Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION Granting In Part And Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge 1. INTRODUCTION Pro se Plaintiff Jeremy Pinson is currently an inmate at ADX Florence, a federal prison located in Colorado. While in prison, Mr. Pinson has filed multiple Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, requests with different components of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”). On several occasions, the DOJ has asked Mr. Pinson to clarify his records requests, told him that it could not find records that are responsive to his requests, or informed him that the records he sought were exempt from disclosure by law. Mr. Pinson took issue with some of these determinations, so he filed a complaint claiming that the DOJ improperly withheld numerous records- from him in violation of FOIA. In response, the DOJ filed several pre-answer motions, each asking the Court to dismiss or grant summary judgment in its favor on different portions of Mr. Pinson’s complaint. Now" before the Court is the DOJ’s motion for partial summary judgment as to Mr. Pinson’s numerous FOIA requests submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 137. As to his FOIA requests, Mr. Pinson alleges that the FBI responded improperly to twenty-three numbered requests that he submitted between 2010 and 2013, and that it unlawfully “refused to release” information on those requests. See Corr, 2d Am. Compl. at 6-7, ECF No. 32. He further claims that the FBI failed to respond altogether to twelve additional, unnumbered requests. Id. at 7-8. DOJ’s motion for partial summary judgment addresses all twenty-three numbered claims and all twelve unnumbered requests, and argues: (1) as to seven of the unnumbered requests, that there is no record of Mr. Pinson having properly submitted them; (2) as to seventeen of the numbered requests and three of the unnumbered requests, that Mr. Pinson failed to exhaust his- administrative remedies; and (3) as to thirteen of the numbered requests, that the FBI responded in accordance with FOIA- by conducting an adequate search for. responsive documents and releasing any non-exempt information to Mr. Pin-son. See generally Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 137 (hereinafter “Defs.’ Mem. Supp.”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the DOJ’s motion for partial summary judgment. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Requests Without Appeals With respect to several requests that the FBI processed and to which it provided a response, the DOJ claims that Mr. Pinson failed to file an appeal and, therefore, failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 1. Request No. 1153107 On August 17, 2010, Mr. Pinson submitted a request to the FBI seeking records from the Alabama field office concerning a referral of a criminal matter for investigation at the Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega, Alabama involving himself. See Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 6; Hardy Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. A, ECF No. 137-3. By letter dated September 1, 2010, the FBI acknowledged receipt of Mr. Pinson’s request and assigned the request number 1153107. Hardy Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. B. The FBI responded to Mr. Pinson’s request on November 18, -2010, releasing two .pages with redactions pursuant to Privacy Act Exemption (j)(2) and FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). See Hardy Decl. ¶8 & Ex. C. 2. Request No. 1178465 On November 21, 2011, Mr. Pinson submitted a request to the FBI for records “produced as a result of the visit by 2 FBI Agents on Nov. 1, 2011 to the ILS. Penitentiary Max in Florence, Colorado who spoke to me and took notes of my answers to their questions.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. D. The FBI acknowledged the request and assigned the request number 1178465 on December 6, 2011. Id. ¶ 11 & Ex. E. By letter dated April 20, 2012, the FBI released -three pages with redactions pursuant to the Privacy Act Exemption (j)(2) and FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. ¶ 12 & Ex. F. 3. Request No. 1186051 On March 4, 2012, Mr. Pinson submitted a request to the FBI seeking access to records relating to “[a]ll criminal matters referred for investigation by the Bureau of Prisons during 2010-2011 arising from the U.S. Penitentiary Administrative Maximum at Florence, CO” and “[a]ll ... records produced .in connection with a 12-2-2011 interview of [Mr. Pinson] by Special Agent.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 14 & Ex. G. Mr. Pinson requested that “no more than 2 hours search time and up to 500 pages of information be produced.” Id. After acknowledging Mr. Pinson’s request on April 5, 2012, and assigning the request number 1186051, the FBI on September 28, 2012, released three pages with redactions pursuant to the Privacy Act Exemption (j)(2) and FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). See id. ¶¶ 15,16 & Ex. H. ' 4. Request No. 1192365 On May 17, 2012, Mr. Pinson submitted a request to the FBI seeking access to records from 2006-2010 relating to the “investigations of inmate on inmate assaults at the U.S. Penitentiary in Atwater California involving inmate Edwin Ivan Guzman-Garcia and or inmate on staff assaults,” as well as “any other information maintained by [the FBI] about Mr. Guzman located in [the FBI’s] California, Los Angeles, or Gadsden, Alabama field/RA offices.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 18 & Ex. I. Mr. Pin-son requested “no more than 2 hours search time and 300 pages of information.” Id. The FBI acknowledged the request and assigned the request number 1192365. Id. ¶ 19 & Ex. J. In the acknowledgement, the FBI explained that express authorization and consent of the third party, Mr. Guzman, whom the request implicated, was needed to release the information, and the FBI accordingly attached a “Certification of Identity” form for Mr. Guzman to complete. Id. Around June 21, 2012, Mr. Pinson returned the completed Certification of Identity form to the FBI, and on July 9, 2012, the FBI acknowledged receipt. Id. ¶¶ 20-21 & Exs. K, L. On November 16, 2012, the FBI advised Mr. Pinson that it had reviewed 263 pages responsive to his request and that all pages were being withheld pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(F).. Id. ¶ 22 & Ex. M. 5.Request No. 1194851 On July 8, 2012, Mr. Pinson submitted á request to the FBI for records from the Houston field office “regarding, referencing or containing the name Ismael Eduardo Guzman, including investigative reports, transcripts, photographs, records, memorandums, electronic files or data, emails, video or audio recordings, and any other available information.” Hardy Decl. ¶38 & Ex. Z. Mr. Pinson included Mr. Guzman’s signed Certification of Identity form authorizing the FBI to release the responsive records to Mr. Pinson. Id. The FBI acknowledged receipt and assigned the request number 1194851 on July 19, 2012. Id. ¶ 39 & Ex. AA. By letter dated July 31, 2012, the FBI advised Mr. Pinson that it was unable to identify any main files responsive to his request. Id. ¶ 40 & Ex. BB. When the letter was returned to the FBI as not, deliverable around August 25, 2012, the FBI resent the letter to Mr. Pinson’s proper address on February 13, 2013. Id. ¶ 40 n. 4. 6. Request No. 1199194 In August 2012, Mr. Pinson submitted a request to the FBI for records “regarding investigations of the California Aryan Brotherhood.” See Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 6; Hardy Decl. ,¶ 28 & Ex. Q. The FBI acknowledged, receipt of the request and assigned the request number 1199194 on September 27, 2012. Hardy Decl. ¶29 & Ex. R. By letter dated October 1, 2012, the FBI informed Mr. Pinson that the information requested on the California Aryan Brotherhood could be accessed free of charge online at the FBI’s Vault. Id. ¶ 30 & Ex. S. 7. Request No. 1199202 In August 2012, Mr. Pinson submitted a request to the FBI for records “regarding investigations of the California Mexican Mafia,” to which the FBI assigned the request number 1199202. See Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 6; Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 24, 25 & Exs. N, O. By two separate letters dated September 27, 2012, the FBI both acknowledged receipt of the request and advised Mr. Pinson that the information requested on the California Mexican Mafia could be accessed free of charge online at the FBI’s Vault, the .FBI’s electronic reading room. Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 25, 26 & Exs. O, P. 8. Request No. 1202477 By letter dated October 14, 2012, Mr. Pinson submitted a request to the FBI seeking records pertaining to “the death of an individual known as Imam Luqman Ab-dullah on or about 10-28-10.” Hardy Decl. Ex. NN. The FBI acknowledged the request and assigned the request number 1202477. See id. ¶ 54' & Ex. OO. In the acknowledgement, the FBI explained that express authorization and consent of the third party, Mr. Abdullah, whom the request implicates, was needed to release the information, and the FBI accordingly attached a “Certification of Identity” form for Mr. Abdullah to complete. Id. 9. Request No. 1210449 On February 27, 2013, Mr. Pinson submitted a request to the FBI seeking “production of FBI File No. 90-DN-C5Q642.” See Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 7; Hardy Decl. ¶ 69 & Ex. BBB. By letter dated March 18, 2013, the FBI. acknowledged receipt and assigned the request number 1210449. Hardy Decl. ¶ 70 & Ex. CCC. A few weeks later, by letter dated April 4, 2013, the FBI advised Mr. Pinson that it had located pages responsive to his request and he would owe a duplication fee for processing. Id. ¶ 71 & Ex. DDD. On April 9, 2013, Mr. Pinson agreed to pay the fees and also requested the release to be sent to “Attorney Edwin Aro” in Denver. Id. ¶ 72 & Ex. EEE. The FBI on September 17, 2013, notified Mr. Pinson that the FBI had reviewed 748 pages and released 381 pages to him at the requested address. Id. ¶ 73 & Ex. FFF. The FBI asserted FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E) to withhold certain information from these records. Id. 10. Request No. 1217894 By letter dated June 19, 2013, the FBI opened request number 1217894 to address Mr. Pinson’s June 1, 2013 request for records pertaining to James Martin. See Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 7; Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 75, 113, 114 & Exs. PPPP, QQQQ. On August 22, 2013, the FBI advised Mr. Pin-son that it had located pages responsive to his request and he would owe a duplication fee for processing. Hardy Decl. ¶ 115 & Ex. RRRR. Subsequently on August 30, 2013, Mr. Pinson agreed to pay and simultaneously requested the release to be sent to “Edwin Aro — Attorney” in Denver. Id. ¶ 116 & Ex. SSSS. The FBI on September 17, 2014, notified Mr. Pinson that the FBI had reviewed 29 pages responsive to his request and released 17 pages to him at the requested address. Id. ¶ 117 & Ex. TTTT. The FBI asserted FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to withhold certain information from these records. Id. There is no record of Mr. Pinson filing an appeal of this decision by November 16, 2014, 60 days from the date of the September 17 letter. Id. 11. Request No. 1217895 By letter dated June 19, 2013, the FBI opened request number 1217895 to address Mr. Pinson’s June 1, 2013 request for records pertaining to Bryan Cook. See Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 7; Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 75, 118, 119 & Exs. UUUU, WW. On October 4, 2013, the FBI advised Mr. Pin-son that it had located pages responsive to his request and he would owe a duplication fee for processing. Hardy Decl. ¶ 120 & Ex. WWWW. Mr. Pinson subsequently agreed to pay on October 11, 2013, and also requested the release to be sent to “Edwin Aro — Attorney” in Denver. Id. ¶ 121 & Ex. XXXX. By letter dated April 30, 2014, the FBI released 14 pages to the requested address and withheld certain information pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Id. ¶ 122 & Ex. YYYY. 12. Request No. 1217896 By letter dated June 19, 2013, the FBI opened request number 1217896 to address Mr. Pinson’s June 1, 2013 request for records pertaining to Clay Palmer. Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 86, 87 & Exs. RRR,. SSS. On December 16, 2013, the FBI advised Mr. Pinson that it had located pages responsive to his request and he would owe a duplication fee for processing. Id. ¶ 88 & Ex. TTT. Mr. Pinson subsequently agreed to pay on December 20, 2013 and also requested the release to be sent to “Edwin Aro” in Denver. Id. ¶ 89 & Ex. UUU. By letter dated February 4, 2014, the FBI released 115 pages to the requested address and withheld certain information pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 4, 6, 7(C), and 7(D). Id. ¶ 90 & Ex. VW. 13. Request No. 1217898 By letter dated June 19, 2013, the FBI opened request number 1217898 to address Mr. Pinson’s June 1, 2013 request for records pertaining to Gregory Joiner. Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 108, 109 & Exs. KKKK, LLLL. On August 22, 2013, the FBI advised Mr. Pinson that it had located pages responsive to his request and he would owe a duplication fee for processing. Id. ¶ 110 & Ex. MMMM. Subsequently on August 30, 2013, Mr. Pinson agreed to pay and also requested the release to be sent to “Edwin Aro — Attorney” in Denver. Hardy Decl. ¶ 111 & Ex. NNNN. The FBI on September 17, 2014, notified Mr. Pinson that the FBI had reviewed 85 pages responsive to his request and released 59 pages to him at the requested address. Id. ¶ 112 & Ex. OOOO. The FBI asserted FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C) to withhold certain information from these records. Id. There is no record of Mr. Pinson filing an appeal of this decision by November 16, 2014, 60 days from the date of the September 17 letter. Id. 14. Request No. 1217899 By letter dated June 19, 2013, the FBI opened request number 1217899 to address Mr. Pinson’s June 1, 2013 request for records pertaining to Mark Baker. Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 75, 76 & Exs. GGG, HHH. On July 1, 2013, the FBI advised Mr. Pinson that the information was exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(A). Id. ¶ 77 & Ex. III. Subsequently, Mr. Pinson filed appeals of the FBI’s actions to the Office of Information Policy (“OIP”) by letters dated July 9 and August 10, 2013, of which the OIP acknowledged receipt and assigned the appeal number 2013-05004. Id. ¶¶ 78, 79 & Exs. JJJ, KKK. The OIP affirmed the FBI’s response on September 17, 2013. Id. ¶ 80 & Ex. LLL. Upon learning of this litigation, the FBI by letter June 30, 2014, reviewed and released two pages to Mr. Pinson because the investigation referenced on the responsive records was no longer pending. Id. ¶ 81 & Ex. MMM. As a result, the documents were no longer exempt from disclosure in their entirety pursuant to Exemption 7(A). Instead, the FBI asserted FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(E) to withhold certain information from these two pages. Id. Because the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) returned the response to the FBI, on September 8, 2014, the FBI re-mailed the responsive records to James Ridgeway in Washington, D.C., a designee and address he provided in an August 18, 2014 letter. Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 83-85 & Exs. OOO, PPP, QQQ. 15.Request No. 1217900 By letter dated June 19, 2013, the FBI opened request number 1217900 to address Mr. Pinson’s June 1, 2013 request for records pertaining to Pablo Zuniga-Garcia. Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 92, 93 & Exs. WWW, XXX. In a separate letter on June 19, 2013, the FBI advised Mr. Pinson that it had located pages responsive to his request and he would owe a duplication fee for processing. Id, ¶ 94 & Ex. YYY. Subsequently on August 30, 2013, Mr. Pinson agreed to pay and also requested the release to be sent to “Edwin Aro — Attorney” in Denver. Id. ¶ 95 & Ex. ZZZ. The FBI on May 14, 2014, reviewed and released 20 pages responsive to his request at his previous address in Florence. Id. ¶ 96 & Ex. AAAA. The FBI asserted, FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), and 7(D) to withhold certain information from these records. Id. 16. Request No. 1217901 By letter dated June 19, 2013, the FBI opened request number 1217901 to address Mr. Pinson’s June 1, 2013 request for records pertaining to Christopher Anderson. Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 98, 99 & Exs. BBBB, CCCC. On October 2, 2013, the FBI advised Mr. Pinson that the information requested was exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA Exemption 7(A). Id. ¶ 100 & Ex. DDDD. 17. Request No. 1229060 On September 11, 2013, Mr. Pinson submitted a request to the FBI for records “related to a 9/10/13 FBI interview of [himself] at ADX Florence.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 124 & Ex. ZZZZ. After acknowledging receipt of the request and assigning the request number 1229060, the FBI released two pages to Mr. Pinson and withheld information pursuant to Privacy Act Exemption (j)(2) and FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(A), 7(C), 7(D), and 7(F). Id. ¶¶ 125,126 & Exs. AAAAA, BBBBB. B. Purportedly Exhausted Requests 1. Request No. 1171229 On July 22, 2011, Mr. Pinson .submitted a four-part request, which is referred to in the amended complaint as “All records relating to myself from FCI Talladega,” “August 2010 Neath of Bobby Cowley,” “All records relating to myself from USP Florence, USP Beaumont,” and “All records relating to myself from USP Victor-ville,” Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 7; see Hardy Decl. ¶ 137 & Ex. DDDDD. The FBI acknowledged receipt of the request and assigned it Request No. 1171229; however, the FBI notified Mr. Pinson that it was unable to identify any responsive records on August 18, 2011. Hardy Decl. ¶ 138 & Ex. EEEEE. On September 20, 2011, Mr. Pinson filed an appeal, to which the OIP assigned appeal number AP-2011-03134. Id, ¶¶ 139-40 & Ex. FFFFF, GGGGG. Finally, on December 21, 2011, the OIP affirmed, on partly modified grounds, the FBI’s action on Mr. Pinson’s request, citing FOIA Exemption 7(E) to the extent the records required confirming or denying an individual’s placement on a government watch list. Id. ¶¶ 140-41 & Ex. GGGGG, HHHHH. The OIP further advised Mr. Pinson that the FBI did not process the first part of his request because Mr. Pinson had already received such records in response to Request No. 1153107, and that the FBI had conducted an adequate search. Id. ¶ 141 & Ex. HHHHH. 2. Request No. 1199078 On August 31, 2012, Mr. Pinson submitted a request to the FBI seeking records “relating to any investigation of the March 16, 2000 shooting death of Fulton County, GA deputy sheriff Ricky Kinchen.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 42 & Ex. CC. By letter dated September 26, 2012, the FBI acknowledged the request and assigned the request number 1199078.7& ¶ 43 & Ex. DD. The FBI also advised Mr. Pinson that records responsive to his request were previously processed and that 350 pages were available for release in hard copy at a cost of $25.00. Id. By letter dated November 9, 2012, the FBI acknowledged receipt of Mr. Pinson’s October 2, 2012 $25.00 payment and simultaneously notified Mr. Pinson that the responsive material needed to ■ be reprocessed to make it appropriate for release to a third party. Id. ¶¶ 44, 45 & Exs. EE, FF. By letter dated May 9, 2013, the FBI released 350 out of 555 pages the FBI reviewed responsive to his request and withheld certain information pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1, 3, 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E). Id. ¶ 46 & Ex. GG. By letter dated June 14, 2013, the FBI instructed Mr. Pinson to provide an alternative address to send the documents because the BOP had previously returned the FBI’s 350 page release on May 21, 2013. Id. ¶¶ 46-48 & Exs. GG, HH, II. The FBI re-mailed the documents on July 8, 2013, after Mr. Pinson provided an alternative address on June 17, 2013. Id. ¶49 & Ex. JJ. Mr. Pinson subsequently filed an appeal with the OIP around July 9, 2013, which the OIP acknowledged and assigned appeal number 2013-04349. Id. ¶¶ 50, 51 & Exs. KK, LL. By letter dated September 10, 2013, the OIP notified plaintiff that his appeal was being closed due to this pending litigation. Id. ¶ 52 & Ex. MM. 3. Request No. 1199153 In August 2012, Mr. Pinson submitted a request to the FBI for records regarding “investigations of the Florencia 13 gang in Los Angeles, California.” See Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 6; Hardy Decl. ¶ 32 & Ex. T. The FBI acknowledged receipt of the request and assigned the request number 1199153 by letter dated September 26, 2012. Hardy Deck ¶ 33 & Ex. U. By letter dated February 19, 2013, the FBI notified Mr. Pinson that it was releasing 100 pages with some information redacted pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(A), 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E). Id. ¶ 34 & Ex. V. Mr. Pinson appealed this decision to the OIP on February 28, 2013. Id. ¶ 35 & Ex. W. On March 20, 2013, the OIP acknowledged receipt of the appeal and assigned it appeal number 2013-02370. Id. ¶ 36 & Ex. X. By letter dated March 28,2013, the OIP notified Mr. Pinson that it was closing the appeal due to this pending litigation. Id. ¶ 37 & Ex. Y. 4. Request No. 1203873 On November 5, 2012, Mr. Pinson submitted a request to the FBI seeking records “produced on or after Jan. 1, 2000 that mentions or references Jamil Abdul-lah Al-Amin, Date of Birth 10-4-1943.” See Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 6; Hardy Deck ¶ 56 & Ex. PP. By letter dated December 3, 2012, the FBI acknowledged the request, assigned the request number 1203873, and also attached a “Certification of Identity” form for Mr. Al-Amin to complete. Hardy Deck ¶57 & Ex. QQ. The FBI explained that express authorization and consent of the third party Mr. Al-Amin was needed to release the information because without Mr. Al-Amin’s authorization and consent, release of the information would result in an unwarranted invasion of Mr. Al-Amin’s personal privacy. Id. Shortly thereafter, on December 11, 2012, Mr. Pinson filed an appeal, which by letter dated January 9, 2013, the OIP acknowledged and assigned the appeal number 2013-01272. Id. ¶¶ 58, 59 & Exs. RR, SS. In this appeal Mr. Pinson argued that he submitted a Certification of Identity form from Mr. Al-Amin with the original request and that it was improper to request a second one. Id. ¶ 58 & Ex. RR. By letter dated February 11, 2013, the OIP informed Mr. Pinson that his appeal was being closed due to this pending litigation. Id. ¶ 60 & Ex. TT. 5.Request No. 1210450 On February 26, 2013, Mr. Pinson submitted a request to the FBI seeking “Los Angeles Field Office File No. 166E-LA-219961-302,” and on March 18, 2013, the FBI acknowledged receipt of the request and assigned the request number 1210450. Hardy Deck ¶¶ 61, 62 & Exs. UU, W. By letter dated April 24, 2013, the FBI notified Mr. Pinson that it located approximately 844 pages that were potentially responsive to his request and that Mr. Pinson would owe the FBI $74.40 for a paper release, which Mr. Pinson agreed to pay on April 30, 2013. Id. ¶¶ 63, 64 & Exs. WW, XX. After reviewing 760 pages, the FBI released 135 pages and withheld certain information pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E). The FBI did not collect payment at this time. Id. ¶65 & Ex. YY. By letter dated June 1, 2014, Mr. Pinson filed an appeal with the OIP claiming that the FBI reviewed and produced irrelevant and an insufficient amount of records and that the FOIA exemptions asserted by the FBI were used too broadly. Id. ¶ 66 & Ex. ZZ. While the OIP acknowledged receipt of the appeal and assigned the appeal number 2014-03497, the matter has not yet been adjudicated. Id. ¶¶ 67, 68 & Ex. AAA. 6. Request No. 1217897 By letter dated June 19, 2013, the FBI opened request number 1217897 to address Mr. Pinson’s June 1, 2013 request for récords pertaining to Manuel Torrez. Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 102, 103 & Exs. EEEE, FFFF. On July 1, 2013, the FBI advised Mr. Pinson that the information requested was exempt from disclosure pursuant tó FOIA Exemption 7(A). Id. ¶ 104 & Ex. GGGG. By letters dated July 9 and August 10, 2013, Mr. Pinson appealed the FBI response, which the OIP acknowledged and assigned the appeal number 2013-04612. Id. ¶¶ 106,106 & Exs. HHHH, IIII. The OIP affirmed the FBI’s actions on October 29, 2013. Id. ¶ 107 & Ex. JJJJ. C. Unnumbered Requests In his complaint, Mr. Pinson lists twelve unnumbered requests submitted between April 28, 2011 and August -6, 2012, to which, he claims,- the FBI failed to respond. See Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 7-8. The DOJ states that as to seven of these twelve unnumbered requests, it has conducted a search of its records for documentation of these requests, but has no record of ever receiving them. See Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 132-36, 149,152. In regards to the FOIA request labeled “Investigations in 2007-08 of Assaults at USP Florence, Vic-torville,” the FBI claims it referred the request to the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) because the BOP is most likely in possession of such records. The other four FOIA requests are discussed below. 1. Letters to Wardens of USP’s Victorville, Florence, Coleman One June 6, 2011, Mr. Pinson submitted a request seeking “production of all letters written by [the FBI] in California, Colorado to the Wardens of the Federal Correctional Complex or institutions in Florence, CO or/and Victorville, CA for any reason from 2008 to the present.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 147 & Ex. IIIII. The FBI responded on July 5, 2011 that Mr. Pinson’s letter did not contain enough information to permit a search of the FBI’s records. Id. ¶ 148 & Ex. JJJJJ. 2. Investigations of CA AB & Mexican Mafia Since 2005 and All FD-302’s of USP Victorville Homicide Investigations On June 5, 2011, Mr. Pinson submitted a request for all documents “concerning the activities of the California Mexican Mafia and Aryan brotherhood gangs within federal prisons generated since 2007.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 150 & Ex. KKKKK. In addition, on August 6, 2012, Mr. Pinson submitted a request for “all information, specifically Form-302’s, produced during investigations of inmate homicides at the U.S. Penitentiary in Victorville, California between 2004 and 2012.” Id. ¶ 129 & Ex. CCCCC; see Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 7. The FBI responded to these requests stating that the requests were too vague- or not descriptive enough to permit a search of its records on July 5, 2011, and September 25, 2012, respectively. Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 130, 151 & Ex. LLLLL. 3. Addresses of All FBI Offices On May 6, 2011, Mr. Pinson submitted a request seeking an “[a]ddress directory to all agency departments or field offices.” Hardy Decl. ¶ 153 & Ex. MMMMM. The FBI responded stating that his request did not contain enough information to conduct a search. Id. ¶ 154 & Ex. NNNNN. Mr. Pinson subsequently filed an appeal, on June 8, 2011, to which the OIP assigned number 2011-02269. Id. ¶¶ 155-56 & Exs. OOOOO, PPPPP. In its response on September 26, 2011, the OIP affirmed in part the FBI’s actions, and also provided Mr. Pinson with a nine page document, printed from the FBI’s website containing the contact information for all FBI field offices by state. Id. ¶ 157 & Ex. QQQQQ. III. LEGAL STANDARD “FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary judgment.” Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F.Supp.2d 83, 87 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Bigwood v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 484 F.Supp.2d 68, 73 (D.D.C.2007)). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material” fact is one capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-movant. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The principal purpose of summary judgment is to streamline litigation by disposing of factually unsupported claims or defenses and determining whether there is a genuine need for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant bears the initial burden of identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In response, the non-movant must point to specific facts in the record that reveal a genuine issue that is suitable for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must “eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence,” Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C.Cir.2007), and all underlying facts and inferences must be analyzed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Nevertheless, conclusory assertions offered without any evidentiary support do not establish a genuine issue for trial. See Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999). When assessing a summary judgment motion in a FOIA case, a court makes a de novo assessment of whether the agency has properly withheld the requested documents. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 598 F.Supp.2d 93, 95 (D.D.C.2009). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, “the defending agency must prove that each document that falls within the class requested either has been produced, is unidentifiable or is wholly exempt from the Act’s inspection requirements.” Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 627 F.2d 365, 368 (D.C.Cir.1980) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 186 (D.C.Cir.1973)). To meet its burden, a defendant may rely on declarations that are reasonably detailed and non-conclusory. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Dep’t of Labor, 478 F.Supp.2d 77, 80 (D.D.C.2007) (“[T]he Court may award summary judgment solely on the basis of information provided by the department or agency in declarations when the declarations describe ’the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that , the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.’” (quoting Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C.Cir.1981))). “Ultimately, an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or ‘plausible.’” Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374-75 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C.Cir.1982)). Generally, a reviewing court should “respect the expertise of an agency” and not “overstep the proper limits of the judicial role in FOIA review.” Hayden v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 608 F.2d 1381, 1388 (D.C.Cir.1979). IV. ANALYSIS A. Requests Without Responses Mr. Pinson’s complaint lists twelve unnumbered FOIA requests that he submitted to the FBI, for all of which he claims to have never received a response. See Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 7-8. In the DOJ’s summary of facts and statement of material facts as to which there is no genuine issue, the FBI. contends that it has no record of having received seven of these twelve requests, see Defs.’ Mem. Supp. at 16-20; Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 132-36, 149, 152, and also contends that it referred one unnumbered request, “Investigations in 2007-08 of Assaults at USP Florence, Vic-torville,” to the BOP, see Defs.’ Mem. Supp. at 21; Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 158-59. As “[fjederal jurisdiction over a FOIA claim is dependent upon a showing that an agency improperly withheld agency records,” if there is no “’showing that the agency received the request, the agency has no obligation to respond to it.’” See Banks v. Lappin, 539 F.Supp.2d 228, 235 (D.D.C.2008) (quoting Hutchins v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 00-2349, 2005 WL 1334941, at *2 (D.D.C. June 6, 2005)); see also Trupei v. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., No. 07-0475, 2008 WL 249878, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2008) (“[A]n agency’s FOIA obligations are not triggered until a request has been received.”). In order to create an issue of material fact, a plaintiff must offer evidence that thé requests were received by the agency, rather than merely stating that the requests were placed in the mail. See Banks, 539 F.Supp.2d at 235 (“The mailing of a FOIA request to a federal government agency does not constitute its receipt by the agency.”). Here, not only has Mr. Pinson failed to provide any evidence,-that these requests were received by the FBI, but Mr. Pinson’s opposition fails to mention these requests at all. “In this district, when a party responds to some but not all arguments raised on a Motion for Summary Judgment, a court may fairly view the unacknowledged arguments as conceded.” Sykes v. Dudas, 573 F.Supp.2d 191, 202 (D.D.C.2008). Moreover, because Mr. Pinson.has not contested the FBI’s factual statement- that it never received those requests, that fact is deemed conceded. The Court therefore grants the FBI’s motion for summary judgment as to the seven unnumbered requests. The FBI also contends that it referred one unnumbered request, “Investigations in. 2007-08 of Assaults at USP Florence, Victorville,” to the BOP because the FBI determined that the BOP is the agency most likely in possession of tjie requested records. Hardy Decl. ¶ 159. The referral of records does not automatically relieve the FBI of its disclosure responsibility. “[A]geneies are ‘obligated to account for the responsive materials located in their records, even if the decision to release or withhold information is left to the component where those records originated.’” Lea v. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, 85 F.Supp.3d 85, 88 (D.D.C.2015) (quoting Fowlkes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 67 F.Supp.3d 290, 296 n. 2 (D.D.C.2014)). Mr. Hardy has not attested to what happened to the referral, and the “referral of records could constitute an improper withholding if the net effect of the referral procedure is significantly to impair the requester’s ability to obtain the records or significantly to increase :the amount of time he must wait to obtain them.” Id. at 88-89 (alterations and internal quotations omitted). Because the Court has insufficient information to assess whether the referral was proper and whether the referral was sufficiently accounted for, the Court denies summary judgement as to the unnumbered request “Investigations in 2007-08 of Assaults at USP Florence, Victorville.” B. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies The DOJ seeks summary judgment as to twenty of the FOIA requests at issue claiming that Mr. Pinson failed to exhaust administrative appeal remedies before seeking judicial redress in this Court. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. at 31-33. Specifically, the DOJ contends that Mr. Pinson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because, for each of these requests, he did not file an appeal of the agency’s decision. Id. Mr. Pinson disputes the DOJ’s exhaustion argument as it pertains to these requests stating that he did not receive responses and never had a chance to appeal. See Pl.’s Resp. at 1-3, ECF No. 241; Pinson Decl. ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 241. In general, a FOIA requester must exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court. See Wilbur v. CIA, 355 F.3d 675, 677 (D.C.Cir.2004). This means that the requester must appeal an adverse determination of his FOIA request to the head of the agency before suing that agency in federal court. See Smith v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 517 F.Supp.2d 451, 453 (D.D.C.2007). If the requester fails to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, a court can dismiss the complaint or grant summary judgment for the agency. See Wilbur, 355 F.3d at 676-77. But FOIA’s exhaustion requirement is a prudential consideration, rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. See id. at 677. A court therefore may waive the exhaustion requirement under certain circumstances, such as if an agency failed to respond to the FOIA request within a certain number of days. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 711 F.3d 180, 184 (D.C.Cir.2013) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i)). Further, if there is a genuine. dispute of material fact on the exhaustion issue, a court may refuse to grant summary judgment for the agency. See Jones v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 576 F.Supp.2d 64, 67 (D.D.C.2008). A court may, for example, deny summary judgment to an agency that claims to have notified a plaintiff of its response to a FOIA request if the plaintiff attests that he never received the agency’s response and if the agency fails to offer evidence to the contrary. See id. at 67 (“If Jones did not receive a response to his FOIA request, then the agency did not comply with its duty to make a determination within 20 days after receiving Jones’ request and ‘immediately notify the person making such request’ of its determination.” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i)). 1. Request Nos. 1210449, 1217894, 1217895, 1217896, 1217898, 1217899, and 1217900 The DOJ first contends that it is entitled to summary- judgment as to Request Nos. 1210449, 1217896, 1217894, 1217895, 1217898, 1217899, and 1217900 because Mr. Pinson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. at 31. More specifically, the DOJ argues that Mr. Pinson “was notified that his mail from the FBI was not delivered and the FBI delivered the records to alternate addresses designated by [Mr. Pinson].” Id. Mr. Pinson argues that he never received these responses because the BOP rejected his mail, and thus he was unable “to see and evaluate the FOIA responses ... and perfect an appeal to the Office of Information Policy.” Pinson Decl. ¶¶ 1-2; see Pl.’s Resp. at 2-3. ■ At the outset, the Court notes that the FBI only provides evidence to demonstrate that the FBI requested an alternate address to send the material when it was returned by the BOP as to Request No. 1217899. See Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 82-84. As to Request. Nos. 1210449, 1217894, 1217895, 1217896, 1217898, and 1217900, the DOJ fails to provide evidence to demonstrate that the mail was returned by the BOP or the FBI requested an alternate address. However, the evidence provided does show that Mr. Pinson voluntarily provided an alternative address in his correspondence with the FBI and the FBI delivered responsive records to these alternate addresses for all requests except Request No. 1217900. For Request Nos. 1210449, 1217894, 1217895, 1217896, and 1217898, Mr. Pin-son, after receiving notification from the FBI that he would need to pay a processing fee, wrote to the FBI agreeing to pay the fees and requested the responsive materials to be sent to an alternative address. In all five instances, Mr. Pinson requested the materials be sent to “Edwin Aro” at Arnold & Porter, LLP’s Denver Office. See Hardy Decl. Exs. EEE, SSSS, XXXX, UUU, NNNN, ZZZ; See also Denver, Arnold & Porter, http://www.arnoldporter. com/en/about/offices/denver (last visited Mar. 28, 2016) (displaying the Denver office’s address). For Request No. 1217899, Mr, Pinson provided an alternate address when the FBI notified Mr. Pinson that his mail was not deliverable due to the BOP’s regulations. Per Mr. Pinson’s request, the FBI sent the materials to James Ridgeway, Director and Editor of Solitary Watch, a non-profit organization. See Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 82-86 & Ex. PPP; see also About, Solitary Watch, http://solitarywatch.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2016). For the following reasons, Mr. Pinson fails to create' a material issue of fact regarding Request Nos. 1210449, 1217894, 1217895, 1217896, 1217898, and 1217899. Mr. Pinson does not provide any evidence that Mr. Aro or Mr. Ridgeway, the persons to whom he requested the responses be sent, never received the responses. Mr. Pinson only claims that he himself never received the material, which would only be natural because the' material, upon his request, was sent to Mr. Aro and Mr. Ridgeway, not Mr. Pinson. The Supreme Court has emphasized that in FOIA cases, courts generally accord government records and official conduct a presumption of legitimacy. See U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 179, 112 S.Ct. 541, 116 L.Ed.2d 526 (1991); see also Schoenman v. FBI, No. CIV.A.04-2202(CKK), 2006 WL 1582253, at *10 (D.D.C. June 5, 2006). Here, the DOJ has provided a detailed declaration from Mr. Hardy and provided documents, which include Mr. Pinson’s requests and correspondence, as well as the FBI’s dated responses to Mr. Pinson’s letters. Mr. Pinson, in contrast, has not only failed to address the government’s argument, but also failed to provide counter evidence that either Mr. Aro or Mr. Ridgeway did not receive these responses. Thus, Mr. Pinson has not rebutted the good faith presumption accorded government action. Because Mr. Pinson does not address the fact that these responses were requested and actually sent to an alternative address and not to his prison, the Court finds that Mr. Pinson has failed to raise a. material issue of fact and the DOJ is entitled to summary judgment as to request numbers 1210449, 1217894, 1217895, 1217896, 1217898, and 1217899. As to Request No. 1217900, however, Mr. Pinson requested the materials to be sent to an alternate address, specifically to Edwin Aro at Arnold & Porter. See Hardy Decl. Ex. ZZZ. Despite this request, the FBI sent the responsive materials to the ADX Florence facility. Compare Hardy Decl. Ex. AAAA with Hardy Decl. Ex. ZZZ. This erroneous mailing of the document cannot, be attributed to Mr. Pinson’s action or inaction. Accordingly, summary judgment will be denied as to request No. 1217900, and the FBI will be ordered to re-mail the responsive documents to the address Mr. Pinson provided. 2. Request No. 1203873 In its summary of facts and statement of material facts as to which there is no genuine issue, the FBI contends that the OIP closed Mr. Pinson’s appeal of Request No. 1203873 due to the pending litigation. Defs.’ Mem. Supp. at 9; Hardy Decl. ¶ 60 & Ex. TT. The Court notes that the DOJ does not explicitly raise an argument or move for summary judgment as to Request No. 1203873. The OIP acknowledged Mr. Pinson’s December 11, 2012 appeal on January 9, 2013, but failed to make a determination before closing the appeal on February 11, 2013. Hardy Decl. ¶¶-58-60 & Exs. RR, SS, TT. If Mr. Pinson filed his complaint- after- his appeal went unanswered for more than twenty days, he would be deemed to have constructively exhausted his administrative remedies. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i) (providing that if an agency “fails tó comply with the applicable time limit provisions,” any person making a request “shall be deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to such request”). Here, the OIP failed to make a determination within twenty days and instead closed the appeal on February 11, 2013, by which time 62 days had lapsed since the appeal was filed on December 11, 2012. Because the OIP failed to make a timely determination and Mr. Pinson included this request number in his verified Second Amended Complaint filed on October 23, 2013, after OIP’s close of the appeal, Mr. Pinson is deemed to have constructively exhausted his administrative remedies. In his administrative appeal, Mr. Pinson claimed that he had “submitted a properly executed Certificate of Identity from Mr. Al-Amin with [his] original request,” Hardy Decl. Ex. RR; the FBI, on the other hand, states that it has no record of receiving a Certificate of Identity. Because Mr. Pinson fails to provide any evidence to the contrary and his opposition to the DOJ’s motion makes no mention of this request at all, the Court deems Mr. Pinson to. have conceded this claim. As a result, with a declaration from the FBI stating it has properly withheld the records and because Mr. Pinson concedes these facts, the Court has no statutory duty to perform, see Cole v. Dep’t of Justice, 905 F.Supp.2d 293, 296 (D.D.C.2012), and finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. The Court will accordingly grant summary judgment to the DOJ for Request No. 1203873. 3. Request Nos. 1153107, 1186051, 1192365, 1194851, and 1202477 The DOJ seeks summary judgment as to Request Nos. 1153107, 1186051, 1192365, 1194851, and 1202477, arguing that Mr. Pinson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. at 32-33. Mr. Pinson argues that summary judgment should not be granted because he never received these documents and thus was unáble to “see and evaluate the FOIA responses ... and perfect an appeal” to the OIP. Pl.’s Resp. at 2-3; Pinson Decl. ¶¶ 1-2. Because Mr. Pinson’s verified Second Amended Complaint directly contradicts the assertions he makes in his more recent declaration, the Court finds that Mr. Pinson has failed to raise a material issue of fact and the DOJ is entitled to summary judgment as to these requests. Mr. Pinson’s complaint was signed under penalty of perjury on October 10, 2013. See Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 17. “Courts have long held that a party may not create a material issue of fact simply by contradicting its prior sworn testimony.” Pyramid Sec. Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924 F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C.Cir.1991). “Virtually every circuit has adopted a form of the so-called ‘sham affidavit rule,’ which precludes a party from creating an issue of material fact by contradicting prior sworn testimony unless the ‘shifting party can offer persuasive reasons for believing the supposed correction’ is more accurate than the prior testimony.” Galvin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 488 F.3d 1026, 1030 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting Pyramid Sec. Ltd., 924 F.2d at 1123). Unlike in previous filings where Mr. Pinson clarified the import of the dates listed in his complaints as the dates when he received acknowledgement letters from certain agencies, see, e.g., Pl.’s Part. Resp. to Bureau of Prisons Mot. Summ. J., Exhibit 1 at 2-4, ECF No. 180, Mr. Pinson in his most recent declaration outright denies receiving responses from the FBI, see Pin-son Decl. ¶ 1. For example, Mr. Pinson’s declaration claims that he “never received from the FBI [a] response[ ] to FOIA Req. No[ ]_ 1153107.” Pinson Decl. ¶ 1. In his complaint, however, Mr. Pinson lists receiving a response to that request on November 22, 2010, see Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 6, only a few days after the FBI sent him a response on November 18, 2010, see Hardy Decl. ¶ 8 & Ex. C. Because Mr. Pinson has not clarified the import of the dates listed in his complaint, he has failed to provide the Court with any reason whatsoever, “for believing the supposed correction is more accurate than the prior testimony.” United States v. Project on Gov’t Oversight, 839 F.Supp.2d 330, 347 (D.D.C.2012) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Galvin, 488 F.3d at 1030). In light of the direct contradiction between Mr. Pinson’s sworn statements, and in the absence of any reason to believe that the outright denial of receipt in Mr. Pinson’s declaration for Request Nos. 1153107, 1186051, 1192365, 1194851 and 1202477 is more accurate than his prior statement that he received a response to the request, the Court finds that Mr. Pin-son’s prior sworn statement is controlling. See Pyramid Sec. Ltd., 924 F.2d at 1123. Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Pin-son has not exhausted his administrative remedies and thus grants summary judgment in favor of the DOJ as to Request Nos. 1153107, 1186051, 1192365, 1194851, and 1202477. 4. Request Nos. 1178465, 1199194, 1199202, 1217901, and 1229060 The DOJ seeks summary judgment as to Request Nos. 1178465, 1199194, ■ 1199202, 1217901, and 1229060 arguing that Mr. Pinson failed to appeal the FBI’s redacted release and, therefore, did not exhaust-his administrative remedies. Defs.’ 'Mem. Supp. at 31-33. For these requests, the DOJ has provided the Court with copies of the FBI’s final response letters and with the declaration of David M. Hardy who asserts that the FBI sent Mr. Pinson the letters in question. See Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 10-13, 24-26, 28-30, 98-100, 124-26 & Exs. E, F, O, P, R, S, BBBB, CCCC, DDDD, AAAAA, BBBBB. The mere existence of these final response letters, however, does not conclusively “establish that the letter[s] [were] actually ... received by” Mr. Pinson, which may leave open a genuine issue of material fact. See Jones, 576 F.Supp.2d at 67. As discussed above in Part IV.B.3, it appears that Mr. Pinson’s declaration and verified amended complaint directly contradict each other because Mr. Pinson outright denies receiving responses in his declaration, but generally lists the date he received a response for each request in his complaint. See Pinson Deck ¶ 1; Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 6-7. Although the inclusion of those dates in Mr. Pinson’s complaint appears to acknowledge that he did receive a response from the FBI with respect to each request, in the past this Court has “credited statements in Mr. Pinson’s declarations asserting that he had not received response letters from various DOJ components — despite the existence of contrary assertions in his verified complaint — where Mr. Pinson explained that he had received acknowledgement letters rather than final response letters.” Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 61 F.Supp.3d 164, 176 (D.D.C.2015). Despite Mr. Pinson’s failure to articulate that he did not receive the final response in either his declaration or verified complaint, the Court faces similar circumstances here. For example, with respect to Request No. 1178465, Mr. Pinson’s complaint states that he received a response from the FBI on December 2, 2011, Corr. 2d Am, Compl. at 6, around the time the FBI sent its initial acknowledgment letter on December 6, 2011, Hardy Decl. ¶ 11 & Ex. E. It was not until April 20, 2012, that the FBI sent Mr. Pinson a response with the documents he requested. Hardy Decl. ¶ 12 & Ex. F. Despite the imprecision of the dates, there remains a question as to whether Mr. Pinson did indeed receive the April 20, 2012 FBI response. In the case of Request Nos. 1199194 and 1199202, Mr. Pinson’s complaint states that he received a response to both requests from the FBI on February 26, 2013, Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 6, approximately five months after the mailing of either the acknowledgment and final response letters on September 27, 2012 and October 1, 2012, see Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 25, 26, 29, 30. Because there is such a large gap between when the letters were sent and when Mr. Pinson claims he received them, coupled with a history of Mr. Pinson failing to receive mail, see, e.g., Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. CV 12-1872 (RC), 2016 WL 29245, at *12-13 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2016), ECF No. 259, there remains a question as to which letters he did and did not receive. Because at summary judgment the Court must view facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, see Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)), and cannot make credibility determinations, see Fed. Ins. Co. v. Olawuni, 539 F.Supp.2d 63, 66 (D.D.C.2008) (“On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must ‘eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.’” (quoting Czekalski, 475 F.3d at 363)), the Court must accept as true Mr. Pinson’s declaration that he did not receive a response and the December 2, 2011 response referenced in Mr'. Pinson’s complaint is more' likely an acknowledgement letter. And if it turns out that Mr. Pinson did not receive the FBI’s final response letter, he cannot be penalized for having failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he was denied the opportunity to reformulate his request or appeal the determination that the request was improper. Therefore, because Mr. Pinson’s declaration made under penalty of perjury raises a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his initial receipt of the documents, the Court denies the DOJ’s motion for summary judgment as to Request Nos. 1178465, 1199194, 1199202, 1217901, and 1229060. In addition, assuming Mr. Pin-son’s description of events is accurate and he did not receive the responses or records purportedly, sent to him, the Court orders the DOJ to resend those documents to Mr. Pinson, so that. he can review them and determine the DOJ’s compliance with FOIA. 5. Requests Concerning Investigations of the CA AB and Mexican Mafia Since 2005, All FD-302s of USP Vic-torville Homicide Investigations, and Letters to Wardens of USP’s Victorville, Florence, Coleman The DOJ seeks summary judgment as to unnumbered requests for “Investigations of the CA AB and Mexican Mafia Since 2005” and for all “FD~302s of USP Victor-ville Homicide Investigations” because Mr. Pinson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Defs.’ Mot. Supp. at 32. The DOJ also seeks summary judgment as to unnumbered request for “Letters to Wardens of USP’s Victorville, Florence, Coleman” because there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Defs.’ Reply at 1-2; Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Ex. 1 ¶¶ 126-27. For these requests, the DOJ has provided the Court with copies of the FBI’s final response letters and with the declaration of David M. Hardy who asserts that the FBI sent Mr. Pinson the letters in question. See Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 129-30, 147-48, 150-51 & Exs. CCCCC, IIIII, JJJJJ, KKKKK, LLLLL. The mere existence of these final response letters, however, does not conclusively “establish, that the letter[s] [were] actually ... received by” Mr. Pinson, which may leave open a genuine issue of material fact. See Jones, 576 F.Supp.2d at 67. Both Mr. Pinson’s declaration and verified amended complaint deny receiving responses to these requests. See Pinson Decl. ¶ 1; Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 7-8. Because at summary judgment the Court must view facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, see Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)), and cannot make credibility determinations, see Olawuni, 539 F.Supp.2d at 66 (“On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must ‘eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.’” (quoting Czekalski, 475 F.3d at 363)), the Court must accept as true Mr. Pinson’s declaration and second amended complaint that he did not receive responses to these requests, and cannot be penalized for having failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he was denied the opportunity to reformulate his request or appeal the determination that the request was improper. Therefore, because Mr. Pinson’s declaration made under penalty of perjury raises a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his initial receipt of the documents, the Court denies the DOJ’s motion for summary judgment as to the unnumbered requests for “Investigations of the CA AB and Mexican Mafia Since 2005,” “All FD-302s of USP Victorville Homicide Investigations,” and “Letters to Wardens of USP’s Victorville, Florence, Coleman.” Assuming Mr. Pinson’s description of events is-accurate and he did not receive responses or records purportedly sent to him, the Court orders the DOJ to -resend those documents to Mr. Pinson so that he can review the documents; and determine the DOJ’s compliance with FOIA. 6. Request for Addresses of All FBI Offices The DOJ seeks summary judgment as to a request for the Addresses of All FBI Offices arguing that Mr. Pinson did not file an administrative appeal of the responses. Defs.’ Mot. Supp. at 32. Yet, Mr.,Hardy’s Declaration and the exhibits the DOJ attaches both plainly demonstrate that .Mr. Pinson filed an appeal of this response, and the OIP provided materials that may have been responsive to plaintiffs request. See Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 155-57 & Exs. OO-000, PPPPP, QQQQQ. This request was clearly exhausted; Despite the exhaustion of this request, Mr. Pinson argues that he has not received the response to this request in ■both his declaration and verified amended complaint. See Pinson Decl. ¶ 1; Corr. 2d Am. Compl. at 6. Because at summary judgment the Court must view facts in the light most favorable to the non-mov-ant, see Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)), and cannot make credibility determinations, see Olawuni, 539 F.Supp.2d at 66 (“On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must ‘eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.’” (quoting Czekalski, 475 F.3d at 363)), the Court must accept as true Mr. Pinson’s declaration and second ‘ amended complaint that he did not receive a response to this request, and cannot be penalized for having failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he was denied the opportunity to reformulate his request or appeal the determination that the request was improper. Thus, the Court denies the DOJ’s motion for summary judgment as to the unnumbered • request for “Addresses of All FBI Offices.” Assuming Mr. Pinson’s description of events is accurate and he did not receive the document sent to him, the Court orders the DOJ to re-mail the responsive document to Mr. Pinson, so that Mr. Pinson can review it and determine whether his request has been satisfied. C. Adequacy of the FBI’s Search The DOJ seeks summary judgment on the ground that its search for responsive records was reasonable and adequate with respect to five requests that Mr. Pinson either fully appealed or (for reasons not stated in the-; record, and despite no evidence of an appeal by Mr. Pinson) which the DOJ does not claim remain unexhaust-ed. These include Request Nos. 1171229, 1199153, 1199078, 1210450, and 1217897. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp. at 33-34; see also Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 170, 173-75, 177. . Under FOIA, an adequate search is one that is “reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1114 (D.C.Cir.2007) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C.Cir.1983)). The agency does ' not have to search “every record system” for the requested documents, but it “must conduct a good faith, reasonable search of those systems of records likely to possess the requested records.” Marino v. Dep’t of Justice, 993 F.Supp.2d 1, 9 (D.D.C.2013) (citing Oglesby v. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C.Cir.1990)). When an agency seeks summary judgment on the basis that it conducted an adequate search, it must provide a “reasonably detailed” affidavit describing the scope of that search. Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 313-14 (D.C.Cir.2003) (quoting Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68). It is not enough, however, for the affidavit to state in conclusory fashion that the agency “conducted a review of [the files] which would contain information that [the plaintiff] has requested” and did not find anything responsive to the request. Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 627 F.2d 365, 370 (D.C.Cir.1980). On the other hand, once the agency has provided a “reasonably detailed” affidavit describing its search, the burden shifts to the FOIA requester to produce “countervailing evidence” suggesting that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the adequacy of the search. Morley, 508 F.3d at 1116. Here, the DOJ has provided a declaration from Mr. Hardy, which provides an overview of the Central Records System (“CRS”) and explains in varying detail the searches ' for the requests at issue. See Hardy Decl. ¶¶ 160-65, 168-81. In general, the FBI conducted a search of the automated indices to the CRS using various search terms to yield responsive results. For all of these requests, the declaration’s descriptions suffice to- provide a “reasonably detailed” account of the scope of the FBI’s search for each request. Mr. Hardy’s declaration describes- how the Central Records System stores information and how that information is searcha-ble and identifies the search terms used to locate documents with respect to each of Mr. Pinson’s requests. See, e.g., Hardy Decl. ¶ 173. For example, with respect to Request No. 1217897, the FBI conducted a search “utilizing a phonetic breakdown of the name ‘Manuel Torrez.’ The search results included any variation of first and last name that sounds similar or are spelled differently than the - name searched.” Id. ¶ 177. Neither Mr. Pinson’s responses nor declarations address the DOJ’s “adequacy of the search” argument. As this Court has explained, “when a party responds to some but