Full opinion text
RULING AND ORDER JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT," MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc, 60) filed by Defendant, University of Louisiana System, Plaintiff Melinda Mitchell opposes the motion. (Doc. 75.) Oral argument is not necessary. Having carefully considered the law, facts in the record, and arguments of the parties, the Defendant’s motion is granted in part and denied in part. I. Introduction Plaintiff Melinda Mitchell is currently an employee of the Defendant University of Louisiana System at the University of Louisiana Monroe (“ULM”). She was at all times relevant to this suit. She is a 55 year-old African-Ajnerican. Plaintiff brings claims of discrimination on the basis of age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 .et seq. (“ADEA”);. of discrimination on the basis of race and gender under Title VTI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”); of retaliation under the ADEA; and of reprisal, under the Louisiana Whistleblower Act, La. Rev. Stat. § 23:967. In short, as to the discrimination claims, Plaintiff was an employee at ULM in the University Planning and Analysis . Office (“UPA Office”). When the Executive Director of the UPA Office resigned, she sought the position. Defendant instead hired Rusem Hemed, a 27. year old white male. Plaintiff complains she was discriminated against'because of her age, race, and gender. Defendant responds- that she was unqualified because she lacked a graduate degree and that it wanted to hire a different kind of candidate to suit the UPA Office’s new function. The Court finds that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on the age discrimination claim. A reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant’s justifications were pretexts for discrimination. Specifically, construing the evidence in a light.most favorable to.the Plaintiff, a reasonable juror could conclude that ULM changed the qualifications for the position to exclude the Plaintiff and that- ULM’s Executive Vice President made a discriminatory remark evidencing discrimination. However, the claims of discrimination based on gender and race are dismissed. As to the disparate treatment claim, Plaintiff has failed to bring forward competent summary judgment evidence to show pretext. Even if the Court considered the Plaintiff’s incompetent evidence, no reasonable juror would find racial or sexual discrimination. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed with prejudice. As to the disparate impact claim, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her remedies. Her EEOC charge facially alleged disparate treatment, and it identified no neutral employment policy. As a result, this claim is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff also asserts claims of retaliation under the ADEA. First, she claims that Hemed locked his personal office door, which kept her from equipment important to her job; asked her for a list of job duties and made inquiries about her job; and' carbon-copied . (“CC’ed”) the Vice-President of ULM on one of these inquiries. Second, Plaintiff claims that she was effectively demoted by being transferred to the Computing Center, where she was given little to nothing to do and was required to perform menial tasks. The first set of retaliatory acts are dismissed. Each of these claims are petty slights and minor annoyances, and no reasonable juror would conclude that these actions would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. These claims are consequently dismissed with prejudice. However, the second set — transfer to the Computing Center — survives. Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, Plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies on this claim; there is a proper charge of race and age discrimination before the Court, so the Court has ancillary jurisdiction over the retaliation claim. Further, despite inconsistencies in Plaintiffs account, her evidence (including her sworn testimony and audio recording) creates genuine issue of material fact that this was not a lateral transfer but was instead a de facto demotion that would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Finally, the Court denies summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s reprisal claim under La. Rev. Stat. § 23:967. Louisiana law looks to federal .law for its retaliation and discrimination claims. Because there are issues of fact on the ADEA disparate treatment and retaliation claims, summary judgment is inappropriate for the state law claims. Accordingly,. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. The ADEA claims of age discrimination for failure to promote and of retaliation for the transfer to the Computing Center survive. The state law reprisal claim also survives. However, the Title VII claims of disparate treatment are dismissed with prejudice, and the Title VII claim of disparate impact is dismissed without prejudice. Further, the retaliation claims related to locking the office door, asking about the job. and duties, and CC’ing the Vice President are dismissed with prejudice. II. Factual Background A. Plaintiff’s Time in the UPA Office Plaintiff worked for ULM in the early 1990s for three years, and she rejoined it on January 7, 2008. (Docs. 75-2 at 4, 60-2 at 1, and 75-1 át 1.) On that day, she began working as an Institutional Research Programmer/Data Analyst within the UPA Office. (Docs. 60-2 at 1, 75-1 at 1.)-According to Dr. Stephen Richters, Executive Vice President of ULM, the UPA Office traditionally performed four functions: 1) Generating and submitting external reports that are required by a number of federal and state entities, each of. which require specific reports of all universities; 2) Handling internal data requests received from deans, faculty, and administration; 3) Keeping a “fact book” which was a collection of information about the university, with the intention to publish sufficient data and therefore min- ■ imize' requests that could be simply answered by accessing the data in the fact book; and 4) Answering any ad hoc requests from the president or the staff. (Doc. 60-3 at 1-2.) At the time of her hire, Mitchell reported to the Executive Director for University Planning and Analysis, who was Robin Logan from 2008 to 2009 and Justin Roy from 2009 to November 2012. (Doc. 63 at 11-13.) Concerning Plaintiffs specific duties at UPA, Plaintiff stated in her declaration that: I served'as a liaison between the computing center and administrative offices who deal -with university information, ■maintaining the local records retention plan within the office, collecting, compiling and analyzing data, researching computing .and composing ■ reports, worksheets, and graphs. I assisted with the development, updating and streamlining of office reporting procedures. I' also assisted in completion of surveys and statistical reports requested by campus departments, and state and other agencies. (Doc. 75-2 at 280.) As will be discussed below, Plaintiff also claims that she was acting Executive Director-from November 2012 to January 2013. B. Vacancy at the Executive Director Position and Minimum Qualifications In November 2012, Executive Director Justin Roy resigned from his employment with Defendant. (Docs. 60-2 at 2, 75-1 at 2.) At the time of his resignation, the Executive Director position reported directly to Dr. Richters. (Id.) Dr. Richters testified via affidavit: [A]s early as in 2010 and 2011 ... the university’s need for data driven decision making in marketing, recruiting, and other areas suggested that UPA be -tasked with analyzing data in addition to its traditional reporting of data. In order to accomplish this, some of the data reporting would need to be reassigned to another area. ... [W]hen .,. Roy resigned in November 2012, [the] administration made a determination to complete the changeover and to focus that department on data mining and predictive analysis, with the expectations that the department would no longer handle internal report: ing and that the university “fact book” would be phased out. ... [T]his shift in the focus of the UPA office had a significant impact in setting the job qualifications for the Executive Director position in replacing Justin Roy in late 2012, specifically that the new Executive Director would be expected to do data modeling and predictive analysis, do cross-checks óf data production, and have a master’s degree. [Dr. Richt-ers] was looking to hire a completely different type of candidate than the type that the university had previously hired before. (Doc. 60-3 at 2.) On or' about November 26, 2012, Defendant posted an advertisement for the Executive Director position. (Id. at 2-3) According to the Defendant, one of the minimum qualifications for the Executive Director position in 2012 was a graduate degree. (Def. Ex. H, Doc. 63-1 at 79.) While Plaintiff admits that she does not possess a Master’s degree (Doc. 76-1 at -3), she (1) asserts that she ran the department as “Interim Director” (Id.) and (2) denies that a graduate degree was a minimum qualification. (Id. at 2) In support of the former, Plaintiff argues that, “[i]n November . 2012, Ms. Mitchell served as the Interim Director of the University Planning and Analysis Office until January 2012, when Ruslan Hemed, with no seniority or experience, at age 27, was hired as the''Director of the University Planning and Analysis Office[ ] over Mitchell, then age 53.” (Doc. 75-1 at 1.) Plaintiff bases the “Interim Director” -title on Hemed’s deposition testimony. Specifically, Hemed stated that his predecessor, Justin Roy, left the position on November 30, 2012, and Hemed came on in mid-January 2013. (Doc. 75-2 at -312.) During that time, “the only full-time person in that office was Melinda Mitchell,” though, as Hemed notes, “two or three weeks out óf Decembér is Christmas break.” (Id.) Indeed, Defendant even acknowledges in its memorandum in support that Plaintiff was “the sole UPA employee during - the Executive Director vacancy.” (Doc. 63 at 3.) In support of Plaintiffs assertion that there was no graduate degree requirement, she cites to three things - an advertisement, an email from Roy, and Roy’s qualifications. First, Plaintiff submits an advertisement for the position in the “The News Stars” paper in Monroe, Louisiana, which provided: The University of Louisiana at Monroe seeks to hire an EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR for University Planning and Analysis. This individual will be responsible for the compilation .analysis'and both internal and external reporting of data ‘ for the university. For additional information & where to send resume: http://www.ulm.edu/cgi-bin/hr-unclassified.pl (Doc. 75-2 at 14-16, 113.) Thus, Plaintiff claims, that,a Master’s degree was not required or a qualification. Second, Plaintiff also submits an email dated November 20, 2012, from Justin Roy to Stephen Richters. In the email, he attached a “job description” for the Executive Director position. (Def. Ex. UU, Doc. 63-2 at 97-98.) There is no requirement of a Master’s degree listed (or of any other qualification). (Id.) Third, Plaintiff points to the history of the Executive Director Position. Plaintiff testified that Justin Roy was promoted to the Executive Director position without a Master’s degree, and she had the same qualifications and degree level as he did. (Doc. 75-2 at 23.) Defendant submits a document of all former Executive Directors purportedly showing that they all had graduate degrees. (Def. Ex. F, Doc. 63-1 at 74.) But Defendant acknowledges in its memorandum in support that “Mr. Roy did not have a Master’s degree when hired, but earned his during his tenure as Executive Director.” (Doc. 63 at 3.) C. Plaintiffs Initial Meeting with Dr. Richters’ and Her Applications to the Executive Director and System Coordinator Job According to Dr. Richters’ deposition, on December 6, 2012, he first met Plaintiff when he dropped by the UPA Office for a “short chat.” (Doc. 63-1 at 68.) He said he assured her that her job was not in jeopardy, that they were not going to close the office, and that they were going to try to find a new director as quickly as possible. (Doc. 63-1 at 69;) Plaintiff testified that, at this meeting in the first week of December, Dr. Richters told her she had someone in mind for the position. (Doc.75-2 at 27-28.) She stated that Dr. Richters told her “that basically— I can’t remember all the words, but it’s basically I need to be a team player ... [a]nd train the person that he selected” for both the Executive Director position and the System Coordinator positions. (Id) On December 10, 2012, Plaintiff applied for the position of Executive Director (Doc.63-1 at 15-16.) Plaintiff claims she did so based on two advertisements in The News Star, one of which was quoted above. (See Doc. 75-2 at 14-16.) On or about December 10, 2012, Plaintiff also applied for the position of System Coordinator in the UPA Office. (Docs. 60-2 at 2, 75-1 at 3.) Plaintiff did not see the position posted. (Doc. 75-2 at 25.) However, Plaintiff testified that Dr. Richters told her that additional people were needed and that he had someone in mind for this job, so she applied and let him know that she was interested in a promotion. (Id) At all times pertinent to this case, the System Coordinator position had been vacant. (Docs. 60-2 at 2, 75-1 at 3.) D. Plaintiffs Rejection and Dr. Richters’ “Younger” People Comment Defendant instead hired Ruslan Hemed, a 27 year old white male, for the Executive Director position. (See Docs. 63 at 4; 75 at 5.) According to a Report on Disposition of Candidates for Replacement or New Position (Def. Ex. S, Doc. 63-1 at 115), nine individuals applied, of whom three were black, six were white. Three were deemed “late,” two were deemed “less qualified than the hiree,” and three (including Plaintiff) were deemed lacking the minimum qualifications. (Id.) Dr. Richters attests that he considered other applicants, including Plaintiff, but “she lacked the required mastér’s degree, she had no experience with external reporting, she had no experience with predictive data analysis and modeling, and there was nothing compelling about her work performance that would compensate for her lacking a master’s degree.” (Doc. 60-3 at 3.) On January 8, 2013, Dr. Richters advised the Plaintiff that she was not receiving the Executive Director job. (Doc. 63-1 at 24). Defendant asserts that Hemed received his Master’s degree in- December 2012. (Def. .Ex. N, Doc. 63-1 at 107.) Plaintiff denies this allegation (Doc. 75-1 at 4) but provides no citation to the record in support of this denial. Indeed, Plaintiff notes that, according to Hemed’s resume (Def. Ex. N, Doc. 63-1 at 107), he received his Master’s Degree in December 2012. Thus, Plaintiff contends, as of the time of the November postings, Hemed lacked a graduate degree. Plaintiff also infers that he lacked this degree when Defendant advised her that Dr. Richters had preselected someone for -the position. Additionally, Plaintiff . complains that Hemed lacked knowledge of SQL, which was was an important part of the job, and that he did not know how to write queries. Plaintiff claims that Hemed received the job even though Plaintiff was “more qualified” than Hemed and had been “Interim Director” from November 2012 to January 2013. (Doc. 75-1 at 3-4.) In support of her being “more qualified,” Plaintiff refers to the fact that she had been in the UPA Office for a number of years. (See Doc. 75-2 at 3, 6, -7.) Additionally, the parties have differing accounts of what was said by Dr. Richters at this meeting. Dr. Richters testified via affidavit, that: [he] discussed the issue of salary compression among certain employees, specifically that recent hires (referred to by [Dr. Richters] as ‘younger employees’) had not had pay raises for some time and that there were some employees who had been hired within the previous five or six years, who had not received salary-increases since their initial hire. ... [Although [Dr. Richters] referred to these recent hires, as “young employees,” his intent was-not age-related but a reference to newer employees. .,. [Dr. Richters] advised [Plaintiff] that he recognized the salary compression issue among - these’ newer -employees; ... these newer employees were hired at •relatively low pay, and that the university had not had a chance to adjust these salaries upward; and ... upon the availability of sufficient .funds, he intended to rectify the issue, by prioritizing those individuals for salary increases. (Doc. 60-3 at 4.) Dr. Richters said that, during this discussion, he “included plaintiff Melinda Mitchell'in this group as he felt that she too was underpaid at her current salary and wanted to address her salary- inequity as soon as the university budget allowed.” (Id.) Dr. Richters claims that he “did not say, suggest, or otherwise imply that younger employees should be or would be considered for pay raises before older employees or before plaintiff.” (Id.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims that Dr. Richters told her that he wanted “younger folk” in the Executive Director position. (Doc. 75-1 at 3-4.) Specifically, according to Plaintiff, when Dr. Richters told her she did not get the position, the following took place: ■ [Dr. Richters] came in and sat across the desk ... and said that - asked me if I was keeping busy and I told him what I was working on. ... And he said that the - that was - the person he had chosen was starting and he went off into the budget and salary issues. ... And then he said, but the people who would be considered for raises and promotions first on campus would be the younger folks. (Doc. 63-1’ at 24.) When asked if Dr. Richt-ers meant “younger” with respect to- age or “younger”-in service’(i.e., newer hires), Plaintiff said that he “implied” age “[because he was talking about people on campus,, and when you say .‘but’ and then use the rest of that, ‘the younger folks,’ ” (Doc. 75-2 at 30-31.) . E. Plaintiffs January 9, 2013, Complaint of Age Discriminátion On January 9, 2013, Mr.’ Hemed began his employment as the Executive Director, and, on the same day, Plaintiff' filed , a complaint with ULM’s Human Resources office complaining of age discrimination. (Docs. 63-2 at 3, 75-1 at 4.) This EEOC complaint provides a,little more detail than her deposition testimony. Specifically, Plaintiff gave the following account of the January 8,-2013 meeting; Stephen Richters then told me that he had made a selection for the position and that the new hire will be on campus tomorrow (January 9) at 7:30a. They will be taking him around'for introductions then'over‘to HR to fill ottt his-paperwork. They will be in Brown'Hall around 9:00 or 9:30. He then said that the new hire would be new to the office/campus and will need to rely heavily on me to keep the office running. Stephen Richters went on to say that he knows that I am underpaid at $38,500 and , that he would like to look into having my salary reviewed by this summer. Told me that I have to understand that with the budget cuts there is just so much that can be done and that it would be highly unlike that there can be pay increases without increased ' funding. And with the way things have been going in recent years, things do not look good. He said that we have to be just glad that we all have jobs. He said that there are a number of folks on campus that are underpaid that do good work and are also in my salary range $35,000 to $40,000. He said even in filling the Directors - [sic] job the salary is lower than he would have liked. He said that he would like to review all of these people and do what he can for all. But the ones. that would need to be considered first on that list “would have to be •the younger folks”. I.wasn’t sure -I.had heard him correctly. But he repeated it again. The second time he added “you see”. This statement and his body language insinuating that surely I. must understand that the younger folks on campus should be ■ considered for ■ pay increases before me (an older person) was very clear. He then walked to the director’s office and made small talk about how nice the rooms were and that there are plans to move UPA to the library., . . What T would .like "to have underscored is, that: ... 2. Based on Stephen Richters[’] .claim that younger folks should be preferred over me implies that he thinks I am,-too old to be considered for a pay increase or promotions. (Def. Ex. K, Doc. 63-1 at 96; PI. Ex. A-O, Doc. 75-2 at 122) (underline in original). Both parties acknowledge that, áfter January 9, 2012, Plaintiff started keeping notes and audio recordings of her interactions with Hemed, among others. (Docs 75 at 6, 63 át 5.) F. Plaintiffs February 5, 2013, Complaint of Retaliation ' On February 5, 2013, Plaintiff filed another complaint with Deféndant’s Human Resources Department. (Doe. 75-2 at 56, 124.) Plaintiff alleged “retaliatory actions” toward her by Ruslan Hemed.. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleged three retaliatory actions: 1) After returning from a conference, Hemed “began locking the director’s office door whenever he is away from Planning and Analysis both during office hours and after hours.” (Doc. 75-2 at 124.) This “in effect prohibited] [her] access to material and equipment that allow [her] to do [her] job.” (Id.) 2) Hemed told her that Dr. Richters wanted “a list from [her] detailing everything [she did] in the office; detailing how [she did] it and how much time it takes to complete every task.” (Id.) Further, she had to complete a list of what- Justin Roy worked on and what she worked on with Roy. (Id.) Plaintiff had one week to do it. (Id.) Plaintiff claimed this was an “unreasonable request” that intentionally created “an onerous work environment” in that she had other projects with deadlines. (Id.) 3) Hemed told her that Dr. Richters and he wanted to know what part of her job involved “completing campus departments[’] ad-hoc reports because they [were] planning to have [UPA] discontinue accepting these types of requests. (Id.) Plaintiff .claimed this was a “plan to diminish and ultimately dissolve my job duties.” (Id.) A detailed discussion of the facts supporting these charges will be provided below. G. March 6, 2013, Audit Into Hemed’s Attending Classes On March 6, 2013, Plaintiff complained to Human Resources that Hemed .was auditing a class and that the Executive VP office was “seeking to provide Ruslan Hemed with computer job skills he lack[ed] but skills that [were] required to perform the duties” of a Director. (Def. Ex. Y, Doc. 63-2 at 1.) Plaintiff claimed that Hemed was allowed to audit the course “off the record and without paying tuition.” On May 1, 2013, ULM issued a report on the complaint. (Doc. 75-2 at 86, 130-142.) The report concluded that Hemed was attending a database application development course for which he was not registered, had not paid tuition and fees,- and had not completed and filled with the department the appropriate application and that this violated Employee Class Enrollment Policy. (Doc. 75-2 at 131.) However, the report also concluded that the “current job description for the Executive Director ... does not appéar to have the specific requirement for advanced skills with computer systems and data management that were contained in the previous job description” and that “nothing came to [the auditor’s] attention to indicate that Mr. Hemed did not meet the required qualifications.” (Id.) The report- notes that Dr. Richters was aware that Hemed was attending the class but was unaware that his attendance may have violated university policies. (Id. at 133.) H. March 27, 2013, Complaint of Retaliation 1 On March 27, 2013, Plaintiff filed a third complaint with- Human Resources. (Def. Ex. AA, Doc. 63-2 at 19.) Plaintiff complained that, on March 6 and March 12, 2Ó13, she received emails from Ruslan Hemed concerning her projects and reports, and Stephen Richters and his secretary were copied. (Id.) Plaintiff said that Dr. Richters had sent him ah email with instructions to document' everything Plaintiff said or did- in the --office.' -(M) Dr. Richters also instructed Hemed to copy Richters and his secretary on any email exchange between Hemed and Plaintiff. (Id.) When Plaintiff asked why Dr. Richt-ers selected her for such documentation requirements, Hemed said “they” want to move the office in a new direction. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that she considered “these actions as steps taken by Richters in his process of ‘building a case’ to find a reason to remove [her] from [her] position.” (Id.) Further, singling her out for “specific” treatment was “a form of intimidation. No instructions or questions can be asked of me unless the Executive VP knows about it. This is retaliatory actions generated in response to my EEOC complaint filed against Stephen Richters.” (Id.) Defendants point to the fact that Hemed first requested the information on February 1, 2013 (Doc. 75-2 at 59.) and that, as stated above, she provided it at least a month later. (Doc. 75-2 at 67.) I. The Rest of the Story — May to September 2013. From May through July 2013, four main events were occurring. The first is the Plaintiffs transfer and alleged demotion to the Computing Center. The second is an investigation conducted by ULM into Hemed. The third involves ULM’s evaluation of Plaintiffs complaints of discrimination and retaliation..And the fourth is additional complaints by the Plaintiff of retaliation and mishandling of her complaint. While the transfer to the Computing Center job and the complaints of discrimination and retaliation are the issues that are most relevant for this motion, the remaining issues are discussed for context. 1. Computing Center Job Part I — Initial Meeting . In May 2013, Plaintiff was first approached about a position in the Computing Center. The accounts of this initial meeting differ. Defendant submits the affidavit of Chance Eppinette, then Interim Director of the Computing Center. (Doc. 65-2 at 1.) According to Eppinette, on May 9, 2013, he approached Plaintiff “to discuss an opportunity in the Computing Center, specifically a position that would be responsible for .handling ad hoc requests for reports for the campus and community.” (Doc. 65-2 at 2.) According to Eppinette, “plaintiff expressed her interest in the opportunity in the Computing Center and requested additional information regarding that position,” but he also advised her that this meeting “was an exploratory meeting; that no specifics regarding the position were available at that time; and that he would get back with [her] with detailed information as that opportunity continued to develop.” (Id.) Plaintiff, on thé other hand, testified that, shortly after May 1, Eppinette approached her and said “that they were creating a job in the computing center and he was there on Dr. Richters’ instructions ... to check or look at [her] — how it would match up, [her] qualifications.” (Doc. 75-2 at 86-87.) The Plaintiff further said, “when Chance came over to tell me that a job was being créated in the computing center ... and that he was checking to see what my qualifications were to see if I was a fit, he said that there was a lot of work that needed to be done and that I’d have all these extra duties to be — to do, so they wanted me to move.” (Id. at 88.) Plaintiff testified that she was told by a Donnie Lynn that “the reason [she] was moved over to the computing center didn’t pan out and that they were trying to- find something for [her] to do, basically.”' (Id. at 105.) Plaintiff argues that the position did not exist. Plaintiff also states in her declaration that the Computing Center and UPA Of-flee have different functions. According to Plaintiff: The Computing Center provides network support, training and orientation, configuration design and hardware specifications, site license software distribution, test grading, assistance, with instructional media, and web and database development. The computing handles equipment and software support functions. Its primary function does not include data extraction. ... The UPA department is a division of the Executive Vice President. Its purpose is to provide timely, accurate, and consistent information and data about ULM to all constituents, both internal to and external of the institution. Common requests for data include: official enrollment and/or headcount for current and past terms, student profile or demographic information,.enrollment and retention analysis, graduate head count and graduate rates. (Doc. 75-2 at 285-86.) 2.ULM’s Investigation into Plaintiffs Complaints On May 15, 2013, Faculty & Staff Investigators issued a report addressing Plaintiffs above three complaints. (Doc. 63-2 at 22-31.) The report concluded that there was no age discrimination in Hemed’s hiring and no .retaliatory actions against Plaintiff. (Doc. 63-2 at 29.) Based on the facts detailed above, Plaintiff denies the findings of this report. 3.Payroll Fraud Investigation I On May 30, 2013, Plaintiff verbally requested an investigation into alleged payroll fraud by Ruslan Hemed. (Doc. 60-2 at 6, 75-1 at 6.) On June 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed a written request with ULM’s Department of Internal Audit. (Doc. 60-2 at 7, 75-1 at 7; Def. Ex. CC, Doc 63-2 at 32.) Plaintiff requested an investigative audit concerning improper payroll actions by Ruslan Hemed, specifically concerning unauthorized and/or excessive absences from work. (Doc. 63-2 at 32.) The audit involved-a trip Hemed planned to take in September to Israel. (Doc. 75-2 at 78-79.) The parties dispute the basis of Plaintiffs knowledge. (See Docs. 60-2 at 7, 75-1 at 7.) 4.Computing Center Job Part II Plaintiff testified that, on June 10, 2013, Epinnette told her that the job was ready and that she would move the next day.' (Doc. 75-2 at 89.) Plaintiff asked for the terms to be laid out in writing. (Id.) Epin-nette gave her a document and told her she would have to sign it — “it didn’t matter one way or the other, but I was going to have to sign it.” (Id. at 90.) Plaintiff reviewed the document but did not agree with its terms. (Id.) According to Plaintiffs work journal, on June 10, 2013, Plaintiff spoke with Hemed. (D.oc. 63-1 at 93.) This occurred before Plaintiff filed her request for an audit of Hemed. (Id.) Hemed told her that he had talked with Dr. Richters and that, according to Dr. Richters, Eppinette was going to offer her a job in the computing center effective July 1. (Id.) Hemed said he was giving her a heads up and that he was not sure if he was supposed to tell or not. (Id.) Plaintiff wrote that Hemed had “struggled all weekend with the fact that [she] might not know what’s getting ready to happen to” her. (Id.) Plaintiff also wrote, “[Hemed] [s]aid that I should be happy about this move cause ‘at least you’re not being fired.’ ” (Id.) Plaintiff also records in her work journal that, on June 11, 2013, she met with Eppi-nette about the move to the Computing Center. (Doc. 75-2 at 225.) “Chance told me that Dr. Richters wanted him to push forward with moving me to the computing center as soon as1 possible.” (Doc. 75-2 at 226.) Defendant notes that, according to the journal, Eppinette said this was a lateral-move and that she would keep the same pay. (Doc.' 75-2 at 226.) According to the journal, Plaintiff “[tjold [Eppinette] that [she] believe[d] this move is'retaliation and that Richters was sending Chance here to convince [her] to move.” (Doc. 75-2 at 225.) 5.EEOC Charge At some point around this time, Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge, though the parties dispute as to when this took place. Defendant claims that Plaintiff filed the charge on June 12, 2013 (Doc. 60-2 at 7), and Defendant appears to base this on the fact that this date appears next to Plaintiffs signature on the EEOC Charge of Discrimination form. (Doc. 63-2 at 40.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims the form was filed on May 14, 2013 (Doc. 75-1 at 7), and she appears to base this on the fact that Plaintiffs EEOC Intake Questionnaire is signed May 14, 2013. (Doc. 63-2 at 45.) In any event, the content of the charge will be set forth below. In short, Plaintiff complained that she was denied the Executive Director position and 'that she was retaliated -against. (Doc. 75-2 at 274.) She claimed' discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and age. (Id.) 6.ULM’s Internal Investigation On June 24, 2013, ULM’s internal EEO Advisory Committee’s Confidential Report was issued. (Doc. 63-2 at 46.) The report examined the merits of Plaintiff’s complaints of retaliation and age discrimination and concluded that they were unsupported. (Id. at 46-48.) Plaintiff denies that an investigation in fact occurred, though she presents no evidence of this. (Doc. 75-1 at 7.) 7.Computing Center Job Part III— Plaintiffs Official Transfer In a letter dated June 25, 2013, Eppi-nette told the Plaintiff that, effective July 1, Plaintiff would be reassigned from Institutional Research to the Computing Center. (Def. Ex. HH, Doc. 63-2 at 54.) Eppi-nette said that the Computing Center had been charged with developing a new data reporting group that would act as a “central repository for all things regarding requests of Banner related data and other University data repositories.” (Id.) Eppi-nette said: This will be a lateral move between departments and your pay remains the same at this time.... T have made slight modifications to your official job description to tune it up for purposes within the Computing Center. There may be other adjustments to the job description at this group development moves forward. (Id.) Defendants also submit a document entitled “Payroll Action Form-M” (Def. Ex. LL, Doc. 68-2 at 59) with “Melinda Mitchell” at the top, with Eppinette and Dr. Richters’ signatures at the bottom, and with the following stated: “Action: Dept. Transfer; Title Chge. Effective Date: 7/1/2013” and “Title Change with Dept. Transfer from University Planning & Analysis to Computing Center effective 7-1-13.”(M) For the above reasons, Plaintiff denies this was a “transfer.” (Doc. 75-1 at 8.) 8. Computing Center Job Part IV— Plaintiffs Job Duties a. Defendant’s Evidence Defendant attaches two documents (Def. Exs. II & JJ, Doc. -63-2 at 56-57) purporting to be descriptions of Plaintiffs job in the Computing Center and in University Planning and Analysis. On paper, there are the following differences in job description: 1)The title is changed from “Institutional Research Programmer/Data Analyst” to “Programmer/Data Analyst (3889)” 2) The new job description no longer has as a duty and responsibility, “To maintain the local records retention plan within the office.” 3) ííer old job duty of “To collect, compile, and analyze data” was changed to “To collect, compile, and analyze data in the form of database queries and process the output as heeded in reports, Argos, etc.” ,4) The new job description has an additional qualification and skill: “Knowledge and working use of SQL to obtain needed data points for various database formats — such as Oracle, MS-SQL, Access.” (Id.) The Defendant correctly notes that no additional duties were added to the new job description. (Id.) On June 25, 2013, Plaintiff sent a letter to Fred Baragoná, head of Human Resources. In the letter, she noted that she received the revised job restriction and that she “voiced [her] frustration to [him] in that the duties of this new position are greatly increased but the pay is the same as in [her] current job.” (Def.' Ex. KK, Doc. 63-2 at 58) She' called the move a “demotion.” (Id.) She also complained that the transfer was retaliatory in that (1) her. duties increased without an increase in pay, (2) she was moved into one of “the most dysfunctional work areas on campus,” (3) the “new direction” mentioned by Dr. Richters “only became evident when [she] file[d] [her] complaint;” and ’(4) the position was “created under a questionable supervisor.” (Id.) b. Plaintiffs Deposition Testimony While Plaintiff still claims’that she was “effectively demoted,” She now argues, unlike her letter to Freddie Baragoda, that she was “given no work to perform.” (Doc. 75-1 at 2.) She testified that she'was forced to perform menial, degrading duties such as “forms, which was the clerical, the secretary’s duties. ... As opposed to being in a position to advance to a higher level, now I’m doing things that are even below me, below the programmer analyst duties.” (Doc. 75-2 at 106.) Plaintiff was “just modifying the documents!,] ... not creating new ones. ... That’s the skill set a secretary normally has.” (Id. at 107.) Plaintiff found it degrading because she believed she “was in line for an executive director’s position.” (Id.) She also “started doing help desk functions.” (Id. at 108.) Plaintiff said that Donnie Lynn (her supervisor at the Computing Center) (See Doc. 63-2 at 54) told her that “the reason [she] was moved over to the computing center didn’t pan out and that they were trying to find something for [her] to do, basically. And he said that [they] [had] these one-offs that no one has been doing for a while and that would be something that we’ll have you doing.” (Doc. 75-2 at 109.) Plaintiff also asserts that she sits through training for certain software packages for a foundation, and she has “gone over there to ask if there’s any help that [she] can give them after [she sat] through the training and they [didn’t] need her.” (Id.) So far, “there hasn’t been a need” for her. (Id. at 110.) Plaintiff cited two software trainings she has received which she has not used since. (Id.) Plaintiff testified, “even if I go and get the training, which I have, they’re not calling me back to come help them because they don’t need it.” (Id. at 112.) c. Plaintiffs Declaration In her declaration (Doc. 75-2 at 280), Plaintiff stated that, “As an employee in the Computer Center, beginning on July 1, 2013, my job description reads nearly identical to my UPA position but requests that I previously completed are now being sent to the computing center and are forwarded to other programmers. This leaves me with nothing to do for weeks.” (Id. at 281-82.) Plaintiff also attaches a document entitled “Reporting System Tickets” (Doc. 75-2 at 287-291) which appears to show that, in 2013, Plaintiff had 10 tickets (others in the office working a comparable amount of months had had 9, 41, 4, and 14) and that, in 2014, Plaintiff had 23 (others in the office working a comparable amount of months had 17, 47, 46, and 10). Plaintiffs declaration also describes seven “one-off’ projects from October 2013 to May 2015. Plaintiff makes various complaints about them. For instance, the October 2018 project was described as' “not a programming project. Donnie Lynn asked me to puli'and forward copies of all.of the computing center web forms saved in .pdf format and he would convert them to Word documents. Once modified by him, I was to give them to an administrative, assistant for edits.” (Doc. 75-2 at 282 n. 1). According to Plaintiff, “Donnie Lynn insisted that revising . computing center forms as ‘something for me to do.’” (Id.) In the December 2013 project, Plaintiff supposedly “pulled one list of graduate students from the software on March 18, 2004. No other work was ever done on this project. Alumni Director Susan Chappell said that the Alumni group did not need my assistance.” (Id. at'282 n. 2.) For others, Plaintiff either worked initially on something or ' met with others to begin working, and nothing' came happened afterward. (See'id. at 282 n. 3-5.) d. Plaintiffs Work Performance Plan Plaintiff also attaches to her declaration a “Performance Expectation Plan” dated May 14, 2015. (Doc. 75-2 at 296.) Defendant objects to this document as not having been previously produced. Plaintiff responds that it was in Plaintiffs custody and that the Plaintiff identified “performance evaluations” in her initial disclosures. Plaintiff argues that, for the first time in the evaluation, “ULM attempts to rate and .assign tasks to Mitchell .., tasks which Mitchell attests are bogus.” (Doc. 96 at 6.) The Court finds that, even if this document wére timely produced, it is irrelevant and is thus excluded. - e. Hémed’s Testimony Plaintiff also points to some of Hemed’s testimony. Specifically, Hemed testified that, after Plaintiff was reassigned' to the Computing Center, ULM' provided him with a graduate assistant to work at the ÚPA Office. (Doc! 75-2 at 313-314.) f. Plaintiff’s Audio Recording Finally, Plaintiff also submits several audio recordings. Most significantly, at the beginning of one such audio recording, which involved a -conversation taking place after the transfer, Plaintiff appears to be discussing one of her work assignments with Donnie Lynn. (PI. Ex. 7, Doc. 75-2 at 306,. Oral Recording 2014 08 28 CC.) Plaintiff asks her boss about why he reassigned one of her projects, but he responds that it was not reassigned; rather it was used as a training exercise for a new programmer. (Id.) While Lynn informed her that he liked her coworkers work “a little better” because it was a little more “fleshed” out, she was told that “there was nothing wrong with [hers], everything [she] did was correct based on the criteria [he] gave her”. (Id. at 1:37-1:48.) Lynn related to her that “it’s a standard practice in the programming world for the new person ... is to give them something somebody else has already done that.you know is working that is functional that is there, to see what they’re doing.” (Id. at 2:57.) Plaintiff .responded that she “didn’t get that.” (Id. at 3:12.) Lynn told her that he knew she didn’t get that, but that it was not needed for her to be told what he was assigning to another person. (Id. at 3:30.) Plaintiff then asked -“Why? Because I have not... .I’m not a programmer, I was brand new and this would be training for me to know how things work ... [inaudible] ... it would have been great , for me when I first came over here because we were just doing analysis at our old job.” (Id, at 3:28.) In response, the' following conversation occurred: Lynn: We’re looking at different things for you because the reporting aspect has not grown the way we thought it would grow. And that’s what we’re looking at now is .:. why we’re trying to get- you involved in some of these third party products is because we have to have that knowledge. We’ve been - tasked by on high to have -that knowledge in the computing - center: The reporting aspects have not grown the way we thought they would. - ■ Plaintiff: So, am I going to stay here.-.. Lynn: As far as I know_ Plaintiff: ... because if there’s no reporting to be done or [inaudible] to do, that means that I have nothing to do. Lynn: Well, that’s the reason'why ... again • Plaintiff: Not here, anyway. Somewhere else, but not here. Lynn:- Well that’s the reason why we’re trying to get you involved in these third party products and helping out with those. Because ... that thing is growing, especially on the academic side. The number of third party products that are hosted off site ... the number of them are growing, and as we well know academics is a high turnover area... (Id. at 3:49 -4:51.) Later in the conversation, Lynn told Plaintiff that they have been “fighting out” for the last couple of months trying to figure out how. to rearrange various aspects of everyone’s job and that they were “tweaking everyone a little bit.” (Id. at 20:45.) Lynn then informed Plaintiff: Unfortunately, my fault, you fell to the... you were not informed of everything and you sort of fell to the wayside and I was trying to juggle too many things, I mean that’s part of what’s ... I’m trying to shift some of my responsibilities of the day to day things to other people. (Id. at 21:12.) 9. July 1, 2013 Complaint of Retaliation Returning to the chronology, on July 1, 2013, the same day as the “transfer” to the Computing Center, Plaintiff filed another complaint to Human Resources. (Doc. 63-2 at 60.) In short, she claimed that the move to the Computing Center was retaliation for her outstanding EEOC complaint. (Id.) Plaintiff said Dr. Richters “forcefully move[d] her to a hostile work environment and greatly increased [her] job duties without salary compensation” and that this was “punishment for speaking out concerning his discriminatory actions.” (Id.) 10. Reports and Investigations In a letter dated July 11, 2013, the ULM President advised Plaintiff that' the EEO Advisory Committee reviewed her January 9, 2013 complaint against Dr. Richters and her February 5, 2013,' complaint against Hemed. (Def. Ex. GG, Doc. 63-2 at 49.) The President provided the report, which rejected Plaintiffs complaints of age discrimination and retaliation. (Id. at 51.) The President stated that- he concurred with the findings of the Committee and considered the matter closed. (Id. at 49.) Plaintiff denies there was an investigation but offers no proof to support this. In' a document dated July 12, 2013, Plaintiff stated that she met with ULM., investigators concerning her age discrimination complaint. (Def. Ex. NN, Doc. 63-2 at 62.) Plaintiff stated that she told the investigators she had prepared a retaliation complaint document dated March 27 for filing in Human Resources. (Id.) Plaintiff said they took the document, yet the EEO Advisory Committee’s Confidential Report referenced an “alleged second retaliation complaint” as not being filed. (Id.) PÍaintiff subsequently re-submitted it. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that, after July 11, the investigators askéd her “to prepare some supplement [sic] information that went into the July 1st, but [she] didn’t file .another [complaint].” (Doc. 75-2 at 98.) Rather, she filed this “complaint” because the March 27 complaint had not been filed. (Id. at 99.) Plaintiff gave the complaint to the investigators in the meeting, who said they would take it and add it to the age discrimination complaint. (Id.) On July 29, 2013, Fred Baragona sent to the EEOC a response to the June 12,2013, “Charge of Discrimination.” (Def. Ex. 00, Doc. 63-2 at 66.) In the document, Barago-na said that “Dr. Richters denies making any statement regarding ‘younger folks’, as well as Ms. Mitchell’s interpretation of the conversation they had regarding compensation and potential pay adjustments.” (Id.) ULM expressly denied discrimination or retaliation for the February 5 and March 27 complaints. (Id.) In an email chain dated August 19, 2013, from an HR employee to Plaintiff (Def. Ex. PP, Doc. 63-2 at 68), an HR employee told Plaintiff that Fred Baragona talked to Dr. Richters about. Hemed’s alleged improper payroll activities and that Dr. Richters talked with Hemed. (Id.) “The matter has been handled by Dr. Richters.” (Id.) Plaintiff denies that the complaint was handled but offers no evidence. According to a different email chain (Def. Ex.- QQ, Doc. 63-2 at 7L73), on August 22, 2013, Plaintiff sent another inquiry about Hemed’s alleged improper usage of annual leave. (Id. at 72.) Fred Baragona responded that he understood that Mitchell had been contacted by others and himself about a personnel matter and that “We .cannot discuss personnel matters with you.” (Id.) On August 23, 2013, Plaintiff responded to Baragona detailing her efforts to. get answers. (Id. at 71.) On August 21, 2013, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights informing Plaintiff of the EEOC’s determination that, based upon its investigation, “the EEOC [was] unable to conclude that'the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes.” (Def. Ex. RR, Doc. 62-2 at 74) On September 25, 2013, Faculty and Staff Investigators issued a report addressing Plaintiffs EEO Complaints dated March 27, 2013, and Juiy 1, 2013. (Def. Ex. SS, Doc. 63-2 at 75.) The report concluded that there was no retaliation or hostile work environment. (Id. at 82.) Plaintiff, of course, denies the conclusions of the report. (Doc. 75-1 at 9.) On May 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed-a verified Petition in the 19th Judicial District Court, Parish of East Baton Rouge. (Doc. 1-2.) On December 23, 2013, the action was removed to this Court. (Doc. 1.) On June 15, 2015, Defendant filed the instant motion. III. Summary Judgement Standard • “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine' dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.CivJP. 56(a). If the mover bears his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, “its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts ... [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing-that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal citations omitted). The non-mover’s burden is not satisfied by “conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a ‘scintilla’-of evidence.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (citations and internal quotations omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Further: In resolving the motion, the court may not undertake to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes; so long as the evidence in the record is such that a reasonable jury drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party could arrive at a verdict in that party’s favor, the court must deny the motion. ’ International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir.1991). IY. Discussion A. ADEA Claim of Discrimination 1. ADEA Generally “The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits] employers .from discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individual because of his or her age.” Palacios v. City of Crystal City, Tex., 634 Fed.Appx. 399, 401, 2015 WL 4732254, at *3 (5th Cir. Aug. 11, 2015) (citations and quotations omitted). “Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer ‘to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual’s age.’ ” Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)). “To establish a claim under the ADEA, ‘[a] plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which may be direct or • circumstantial), that age was the ‘but-for’ cause' of the challenged employer decision.’ ” Id. (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009)). The parties spar over the correct burden and the meaning of Gross. In short, Plaintiff argues that, while age must be the “but-for” cause, it need not be the only reason as long as age “actually played a rolé in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.” (Doc. 75.) Defendants claims this is “absolutely inconsistent” with the definition of ‘but-for,’ ” (Doc. 80 at 8.) The Court finds that both parties miss the mark. As the Fifth Circuit recently explained: In Gross, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging age discrimination under the ADEA has the burden of proving that age was the “but-for cause” of the adverse employment action, such as the discharge or failure to hire. See 557 U.S. af 176, 180, 129 S.Ct. 2343 (quotation marks omitted). The Court interpreted the ADEA’s statutory language pertaining to the nonfederal sectors, which proscribes discrimination “because of such individual’s age.” Id. at 176, 129 S.Ct. 2343 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)) (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that the ordinary meaning óf “because of,” based on prior precedent, is that a given basis is the “but-for cause,” meaning that “age was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act.” Id. (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) see also Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701 (“Whatever the employer’s decisionmaking process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.” (emphasis added))). Gross contrasted the ADEA with Title VII, which requires that a plaintiff prove that the prohibited basis — i.e., race, color, religion, sex, or national origin — was a “motivating factor” in the challenged employment decision. Id. at 174, 129 S.Ct. 2343 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (stating that “ah unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for' any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice”)) (other citations omitted). When a.plaintiff asserts multiple bases for an employer’s decision, i.e., where “other factors motivated the [employment] practice,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), those actions are known- as “mixed-motive” cases. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 171, 129 S.Ct. 2343 (defining “mixed-motive” cases as “when an employee alleges that he suffered an adverse employment action because of both permissible and impermissible considerations” (citation omitted)). The Gross Court observed, “[u]nlike Title VII, the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor.” Id. at 174, 129 S.Ct. 2343. Accordingly, the “but-for” standard of proof is more demanding than the “motivating factor” standard of proof. As the question presented to the Gross Court was whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motives jury instruction, the Court concluded that “a mixed-motives jury instruction is never proper in .an ADEA case.” Id. at 169-70, 129 S.Ct. 2343. Leal v. McHugh, 731 F.3d 405, 411 (5th Cir.2013). In finding that the district court erred in dismissing a complaint that asserted two reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain a position (one related to age and one not), the Fifth Circuit explained: By dismissing Appellants’ complaint on the basis that they “have. asserted a mixed-motive- case, which is prohibited,” the district court misread Gross, since “but-for cause” does not mean “sole cause.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 250 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “but-for cause” as “[t]he cause without which the event could not have occurred — [a]lso termed actual cause; cause in fact; factual cause ”); id. (defining “sole cause,” in relevant part, as “[t]he only cause that, from a legal viewpoint, produces an event or injury”); Jones v. Okla. City Pub. Schs., 617 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir.2010) (holding that Gross does not place “a heightened evidentiary requirement' on ADEÁ plaintiffs to prove that age was the sole cause of the adverse employment action”). In Jones, the Tenth Circuit rejected the employer’s argument that, under Gross, “ ‘age must have been the only factor’ in the employer’s decision-making process.” Id. at 1277. The Tenth Circuit reasoned instead that “an employer may be liable under the ADEA if other factors contributed to its taking the adverse action, as long as ‘age was the factor that made a difference.’ ” Id. at 1277. We find the reasoning of Jones persuasive. Id. at 415. Accordingly, the court will apply this standard: Plaintiff must prove that age was “the cause without which the event could not have occurred,” or that age was “the difference.” Additionally, a plaintiff may prove her case by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Palacios, 634 Fed.Appx. at 401-02, 2015 WL 4732254, at *3. The burdens differ according to whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. See id. Here, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Richt-ers’ “younger folks” comment is direct evidence of discrimination, entitling her to that burden. Defendant disagrees. The issue turns on whether the statement satisfies the Fifth Circuit’ four-part test for discriminatory remarks. See id. at 405-06, at *7 (citations omitted). The Court need not decide this issue. Because Plaintiff has demonstrated that a reasonable jury could find age discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, the Court denies summary judgment on Plaintiffs age discrimination claim. 2. Circumstantial Evidence The Fifth Circuit has recently explained: A plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence must prove her claims under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). She must put forth a prima facie case, at which point the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. If the employer provides a legitimate, non-diseriminatory reason, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s proffered reason was not true — but was instead a pretext for age discrimination — or that, even if the employer’s reason is true, [s]he was terminated because of h[er] age. At the summary judgment stage, the question is whether the plaintiff has shown that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether this reason was pretextual. A plaintiff may -show [a genuine issue of material fact regarding] pretext either through evidence of disparate treatment or by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is false or unworthy of credence. ■ ■ Palacios, 634 Fed.Appx. at 402, 2015 WL 4732254, at *3 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). " In short, Defendant attacks Plaintiffs claim on two grounds. First, Defendant argues that there is no prima facie case because the Plaintiff was not qualified. Second, the Defendant argues that, even if she were qualified, Plaintiff has failed to establish pretext. The Court will examine each of these in turn. a. Prima Facie Case: Qualification To establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff must show that (1) she was denied a promotion; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was within the protected class (over 40 years old); and (4) someone outside the protected class with the plaintiffs qualifications received the position. See Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 309 (5th Cir.2004). Here, Defendant only contests the second requirement. i. Parties’ Arguments Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not qualified for the position. Defendant focuses solely on the fact that Plaintiff did not have a graduate degree. As stated above, Plaintiff has two grounds for claiming she was qualified. First, Plaintiff responds that there was no graduate degree requirement because 1) Roy did not have a graduate degree when he was hired, and Hemed did not have a graduate degree when he applied for the position; 2) Roy-sent a description of,the job to Dr. Richters, and this description mentioned no graduate degree requirement; and 3) the newspaper advertisements did not mention a graduate degree requirement. Second, Plaintiff asserts that she ran the department as “Interim Director.” ■ Defendant responds that 1) all prior Executive Directors had graduate degrees, and, even if it was not a requirement before, it was when Plaintiff applied; 2) the Roy description is not exhaustive or controlling; 3) the qualifications for the position did not change after Plaintiff applied for the position; and 4) Plaintiff was never the “Interim Director” and did not run the department. ... ii. Analysis Construing the evidence in a light most favorable - ‘to thé Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has' satisfied her burden of proving that she-was qualified for the position. At the very least,