Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION Amit P. Mehta, United States District Judge I. INTRODUCTION In December 2015, pursuant to permits issued by Defendant United States Foreét Service (“Forest Service”) and an Operating Plan that the agency had approved, Intervenor Elkhorn Minerals LLC (“Elk-horn Minerals”) began mining for gravel on a five-acre parcel of land in Billings County, North Dakota. The five-acre parcel lies within a 24.6 acre tract of land on which, under the agreed upon Operating Plan, mining operations are expected to continue for the next two to three years. The surface rights of the 24.6 acre tract are owned by the Forest' Service, ■ which acquired those rights in 2007 as part of a 5,200 acre' purchase of land surrounding the Elkhorn Ranch Unit of Theodore Roosevelt National Park. The 5,200 acre purchase was explicitly subject to pre-ex-isting mineral rights,' including those within the 24.6 acres now held by Elkhorn Minerals. - ... , - Though mining operations began only months ago, more than six years have passed since the Forest Service first received Elkhorn Minerals’ plans to extract gravel from the land. Extensive negotiations followed, with the Forest Service mindful throughout of Elkhorn Minerals’ valid subsurface rights,- and Elkhorn Minerals equally mindful of the Forest Service’s entitlement to limit surface use'to that which is reasonable. As negotiations progressed, so'too did the Forest Service’s efforts to comply with the procedural duties' imposed upon it by the National Environmental Policy Act. It this lawsuit, Plaintiff National Parks Conservation Association (“NPCA”) challenges the Forest Service’s fulfillment of those duties. NPCA brought this action under the Administrative Procedure Act. It alleges that the Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act by issuing a “Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact,” rather than preparing ah “Environmental Impact Statement,” for Elkhorn Minerals’ mining operations. NPCA alleges a host of deficiencies in the Forest Service’s actions. It argues that the Forest Service (1) adopted an improperly narrow “purpose and need” statement to evaluate the proposed project; (2) inadequately considered alternatives to approving the project; and (3) failed to take a “hard look” at the project’s environmental impacts. NPCA asserts that these deficiencies, along with the precedential and controversial nature of the ■ Forest Service’s actions, required the production of an Environmental Impact Statement. NPCA further alleges that the Forest Service’s failure to amend the Land and Resource Management Plan for the Dakota Prairie Grasslands — the. Forest. Service region in which the mining is occurring — violated the National Forest Management Act. Following the court’s denial of NPCA’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and its subsequent denial of NPCA’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, the parties — including Intervenor Elkhorn Minerals — cross-moved for summary judgment. Those Motions for Summary Judgment are now before this court. Upon consideration of the parties’ filings and the Administrative Record, the court-finds that the Forest Service has complied with the National Environmental Policy Act and the National Forest Management Act. It therefore grants the Forest Service’s and Elkhorn Minerals’ Motions for Summary Judgment in their entirety, and denies NPCA’s Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety. II. BACKGROUND A. Regulatory Framework 1. The National Environmental Policy Act The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., “establishes a ‘national policy [to] encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment.’ ” U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756, 124 S.Ct. 2204, 159 L.Ed.2d 60 (2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4321). It aims to effectuate that policy, “not [by] mandating] particular results, but simply [by] prescribing] the necessary process.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989); see also Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (“NEPA does not work by mandating that agencies achieve particular substantive environmental results.”). As the Court of Appeals has noted, it “is an ‘essentially procedural’ statute intended to ensure ‘fully informed and well-considered’ decisionmaking, but not necessarily the best decision.” New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C.Cir.2012) (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978)). NEPA ensures that federal agencies engage in such deci-sionmaking through certain “‘action-forcing procedures,’ ” Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350, 99 S.Ct. 2335, 60 L.Ed.2d 943 (1979) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-296, at 19 (1969)), which require them “to consider and report on the environmental effect of their proposed actions,” WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 302 (D.C.Cir.2013). The Council on Environmental Quality, a body created by NEPA, promulgates binding regulations that “tell federal agencies what they must do to comply with [NEPA’s] procedures and achieve the goals of the Act.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1. Specifically, NEPA and its implementing regulations require federal agencies to issue an exhaustive, in-depth analysis document referred to as an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) in connection with “proposals for ... major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). An EIS must include “detailed statement^]” about, among other things, “the environmental impact of the proposed action”; “any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented”; and “alternatives to the proposed action.” Id. § 4332(C)(i)-(iii), “The statutory requirement that a federal agency contemplating a major action prepare such an [EIS] serves NEPA’s ‘action-forcing’ purpose” by guaranteeing (1) “that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts” and (2) “that the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision.” Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349, 109 S.Ct. 1835; see also Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983) (discussing NEPA’s “twin aims”). Because agencies need only prepare an EIS for actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C), and “as the ecological significance of administrative actions are often less than self-evident,” Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 432 F.Supp.2d 4, 13-14 (D.D.C.2006), NEPA permits agencies as a first step to prepare an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) — a comprehensive but abbreviated analysis of a proposed project’s environmental impacts — to determine whether an EIS is necessary, see 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3-4. If, based on a completed EA, an agency determines that a proposal will not significantly affect the quality of the environment, it may issue a Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact (“DN/FONSI”) instead of proceeding with an EIS. Id. §§ 1501.4(e)(1), 1508.13. A DN/FONSI includes the EA or a summary of it and “briefly presentís] the reasons why an action ... will not have a significant effect on the human environment and for which an [EIS] therefore will not be prepared.” Id. § 1508.13. It is the adequacy of the EA for Elkhorn Minerals’ mining operations and the Forest Service’s issuance of a DN/FONSI in lieu of an EIS that Plaintiff challenges here. 2. The National Forest Management Act The National Forest Management Act of 1976 (the “NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq., requires the Secretary of Agriculture, through the Forest Service, to “develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise land and resource management plans for units of the National Forest System.” Id. § 1604(a). “In developing the plans, the Service must take both environmental and commercial goals into account.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 729, 118 S.Ct. 1665, 140 L.Ed.2d 921 (1998). More specifically, the Forest Service must consider its statutory mandates to develop and administer the national forests “to secure favorable conditions of water flows and to furnish the country with a continuous supply of timber”; “for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes”; and “for multiple use and sustained yield of the several products and services obtained therefrom.” Montanans For Multiple Use v. Barbouletos, 568 F.3d 225, 226-27 (D.C.Cir.2009) (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 475, 528, 529). The NFMA imposes a second requirement on the Forest Service. The NFMA mandates that “[r]esource plans and permits, contracts, and other instruments for the use and occupancy of National Forest System lands ... be consistent with the land [and resource] management plans.” 16 U.S.C § 1604(i). In practice, this provision requires the Forest Service to “analyze[] and authorize[ ] site-specific projects consistent with the governing plan” for the region- in which the project is located. Montanans For Multiple Use, 568 F.3d at 227 (citations omitted). Plaintiff here challenges the adequacy of the Dakota Prairie Grasslands’ Land and Resource Management Plan (the “Grasslands Plan”) and thus' the adequacy of the Forest Service’s compliance with the NFMA in connection with the approval of Elkhorn Minerals’ mining operations. B. Factual Background The court has twice summarized the factual background of this case. See Nat’l Parks Conservation Assoc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 15-cv-01582, 2015 WL 9269401 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2015) [hereinafter TRO Op.]; Nat’l Parks Conservation Assoc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 15-cv-01582, 2016 WL 420470 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2016) [hereinafter PI Op.], at *2-6. The court presumes familiarity with the facts as set forth in its prior decisions and thus provides only a recap of the relevant facts below. In 2007, the Forest Service acquired the 5,200-acre Elkhorn Ranchlands from a private landholder with the goal of “pre-serv[ing] the integrity and historic character of the area around ... Theodore Roosevelt[’s] Elkhorn Ranch.” FS-002296; see also Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Preliminary Inj., ECF No. 31-1 [hereinafter PL’s Mot. for PI], at 4. “During a three-and-one-half year period between 1884 and 1887, Elkhorn Ranch served as [President Theodore] Roosevelt’s ‘home ranch.’” Mot. for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief, ECF No. 37, Ex. 1, Proposed Br., ECF No, 37-1, at 5. The site of President Roosevelt’s former “ranch house” is in the Elkhorn Ranch Unit of Theodore Roosevelt National Park — one of the Park’s three separate units — which the Elkhorn Ranchlands surrounds. See Pl.’s Mot. for PI at 4. The Elkhorn Ranchlands is located within the region the Forest Service refers to as the Dakota Prairie Grasslands and is within the domain of the Forest Service’s Medora District Ranger. See Defs.’ Opp’n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 35 [hereinafter Defs.’ Opp’n to PI], at 6. The Elkhorn Ranchlands is also located within the “Theodore Roosevelt’s Elkhorn Ranch and Greater Elkhorn Ranchlands National Historic District,” which was created in 2012. See FS-000388-575, Environmental Assessment: Elkhorn Gravel Pit [hereinafter EA], at 29. The Forest Service’s 2007 purchase of the Elkhorn Ranchlands was subject to all valid, existing mineral rights. See FS-003443-44. In 2009, Elkhorn Minerals co-owner Peggy Braunberger purchased “26.86% [of the] mineral ownership” from one. of the “approximately forty different third party surface mineral and/or subsurface mineral owners,” whose rights preexisted the Forest Service’s 2007 acquisition, and “were not available for purchase by the government” at that time. EA at 6. On February 9, 2010, Braunberger submitted to the Medora District Ranger the “initial Operating Plan to mine and develop” the 24.6 acre tract at issue in this case (the “Gravel Pit”). Id. at 4, 11, On September 1, 2011, after “approximately eighteen months of negotiations” with the Forest Service, Braunberger submitted her final Operating Plan, id. at 4, 19, which then underwent a public comment period, see FS-000628-740. From May 2012 to January 2015, the Forest Service engaged in the public-facing portion of the process required of it by NEPA. The Forest Service sought comments regarding multiple draft EAs, see FS-000958-59; FS-000081-151; FS-000974-1086, and, thereafter, “incorporate^] changes resulting from public and agency input” into future drafts, see Defs.’ Opp’n to PI at 9. On April 24, 2014, the Forest Service issued a draft DN/FONSI, which underwent a “pre-decisional objection period.” Id. at 10. More than eight months later, on January 6, 2015, the Forest Service issued the final versions of the 80-page EA and the 19-page DN/FONSI. See generally EA; FS-000576-95. Nearly six months later, on May 29, 2015, the Forest Service issued permits to Elkhorn Minerals that authorized the company to use certain access roads and to make use of the land’s surface for mining activities through April 1, 2017. See FS-004728-35; FS-004842-53; FS-004617-26. On December 14, 2015, after a contractor for Elkhorn Minerals improved the roads and performed other “pre-work,” the Forest Service issued a “Notice to Proceed” with “Phase 2,” “the first of 4 mining phases.” Defs.’ Opp’n to PI, Second Deck of Shannon Boehm, ECF No. 35-1 [hereinafter Boehm Decl.], ¶¶ 4-7. Each phase “involve[s] an approximately 5-acre sub-site of the overall 24.6-acre authorization. Id. ¶7. As of this date, the court understands that mining operations on the second five-acre subsite — “Phase Three”— have yet to begin. See PI Order, ECF No. 43, at 2 (ordering the Forest Service and Elkhorn Minerals to “provide notice to Plaintiff and the court at least 72 hours before the Forest Service .issues any permit that authorizes Elkhorn Minerals to commence mining operations on the next five-acre parcel, Le., Phase Three”; as of this date, no such notice has been filed). Mining thus has occurred on no more than five acres of the 24.6 acre parcel. C. Procedural History On September 29, 2015, Plaintiff NPCA filed its Complaint against the Forest Service and five individuals in their official capacities, seeking declaratory and injunc-tive relief. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Elkhorn Minerals, as the owner of “the dominant mineral rights at issue in this case,” then filed a Motion to Intervene. See Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 4, at 5. On November 9, 2015, in response to Plaintiffs Complaint, the Forest Service filed a Motion to Transfer the case to the District of North. Dakota. See generally Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer Venue, ECF No. 15. Before the court had ruled on those pending motions, on November 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order based on its understanding that mining operations soon would commence. See generally Pl.’s Mot. for TRO, ECF No. 20. The court denied that Motion because “Plaintiff ... made an insufficient showing as to both likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm.” TRO Op. at *2. Two weeks later and immediately after mining operations had begun, on December 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. See generally Pl.’s Mot., for PI. On January 8, 2016, the court- held a hearing on that Motion. See Dkt. Entry (Jan. 8, 2016). At the start of the hearing, the court orally granted Elkhorn Minerals’ Motion to Intervene and denied the Forest Service’s Motion to Transfer. Mot. Hr’g Tr., Jan. 8, 2016, ECF No. 41, at 3:16-20, 3:22-26, 4:1-10. On January 22, 2016, the court denied Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See generally PI Op. The court found that Plaintiff “failed to carry its burden of demonstrating irreparable harm and ... failed to show that the balance of equities and the public interest weigh in favor of injunctive relief.” Id. at *12. Accordingly, the court did not need to address Plaintiffs claims on the merits, but set an expedited briefing schedule to consider those issues before the next stage of mining commenced. See id. at *2-3; PI Order at 1. The merits are now before the court. III. LEGAL STANDARD Plaintiff, Defendants, and Inter-venor have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs NEPA and NFMA claims, which are properly brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Cross-motions for summary judgment ordinarily are reviewed under the standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which requires a court to grant summary judgment when the pleadings and the evidence demonstrate that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). However, in cases such as this one that involve the review of a final agency action, the Rule 56 standard does not apply. See Stuttering Found. of Amer. v. Springer, 498 F.Supp.2d 203, 207 (D.D.C.2007). Instead, “the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal” and “[t]he ‘entire case’ on review is a question of law.” Am. Biosci. Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C.Cir.2001) (citing cases). “[T]he court’s review is limited to the administrative record,” Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F.Supp. 96, 105 (D.D.C.1995) (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973)), and its role is limited to “determinfing] whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did,” see Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F.Supp.2d 76, 90 (D.D.C.2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that a “reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). When analyzing agency action under “this ‘narrow' standard of review — which appropriately encourages courts to defer to the agency’s expertise,” Ark Initiative v. Tidwell, 64 F.Supp.3d 81, 90 (D.D.C.2014) aff'd, No. 14-cv-5259, 816 F.3d 119, 2016 WL 874773 (D.C.Cir. Mar. 8, 2016), courts must determine whether the action at issue was based on “reasoned analysis,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56-57, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). Generally, an agency has engaged in such analysis when the administrative record indicates it “examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ ” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962)). Where, however, the administrative record indicates that an agency “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or [made a decision that] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise,” it has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Id. Although this standard is not “particularly demanding,” Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C.Cir.1993), and a reviewing court may “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned,” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974) (citation omitted), a court is not to “supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given,” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Important here, when reviewing an agency’s compliance with NEPA, “because the statute directs agencies only to look hard at the environmental effects of their decisions, and not to take one type of action or another, federal judges [must] correspondingly enforce the statute by ensuring that agencies comply with NEPA’s procedures, and not by trying to coax agency decisionmakers to reach certain results.” Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 194 (D.C.Cir.1991) (“CAB”) (citing Baltimore Gas & Elec., 462 U.S. at 97-98, 103 S.Ct. 2246); see also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976) (“Neither [NEPA] nor its legislative history contemplates that a court should substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of its actions.”). Thus, as to Plaintiffs NEPA claims, the court considers only whether the Forest Service complied with NEPA’s procedural mandates in preparing the EA and issuing a DN/FONSI for the Gravel Pit. IV. DISCUSSION A. The Forest Service’s Compliance with NEPA Plaintiff argues that the Forest Service failed to comply with several different requirements of NEPA, each of which renders arbitrary and capricious the agency’s issuance of a DN/FONSI in lieu of an EIS. First, Plaintiff argues that the Forest Service’s objectives, as set forth in the EA’s “purpose and need” statement, were so narrow as to improperly make the Forest Service’s approval of mining at the Gravel Pit a foregone conclusion. See Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 47 [hereinafter PL’s Mot.], at 28-29; see also Pl.’s Mot. for PI at 22-24; Compl. ¶ 112(1). In a related argument, Plaintiff contends that the Forest Service failed to adequately consider alternatives to the Gravel Pit, as required by NEPA. See Pl.’s Mot. at 27-29; see also Pl.’s Mot. for PI at 23-25; Compl. ¶ 112(2). Second, Plaintiff argues that the Forest Service neither took a hard look at, nor implemented sufficient measures to mitigate, several of the direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts that will result from operations at the Gravel Pit. See Pl.’s Mot. at 15-24; see also Pl.’s Mot. for PI at 13-22; Compl. ¶¶ 112(4)-(6). And third, Plaintiff claims that the presence of two “significance factors” set forth in the CEQ regulations, namely the precedential and controversial nature of the Forest Service’s actions, required the production of an EIS. See Pl.’s Mot. at 24-26; see also Pl.’s Mot. for PI at 13-15. The court will address each argument in turn. 1. The EA’s “Purpose and Need” Statement and the Forest Service’s Consideration of Alternatives Plaintiff asserts that the “purpose and need” statement that the Forest Service adopted for the EA was impermissibly narrow, rendering the approval of mining operations a foregone conclusion. Plaintiff also- argues that the Forest Service failed to adequately consider certain reasonable alternatives to the plan it ultimately approved. These two contentions are appropriately addressed together because an agency’s purpose and need as to a proposed action — in other words, the objectives or goals that guide its evaluation— “provide the point of reference for a determination whether an alternative is reasonable in the first place.” City of Alexandria, Va. v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862, 867 (D.C.Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also CAB, 938 F.2d at 195 (“The goals of an action delimit the universe of the action’s reasonable alternatives.”). Thus, the court must “first consider whether the agency has reasonably identified and defined its objectives. The agency’s choice of alternatives are, then, evaluated in light of these stated objectives.” City of Alexandria, 198 F.3d at 867; see also Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 72 (D.C.Cir.2011) (“TRCP”) (“[Determining whether an agency has included all reasonable alternatives requires us to decide first whether the- agency has reasonably defined its stated goals.”). a. The Forest Service’s objectives in evaluating the Gravel Pit Where an agency, as here, is “asked to sanction a specific plan,” it must “look hard” at several factors to determine appropriate objectives. CAB, 938 F.2d at 196. The agency must “take into account the needs and goals of the parties involved in the application” or proposal, and “[p]er-haps more importantly, ... [must] consider the views of Congress, expressed, to the extent that the agency can determine them, in the agency’s statutory authorization to act, as well as in other congressional directives.” Id.; see also TRCP, 661 F.3d at 72-73. Courts are to review the agency’s consideration of these factors under the “rule of reason,” see CAB, 938 F.2d at 195; TRCP, 661 F.3d at 73; City of Alexandria, 198 F.3d at 867, while according “considerable deference to the agency’s expertise and policy-making role,” id. (citing CAB, 938 F.2d at 196). “[A]s long as the agency ‘look[s] hard at the factors relevant to the definition of purpose,’ [courts] generally defer to the agency’s reasonable definition of objectives.” TRCP, 661 F.3d at 73 (quoting CAB, 938 F.2d at 196). Courts shall “reject an ‘unreasonably narrow' definition of objectives,” however, “that compels the selection of a particular alternative.” Id. (quoting CAB, 938 F.2d at 196). Here, the Forest Service adopted the following “purpose and need” statement: “The purpose of this proposal is to implement Forest Service Policy, by documenting concerns, effects, design criteria and stipulations, and conditions of access and surface occupancy for exploration of private minerals in the analysis area.” EA at ll. This purpose and need statement, according to Plaintiff, is “improperly narrow” and “made approval of the gravel pit a preordained conclusion.” Pl.’s Mot. at 28. The Forest Service counters that it “was appropriately defined based on the purpose of the proposal, the infeasibility of a mineral exchange or purchase, and the scope of the authorities of the Forest Service as the subservient estate.” Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., EOF No. 46, [hereinafter Defs.' Mot.], at 11. “The decision before the Agency was not whether or not to allow the gravel mine to be built,” the Forest Service asserts, but was to “evaluate[] the contours of the potential operations.” Id. at 14. The court agrees. i. “Needs and goals” of Elkhom Minerals In evaluating the “needs and goals of the parties involved in the application,” an agency necessarily must take into account at least two considerations. First, it must consider the requesting party’s interest in the project, and second, it must consider the extent of the agency’s authority to approve or modify the project. See CAB, 938 F.2d at 199. Here, the requesting party’s interest in the project is obvious — Elkhom Minerals’ desire to exercise its mineral rights, which “were reserved or outstanding when the United States acquired the surface” in 2007. EA at 5. The extent of the Forest Service’s authority to approve or modify the proposed project requires a more extended discussion. In Duncan Energy Co. v. U.S. Forest Service, 50 F.3d 584 (8th Cir.1995), the Eighth Circuit was presented with the‘precise question at issue here: To what extent may the Forest Service regulate access to privately held mineral rights found beneath land it owns within the State of North Dakota? See id. at 589 (“The only issue before us is the Forest Service’s ability to regulate surface access to outstanding mineral rights.”). The Eighth Circuit determined that, “[u]nder North Dakota law, the mineral estate is dominant, carrying ‘inherent surface rights to find and develop the minerals.’” Id. at 588 (citing Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D.1979)). As a result, even where the Forest Service controls the rights to the surface sitting atop the mineral estate, it has no “ ‘veto authority' over mineral development.” Id. at 589. Notwithstanding that conclusion, the Eighth Circuit' declared, the “mineral developer’s rights ... are not unrestricted.” Id. at 588. The developer is “limited to so much of the surface and such use thereof as are reasonably necessary to explore, develop, and transport the minerals.” Id. Thus, the Eighth Circuit held, “we are convinced that the [agency] has the limited authority ... to determine the reasonable use of the federal surface.” Id. at 591. As in Duncan Energy, the Forest Service here had only the “limited authority” “to determine the reasonable use of the federal surface.” It did not have the authority, short of effectuating a taking— which the court discusses below — to prevent Elkhorn Minerals from exploiting its mineral rights. Plaintiffs criticism that the EA’s “purpose and need” statement made approval of the project inevitable is thus misplaced. The EA’s stated objective — to “implement Forest Service Policy, by documenting concerns, effects, design criteria and stipulations, and conditions of access and surface occupancy,” EA at 11 — was consistent with the Forest Service’s limited authority to determine the use of the federal surface. It therefore was reasonable. The Forest Service was not required, contrary to Plaintiffs contention, to craft a purpose and need statement that contemplated an exercise of authority that the agency did not have — denying access altogether to Elkhorn Minerals’ dominant subsurface rights. ii. The views of Congress The views of Congress also support a finding that the Forest Service’s objectives were reasonable. The federal legislation that authorized the Forest Service’s purchase of the Elkhorn Ranchlands is contained in Section 424 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 (the “2008 Appropriations Act”), Pub. L. No. 110-11, 121 Stat. 1844 (2008) (authorizing the sale of “5,195 or 5,205 acres of National Forest System lands” in order “[t]o offset the acreage acquired by .the Federal Government upon the acquisition of the Elkhorn Ranch”). In authorizing the purchase, Congress expressly stated that “the multiple uses of the acquired Elkhorn Ranch shall continue.” Id. § 424(h). In the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 et seq.—one of the “two venerable statutes [that] set forth the Forest Service’s management goals,” Montanans For Multiple Use, 568 F.3d at 226—Congress defined “multiple uses,” in part, as “management of all the various renewable surface resources of the national forests so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the needs of the American people.” 16 U.S.C. § 531; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1601 (“It is the policy of the Congress that all forested lands in the National Forest System shall be maintained in ... conditions ... designed to secure the maximum benefits of multiple use sustained yield management.”). Consistent with Congress’ intent, the Forest Service regulations make clear that mineral exploration and development are among the multiple uses permitted within the national forests. See generally 36 C.F.R. § 251.15 (Forest Service regulation setting forth the specific “[cjonditions, rules and regulations to govern [the] exercise of mineral rights reserved in conveyances to the United States”); see also Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman’s Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 679 (D.C.Cir.1982) (analyzing the Forest Service’s “approval of] a plan of operations for exploratory mineral drilling” on Forest Service-controlled land). Accordingly, Congress’ express statement in the 2008 Appropriations Act that multiple uses shall continue in the Elkhorn Ranchlands belies Plaintiffs assertion that the Forest Service was empowered to prohibit Elkhorn Minerals’ exercise of its valid, preexisting mineral rights. In light of the views expressed by Congress, the Forest Service’s objectives for evaluating the proposal for the Gravel Pit were reasonable. Hi. The Elkhorn Ranchlands “Warranty Deed” The “Warranty Deed” that effectuated the Forest Service’s purchase of the Elk-horn Ranchlands set forth a further limitation on the agency’s authority. The Warranty Deed expressly “[r]eserv[ed] [u]nto the Grantor” — the land’s seller — “[a]ll metals, ores and minerals of any nature whatsoever in or upon the [Elkhorn Ranchlands] and including ... gravel that may be owned together with the right to enter upon said lands for the purpose of [mining operations] and to occupy and make use of so much of the surface of said land as may be reasonably necessaryf.]” FS-004513; see also EA at 7 (quoting FS-004513); Boehm Decl. ¶ 3 (“All transaction documents made clear that surface and subsurface minerals were not included in the acquisition of Elkhorn Ranchlands.”). No party, including Plaintiff, disputes that the mineral rights now held by Elkhorn Minerals pre-date the 2007 acquisition of the Elkhorn Ranchlands. Thus, in accordance with the express terms of the Warranty Deed, Elkhorn Minerals was entitled to explore and develop its valid mineral rights, using the Forest Service-controlled surface “as may be reasonably necessary.” The Warranty Deed’s express reservation of mineral rights further supports the reasonableness of the Forest Service’s objectives here. ^ ^ In summary, this is not a case in which the federal government owned outright the land that a private party1 sought to use. In such a case, the Forest Service would have greater discretion over whether to allow special use of the land and, correspondingly, would have a broader range of objectives available to it. Here, by contrast, Elkhorn Minerals held valid mineral rights that predated the Forest Service’s acquisition of the surface; the acquisition was explicitly subject ■ to existing mineral rights; the existing mineral rights are dominant over surface rights under North Dakota law; and the views of Congress mandate that such mineral rights be respected. “An agency cannot redefine the goals of the proposal that arouses the call for action; it must evaluate alternative ways of achieving its goals, shaped by the application at issue and by the function that the agency plays in the decisional process.” CAB, 938 F.2d at 199. That is exactly what the Forest Service did here. The court therefore finds that the EA’s purpose and need statement did not violate NEPA. b. The Forest Service’s evaluation of alternatives The court now turns to the Forest Service’s evaluation of alternatives, which the CEQ regulations implementing NEPA refers to as the “heart of the [EIS]” or EA. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. The CEQ regulations require agencies, in preparing an EIS or EA, to “[Vigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives.” Id. ■§ 1502.14(a). The determination — by both agencies and courts — of whether an alternative is “reasonable,” is guided by the same “rule of reason” that instructs the court’s evaluation of objectives. See CAB, 938 F.2d at 195-96; TRCP, 661 F.3d at 73. That rule of reason “necessarily governs both which alternatives the agency must discuss, and the extent to which it must discuss them.” Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 475 (D.C.Cir.1978) (emphasis added) vacated in part sub nom. W. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922, 99 S.Ct. 303, 58 L.Ed.2d 315 (1978); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel, 865 F.2d 288, 294 (D.C.Cir.1988) (“NEPA’s requirement of a discussion of alternatives ... should be superintended according to a ‘rule of reason.’ ”). Accordingly, agencies must discuss in detail those alternatives that are “objectively feasible as well as ‘reasonable in light of [the agency’s] objectives.’ ” TRCP, 661 F.3d at 72 (quoting City of Alexandria, 198 F.3d at 867); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 551, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978) (“[T]the concept of alternatives [under NEPA] must be bounded by some notion of feasibility”); 43 C.F.R. § 46.420(b) (“Reasonable alternatives ,,, include[ ] alternatives that are technically and economically practical or feasible and meet the purpose and need of the proposed action.”). On the other hand, if a proposed alternative is infeasible; “will [not] bring about the ends of the federal action,” CAB, 938 F.2d at 195; or is “remote and speculá-tive,” Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C.Cir.1972), it does not require a detailed discussion. Indeed, CEQ regulations instruct that “an agency need only ‘briefly discuss the reasons’ why rejected possibilities were not ‘reasonable alternatives.’” Tongass Conservation Soc’y v. Cheney, 924 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C.Cir.1991) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a)). Courts are to defer to an agency’s assessment, “uphold[ing a] discussion of alternatives so long as the alternatives are reasonable and the agency discusses them in reasonable detail,” CAB, 938 F.2d at 196. Here, Plaintiff argues that the Forest Service “failed to ‘rigorously explore and objectively evaluate’ several reasonable alternatives, including”: (1) “an exchange of the mineral rights for other property rights or gravel in equal volumes”; (2) “buying the mineral rights”; (3) “conducting a taking”; .and (4) “pursuing a [Grasslands] Plan amendment and [imposing] additional mitigation measures” based on the amendment. Pl.’s Mot. at 28; see also Pl.’s Response Memo, of Law in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ J., ECF No. 51 [hereinafter Pl.’s Resp.], at 8 (“[T]the Forest Service could have pursued an exchange of land or minerals, acquired the mineral rights, conducted a taking, or pursued an amendment to the [Grasslands] Plan and adopted additional mitigation measures pursuant to the amendment.”). Plaintiff asserts that the Forest Service’s “cursory discussion in the EA about those, reasonable alternatives — and its complete failure to consider both condemnation of the mineral rights ... or imposition of additional mitigation measures — does not constitute the hard look required by NEPA.” Pl.’s Mot. at 28. The court disagrees. i. Exchange of mineral rights Plaintiff contends that the Forest Service inadequately considered an exchange of Elkhorn Minerals’ sub-surface rights for other rights or property located elsewhere. Plaintiff does not claim that the Forest Service failed to consider this alternative at all. Instead, its argument appears to be that although the Forest Service considered an exchange, it did not work hard enough to effectuate it. See Pl.’s Mot. at 28 (“[T]he record shows that the Forest Service was, in fact, looking into an exchange of land or minerals before commencing the EA, although there is no evidence in the record that the Forest Service ever provided a specific exchange proposal to the mineral owners, even after more than a year of looking into it.”); PL’s Resp. at 11 (“It appears from the record that an exchange ... was not carried out in part due to the Forest Service’s own failure to diligently explore and pursue th[at] option[ ].”). The record shows otherwise. The Forest Service undertook substantial efforts to pursue an exchange and ceased its efforts only when the alternative proved infeasible. On July 18, 2012, the Forest Service halted its ongoing NEPA review of the Gravel Pit and entered into an “Agreement in Principle” with Elkhorn Minerals’ co-owners, Peggy Braunberger and Roger Lothspeich. See FS-003914. The Agreement in Principle’s “sole purpose [was] negotiating an exchange of minerals.” Defs.’ Mot', at 15; see also FS-003914 (listing seven conditions that Braunberger, Lothspeich, and the Forest Service “agreed to, in principle, as objectives for accomplishing an exchange between [the parties]”). Among the types of exchanges the Agreement in Principle contemplated were “mineral ownership for land'ownership, gravel ownership for gravel ownership, or mineral ownership for mineral ownership.” FS-003914; see also FS-003915 (listing legally feasible exchanges). The Forest Service pursued these exchanges despite the many hurdles that they presented, including: the need for congressional approval; the involvement of a multitude of government agencies and other bodies; the receipt of administrative approvals; the threat of liability posed by chemicals present at the site of the Gravel Pit; and, perhaps most problematic, the existence of many other mineral rights holders in the area adjacent to the Elk-horn Ranch Unit. EA at 20-21. “Over the years, the surface and subsurface mineral estates [in the area of the Gravel Pit were] split and sold,” EA at 19, and at the time the EA was issued “there [we]re approximately forty different third party surface mineral and/or subsurface mineral owners,” id. at 6, some of whom leased their rights to yet other parties, id. at 21. Thus, an exchange of Elkhorn Minerals’ rights alone, and even an exchange involving Elk-horn Minerals’ and other parties’ rights, would not necessarily prevént mineral development in the area. As the Forest Service wrote in the EA: Development could only be abated by obtaining 100% of the mineral rights which would also require 100% willing sellers. And even then, there could still be issues pending the expiration of existing leases and the potential for lease right development. Anything less than 100% would not guarantee government control and the result is status quo that mineral development could occur at any given time at the discretion of the mineral owners. Id. In other words, an exchange of Elk-horn Minerals’ rights with rights or property elsewhere would not necessarily — and perhaps, not likely — have prevented the mineral development that Plaintiff seeks to avert. Because of the divided mineral ownership as well as the other hindrances discussed above, an exchange proved infeasible. On August 2, 2013, after more than a yéar of negotiations, Braunberger and Lothspeich' exercised their right tó withdraw from the Agreement in Principle. See FS-003916-19; see also EA at 20r21. In a letter to the Forest Service, counsel for Braunberger and Lothspeich explained that his clients chose to withdraw “because of the lack of progress that has occurred over the past year in pursuing the mineral exchange option, and because of various acknowledged feasibility problems which have arisen[,] raising questions about whether it is realistic to hope to achieve the mineral exchange as a solution.” FS-003916. Although the letter indicated that Braunberger and Lothspeich “remained] open to considering alternative resolutions” — and, in fact, the Forest Service continued to pursue an exchange for the next 15 months, see EA at 22 — Braunber-ger and Lothspeich’s counsel “requested] that the Forest Service ... bring the Operating Plan review process to , a favorable conclusion expeditiously,” FS-003917. Based on this record, the court finds that the Forest Service took the required hard look at the mineral rights exchange alternative. Notwithstanding Elkhorn Minerals’ withdrawal from the Agreement in Principle and the substantial, potentially insurmountable obstacles in its way, the Forest Service pursued an exchange until just months before it issued the EA and DN/FONSI. See swpra note 7. And, although an exchange was arguably infeasible, remote, and speculative, the EA discussed the alternative and explained why it was not executed. That is all NEPA requires. See Tongass, 924 F.2d at 1141 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a)). ii Purchase of mineral rights Plaintiff raises the same argument as to the Forest Service’s failure to adequately consider an outright purchase of Elkhorn Minerals’ rights — that the Forest Service did not try hard enough to execute a transaction. Pl.’s Resp. at 11 (“It appears from the record that [a] ... purchase was not carried out in part due to the Forest Service’s own failure to diligently explore and pursue th[at] option[].”). As with Plaintiffs complaints about the Forest Service’s evaluation of an exchange, the court finds this assertion meritless. The mineral purchase alternative faced issues “very similar” to those that plagued the exchange, including the problem of divided ownership. See EA at 19-20. Those issues ultimately rendered the alternative infeasible, and the EA explains as much. Id. The Forest Service’s evaluation of a mineral purchase and discussion of that alternative in the EA thus fulfilled the agency’s NEPA obligations. Hi Conducting a taking Plaintiff also argues that the Forest Service inadequately considered conducting a taking of the Gravel Pit. Plaintiff asserts that “a taking was not evaluated at all.” Pl.’s Resp. at 4. It contends that the Forest Service “had the right and authority to [conduct a taking] under the Fifth Amendment, the Department of Agriculture Act of 1956, and federal takings statutes,” and asserts that “the agency’s discomfort with a taking does not render that alternative unreasonable.” Id. at 11. As support' for its position, Plaintiff points to statements in the EA indicating that the Forest Service “has the authority to deny the request to mine gravel and to conduct a legal taking.” Pl.’s Mot. at 6; see also id. at 13 (“The fact that the agency acknowledged that it could conduct a taking, but chose not to do so, does not divest the Forest Service of its ability to prevent or otherwise regulate mining on its lands.”). As an initial matter, Plaintiffs assertion that “a taking was not evaluated at all” is flatly contradicted by the record. The Forest Service did consider a taking. The “No Action Alternative” that the Forest Service evaluated throughout the EA is a taking. When introducing the No Action Alternative, the Forest Service stated: This alternative is not legal due to the taking of private mineral rights. The Forest Service does not have authority to deny the exercise of a mineral reservation or outstanding mineral right. ... A denial, or takings, would likely result in a lawsuit and a court settled compensation to the mineral owner(s). EA at 23 (emphasis added); see also id. at 13. Although the Forest Service clearly considered conducting a taking, it determined that its limited authority and its reasonable objectives — which, as discussed above, “delimit[ed] the universe of the action’s reasonable alternatives,” CAB, 938 F.2d at 195—rendered a taking infeasible. In a document appended to the EA addressing public comments, the Forest Service thoroughly explained its consideration of a taking: All parties involved in the acquisition of the Elkhorn Ranchlands were aware of the fact that the private mineral estates were not offered as part of the acquisition. The Forest Service agreed to honor all valid existing mineral rights and other encumbrances at the time of the acquisition, including the surface mineral rights. The acquisition was successful because of the multiple use concept of the Forest Service. The mineral holder does have a right to access them minerals as per the terms of their deeded rights. However, that does not imply that the access is. carte blanche. ... The Forest Service can determine what level of access is adequate to allow the owner reasonable use and enjoyment of their mineral rights. ... The Forest Service could deny the use which.would result in a legal mineral taking. This would be inconsistent with the terms of the acquisition and would also be inconsistent with years of [Grasslands Plan] direction ... honoring valid rights. The result of takings would likely be a legal action against the government by the surface and subsurface mineral owners affected. FS-000553. And, a draft version of the above response offered an additional reason as to why a taking was infeasible: “At this point and time there is neither internal agency support nor external political support to deny the exercise of the mineral rights.” FS-001313. Under the rule of reason, the Forest Service’s evaluation of a taking was adequate. As the Court of Appeals stated in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, “NEPA was not meant to require detailed discussion of the environmental effects of ‘alternatives’ ... available, if at all, only after protracted debate and litigation not meaningfully compatible with the time-frame of the needs to which the underlying proposal is addressed.” 458 F.2d at 838. The Forest Service considered a taking, determined that lengthy and costly litigation would likely result if the alternative was pursued, and as with the exchange or purchase of mineral rights,' reasonably concluded that a taking was infeasible. iv. Amending the Dakota Prairie Grasslands’ Land and Resource Management Plan and implementing additional mitigation measures Finally, Plaintiff contends that the Forest Service failed to adequately consider as an alternative amending the Dakota Prairie Grasslands5 Land and Resource Management Plan, or the Grasslands Plan, and implementing additional mitigation measures pursuant to the amended plan. This argument suffers from two fatal flaws. First, as the court concludes below, see infra Part IV.B, the NFMA did not require the Forest Service to issue an amended Grasslands Plan before conducting its NEPA analysis of the Gravel Pit. And second, Plaintiff fails to identify any feasible mitigation measures that would have been implemented had the Forest Service amended the Grasslands Plan. After the Forest Service argued in its Motion that “Plaintiff has not proffered a single mitigation measure left unstudied,” Defs.’ Mot. at 15, Plaintiff alleged one such measure in its ' Response: “Th[e] amendment would have provided clear guidelines regarding what additional mitigation measures were necessary that the agency did not contemplate here, possibly including a No Surface Occupancy restriction for the Elkhorn Ranchlands.” Pl.’s Resp. at 12. But, as discussed, under Duncan Energy, the “No Surface Occupancy restriction” would have been unlawful. See supra Part IV.A.1. Amending the Grasslands Plan therefore would not have resulted in any mitigation measure the Forest Service did not already consider. Moreover, the Forest Service did in fact consider issuing an amended Grasslands Plan, but deemed it unnecessary. As the EA explains: Resource protection standards and guidelines, including the protection of historic, scenic, and valid mineral rights, are included within Chapters 1 and 2 of the current [Grasslands Plan]. The importance of the ranchlands have been taken into consideration in developing the site specific operating plan stipulations to both honor the private mineral rights and provide protection to the Historic District, The bas[e]s for all of the mitigation measures all originated from the current [Grasslands Plan]. However, the negotiated stipulations are more stringent than would be applied under general [Grasslands Plan] requirements. EA at 22. Given the foregoing, it is no surprise that Plaintiff has been unable to set forth a single, lawful mitigation measure “left unstudied,” In the Forest Service’s view, no amendment to the Grasslands Plan was required in order to adequately mitigate the harm to the surface. The court owes deference to that conclusion. The Forest Service thus adequately considered and discussed the alternative of , amending the Grasslands Plan and implementing additional mitigation measures based on the amended Plan. 2. The Adequacy of the Forest Service’s Decision to Issue a DN/FONSI Rather Than Prepare an EIS As explained above, NEPA permits agencies to prepare an EA in order to determine whether they are obligated to produce an EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3-4. If an agency concludes from a completed EA that the project at issue will not significantly affect the quality of the environment, it may eschew an EIS and instead publish a DN/FONSI. Id. §§ 1501.4(e)(1), 1508.31. That is the course of action the Forest Service chose here. Plaintiff challenges that course as unlawful. In reviewing an agency’s decision to issue a DN/FONSI rather than prepare an EIS, courts must bear in mjnd that “[a]n agency has broad discretion in making this determination, and the decision is reviewable only if it was arbitrary, capricious , or an abuse of discretion.” Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 126 (D.C.Cir.1985), The court’s role “is a ‘limited’ one, designed primarily to ensure ‘that no arguably significant consequences have been ignored.’” TOMAC, Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 860 (D.C.Cir.2006) (quoting Pub. Citizen v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 848 F.2d 256, 267 (D.C.Cir.1988)). Courts are not to “‘flyspeck’ an agency’s environmental analysis, looking for any deficiency no matter how minor.” Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 93 (D.C.Cir.2006) (quoting Fuel Safe Wash. v. FERC, 389 F.3d 1313, 1323 (10th Cir.2004)). In this Circuit, courts have long been guided in their analysis of an agency’s decision to. issue a DN/FONSI by the following four-step test: First, the agency must have accurately identified the relevant environmental concern. Second, once the agency has identified the problem, it must have taken a “hard look” at the problem in preparing the EA. Third, if a finding of no significant impact is made, the agency must be able to make a convincing case for its finding. Last, if the agency does find an impact of true significance, preparation of an EIS can be avoided only if the agency finds that changes or safeguards in the project sufficiently reduce the impact to a minimum. Sierra Club, 753 F.2d at 127; see also TOMAC, 433 F.3d at 861. As to the second step — whether the agency took a “hard look” at an environmental impact — the Court, of Appeals has noted that “[although the contours of the ‘hard look’ doctrine , may be imprecise, our task is ‘simply to ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious.’” Nevada, 457 F.3d at 93 (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec., 462 U.S. at 97-98, 103 S.Ct. 2246); see also Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 410 n. 21, 96 S.Ct. 2718 (1976). Courts must, however, ensure that the agency took a hard look at (1) the project’s “direct impacts” — those impacts “caused by the action and occur at the same time and; place,” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(a); (2) its “indirect impacts”— those impacts “caused by the. action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable,” id. § 1508.8(b); and (3) its “cumulative impacts” — those, impacts “which result ] from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency ... or persons undertakes such other actions,” id. at § 1508.7. As to the fourth step — whether changes or safeguards sufficiently reduce ah impact to a minimum — an agency is required to “discuss[ mitigation measures] in sufficient detail to ensure that environmental consequences have been fairly evaluated.” Robertson, 490 U.S. at 353, 109 S.Ct. 1835. The agency need not, however, present “ ‘a detailed explanation of specific measures which will be employed to mitigate the adverse impacts of a proposed action.’ ” Id. (quoting Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 819 (9th Cir.1987)). In this case, Plaintiff claims that, under the test’s second step,'“the Forest Service failed to take a hard look at the significant cumulative, direct, and indirect impacts of the” Gravel Pit, Pl.’s Mot. at 15, including its impacts on the “soundscape” (ie., the noise level),'“viewshed” (ie., the view and landscape), and golden eagles, id. at 17-24. Accordingly, under the third step, Plaintiff contends that the “Forest- Service could not and did not ‘ma[k]e a convincing case’ that the impacts of the proposed gravel pit are insignificant.” Pl.’s Mot. for PI at 12. Under the fourth step, Plaintiff argues that the Gravel Pit’s adverse impacts “are not fully mitigated by the measures described in the EA,” Pl.’s Mot. at 19, asserting that “because the Forest Service did not- adequately evaluate those impacts, it could not and did not fully mitigate them,” id. at 2. Thus, under the four-step test-set forth by the Court of -Appeals, Plaintiff contends that the “Forest Service’s ‘finding of no significant impact’ should be set aside.” Id. at 16. Plaintiff also offers an additional argument as to why the Forest Service’s decision to issue a DN/FONSI rather than prepare an EIS was unlawful: The Forest Service’s finding of no significant impact, and thus its issuance of the DN/FONSI, should be set aside because of the presence of two significance factors set forth in the CEQ regulations, each of which demands the production of an EIS. Plaintiff argues that the Forest Service’s conduct with regard to the Gravel Pit is prece-dential, id. at 24-25, and contends that the Gravel Pit is “highly controversial,” id. at 26. The court first addresses whether the Forest Service took a hard look at each of the Gravel Pit’s environmental -impacts that Plaintiff argues is insufficiently mitigated. It then addresses Plaintiffs arguments regarding the two significance factors. a. Impacts on the soundscape The bulk of Plaintiffs criticism of the Forest Service’s evaluation of environmental impacts centers on the increased noise that will result from mining operations at the Gravel Pit. As to direct impacts on the soundscape, Plaintiff notes that, according to the EA, the “gravel pit will produce an average of 65 decibels of noise,” which will cause the “noise level at the National Park [to] more than quadruple ... even without adding in other cumulative impacts.” Id. at 20. It argues that the temporary nature of the noise “does not preclude [it] from being ‘significant under NEPA,’ ” id. at 20 n. 2, particularly where mining operations are likely to take place from “April to November, ... when most of the National Park’s visitors” enjoy Theodore Roosevelt National Park, id. at 21. As to cumulative impacts,-Plaintiff asserts that the EA references “a ‘variety of other sources of noise, including an existing oil and gas well that is 1;600 feet north of the mine site, truck traffic, more oil and gas wells that ‘more than likely will be developed within the area,’ and ‘year round noise associated with motors, pumps, and production equipment,’ ” but fails to “discuss how many decibels above the maximum outdoor noise level these cumulative noises, added to the gravel pit’s noise, will reach.” Id. at 17 (quoting EA at 47). Further, Plaintiff asserts, “the EA acknowledges, and the record shows, that additional gravel mining is ‘foreseeable’ — indeed ‘high[ly] probab[le]’ — ‘within the same vicinity1 as the Elkhorn gravel pit,” but the “Forest Service’s discussion of cumulative effects on [the] soundscape neither mentions additional gravel pits in the vicinity nor provides any analysis of what noise impacts those additional mines will generate.” Id. at 18 (quoting EA at 33). It is not surprising that Plaintiff focuses on noise impacts. So, too, did the Forest Service in the EA, devoting eight pages of analysis to the Gravel Pit’s impacts on the soundscape. EA at 40-47. That the Forest Service took a hard look at the increased noise is evident from those pages. The court first addresses the Forest Service’s evaluation of direct impacts on the sounds-cape and then discusses the agency’s assessment of cumulative impacts on the same. i. Direct 'impacts on the soundseape To assess the Gravel Pit’s direct impacts on the soundseape, the Forest Service used an “Acoustical Monitoring Report” provided by Theodore Roosevelt National Park; identified “all existing contributing noises within a one-mile radius of’ the Park; and conducted scientific mapping in order to determine the average noise level —