Full opinion text
OPINION & ORDER KATHERINE B. FORREST, District Judge. Pending before the Court are four motions to dismiss claims brought by purchasers of primary zinc under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that defendants, which consist of trading and metals warehouse operating affiliates of Glencore pic, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (“Goldman Sachs”), and JPMorgan Chase & Company (“JPMor-gan”), have engaged in a conspiracy to monopolize and otherwise restrain trade in the market of services for zinc stored in warehouses licensed by the London Metal Exchange (“LME”) in the United States, North America, and/or the world, with the intended effect of manipulating the market for special high grade zinc or the market for selling such zinc. Essentially, plaintiffs allege that the purpose and effect of defendants’ anticompetitive activity in the market for LME warehouse services was to manipulate the price of zinc premiums, and thus the price of physical zinc. According to plaintiffs, since May 2010 defendants have engaged in anticompeti-tive conduct designed to ensure lengthy metals queues at LME-licensed warehouses, creating a supply constraint and artificially high prices ip the market for physical zinc. These actions included, inter alia, manipulation of LME rules, strategic warrant cancellations, shuttling zinc between LME-licensed warehouses, hording zinc in warehouses, agreeing to a particular order of the load out of zinc from defendants’ warehouses, and falsifying shipping records. At first glance, the basic storyline and allegations in this case strongly resemble those in the aluminum antitrust multidis-trict litigation currently pending before this Court. See In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litigation (“Aluminum”), 13-md-2481 (S.D.N.Y.). Indeed, counsel are largely overlapping for both plaintiffs and defendants; and while the plaintiffs are different between the actions, the defendants are not. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps unsurprising that plaintiffs have piggybacked on an early complaint and judicial opinions in Aluminum. Both actions involve allegations that these same defendants entered into anti-competitive agreements to increase load-out queues for metal stored at LME-licensed warehouses in order to drive up the price of premiums that comprise part of the formula used to create global benchmarks for physical contracts for the delivery of those metals. Plaintiffs here are in an analogous market position to the first level purchaser and direct purchaser plaintiffs in Aluminum, and essentially allege the same sort of injury in fact. As was the case in Aluminum, plaintiffs are not themselves zinc producers, traders or warehouse owners; in other words, they are not competitors of defendants in any market. Nor are they consumers of defendants’ products (that is, warrants or trading instruments with regard to the traders) or services (warehouse storage with regard to the warehouse operators). In both cases, they are purchasers at the first level of the supply/distribution chain of physical zinc. While there are certainly many similarities between this case and Aluminum, the allegations differ in important ways that justify different outcomes as to certain claims. One significant distinction is that, in Aluminum, plaintiffs plausibly alleged that Goldman Sachs and Metro needed and used conspirators to assist in their scheme; this led to a plausible series of interconnections, with the following webbed structure: Here, in contrast, plaintiffs do not plausibly explain why, given Glencore and/or Pacorini’s alleged dominance in physical zinc, they needed outside conspirators to assist in the alleged anticompetitive scheme, or, why outside conspirators would want to assist them. An equally significant distinction is that plaintiffs here have far less specific and non-conclusory allegations supporting an inference of anti-competitive agreement. Plaintiffs do not present the specificity of allegations in terms of communications between various defendants that the plaintiffs presented in Aluminum II. In addressing plaintiffs’ Section 1 claim in particular, the Court explains these differences and why they lead to a determination that plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to plausibly state a claim, whereas the allegations were sufficient in Aluminum II. Turning back to the pending motions, defendants primarily raise common issues including antitrust standing and the plausibility of allegations supporting claims for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Individual motions also articulate reasons why certain defendants should be dismissed for reasons that are specific to those defendants. The Court has expended significant time considering the pending motions. In addition to the parties’ thorough briefing of the issues raised in this complex action, the Court had the benefit of nearly four hours of oral argument in which the parties addressed specific issues that the Court had raised prior to argument. In resolving these motions, the Court has considered all of the briefing as well as the parties’ oral presentations. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motions to dismiss all four claims in plaintiffs’ Consolidated Amended Complaint.- While plaintiffs’ opposition brief has “curb appeal” on a first review (at least with respect to certain claims), closer reading reveals that their arguments are not backed up by the allegations. Digging into the substance of the allegations (both on an individual basis and when viewed in the aggregate), reveals numerous flaws in plaintiffs’ pleadings. Put otherwise, if one reads only plaintiffs’ opposition brief or the transcript of their presentation at oral argument, without actual reference to the complaint, their claims appear stronger than is actually the case. In reaching its conclusions set forth herein, the Court takes no position on whether defendants’ conduct was in fact legitimate — it remains possible that shenanigans drove up the price of physical zinc. But, at long last, plaintiffs have not adequately alleged that such price movement was due to a plausible antitrust violation, as opposed to parallel, unilateral conduct beyond the reach of that statutory scheme. Plaintiffs have requested leave to amend. Although plaintiffs had considerable opportunity to learn from this Court’s decisions in Aluminum when they drafted the operative complaint (a lengthy schedule was designed to that end), and they have not explained how they would seek to supplement their pleadings, the Court will, as discussed below, allow plaintiffs one additional opportunity to replead their most promising Section 2 claims for monopolization and attempted monopolization against defendants Glencore Ltd. and Pacorini Metals USA, LLC. In contrast, any attempt by plaintiffs to re-plead their Section 1 claim and Section 2 conspiracy claim would be futile, and those claims are therefore dismissed with prejudice. 1. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff- Duncan Galvanizing Corporation commenced this action by filing a class action complaint on May 23, 2014, alleging antitrust conspiracy and monopolization claims against the London Metal Exchange Limited, LME Holdings Limited, Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing Limited, Glencore Xstrata pic, Glencore Ltd., Pacorini Metals USA, LLC, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Metro International Trade Services LLC, and JPMorgan Chase & Company. (14-cv-3728, ECF No. 2.) Plaintiffs Oklahoma Steel and Wire Co., Inc., Iowa Steel and Wire Co., and Southwestern Wire, Inc., subsequently filed a complaint on June 13, 2014 (14-cv-4290, ECF No. 2), and plaintiff Galvanizers Company filed on July 8, 2014 (14-cv-5066, ECF No. 1), each making similar allegations to those made in Duncan Galvanizing’s initial complaint. The Court held a joint initial pre-trial conference for all three actions on July 23, 2014, and directed plaintiffs to file a consolidated amended complaint no later than September 30, 2014. (ECF No. 74.) After the Court granted several extensions to allow plaintiffs time to frame their consolidated amended complaint in response to the Court’s decision on the second round of motions regarding the then-proposed amended complaint in Aluminum (see ECF Nos. 78, 84, 101), plaintiffs filed their consolidated amended complaint on June 17, 2015 (ECF No. 106). That complaint dropped a number of defendants from this action based on the Court’s decisions in Aluminum. (CAC at 13 n.4.) The CAC asserts one cause of action under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade against all defendants, and three causes of action under Section 2 of the Sherman Act — one claim for conspiracy to monopolize against all defendants, and claims for monopolization and attempted monopolization against defendants Glencore Ltd. and Pacorini Metals USA, LLC. (CAC ¶¶ 264-90.) Defendants collectively filed a total of four motions to dismiss the CAC under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 122, 124, 127, 130.) With leave of Court, plaintiffs filed one omnibus opposition brief in response to defendants’ motions on September 17, 2015. (ECF No. 136; see ECF No. 135.) The motions became fully briefed on October 19, 2015. (ECF Nos. 143, 144, 146,147.) The Court held oral argument on the motions on October 30, 2015. On the day prior to oral argument, the Court issued three Orders informing the parties of a number of issues and questions of particular interest to the Court. (ECF Nos. 149, 150, 151.) The Court appreciates the parties’ thoughtful presentations and responses to the Court’s questions, and has carefully considered the parties’ elaborations of their positions at oral argument in resolving the pending motions. II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS On these motions to dismiss, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court does not credit “mere conclusory statements” or “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” id. nor will it give effect to “legal conclusions couched as factual allegations,” Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 185 (2d Cir.2012). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider facts alleged in the complaint and documents attached to it or incorporated in it by reference, DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir.2010), as well as documents that are integral to the complaint and relied upon in it, even if not attached or incorporated by reference, Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir.2007). The Court may also properly consider matters of public record of which it may take judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007) (court may consider “matters of which a court may take judicial notice” on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss); Global Network Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir.2006). A. The Zinc Industry Zinc is the twenty-third most abundant element in the earth’s crust and is the world’s fourth most produced metal in terms of tonnage, trailing only iron, aluminum and copper. (CAC ¶ 91.) The world’s largest zinc producer is Nyrstar. (CAC ¶ 95.) More than 13 million tons of zinc are mined and produced annually worldwide. (CAC ¶ 96.) Zinc uses range from metal products to rubber and medicines, but corrosion resistant zinc plating of iron is its major application. (CAC ¶¶ 91, 94.) Commercially pure zinc is known as Special High Grade (“SHG”) zinc and is 99.995% pure. (CAC ¶ 95.) Primary zinc, which is produced from mining ore, is sold to two broad categories of customers who directly compete with each other for the same supply of metal: (1) manufacturers, processors, and brokers in physical zinc that use zinc in industrial processes and/or fabricate finished products, and (2) traders, speculators, and holders of zinc stocks who buy and sell zinc for profit. (CAC ¶ 97.) Plaintiffs allege that several government regulators, including the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate, and the European Commission, have, since 2012, conducted investigations regarding industrial metals, including zinc. (CAC ¶¶ 221-43.) B. London Metal Exchange The London Metal Exchange Limited (“LME”) is the world center for trading industrial metals; about 85% of all nonferrous metals futures business is transacted on the LME’s trading platforms. (CAC ¶ 99.) By the end of 2013, the LME market share of global exchange-traded metals futures reached 84.2%, including 89.4% for zinc. (CAC ¶ 107.) The LME’s role is to bring together industrial and financial participants to create a market for buyers and sellers, and it serves to provide producers and consumers of metals with a physical market of last resort and the ability to hedge against the risk of volatile metal prices. (CAC ¶ 99.) The purchase of zinc on the LME operates through the use of warrants, which serve as documents of title to metal stored in LME-approved warehouses around the world. (CAC ¶ 204 n.103.) When an LME forward contract matures, delivery of warrants for metal in a LME-certified warehouse must be made by sellers who have not liquidated (i.e. traded out of their contract) to buyers who have not liquidated. (CAC ¶ 204 n.103.) Each warrant represents a specific, non-interchangeable physical lot, tonnage, and brand in a specific LME warehouse. (CAC ¶ 204 n.103.) The LME was sold to Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing Ltd. (“HKEx”) in December 2012. (CAC ¶ 130.) Prior to the sale, Goldman Sachs owned approximately 9.5% of the LME and JPMorgan owned approximately 11%; they subsequently remained Class B shareholders and their affiliates remained a Category 2 .member and Category 1 member of the LME, respectively. (CAC ¶ 130.) An affiliate of Glencore pic serves as a category 5 member of the LME. (CAC ¶ 130.) As mentioned above, the LME also licenses and certifies an international network of warehouses for metals, including zinc in the United States. (CAC ¶ 99.) There are over 700 LME-licensed warehouses globally, approximately 200 of which are located in the United States. (CAC ¶ 102.) These warehouses must meet certain requirements relating to proximity to highways, railroads, and/or waterways, and must have the capacity to offload a specified daily minimum tonnage of metal. (CAC ¶ 104.) Defendants Metro International Trade Services, LLC (“Metro”), Henry Bath LLC (“Henry Bath”), and Pa-corini Metals USA, LLC (“Paeorini”), collectively own and operate more than 80% of the LME-certified warehouses in the United States and throughout the world. (CAC ¶ 102.) Metro operates warehouses in Detroit, Toledo, Chicago, Mobile and New Orleans. (CAC ¶ 103.) Pacorini operates warehouses in Detroit, Baltimore, Chicago, New Orleans, Mobile and Los Angeles. (CAC ¶ 103.) Henry Bath operates warehouses in Baltimore, Chicago and New Orleans. (CAC ¶ 103.) Only LME-registered warehouses deal in LME-warrants, which are the receipts for all LME-traded metals. (CAC ¶ 102.) SHG zinc warranted to LME specifications is stored in LME warehouses. (CAC ¶ 116.) About 65-70% of zinc stored in LME-certified warehouses is located in New Orleans, Louisiana. (CAC ¶¶ 103, 249.) Approximately 12% of zinc stored in LME warehouses is located in Detroit, Michigan. (CAC ¶ 105.) C. Zinc Pricing Plaintiffs allege that “[n]early all industrial contracts for the physical delivery of [SHG] Zinc express the price for zinc using a formula with at least two standardized components,” the “LME Settlement Price” and a “regional premium” such as the Platts Midwest Special High Grade Zinc Premium (“MW SHG Premium”). (CAC ¶ 128.) Together, these components are generally referred to as the “all-in” price for physical delivery of SHG zinc. (CAC ¶¶ 115,129.) The LME Official Price serves as the global reference for physical base metal contracts and the LME Official Settlement Price is the price at which all LME futures are settled. (CAC ¶ 101.) LME prices for physical base metal contracts, including zinc, are arrived at through a live open-outcry process in London in what is called the “Ring.” (CAC ¶ 101.) The cost of purchasing physical zinc in satisfaction of an LME forward contract long position is the LME Official Settlement Price, plus any warrant trading costs, plus the costs to the owner to move the zinc from the LME warehouse to its factory or facility. (CAC ¶ 114.) This method of purchasing zinc is small in volume relative to the market as a whole, but it serves as an important price discipline and check on prices in the remainder of the physical zinc market. (CAC ¶ 114.) The remainder of physical zinc is purchased at the MW SHG Premium plus the LME price, or another “all-in” price. (CAC ¶ 115.) Regional premiums, such as the MW SHG Premium, are compiled based on reporting of the preponderance of physical transactions between buyers and sellers of spot zinc on a given day for delivery to relevant geographic points. (CAC ¶ 129.) The premiums reflect current offers for immediately available zinc for delivery from United States and foreign producers, traders, and holders of warehoused zinc, and these offers in turn incorporate the fluctuating delivery, storage, finance, and insurance costs incurred by these competing suppliers of zinc. (CAC ¶ 129.) Regional premiums are published by private companies, including Platts, a division of McGraw-Hill Financial, and Metal Bulletin. (CAC ¶¶ 19,129.) D. Parties 1. Plaintiffs The named plaintiffs are five companies in the business of producing galvanized metal products coated with a protective layer of zinc. (CAC ¶¶ 32, 39, 46, 53, 60.) Plaintiffs allege that they purchased physical zinc for delivery in the United States between May 24, 2010 and the present (the “Class Period”) and were the first in the chain of distribution to pay prices that incorporated the MW SHG Premium on such zinc or directly purchased physical zinc from a defendant, or both. (CAC ¶¶ 22, 29-31, 36-38, 43-45, 50-52, 57-59.) Plaintiffs claim they suffered injury in fact as well as antitrust injury by having to pay a higher premium than they otherwise would have paid but for defendants’ alleged conduct. (CAC ¶¶ 33, 40, 47, 54, 61.) Plaintiffs define their putative plaintiff class as “All persons [with certain exclusions] who, or entities which, purchased LME U.S. Zinc and paid the Platts Zinc MW SHG Premium or similar price premium in the United States from a primary zinc producer or a Defendant from May 24, 2010 to the present.” (CAC ¶¶ 255-56.) 2. Defendants Defendants include three operators of LME-certified warehouses that store zinc (among other metals) — Pacorini, Metro, and Henry Bath — and a number of their corporate affiliates that consist of financial entities with commodities trading units that, during the Class Period, traded financial instruments whose price was predicated on the underlying cost of physical zinc and its storage. (CAC ¶¶ 62-89.) Plaintiffs allege that these defendants collectively own 54 of 56 LME-approved warehouses in New Orleans, Pacorini owns 55 of 60 LME-approved warehouses in Vlis-singen, Netherlands, “Metro dominates warehousing in Detroit”, and defendants own 15 of 20 LME-approved warehouses in Johor, Malaysia. (CAC ¶ 218.) In conclu-sory terms, plaintiffs allege that defendants agreed to a market allocation to Metro of aluminum in Detroit and to Pa-corini of aluminum in Vlissingen and zinc in New Orleans. (CAC ¶ 241.) Plaintiffs do not allege that any market was allocated to Henry Bath. Pacorini has been owned, and its operations controlled by, defendant Glencore Ltd. since it was acquired for $209 million in September 2010. (CAC ¶¶ 67, 108.) It owns 34 of the 56 LME-approved warehouses in New Orleans. (CAC ¶ 218.) Glen-core Ltd.’s ultimate parent is Glencore pic, which was formerly known as Glencore Xstrata pic. (CAC ¶ 62.) When Glencore pic merged with Xstrata in 2013, it became the world’s largest commodities trading company. (CAC ¶ 140.) The CAC alleges that no player was or is as dominant in the zinc market as Glencore and its affiliates. (CAC ¶ 140.) Until it was sold to Reuben Brothers, a Swiss private equity firm, in December 2014, Metro was wholly-owned directly by defendant Mitsi Holdings LLC (“Mitsi”) and operated as a subsidiary of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (“Goldman Sachs”). (CAC ¶¶ 74, 229.) The CAC alleges that Metro stores zinc at 14 LME-approved warehouses located in and around New Orleans and owns a total of 15 LME-approved warehouses in the city. (CAC ¶¶ 81, 218.) Metro was acquired by Goldman Sachs’s wholly-owned subsidiaries for a deal worth purportedly $550 million in February 2010. (CAC ¶¶ 75, 108.) Mitsi is owned by defendants GS Power Holdings LLC (“GS Power Holdings”) and MCEPF Metro I, Inc. (“MCEPF Metro I”), both of which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Goldman Sachs. (CAC ¶¶ 71-72, 74.) Defendant Goldman Sachs International (“GSI”) is a “significant subsidiary” of Goldman Sachs and is the affiliate of Goldman Sachs that serves as a member of the LME. (CAC ¶ 70.) Henry Bath is a subsidiary of Henry Bath & Son, Ltd., which was acquired by defendant JPMorgan Ventures Energy Corporation (“JPMorgan Ventures”) as part of the purchase of the commodities business of RBS Sempra in 2010 for approximately $1.7 billion. (CAC ¶¶ 84, 108.) Henry Bath owns 5 LME-approved warehouses in New Orleans. (CAC ¶ 218.) JPMorgan Ventures is the commodities division of JPMorgan Chase & Co. (“JPMor-gan”). Defendant JPMorgan Securities pic (“JPMorgan Securities”) provides securities brokerage services for its ultimate parent, JPMorgan, and was a Category 1 ring dealing member of the LME. (CAC ¶ 83.) The CAC alleges that JPMorgan Securities transacted directly with Metro regarding zinc storage in the United States. (CAC ¶ 83.) Henry Bath and its warehousing business was sold by JPMor*-gan-affiliated entities to Mercuria, a Swiss commodities firm, in a transaction that closed on or about October 3, 2014. (CAC ¶¶ 86, 228.) E. Defendants’ Allegedly Unlawful Conduct 1. Conspiracy Allegations Plaintiffs allege a conspiracy prohibited by both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. In their Section 1 claim, plaintiffs assert that defendants “shared a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve the unlawful objective of artificially fixing, depressing, raising, pegging, maintaining, stabilizing, and otherwise manipulating the supply of physical zinc available for delivery from LME warehouses.” (CAC ¶ 267.) In their conspiracy to monopolize claim under Section 2, they assert that defendants “by and through the LME, and, on information and belief, with each other have conspired to monopolize the market for the LME Zinc Warehouse Services Market.” (CAC ¶ 272.) Both claims depend on the same alleged scheme, summarized as follows: at least by the start of the Class Period, defendants “owned the largest LME warehouses in the world, were on the rules committee for recommending storage fees and minimum delivery requirements for those warehouses, and traded in zinc as well as financial instruments tied to the price of zinc,” enabling them to “conspire with each other to manipulate the LME warehousing system and its rules to, inter alia, maximize profits from rental income and trading.” (CAC ¶ 109.) Plaintiffs’ support for this alleged conspiracy includes allegations of, inter alia, manipulation of LME load-out rules, Pacorini’s falsification of bills of lading, an agreement to organize warrant cancellations in Pacorini’s warehouses, Pa-corini’s and Metro’s provision of financial incentives for storing zinc, and the use of shadow warehousing and delisting of warehouses. In this regard, plaintiffs allege that, as members of the LME Warehousing Committee and by their influence of and membership on various other LME committees, defendants combined and conspired to treat as a maximum the LME’s minimum load-out requirement of 1,500 tons (increased to 3,000 tons during the Class Period) of metal per city per day. (CAC ¶¶ 132, 138.) This minimum applied on a city-wide basis (i.e. no minimum percentage-per-warehouse was required) and it applied to all metals as a whole. (CAC ¶ 132.) Plaintiffs further allege that this arrangement allowed defendants to “net” incoming shipments and “shuttle” shipments between warehouses that would count against the daily quota without requiring warehouse operators to actually release zinc from storage into the market. (CAC ¶¶ 132-33.) Plaintiffs then assert that by virtue of their ownership of and rule-making role in the LME, defendants have controlled the supply of zinc and thereby dictated the price of premiums incorporated into zinc prices in the United States. (CAC ¶ 139.) Plaintiffs allege that in late summer or fall of 2012, during a meeting with Pacorini CFO Lisa Loeffler and Assistant General Manager Deborah Bressie, plaintiffs’ Confidential Witness 1 (“CW1”), who worked in management for Pacorini and had oversight for the LME warranting side of Pa-corini’s business during the Class Period, was told that Pacorini was going to engage in high volume transfers of canceled LME metals between its warehouses in New Orleans. (CAC ¶ 179.) CW1 was ordered to create falsified bills of lading for Pacorini to mask the high volume movements of zinc so that Pacorini could manipulate the daily reports sent to the LME without being detected. (CAC ¶¶ 180, 185.) CW1 was instructed that these bills of lading were to falsely state that the zinc was to be delivered to a customer location when in actuality it was either not being moved at all or was being redirected to another Pacorini warehouse; these documents also contained false signatures and, at times, incorrect tonnage amounts. (CAC ¶ 180.) CW1 recalls that warehouses not owned by Pacorini, but owned by third parties such as Metro and Henry Bath, were also sometimes falsely listed as delivery locations in the forged bills of lading. (CAC ¶ 181.) There are no allegations that any defendant other than Pacorini engaged in these practices. Plaintiffs’ Confidential Witness 2 (“CW2”), who worked as a shipping and receiving/LME clerk for Pacorini during the Class Period, corroborates that Pacori-ni altered bills of lading to make it appear as if zinc and other metals moved from warehouse to warehouse when in fact the metals were not moving at all; CW2 also recalls that many of the falsified bills of lading listed a Metro warehouse as a delivery location. (CAC ¶ 184.) Plaintiffs allege that, “[o]n its own, Pacorini’s efforts to hide the implementation of defendants’ scheme from the LME through false bills of lading and non-existent ghost transactions had the effect of further increasing warehouse queues.” (CAC ¶ 188.) The CAC does not allege that any entity unaffiliated with Pacorini engaged in a practice of falsifying bills of lading. Plaintiffs further allege that, according to CW1, in the fall of 2012 defendants “agreed to a ’synchronized’ and ’highly coordinated’ schedule of warrant cancellations at Pacorini’s warehouses.” (CAC ¶ 189.) Plaintiffs allege that CW1 attended a meeting with Pacorini management in which Pacorini CEO Mario Casciano informed CW1 and others that certain of Pacorini’s preferred customers, which mostly consisted of “big trading companies”, had recently met and agreed on the load-out queue order and tonnage amounts at Pacorini’s warehouses. (CAC ¶ 189.) It was explained to CW1 that representatives of Glencore, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Henry Bath and metals trader Noble Americas Corp. (“Noble”) entered into an agreement (the “Queue Order Agreement”) that zinc would be the first metal to be released from Pacorini’s warehouse load-out queue and that these customers were going to get their zinc tonnage released first and in a certain agreed upon order. (CAC ¶ 189.) Plaintiffs allege that CW1 was informed that defendants agreed that Noble would have its zinc removed first, followed by Goldman Sachs, and then JPMorgan. (CAC ¶ 190.) Plaintiffs allege that “many warrants were canceled at once” by each of these “preferred customers” pursuant to the agreed upon order and no two companies involved in setting the queue order canceled warrants at the same time. (CAC ¶ 190.) According to CW1, it was not uncommon, prior to this agreement, for warrant cancellations by warrant holders to overlap at times. (CAC ¶ 190.) In addition to their agreed upon schedule of warrant cancellations, Pacorini also provided these preferred customers with special rates on both rent and the cost to ship the metal out of a warehouse if they canceled warrants on a certain amount of metal. (CAC ¶ 193.) To monitor and manage the implementation of the Queue Order Agreement, Pacorini created a “Queue Manager” spreadsheet — first “rolled out” in fall 2012 — listing all of Pacorini’s warehouse customers in line in the queue for each day and month. (CAC ¶ 194.) Plaintiffs allege that Pacorini held weekly internal meetings to discuss the Queue Manager spreadsheet, and that Loeffler directed CW1 to enter information into the spreadsheet and specifically informed CW1 that Casciano was directing the spreadsheet activities. (CAC ¶ 195.) After implementing the spreadsheet, Pacorini officials knew exactly when cancellations were going to occur prior to the warrants being officially canceled through the LME. (CAC ¶ 195.) According to CW1, the Queue Manager spreadsheet was a strictly “in-house” (Pacorini) project that contained certain information, such as tonnage, that differed from what Pacorini reported to the LME in daily reports. (CAC ¶ 196.) Plaintiffs allege that, according to CW1 and CW2, wait times for customers to get metal out of the queue were significantly lengthened after implementation of the Queue Manager spreadsheet. (CAC ¶¶ 197, 198.) According to one trader in October 2012, “zinc and aluminum cancellations [we]re being carried out on what appealed] to be a friendly basis by two warehousing firms in particular, creating a queue for material and allowing the market to be bid as a result.” (CAC ¶ 249.) Plaintiffs also allege that defendants engaged in certain other anticompetitive practices to manipulate the volume of zinc maintained in warehouses, including that Pacorini and Metro provided ever increasing financial incentives to metals producers and traders to store zinc in their warehouses. This practice, according to plaintiffs, resulted in defendants amassing even greater stockpiles of zinc and inflating zinc premiums. (CÁC ¶¶ 201-04.) Plaintiffs allege, in particular, that Pacorini paid incentives exceeding the price premium that producers could obtain by selling their zinc on the open market. (CAC ¶ 202.) Plaintiffs also allege that “defendants” engaged in “shadow warehousing”, which is the practice of moving metal from LME-approved warehouses to areas not registered as LME warehouses because such locations are unregulated and don’t disclose their holdings, allowing defendants to manipulate the inventories reported to the LME. (CAC ¶ 205.) However, these allegations are (again) factually limited to Pacor-ini. Plaintiffs allege that, with the LME’s permission, “Gleneore” — which is defined in the CAC as Gleneore Ltd. and Pacori-ni — has also delisted LME warehouses to increase its ability to manipulate market conditions. (CAC ¶ 207; see CAC ¶ 68.) Plaintiffs allege that “defendants”— which are identified only in the aggregate and in general terms — have profited in numerous ways from their anticompetitive agreements in light of their positions in the market. They allege that defendants profited from increased storage fees and higher zinc premiums by taking long positions in zinc and selling it into the market at a higher premium than at which they purchased it. (CAC ¶ 210.) Plaintiffs also allege that defendants created conditions that allowed a market “contango” to persist during the Class Period, meaning that the spot or cash price for zinc was lower than the futures price; the contango reflected purchasers’ willingness to pay more for zinc at a future date than at the current spot or cash price. (CAC ¶ 211.) The contango allowed investors, such as defendants, to take advantage of historically low interest rates to enter into warehouse financing deals in which they purchased zinc at depressed spot prices, incurred carrying and storage costs, and still profited from the difference between the costs incurred and the increased futures price. (CAC ¶¶ 212, 244.) Plaintiffs allege that Goldman Sachs or J. Aron traded in zinc and zinc derivatives and stood to benefit from increases in the zinc premium. (CAC ¶ 242.) The CAC contains no allegation specifically identifying any other defendant by name as having traded in financial instruments involving zinc premiums. 2. Monopolization Allegations Plaintiffs also allege that Gleneore Ltd. and/or Pacorini had monopoly power, or attempted to acquire monopoly power, in the market for LME-licensed zinc warehousing services in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. (CAC ¶¶ 277-90.) Plaintiffs allege two relevant markets: (1) the market of “services for zinc stored in LME warehouses” (which plaintiffs refer to as the “LME Zinc Warehouse Services Market”) in the United States, North America, and/or the world, and (2) the “market for Special High Grade Zinc or the market for selling such zinc” in North America (which plaintiffs refer to as the “LME U.S. Zinc Market”), and/or the world (which plaintiffs refer to as the “Zinc Market”). (CAC ¶ 113.) Plaintiffs allege that the “LME Zinc Warehouse Services Market” provides and controls the release of physical zinc to owners that have taken delivery in satisfaction of an LME zinc forward contract long position. (CAC ¶ 114.) Count III alleges that Gleneore “willfully acquired and maintained monopoly power in the market for LME Zinc Warehouse Services in the United States” by owning a substantial majority of warehouses in New Orleans, where most LME-licensed warehouses are located. (CAC ¶¶ 278-79.) Count IV alleges, in the alternative, that Gleneore specifically intended to obtain a monopoly in the “market for LME-licensed zinc warehousing in the United States” and had a dangerous probability of success in doing so. (CAC ¶¶ 285-86.) Plaintiffs allege that there are no reasonable substitutes for LME zinc warehouse services because LME warrants are considered first class collateral, and the only zinc sources of such first class collateral is zinc deliverable on the LME. (CAC ¶ 118.) Plaintiffs also allege that there are no reasonable substitutes for SHG zinc, which is of specific quality and has specific industrial uses, including galvanizing steel. (CAC ¶ 119.) Finally, plaintiffs allege that demand for primary zinc is “relatively price inelastic.” (CAC ¶ 123.) In the physical zinc market, plaintiffs • allege that “no player was or is as dominant as Glencore and its affiliates.” (CAC ¶ 140.) After Glencore pic’s merger with Xstrata, it became the world’s largest zinc miner, with 24 mines producing around 1.5 million metric tons of contained zinc in 2012 out of total global production of 13 million metric tons. (CAC ¶ 142.) Glencore pic also operates seven zinc smelters with a capacity of around 1.2 million metric tons per year of zinc metal, sells 100% of primary zinc produced in the United States, trades 60% of the world’s zinc, and owns or has exclusive rights to 35% of the output of the world’s zinc mines, including 100% of all U.S. output of primary zinc. (CAC ¶¶ 124, 142, 160, 163, 166.) Plaintiffs allege that even where it does not own a mine, Glencore and its affiliates partially own or have marketing or “off take” agreements with miners providing it with exclusive rights to sell a zinc mine’s output. (CAC ¶¶ 124, 161.) Glencore and its affiliates recognized more than $7.7 billion of revenue from zinc assets in 2014. (CAC ¶ 171.) Beyond its dominant position in the United States, plaintiffs allege that Glen-core “has a dominant position in zinc distribution worldwide”; “[sjinee 2009, its control over LME warehouse stocks of zinc is estimated to have grown to more than 90% of all LME warehouse stocks of zinc.” (CAC ¶ 143.) Plaintiffs allege that in the months preceding Glencore’s takeover of Pacorini, extraordinary volumes of zinc thought to be from Glencore and its .affiliates in Spain were delivered to New Orleans warehouses, resulting in a 25% jump in the MW SHG Premium. (CAC ¶¶ 146, 149.) Within a week after Glencore’s August 2010 announcement that it was acquiring Pacorini, warrants for more than 50,000 tons of zinc in New Orleans warehouses were canceled in a single day. .(CAC ¶¶ 155, 157.) Plaintiffs allege that after Glencore completed its acquisition of Pacorini on September 14, 2010, it moved zinc to New Orleans to create lengthy warehouse queues. (CAC ¶ 160.) F. Alleged Effects on the Physical Zinc Market As detailed below, plaintiffs allege that defendants’ anticompetitive conduct had numerous effects on the zinc market, including increasing the MW SHG Premium, the trading volume of zinc futures contracts, the level of zinc inventories, the number of canceled warrants, and the length of load-out queues at LME warehouses. Notably, plaintiffs’ own allegations indicate that several of these trends began prior to the start of the Class Period and prior to much of the anticompetitive conduct alleged. The first and primary competitive effect was allegedly price related. Plaintiffs assert that during the Class Period, price premiums for physical zinc (based on the MW SHG Premium) nearly tripled from 3.50 cents per pound to 9.25 cents per pound (CAC ¶¶ 7, 143, 250-51), and that these changes were “causally related” to “changes in the estimated zinc load-out queue from the Pacorini LME warehouses located in New Orleans and to changes in the Herfindahl index of concentration of zinc stocks in LME warehouses worldwide.” (CAC ¶ 144.) Notably, however, the MW SHG Premium increased by almost 50% from 3.25 cents per pound to 4.75 per pound in the roughly four months prior to Glencore’s acquisition of Pacorini in 2010. (CAC ¶ 250.) The CAC also states that between 2009 (prior to defendants’ warehouse acquisitions) and 2013, the volume of zinc futures nearly doubled, and that there was significant volume growth in the one-and-a-half years prior to the start of the Class Period. (CAC ¶ 245.) Plaintiffs allege that in May 2010 (again, prior to certain defendants’ warehouse acquisitions), zinc inventories reached a five-year high, and reached a seventeen-year high by July 2012; notably, though, zinc inventories roughly doubled in the year prior to the start of the Class Period. (CAC ¶¶ 151, 174.) Plaintiffs also allege that by July 2011, canceled warrants in New Orleans reached 105,650 metric tons, extending the maximum queue to withdraw material to 70 working days. (CAC ¶ 176.) Plaintiffs allege that there have been long backlogs of zinc (and other metals) at LME-certified warehouses due to LME rules that allow warehouse operators to release much less material per day than they take in, raising premiums. (CAC ¶¶ 246-47.) Of the 71% of total LME warehouse stocks of zinc stored in New Orleans in October 2012, plaintiffs allege that 45% of that inventory was waiting in queue to be delivered out. (CAC ¶ 249.) This represented a tripling of the outbound delivery queue from that in late 2011. (CAC ¶ 249.) By November 2012, purchasers of zinc had to wait months and sometimes more than a year to get deliveries of zinc. (CAC ¶ 249.) Load-out delays had a substantial effect on metals stored in LME warehouses under warrants because canceled warrants on zinc have consistently exceeded the daily load-out rate throughout the Class Period, leading to increases in the rents paid to defendants. (CAC ¶ 134.) During the Class Period, the LME agreed to increase storage rates by 20%; the storage rental rate per ton per day increased from $0.40 in 2010 to $0.41 in 2011, to $0.45 in 2012, and finally to $0.48 in 2013. (CAC ¶ 135.) III. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in a complaint must raise the plaintiffs’ right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In other words, a complaint must allege enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. In applying that standard, a court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, but does not credit “mere conclusory statements” or “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. Similarly, a court need not accept “legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Anderson News, 680 F.3d at 185. If the Court can infer no more than the mere possibility of misconduct” from the factual averments — that is, if the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint have not “nudged [plaintiffs’] claims ... across the line from conceivable to plausible”— dismissal is appropriate. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679-80, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The “plausibility” requirement should not, however, be misunderstood as a “probability” standard. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955; Anderson News, 680 F.3d at 184. “Because plausibility is a standard lower than probability, a given set of actions may well be subject to diverging interpretations, each of which is plausible.” Anderson News, 680 F.3d at 184. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may not choose between two plausible inferences that may both be drawn from the factual allegations. Id. at 185. This is so even if a court finds one of the two versions more plausible. Id. IV. ANTITRUST STANDING In an antitrust case, a plaintiff must have constitutional standing under Article III, as well as antitrust standing. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters (“AGC”), 459 U.S. 519, 535 n. 31, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983); see also Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Ne., Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir.2007). Plaintiffs’ Article III standing is not in dispute. Defendants do, however, contest that plaintiffs have or could plead antitrust standing as to both their Section 1 and 2 claims. Antitrust standing is “a threshold, pleading-stage inquiry and when a complaint by its terms fails to establish this requirement [the court] must dismiss it as a matter of law.” Gatt Commc’ns Inc. v. PMC Assocs. L.L.C., 711 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 450 (6th Cir.2007) (en banc)); see also Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v. MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 467 F.3d 283, 290-95 (2d Cir.2006) (dismissing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of antitrust standing). A court must answer three separate questions to determine if plaintiffs have antitrust standing: have plaintiffs alleged injury in fact; have they alleged antitrust injury, and are they efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws? See AGC, 459 U.S. at 535 n. 31, 103 S.Ct. 897; Port Dock, 507 F.3d at 121. Plaintiffs allege that they have paid higher prices for zinc than they would have paid in the absence of defendants’ actions. (See CAC ¶¶ 24, 33, 40, 47, 54, 61.) Because plaintiffs’ alleged injury is concrete, particularized, and actual, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they suffered injury in fact as to their claims under Sections 1 and 2. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The Court next turns to the questions of whether plaintiffs adequately allege antitrust injury and have shown that they would be efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws, first in relation to their Section 1 claim, and then with respect to their Section 2 claims. To establish antitrust injury, ■ a plaintiff must allege plausible facts that he suffered “injury ’of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes [the] defendants’ acts unlawful.’ ” Gatt, 711 F.3d at 78 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977)). Thus, although causally related to an antitrust violation, injury does not constitute “antitrust injury” unless it is “attributable to an anti-competitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny.” Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334, 110 S.Ct. 1884, 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990). The antitrust injury requirement is derived from the principle that the antitrust laws were enacted for “ ’the protection of competition, not competitors.’ ” Paycom Billing, 467 F.3d at 290 (quoting Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 488, 97 S.Ct. 690); see also Gatt, 711 F.3d at 75 (“Absent such boundaries, the potent private enforcement tool that is an action for treble damages could be invoked without service to — and potentially in disservice of — the purpose of the antitrust laws: to protect competition.”). The Second Circuit employs a three-step analysis to determine whether a plaintiff has sufficiently alleged antitrust injury arising from an anticompetitive practice. First, a court must determine whether the party asserting that it has been injured by an illegal competitive practice has identified the practice complained of and the reasons such a practice is or might be anticompeti-tive. Gatt, 711 F.3d at 76. Second, a court must “identify the actual injury the plaintiff alleges.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Third, a court compares the “anticompeti-tive effect of the specific practice at issue to the actual injury the plaintiff alleges.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The questions of antitrust injury and whether a plaintiff is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws are often analyzed together. The Court is guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in AGC, in which it concluded that a union lacked standing to redress alleged antitrust violations on behalf of its members. AGC, 459 U.S. at 520, 103 S.Ct. 897. In AGC, the Supreme Court identified several factors a court should consider in determining whether a plaintiff has antitrust standing: (1) the causal connection between the violation and the harm, (2) the presence of an improper motive, (3) the type of injury and whether it was one Congress sought to address, (4) the directness of the injury, (5) the speculative nature of the damages, and (6) the risk of duplicative recovery or complex damage apportionment. Id. at 537 — 44, 103 S.Ct. 897. Applying these factors, the Court concluded that the plaintiff union lacked antitrust standing because: (1) the causal chain consisted of several “somewhat vaguely defined” links, (2) motive was not a significant issue in the case, (3) the type of injury was not one Congress sought to address because the union was “neither a consumer nor a competitor in the market in which trade was restrained”, (4) the union’s alleged injury was too indirect; (5) the injury was speculative because the effects of the conspiracy were indirect and could have been caused by independent factors, and (6) there was an alternative class of plaintiffs better situated to pursue the claims, which created a risk of duplicative damages. Id. at 539-45 & n. 37, 103 S.Ct. 897. The Second Circuit has “distilled” these factors “into two imperatives”: first, that a plaintiff plausibly allege facts supporting antitrust injury, and, second, that he plausibly allege facts supporting his suitability as a plaintiff to pursue the alleged antitrust violation — and that he would therefore be an “efficient enforcer” of the antitrust laws. Gatt, 711 F.3d at 76; see also Port Dock, 507 F.3d at 121; Daniel, 428 F.3d at 443. Whether a plaintiff is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws depends on a balancing of the following factors: (1) the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury; (2) the existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement; (3) the speculativeness of the alleged injury; and (4) the difficulty of identifying damages and apportioning them among direct and indirect victims so as to avoid duplicative recoveries. Gatt, 711 F.3d at 76 (quoting Paycom Billing, 467 F.3d at 290-91); see also Port Dock, 507 F.3d at 121; Daniel, 428 F.3d at 443. To determine if a pleading adequately alleges antitrust injury as well as whether each plaintiff is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws, a court must analyze whether a plaintiffs alleged injury constitutes injury to the competitive process, and not just injury to a competitor. Understanding where plaintiffs have positioned themselves in the competitive landscape is the most logical starting point for this question. The Court asks whether plaintiffs are consumers of a product, and therefore injured when sellers engage in price fixing, allocating markets, or dividing customers, etc., because those actions have increased the prices paid? Or, whether plaintiffs allege that they are competitors of a defendant, and injured when, for instance, they are deprived of customers as a result of an unlawful bargain struck between the defendants? The Court must, finally, ask whether plaintiffs allege that they are neither consumers nor competitors but nonetheless have suffered an injury of the type the antitrust laws are intended to address? In answering this third question, the Court is also guided by the Supreme Court’s decision in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready (“McCready”), 457 U.S. 465, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982), a case decided in the term immediately prior to the term in which AGC was decided. In McCready, a case arising under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court held that while the plaintiff was not a competitor of the alleged conspirators, she had nevertheless suffered antitrust injury because “the injury she suffered was inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict.” Id. at 484, 102 S.Ct. 2540. McCready had alleged that her health insurer, Blue Shield of Virginia, and an organization of psychiatrists conspired to exclude psychologists from eligibility for compensation under Blue Shield’s insurance plans. Id. at 469-70, 102 S.Ct. 2540. McCready alleged that she suffered injury when she sought reimbursement from Blue Shield for treatment by a psychologist and was denied because Blue Shield only allowed her and other subscribers to choose between “visiting a psychologist and forfeiting reimbursement, or receiving reimbursement by forgoing treatment of a provider of their choice.” Id. at 467-69, 483, 102 S.Ct. 2540. The Court found that McCready’s injury “flow[ed] from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful” under the antitrust laws, and accordingly there was no persuasive rationale to deny McCready redress. Id. at 484-85, 102 S.Ct. 2540. Although not frequently relied upon, lower courts have, subsequent to McCready, cited its inextricably intertwined analysis. See, e.g., Crimpers Promotions Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 724 F.2d 290, 294 (2d Cir.1983) (Friendly, J.) (plaintiff was trade show organizer, not direct participant in relevant market, but had antitrust standing); Province v. Cleveland Press Publ’g Co., 787 F.2d 1047, 1052 (6th Cir.1986) (plaintiffs who are not “direct participants in the relevant market” can establish standing by showing that their injury is “inextricably intertwined” with the injury inflicted on the relevant market). “To be inextricably intertwined with the injury to competition, the plaintiffs must have been ‘manipulated or utilized by [defendant as a fulcrum, conduit or market force to injure competitors or participants in the relevant product and geographical market.’ ” Province, 787 F.2d at 1052 (quoting Southaven Land Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079, 1086 (6th Cir.1983)). A. Standing for the Section 1 Claim At least with respect to the issue of antitrust standing for their § 1 claim, plaintiffs are situated much like the first level purchaser plaintiffs in Aluminum. As in Aluminum, plaintiffs are not competitors of any of the defendants or consumers of their products or services: they do not operate warehouses, do not have commodities trading arms, and do not allege that they directly consume any of defendants’ trading products or zinc warehouse-related products or services. See Aluminum II, 95 F.Supp.3d at 442. Rather, as was true for the first level purchasers in Aluminum, the core of plaintiffs’ claims is that they have suffered necessary yet collateral damage from defendants’ scheme by having to pay artificially inflated prices for primary zinc in the physical market. Plaintiffs allege that they are the real world users whose demand for zinc creates the market for zinc sales. (CAC ¶¶ 32, 39, 46, 53, 60.) Were it not for entities like plaintiffs, who need to use zinc for their galvanizing processes, defendants’ trading arms would not be able to trade zinc futures as a commodity, and their warehousing arms would not have need to store the metal. (CAC ¶ 26.) Plaintiffs allege that they are thus central to — or the fulcrum of — the creation of the market opportunity underlying both metal storage and warrant trading for zinc. (CAC ¶ 26.) As the entities that were the first purchasers to pay the MW SHG Premium, they were closest to the anticompet-itive effects of defendants’ alleged conduct and are necessarily directly impacted by defendants’ alleged manipulation of the price of that premium. That is, their purchases are inextricably intertwined with the competitive landscape in which defendants’ alleged scheme ultimately played out. Plaintiffs argue that, at the very least, they therefore fall within the scope of antitrust injury contemplated by McCready. The Court agrees. The heart of defendants’ argument is that as plaintiffs are neither direct consumers nor competitors of defendants, they cannot have experienced a competition reducing impact of defendants’ conduct. But plaintiffs’ theory of antitrust injury depends not on any single act, but rather on the aggregate impact of the acts. McCready makes clear that the antitrust laws do not require a plaintiff to fit neatly into a box of competitor or consumer, so long as “the injury [they] suffered was inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict.” 457 U.S. at 484, 102 S.Ct. 2540. Defendants also contend that plaintiffs lack antitrust standing because they do not allege that they owned or stored zinc in any Pacorini-owned or other LME-approved warehouse such that defendants’ alleged agreement would have delayed their ability to load them zinc out of Pacorini’s warehouses. Plaintiffs’ lack of direct participation in warehouse operations and services or the trading of zinc warrants is, here, not dis-positive as it might well be in some cases. Given the totality of the factual allegations here, plaintiffs’ participation in the separate but related market of purchasing zinc, the price of which is allegedly directly impacted by defendants’ conduct, is sufficient to allege antitrust injury for purposes of their Section 1 claim. See, e.g., Loeb Indus. Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir.2002) (“McCready ... recognizes that different injuries in distinct markets may be inflicted by a single antitrust conspiracy, and thus ... differently situated plaintiffs might be able to raise claims.”). The Court recognizes that, like Aluminum, this case does not fit into any traditional box and these are unusual facts for an antitrust case, but McCready dictates that this Court examine whether plaintiffs have alleged facts that call for the application of analogous principles. Plaintiffs have done so here. If defendants have engaged in a conspiracy that caused dysfunction in the price-setting process and drove prices higher, and plaintiffs paid those higher prices, then, so long as McCready remains good law, plaintiffs have suffered an injury of the type that the McCready Court stated the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. Defendants also argue that even if plaintiffs are able to allege injury to the competitive process, they have not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that they are efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws. Based on the facts as alleged, the Court must find otherwise. As was the case with the first level purchaser and direct purchaser plaintiffs in Aluminum, the facts supporting the existence of antitrust injury also demonstrate that plaintiffs are efficient enforcers for Section 1 purposes. First, each plaintiff is alleged to buy zinc directly from a zinc producer (and, in the case of Jasper Materials, Inc., directly from Glencore), and the contracts between the producer-seller and plaintiff-buyer allegedly contain provisions tying the contract prices to the MW SHG Premium. (CAC ¶¶ 28-30, 35-37, 42-44, 49-51, 56-58.) Plaintiffs also allege that, due to industry standards, they had no choice but to purchase zinc at a price that included the MW SHG Premium. (CAC ¶ 19.) Second, according to plaintiffs, no buyer of primary zinc higher up or more direct in their respective distribution chains paid prices that included the MW SHG Premium. (CAC ¶¶ 31, 38, 45, 52, 59.) Third, plaintiffs’ allegations support non-speculative damages, as they define damages by the amount by which the MW SHG Premium was inflated. (CAC ¶¶ 2, 24, 145-47, 203, 250-53.) At the motion to dismiss stage, this is sufficient. See Gatt, 711 F.3d at 76 (whether plaintiff is efficient enforcer is based in part on a prospective analysis of the difficulty of identifying and apportioning damages); Paycom Billing, 467 F.3d at 291 (same). Applying the Gatt factors, these allegations show that (1) plaintiffs’ injuries were directly caused by defendants’ alleged misconduct, (2) their damages are not speculative, (3) there are no issues regarding duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of damages given that plaintiffs were the first in the chain of distribution to pay a price incorporating the MW SHG Premium, and (4) there are no more direct victims of defendants’ misconduct. See Gatt, 711 F.3d at 76. Based on the facts alleged — that they are the first level of purchasers to pay, and thus be harmed by — inflated prices of zinc, plaintiffs have sufficiently positioned therm selves as efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws to pass muster at the pleading stage. B. Standing for the Section 2 Claims On the other hand, as was the case in Aluminum, plaintiffs do not fare as well in asserting antitrust standing with respect to their Section 2 claims. The CAC alleges two relevant product markets: the market of “services for zinc stored in LME warehouses” and the “market for Special High Grade Zinc or the market for selling such zinc.” (CAC ¶ 113.) The only market for which they allege that monopoly power was obtained or dangerously close to being acquired (and the market which plaintiffs allege defendants conspired to monopolize), however, is the “LME Zinc Warehouse Services Market”, which, as previously noted plaintiffs define as the market of “services for zinc stored in LME warehouses.” (CAC ¶¶ 272, 278-79, 285-86.) As set forth below, plaintiffs do not adequately allege an antitrust injury based on antitrust conduct in this market, and in any event have not adequa