Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MARY M. LISI, District Judge. This case was brought on behalf of several minors (the “Named Plaintiffs” or “Plaintiffs”) in custody of the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth & Families (“DCYF”), who had been placed into foster care after they were removed from their biological homes following allegations of abuse and/or neglect. After the parties engaged in a lengthy discovery process and after settlement negotiations were unfruitful, the Plaintiffs’ case was presented to this Court in the course of a sixteen-day bench trial. At the conclusion of the Plaintiffs’ case, the Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the record pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52. For the reasons set forth herein, that motion is GRANTED. 1. Procedural History This case was first filed in 2007 on behalf of ten minor children, who were, at the time, in legal custody of DCYF, Rhode Island’s child welfare agency. The action was initiated by then Rhode Island child advocate, Jametta O. Alston (“Alston”), and a number of individuals (the “Next Friends”) whom Alston had identified as suited to vindicate the children’s constitutional rights in federal court. Sam M. v. Carcieri, 608 F.3d 77, 82 (1st Cir.2010). Prior to filing suit, Alston had sent an undisclosed number of DCYF case files to the New York-based child advocacy group “Children’s Rights.” Children’s Rights, which has brought suits against a number of other states in similar foster care management disputes, filed this action on behalf of the ten minor children. See Connor B. v. Patrick, C.A. No. 10-30073-WGY, 985 F.Supp.2d 129, 133 n. 2, 2013 WL 6181454 at *1 n. 2 (D.Mass. Nov. 22, 2013) (noting that more than a dozen other states have settled with Children’s Rights and that Massachusetts was the first state to proceed to trial in a similar dispute). The action, which named the governor, the secretary of the Rhode Island Office of Health and Human Services, and the director of DCYF as defendants, was intended as a class action suit on behalf of “all children who are or will be in legal custody of [DCYF] due to a report or suspicion of abuse or neglect.” Complaint at ¶ 11 (Dkt. No. 1). The Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the Defendants’ failure to exercise reasonable professional judgment deprived the Plaintiffs of their substantive due process rights, for which they sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Sam M. v. Carciera, 610 F.Supp.2d at 173. After the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 7, 2007, (Dkt. No. 12), the Defendants sought dismissal of the case (1) for lack of standing on part of the Next Friends; (2) based on Younger and Rooker-Feldman abstention principles; and (3) for lack of a private right of action under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (“AACWA”), 42 U.S.C. § 670-676. (Dkt. No. 25). On April 29, 2009, the case was dismissed for lack of standing on part of the child advocate and the Next Friends. Sam M. v. Carcieri, 610 F.Supp.2d at 173, 184. Plaintiffs appealed the decision and, on June, 18, 2010, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to this Court with instructions to allow the Next Friends to represent the Plaintiffs. Sam M. v. Carcieri, 608 F.3d at 81. The First Circuit noted that, although the children were represented in Rhode Island Family Court proceedings by court-appointed guardians ad litem, also known as Court Appointed Special Advocates (“CASA attorneys”), such an arrangement did not preclude the Plaintiffs from filing suit by a Next Friend. Id. at 87. The First Circuit further concluded that “because these foster care children lack significant ties with their parents and have been placed under the state’s legal custody and guardianship, a significant relationship need not be required as a prerequisite to Next Friend status.” Id. at 91. “Important social interests are advanced by allowing minors access to a judicial forum to vindicate their constitutional rights through a Next Friend that the court finds has a good faith interest in pursuing a federal claim on the minor’s behalf.” Id. at 91-92. In determining whether a proposed Next Friend is “ ‘truly dedicated to the best interests’ ” of the child whose interest he or she seeks to represent, the trial court must consider “the individual’s familiarity with the litigation, the reasons that move [him or] her to pursue the litigation, and [his or her] ability to pursue the case on the child’s behalf.” Id. at 92 (quoting Coal. of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir.2002)). The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims brought by four of the Named Plaintiffs (Briana, Alexis, Clare, and Deanna H.) on the ground that legal adoption had rendered their claims moot. Sam M. v. Carcieri, 608 F.3d at 81 n. 1, 93 n. 14. Subsequently, four of the remaining Plaintiffs (Sam M., Tony M., Michael B., and Caesar S.) named in the amended complaint were adopted as well, leaving only two of the original Named Plaintiffs— David T. and Danny B. Following remand of the case to this Court, the Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 79) the amended complaint based on (1) mootness, on the ground that all but two of the original ten Named Plaintiffs had been adopted; (2) abstention under Younger, on the ground that certain relief requested by the Plaintiffs from this Court would invade the province of the Family Court; (3) abstention under Rooker-Feldman, on the ground that some of the Plaintiffs’ claims amounted to a request to review unfavorable state court judgments; and (4) lack of private enforceable rights under the AACWA and, relatedly, for breach of contract. In a July 20, 2011 Memorandum and Order, this Court denied, in part, and granted, in part, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 101). On February 24, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint (the “Complaint”)(Dkt. No. 115), which added five children then in DCYF care as Named Plaintiffs (Cassie M., Alex and Jared C., Terrence T., and Tracy L.). The asserted causes of action which survived the Defendants’ motion to dismiss are as follows: (1) Substantive due process under the United States Constitution — Plaintiffs assert that the actions and inactions of Defendants “constitute a failure to meet the affirmative duty to protect from harm all Named Plaintiffs and class members, which is a substantial factor leading to, and proximate cause of, the violation of the constitutionally protected liberty and privacy interests of all Named Plaintiffs and class members.” Complaint ¶ 220. (2) Substantive due process under the United States Constitution: State-Created Danger — Plaintiffs assert that “removing Plaintiff Children from their caretakers [or returning them to their parents] and placing them in placements that Defendants know or should know pose an imminent risk of harm to these children constitute to [sic] a policy, pattern, practice, or custom that is inconsistent with the exercise of professional judgment and that amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutionally protected rights and liberty and privacy interests of all Named Plaintiffs and class members.” Complaint ¶ 224. (3) Violation of the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution — Plaintiffs assert that “[a]s a result of Defendants’ conduct, all Named Plaintiffs and class members have been and are being severely harmed and deprived of the liberty interests, privacy interests, and associational rights not to be deprived of a child-parent or a child-sibling family relationship, ...” Complaint ¶ 228. (4)Claims under the AACWA — Plaintiffs assert that the “Defendants are engaging in a policy, pattern, practice, or custom of depriving all Named Plaintiffs and class members of rights conferred on them by the [AACWA],” including rights to timely written ease plans and adequate foster care maintenance payments. Complaint ¶ 280. The parties then engaged in extensive and frequently contentious discovery proceedings. In November 2011, the parties attempted, with assistance from this Court, to agree on settlement terms; such efforts continued into 2012, but were ultimately unsuccessful. In the course of discovery, several changes occurred on the Plaintiffs’ legal team, and Alston — who had continued as Plaintiffs’ counsel after leaving her post as Rhode Island’s child advocate — withdrew as counsel of record on September 7, 2012. The claims of four of the remaining seven Named Plaintiffs were dismissed by stipulation when two of the Plaintiffs were legally adopted (Alex and Jared C.) and two reached the age of majority (Terrence T. and David T.). In April 2013, Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(f), or, in the alternative, to obtain a writ of mandamus, seeking to challenge this Court’s decision to address the question of class certification after a determination of the claims asserted by the individual Named Plaintiffs. On June 7, 2013, the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the Plaintiffs’ petition. (Dkt. No. 330). On July 24, 2013, the Court scheduled the case for trial to commence on October 15, 2013. (Dkt. No. 343). On August 2, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a decision on class certification prior to the trial (Dkt. No. 348), which the Court denied. (Docket entry from August 14, 2013). On August 29, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the Defendants to permit private meetings with the Named Plaintiffs, to be conducted by the Next Friends and/or by Plaintiffs’ counsel “for the purpose of preparing for the trial.” Pltfs’ Mot. Compel Access at 1 (Dkt. No. 376). On September 24, 2013, the Court denied the motion — filed three months after the close of discovery — on the ground that the acknowledged purpose of the proposed meetings was to gain information for production at trial that would have been otherwise discoverable. Transcript of Telephone Conference Sept. 24, 2013 at 11:11-25. The Court did, however, grant the Plaintiffs’ second request (Dkt. No. 207) to have Cassie M., Tracy L., and Danny B. evaluated by the Plaintiffs’ retained forensic psychologist, Dr. Adamakos. Id. at 2:14-24. Prior to granting this motion, the Court obtained assessments from the Plaintiffs’ treating physicians and psychologists, to confirm that the proposed testing and evaluation by Dr. Adamakos would not have any deleterious effect on the children. Id. at 2:18-24. Moreover, Cassie, who was seventeen at the time, and Tracy, who turned eighteen prior to commencement of trial, consented to the evaluation. Id. The Court made clear that Dr. Adamakos was to be instructed that he was to inform the children at the beginning of the evaluations that they could discontinue the evaluation at any time. Tr. Sept. 24, 2013 at 3:12-17. See Declaration of Dr. Harry Adamakos at 7 (Dkt. No. 208)(“If during the course of an evaluation a child becomes overly agitated, shuts down, or does not want to continue speaking with me, or if I believe that the evaluation is causing excessive upset to the child, or harming the child in any way, I would end the session or the testing immediately.”) (Emphasis added). The Plaintiffs presented their case to this Court on sixteen days between November 12, 2013 and January 9, 2014. In the course of their presentation, the Plaintiffs called five expert witnesses: (1) Joseph P. Ryan, PhD (“Dr. Ryan”), associate professor at the University of Michigan School of Social Work, who conducted a literature review on the impact of nonadherence to national professional standards applicable to child welfare systems; (2) Thomas Ward (“Ward”), who worked in the administration of child social services for several decades between 1969 and 2002, and who testified regarding several child welfare issues, including maltreatment in care, caseloads, CPS investigations, visitation, and placement array; (3) Mary Hansen, PhD (“Dr. Hansen”), associate professor of economics at American University, who was tasked with performing an assessment of the cost of caring for children in Rhode Island foster care and evaluating whether Rhode Island met its obligations under the AACWA in paying foster care maintenance; (4) Harry Adamakos, PhD (“Dr. Adama-kos”), a clinical and forensic psychologist, who was asked to perform forensic clinical evaluations of the Named Plaintiffs, focusing his inquiry on what the Plaintiffs experienced in DCYF care and “how they may or may not have been harmed from that experience.” Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) at 7:4-9, 9:5-8; and (5) Ruth Chambers, PhD (“Dr. Chambers”), associate professor of social work at California State University Long Beach, who conducted a case study of Danny and Cassie by examining their case files for the time period the Plaintiffs were in DCYF custody. Following sixteen days of testimony, the Plaintiffs introduced into evidence a number of documents in regard to which no direct testimony had been offered during trial; this submission of documentary evidence completed the Plaintiffs’ case. After the Plaintiffs rested, the Defendants asserted their motion for judgment on the record pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(c). At that time, the Court inquired whether Plaintiffs intended to dismiss voluntarily the breach of contract claim. Tr. XVI at 123:21-124:18. Counsel responded in the negative. Tr. XVI at 124:19-125:13. Because no evidence related to a contract claim had been submitted during trial, the Court dismissed that claim. Tr. XVI at 125:9-11. Pursuant to the Court’s direction, the parties provided timely memo-randa in support of their respective positions on the State’s motion. (Dkt. No. 497-1, Dkt. No. 498). 11. Standards of Review (A) Motion for Judgment on the Record Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a nonjury trial and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(c). The Court’s “judgment on partial findings must be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 52(a).” Id. A court should enter judgment pursuant to Rule 52(c) “[w]hen a party has finished presenting evidence and that evidence is deemed by the trier insufficient to sustain the party’s position.” Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 378 F.3d 42, 59 (1st Cir.2004); In re Mosher, 432 B.R. 472, 475 (Bkrtcy.D.N.H., June 8, 2010) (Rule 52(c) motion should be granted “where the plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie case, or despite a prima facie case, the court determines that the preponderance of evidence goes against the plaintiffs claim”). In ruling on a motion pursuant to Rule 52(c), the Court “need not consider the evidence in a light favorable to the plaintiff and may render judgment for the defendant if it believes the plaintiffs evidence is insufficient to make out a claim.” Geddes v. Northwest Missouri State Univ., 49 F.3d 426, 429 n. 7 (8th Cir.1995). Is it the Court’s prerogative “to weigh the evidence, resolve any conflicts in it, and ‘decide for itself where the preponderance lies.’ ” Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 378 F.3d at 59 (citing 9C Wright & Miller Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2573.1, at 497-99); Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local Union 103 v. Indiana Constr. Corp., 13 F.3d 253, 257 (7th Cir.1994) (citing Von Zuckerstein v. Argonne Nat’l Lab., 984 F.2d 1467, 1475 (7th Cir.1993)). (B) Substantive Due Process Claims Before addressing the Defendants’ motion on the merits, the Court must make a determination that is critical to its analysis in this case: under what standard of review are the Plaintiffs’ claims and the State’s corresponding motion to be considered? After the Plaintiffs rested and the State asserted its motion under Fed.R.Civ. P.52(c), the Court noted that, in the pretrial memoranda, the parties had indicated a distinct dispute over the standard of proof applicable to substantive due process claims asserted by children in foster care. For that reason, the Court expressly instructed the parties to present it with case law, particularly from the First Circuit, to support their respective positions. Tr. XVI 126:10-127:1. The State, in its memorandum, asserts that “[t]he ‘shock the conscience’ standard must be applied to the facts of this case.” State Mem. at 11 (Dkt. No. 497-1). More particularly, the State argues that the First Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently applied the “shock the conscience” standard to all substantive due process challenges to executive action. Id. at 7. The Court notes, however, that the cases on which the State relies for this assertion are not related to children in foster care nor do they involve individuals in involuntary custody. See e.g., DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112 (1st Cir.2005) (§ 1983 claim asserted against arresting officer by individual whose drivers’ license was suspended for refusing to submit to breath test); Martinez v. Cui, 608 F.3d 54 (1st Cir.2010) (§ 1983 claim against medical resident at state medical facility for alleged sexual assault during emergency room examination); Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732 (4th Cir.1999) (§ 2254 claim by parolee for re-arrest following erroneous early release); Mongeau v. City of Marlborough, 492 F.3d 14 (1st Cir.2007) (§ 1983 action by developer against city following denial of building permit); Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir.2010) (class of prisoners convicted of murder brought § 1983 claim following their re-incarceration). The State does acknowledge that the First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73 (1st Cir.2010), a DCYF case, that “deliberate indifference” may rise to conscience-shocking conduct in the foster care context. Id. at 10. See J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d at 80 (noting that “deliberately indifferent behavior does not per se shock the conscience ... it is only ‘[i]n situations where actors have an opportunity to reflect and make reasoned and rational decisions’ that ‘deliberately indifferent behavior may suffice to shock the conscience.’ ’’(quoting Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir.2005)). The State also acknowledges that, in this Circuit, the application of the conscience-shocking standard “varies from context to context,” Coyne v. Cronin, 386 F.3d 280, 288 (1st Cir.2004), and that the “analysis will vary with the subject matter and the circumstances.” Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 32 (1st Cir.2006). Accordingly, the State’s position is that “[a]t bottom, conduct must be conscience-shocking; nonetheless the State maintains that ‘deliberate indifference’ must be applied here” to gauge the Defendants’ conduct. Defs’ Mem. at 10. The State expressly rejects the suggestion that “a mere substantial departure from professional judgment without more establishes a cognizable substantive due process claim,” noting that “this amounts to nothing more than a negligence standard.” Id. On their part, the Plaintiffs urge the Court to apply the “professional judgment” standard, which “does not require Plaintiffs to separately demonstrate conscience-shocking conduct.” Pltfs.’ Mem. at 10 (Dkt. No. 498). To support their argument, the Plaintiffs rely on a line of Supreme Court cases that establish an appropriate standard of review for substantive due process claims brought by, or on behalf of, parties “who are in the custody of the state through no fault of their own.” Id. 10-12; Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (applying “professional judgment” standard to an involuntarily committed individual suffering from mental retardation, and acknowledging that “the Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several professionally acceptable choices should have been made.”)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 852 n. 12, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1719 n. 12, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (confirming that an involuntarily committed patient could “state a claim under § 1983 for a violation of substantive due process if the personnel at the mental institution where he was confined failed to exercise professional judgment” because “[t]he combination of a patient’s involuntary commitment and his total dependence on his custodians obliges the government to take thought and make reasonable provision for the patient’s welfare”). The Plaintiffs also point to a series of cases from the First Circuit to support their position that the Youngberg professional judgment standard should be applied in this case. Pltfs.’ Mem. at 11-14. See e.g. Santana v. Collazo, 793 F.2d 41, 43 (1st Cir.1986) (acknowledging that “juveniles who have not been convicted of crimes have ‘a due process interest in freedom from unnecessary bodily restraint which entitles them to closer scrutiny of their conditions of confinement than that accorded convicted criminals’ ”) (citation omitted); Doe v. Gaughan, 808 F.2d 871, 885 (1st Cir.1986) (applying Youngberg standard to claims by involuntarily committed patient with mental retardation; noting, however, that “[i]n determining whether the State has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made by the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of correctness.”)(quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324, 102 S.Ct. at 2462-63); Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 453 (1st Cir.2011) (in case of civilly committed plaintiff, application of Youngberg standard, defined as “whether the defendant failed to exercise a reasonable professional judgment”); Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 98 (1st Cir.2001) (affirming trial court’s refusal to apply “shock the conscience” standard to § 1983 claims brought by involuntary committed mental patient against mental health personnel). It is noted that in Davis v. Rennie — which was decided after Sacramento v. Lewis — the First Circuit confirmed the distinction between criminals in confinement and persons in custody involuntarily and through no fault of their own. 264 F.3d at 99-100. Because “[pjersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish,” the Davis Court concluded that a “shocks the conscience” jury instruction was not indicated. Because there does not appear to be a clearly established standard under which to review substantive due process claims by children in state care, in the context of what amounts to institutional reform litigation, the Court has reviewed both Supreme Court precedent and case law from this Circuit to discern the principles which must shape its analysis. A review of decisions from courts which have considered due process claims in similar, if not identical, circumstances, leads this Court to conclude that the prevailing standards are not clearly delineated; rather, the appropriate standard for considering substantive due process claims falls somewhere on a continuum between the failure to exercise “professional judgment” and conduct that is clearly “conscience shocking.” Factors that determine where on the continuum the standard lies include (1) the nature of the right alleged to be violated; (2) the characteristics of the plaintiffs who allege such a violation; (3) the existence of a special relationship between plaintiffs and defendants; (4) the acts or omissions of defendants and/or resulting harm suffered by the plaintiffs; and (5) the circumstances under which the complained of conduct occurred. Any variation in the facts of a case moves the fulcrum of the scale on which the substantive due rights of the individual are weighed against the necessity of officials’ behavior. It is well established that “when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1005, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 317, 102 S.Ct. at 2458). The DeShaney Court also acknowledged that the removal of a child from his family and placement in a state-operated foster home created a situation “sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect.” Id. at 201 n. 9, 109 S.Ct. at 1006 n. 9. Youngberg established that individuals in civil custody of the state generally enjoy broader liberty rights than those in criminal custody. 457 U.S. at 321, 102 S.Ct. at 2461 (holding that “[pjersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish”). Accordingly, the standard appropriate in the civil commitment context is distinguishable from the “deliberate indifference” standard applicable in the prisoner context. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (concluding that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain ... proscribed by the Eighth Amendment’ ”). In Youngberg, the Court acknowledged the necessity for a “balance between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints.” 457 U.S. at 322, 102 S.Ct. at 2461. The Court also noted that “courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional.” 457 U.S. at 322, 102 S.Ct. at 2461. “[T]he decision, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Id. The Court’s subsequent statement in Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1717, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998), that “in a due process challenge to executive action, the threshold question is whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience,” does not change its holding in Youngberg regarding the applicability of the “professional judgment” standard. Lewis involved a high-speed pursuit of a motorcyclist by a sheriffs deputy, during which the motorcycle passenger was killed. The Court distinguished those circumstances from those of the typical pretrial custody, concluding that “when unforeseen circumstances demand an officer’s instant judgment, even precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful purpose to spark the shock that implicates ‘the large concerns of the governors and the governed.’” 523 U.S. at 853, 118 S.Ct. at 1720 (citation omitted). From this line of Supreme Court cases, it is apparent that both the “professional judgment” standard and the “deliberate indifference” standard have a place in this type of analysis and that conduct that fails under either standard may or may not also implicate the “shock the conscience” test. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850, 118 S.Ct. at 1719 (“That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial.”)(quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 1256, 86 L.Ed. 1595 (1942)). The First Circuit has acknowledged that “the ‘shock the conscience’ standard is imprecise,” DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d at 118, and that decisions with respect to substantive due process claims “are almost always highly dependent on context and detail.” Id. at 119. See Coyne v. Cronin, 386 F.3d at 288 (“The conscience-shocking standard is not a monolith; its rigorousness varies from context to context”)(citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850, 118 S.Ct. 1708). The First Circuit Court of Appeals has acknowledged that “in situations where a state creates a special relationship because of ‘the limitation which [the state] has imposed on [an individual’s] freedom to act on his own behalf,’ its subsequent failure to protect an individual may amount to a substantive due process violation.” J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d at 79 (quoting Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d at 34 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. 998)). In J.R. v. Gloria, the minor plaintiffs were removed from their mother’s custody and placed into Rhode Island foster care, where they were alleged to have suffered physical and sexual abuse. The plaintiffs’ claims were directed against a social worker and her supervisor individually for failing to comply with state law requirements. After the trial court granted the defendants judgment as a matter of law based on the defendants’ qualified immunity, the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the case. The Court noted in J.R. that “[t]he mere creation of a special relationship, even if placing young children into foster care created such a relationship, is not enough to make out a due process claim for any harm that may follow.” J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d at 79. Rather, the plaintiff is required to establish that the conduct by state officials was “conscience-shocking.” Id. The Court concluded that “state officials’ negligence, without more, is simply insufficient to meet the conscience-shocking standard.” Id. at 80 (emphasis added). See also, Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d at 36 (“[I]n a state creation of risk situation, where the ultimate harm is caused by a third party, ‘courts must be careful to distinguish between conventional torts and constitutional violations, as well as between state inaction and action.’ ’’)(quoting Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir.1997)). The J.R. Court reiterated that “deliberately indifferent behavior does not per se shock the conscience.” Id. at 80 (emphasis added). “[I]t is only ‘[i]n situations where actors have an opportunity to reflect and make reasoned and rational decisions’ that “deliberately indifferent behavior may suffice to shock the conscience.” ” Id. (quoting Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d at 36). The precedential value of J.R. v. Gloria to establish the applicable standard of review in the circumstances of the case now before this Court is limited, however. As pointed out by Judge Ponsor of the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, the parties in J.R. did not raise the applicability of the professional judgment standard under Youngberg; J.R. did not seek to address alleged systemic failures within the foster care system; and the plaintiffs in J.R. sought damages, not in-junctive relief. Connor B. v. Patrick, 771 F.Supp.2d 142, 162 n. 5 (D.Mass.2011). Another indication as to which standard of review is appropriate in the instant case is the First Circuit’s pronouncement that “the shocks-the-conscience test, first articulated in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), governs all substantive due process claims based on executive, as opposed to legislative, action.” Martinez v. Cui, 608 F.3d at 64 (emphasis added)(Plaintiff asserted claims of sexual assault by medical resident at state facility as violation of substantive due process under § 1983). The Martinez Court noted, however, that “whether behavior is conscience-shocking may be informed in some cases by the nature of the right violated.” Id. at 66. Moreover, unlike in the instant case, which seeks to address allegations of systemic shortcomings of the State’s foster care system, the plaintiffs allegations in Martinez were more akin to those asserted in a negligence or medical malpractice tort claim. Martinez, 608 F.3d at 66-67 (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that due process claims may not be used in that manner.” See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848-49, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976))). Other courts that have addressed the issue in circumstances comparable to the instant case have sometimes elected to combine standards under which to review allegations of substantive due process violations. In Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dept. of Human Serv., 959 F.2d 883 (10th Cir.1992), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed two plaintiffs’ civil rights action against state officials for injuries they suffered while in state custody and foster care. The Yvonne L. Court adopted the standard set forth in Youngberg, noting that “ ‘[flailure to exercise professional judgment’ does not mean mere negligence as we understand Youngberg; while it does not require actual knowledge the children will be harmed, it implies abdication of the duty to act professionally in making the placements.” Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dept. of Human Serv., 959 F.2d at 894. See also Schwartz v. Booker, 702 F.3d 573, 585-586 (10th Cir.2012) (§ 1983 claim for violation of substantive due process rights brought against human services department after child died in foster care)(“Whether the state official failed to exercise professional judgment requires more than mere negligence; the official must have abdicated her professional duty sufficient to shock the conscience.”) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals conducted a detailed review of the standards employed by other courts in cases involving foster care. Tamas v. Dept. of Social & Health Serv., 630 F.3d 833, 844-846 (9th Cir.2010) (Plaintiffs brought claims of negligence and civil rights violations against department and nine of its employees, after suffering years of sexual abuse at hand of foster parent). The Tamas Court, persuaded by Ninth Circuit precedent and cases from other circuits, applied the “deliberate indifference” standard. Tamas v. Dept. of Soc. & Health Serv., 630 F.3d at 845. (The Court further explained that the standard, “as applied to foster children, requires a showing of an objectively substantial risk of harm and a showing that the officials were subjectively aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed and that either the official actually drew that inference or that a reasonable official would have been compelled to draw that inference.” Id. The Court noted that “the subjective component may be inferred ‘from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious.’ ”) Id. (citation omitted). A similar two-element “deliberate indifference” standard was applied by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Waubanascum v. Shawano Cnty., 416 F.3d 658 (7th Cir.2005) (Substantive due process claims asserted by foster child against counties and school district after child suffered sexual abuse by foster parent). The Waubanascum Court defined a “modified” deliberate indifference standard, under which “the state must have actual knowledge or suspicion of the risk of harm the child may suffer while in foster care.” Waubanascum v. Shawano County, 416 F.3d at 666-667. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals drew the distinction between “deliberate indifference” and “negligence” in the foster care context in Doe v. South Carolina Dept. of Soc. Serv., SCDSS, 597 F.3d 163 (4th Cir.2010) (Claims brought by minor and her adoptive parents related to child’s foster care placement and adoption process). The Court of Appeals concluded that the involuntary removal of a child from her home imposed a responsibility on the state for the child’s safety and general well-being, which included “a duty not to make a foster care placement that is deliberately indifferent to the child’s right to personal safety and security.” Doe v. South Carolina Dept. of Soc. Serv., SCDSS, 597 F.3d at 175. The Court noted that a “ ‘claim of deliberate indifference, unlike one of negligence ... implies at a minimum that defendants were plainly placed on notice of a danger and chose to ignore the danger notwithstanding the notice.’ ” Id. at 175 (quoting White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 737 (4th Cir.1997)). Although the cases from other circuits are instructive on the issue of the appropriate standard of review, the applicability of those cases is limited because they all arose from claims asserted by foster children who had suffered severe abuses by foster parents or by third parties while the plaintiffs were in foster care. In contrast, the Plaintiffs in this case seek declaratory and injunctive relief in an effort to bring about systemic changes that, they believe, will improve the Rhode Island foster care system. The Plaintiffs in the instant case clearly belong in a most vulnerable category. They are minors who have been removed from their homes after a finding of abuse and/or neglect. They find themselves in custody of the State involuntarily and through no fault on their part. The Court notes that the due process claims asserted by the Plaintiffs are not directed against individuals for alleged wrongdoings, and that the Plaintiffs do not seek compensation for the harm they allege to have suffered or the risk of harm they allege to have been exposed to. Instead, the Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief to effect systemic reform to Rhode Island’s child welfare services, particularly the State’s foster care system. Complaint at 37 (Dkt. No. 115). Under those circumstances, and after reviewing the relevant case law, the Court concludes that a straight application of the “shock the conscience” standard suggested by the State is inapplicable in this case, to the extent that the standard requires conduct that is “ ‘extreme and egregious,’ ” Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 32 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting DePoutot, 424 F.3d at 118), “‘truly outrageous, uncivilized, and intolerable,’ ” id. (quoting Hasenfus v. La-Jeunesse, 175 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir.1999), or “ ‘tunning,’ ” id. (quoting Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 754 n. 5 (1st Cir.1990))). Under the circumstances of this case, a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, or a deliberate disregard (or complete absence) of a process established by the State for the protection of children in foster care may well constitute a degree of deliberate indifference that could also be said to shock the conscience. The question remains, however, against which accepted professional standard any such deviation should be measured and what degree of deviation from such a standard is required to result in a violation of the plaintiffs’ due process rights. In the course of the trial, the Plaintiffs frequently referred to the “Standards of Excellence” established by the Child Welfare League of America (“CWLA”), a membership-based child welfare organization. The CWLA standards, by their own description, “are intended to be standards of excellence — goals for the continuing improvements of services for children and their families.” 1999 CWLA Standards, Ex. 2004 at PLTF0032801. The CWLA standards provide “a vision to which we can aspire,” id., and they “carry no implication of control or regulation.” Id. at PLTF0032809. Accordingly, the CWLA standards present an ideal or goal to be achieved; they cannot serve to establish whether Rhode Island policies or conduct by state officials or employees falls short of professional judgment. Another set of standards against which Plaintiffs sought to measure services provided by the State to children in foster care is set by the Council for Accreditation (“COA”). Tr. I at 134:1-14. The COA accredits child welfare agencies, and its standards are intended to guide practices in the delivery of foster care services. Rhode Island has officially acknowledged that “[the standards set by the Council on Accreditation (COA) are nationally recognized as best practices for protecting and providing services to abused and neglected children.” R.I. Gen. Laws 42-72-5.3(a). Rhode Island has also declared its intent “to provide the resources for the department of children, youth, and families to meet, achieve and sustain accreditation by the Council on Accreditation.” R.I. Gen. Laws 42-72-5.3(b). To the extent Rhode Island DCYF practices and policies have adopted or have been modeled after the COA standards, a significant deviation from COA standards may well constitute a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment that, under certain circumstances, may give rise to a substantive due process claim by individuals for whose benefit such standards have been implemented. The Court notes that, as is further detailed herein, the COA standards do not have the force of statutory regulations and they include some built-in flexibility in certain circumstances. The Court is also mindful that the State, although it is mandated to protect the health and safety of the children it takes into its custody and places into the foster care system, can control neither the volume of its intake, nor the characteristics and needs of its individual charges. In consideration of the Plaintiffs’ extreme, vulnerability, the special relationship established by the State upon taking custody of the Plaintiffs, the nature of the due process rights asserted by the Plaintiffs, and the harm which the Plaintiffs allege to have suffered, the Court is of the opinion that official conduct which constitutes either a deliberate disregard of, or a substantial deviation from, a professional standard acknowledged and, at least in part, implemented by the State, may support the Plaintiffs’ claim of a due process violation if such conduct can also be shown to have deprived the Plaintiffs of a constitutionally protected interest. It is against this framework that the Court will proceed to review the Plaintiffs’ claims of due process violations and the evidence that they presented in support of their allegations at trial. The following constitutes the Court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law in considering the State’s motion for judgment on the record pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(c). III. Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law (A) The Named Plaintiffs 1. Cassie M. Cassie was born in 1996. Tr. XI at 24. After an investigation into allegations of abuse and neglect in her biological home, Cassie entered DYCF care in 2006, when she was nine years old. Tr. XI at 25. Although not every detail of Cassie’s early years need be discussed herein, some of the undisputed facts establish that, while in her biological home, Cassie lived in circumstances that no child should have to experience. Tr. XII at 58-61. To summarize, Cassie suffered neglect and deprivations of the most extreme kind; she was also exposed to physical abuse, sexual abuse of her siblings, and incidents of domestic violence. Id. While still living in her biological home, Cassie was diagnosed with ADHD for which she was prescribed Adderall (although there was some question as to whether her mother was giving the medication to Cassie regularly). Tr. XII at 61. Cassie’s younger sister and two older half-sisters entered into DCYF care at the same time; an older half-sister was no longer living at the house full-time. Tr. XI at 26-27. Initially, Cassie was placed in foster care on an emergency basis for less than a month, after which she was placed into specialized foster care with the DM family for about a year. Tr. XI at 30. During her stay at the DM home (where her half-sisters were also placed for a time, see Tr. XII at 107), Cassie exhibited certain disruptive behaviors that made her difficult to manage. Tr. XI at 34. A psychiatric evaluation performed seven weeks into foster care placement revealed that Cassie was grossly underweight, had minimal hygiene skills, was unfamiliar -with the use of a knife and fork, and had to be redirected to limit her physical contact with others. Tr. XII 64, Ex. 2048. Cassie’s treating psychiatrist stated that it was “unclear whether [Cassie] will be able to tolerate a more intimate setting without more intense and unstable effects,” Tr. XII at 67:15-17, and included in his diagnoses “rule out language disorder” and “rule out reactive attachment disorder.” Tr. XII at 68:20-25. While Cassie was at the DM home, she was provided with weekly therapy and other support from NAFI [North American Family Institute]. Tr. XII at 69. After the DM family requested camps or after-school dance activities for Cassie to assist with her behaviors, they were provided. Tr. XII at 70. In early 2007, Cassie was referred for a sexual abuse evaluation because she was exhibiting certain sexualized behaviors. Tr. XII at 80. Cassie was eventually removed from the DM home because both the foster family and DCYF considered the situation unworkable. Tr. XI at 35. Cassie’s behaviors while in the DM home included hoarding of food, taking and destroying things, lying, temper tantrums, sexual and physical boundary issues, as well as enuresis and encopresis. Tr. XII at 70-71. Cassie stayed less than six months in another specialized foster home (the J home); although Cassie initially did show improvement, there was some regression in her more difficult behaviors. Tr. XI at 36. In general, there was concern that Cassie had problems attaching to either of the two foster homes. Tr. XI at 38. While at the J home, Cassie was again provided with services by DCYF, including weekly counseling. Tr. XII at 72. As no third specialized foster home was available, and it was believed that Cassie needed more services than a specialized foster home could offer, Tr. XII at 73, Cassie was placed in the TH group home, where she remained for approximately three years. Tr. XI at 37. During that placement, Cassie demonstrated some success in terms of her behavior, although other behavioral problems remained. Tr. XI at 41. In the interim, about two years after Cassie was first placed into DCYF custody, her mother’s parental rights were terminated. Tr. XI at 53-54. Prior to such termination, a clinical psychologist conducted a parent-child evaluation, in which the psychologist observed, inter alia, that Cassie’s mother was “emotionally isolated” from her daughters, and that Cassie was “the most isolated” of the three girls. Tr. XII at 77:5-21. Cassie’s mother was diagnosed as bipolar; and it was noted that, rather than taking her medication, Cassie’s mother would smoke marijuana in an attempt to alleviate her condition. Tr. XII at 84. Athough the Family Court allowed Cassie’s mother continued contact with Cassie, the visits were inconsistent and sporadic, with long periods of time where there was no contact from the mother. Tr. XI at 55. Cassie appeared to be disturbed by the contact with her mother (and the infrequency of it), and Cassie’s behavior became more difficult both before and after visits. Tr. XI at 55-56. In April 2010, it was recommended that Cassie be placed in a specialized pre-adop-tive foster home. Tr. XI at 42. In June 2010, Cassie was placed in the LH group home for about 19 months. Tr. XI at 42. During that placement, it was noted that there was an increase in the problematic behaviors; Cassie was described as oppositional and disruptive. Id. At times, Cassie threatened to harm herself, which resulted in several hospitalizations. Cassie never did harm herself, however; peer conflicts were usually verbal; and there was no record of physical altercations, although there was some sexual acting out between Cassie and other residents. Tr. XI at 43-45. In one particular incident, inappropriate contact between Cassie and another resident led to a two-day suspension of one of the staff members. Tr. XI 46. While she was at this second group home, Cassie maintained contact with visiting resources, a couple with whom Cassie formed a good bond of attachment. In November 2011, the recommendation was made that Cassie be placed in a specialized foster home without younger children. Tr. XI 47. In early 2012, Cassie was placed in the AD home — another specialized foster home — where she stayed about eleven months. Tr. XI at 49. After leaving the AD home, Cassie was placed in another group home. Tr. XII at 99. Around that time, Cassie’s younger sister A. was legally adopted. Tr. XI at 87. At some point, A.’s adoptive parents requested that Cassie’s communication with her sister be discontinued as it was having a negative effect on A. Tr. XII at 107. Following a physical dispute at this group home, Cassie went to another foster home, but decided that she did not want to stay there. Tr. XII at 100. At the time of the trial, Cassie was residing at the G group home. Tr. XI at 53. 2. Danny B. Danny was born in 2001. Danny’s biological family had come to DCYF’s attention in 2004, when police were called because Danny and his younger brother, M., were found wandering the streets. Tr. X at 144. In the course of a CPS [Child Protective Services] investigation, it was determined that the mother had left the boys with a caregiver who had become intoxicated. Tr. XI at 138. Danny and M. were removed from their biological home in April 2005 — when Danny was four years old — for reasons of neglect, concerns about parental drug use and substance abuse, lack of parental supervision, and the occurrence of domestic violence requiring police intervention. Tr. X at 38, 39, 145. The home had also been found unfit for habitation. Tr. X at 145. At the time Danny and M. came into DCYF care, Danny was described as “energetic, hyperactive, and impulsive.” Tr. X at 41:2-5. He also had some speech and motor issues, Tr. X at 41; very limited verbal ability, Tr. XI at 153; and he was “undersocialized,” with regard to hygiene, toileting, and other issues. Tr. XI at 41:6-8. After a very brief placement with their maternal great-grandmother, the great-grandmother indicated that both Danny and his brother were exhibiting sexualized behaviors and that she could not handle their behavior. Tr. XI at 151, 182. Danny was then placed in the LF foster home, where he remained for more than a year. Tr. X at 42. M. was placed in a different foster home. During Danny’s stay at the LF home, the foster mother reported that Danny had problems with enuresis, enco-presis, screaming, swearing, and aggressive behavior on a daily basis. Tr. XI at 176. Danny’s psychiatrist diagnosed him with adjustment disorder, disturbance of conduct, and a rule-out diagnosis of ADHD. Tr. XI at 177. While in the LF home, Danny received weekly treatment by a clinician to assist the foster mother with Danny’s behaviors. Tr. XI at ISO-181. The foster mother also observed sexually explicit behavior on Danny’s part and expressed her concern regarding that issue during an IEP [Individualized Education Program] meeting at Danny’s school. Tr. XI at 186. Danny was removed from the LF foster home after there was an allegation of sexual abuse, which, after an investigation, was determined to be unsubstantiated. Tr. X at 47. Following his removal from the LF home, Danny appeared to require more structure and direction. He was difficult to manage and he began to make allegations that his brother had touched him over his clothes. Tr. X at 49-50. After a brief return to his great-grandmother’s house, where he was reunited with his brother, Danny was placed in a group home. Tr. X at 51. He showed some improvement in the group home setting and, by May 2007, an adoption placement was strongly recommended. Tr. X. at 52. Efforts to find a suitable pre-adoptive home were made by DCYF, and Danny began visiting with the J family. Tr. X at 52. The adoption did not come to fruition after Danny alleged that he had been hit by the pre-adoptive father during a visit, an allegation that the family denied. Tr. X at 58-54; Tr. XII at 38. After additional efforts by DCYF, another potential pre-adoptive home was found, and Danny stayed with the T family for about seven months. Tr. X. at 54. After the T family found Danny’s behavior too difficult to manage, Danny returned to the group home where he stayed for approximately eight months. Tr. X at 55. Again, Danny responded to the structure provided in the group home and his behavior improved. Tr. X at 56. During this placement, Danny was receiving regular weekend visits with his grandmother and with a visiting resource. Tr. XII at 17. Some time after he was removed from the T family, Danny alleged that the pre-adop-tive mother had yelled at him and that the pre-adoptive father had twisted his arm. Tr. X at 57. In February 2010, another pre-adoptive home was identified for Danny. Tr. X at 60. The adoption by AF, a single male, did not come to pass after AF withdrew from consideration. Tr. X at 67. Although the record shows that AF was given extensive information regarding Danny’s evaluation, care, and treatment, it appears that AF conducted internet research on his own and then conveyed to DCYF that he thought Danny would benefit from services more targeted towards Danny’s sexual acting out. Tr. XII at 33-34. After AF’s withdrawal, Danny exhibited some decline in his functioning, which included the recurrence of sexual acting out. Tr. X at 70. In December 2010, now at age nine, Danny received a placement at the SM residential treatment center. Tr. X at 70. Following that placement, Danny showed some improvement, but also an increase in sexual acting out. Tr. X at 73. According to a caseworker’s note, Danny was punched during a physical altercation with another child at the home. Tr. X at 79. When Danny’s social worker was advised that, following an incident with another resident, Danny was bruised, she met with Danny’s clinician. Tr. XII at 45-46. The incident was investigated and, after it was concluded that staff could not have prevented what was a “spontaneous engagement between two residents,” staff was advised to continue an “increased level of oversight.” Tr. XII at 46:21-25. On another occasion, Danny was restrained by staff, Tr. X at 79, and there was some indication in Danny’s file that there had been two investigations as to staff conduct for allegations of an incident involving inappropriate restraints. Tr. X at 84. That incident did not involve Danny; there was no evidence in the record that Danny was present or observed the incident; and, following a CPS investigation, the staff member at the SM home was terminated. Tr. XII at 43. Although it had been previously recommended that Danny would benefit from a stable and secure adoptive home, it was noted in February 2012 that Danny was not ready to transition from the SM residential treatment home because he was not ready for a less restrictive environment. However, adoption remained the placement plan. Tr. X at 92. At the time of the trial, Danny was still residing at the SM home. Tr. X at 85. The current recommendation is to place him in a pre-adoptive home, Tr. X at 86, and since the 2012 evaluation, efforts have been made to find Danny an adoptive or foster home placement. Tr. X 94. From the time Danny came into DCYF care, and throughout his various placements, Danny has received regular treatment and evaluations by healthcare professionals in different specialties to address behavioral issues. Tr. XII at 3-4, 7, 9, 10, 13. DCYF, Adoption Rhode Island, and his placement supports have been working towards finding Danny a pre-adoptive placement since the termination of parental rights to Danny. Tr. XII at 22. (B) The Plaintiffs’ Case To establish a substantive due process claim, the Plaintiffs must first “show a deprivation of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property.” Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d at 33-34 (citing Rhode Island Bhd. of Correctional Officers v. Rhode Island, 357 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir.2004); Macone v. Town of Wakefield, 277 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2002)). In addition, the Plaintiffs must establish that the deprivation of this protected right was caused by governmental conduct. Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d at 34. “[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998, (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. at 317, 102 S.Ct. 2452). Under such circumstances, the State is required to provide for the basic human needs of the individual in its custody, “e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety,” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. 998. The Plaintiffs assert in their Complaint what appears to be a number of additional rights to which they lay claim, including “appropriate planning and services directed toward ensuring that the child can leave foster care and grow up in a permanent family,” and the right “to be placed in the least restrictive placement according to a Plaintiff Child’s needs.” (Dkt. No. 115 at ¶ 222). However, to the extent that meeting such particular needs is essential to provide a child in DCYF custody with reasonable care and safety, the Court reviews the Plaintiffs’ claims under the standard articulated herein. See Section III, supra; see also Connor B. v. Patrick, C.A. No. 10-30073-WGY, 985 F.Supp.2d at 159, 2013 WL 6181454 at *23. In support of their due process claims and the claims brought under the AACWA, the Plaintiffs offered the testimony of five separate expert witnesses. 1. Dr. Ryan’s Testimony Dr. Ryan was asked by the Plaintiffs to review literature regarding national professional standards applicable to child welfare systems; to identify the standards; and to offer an opinion on the consequences if such standards were not met. Tr. I at 48. As Dr. Ryan acknowledged, his opinion was limited to assessing, according to the reviewed literature, what the general consequences of not meeting professional standards are; he did not look at the actual case records of the Named Plaintiffs. Tr. I at 49. Specifically, Dr. Ryan considered the areas of maltreatment in care; caseload size for child welfare workers; visitation between caseworkers and children in the foster care system; and placement array, particularly congregate care placement. Tr. I at 49. According to Dr. Ryan, based on the reviewed literature, maltreatment in care exposes children to additional trauma, and it compromises a child’s ability to form strong attachments with adults in his or her life. Tr. I at 65. As a result of such maltreatment, a child is more likely to develop anxiety and depression. Tr. I at 70. It was unclear to what extent some of the materials Dr. Ryan reviewed were applicable and/or relevant to the instant case. By example, Dr. Ryan discussed a 2003 GAO [U.S. General Accounting Office] report on the challenges of recruitment and retention in the child welfare workforce that was based on responses from 600 caseworkers who were retiring or leaving their positions. Tr. I at 72-74, 76-77. In forming his opinions, Dr. Ryan relied on the finding in the GAO report that such challenges, along with worker turnover, “imped[ed] progress toward the achievement of federal safety and permanency outcomes.” Tr. I at 77:8-13; Ex. 679. It is undisputed, however, that Cassie had the same caseworker for all but the first few months in DCYF care and that, with the exception of two maternity leaves, Danny had the same caseworker since he entered DCYF care. With respect to maltreatment in congregate care, ie. residential, non-family care, Dr. Ryan relied on a 1991 study, noting that the year of publication was not particularly important. Tr. I at 83, 84:3-10; Ex. 85. Based on that study, Dr. Ryan concluded tha