to identify the rare cases where the FBI has exercised its discretion to issue a “none-found” response to a FOIA request for records that are “excludable” under FOIA, and thus would risk the implicit disclosure of highly sensitive information relating to ongoing investigations, confidential informants, and classified national security matters. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E), (c). The agency also broadly declined to provide any “case evaluation forms,” which are forms used to track and evaluate the performance of FBI employees engaged in processing FOIA requests. In the FBI’s view, these forms are exempt from disclosure because they relate “solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of [the] agency.” Id. § 552(b)(2). In addition to these categorical denials, the FBI declined to produce a number of records responsive to individual requests, relying on a host of other, more specific grounds. The plaintiffs filed this action to compel the FBI to produce the withheld material. They challenge the adequacy of the FBI’s searches and many, although not all, of the grounds asserted by the agency to withhold responsive records. They also bring a facial challenge to the FBI’s policy of declining to provide any processing records for FOIA requests made within the last 25 years that sought material from FBI investigative files. The FBI has now moved for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs have cross-moved for partial summary judgment. For the reasons detailed below, the Court will GRANT the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment in part and DENY it in part; it will, for the same reasons, GRANT the FBI’s motion for summary judgment in part and DENY it in part. I. BACKGROUND A. Statutory Framework The Freedom of Information Act is premised on the notion that an informed citizenry is “vital to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.” NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978). The Act embodies “a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.” U.S. Dep’t of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 494, 114 S.Ct. 1006, 127 L.Ed.2d 325 (1994) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976)). It thus mandates that an agency disclose records upon request, unless they fall within one of nine exemptions. “These exemptions are ‘explicitly made exclusive’ and must be ‘narrowly construed.’ ” Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565, 131 S.Ct. 1259, 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973), and FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630, 102 S.Ct. 2054, 72 L.Ed.2d 376 (1982)). At issue here are four of the nine exemptions. Exemption 2 “shields from compelled disclosure documents ‘related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.’ ” Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)). Exemption 5 protects “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). It exempts “those documents, and only those documents, normally privileged in the civil discovery context.” NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975)). Exemption 6 protects information about individuals in “personnel and medical files and similar files” when its disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Finally, Exemption 7 shields from disclosure “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that” release of the records would disclose one of six kinds of sensitive information. Id § 552(b)(7). Two of the six are relevant here: Exemption 7(C), which applies whenever disclosure “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” id § 552(b)(7)(C), and Exemption 7(E), which applies whenever release of the information “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law,” id § 552(b)(7)(E). Also at issue here are FOIA’s three “exclusions.” These statutory provisions authorize law enforcement agencies, under unusual circumstances, to “treat [responr sive] records as not subject to the requirements of [FOIA],” see id § 552(c)(1)-(3), and accordingly to deny that any such records exist. See ACLU of Michigan v. FBI, 734 F.3d 460, 469-72 (6th Cir.2013). A law enforcement agency may rely on an exclusion only if a request is made for records that (1) implicate an ongoing criminal investigation if “there is reason (i) to believe that the subject of the investigation ... is not aware of its pendency, and (ii) disclosure of the existence of the records could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(1); (2) concern an undisclosed informant, id § 552(c)(2); or (3) “pertain[] to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, or international terrorism,” if the records are maintained by the FBI and are classified, id § 552(c)(3). B. FBI FOIA Procedures This case concerns various documents that the FBI creates while processing FOIA requests. The division of the FBI that is responsible for processing FOIA requests, is known as the Record/Information Dissemination Section (“RIDS”). See Dkt. 21-3 at 1-2 (Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 1-8). According to a declaration submitted by the director of RIDS, David M. Hardy, RIDS analysts primarily rely on two database systems to conduct searches of records that might be responsive to FOIA requests. Id at 14-16 (Hardy'Decl. ¶¶ 53-57). The FBI’s Freedom of Information and Privacy Act Document Processing System (“FDPS”) is the primary database. Id at 14 (Hardy Decl. ¶ 53). FDPS is a “request management system” that RIDS employees use to “track FOIA/Privacy Act requests, referrals, appeals, and litiga-tions.” Id. (Hardy Decl. ¶ 54). “Within FDPS, an electronic file is created for each FOIA/Privacy Act request” that contains “copies of pertinent correspondence,” including the request and the FBI’s response letter; “processing-related documents,” including search slips; and “multiple versions” (i.e., the original version and a redacted version) “of the records processed in response to” the FOIA request. Id. at 14-15 (Hardy Deck ¶ 55). “FDPS also includes a ‘notes’ section in which additional processing-related information may be included.” Id The second database is the FBI’s Central Records System (“CRS”). Id. at 15 (Hardy Decl. ¶ 56). The CRS contains “administrative, applicant, criminal, personnel, and other files compiled for law enforcement purposes.” Id. According to Hardy, “[although the CRS is primarily designed to serve as an investigative tool, the FBI searches the CRS for documents that are potentially responsive to FOIA/Privacy Act requests[] when it determines that responsive records are likely to be maintained in the CRS.” Id. In other words, RIDS employees search the CRS for records that may be responsive to FOIA requests; they document the results of those searches, and other efforts, in FDPS. As described below, Plaintiffs submitted various FOIA requests to obtain documents that the FBI had previously created in processing earlier FOIA requests— some submitted by Plaintiffs themselves and some submitted by other requesters. Although Plaintiffs stated generally that they sought “all records” that documented the FBI’s efforts to respond to the prior FOIA requests, see, e.g., Dkt. 21-4 at 3 (Hardy Decl., Ex. A), this case centers on three types of processing records: search slips, case processing notes, and case evaluation forms. Search slips are records that document the efforts of RIDS analysts to search for files responsive to FOIA requests. Plaintiffs have provided the following example of a search slip, which they presumably obtained before the FBI adopted its categorical policy of denying access to these records: Dkt. 27-13 at 44 (Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. M). Although the exact format of the search slips the FBI creates has varied over time, most search slips contain, at the very least, cross-references to the CRS files searched by the RIDS analysts, see Dkt. 21-3 at 21-22 (Hardy Decl. ¶ 70), and the dates on which those files were searched. PDFS case processing notes also document the efforts of RIDS analysts to process FOIA requests. The plaintiffs have provided the following example of a page of case processing notes: Dkt. 27-5 at 26 (Pls.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. E). The primary difference between the FDPS case processing notes and the search slips is that the notes contain “employee-generated notations ... [that] may contain the same information as ... search slips but are often far more detailed.” Dkt. 21-3 at 23 (Hardy Decl. ¶ 72). That is, while the search slips that correspond to a given FOIA request may contain cross-references to the relevant CRS files, the processing notes may explain why a particular record contained in those files could not be located, or why it could not be provided to a requester. See id. (Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 72-73). Finally, case evaluation forms are records that are “maintained in RIDS administrative personnel files for purposes of tracking and evaluating the performance of employees who process FOIA and Privacy Act requests.” Id. at 19 (Hardy Decl. ¶ 66). The plaintiffs have provided the following example of both sides of a case evaluation form, which, again, they presumably obtained before the FBI adopted its current policy: Dkt. 27-6 at 1-2 (Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. F). The case evaluation forms contain some information about the databases that the RIDS analyst tasked with processing a particular FOIA request relied on in processing it, see id. at 2, but the forms focus on the performance of the analyst rather than the substance of the request. C. plaintiffs’ FOIA Requests This action arises from the denial of several different FOIA requests brought by several different plaintiffs. For the sake of clarity, the Court sets out the administrative history of each request, or set of requests, separately. 1. NSC’s First Request (No. 1156218-000) Plaintiff National Security Counselors (“NSC”) is a nonprofit organization incorporated in Virginia. Dkt. 1 at 2 (Compl. ¶ 5); see also Nat’l Sec. Counselors v. CIA, 811 F.3d 22, -, No. 14-5171, 2016 WL 191904, at *2-3 (D.C.Cir. Jan. 15, 2016). On October 26, 2010, NSC submitted a FOIA request to the FBI via e-mail seeking “all [FBI] records” regarding seven previous FOIA requests “that contain remarks, comments, notes, explanations, etc.[,] made by FBI personnel or contractors about the processing of these requests.” Dkt. 21-4 at 3 (Hardy Decl., Ex. A). NSC specified that it was seeking any analysts’ notes made during the processing of the requests, any standard worksheets (including Work Process Unit Case Evaluation Forms) completed by FBI personnel or contractors, any justifications for exemption invocations or other supporting documentation provided to the Appeals Authority, and any correspondence referencing the requests, including tasking orders, emails, referral memos, and coordination documentation. Id. The FBI replied on December 6, 2010. Dkt. 21-4 at 8 (Hardy Decl., Ex. B). It indicated that it had reviewed eight pages of records and released all eight, withholding some information on the basis of Exemptions 2, 6, and 7(C). Id. The pages the FBI released were “printouts] of the ‘Notes’ field of the FBI processing database for each of the requests in question.” See id. at 12 (Hardy Decl., Ex. C). NSC appealed the adequacy of the FBI’s search. Id. It stated that it believed the FBI’s response had been incomplete, given that the documents released “did not reflect the complete histories of six of the requests.” Id. NSC specified that: it “did not receive any of the Work Processing Unit’s Case Evaluation Forms that are typically completed for FOIA requests.” Id. at 13 (emphasis in original). The Justice Department’s Office of Information Policy (“OIP”), which adjudicates appeals regarding FOIA requests submitted to Justice Department components, “remanded] [NSC’s] request for a further search for records” on June 24, 2011. Id. at 17 (Hardy Decl., Ex. E). On remand, the FBI released “the exact same records” for six of the seven case files, this time withholding information only on the basis of Exemption 6. Id. at 32 (Hardy Decl., Ex. G); see also id. at 19-30 (Hardy Decl., Ex. F). The FBI did not release any records for the seventh case file, and NSC does not challenge its failure to do so in this action. On November 4, 2011, NSC again appealed the adequacy of the FBI’s search. Id. at 32 (Hardy Decl., Ex. G). NSC’s executive director, Kel McClanahan, wrote: I can point directly to the documents that are missing. When' the [Records and Management Division] performs a search, it fills out an “FBI RMD FOIPA Search Slip,” and the person doing the search writes a memo back_However, no such documents were released in this request, despite the fact that they would be clearly responsive. Id. On January 20, 2012, OIP again remanded the request for further review. Id. at 41 (Hardy Decl., Ex. I). But it simultaneously “affirm[ed], on modified grounds, the FBI’s action.” Id. Specifically, OIP wrote: To the extent that you are seeking search slips- associated with the processing of the above-referenced requests, please be advised that this information is protected from disclosure under the FOIA pursuant to [Exemption 7(E)]. This, provision concerns records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes the release of which would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions. Because any such .records responsive to your request would be categori-. cally exempt from disclosure, the FBI properly asserted Exemption 7(E) and was not required to conduct a search for such records. Id. 2. NSC’s Second Request (No. 1174832-000) On October 5, 2011, while it was appealing the FBI’s second production of records in its first request, NSC submitted another FOIA request to the FBI. Dkt. 21-4 at 44 (Hardy Decl., Ex. J). NSC sought “all [FBI] records” relating to twelve previous FOIA requests “that contain remarks, comments, notes, explanations, etc.[,] made by FBI personnel or contractors about the processing of these requests.” Id. at 45. Specifically, NSC explained that it sought “[a]ny and all” of the following documents: “analysts’ notes made during the processing of the requests,” “pages and fields from [the FBI]’s case tracking system,” “records pertaining to the searches performed,” “worksheets (including Work Process Unit Case Evaluation Forms) completed by FBI personnel or contractors,” and “correspondence referencing the requests.” Id. None of the twelve previous FOIA requests had been submitted by NSC; each request had been submitted by someone else and had ultimately been the subject of FOIA litigation. See Id. at 58 (Hardy Decl., Ex. M). The FBI replied on October 31, 2011. Id. at 52 (Hardy Decl., Ex. L). It released six partially redacted pages, all documenting the FBI’s processing of one of the twelve previous FOIA requests. Id. at 53. The FBI indicated that the other eleven FOIA requests “pertain[ed] to third parties” and therefore “c[ould ]not be released absent express authorization and consent of the third parties, proof that the subjects ... [we]re deceased, or a clear demonstration that the public interest in disclosure outweighs the personal privacy interest.” Id. The subject of the one FOIA request for which the FBI did provide processing records was deceased. Id. The FBI explained that disclosure of the records — absent consent, proof of death, or proof that disclosure would be in the public interest— “would be in violation of the Privacy Act.” Id. The FBI added that the records “may also b[e] exempt from disclosure pursuant to” Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id.. NSC appealed. Id. at 56 (Hardy Decl., Ex. M). It argued that the Privacy Act did not apply to a FOIA request, and that the requested records were not exempt under Exemption 6, because “[t]he information in these records is publicly available in the [FBI’s declarations] in the court cases which arose from these requests.” Id. at 58. NSC’s request, it explained, was simply “a request for the raw material used in the crafting of those declarations.” Id. In response, OIP “affirm[ed], on partly modified grounds, the FBI’s action on [NSC’s] request.” Id. at 62 (Hardy Decl., Ex. O). It explained that the requested documents were properly withheld because they were exempt under Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(E). Id. 3. Stem’s First Request (No. 1174507-000) Plaintiff Jeff Stein is an “investigative reporter of long standing, specializing in U.S. intelligence, defense, and foreign policy.” Dkt. 21-4 at 67 (Hardy Decl., Ex. P). Represented by NSC, he submitted a FOIA request to the FBI on September 28, 2011, seeking “all information pertaining to the searches conducted by the [FBI] which were used, referenced, or relied upon” in the declarations submitted by the FBI in six FOIA actions. Id. at 66. The FBI replied on October 4, 2011. Id. at 72 (Hardy Decl., Ex. Q). It released no records, relying on the same ground it .had cited in denying NSC’s similar request 'for third-party records. Id. It stated that, because the original FOIA requests for which Stein had requested processing documents “pertain[ed] to third parties,” they “c[ould jnot’be released absent express authorization and consent of the third parties, proof.that the subjects ... [we]re deceased, or a clear demonstration that the public interest in disclosure outweighs the personal privacy interest.” Id. Stein appealed on October 6, 2011. Id. at 76 (Hardy Decl., Ex. R). As it had in adjudicating NSC’s appeal, OIP “affirm[ed], on modified grounds, the FBI’s action.” Id. at 80 (Hardy Decl., Ex. T). It explained that “[t]he FBI properly withheld this information in full because it is protected from disclosure” under Exemption 7(E). Id. 4. Stein’s Second Request (No. 1182250-000) On November 10, 2011, Stein (again represented by NSC) submitted a second FOIA request to the FBI. Dkt. 21-4 at 83 (Hardy Decl., Ex. U). He requested “all information pertaining to the searches conducted by the [FBI] which was used, referenced, or relied upon” in the declarations submitted by the FBI in two additional FOIA actions. Id. The FBI assigned Stein two “request, numbers,” one corresponding to each action for which Stein had requested documents. See id. at 88-89 (Hardy Decl., Ex. V). On May 31, 2012, the FBI responded to the first of the two requests (No. 1182250-000). Id. at 91 (Hardy Decl., Ex. W). It stated that it had reviewed 194 pages of documents and released 33 pages with withholdings. Id. It justified its with-holdings on the basis of Exemptions 1, 6, 7(C), and 7(E). Id. Because the cost of producing the documents fell beneath the FBI’s regulatory threshold for assessing fees, the FBI provided the documents at no cost. Id. at 92. Stein appealed “all of the FBI’s with-holdings.” Id. at 98 (Hardy Decl., Ex. Y). On September 27, 2012, OIP “affirm[ed] the FBI’s action.” Dkt. 21-5 at 6 (Hardy Decl., Ex. CC). It explained that the FBI’s withholdings were appropriate because the information was protected from disclosure under Exemptions 1, 6, 7(C), and 7(E). Id. at 6-7. 5. Stein’s Third Request (No. 1182251-000) On March 27, 2012, the FBI responded to what it had treated as the second of Stein’s two November 2011 requests (No. 1182251-000). Dkt. 21-5 at 11 (Hardy Decl., Ex. EE). It stated that it had located 694 pages potentially responsive to Stein’s request. Id. But it notified him that he would be required to be a processing fee of either $59.40, for the cost of duplicating the records, or $20, for the cost of producing two CDs with the records. Id. Stein appealed. Dkt. 21-5 at 13 (Hardy Decl., Ex. FF). He argued that the $20 estimate was driven solely by the FBI’s “blanket policy of placing only 500 pages on a CD (since he is entitled to one CD free of charge).” Id. at 14. In response, OIP affirmed the FBI’s action, concluding that the fee estimate was reasonable in light of the circumstances. Id. at 20 (Hardy Decl., Ex. HH). The FBI ultimately closed Stein’s request administratively on the basis of his failure to pay fees. Dkt. 21-3 at 17 (Hardy Decl. ¶ 61). 6. Truthout’s Request (No. 1196979-000) Plaintiff Truthout.org (“Truthout”) is “an online news publication that publishes news and commentary.” Dkt. 21-5 at 22 (Hardy Decl., Ex. II). On January 24, 2012, Truthout’s deputy managing editor, Jason Leopold, submitted a FOIA request on Truthout’s behalf for “the FBI FOIA analyst processing notes related to” an earlier FOIA request that he had submitted. Id. Specifically, Leopold requested “copies of all FBI records” related to the earlier request “that contain remarks, comments, notes, explanations, etc.[,] made by FBI personnel or contractors.” Id. The FBI replied on August 17, 2012. Id. at 36 (Hardy Decl., Ex. KK). It stated that “[t]he material [Truthout] requested [was] located in a file which is exempt from disclosure” pursuant to. Exemption 5. Id. FBI official David Hardy explained: In applying this exemption, I. have determined that the records responsive to your request are predecisional records; that there is a pending agency decision relevant to these responsive records; and that release of the information contained in .these responsive records could reasonably be expected to interfere with that decision. Id. Truthout, now represented by NSC, appealed. Id. at 41 (Hardy Decl., Ex, LL). OIP failed to respond to the appeal within the 20-day statutory deadline, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii), and Truthout filed suit. On March 7, 2013, OIP closed Truthout’s appeal administratively on the .ground that it was now before this Court. Dkt. 21-5 at 45 (Hardy Decl., Ex. NN). 7. Shapiro’s Request Plaintiff Ryan Noah Shapiro is a doctoral candidate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who studies “the history, theory, and practice' of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts.” Dkt. 21-5 at 53-54 (Hardy Decl., Ex. 00). On February 10, 2012, Shapiro submitted a FOIA request to the FBI seeking “any and all records associated with the administrative case files for” 71 separate FOIA requests that he had previously submitted to‘the FBI. Id. at 47-49. He noted that his request “specifically include[d], but [was] not limited to, any and.all search slips, administrative processing notes, and case evaluation forms (even if the case evaluation forms are located in the FOIA specialists’ personnel files).” Id. at 47. The FBI failed to respond within the 20-day statutory deadline, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i), and Shapiro filed this suit rather than appeal. The FBI replied on April 29, 2013. Id. at 69 (Hardy Decl., Ex. QQ). It released no records. Id. It explained that “[t]he material [Shapiro] requested contained] information derived from one or more investigative file(s) and [was] being withheld pursuant to” Exemption "7(E). Id. It sent Shapiro a second letter on December 13, 2013, about the case evaluation forms he had requested; Id. at 72 (Hardy Decl., Ex. RR). The FBL explained that it had located “approximately 19 cáse evaluation forms” responsive to his request, but that it was withholding them in full under Exemptions 2 and 6. Id. Because this suit was already pending, Shapiro did not appeal. D. Procedural History NSC, Stein, Truthout,- and Shapiro originally brought suit in November 2012 to challenge the FBI’s responses to these FOIA requests and several others. See Complaint (Dkt. 1), Shapiro v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 969 F.Supp.2d 18 (D.D.C.2013) (No. 12-1883). As originally filed, plaintiffs’ action “involve[dj thirteen claims brought by four separate plaintiffs ... regarding twenty separate” requests under FOIA and the Privacy Act. Shapiro, No. 12-1883, slip op. at 1 (D.D.C. April 17, 2013) (Dkt. 28). Accordingly, on April 17, 2013, the Court granted the Department of Justice’s motion to sever the claims, retaining one fully briefed claim and ordering the remaining counts of the plaintiffs’ complaint dismissed unless they were “refiled in appropriate separate actions.” Id., slip op. at 7. One week later, plaintiffs refiled five of the severed claims in a new complaint, thereby initiating this action. Dkt. 1. The Court issued an order directing the plaintiffs to show cause why the first four counts of the complaint should not be severed or dismissed. Dkt. 8. The case was then reassigned to another judge, who discharged the order to show cause on September 19, 2013, concluding that “the interest of judicial economy weighted] against severance.” Shapiro v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 13-555, 2013 WL 5287615, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2013). Specifically, the Court explained, “the government does not contest that the FBI’s search slip policy is implicated in each of Counts One through Four, and it appears that legal questions relating to that alleged policy are likely to predominate over other issues in the case.” Id. The case was again reassigned in November 2014. The matter is now before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Dkts. 21, 28. II. LEGAL STANDARD FOIA cases are typically resolved on motions for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See, e.g., Beltranena v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 821 F.Supp.2d 167, 175 (D.D.C.2011). To prevail on a summary judgment motion, the moving party must demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In a FOIA action, the agency may meet its burden by submitting “relatively detailed and non-conclusory” affidavits or declarations, SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C.Cir.1991) (quotation marks and citation omitted), and an index of the information withheld, Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827-28 (D.C.Cir.1973); Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C.Cir.1998). An agency “is entitled to summary judgment if no material facts are in dispute and if it demonstrates ‘that each document that falls within the class requested either has been produced ... or is wholly exempt from the [FOIA’s] section requirements.” Students Against Genocide v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 833 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C.Cir.1978)). The Court reviews the agency’s decision de novo, and the agency bears the burden of sustaining its action. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). III. DISCUSSION Plaintiffs challenge the FBI’s decision to withhold the processing records that are at the heart of this action — search slips, FDPS case processing notes, and case evaluation forms — as inconsistent with FOIA’s “general philosophy of full agency disclosure.” Dep’t of Defense, 510 U.S. at 494, 114 S.Ct. 1006. They argue that the FBI’s withholdings cannot be sustained, either as a categorical matter or on a case-by-case basis. The FBI defends its with-holdings- on multiple grounds. It argues that all search slips and processing notes generated in the past 25 years in response to FOIA requests directed at investigative files are protected from disclosure under Exemption 7(E) and that the case evaluation forms are, in general,- protected under Exemptions-2 and 6. The FBI also argues that it properly withheld records from NSC and Stein because their requests were for information about third parties and that it properly withheld records from Truthout because its request implicated an ongoing investigation.- It finally argues that, considered individually, each of the withholdings in the records it provided in response to Stein’s second request was justified; that its searches in response to NSC’s first request for records and Stein’s second request were adequate; and that it properly denied Stein’s third request on the basis of his failure to pay fees. The Court first considers the two categorical policies that the FBI concedes it has' adopted in responding to FOIA requests for case processing notes: (1) the withholding of search slips and FDPS case processing notes under Exemption 7(E), and (2) the -withholding of case evaluation forms under Exemptions 2 and 6. The Court then considers the remaining issues plaintiff-by-plaintiff and request-by-request. A. Categorical Policies The plaintiffs challenge the FBI’s policies of categorically withholding documents associated with its processing of FOIA requests. The FBI concedes that it has adopted two such policies: it has adopted a policy of “denypng] access to processing records related to FOIA/Privacy Act requests related to criminal investigative, national security, counterintelligence, or foreign intelligence information pursuant to Exemption 7(E),” Dkt. 21-3 at 25 (Hardy Decl. ¶ 75); and a policy of denying access to case evaluation forms pursuant , to Exemptions 2 and 6, Dkt. 31 at 14. It relied on these categorical policies in withholding documents from NSC, Stein, and Shapiro. See Dkt. 21-4 at 41 (Hardy Decl., Ex. I); id. at 62 (Hardy Decl., Ex. 0); id. at 80 (Hardy Decl., Ex. T); Dkt. 21-5 at 69 (Hardy Decl., Ex. QQ); id. at 72 (Hardy Decl., Ex. RR). Although the FBI did not deny Truthout’s request on either of these bases, it now justifies its denial of Truthout’s request in part on the basis of the first of these policies. See Dkt. 21-3 at 23-25 (Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 72-75). The Court' addresses each of these policies in turn. 1. Withholding of Search Slips and Processing Notes Plaintiffs contend that the FBI has unlawfully withheld both search slips and FDPS case processing notes on the basis of Exemption 7(E). Exemption 7(E) permits an agency to withhold “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes” if the production of such records “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). Agencies “must meet the threshold requirements of Exemption 7” — primarily the requirement that the records weré ‘ “compiled for law enforcement purposes” — “before they may withhold requested documents on the basis of any of its subparts.” Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 416 (D.C.Cir.1982); see also Pub. Employees for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n, U.S.-Mexico (“PEER”), 740 F.3d 195, 202 (D.C.Cir.2014). The FBI characterizes its nondisclosure policy as arising under Exemption 7(E), but the basis for the policy is somewhat more complex. As the Hardy Declaration explains, the .search slips and processing notes.sought by the plaintiffs and other requesters “contain specific, detailed information about the existence, extent, and nature of the FBI’s interest in an individual.” Dkt. 21:3. at 23 (Hardy Decl. ¶ 73). The search slips and notes, the FBI explains, may refer to files on individuals that would be exempt from withholding under a specific FOIA exemption, and that in fact were withheld from the original requester. Id. (Hardy Decl. ¶ 72). But, more importantly, they may also contain references to files that are excludable under FOIA— that is, files whose very existence the FBI is permitted to deny. Id. (Hardy Decl. ¶ 73); see 5 U.S.C. § 552(c).. Indeed, the FBI points out, the search slips may contain references to files that were excluded from its response to the original reques-teiv — that is,. files that the FBI- told the requester did not exist. .Requests for search slips therefore put the FBI in a difficult position. The FBI cannot plausibly deny that the search slip exists — because search slips are created as a matter of course in responding to. FOI-A requests— but it argues that it also.-cannot release the search slip, as the. search slip would reveal the existence of the file that the FBI told the requester did not exist. And, for similar reasons, the FBI cannot release a redacted version of the search, slip; even if the redaction would tell the, requester nothing about the underlying file, the FBI argues, the existence of the redaction would “tip off’ the requester that some file existed, contradicting the FBI’s prior assertion that no responsive records existed. Likewise, the FBI argues that it.cannot withhold the entire search slip under one of the exemptions, because the withholding itself would ‘tip off the requester that the search slip must refer to a file that he or she had previously been told did not exist. The FBI highlights the' dilemma it faces with the following hypothetical. “[A]ssume that a requester sought processing records for 50 different FOIA requests, 49 of which contained no excludable information but one of which reflected an on-going investigation subject to exclusion under 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(1).” Dkt. 21-3 at 25 (Hardy Decl. ¶74), “If the FBI released the administrative processing records for the 49 requests ’but denied access to (or issued a ‘no records’ response) in response to the remaining request, this could signal the existence and use of an exclusion by the FBI.” Id. Accordingly, the FBI explains, any. response that it might make to a request for a search slip that documents the existence of excluded flies would “allow subjects to circumvent the law by placing them on notice that they are the subject of an ongoing investigation about which they were previously unaware; by confirming or compromising the informant status of individuals; or by alerting of the existence of classified investigations related to the subject.” Id. The FBI argues that the only option available to it is. to withhold all search slips and processing notes that it has created in responding to FOIA requests for investigative files in the last 25 years. Id. (Hardy Decl. ¶ 75); see also Dkt. 31-1 at 9 (Second Hardy Decl. ¶ 20). The Court does not doubt that the problem, the FBI describes is a serious one. Congress specifically authorized law enforcement agencies to treat certain records as “not subject to the requirements of’ FOIA. 5. U.S.C. § 552(c)(1)-(3). Responding to requests for search slips and processing notes might undermine the FBI’s ability to exercise that authority by enabling sophisticated requesters to infer the existence of those records. The question before the Court, however, is not the existence or the gravity of the problem facing the FBI, but whether the, solution the FBI has adopted is consistent with FOIA. Although the question is a difficult one, the Court concludes that the FBI’s proposed reading of the statute cannot be squared with its , text or the governing precedent. First, although the FBI argues that its policy is necessary to protect its ability to exercise the FOIA exclusions, it does not maintain that the. exclusions themselves authorize its policy of withholding processing records. Dkt. 31 at 20. Nor could it. The first exclusion applies only to records subject to Exemption 7(A) (i.e., records “compiled for law enforcement purposes,” the disclosure of which “could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A)), and it applies only in a criminal investigation if “there is reason to believe that (i) the subject of the investigation or proceeding is not aware of its pendency, and (ii) disclosure of the existence of the records could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings,” id. § 552(c)(1). The second exclusion applies only to “informant records maintained by a criminal law enforcement agency under an inforr mant’s name or personal identifier,” and only unless and until “the informant’s status as an informant has been officially confirmed.” Id. § 552(c)(2). The final exclusion applies only to classified FBI records “pertaining to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, or international terrorism,” and it applies only “as long as the existence of the records remains classified information.” Id. § 552(c)(3). These narrowly defined exclusions relate to sensitive matters of law enforcement and national security. They have nothing to do with the day-to-day administration of FOIA itself. To be sure, a particular search slip might, on a .rare occasion, replicate excludable records and thus also fall within one of the FOIA exclusions, in full or in part. Cf. Abramson, 456 U.S. at 625, 102 S.Ct. 2054 (construing .Exemption 7 “to protect that part of an otherwise non-exempt compilation which essentially reproduces .and is substantially the equivalent of all or part of an earlier record made for law enforcement uses”). But the overwhelming majority of FBI processing documents are not excludable under any reasonable construction, of Section 552(c). As the FBI acknowledges, the Section 552(e) exclusions are rarely applicable in principle and are even more rarely applied in practice. In the words of the Justice Department’s own guide to FOIA, the exclusions are “a novel mechanism for protecting certain especially sensitive law enforcement matters,” and are employed only in “exceptional circumstances.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Guide to the Freedom of Information Act: Exclusions 1 (last updated Mar. 5, 2014), http://1.usa.gov/1S9kIZF. In the most recent fiscal year, the Justice Department invoked an exclusion only 145 times — or in 0.23% of the over 60,000 requests that it processed. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2015 Chief FOIA Officer Report 26-28 (Mar. 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1JoJunf. The FBI’s sweeping policy of withholding all search slips for investigative records, as a result, cannot be justified based on the plain terms of Section 552(c). Second, although the FBI characterizes its policy as arising under Exemption 7(E) rather than directly under Section 552(c), that exemption does not authorize the policy either. As a threshold matter, Exemption 7 can be invoked only to withhold “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7); see also PEER, 740 F.3d at 202. The search slips are not themselves “records ... compiled for law enforcement purposes”; they are records compiled for the purpose of responding to FOIA requests. See Dkt. 21-3 at 23 (Hardy Decl. ¶72) (explaining that search slips and FDPS ease notes “are employee-generated notations located within the FBI’s processing system used to document the action taken on FOIA/Privacy Act requests received by the FBI”). The FBI acknowledges as much, arguing only that “the underlying FBI CRS records” that are referenced and recompiled in the search slips were “compiled for a law enforcement purpose.” Id. at 21-22 (Hardy Decl. ¶ 70). But the FBI is not seeking to withhold specific law enforcement information compiled in the search slips on the basis of Exemption 7(E); it is seeking to withhold all of the search slips in their entirety on the basis of Exemption 7(E). Under well-established law, “an agency cannot justify withholding an entire document simply by showing that it contains some exempt material,” Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Group Ltd. v. United States, 534 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting Mead Data Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C.Cir.1977)), and the FBI does not claim that it would be impossible or unreasonable to segregate the law enforcement information that would be subject to Exemption 7 from any remaining material, cf. Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 825 (“[T]he agency may not sweep a document under a general allegation of exemption_”). Moreover, even if — in a case in which the FBI denied that responsive records existed' — the existence of a search slip might constitute the substantial “equivalent” of a record compiled for law enforcement purposes, see Abramson, 456 U.S. at 625, 102 S.Ct. 2054, that would at most bring that particular search slip within the ambit of Exemption 7. In the absence of a showing that all of the withheld search slips in their entirety constitute records “complied for law enforcement purposes,” the FBI’s categorical reliance on Exemption 7 fails at the threshold. Even if the FBI could demonstrate that it would be unreasonable to require it to segregate the material that would fall within the scope of Exemption 7 from the material that would not, it is doubtful that the harm produced by disclosure of the search slips would sound in Exemption 7(E). Documents can be withheld under Exemption 7(E) only where their production “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). But the FBI does not point to any “technique,” “procedure,” or “guideline” that disclosure of the search slips might illuminate. See Allard K. Lowenstein Int’l Hurhan Rights Project v. DHS, 626 F.3d 678, 682 (2d Cir.2010) (“The term ‘guidelines’ ... generally refers in the context of Exemption 7(E) to resource allocation” whereas “[t]he phrase ‘techniques and procedures’ ... refers to how law enforcement officials go about investigating a crime.”); see also Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 37, 42 (D.C.Cir.2011) (upholding FBI’s invocation of Exemption 7(E) to withhold “details about procedures used during the forensic examination of a computer” on the ground that these were “undoubtedly ‘techniques’ or ‘procedures’ used for ‘law enforcement investigations’ ”); Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190, 1193 (D.C.Cir.2009) (upholding use of Exemption 7(E) to withhold IRS settlement guidelines on the ground that disclosure “could encourage decisions to violate the law or evade punishment”). The FBI argues that disclosure of the search slips could reveal its use of Section 552(c) exclusions in individual cases. But the FBI’s exercise of its statutory authority to exclude documents from FOIA’s reach is not the kind of “technique” or “procedure” to which Exemption 7(E) refers. The legislative history of Exemption 7(E) makes clear that it was intended to authorize agencies to withhold only techniques and procedures not “already well known to the public.” See H.R. Rep. 93-1380 at 12 (1975); see also Malloy v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 457 F.Supp. 543, 545 (D.D.C.1978). That is, the purpose of Exemption 7(E) is to prevent the public from learning about the existence of confidential law enforcement techniques, not to prevent it from learning about the use of already-disclosed law enforcement techniques. It is thus implausible that the disclosure of the FBI’s use of Section 552(c) exclusions— although in some instances harmful— would be harmful in a way that would bring the search slips within Exemption 7(E)’s grant of authority. The real question, therefore, is not whether records created in processing FOIA requests for documents contained in investigative files are protected categorically by Section 552(c) or Exemption 7(E), but whether the Court should recognize a judicial gloss on FOIA, as the courts did when they first recognized the now-established Glomar doctrine. See Dkt. 21-1 at 13. The Glomar doctrine, which permits an agency where appropriate to “refus[e] to confirm or deny its possession of responsive documents,” originated under circumstances similar to those present here, where “merely acknowledging the existence of responsive records would itself ‘cause harm cognizable under [a] FOIA exception’” or exclusion. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. NIH (“PETA”), 745 F.3d 535, 540 (D.C.Cir.2014) (quoting Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C.Cir.2007)); see Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (D.C.Cir.1976). As with the FBI’s search-slip policy, moreover, the Glomar doctrine is not “described in the statute” or its legislative history. Nathan Freed Wessler, Note, “[We] Can Neither Confirm Nor Deny The Existence or Nonexistence of Records Responsive to Your Request”: Reforming the Glomar Response Under FOIA, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1381, 1388 (2010). Instead, it is “a judicial construct ... that flows from” the purpose of the FOIA exemptions “rather than their express language.” ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 431 (D.C.Cir.2013). Despite these similarities with the Glomar doctrine, however, the Court concludes that the FBI’s present policy goes well beyond what the courts have previously permitted and that it cannot be sustained on the basis of the text of FOIA or existing precedent. Although FOIA does not expressly authorize the use of the Glomar response, the doctrine is not without statutory moorings. As the D.C. Circuit observed in the case that gave rise to the Glomar doctrine, requiring an agency to confirm or to deny the existence of records subject to a FOIA exemption can, at times, be the equivalent of requiring that the agency confirm or deny the underlying facts that are themselves protected by .the exemption. Phillippi, 546 F.2d at 1011-12. For instance, because individuals have a “ ‘substantial’ privacy interest ... ‘in ensuring that their relationship to [law enforcement] investigations remains secret,’ ” PETA, 745 F.3d at 541 (quoting Roth v. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1174 (D.C.Cir.2011)), a law enforcement agency may refuse to confirm or to deny the existence of law enforcement records regarding an individual on the ground that the fact of the records’ existence is itself protected by a FOIA exemption. In other words, if the agency can withhold access to responsive records under FOIA, it stands to reason that it should also be able to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records when it is necessary to protect precisely the same information. This is true even if the records do not exist; the important question is whether the fact of the records’ existence “falls within a FOIA exemption.” Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374; see also PETA, 745 F.3d at 540; Roth, 642 F.3d at 1178. This principle operates as an important limitation on the use of the Glomar response: it is proper for an agency to refuse to confirm or deny the existence- of records only “if the particular FOIA exemption at issue would itself preclude the acknowledgement of such documents,” EPIC v. NSA, 678 F.3d 926, 931 (D.C.Cir.2012). In none of the Glomar cases, however, has the D.C. Circuit permitted' an agency to withhold — or to decline to confirm or to deny the existence of — any record or information that is not itself protected by a FOIA exemption or exclusion. When the Glomar doctrine is properly invoked, one of two things holds true: either a protected record exists or no record exists. Either way, the requester is not denied access to any unprotected records. Indeed, to the Court’s .knowledge, the doctrine has never been used to preclude the production or disclosure of concededly unprotected records, even when such a response might have been useful to guard records or information that were protected. To do so would violate the statutory command that FOIA “does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in” the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(d). See also Rose, 425 U.S. at 361, 96 S.Ct. 1592 (“[Disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act.”); Mink, 410 U.S. at 79, 93 S.Ct. 827; Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 823. It is true that in related contexts courts have permitted agencies to withhold documents that, considered separately, might not be sufficiently sensitive to permit an agency. to invoke Exemptions 1 or 7(A), but would meet that threshold when considered together with other documents or information. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (“CNSS”), 331 F.3d 918, 928-29 (D.C.Cir.2003); Abbotts v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 766 F.2d 604, 608 (D.C.Cir.1985). But these cases are- different in kind from the present one. In these cases, the central question was-whether the agency could analyze the applicability of FOIA exemptions (and specifically, the consequences of disclosure) in light of other available or potentially available records or information, rather than on a document-by-document basis. See CNSS, 331 F.3d at 924, 926 (rejecting the district court’s conclusion that Exemption 7(A) “requires an individualized assessment of disclosure”). In permitting agencies to employ a “mosaic” analysis when considering the consequences of disclosure, however, the D.C. Circuit did not authorize agencies to withhold documents that are not protected by FOIA. It simply made clear that the question whether certain documents are protected by FOIA need not be assessed on a document-by-document basis — at least when the operative question is what consequences will flow from disclosure. Here, by contrast, the FBI is not arguing that all of the search slips are exempt or excludable under FOIA when considered in light of other records or information; indeed, it concedes that the vast majority of them are not protected at all. The FBI is not making a “mosaic” claim, nor could it. It is only arguing that by withholding all search slips, even those not protected by FOIA, it can amass a haystack in which to hide the search slips that are protected. The FBI thus asks the Court to recognize a new doctrine — akin to the Glomar and mosaic doctrines, but far more expansive in scope — that would permit it to withhold an entire category of otherwise unprotected records in order to further the purpose of the FOIA exclusions. In practice, this would mean withholding hundreds of unprotected processing records for every document that might permit a sophisticated FOIA requester to infer the existence of protected information. Although the Glomar doctrine may constitute a gloss on FOIA’s text, it does not lead to results fundamentally at odds with the statute. The FBI’s present policy does. The statute requires the production of records unless one of the exemptions or exclusions shields the particular records at issue. See Milner, 562 U.S. at 565, 131 S.Ct. 1259. These statutory exemptions and exclusions are “explicitly made exclusive.” Mink, 410 U.S. at 79, 93 S.Ct. 827. But the FBI’s present policy would permit it to deny access to a large number of records that are neither exempt nor excluded. For this reason, the pdicy — unlike the Glomar and mosaic doctrines — cannot be reconciled with the statute. The only remaining question is whether the policy goals embodied in the exclusions — which the FBI contends can be promoted only by categorically denying access to all processing records created in the last 25 years — provides a sufficient basis to overcome these textual and prece-dential -hurdles; It is true that some opinions applying the Glomhr doctrine have stated in sweeping- terms that an agency “may refuse to confirm’ or-deny the existence of records where to answer the FOIA inquiry would cause harm cognizable under a[ ] FOIA exception.” Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C.Cir.1982); see also PETA, 745 F.3d at 540; Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374. But, as explained above, in none of these cases was the agency attempting to withhold records that were not exempt or excluded by FOIA in order avoid “harm cognizable under a[] FOIA exception.” Gardels, 689 F.2d at 1103. In each of these cases, the agency was permitted to withhold the fact of the records’ existence (or non-existence) only because the records (if they existed) would have been exempt under FOIA. The possible presence of “harm cognizable under a[] FOIA exception” does not, standing alone, permit the Court to .extend FOIA to documents that do not fall within an exemption or exclusion. Recent Supreme Court precedent emphasizes this point and counsels against permitting even substantial policy considerations to trump the plain language of FOIA. In Milner v. Department of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 131 S.Ct. 1259, a FOIA requester sought data from the Department of the Navy relating to the safe storage of explosives and, among other things, the effects of hypothetical explosions. Invoking Exemption 2, the Navy declined to provide the requested data, “stating that disclosure would threaten the security of the base and surrounding community.” Id. at 568, 131 S.Ct. 1259. The D.C. Circuit had previously interpreted Exemption 2, which applies to records “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), to apply to records dealing with “pay, pensions, vacations, hours of work, lunch hours, parking” and the like (“Low 2”) and also to “predominantly internal” records the disclosure of which might “significantly risk[] circumvention of agency regulations or statutes” (“High 2”). Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051, 1056-57, 1074 (D.C.Cir.1981) (en banc). The Milner Court, however, rejected the availability of the “High 2” exemption, concluding that “the plain meaning” of the exemption’s text required a narrower reading. 562 U.S. at 580, 131 S.Ct. 1259. In reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged the “strength” of the policy considerations behind the Navy’s reading of Exemption 2, and the strong interest in protecting the data at issue. Id. But the Court nonetheless concluded that the government’s interpretation could not be sustained, id.; see also id. at 581, 131 S.Ct. 1259 (“All we hold today is that Congress has not enacted the FOIA exemption the government desires.”), and that, to the extent that other exemptions did not cover records whose release “would threaten the Nation’s vital interests, the Government may of course seek relief from Congress,” id. at 581, 131 S.Ct. 1259. The same is true here. There may be compelling reasons to authorize the FBI to withhold search slips and similar processing records. But FOIA itself does not do so, and the FBI cannot act on the basis of an exemption or exclusion that Congress has not provided. Accordingly, the FBI’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the withholding of search slips and FDPS processing notes is DENIED, and the plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED. The Court will set a status conference to address the timing and substance of an Order implementing this decision, as well as the appropriate remedy. 2. Withholding of Case Evaluation Forms The plaintiffs also challenge the FBI’s policy of withholding case evaluation forms under Exemptions 2 and 6. The FBI uses case evaluation forms to track and evaluate the performance of RIDS analysts who process FOIA and Privacy Act requests. The forms contain fields that describe the request itself (e.g., “Routine,” “Medium,” or “Complex”). See Dkt. 27-6 at 1 (Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. F). They contain fields that describe the analyst’s performance (e.g., “Unacceptable,” “Satisfactory,” or “Error Free”). Id. And they contain a ‘correction list,’ which includes specific errors made by the analyst in responding to the request (e.g., “Failed to recognize fee waiver.”). See id. at 2. The FBI argues that the case evaluation forms are exempt from disclosure under Exemptions 2 and 6. Specifically, it argues that the analysts’ names can be withheld under Exemption 6, which shields private personnel information, and the remainder of the forms can be withheld under Exemption 2, which shields information related solely to an agency’s “personnel rules and practices.” The plaintiffs concede that the analysts’ names can be withheld under Exemption 6. That exemption protects information about individuals held in “personnel and medical files” when its disclosure “would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). It is well established within this circuit that Exemption 6 protects the names of agency employees on evaluation forms, as well as any other information that would identify individual employees. See Ripskis v. HUD, 746 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C.Cir.1984) (per curiam) (finding “Exemption 6 applicable to the names and other identifying information on HUD’s employee evaluation forms”); see also Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 962 F.2d 1055, 1060 (D.C.Cir.1992) (“As in Ripskis, we do not believe that the public interest served by release of identifying information overcomes the substantial invasion of privacy that would result.”). The Court therefore has no difficulty concluding that the FBI appropriately relied on Exemption 6 in withholding the names of individual analysts on the case evaluation forms. Whddier the FBI can rely on Exemption 2 to withhold the remainder of the evaluation forms is a closer question. Exemption 2 shields from disclosure material “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2); Milner, 562 U.S. at 564, 131 S.Ct. 1259. The interpretive history of Exemption 2 is not a model of clarity. See Elliott v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 596 F.3d 842, 845 (D.C.Cir.2010) (“The courts have devoted thousands of pages of the Federal Reporter to the .explication of these twelve words_”). The confusion stems in large part from the “seemingly contradictory interpretations of the exemption expressed in the House and Senate Reports” that accompanied FOIA Id.; see also Milner, 562 U.S. at 573-74, 131 S.Ct. 1259. The Senate report construed Exemption 2 to cover material that courts later -described as “Low 2,” explaining that the phrase “rules and practices of an agency” referred primarily to “rules as to personnel’s use of parking facilities or regulation of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the like.” S. Rep. No. 89-813, at 8 (1965). The House report, in contrast, interpreted the exemption .to exclude material about “employee relations and working conditions and routine administrative procedures,” but to include more substantive documents, such as “[operating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for Government investigators or examiners,” H.R. Rep. 89-1497, at 10 (1966) — material later known as “High 2.” The conflict between these interpretations of Exemption 2 persisted for four decades. In the Supreme Court’s first extended discussion of the exemption, in Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 96 S.Ct. 1592, the Court embraced what lower court