Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Carlton W. Reeves, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE The plaintiffs filed these suits to enjoin a new state law, “House Bill 1523,” before it goes into effect on July 1, 2016. They contend that the law violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Attorney General’s Office has entered its appearance to defend HB 1523. The parties briefed the relevant issues and presented evidence and argument at a joint hearing on June 23 and 24, 2016. The United States Supreme Court has spoken clearly on the constitutional principles at stake. Under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, a state “may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another.” Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968). “When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s ostensible object is to take sides.” McCreary Cnty., Kentucky v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 860, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005) (citation omitted). Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, meanwhile, a state may not deprive lesbian and gay citizens of “the protection of general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 630, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996). HB 1523 grants special rights to citizens who hold one of three “sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions” reflecting disapproval of lesbian, gay, transgender, and unmarried persons. Miss. Laws 2016, HB 1523 § 2 (eff. July 1, 2016). That violates both the guarantee of religious neutrality and the promise of equal protection of the laws. The Establishment Clause is violated because persons who hold contrary religious beliefs are unprotected—the State has put its thumb on the scale to favor some religious beliefs over others. Showing such favor tells “nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and ... adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). And the Equal Protection Clause is violated by HB 1523’s authorization of arbitrary discrimination against lesbian, gay, transgender, and unmarried persons. “It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 633, 116 S.Ct. 1620. The plaintiffs' motions are granted and HB 1523 is preliminarily enjoined. I. The Parties A. Plaintiffs The plaintiffs in this matter are 13 individuals and two organizations—Joshua Generation Metropolitan Community Church (JGMCC) and the Campaign for Southern Equality (CSE). All of the individual plaintiffs are residents, citizens, and taxpayers of Mississippi who disagree with the beliefs protected by HB 1523. They fall into three broad and sometimes overlapping categories: (1) clergy and other religious officials whose religious beliefs are not reflected in HB 1523; (2) members of groups targeted by HB 1523; and (3) other citizens who, based on then- religious or moral convictions, do not hold the beliefs HB 1523 protects. The first group includes Rev. Dr. Rims Barber, Rev. Carol Burnett, Rev. Don Fortenberry, Brandiilyne Mangum-Dear, Susan Mangum, and Rev. Dr. Susan Hros-towski. Rev. Dr. Barber is an ordained minister in the Presbyterian church. Rev. Burnett is an ordained United Methodist minister. Rev. Fortenberry is an ordained United Methodist minister and the retired chaplain of Millsaps' College. Mangum-Dear is the pastor at JGMCC, while Man-gum is the director of worship at that church. Rev. Dr. Hrostowski is the vicar of St. Elizabeth’s Episcopal Church in Collins, Mississippi, as well as an employee of the University of Southern Mississippi. Katherine Elizabeth Day, Anthony (Tony) Laine Boyette, Dr. Susan Glisson, and Renick Taylor comprise the second group of plaintiffs. Day is a transgender woman; Boyette is a transgender man. Dr. Glisson, an employee of the University of Mississippi, is unmarried and in a long-term sexual romantic relationship with an unmarried man. Taylor is a gay man who is engaged to his male partner. The couple plans to marry in the summer of 2017. The third group of individual plaintiffs includes Joan Bailey, Derrick Johnson, and Dorothy Triplett. Bailey is a retired therapist whose practice was primarily devoted to lesbians. Johnson is the Executive Director of the Mississippi State Conference of the NAACP, and Triplett is a retired government employee and a longtime-activist. JGMCC is a ministry in Forrest County, Mississippi, whose members fall into all three categories. It “welcomes all people regardless of age, race, sexual orientation, gender identity, or social status.” Docket No. 1, ¶ 16, in Cause No. 3:16-CV-417 [hereinafter Barber], In particular, the church sponsors “a community service ministry that promotes LGBT + equality.” Id. Approximately 90% of its members in Forrest County identify as LGBT. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 168, Barber v. Bryant, No. 3:16-CV-417 (S.D. Miss. June 23, 2016) [hereinafter Tr. of June 23]. There are over 400 Metropolitan Community Churches worldwide. Id. CSE is a non-profit organization that works “across the South to promote the full humanity and equality of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people in American life.” Docket No. 2-2, at 2, in Cause No. 3:16-CV-442 [hereinafter CSE iy]. It is based in North Carolina but has worked in Mississippi since 2012. Id. CSE claims to advocate for Mississippians in all three categories of plaintiffs. Id. at 4. B. Defendants Governor Phil Bryant is sued in his official capacity as the chief executive of the State of Mississippi. State law charges him with the responsibility to “see that the laws are faithfully executed.” Miss. Code Ann. § 7-l-5(c). Attorney General Jim Hood is also sued in his official capacity. Among his powers and duties, he is required to “intervene and argue the constitutionality of any statute when notified of a challenge.” Id. § 7-5-1; see In the Interest of R.G., 632 So.2d 953, 955 (Miss.1994). John Davis is the Executive Director of the Mississippi Department of Human Services. Under Mississippi Code § 43-1-2(5), he is tasked with implementing state laws protecting children. One of the offices under his purview, the Division of Family and Children’s Services, is “responsible for the development, execution and provisions of services” regarding foster care, adoption, licensure, and other social services. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-1-51. Judy Moulder is the Mississippi State Registrar of Vital Records. She is responsible for “carry[ing] into effect the provisions of law relating to registration of marriages.” Id. § 51-57-43. HB 1523 requires Moulder to collect and record recusal notices from persons authorized to issue marriage licenses who wish to not issue marriage licenses to certain couples due to a belief enumerated in HB 1523. HB 1523 § 3(8)(a). II. Factual and Procedural History A. Same-Sex Marriage Because HB 1523 is a direct response to the Supreme Court’s 2015 same-sex marriage ruling, it is necessary to discuss the background of that ruling. This country had long debated whether lesbian and gay couples could join the institution of civil marriage. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom, The New Republic, Aug, 27, 1989. The debate played itself out on the local, state, and national levels via constitutional amendments, legislative enactments, ballot initiatives, and propositions. In its most optimistic retelling, “[indi-viduáis on both sides of the issue passionately, but respectfully, attempted to persuade their fellow citizens to accept their views.” Obergefell v. Hodges, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2627, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But . see David Carter, Stonewall: The Riots that Sparked the Gay Revolution 109-10,183-84 (2004) (describing the 1966 Compton’s Cafeteria riots by transgender citizens in San Francisco, and the famous 1969 Stonewall riots in New York City). Less charitably, but also true, is the reality that every time lesbian and gay citizens moved one step closer to legal equality, voters and their representatives passed new laws to preserve the status quo. In the 1990s, for example, Hawaii’s same-sex marriage lawsuit inspired the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and a wave of state-level “mini-DOMAs.” Campaign for Southern Equality v. Bryant, 64 F.Supp.3d 906, 915 (S.D.Miss.2014) [hereinafter CSE I], Mississippi’s politicians joined the movement by issuing an executive order and passing a law banning same-sex marriage. Id. It was not until 2013 that DOMA was struck down in part. United States v. Windsor, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013). Mississippi’s mini-DOMA lasted until 2015. CSE I, 64 F.Supp.3d at 906. In the early 2000s, Lawrence v. Texas and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, cases, that found in favor of lesbian and gay.privacy and marriage rights, respectively, resulted in a wave of state constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage. CSE I, 64 F.Supp.3d at 915. Mississippians approved such a constitutional amendment by the largest margin in the nation. Id.; see Michael Foust, ‘Gay Marriage’ a Loser: Amendments Pass in all 11 States, Baptist Press, Nov. 3, 2004. The lawfulness of same-sex marriage was finally resolved in 2015. The Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that same-sex couples must be allowed to join in civil marriage “on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.” 135 S.Ct. at 2605. The decision applies to every governmental agency and agent in the country. “The majority of the United States Supreme Court dictates the law of the land, and lower courts are bound to follow it.” Campaign for Southern Equality v. Mississippi Dep’t of Human Servs., 175 F.Supp.3d 691, 710, 2016 WL 1306202, at *14 (S.D.Miss. Mar. 31, 2016) [hereinafter CSE III]. Many celebrated the ruling as overdue. Others felt like change was happening too quickly. And some citizens were concerned enough to advocate new laws “to insulate state officials from legal risk if they do not obey the decision based on a religious objection.” Lyle Denniston, A Plea to Resist the Cmort on Same-Sex Marriage, SCOTUSblog, July 9,2015. The Supreme Court’s decision had taken pains to reaffirm religious rights. Its commitment to the free exercise of religion is important and must be quoted in full. ' Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continué to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned.' The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. ... In turn, those who believe allowing same-sex marriage is proper or indeed essential, whether as "a matter of religious conviction or secular belief, may engage those who disagree with their view in an open and searching debate. The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2607. “As the Obergefell majority makes clear, the First Amendment must protect the rights of [religious] individuals, even when they are agents of government, to voice their personal objections—this, too, is an essential part of the conversation— but the doctrine of equal dignity prohibits them from acting on those objections, particularly in their official capacities, in a way that demeans or subordinates LGBT individuals — ” Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 Harv. L. Rev. F. 16 (Nov. 10, 2015). Obergefell’s author, Justice Kennedy, had also reaffirmed this principle in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores. “[N]o person may be restricted or demeaned by government in exercising his or her religion. Yet neither may that same exercise unduly restrict other persons ... in protecting their own interests.” - U.S. - 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2786-87, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In the immediate wake of Obergefell, the Fifth Circuit issued a published opinion declaring that “Obergefell, in both its Fourteenth and First Amendment iterations, is the law of the land and, consequently, the 'law of this circuit and should not be taken lightly by actors within the jurisdiction of this court.” Campaign for Southern Equality v. Bryant, 791 F.3d 625, 627 (5th Cir.2015) [hereinafter CSE 77]. The court issued the mandate forthwith. Id. A few hours later, with this mandate in hand, this Court issued a Permanent Injunction and a Final Judgment enjoining enforcement of Mississippi’s statutory and constitutional same-sex marriage ban. The Attorney General’s Office soon advised Circuit Clerks to issue marriage licenses “to same-sex couples on the same terms and conditions accorded to couples of the opposite sex.” In re Steve Womack, 2015 WL 4920123, at *1 (Miss. A.G. July 17, 2015). In physics, every action has its equal and opposite reaction. In politics, every action has its predictable overreaction. Politicians reacted to the Hawaiian proceedings with DOMA and mini-DOMAs. Lawrence and Goodridge birthed the state constitutional amendments. And now Obergefell has led to HB 1523. The next chapter of this back-and-forth has begun. B. House Bill 1523 Mississippi’s highest elected officials were displeased with Obergefell. Governor Bryant stated that Obergefell “usurped [states’] light to self-governance’and has mandated that states must comply with federal marriage standards—standards that are out of step with the wishes of many in the United States and that are certainly out of step with the majority of Mississippians.” Governor Phil Bryant, Governor Bryant Issues Statement on Supreme Court Obergefell Decision, June 26, 2015, Legislative leaders felt similarly. Lieutenant Governor Tate Reeves, who presides over the State Senate, called the decision an “overreach of the federal government.” Geoff Pender, Lawmaker: State Could Stop Marriage Licenses Altogether, The Clarion-Ledger, June 26, 2015. Speaker of the House Philip Gunn said Obergefell was “in direct conflict with God’s design for marriage as set forth in the Bible. The threat of this decision to religious liberty is very clear.” Id. Representative Andy Gipson, Chairman of the House Judiciary B Committee, pledged to study whether Mississippi should stop issuing marriage licenses altogether. Id. The angst was not limited to the executive and legislative branches. Two Justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court also expressed their disgust with Obergefell. In 2014, a lesbian had petitioned that body for the right to divorce her wife in a Mississippi court. Czekala-Chatham v. State ex rel. Hood, 195 So.3d 187, 2015 WL 10985118 (Miss. Nov. 5, 2015). While her case was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court handed-down Obergefell. Although a majority of the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that Obergefell resolved her case in her favor, Justices Dickinson and Coleman argued that the Obergefell Court had legislated from the bench and overstepped its authority. Id. at *3 (Dickinson, J., dissenting). They opined that “state courts are not required to recognize as legitimate legal authority a Supreme Court decision that is in no way a constitutional interpretation,” and claimed “a duty to examine those decisions to make sure they indeed are constitutional interpretations, rather than ... an exercise in judicial will.” Id. at *4, *6. Obergefell was “[w]orthy only to be disobeyed,” they said. Id. at *5. Mississippi’s legislators formally responded to Obergefell in the next legislative session. Speaker Gunn drafted and introduced HB 1523, the “Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act.” The bill overwhelmingly passed both chambers, and the Governor signed it into law on April 5, 2016. It goes into effect on July 1. HB 1523’s meaning is contested. A layperson reading about the bill might conclude that it gives a green light to discrimination and prevents accountability for discriminatory acts. Arielle Dreher, Hundreds Rally to Repeal HB 1523, State Faces Deadline Today Before Lawsuit, Jackson Free Press, May 2, 2016 (quoting Chad Griffin, President of the Human Rights Campaign, as saying, “it’s sweeping and allows almost any individual or organization to justify discrimination against LGBT people, against single mothers and against unwed couples.”). Someone else reading the same article might conclude that HB 1523 simply “reinforces” the First Amendment. Id. (quoting Speaker Gunn as saying the gay community “can do the same things that they could before”). So any discussion should begin with the plain text of the bill. HB 1523 enumerates three “sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions” entitled to special, legal protection. They are, (a) Marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one woman; (b) Sexual .relations are properly reserved to such a marriage; and (c) .Male (man) or female (woman) refer to an individual’s immutable biological sex as objectively determined by anatomy and genetics at time of birth. HB 1523 § 2. These will be referred to as the “§ 2” beliefs. The bill then says that the State of Mississippi will not “discriminate” against persons who act pursuant to a § 2 belief. Id. §§ 3-4. For example, if a small business owner declines to provide goods or services for a same-sex wedding because it would violate his or her § 2 beliefs, HB 1523 allows the business to decline without fear of State “discrimination.” “Discrimination” is defined broadly. It covers consequences in the realm of taxation, employment, benefits, court proceedings, licenses, financial grants, and so on. In other words, the State of Mississippi will not tax you, penalize you, fire you, deny you a contract, withhold a diploma or license, modify a custody agreement, or retaliate against you, among many other enumerated things, for your § 2 beliefs. Id. An organization or person who acts on a § 2 belief is essentially immune from State punishment. The Governor’s signing statement recognized that consequences under federal law are unchanged. States “lack authority to nullify a federal right or cause of action they believe is inconsistent with their local policies.” Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 736, 129 S.Ct. 2108, 173 L.Ed.2d 920 (2009). Parts of the law provide fodder for both its opponents and its proponents. One section of HB 1523 guarantees that the State will not take adverse action against a religious organization that declines to solemnize a wedding because of a § 2 belief. Id. § 3. There is,nothing new or controversial about that section. Religious organizations already have that right under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Citizens also enjoy substantial religious rights under existing state law. The Mississippi. Constitution ensures that “the free enjoyment of all religious sentiments and the. different modes of worship shall be held sacred,” and “no preference shall be given by law to any religious sect or mode of worship.” Miss. Const., § 18. In addition, a 2014 law called the “Mississippi Religious Freedom Restoration Act” (RFRA) states that the government “may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person: (i) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (ii) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-61-l(5)(b) (emphasis added). HB 1523 does not change either of these laws. We return to HB 152B. Several parts of the bill are unclear. One says the State will not take action against foster or adoptive parents who intend to raise a foster or adoptive child in accordance with § 2 beliefs. HB 1528 § 3(3). It is not obvious how the State would respond if the child in urgent need of placement was a 14-year-old lesbian. Another section discusses a professional’s right to refuse to participate in “psychological, counseling, or fertility services” because of a § 2 belief. Id. § 3(4). But some professions’ ethical rules prohibit “engaging] in discrimination against prospective or current clients ... based on ... gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, [and] marital/partnership status,” to name a few categories. American Counseling Association, Code ' of Ethics § C.5 (2014). Under HB 1523, though, a public university’s faculty must confer a degree upon, and the State must license, a person who refuses to abide by her chosen profession’s Code of Ethics. Section 3(8)(a) of the law, in contrast, is crystal clear. It says that a government employee with authority to issue marriage licenses may recuse herself from that duty if'it would violate one of her § 2 beliefs. HB 1523 § 3(8)(a). The employee must provide prior written notice to the State Registrar of Vital' Records and be prepared to “take all necessary steps to ensure that the authorization and licensing of any legally valid marriage is not impeded or delayed as a result of any recusal.” Id. The State’s attorneys agree that- this section “effectively amends Mississippi County Circuit Clerks’ Office’s marriage licensing obligations under state law by specifying conditions under which a clerk’s employee may recuse himself or herself from authorizing or licensing marriages.” Docket No. 41, at 6, in Cause No. 3:14-CV-818. The significance of this section is in the eye of the beholder. The plaintiffs argue that it facilitates discrimination against LGBT Mississippians by encouraging clerks, to opt-out of serving same-sex couples. HB 1523’s defenders respond that the bill protects against discrimination by ensuring that. clerks do not have to violate their religious beliefs. When Senator Jenifer Branning shepherded the bill through the Senate floor debate, she argued that the. legislation actually lifts a burden imposed by Obergefell. H.B. 1523, Debate on the Floor of the Mississippi Senate, at 7:02 (Mar. 31, 2016) (statement of Sen. Jenifer Branning) [hereinafter Senate Floor Debate]. In her view, HB 1523 is “balancing” legislation allowing those who oppose same-sex marriage to continue to perform their jobs with a “clear conscience,” while protecting the rights of same-sex couples to receive a marriage license from another clerk. Id. at 26:55, 32:27. C. These Suits On June 3, 2016, Rev. Dr. Barber, Rev. Burnett, Bailey, Day, Boyette, Rev. For-tenberry, Dr. Glisson, Johnson, Triplett, Taylor, Mangum-Dear, Mangum, and JGMCC filed the first suit encompassed by this Order. See Docket No. 1, in Barber. They asserted Establishment and Equal Protection claims against Governor Bryant, General Hood, Executive Director Davis, and Registrar Moulder. Id. They requested a declaratory judgment that HB 1623 is unconstitutional on its face, as well as preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining its enforcement. CSE and Rev. Dr. Hrostowski sued the same defendants on June 10, 2016. See Docket No. 1, in CSE IV. They asserted an Establishment Clause claim and sought the same relief as the Barber plaintiffs. Id. The various plaintiffs conferred and moved to consolidate. The State was prepared to argue Barber, but objected to consolidation to avoid an abbreviated briefing schedule and a hearing in CSE IV. See Docket No. 22, in Barber. During a status conference, the Court heard the parties’ positions and granted the State its requested response deadline. The Court also delayed the motion hearing—which was converted into a joint hearing—by two days. The State renewed its objection to the consolidated hearing and was overruled. These reasons follow. The State essentially argued that there were too many HB 1523-related lawsuits— there are four—to fully prepare for a hearing in CSE IV. It entered into the record a Mississippi Today article in which General Hood said, “ T and over half of our lawyers in the Civil Litigation Division are working overtime and weekends attempting to prepare for the hearings,’ ” Docket No. 22-2, in Barber. General Hood added that budget cuts prevented him from hiring an expert to prepare “for the highly specialized area of the law seldom litigated in Mississippi—the Establishment Clause.” Id. (ellipses omitted). The first hurdle for the State is the substantial overlap in subject matter between Barber and CSE IV. The similar briefing suggests that little additional work was required to defend CSE IV. Barber, in fact, has a greater number of substantive claims than CSE IV. Having prepared for the more comprehensive hearing, it is difficult for the State to object to the narrower one. The second, more significant problem with the State’s argument is the utter predictability of these lawsuits. The media started reporting the likelihood of litigation on April 6, the day the Governor signed HB 1523 into law. See, e.g., Arielle Dreher, 'Total Infringement’: Governor Signs HB 1523 Over Protests of Business Leaders, Citizens, Jackson Free Press, Apr. 5, 2016 (“ ‘You will see several lawsuits filed before it becomes law if the governor signs it,’” one attorney said); Caray Grace, Local Residents and City Leaders React to House Bill 1523, WLOX, Apr. 5, 2016 (“ ‘the lawyers were already starting to draft up lawsuits so that as soon as he signed it, they could start filing them,’ said [Molly] Kester.”). General Hood apparently knew these lawsuits were coming as early as April 5, when he said he would make “case-by-case” decisions on whether to defend the lawsuits, and warned that the bill doesn’t override federal or constitutional rights. Legal Pressure May Be Ahead for Missis sippi Law Denying Service to Gays, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 5, 2016. The media even telegraphed the exact Establishment Clause arguments the plaintiffs eventually asserted. In early April, the press reported that 10 law professors from across the country released a memorandum outlining several ways in which HB 1523 violates the Establishment Clause. See Sierra Mannie, Will Mississippi’s “Religious Freedom” Act Impact Children in Public and Private Schools?, The Hechinger -Report, Apr. 8, 2016. In May, Jackson attorney Will Manuel, a partner at Bradley LLP, said, “‘[b]y only endorsing certain religious thought, I believe it is in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment which prohibits government from establishing or only protecting one religion. That should be a fairly clear cut constitutional challenge.” Ted Carter, Feds Unlikely to Ignore Mississippi’s HB1523, Lawyers Say, Mississippi Business Journal, May 26, 2016; see also Arielle Dreher, HB 1523: Bad for the Business Sector, Jackson Free Press, June 8,2016 (noting other legal concerns). Perhaps the State’s best argument against a hearing in CSE IV was that it would be unprepared to cross-examine religion experts because it did not have time to find its own expert. Its objection fell flat when its attorneys filed the article in which General Hood said that budget cuts caused the lack of expert assistance. If budget cuts explain the State’s lack of expert assistance, no extension of time could have helped it prepare for a hearing. For these reasons, the hearings were consolidated. Now, having considered the evidence and heard oral argument, the motions for preliminary injunction have been consolidated into this Order. The cases remain their separate identities pending further motion practice. That brings us to the State’s initial legal arguments. III. Threshold Questions A. Standing The State first challenges the plaintiffs’ capacity to bring these suits.- The United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual cases and controversies. U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2. “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal .court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). As the party seeking to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiffs must demonstrate all three elements of standing: (1) an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized as well as imminent or actual; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct; and (3) that a favorable decision is likely to redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). In a standing analysis, the court “must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-02, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Standing is not handed out in gross. CSE III, 175 F.Supp.3d at 698-99, 2016 WL 1306202, at *2. A case with multiple plaintiffs can move forward as' long as one plaintiff has standing as to each claim. CSE I, 64 F.Supp.3d at 916. 1. Injury in Fact To establish an injury in fact, the plaintiffs must show “ah invasion of a legally protected interest :which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, hot conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quotation marks and citation omitted). An injury is particularized if it “affect[s] the plaintiff'in a personal and individual way.” Id. at 560 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2130. An injury is concrete when it is “real, not abstract.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, - U.S. - 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1556, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Intangible injuries can satisfy the concreteness requirement. Id. at 9. A plaintiff must demonstrate “that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (quotation marks and citations omitted). a. Equal Protection Injuries The Barber plaintiffs in category two—i.e., the LGBT plaintiffs and Dr. Glisson—allege that HB 1523 violates their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Claims under the Equal Protection Clause can include both tangible and intangible injuries. As noted in Heckler v. Matthews, discrimination itself, by perpetuating archaic and stereotypic notions or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as innately inferior and therefore as less worthy participants in the political community, can cause serious non-economic injuries to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored group. 465 U.S. 728, 739-40, 104 S.Ct. 1387, 79 L.Ed.2d 646 (1984) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Stigmatic injury stemming from discriminatory treatment is sufficient to satisfy standing’s injury requirement if the plaintiff identifies some concrete interest with respect to which he or she is personally subject to discriminatory treatment and that interest independently satisfies the causation requirement of standing doctrine.” CSE I, 64 F.Supp.3d at 917 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The State first challenges standing on the basis that the plaintiffs’ injuries are speculative and not imminent, arguing that the plaintiffs have not alleged the denial of any right or benefit as a result of HB 1523. It points to Clapper v. Amnesty International, USA, which held that “[although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.” — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1147, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This language, however, supports that the plaintiffs do have imminent injuries. If it goes into effect on July 1, plaintiffs say, HB 1523 will subject them to a wide range of arbitrary denials of service at the hands of public employees and private businesses. The plaintiffs also say that HB 1523 will limit the protections LGBT persons currently have, under state, county, city, and public school anti-discrimination policies. In the City of Jackson, for example, á municipal ordinance provides protection from discrimination on the basis of religion, sexual orientation, and gender identity, among other characteristics. Docket No. 32-17, in Barber. This ordinance protects several of the plaintiffs. Id. The plaintiffs then point to University of Southern Mississippi’s (USM) anti-discrimination policy, which guarantees equal access to “educational, programmatic and employment opportunities without regard to” religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity. Docket No. 32-18, in Barber. If HB 1523 goes into effect, USM’s' policy cannot be fully enforced. USM employees who invoke a § 2 belief will enjoy enhanced protection to decline to serve others on the basis of sexual orientation, and USM will not be able to discipline those employees who violate its internal • anti-discrimination policy. In this context, the imminent injury to the plaintiffs, other LGBT persons, and unmarried persons is exactly the same as the injury recognized by the Supreme Court in Romer. In striking down an amendment to Colorado’s constitution, the Court found that: Amendment 2 bars homosexuals from securing protection against the injuries that these public accommodations laws address. That in itself is a severe consequence, but there is more. Amendment 2, in addition, nullifies specific legal protections for this- targeted . class. in- all transactions _ Not confined -to the private sphere, Amendment 2 also operates to repeal and forbid laws .or policies providing specific protection for gays or lesbians from discrimination by- every level of Colorado government. 517 U.S. at 629, 116 S.Ct. 1620. A closer analogue is difficult to imagine. As in Romer, HB 1523 “withdraws from homosexuals, [transgender, and unmarried-but-sexually-active persons,] but no others, specific legal- protection from the injuries caused by .discrimination, and it forbids the reinstatement of these laws and policies.” Id. at 627, 116 S.Ct. 1620. If individuals had standing to file Romer before Amendment 2 went into .effect, these plaintiffs may certainly do the same. The State’s argument overlooks the fundamental injurious nature of HB 1523— the establishment of a broad-based system by which LGBT persons and unmarried persons can be subjected to differential treatment based solely on their status. This type of differential treatment is the hallmark of what is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587, 99 S.Ct. 1355, 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979) (“The [Equal Protection]- Clause announces a fundamental principle: the State must govern impartially.”). To put it plainly, the plaintiffs’ injuries are “certainly impending” today, and without Court intervention, the plaintiffs will suffer actual injuries. Clapper, 133 S.Ct. at 1147. The State then argues that the plaintiffs lack standing because they are not the “objects” of HB 1523. The argument comes from Lujan's statement that “standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the” government’s action or inaction at issue. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The true objects of the law, the State claims, are those persons who want to freely exercise a § 2 belief. Docket'No. 30, at 18, in Barber. The Court is not persuaded. A robust record shows that HB 1523 was intended to benefit some citizens at the expense of LGBT and unmarried citizens. At oral argument, the State admitted that HB 1523 was passed in direct response to Oberge-fell, stating, “after Obergefell, citizens who hold the beliefs that are protected by 1523 were effectively told by the U.S. Supreme Court, Your beliefs are garbage.” Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 324, Barber v. Bryant, No. 3:16-CV-417 (S.D. Miss. June 24, 2016) [hereinafter Tr. of June 24]. It is therefore difficult to accept the State’s implausible assertion that HB 1523 was intended to protect certain religious liberties and simultaneously ‘ ignore that the bill was passed because same-sex marriage was legalized last summer. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626, 116 S.Ct. 1620. Members of the LGBT community and persons like Dr. Glisson will suffer a concrete and particular injury as a result of HB 1523. Part of the injury is stigmatic, see CSE I, 64 F.Supp.3d at 917, but that stigmatic injury is linked to the tangible rights that will be taken away on July 1, including the tangible rights Obergefell extended. There are almost endless explanations for how HB 1523 condones discrimination against the LGBT community, but in its simplest terms it denies LGBT citizens equal protection under the law. Thus, those plaintiffs who are members of the LGBT community, as well as Dr. Glisson, have demonstrated an injury in fact sufficient to bring their Equal Protection claim. b. Establishment Clause Injuries All plaintiffs have asserted Establishment Clause claims. In Establishment Clause actions, the injury in fact requirement may vary from other types of cases. See Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir.2006). “The concept of injury for standing purposes is particularly elusive in Establishment Clause cases.” Id. Plaintiffs can demonstrate “standing based on the direct harm of what is claimed to be an establishment of religion” or “on the ground that they have incurred a cost or been denied a benefit on account of their religion.” Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 129-30, 131 S.Ct. 1436, 179 L.Ed.2d 523 (2011). Courts also recognize that taxpayers have standing to challenge direct government expenditures that violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 138-39, 131 S.Ct. 1436; see Flast, 392 U.S. at 106, 88 S.Ct. 1942. The Supreme Court has found standing in a wide variety of Establishment Clause cases “even though nothing was affected but the religious or irreligious sentiments of the plaintiffs.” Catholic League for Religious & Civil Rights v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (collecting cases). In Croft v. Governor of Texas, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a citizen had standing to challenge a public school’s daily moment of silence because his children were enrolled in the school and were required to observe the moment of silence. 562 F.3d 735, 746 (5th Cir.2009) [hereinafter Croft i]- This injury was sufficient because the plaintiff and his family demonstrated that they were exposed to and injured by the mandatory moment of silence. Id. at 746-47. In our case, the State contends that the plaintiffs’ alleged non-economic injuries are insufficiently particular and concrete. It cites Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, which found that: [the plaintiffs] fail to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by the observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. Ill, even though that disagreement is phrased in constitutional terms. 454 U.S. 464, 485-86, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). In Valley Forge, an organization and four of its employees who lived in the Washington D.C. area challenged the constitutionality of a land conveyance from a government agency to a religious-affiliated education program in Pennsylvania. Id. at 468-69, 102 S.Ct. 752. The plaintiffs had learned of the land conveyance from a press release. Id. at 469, 102 S.Ct. 752. They merely observed the alleged constitutional violation from out-of-state. The facts in the present ease are quite different. Here, the plaintiffs are 13 individuals who reside in Mississippi, a Mississippi church, and an advocacy organization with members in Mississippi. The plaintiffs may have become aware of HB 1523 from news, friends, or social media, but regardless of how they learned of the legislation, it is set to become the law of their state on July 1. It will undeniably impact their Uves. The enactment of HB 1523 is much more than a “psychological consequence” with which they disagree, it is allegedly an endorsement and elevation by their state government of specific religious beliefs over theirs and all others. A more applicable casé is Catholic League. There, the plaintiffs included a Catholic civil rights organization and devout Catholics who lived in San Francisco. 624 F.3d at 1048. They sued over a municipal resolution that expressly denounced Catholicism and the Catholic Church’s beliefs on same-sex couples. Id. at 1047. The appellate court found that they had standing to bring such a case against their local government. Similarly,- today’s individual- plaintiffs have attested that they are citizens and residents of Mississippi, they disagree with the religious beliefs elevated by HB 1523, HB 1523 conveys the State’s disapproval and diminution of their own deeply held religious beliefs, HB 1523 sends a message that they are not welcome in their political community, and HB 1523 sends a message that the state government is unwilling to protect them. See, e.g., Docket Nos. 32-2; 32-3; 32-5 (all in Barber). Plaintiff Taylor, for example, is “a sixth-generation Mississippian” and “former Navy combat veteran.” Docket No. 32-8, in Barber. He is also a gay man engaged to be married next year. Id. Taylor thinks HB 1523 is hostile toward his religious values and targets LGBT persons. Id. Dr. Glisson describes herself as “a member of the Southern Baptist Church co-founded by my grandparents” who has “studied and reflected upon my faith choice almost all my life.” Docket No. 32-6, in Barber. “I am convinced that the heart of the Gospel is unconditional love. To condemn the presence of God in another human being, especially using faith claims or scripture to do so, is wrong and violates all of the tenets of my Christian faith.” Id. Dorothy Triplett explained her religious objections in detail. “I am a Christian, and nowhere in scripture does Jesus the Christ condemn homosexuality,” she said. Docket No. 32-9, in Barber. “He instructed us to love our neighbors as ourselves. In St. Paul’s Letter to the Galatians 3:28: New Revised Standard Version (NRSV): ‘There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male or female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus.’ ” Id. Based on their allegations and testimony, each individual plaintiff has adequately alleged cognizable injuries under the Establishment Clause. The “sufficiently concrete injuries]” here are the psychological consequences stemming from the plaintiffs’ “exclusion or denigration on a religious basis within the political community.” Catholic League, 624 F.3d at 1052; see Awad, 670 F.3d at 1123. Their injuries are also imminent. HB 1523 is set to become law on July 1. “There is no need for [the plaintiffs] to wait for actual implementation of the statute and actual violations of [their] rights under the First Amendment where the statute” violates the Establishment Clause. Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir.1996). 2. Causation The State next argues that the plaintiffs have not shown that their injuries have a causal connection to the defendants’ conduct. It cites Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of Louisiana for the proposition that an injury cannot be the result of a third party’s independent action, and instead must be traceable to the named parties. 252 F.3d 781, 788 (5th Cir.2001). The contention here is that any injuries will be caused by third parties—like a clerk who refuses to promptly issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple—and therefore that the plaintiffs should sue those third parties. The argument is unpersuasivé. On July 1, the plaintiffs will be injured by the state-sponsored endorsement of a set of religious beliefs over all others. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302, 120 S.Ct. 2266; Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1304 (W.D.Okla.2010). Regardless of any third-party conduct, the bill creates a statewide two-tiered system that elevates heterosexual citizens and demeans LGBT citizens. The plaintiffs’ injuries are therefore caused by the State—and specifically caused by the Governor who signed HB 1523 bill into law—and will at a minimum be enforced by officials like Davis and Moulder. In addition, in similar cases under the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses, the Supreme Court has found a state’s governor to be a proper defendant for the causal connection requirement of standing. E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985); Romer, 517 U.S. at 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have demonstrated that there is a causal connection between their injuries and the defendants’ conduct. 3. Redressability The final prong .of standing requires the plaintiffs to demonstrate that .a favorable judicial decision will redress their grievances. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The State argues that “Plaintiffs would still be facing their same alleged injury tomorrow if the Court preliminary enjoins the named Defendants today.” Docket No. 30, at 24, in Barber. It fails to support this claim with any further argument or facts. “[W]hen the right invoked is that of equal treatment, the appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment, a result that can be accomplished by withdrawal of benefits from the favored class as well as by extension of benefits to the excluded class.” Heckler, 465 U.S. at 740, 104 S.Ct. 1387 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “By declaring the [statute] unconstitutional, the official act of the government becomes null and void.’’ Catholic League, 624 F.3d at 1053. Here, the harm done by HB 1523 would be halted if the statute is enjoined. Nothing in the plaintiffs’ briefs, oral argument, or testimony indicates that they expect a favorable ruling to change the hearts and minds of Mississippians opposed to same-sex marriage, transgender equality, or sex before marriage. They simply ask the Court to enjoin the enforcement of a state law that both permits arbitrary discrimination based on those characteristics and endorses the majority’s favored religious beliefs. That is squarely within the Court’s ability. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir.2012). “Even more important, a declaratory judgment would communicate to the people of -the plaintiffs’ community that their government is constitutionally prohibited from condemning the plaintiffs’ religion, and that any such condemnation is itself to be condemned.” Catholic League, 624 F.3d at 1053. The Court concludes that the individual plaintiffs have standing to bring these claims. 4. Associational Standing In some instances, organizations may bring suit on behalf of their members. To establish associational standing, the organization must show that: (1) its members would have standing to sue on their own behalf; (2) the interests it seeks to safeguard are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the requested relief necessitate the participation of individual members. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). JGMCC seeks associational standing as a church with many LGBT members and a community service ministry that promotes LGBT+ equality. Because members of the church have standing to bring suit on their own behalf—-at least two of its members are individual plaintiffs—the first element of associational standing is satisfied. Ensuring that its members are not discriminated against on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, or religion is undoubtedly germane to its purpose. And JGMCC’s facial challenge does not require the participation of individual members. JGMCC has associational standing. The same is true for CSE. That organization also has a member participad ing in this lawsuit, is aligned with the arguments and relief sought in this suit, and need not have additional members to assert its particular cause of action. It has associational standing. Accord CSE I, 64 F.Supp.3d at 918; CSE III, 175 F.Supp.3d at 707-08,2016 WL 1306202, at *11. B. Ex Parte Young The next issue is whether these defendants are properly named in this suit. 1. Legal Standard Under the Eleventh Amendment, citizens cannot sue a state in federal court. U.S. Const. amend. XI; see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 699, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). In Ex parte Young, however, the Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to this rule. 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). The resulting Ex parte Young “fiction” holds that “because a sovereign state cannot commit an unconstitutional act, a state official enforcing an unconstitutional act is not acting for the sovereign state and therefore is hot protected by the Eleventh Amendment.” Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 411 (5th Cir.2001) (en banc). When a plaintiff sues a state official in his official capacity for constitutional violations, the plaintiff is not filing suit against the individual, but instead the official’s office, and can proceed with the constitutional claims. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). The Ex parte Young fiction requires that the state officer have “some connection with the enforcement of the act” or, be “specially charged with the duty to enforce the statute,” and also that the official indicate a willingness to enforce it. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157, 158, 28 S.Ct. 441. The officer’s authority to enforce the act does not have to be found in the challenged statute itself; it is sufficient if it falls within the official’s general duties to enforce related state laws. “In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). 2. Discussion All four defendants—the Governor, the Attorney General, the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services, and the Registrar of Vital Records—are state officials sued in their official capacities. These suits are effectively brought against their various offices. All four defendants also have a connection to the enforcement of HB 1523. Although Governor Bryant is the chief executive of the State, Ex parte Young does not permit a suit against a governor solely on the theory that'he is “charged with the execution of all of its laws.” Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157, 28 S.Ct. 441. A more specific causal connection is required. Id. That connection is satisfied here. The Governor is the manager and supervisor of, his staff, so ■ he is personally required to enforce HB 1523’s terms prohibiting adverse action against any of his employees who exercise a § 2 belief. Since the Governor has also indicated his willingness to enforce HB 1523 to the full extent of his authority, he is a proper defendant. See CB Condez, Mississippi Governor: Christians Would Line up for Crucifixion Before Abandoning Faith, The Christian Times, June 2, 2016 (“ ‘[HB 1523’s critics] don’t know that if it takes crucifixion, we will stand .in line before abandoning our faith and our belief in our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ,’ [Governor Bryant] said.”). In Establishment and Equal Protection Clause cases in particular, governors are often properly included as named defendants. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (Gov. Roy Romer); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987) (Gov. Edwin W. Edwards); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (Gov. George C. Wallace); Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157 (5th Cir.2010) (Gov. Rick Perry, as the sole defendant) [hereinafter Croft IP; Croft I, 562 F.3d at 735 (same). General Hood is the state’s chief law enforcement pfficer, but his general duty to represent the state in litigation is inadequate to invoke the Ex parte Young exception. Like the Governor, though, HB 1523 prohibits General Hood from taking any action against one of his employees who acts in accordance with a § 2 belief. The Attorney General’s Office employs hundreds of people across Mississippi, so he may very well be confronted with an HB 1523 issue.. Executive Director Davis, until authority is formally transferred to the new Department of Child Protective Services, is responsible for administering a variety of social programs. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-1-51. HB 1523 has at least two sections that fall under his purview. See HB 1523 § 3(2)-(3). Under HB 1523, for example, DHS cannot take action against a foster or adoptive parent who violates DHS policies based on a § 2 belief. Davis’s attorneys have given every impression that he will fully enforce his duties under HB 1523. As discussed above, Registrar Moulder is responsible for executing state laws concerning registration of marriages. See Miss. Code Ann. § 51-57-43. HB 1523 adds a new responsibility to her existing obligations: she must record the recusal of any circuit clerk who refuses to issue a marriage license because of a § 2 belief. HB 1523 § 3(8)(a). Thus, she has a connection with HB 1523’s enforcement. Her counsel has also indicated her intent to comply with her new duties. Lastly, the plaintiffs’ requested relief also satisfies the Eleventh Amendment and Ex parte Young. In both cases, they have requested declaratory and prospective injunctive relief that would enjoin the enforcement of HB 1523 and prevent state officials from acting contrary to well-established precedent. Courts frequently grant this type of relief against state officials- in constitutional litigation. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38, 105 S.Ct. 2479. Accordingly, the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment applies and these suits may proceed to seek declaratory and injunctive relief against these defendants. IV. Motion for Preliminary Injunction A. Legal Standard To receive a- preliminary injunction, the movant must show “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any harm that the injunction might cause to the defendant; and (4) that the injunction' will not disserve the public interest.” Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, Miss., 697 F.3d 279, 288 (5th Cir.2012) (citation omitted). “Each of these factors presents a mixed question of fact and law.” Id. (citation omitted). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. It should only be granted if the movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion on all four ... prerequisites.” Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir.1985). ' “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is always to prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits. It often happens that this purpose is furthered by preservation of the status quo, but not always.” Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir.1974). B, Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits The movant’s likelihood of success is determined by substantive law. Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir.1997), “To successfully mount a facial challenge, the plaintiffs must show that there is no set of circumstances under which [HB 1523] is constitutional. If the plaintiffs successfully show [it] to be unconstitutional in every application, then that provision will be struck down as invalid.” Croft II, 624 F.3d at 164. 1. The Equal Protection Clause Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection- Clause of this Amendment means that “all persons similaiiy circumstanced shall be treated alike.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (citation omitted). The primary intent, of the Equal Protection Clause was to require states to provide the same treatment for whites and freed slaves concerning per-sonhood and citizenship rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Equal Protection Clause is no longer limited to racial classifications. That is not because racial discrimination and racial inequality have ceased to exist. Rather, as discrimination against groups becomes more prominent and understood, we turn to the Equal Protection clause to attempt to level the playing field. Compare Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 21 L.Ed. 442 (1872) (denying women equal protection of the laws) with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996) (recognizing that women are entitled to equal protection of the laws). “A prime part of the history of our Constitution ... is the story of the extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded.” Virginia, 518 U.S. at 557, 116 S.Ct. 2264; see Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161, 1163 (1988) (“The Equal Protection Clause .,. has been understood as an attempt to protect disadvantaged groups from discriminatory practices, however deeply engrained and longstanding.”). One hundred and fifty years after its passage, the Fourteenth Amendment remains necessary to ensure that all Americans receive equal protection of the laws. Sexual orientation is a relatively recent addition to the equal protection canon. In 1996, the Supreme Court made it clear that arbitrary discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635, 116 S.Ct. 1620. Seven years later, the Court held that the Constitution protects LGBT adults from government intrusion into their private relationships. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003). “After Romer and Lawrence, federal courts began to conclude that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation that is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest violates the Equal Protection Clause.” Gill v. Devlin, 867 F.Supp.2d 849, 856 (N.D.Tex.2012). Now, Obergefell makes clear that LGBT citizens have “equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.” 185 S.Ct. at 2608. a. Animus “The Constit