Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION Emmet G. Sullivan, United States District Judge I. Introduction Drawing an analogy to the fate of penguins whose destinies appear doomed in the face of uncertain environmental changes; Defendant. Staples Inc. (“Staples”) and Defendant Office Depot, Inc. (“Office Depot”) (collectively “Defendants”) argue they are like “penguins on a melting iceberg,” struggling to survive in an increasingly digitized world and an office-supply industry soon to be revolutionized by new entrants like Amazon Business, Prelim. Inj. Hrg Tr. (“Hrg Tr.”) 60:15 (Opening Statement of Diane Sullivan, Esq.). Charged with enforcing antitrust laws for the benefit of American consumers, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and its co-plaintiffs, the. Commonwealth-of Pennsylvania and the District -of Columbia, commenced this action in an effort to block Defendants’ proposed merger and alleged that the merger would “eliminate] direct competition between Staples and Office Depot” resulting in “significant harm” to large businesses that purchase office supplies for their own use. Compl., Docket No. 3 at ¶ 4. The survival of Staples’ proposed acquisition of Office Depot hinges on two critical issues: (1) the reliability of Plaintiffs’ market definition and market share analysis; and (2) the likelihood that the competition resulting from new market entrants like Amazon Business will be timely and sufficient to restore competition lost as a result of the merger. Subsequent to Defendants’ announcement in February 2015 of their intent to merge, the FTC began an approximate year-long investigation into the $6.3 billion merger and its likely effects on competition. Defs.’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (“Defs.’ FOF”) ¶58. On December 7, 2015, by a unanimous vote, the FTC Commissioners found reason to believe that the proposed merger would substantially reduce competition in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act. Compl. ¶ 34. That same day, Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking a preliminary injunction pursuant to Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53 (b) to enjoin the proposed merger until the FTC’s administrative proceedings are complete. Pis.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj., Docket No. 5 at 1. This antitrust case involved an extraordinary -amount of work. As a result of the ’FTC’s investigation and seven weeks of discovery, more than fifteen million pages of documents were produced, more than seventy depositions around the country were taken, and five expert reports were completed. Defs.’ FOF ¶ 60. The Court presided over an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony from ten witnesses from March 21, 2016 to April 5, 2016. Id. Nearly 4,000 exhibits were admitted into evidence. Id. ¶ 61. Despite onerous time constraints created by the nature of this unique litigation, lawyers for the parties and non-parties completed this work with civility and professionalism while demonstrating the highest level of sophistication and competency in their written and oral advocacy. The Court commends the lawyers and the paralegals for their outstanding work. At the conclusion of Plaintiffs’ case, Defendants chose hot to present any fact or expert witnesses, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to establish their prima facie case. Hrg Tr. 2889:20-25 (Ms. Sullivan: “It’s going to be the defendants’ position that we’re going to rest on the record as it exists, so there’ll be no need for additional evidence or rebuttal.”). And, although entitled to a trial on the merits before an Administrative Law Judge at the FTC, Defendants indicated that they will not proceed with the merger if Plaintiffs’ motion is granted. Hrg Tr. at 3034:18-22; Defs.’ FOF ¶ 17. Upon consideration of the evidence presented during the hearing, the parties’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the relevant legal authority, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have established their prima facie case by demonstrating that Defendants’ proposed merger is likely to reduce competition in the Business to Business (“B-to-B”) contract space for office supplies. Defendants’ response relies in large part on the prospect that Amazon Business will replace any competition lost because of the merger. Although Amazon Business may transform how some businesses purchase office supplies, the evidence presented during the hearing fell short of establishing that Amazon Business is likely' to ■ restore lost competition in the B-to-B space in a timely and sufficient manner. For the reasons discussed in Section IV infra, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED. In Section II of this Memorandum Opinion, the Court sets forth important background information, including many critical findings of fact underpinning the Court’s analysis. Section III establishes the relevant legal standard pursuant to the Clayton Act. The Court’s analysis in Section IV proceeds as follows; (A) legal principles considered when defining a relevant market; (B) application of legal principles to Plaintiffs’ market definition; (C) Defendants’ arguments in opposition to Plaintiffs’ alleged market; (D) conclusions regarding the relevant market; (E) analysis of the Plaintiffs’ arguments relating to the probable effects on competition based on market share calculations; (F) Defendants’ arguments in opposition to Plaintiffs’ market share calculations; (G) conclusions regarding Plaintiffs’ market share; (H) Plaintiffs’ evidence of additional harm; (I) Defendants’ response to Plaintiffs’ prima facie case; and (J) weighing the equities. In Section V, the Court concludes that the proposed merger must be enjoined due to the likelihood of anticompetitive effects that would result were the merger to be consummated. II. Background A. Overview Every day millions of employees throughout the United States utilize office supplies ‘in the course of their daily work. To sustain employees’ use of pens, Post-it notes and paperclips, large companies purchase more than two billion dollars of office supplies from Defendants annually. Hrg Tr. 10:23-24, (Opening Statement of Tara Reinhart, Esq.). Companies that purchase office supplies for their own use operate in what the industry refers to as the B-to-B space. B-to-B customers prefer to work with one vendor that can meet all of the companies’ office supply needs. Hrg Tr. at 204:1-20 (Gregg O’Neill, Category Manager for Workplace Services at American Electric Power (“AEP”) testifying that because the company spends two million dollars on offiee supplies, its leverage with one vendor is greater than it would be if it utilized twenty vendors); Id. at 1617:1-1618:4 (Leo J. Meehan, III, CEO of WB Mason testifying about the benefits of utilizing one primary vendor, including lower prices, growth rebates, assistance with controlling leakage, etc.). To establish a primary vendor relationship, companies in the B-to-B space request proposals from national suppliers like Staples and Office Depot. See e.g., Hrg Tr. (AEP) 194: 10-195:16. The request for proposal (“RFP”) process typically results in a multi-year contract with a primary vendor that guarantees prices for specific items, includes an upfront lump-sum rebate, and a host of other services. Pis.’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (“Pis.’ FOF”) ¶¶ 41-46. Because the office supplies consumed by large companies are voluminous, such companies typically pay only half the price for basic supplies as compared to .the average retail consumer. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit (“PX”) 06100, Pis.’ Expert Dr. Carl Shapiro’s Report (“Shapiro Report”) at 019. B. Defendants Staples and Office Depot Established as big-box retail stores in the 1980s, Defendants are the primary B-to-B office supply vendors in the United States today. Hrg Tr. 59. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants sell and distribute upwards of seventy-nine percent of office supplies in the B-to-B space. Hrg Tr. 20-21. Since the 2013 merger of Office Depot and Office Max, Defendants consistently engage in head-to-head competition with each other for B-to-B contracts. See, e.g., PX04322 Staples (“SPLS”) 001 (identifying only Office Depot as “Key Competitor ]”). Staples and Office Depot are publicly traded corporations. Compl. ¶¶29 and 30. Staples is the largest office supplier ’of consumable office supplies to large B-to-B customers in the United States and operates in three business segments: (1) North American stores and online sales; (2) North American commercial; and (3) international operations. Id. ¶ 29. In fiscal year 2014, Staples generated $22.5 billion in sales, with more than half of all sales coming from office supplies. Id. In fiscal year 2013, 34.8 percent of Staples’ total revenue came from the North American commercial segment. Id. Office Depot is the second largest office supplier of consumable office supplies to large B-to-B customers in the United States. Id. ¶ 30. Like Staples, Office Depot operates in similar business segments: (1) North America retail; (2) North American business solutions; and (3) an international division. Id. In fiscal year 2014, Office Depot made $16.1 billion in revenue, with nearly half, of those sales coming from office supplies and 37.4 percent of overall sales from B-to-B business. Id. . Staples’ “commercial” and Office Depot’s “business solutions” segments focus on the B-to-B contracts at issue in this case. While both companies serve businesses of all sizes, this case focuses on large B-to-B customers, defined by Plaintiffs as those that spend $500,000 or more per year on office supplies. Hrg Tr. 30:4-6. Approximately 1200 corporations in the United States are included in this alleged relevant market. Hrg Tr. 2473:17-18. C, FTC Investigation On February 4, 2015, Defendants entered into a merger agreement in which Staples would acquire Office Depot for a combination, of cash and Staples’ stock. Compl. ¶ 32. Shortly after the merger was announced, the FTC launched an investigation into the competitive effects of the proposed merger. Defs.’ FOF ¶ 58. Ultimately, the FTC commissioners filed an administrative complaint before an FTC Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and also authorized the Plaintiffs to seek a preliminary injunction to prevent the Defendants from consummating the merger to maintain the status quo pending a full hearing on the merits. Compl. ¶ 34. Plaintiffs filed this suit the same day. Pis.’ Mot. Prelim. Inj. D. Regional and local vendors Regional and local office supply vendors exist throughout the country. Hrg Tr, 84:2. However, they typically do not bid for large B-to-B contracts. Hrg Tr. 907:7-14 (James Moise,' Senior Vice President and Chief Sourcing Officer for Fifth Third Bank testifying that regional suppliers Of: fice Essentials and WB Mason declined to bid on their RFP); Hrg Tr. 1941:18-20 (Leonard Allen Wright, Vice President of Strategic Sourcing for Health Trust Purchasing Group (“HPG”) noting that neither WB Mason nor MyOfficeProducts could meet HPG’s needs nationwide). When regional office supply vendors compete for large RFPs, they are rarely awarded the contract. PX02138 (Sears (Realogy) Dep. 156:15-21,191:6-17) (“,., I was concerned about [WB Mason’s] ability to service the entire country ..., ”). WB Mason is a regional supplier that targets its business to thirteen northeastern states plus the District of Columbia (known in the industry as “Masonville”). Id. WB Mason “ranks a distant third” behind Staples and Office Depot. PX03021-002, Meehan Deck ¶ 6. In fiscal year 2015, WB Mason generated approximately $1.4 billion in total revenue. Id. WB Mason has no customers in the Fortune 100 and only nine in the Fortune 1000. Hrg Tr, 1611:21-1611:24. According to WB Mason’s CEO, Leo Meehan, “Staples and Office Depot are the only consumable office supplies vendors'that meet the needs of most large B2B customers] across the entire country, or even most of it.” Meehan Decl. ¶ 19. WB Mason recently abandoned a plan to expand nationwide. Hrg Tr. 1672 (Mr. Meehan: “And then I just got cold feet about it [redacted text].”) When asked during the hearing if WB Mason would accept a divestiture of cash assets from the Defendants to cover the expenses of nationwide expansion, Mr. Meehan would not commit to accepting such a proposal. Id. 1790 (“Mr, I don’t know if I would. That’s a big challenge.”). E. Amazon Business Amazon.com Inc.’s (“Amazon”) effort to compete in the office supply industry, including the B-to-B space, is Amazon Business. Amazon began exploring how to target companies’ procurement of office supplies more than fourteen years ago. PX02166, Mendelson Dep, 178:24-179:7; Hrg Tr. 525:10-526:10. In 2002, Amazon launched an “office product store at Amazon.com,” a cooperative effort with Office Depot. Mendelson Dep. 178:24-179:7. In 2007, Amazon launched the All Business Center. Id. 175:18-176:21. In April 2012, Amazon launched Amazon Supply, a marketplace for selling a variety of products, including office supplies to business customers. Hrg Tr, 524:3-4. Amazon Business was launched just over one year ago, in April 2015. Amazon Business is á “top priority” for Amazon, Hrg Tr. 659:17-20, and a “must win” opportunity. id. 660:8-14. In 2016, Amazon Business forecasts making $[redacted text] profit. Defendants’ Exhibit (“DX”) 05038. By 2020, Amazon Business’s forecasts estimate $[redacted text] revenue, [redacted text]. percent ($[redacted text]) coming from the sale of basic office supplies. Hrg Tr. 719:25-720:3, 856: 5-16. [redacted text] Hrg Tr. 573:3-574:24. Although in its infancy, Amazon’s vision is for Amazon Business to be the “preferred marketplace for all professional, busiiiess and institutional customers worldwide.”’ DX00030 at 1. Amazon Business has several undisputed strengths: tremendous brand recognition, a user-friendly marketplace, cutting edge technological innovation, and global reach. Hrg Tr. 663:13 (Vice President of Amazon Business, Pren-tis Wilson: “We actually don’t worry a lot about our competitors. Our focus has been on serving our customers.”). Amazon Business also has several weaknesses with regard to its entry into the B-to-B space. One weakness is that Amazon Business is inexperienced in the RFP process. Amazon Business has not bid on many RFPs and has yet to win a primary vendor contract. Hrg Tr. 561:11-13 (“Q: Has Amazon Business ever won an RFP for the role as primary supplier of office supplies? A: No.”). Amazon Business’ marketplace model is also at odds with the B-to-B industry because half of the sales made through the marketplace are from independent third-patty sellers over whom Amazon Business has no control. Hrg Tr. 843: 7-9 (“Q: You have no plans to force the third parties to offer particular prices? A: No, we’ll never do that. No.”). III. Legal Standards A. The Clayton Act Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers or acquisitions “the effect of [which] may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly,” in any “line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country.” 15 U.S.C. § 18. When the FTC has “reason to believe that a corporation is violating, or is about to violate, Section 7 of the Clayton Act,” it may seek a preliminary injunction under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to “prevent a merger pending the Commission’s administrative adjudication of the merger's legality.” F.T.C. v. Staples, Inc., 970 F.Supp. 1066, 1070 (D.D.C.1997) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)); see also Brown Shoe v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 317, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962) (“Congress saw the process of concentration in American business as a dynamic force; it sought to ensure the Federal Trade Commission and the courts the power to brake this force ... before it gathered momentum.”) “Section 13(b) provides for the grant of a preliminary injunction where such action would be in the public interest — as determined by a weighing of the equities and a consideration of the Commission’s likelihood of success on the merits.” F.T.C. v. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 714 (D.C.Cir.2001) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)). B. Section 13(b) Standard for Preliminary Injunction The standard for a preliminary injunction under Section 13(b) requires plaintiffs to show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; and (2) that the equities tip in favor of injunctive relief. FTC. v. Cardinal Health, 12 F.Supp.2d 34, 44 (D.D.C.1998). To establish a likelihood of success on the merits, the government must show that “there is a reasonable probability that the challenged transaction will substantially impair competition.” Staples, 970 F.Supp. at 1072 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Proof of actual anticompetitive effects is not required; instead, the FTC must show an appreciable danger of future coordinated interaction based on predictive judgment.” F.T.C. v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F.Supp.2d 109, 116 (D.D.C.2004) (internal quotations omitted). The Court’s task, therefore, is to “measure the probability that, after an administrative hearing on the merits, the Commission will succeed in proving that the effect of the [proposed] merger ‘may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly’ in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.’” Heinz, 246 F.3d at 714 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18). This standard is satisfied if the FTC raises questions going to the merits “so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make them fair ground for thorough investigation, study, deliberation and determination by the FTC in the first instance and ultimately by the Court of Appeals.” Id. at 714-15 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). As reflected by this standard, Congress’ concern regarding potentially anticompetitive mergers was with “probabilities, not certainties.” Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 323, 82 S.Ct. 1502 (other citations omitted). In sum, the Court “must balance the likelihood of the FTC’s success against the equities, under a sliding scale.” F.T.C. v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1035 (D.C.Cir.2008). The equities or “public interest” in the antitrust context include: “(1) the public interest in effectively enforcing antitrust laws, and (2) the public interest in ensuring that the FTC has the ability to order effective relief if it succeeds at the merits trial.” Sysco, 113 F.Supp.3d at 86. Nevertheless, “[t]he issuance of a preliminary injunction prior to a full trial on the merits is an extraordinary and drastic remedy.” F.T.C. v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1343 (D.C.Cir.l980)(cita-tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The government must come forward with rigorous proof to block a proposed merger because “the issuance of a preliminary injunction blocking an acquisition or merger may' prevent the transaction from ever being consummated.” Id. C. Baker Hughes Burden-Shifting Framework In United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982-83 (D.C.Cir.1990), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit established a burden-shifting framework for evaluating the FTC’s likelihood of success on the merits. See Heinz, 246 F.3d at 715. The government bears the initial burden of showing the merger would result in “undue concentration in the market for a particular product in a particular geographic area.” Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 982. Shewing that the merger would result in a single entity controlling such a large percentage of the relevant market so as to significantly increase the concentration of firms in that market entitles the government to a presumption that the merger will substantially lessen competition. Id. The burden then shifts to the defendants to rebut the presumption by offering proof that “the market-share statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the [merger’s] probable effects on competition in the relevant market.” Heinz, 246 F.3d at 715 (quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 95 S.Ct. 2099, 45 L.Ed.2d 41 (1975) (alterations in original)). “The more compelling the prima facie case, the more evidence the defendant must present to rebut it successfully.” Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 991. “A defendant can make the required showing by affirmatively showing why a given transaction is unlikely to substantially lessen competition, or by discrediting the data underlying the initial presumption in the government’s favor.” Id. “If the defendant successfully rebuts the presumption, the burden of producing additional evidence of anticompeti-tive effect shifts to the government, and merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains with the government at all times.” Id. at 983. “[A] failure of proof in any respect will mean the transaction should not be enjoined.” Arch Coal, 329 F.Supp.2d at 116. The court must also weigh the equities, but if the FTC is unable to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, the equities alone cannot justify an injunction. Id. IV. Discussion The Court’s analysis proceeds as follows: (A) legal principles considered when defining a relevant market; (B) application of legal principles to Plaintiffs’ market definition; (C) Defendants’ arguments in opposition to Plaintiffs’ alleged market; (D) conclusions regarding • the relevant market; (E) analysis of the Plaintiffs’ arguments relating to the probable effects on competition based on market share calculations; (F) Defendants’ arguments in opposition to Plaintiffs’ market share calculations; (G) conclusions' regarding Plaintiffs’ market share; (H) Plaintiffs’ evidence of additional harm; (I) 'Defendants’ response to Plaintiffs’ prima facie case; and (J) weighing the equities. A. Legal principles considered when defining a relevant market As discussed swpra, the burden is on the Plaintiffs to show that the merger would result in a single entity controlling such a large percentage of the relevant market that concentration is significantly increased and competition is lessened. See e.g. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 982. To consider whether the proposed merger may have anticompetitive, effects, the Court must first define the relevant market based on evidence proffered at the evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602, 618, 94 S.Ct. 2856, 41 L.Ed.2d 978 (1974) (Market definition is a “‘necessary predicate’ to deciding whether a merger contravenes the Clayton Act.”). Examination of the particular market, including its structure, history and probable future, is necessary to “provide the appropriate setting for judging the probable anticompetitive effects of the merger.” F.T.C. v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F.Supp.2d at 116 (quoting Brown Shoe at 322 n. 28, 82 S.Ct. 1502); see also United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486, 498, 94 S.Ct. 1186, 39 L.Ed.2d 530 (1974). “Defining the relevant market is critical in an antitrust case because the legality of the proposed merger [ ] in question almost always depénds on the market power of the parties involved.” Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d at 45. Two components are considered when defining a relevant market: (1) the geographic area where Defendants compete; and (2) the products and services with which the defendants’ products compete. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F.Supp.2d at 119. The parties agree that the United States is the relevant geographic market. Hrg Tr. (Shapiro) 2151:23-2152:4; see also Orszag Dep. 155:15-19. The parties vigorously disagree, however, about how the relevant product market should be defined. The Supreme Court in Brown Shoe established the basic rule for defining a product market: “The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.” Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325, 82 S.Ct. 1502. In other words, a product market includes all goods that are reasonable substitutes, even where the products are not entirely the same. Two factors contribute to an analysis of whether goods are “reasonable substitutes”: (1) functional interchangeability; and (2) cross-elasticity of demand. See e.g., Sysco, 113 F.Supp.3d at 25-26. As the following discussion demonstrates, the concepts of cluster and targeted markets are critical to defining the market in this case. a. Consumable office supplies as cluster market Cluster markets allow items that are not substitutes for each other to, be clustered together in one antitrust market for analytical convenience. Shapiro Report at 007 (noting that cluster markets are “commonly used by antitrust economists.”) The Supreme Court has made clear that “[w]e see no barrier to combining in a single market a number of different products or services where that combination reflects commercial realities.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 572, 86 S.Ct. 1698,16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966). Here, Plaintiffs allege that items such as pens, file folders, Post-it notes, binder clips, and paper for copiers and printers are included in this cluster market. Compl. ¶¶ 36-37. Although a pen is not a functional substitute for a paperclip, it is possible to cluster consumable office supplies into one market for analytical convenience. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. F.T.C., 749 F.3d 559, 565-68 (6th Cir.2014). Defining the market as a cluster market is justified in this case because “market shares and competitive conditions are likely to be similar for the distribution of pens to large customers and the distribution of binder clips to large customers.” Shapiro Report at 007; see also PX02167 (Orszag Dep. 91:11-15) (“So, for example, pens may not often be substitutes for notebooks in the context of this case, but a cluster market would, be the aggregation of those two and then the analysis of those together for, as we talked about earlier, analytical simplicity.”). b. Large B-to-B customers as target market Another legal principle relevant to market definition in this case is the concept of a “targeted” or “price discrimination” market. According to the Merger Guidelines: When examining possible adverse com- ' petitive effects from a ’ merger, the Agencies consider whether those effects vary significantly for different customers purchasing the same or similar products. Such differential impacts are possible when sellers can discriminate, e.g,, by profitably raising price to certain targeted customers but not to others. [■.,.] When price- - discrimination is feasible, ' adverse competitive effects on targeted customers can arise, even if such effects will ,not arise for other customers. A price increase for targeted customers may be profitable even if a price in- . crease for all customers would not be profitable because too many other customers would substitute away. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 3 (2010) (hereinafter Merger Guidelines). Defining a market around a targeted consumer, therefore," requires finding that sellers could “profitably target a subset of customers for price increases ...” See Sysco, 113 F.Supp.3d at 38 (citing Merger Guidelines Section 4.1.4.). This means that there must be differentiated pricing and limited arbitrage. Dr. Shapiro concluded that arbitrage is limited here because “it is not practical or attractive for a large customer to purchase indirectly from or through smaller customers.” Id. B. Application of relevant legal principles to Plaintiffs’ market definition The concepts of cluster and targeted markets inform the Court’s critical consideration when defining the market in this case: the products and services with which the Defendants’ products compete. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F.Supp.2d at 119. The parties vigorously disagree on how the market should be defined. As noted supra, Plaintiffs argue that the relevant market is a cluster market of “consumable office supplies” which consists of “an assortment of office supplies, such as pens, paper clips, notepads and copy paper,.that are used and. replenished frequently.” Compl. ¶¶ 36-37. Plaintiffs’ alleged relevant market is also a targeted market, limited to B-to-B customers, specifically large B-to-B customers who spend $500,000 or more on office supplies annually. Hrg Tr. 30:4-6. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Plaintiffs’ alleged market definition is wrong because it is a “gerrymandered and artificially narrow product market limited to some, but not all, consumable office supplies sold to only the most powerful companies in the world.” Defs.’ FOF ¶4 (emphasis in original). In particular, Defendants insist that ink and toner must be included in a proper definition of the relevant product market. Id. ¶ 101. Defendants also argue that no evidence supports finding sales to large B-to-B customers as a distinct market. Id. ¶ 77. 1. Brown Shoe “Practical Indicia” The Broum Shoe practical indicia support Plaintiffs’ definition of the relevant product market. The Brown Shoe “practical indicia” include: (1) industry or public recognition of the market as a separate economic entity; (2) the product’s peculiar characteristics and uses; (3) unique production facilities; (4) distinct customers; (5) distinct prices; (6) sensitivity to price changes; and (7) specialized vendors. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325, 82 S.Ct. 1502. Courts routinely rely on the Brown Shoe factors to define the relevant product market. See, e.g. Staples, 970 F.Supp. at 1075-80; Cardinal Health, 12 F.Supp.2d at 46-48; F.T.C. v. Swedish Match, 131 F.Supp.2d 151, 159-64 (D.D.C.2000); F.T.C. v. CCC Holdings, 605 F.Supp.2d 26, 39-44 (D.D.C.2009); United States v. H & R Block, 833 F.Supp.2d 36, 51-60 (D.D.C. 2011). The most relevant Brown Shoe indicia in this case are: (a) industry or public recog-ration of the market as a separate economic entity; (b) distinct prices and sensitivity to price changes;- and (c) distinct customers that require specialized vendors that offer- value-added services, including: (i) sophisticated information technology; (IT) services; (ii) high quality customer service; and (iii) expedited delivery. a. Industry or public recognition of the alleged market as a separate economic entity Vendors in the office supply industry identify customers according to how much they spend annually and recognize B-to-B customers as a distinct group. Shapiro Report 006-008. For example, Staples defines “Enterprise” customers as those who spend over $1 million per year, “Commercial” customers as those who spend between $100,000 and $1 million per year, and “mid-market” customers as those who spend between $6,000 and $100,000 per year. PX04062 (SPLS) at 009; PX04088 (SPLS) at 23. Office Depot maintains similar categories. PX02002 (Calkins, Office Depot (“ODP”) IH 85:16-86:7). According to Staples, the $500,000 spend mark is a “threshold” that requires “clpser.: attention” be paid to the. customer. PX02153 (Mutschler (SPLS) Dep. 56:11-20). These examples demonstrate that the industry recognizes large B-to-B customers as a separate economic entity. b. Distinct prices and a high sensitivity to price changes Large B-to-B customers. solicit RFPs, requests for information (“RFI”), requests for quote (“RFQ”), or similar processes to select their primary office supply vendor. See e.g., Hrg Tr. (AEP) 194:10-195:16; Hrg Tr. (HPG) 1883, 1915:13-1916:18. Through these competitive processes, large B-to-B customers enter into multi-year contracts that typically last for three to five years. Hrg Tr. at 70,. 92. Large B-to-B customers generally request prices for all items on their core list of office supplies, particularly those purchased in high volume. Hrg. Tr. (AEP) 207:19-208:10; (Select Medical) 1012:18-25; 1112:14-18; The volume of consumable office supplies purchased by large B-to-B customers allows them to purchase office supplies for half the price paid by the average retail consumer. Shapiro Report at 019. Multi-year contracts with a primary office supply vendor allow large B-to-B customers to avoid regional price differences and to lock in prices on core items for several years. Hrg Tr. (Select Medical) 1.023:3-7; (HPG) 1929:8-1931:19. B-to-B contracts are not exclusive, which means that B-to-B customers can buy office supplies off contract at any time without penalty. See e.g. Hrg Tr. at 411:7-20; 412:9-12; 919:20-25; 1898:24-1900:23. B-to-B customers may seek to amend the items on their core list and re-negotiate the price for those items. PX02100 (Heisroth (SPLS) Dep. 92:1-16). B-to-B customers typically receive a flat percentage discount off published prices for non-core items. Pis.’ FOF ¶52. Upfront payments and volume discounts also reduce costs for large B-to-B customers. Hrg Tr. (AEP) 173:1-23; (Mees-ter (Best Buy)) 1320:4-10. In addition to price, other services are also evaluated, including delivery and information technology capabilities, customer service, and more. Hrg Tr. (AEP) 208:12-22; (HPG) 1914:15-1915:10. After evaluating all proposals and selecting finalists, intense competition between the top two or three bidders ensues. Hrg Tr. (AEP) 209:17-210:3. Vendors naturally seek to charge B-to-B customers the highest price possible, while the B-to-B customers’ interest in obtaining the lowest possible price is served by the head-to-head competition among vendors. PX02002 (Calkins (ODP) IH 305:7-306:8). Large B-to-B customers possess a tremendous amount of bargaining power. See e.g. Hrg Tr. 404:3-16; 940:20-941:12. The bargaining power of large B-to-B customers is enhanced by their ability to pit Defendants against each other. For example, in 2015, Staples was in “a dog fight” with Office Depot for [redacted textj’s business, so it offered an additional 1.5 percent volume rebate, PX04064. In November 2014, Staples offered a $[redacted text] upfront payment to win a contract with [redacted text], beating Office Depot’s offer of $[redacted text]. PX04034 (SPLS) at 001. In 2014, Office Depot offered [redacted text] a retention incentive of $[redacted text] per year for three years. PX05266 (ODP) at 001. These examples demonstrate that large B-to-B customers are extremely price sensitive, c. Large B-to-B customers are distinct In addition to wanting the best price, large B-to-B customers also want the best service. PX02003 (Ringel (SPLS) IH 127:9-11) (“It’s not always about the company wanting the lowest price, they want the best service, they want the best services, they want a competitive price, and they want good representation.”). This includes sophisticated IT capabilities, personalized customer service,'and expeditéd delivery capabilities. See e.g. Hrg Tr. (HPG) 1914:15-1915:10; PX02119 (O’Neill (AEP) Dep.) -262:16-263:5; PX 07006 ([redacted text]) at 012. i. Sophisticated IT capabilities Sophisticated IT capabilities include customizable product catalogs, electronic procurement systems, and punch-out sites. See e.g., Hrg Tr. (McDonalds) 375:25-376:13; (PDME) 1391:7-23. Customized catalogs allow large B-to-B customers to limit the products their employees can purchase in accordance with the specific high-volume items for which they have negotiated the lowest price from their vendor. See e.g., Hrg Tr, (Select Medical) 1067:16-25; 1069:3-1070:4. The “punch out” IT interface enables companies to control ordering, approval, payment and invoicing. Hrg Tr. (WB Mason) 1624:3-1625:20. Such IT capabilities are expensive and are therefore offered by only a select few nationwide vendors. PX03032 (Pfizer Deck ¶ 9). These capabilities are critical, however, to invoicing in such a way that reduces the administrative burden of processing a high volume of invoices. Hrg Tr. 1624. In addition to detailed invoicing, large B-to-B customers require utilization reports. See e.g., Hrg Tr. (AEP) 182:1-9; (McDonalds) 376:14-377:9. These reports include data on the products ordered by employees (whether they are core or non-core), the quantity, unit price and delivery location. Id. (Best Buy) 1237:7-1238:4. The reports also identify the product purchased by employees at the stock keeping unit (“SKU”) level. Id. This detailed reporting allows B-to-B customers to track spending and make necessary adjustments in order to decrease off-contract spend and save money, Id. ii. Personalized, high quality customer service Dedicated customer service experts are another unique feature demanded by large B-to-B contract customers. See e.g,, (WB Mason) 1631:18-1633:9. Large B-to-B customers demand an office supply vendor that provides a dedicated account manager, Id. (BestBuy) Hrg 1241:14-18; (HPG) 1938:7-13. Account managers for large B-to-B customers are expected to understand the customers’ office supply needs. Id. (AEP) 187:19-18:14. According to Staples’ CEO Ron Sargent, large B-to-B customers require “more high-touch hand holding” from dedicated sales experts, PX02012. iii. Next day and desktop delivery The sale and distribution of consumable office supplies to large B-to-B customers, many of whom have locations nationwide, requires the warehousing, sale, and distribution of a wide range of office supplies. Hrg Tr. (HPG) 1907:24-25. Nationwide delivery to dispersed geographic locations is critical for large B-to-B customers. See e.g., Hrg Tr. (Fifth Third Bank) 895:24-896:13. Large B-to-B customers require reliable next-day delivery because they have limited storage space for office supplies. Id. (Select Medical) 1082:1-1083:24. Large B-to-B customers also prefer a vendor with the ability to make desktop deliveries because such a service eliminates the need to hire employees to make internal deliveries. Hrg Tr. (Fifth Third Bank) 982:25-983:10, 983:17-984:12. Defendants are the only two office supply vendors that provide nation-wide desktop delivery. Id. (WB Mason) 1695:25-1696:5. Defendants tout their nationwide distribution capabilities to differentiate themselves among other office supply vendors. PX 02002 (Cal-kins (QDP) IH 118:21 — 119:2); PX04321 (SPLS) at 001; PX04469 (SPLS) at 014; PX05380 (ODP) at 044; PX04320 (SPLS) at 001; PX04338 (SPLS) at 004.. In sum, the evidence shows that the Brown Shoe factors support Plaintiffs’ alleged market definition because there is: (a) industry or public recognition of the market as a separate economic entity; (b) B-to-B customers demand distinct prices and demonstrate a high sensitivity to price changes; and (c) B-to-B customers require specialized vendors that offer value-added services, including: (i) sophisticated information technology (IT) services; (ii) high quality customer service; and (iii) expedited delivery. These factors support viewing large B-to-B customers as a target market. 2. Expert testimony of Dr. Carl Shapiro ■ and. the Hypothetical Monopolist Test In addition to the Brown Shoe factors, the Court must consider the expert testimony offered by Plaintiffs in this case. The parties agree that the main test used by economists to determine a product market is the hypothetical monopolist test. (“HMT”). Shapiro Report at 014; see Orsz-ag Dep. at 89:6-8. This test queries whether a hypothetical monopolist who has control over the products in an alleged market could profitably raise prices on those products. Defs.’ FOF ¶ 31 (“The key question is whether a hypothetical monopolist- in the alleged market profitably could impose a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price (“SSNIP”)”) (citing United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 1098 at 1111-12 (N.D.Cal.2004)). If so, the products may comprise a relevant product market. See H & R Block, 833 F.Supp.2d at 51-52. The HMT is explained in the Merger Guidelines. [T]he test requires that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm,, not subject to price regulation, that was the only present and future seller of those, products .., likely would impose at least a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price (“SSNIP”) on at least one product in the market, including at least one product sold by one of the merging firms. Merger Guidelines § 4.1.1 The SSNIP is generally assumed to be “five percent of the price paid by customers for the products or services to which the merging firms contribute value.” Merger Guidelines § 4.1.2. Dr. Shapiro’s HMT analysis emphasizes that the proposed or “candidate” market consisting of the sale and distribution of consumable office supplies includes all methods of procuring office supplies by large companies, i.e. procurement through a primary vendor relationship, off contract purchases, online and retail buys. Shapiro Report at 014. “Since the hypothetical monopolist, by definition, controls all sources of supply to large customers, it would not have to worry that raising prices would cause large customers to switch to other suppliers of consumable office supplies: by definition, there are none.” Id. Dr. Shapiro also points out that Staples and Office Depot’s head-to-head competition “tells us that a monopoly provider of consumable office supplies would charge significantly more to large customers than Staples and Office Depot today charge these same customers.” Id. Dr. Shapiro also highlights the record evidence that demonstrates Defendants compete “fiercely” for business in the large B-to-B space. Id. Dr. Shapiro concludes that such competition implies that “the elimination of competition would lead to a significant price increase to large customers, which in turn implies that the HMT is satisfied.” Id. ■ Dr. Shapiro’s conclusions are supported by the testimony presented during the hearing. For example, Mr. O’Neill, who testified on behalf of AEP, noted that the Company was able to get a lower price because of competition between Staples and Office Depot. Hrg Tr. 340. Mr. Jason Cervone, Sourcing Manager of indirect procurement at McDonalds, acknowledged the same. Id. at 492 (“So in our definition of what we need in terms of vendor in this space [with Staples and Office Depot] you have more chance of lowering prices or maintaining pricing than you would with just one player there.”); see also Hrg Tr. 1890:15-24 (Mr. Wright for HPG: “Without competition, we can’t secure best-in-class price and best-in-class terms for our members and that’s really part of our operating model.”). In sum, Dr. Shapiro’s expert report and testimony, as well as the testimony of the corporate representatives, supports Plaintiffs’ definition of the relevant market as the sale and distribution of consumable office supplies to large B-to-B customers. C. Defendants’ arguments in opposition to Plaintiffs’ alleged market Defendants make two primary' arguments in response to Plaintiffs’ alleged market. First, although Defendants do not explicitly discuss the Brown Shoe practical indicia, they argue that exclusion of ink and toner, as well as “beyond office supplies” or “BOSS” products from the alleged market, is error. Defs.’ FOF ¶¶ 6 and 72. Second, Defendants argue that no evidence supports Plaintiffs’ contention that large B-to-B customers should be treated as a separate market. Defs.’ FOF ¶ 77. 1. Exclusion of ink, toner and BOSS from alleged market is proper Defendants’ principal challenge to Plaintiffs’ alleged market centers on the exclusion of ink, toner and BOSS from the alleged relevant market. Defendants advance three arguments, none of which are persuasive. First, Defendants argue that exclusion of these products from the alleged market is a “made for litigation market,” that is inconsistent with commercial realties. Defs.’ FOF ¶ 6. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ market definition is inconsistent with the one used by the FTC in 1997 and 2013. Id. Finally, Defendants seize on Dr. Shapiro’s admission that the FTC made the decision to exclude ink and toner from the proposed market prior to his independent determination that doing so was proper. Id. These arguments are addressed in turn, a. Defendants’ argument for inclusion of ink and toner fails because they are not subject to the same competitive conditions as general office supplies Defendants’ fundamental legal argument for inclusion of ink, toner and BOSS products in the alleged market is that “a well-defined product market must correspond to the commercial realties of the industry and be economically significant.” Defs.’ FOF ¶ 32 (citing Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 336-37, 82 S.Ct. 1502). Defendants argue that the dispositive “commercial reality” is that many large B-to-B customers include ink, toner and other BOSS products in the bundle of goods they contract for with their primary vendor. Defs.’ FOF ¶74. Many large businesses include these adjacent items in their primary vendor bundle. Hrg Tr. 2641:3-9 (Professor Shapiro agreed that BOSS products are included in customer contracts and RFPs “the overwhelming majority of the time.”); see also id. at 235:19-236:25; 342:13-343:1; 351:10-13; 353:8-14 (AEP testifying that “office supplies” includes pens, pencils, paper, binder clips, folders, ink and toner, [janitorial and sanitation “jan/san”] materials, break room supplies, furniture, and technology); see also id, at 397:11-398:22 (McDonald’s testifying that “office supplies” includes traditional office supplies, toner, and copy paper, as well as break room supplies and some technology items). However, Defendants do not address the critical question that must be answered when determining whether a particular product should be included in a cluster market: are the items subject to the ■ same competitive conditions? ProMedica Health, 749 F.3d at 566 (holding that “the competitive conditions across the markets for primary and secondary services are similar enough to justify clustering of those markets when analyzing the merger’s competitive effects.”); see also Hrg Tr. (Shapiro) 2123:3-2124:21, 2313:19-2314:8. Competition for the sale of ink and toner has increased due to the “recent and rapid” rise of Managed Print Services (“MPS”). Pis.’ FOF ¶ 26. MPS vendors like Xerox, Hewlett-Packard, Lexmark, and Ricoh provide a bundle of services that includes sale of ink and toner in addition to service and maintenance of printers and copiers. See e.g., Hrg Tr. (Select Medical) 1018:18-1019:3; (WB Mason) 1604:14-20. There is ample record evidence to show that ink, toner, and other adjacent BOSS items are properly excluded from the relevant market because they are subject to distinct competitive conditions. For example, some large companies are shifting all of their ink and toner business to an MPS. See e.g., Hrg Tr. 357-358; 503 (McDonalds noting that in November 2015 it changed from Office Depot to an MPS to procure its ink and toner and that the number of companies capable of providing ink and toner is larger than those that provide office supplies). Other large companies are disaggregating ink and toner' purchases between their primary vendor and an MPS. Id. (AEP) 236 (noting that AEP buys some ink and toner from Office Depot and some from Xerox). Many companies hold separate sourcing events for ink and toner. See e.g., Hrg Tr. 166-170 (AEP confirming that it runs a separate sourcing event for office furniture, jan/san and ink and toner); id. at 1019:13-1020:3 (Select Medical noting five vendors submitted bids during,its 2013 RFP for MPS. Select Medical ultimately contracted with MPS Total Print); id. at 1316-18 (Best Buy confirming purchases of BOSS items from Kimberly-Clark and ink and toner through MPS contract with Hewlett-Packard). The same is true of other BOSS items. Hrg Tr. 168 (AEP: “... most of our commercial, if not all of our commercial jan san is part of a janitorial contract that also provides labor.”). Moreover, the authority relied on by Defendants is readily distinguished. Defendants rely on Brorni Shoe to support a focus on the “commercial realities of the industry.” However, Defendants rely on Broivn Shoe’s discussion of the proper geographic boundaries of a market, which is distinct from Brown, Shoe’s discussion of the relevant product market. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 336-37, 82 S.Ct. 1502 (“The geographic market selected must, therefore both ‘correspond to the commercial realities of the industry’ and be economically significant.”). To the extent that the “commercial realities of the industry” are important in this case, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the commercial realities are “that Defendants are the largest and second-largest office supplies vendors in the country; they are each other’s closest competitor for large business customers; bid data show that they lose bids most often to each other; and large customers currently benefit greatly from their head-to-head competition.” Pis.’ FOF ¶ 288. Defendants also rely on PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca Cola Co., a case brought by PepsiCo under Section 2 of the Sherman Act alleging that Coca Cola had monopolized, or attempted to monopolize, the market of fountain syrup distributed by independent food service entities. 114 F.Supp.2d 243 (S.D.N.Y.2000). PepsiCo is distinguishable for a number of reasons. First, the critical question before the Court in PepsiCo was whether the evidence supported a finding that the distribution channel of fountain syrup through independent foodservice distributors should be recognized as a relevant market. Id. at 249-50. The Court rejected PepsiCo’s proposed relevant market because the evidence showed that “while customers view fountain syrup delivered through independent foodservice distributors as preferential and advantageous, they view fountain syrup delivered through other means as acceptable.” Id. Here, the record evidence shows that large B-to-B customers do not view any alternative sources for bulk procurement of basic, office supplies that would retain the current competitive conditions of the market. Hrg Tr. 349 (AEP) (“I think our team would be very good at finding alternatives to provide pens and pencils; however, they cannot create competition.”); Id. (McDonalds)(“We would attempt to look for alternatives. We find ourselves, though, back to a situation, where we don’t have another national player that has a retail footprint nationwide that stocks everything we need ...”) In contrast, large B-to-B customers not only view alternative vendors for ink, toner and BOSS as adequate, they increasingly contract with MPS, furniture, and janitorial companies for their primary purchase of these distinct products. See e.g., Hrg Tr. 1019 (Select Medial) (after considering MPS bids in 2013 from Office Depot, OfficeMax, Staples, Total Print and Weaver, Select Medical entered into a contract with Total Print for its MPS needs). In light of these distinctions, PepsiCo does not support a finding that Plaintiffs’ alleged market is in error. In sum, inclusion of ink, toner and BOSS items by large companies in the bundle of goods they want to have the option of purchasing through their primary vendor does not mean that those goods are subject to the same competitive conditions, b. Consideration of ink and toner during 1997 and 2013 investigations Next, Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs’ alleged market is inconsistent with how the FTC defined the market during its investigation of the Staples and Office Depot proposed merger in 1997 and the Office Depot-and Office Max merger in 2013. Defs.’ FOF ¶ 113-116. In 1997, the proposed merger between Staples and Office Depot was enjoined by this Court. F.T.C. v. Staples, 970 F.Supp. 1066, 1070 (D.D.C.1997) (J. Hogan).- At that time, FTC included ink and toner in its definition of consumable office supplies. Id. at 1080. However, scant precedential value can be gleaned from comparing the defined market in that case and the Plaintiffs’ alleged market in this case. The 1997 case is nearly twenty years old, and the office supply market has changed dramatically since that time. For example, as discussed in Section IV.B.l.a. supra, the rise of MPS services as a competitive force has occurred in the last several years. Moreover, the 1997 Staples case was a retail case that focused on how the proposed merger would affect the average consumer. The case before the Court today is a contract channel case focused on large B-to-B customers. In 2013, after a seven month investigation, the FTC did not .challenge Office Depot’s proposed acquisition of Office Max. See FTC’s Closing Statement ("2013 Closing Statement”), https://www.ftc.gov/ system/files/documents/publicstatements/ statement-commission/131101officedepot officemaxstatement,pdf. Because the Commission cited to the definition of consumable office supplies from Staples in its Closing Statement, Defendants argue that ink and toner should be included in the relevant market because Plaintiffs “presented no evidence whatsoever that the ‘competitive conditions’ are different in any way from November 2013.” Defs.’ FOF ¶ 116. The Court rejects this argument. In the 2013 Closing Statement, one of the rationales for allowing the proposed merger to proceed was because: large customers use a variety of tools to ensure that they receive competitive pricing such as ordering' certain products (like ink and toner) directly from manufacturers and sourcing (or threatening to source) certain categories of office supply products from multiple firms. 2013 Closing Statement at 3. The FTC’s decision recognized that "yesterday’s market dynamics may be very different from market dynamics of today.” Id. Plaintiffs’ decision to not include ink and toner in their proposed relevant market in this case is therefore entirely consistent with the 2013 decision to not challenge the Office Depot and Office Max merger. See also, Hrg Tr. 3593 (Plaintiffs’ closing argument noting that the 2013 decision is “wholly consistent with what we’re doing here. It’s exactly the same thing. We did not see a reason to challenge ink and toner based on the evidence that was developed in the investigation.”). c. Dr. Shapiro and the FTC worked collaboratively to determine that ink and toner should be excluded •Finally, Defendants challenge the propriety of excluding ink and toner from the alleged cluster market based on Dr. Shapiro’s testimony indicating that the decision to exclude ink and toner resulted from a collaborative process with.-the FTC and that he did not perform a market share analysis including ink and toner. Defs.’ FOF ¶ 121-124. The Court, is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument. First, the fact that the FTC works collaboratively with its experts to determine what products should be included in an antitrust market is not problematic. The FTC’s own economists contribute to the FTC’s decision regarding the relevant market prior to the time the expert witness for trial is retained. See e.g. Hrg Tr. 2907 (Ms. Rein-hart: “The amount of work that went into this investigation is huge. And these staff attorneys, they’re experts themselves. They know the antitrust laws, they know the antitrust economics. ... ”). Further, Defendants take Dr. Shapiro’s testimony regarding market shares of Defendants for ink and toner out of context. Defs.’ FOF ¶ 124. Defendants’ highlight Dr. Shapiro’s statement that if one were to calculate market shares for ink and toner, Defendants’ share would be significantly smaller. Id. Defendants seek to imply that Dr. Shapiro agrees that Defendants’ market shares in the alleged market would be smaller if ink and toner were included. However, Dr. Shapiro’s comment was referring to his earlier statement that: I think that both the FTC and Staples and Office Depot agree, as far as I can tell, that if you took Staples and Office Depot’s market share in ink and toner, it , would be significantly lower than it is in core office supplies and paper. To me that is confirmation that it’s correct not to include ink and toner in the cluster. Hrg Tr. 2783. In other words, because there are more companies that sell ink and toner, Defendants’ market share in an ink and toner market would be lower than they are in the alleged market. All of the above arguments are advanced by Defendants to bolster their assertion that the Plaintiffs have “gerrymandered the market” to inflate Defendants’ market share. Defs.’ FOF ¶ 4. As discussed supra, voluminous record evidence supports excluding ink, toner and BOSS products from the relevant cluster market. To the extent Defendants sought to show that exclusion of ink and toner radically altered Defendants’ market share, Defendants could have presented expert testimony to support that proposition. 2. Antitrust laws exist to protect competition, not a particular set of consumers Defendants’ second primary argument in opposition to Plaintiffs’ proposed relevant market is that “there is no evidence to support Plaintiffs’ claim that large B-to-Bs should be treated as a separate market.” Defs’ FOF ¶ 77. Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs’ attempt to protect “mega companies” is misplaced because the merger “indisputably will benefit all retail customers, and more, than 99 percent of business customers.” Defs.’ FOF ¶ 1. Antitrust laws exist to protect competition, even for a targeted group that represents a relatively small part of an overall market. See Merger Guidelines § 3 (“When price discrimination is feasible, adverse competitive effects on targeted customers can arise, even if such effects will not arise for other customers.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that within a broad market, “well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes.” Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 325, 82 S.Ct. 1502, (1962); Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d at 47 (concluding that “the services provided by wholesalers in fact comprise a distinct submarket within the larger market of drug delivery.”); ' See e.g. Sysco, 113 F.Supp.3d at 40 (holding that “the ordinary factors that courts consider- in defining a market the Brown Shoe practical indicia and the Merger Guidelines’ SSNIP test — support a finding that broadline distribution to national customers is a relevant product market.”); see also United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 360, 90 S.Ct. 2035, 26 L.Ed.2d 658 (1970) (“[I]t is the cluster of products and services ... that as a matter of trade reality makes commercial banking a distinct” market). As discussed in Section IV.A.2.a-c supra, the nature of how large B-to-B' customers operate, including the services they demand, supports a finding that they are a targeted customer market for procurement of consumable office supplies. There is overwhelming evidence in this case that large B-to-B customers constitute a market that Defendants could target for price increases if they are allowed to merge. Significantly, Defendants themselves used the proposed merger to pressure B-to-B customers to lock in prices based on the expectation that they would lose negotiating leverage if. the merger were approved. See e.g., PX05236 (ODP) at 001 (“This offer is time sensitive. If and when the purchase of Office Depot is approved, Staples will have no reason to make this offer.”); PX05249 (ODP) at 001 (“[The merger] will remove, your ability to evaluate your program with two competitors. There will only be one.”); PX05514 (ODP) at 003 (“Today, the FTC announced 45 days for its final decision. You still have time! You would be able to leverage the competition, gain an agreement that is grandfathered in and drive down expenses!”). ■ D. Conclusions regarding the definition of the relevant market The “practical indicia” set forth by the Supreme Court in Broum Shoe and Dr. Shapiro’s expert testimony support the conclusion that Plaintiffs’ alleged market of consumable office supplies (a cluster market) sold and' distributed by Defendants to large B-to-B customers (a targeted market) is a relevant market for antitrust purposes. The Brown Shoe factors support Plaintiffs’ argument that the sale and distribution of consumable office supplies to large B-to-B customers is a proper antitrust market because the evidence supports the conclusion that: (1) there is industry or public recognition of the mark