Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, United States District Judge Table of Contents I. Background ... 308 II. Applicable Legal Standards .. .310 III. Analysis ... 311 A. FinCEN’s Compliance with Statutory-Procedural Requirements.... 318 1. Whether FinCEN Complied with its Obligations Under the APA... 314 a. Informal Versus Formal Rulemak-ing ...314 b. Notice-and-Comment Procedures.. . .314 2. Whether FinCEN Adequately Put FBME on Notice of the Basis for the Second Final Rule... 316 a. FinCEN’s Nondisclosure of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) ... 316 b. FinCEN’s Failure to Produce a Privilege Log of Otherwise Privileged or Protected Information ... 317 c. FinCEN’s Alleged Nondisclosure of New Accusations and Information ...318 3. Whether FinCEN Met Its Obligation to Undertake Required Consultations. . .322 a. FinCEN’s Contention That FMBE Is Precluded from Raising This Argument ...323 b. The Sufficiency of the Administrative Record to Establish that FinCEN Undertook the Required Consultations. ...325 B. FinCEN’s Compliance with Constitutional Due Process Requirements ... 326 1. Whether FBME is Entitled to Due Process.. .326 2. Whether the Rulemaking Complied with Due Process... 328 C. FinCEN’s Compliance with APA § 706(2)(A).. .331 1. Whether FinCEN Impermissibly Failed to Respond to FBME’s Concerns Regarding the Agency’s Analysis of SARs.. .331 2. Whether FinCEN Failed to Respond to FBME’s Concerns Regarding FBME’s Cypriot Regulator.. .334 3. Whether FINCEN Considered Other ‘Discredited” Allegations.. .336 A Whether FinCEN Considered the Statutory Factors Listed in Section 311.. .337 a. Factors Related to Whether FBME Is of Primary Money-Laundering Concern .. .337 b. Factors Related to Which Special Measure to Impose .. .338 5. Whether FinCEN Considered Alternatives to a Prohibition Under the Fifth Special Measure.. .339 6. Whether the Rulemaking was Tainted by FinCEN’s Alleged Review of Privileged Materials... 340 D.Remedy .. .341 IV. Conclusion ... 343 I. Background On July 29, 2015, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) promulgated a Final Rule under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, imposing a “special measure” against FBME Bank Ltd. (“FBME” or the “Bank”), a Tanzanian-chartered commercial bank that operates mainly in Cyprus. The measure—the fifth and most serious authorized by the statute—prohibited domestic financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent bank accounts on behalf of FBME. The Final Rule was designed to prevent FBME from continuing to do business in the United States or in U.S. dollars. Congress required that the agency impose this special measure only by regulation, following a finding that a nondomestic financial institution is of “primary money laundering concern” and thus a threat to national security and the U.S. financial system. 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(a)(2)(C). Congress also empowered the agency to consider classified information in formulating a rule under this section, and to provide that information “to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera.” Id. § 5318A(f). In other words, the imposition of this special mea'sure involves a sort of quasi-adjudicative rulemaking process in which the agency may rely on classified information unavailable to the target of the rule or the public. Beginning in July 2014, after FinCEN issued a Notice of Finding (“NOF”) that FBME was an institution of primary money-laundering concern and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to impose the fifth special measure, U.S. banks holding correspondent accounts on behalf of FBME began to terminate their relationships with the Bank, and other banks abroad held FBME’s U.S.-dollar correspondent accounts in suspension pending imposition of the Final Rule. If the Final Rule had taken effect as scheduled in August 2015, U.S. banks would have been wholly prohibited from engaging in transactions with or for FBME. The Bank thus moved for a preliminary injunction to block the Rule, contending that it would prompt remaining banks with which FBME maintained U.S.dollar correspondent accounts to liquidate those accounts, effectively excommunicating FBME from the global financial system. The Court granted the Bank’s motion and preliminarily enjoined the Rule on August 27, 2015. See FBME Bank Ltd. v. Lew (“FBME I”), 125 F.Supp.3d 109, 129 (D.D.C.2015). FinCEN then moved for a “voluntary remand,” which the Court granted, in order to conduct a new rule-making and correct the deficiencies the Court had identified in its earlier opinion. See FBME Bank Ltd. v. Lew (“FBME II”), 142 F.Supp.3d 70 (D.D.C.2015). On November 27, 2015, FinCEN published a notice to reopen the Final Rule for 60 days to solicit additional comments. See 80 Fed. Reg. 18481 (Nov. 27, 2015) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010). The comment period closed on January 26, 2016. See id. at 18482. FinCEN issued the new Final Rule (“Second Final Rule”) on March 25, 2016 and published it in the Federal Register on March 31, 2016. The Second Final Rule again concludes that FBME is of primary money-laundering concern and imposes the fifth special measure of Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. As the Court detailed in its opinion granting FBME’s preliminary-injunction motion, FBME 1,125 F.Supp.3d at 115-17, FinCEN’s NOF concluded that FBME had facilitated money laundering and maintained weak anti-money-laundering (“AML”) controls for many years. The agency specifically found that FBME had maintained accounts for the head of an international narcotics-trafficking and money-laundering network; an account for a front company for a U.S.-sanctioned Syrian entity that has been designated as a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction; and an account that the Department of Justice suspected of containing some $7 million in proceeds from foreign corruption offenses perpetrated by the President of Equatorial Guinea. 79 Fed. Reg. 42639-40. FinCEN also found that FBME had facilitated transactions involving a Hezbollah financier, a financial advisor to a major transnational organized-crime figure, a transfer of over $100,000 to an FBME account involved in a high-yield investment program fraud against a U.S. person, a transfer of over $100,000 to an FBME account from a Michigan-based company that was the victim of a computer-fraud attack, and transfers of over $600,000 generated from a wire fraud scheme. Id. In addition, FinCEN’s investigation uncovered almost $400 million in FBME wire transfers through the U.S. financial system that the agency concluded “exhibited indicators of high-risk money laundering typologies, including widespread shell company activity, short-term ‘surge’ wire activity, structuring, and high-risk business customers,” and “at least 4,500 suspicious wire transfers through U.S. correspondent accounts that totaled at least $875 million between November 2006 and March 2013.” Id. These findings continue to serve as at least part of the basis for the Second Final Rule. Following FinCEN’s issuance of the Second Final Rule, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment that became ripe on May 23, 2016, and the Court heard argument on those motions on June 3, 2016. In order to enable thorough judicial review, the court stayed implementation of the Rulé pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 705, which “authorizes courts to stay agency rules pending judicial review without any time limit on the duration of the stay.” Mexichem Specialty Resins, Inc. v. EPA, 787 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C.Cir.2015) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). For the reasons that follow, the Court declines to vacate the rule, but will remand the matter to FinCEN so that it may adequately respond to certain comments made by FBME. The Court will continue to stay implementation of the rule until FinCEN complies with that directive. II. Applicable Legal Standards The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) empowers a reviewing court to hold unlawful and set aside an agency’s actions, findings, or conclusions that are “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; [or] (D) without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). “An agency must ‘examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made’ to allow [a reviewing court] to evaluate the agency’s decision-making process.” Nat’l Shooting Sports Found., Inc. v. Jones, 716 F.3d 200, 214 (D.C.Cir.2013) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)). A court “may not uphold agency action based on speculation ... or on the post hoc rationalization of the agency’s appellate counsel,” and it does not “defer to an agency’s ‘conclusory or unsupported suppositions.’ ” Id. (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 375 F.3d 1182, 1187 (D.C.Cir.2004)). A court “will, however, uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Id. (citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856). And review of agency action “in an area at the intersection of national security, foreign policy, and administrative law ... is extremely deferential.” Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C.Cir.2007). Judicial review of agency action is generally confined to the administrative record as designated by the agency. See Hecht ex rel. James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1095 (D.C.Cir.1996). “The administrative record includes all materials compiled by the agency that were before [it] at the time the decision was made.” Id. “[Ajbsent clear evidence to the contrary, an agency is entitled to a strong presumption of regularity, [i.e.,] that it properly designated the administrative record.” Pac. Shores Subdivision v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 448 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (D.D.C.2006). As.a result, courts “do not allow parties to supplement the record ‘unless they can demonstrate unusual circumstances justifying a departure from this general rule.’ ” City of Dania Beach v. FAA, 628 F.3d 581, 590 (D.C.Cir.2010) (quoting Tex. Rural Legal Aid v. Legal Servs. Corp., 940 F.2d 685, 698 (D.C.Cir. 1991)); see also Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 667 F.Supp.2d 111, 115 (D.D.C.2009) (“[Tjhere are certain limited, and highly exceptional, circumstances when a court may review evidence beyond the administrative record.”). Departures from the general rule should be made “sparingly” and typically “only [in] those cases where extra-record evidence [is] necessary to make judicial review effective.” Cape Hatteras, 667 F.Supp.2d at 115. Finally, a court ruling on agency action pursuant to the APA’s judicial-review provision is required to “take account” of “the rule of prejudicial error.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. Few rulemakings are perfect, and a court should not set aside an agency’s action under the APA based on procedural irregularities that constitute harmless error. Although the burden to show that an error was not harmless may fall on the agency if it “completely fail[s] to comply” with its notice-and-comment obligations under 5 U.S.C. § 553, the burden is generally on the challenger to the rule to demonstrate that any given error was not harmless. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1323-24 (D.C.Cir.1988). At a minimum, the challenger bears the burden to demonstrate prejudice “where the agency merely failed to provide proper access to some supplemental study or studies”—or other data, information, or evidence—“that partially undergirded its rule.” Id In particular, when an agency fails to disclose supporting documents or information, a plaintiff must “show that error was prejudicial” by “indicating] with reasonable specificity what portions of the documents [or other supporting material] it objects to and how it might have responded if given the opportunity.” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 494 F.3d 188, 202 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C.Cir.2002)) (internal quotation mark omitted). Furthermore, a plaintiff “must ‘show that on remand [it] can mount a credible challenge ... and [was] thus prejudiced by the absence of an opportunity to do so before’ the agency.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Gerber, 294 F.3d at 184). III. Analysis The Administrative Procedure Act has governed federal-agency action in the United States for over seventy years. The APA on its own does not authorize federal agencies to issue whatever rules they see fit; rather, the statute provides a framework for agencies to issue rules pursuant to some other source of statutory authority. In recent history, federal agencies have promulgated between roughly 2,500 and 4,500 final rules each year, many of them implicating the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures. See Maeve P. Carey, Cong. Research Serv., R43056, Counting Regulations: An Overview of Rulemaking, Types of Federal Regulations, and Pages in the Federal Register (2015). Under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, FinCEN has authority to impose a variety of special measures against institutions that it finds to be of primary money-laundering concern, and it may impose the fifth special measure—at issue here—only by rulemak-ing. To date, FinCEN has acted pursuant to its authority under Section 311 to issue just seven final rules since 2004. See Section 311—Special Measures, FinCEN, https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/ patrioVsection311.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2016). And as far as the Court is aware, this is the first judicial challenge to a Section 311 rulemaking. FinCEN’s authority under Section 311 is unique in at least two important respects. First, the statute requires the agency to act through rulemaking when it imposes the fifth special measure. True, these rules technically bind all U.S. financial institutions and prevent them from doing business with the entity in question, but there is no dispute that each of these rules targets one particular entity and involves heavy reliance on factual information specific to that entity. Rulemaking is more commonly used to “resolve certain issues of general applicability.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 612, 111 S.Ct. 1539, 113 L.Ed.2d 675 (1991). It is unusual for a rulemaking to focus so acutely on a single suspected bad actor. Second, and perhaps more important, Section 311 allows the agency to consider—and a court to review ex parte—classified information as part of the rulemaking. As far as the Court is aware, no other statute expressly allows an agency to consider and use classified information in promulgating a rule pursuant to the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures. This statutory authorization obviously clashes with the goals of transparency and public participation that underlie the notice-and-comment process. The authorization also creates some tension with a large body of case law requiring agencies to disclose for public comment at least the most critical factual information underlying a proposed rule. In cases like these, the most critical information is very likely to be classified. Taken to the extreme, requiring the agency to share only the most critical information could license it to share almost nothing publicly, despite nominally proceeding through notice and comment. To avoid that result here, the Court has sought guidance in first principles. The purpose of requiring agencies to disclose certain information, evidence, or material during the notice-and-comment period is to allow the public to meaningfully comment on the proposed rule. And the opportunity to offer meaningful comment would be severely limited by an inability to question or criticize the factual basis for the proposed rule. The Court must thus confront the question of how an agency in FinCEN’s position can afford the public a meaningful opportunity to comment on a rule that is based, in potentially crucial respects, on classified information. Neither the D.C. Circuit nor any other court has had occasion to weigh in on this issue. As a result, the Court—and the parties, for that matter—have been navigating without a detailed roadmap. The Court has nonetheless attempted to formulate at least two standards for assessing whether FinCEN has disclosed enough information to put the public on notice of the basis for its proposed rule and allow for a meaningful opportunity to comment. As previously noted in the Court’s preliminary injunction ruling, one step the agency should take under these circumstances is to disclose any unclassified material that it relies on, even if this material is not as important to the agency’s decision as the classified material (dr material that is otherwise protected from disclosure by statute). See FBME I, 125 F.Supp.3d at 123 (explaining that “withholding from FBME and the public the unclassified record on which [the agency] relied and which provided part of the evidentiary basis for its rule” likely violates the APA’s notice-and-comment provision). This requirement tracks what the D.C. Circuit has held to be necessary for meaningful comment when the government employs classified evidence to restrict foreign entities from investing in the United States under the Defense Production Act, Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 758 F.3d 296, 318 (D.C.Cir.2014), or designates an entity as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State (“PMOI III”), 613 F.3d 220, 230 (D.C.Cir.2010). In addition, FinCEN has distilled, generalized from, or declassified certain classified information that it then held up publicly as part of the basis for the Second Final Rule. Any significant factual information or assertions that the agency publicly invokes as a basis for the Rule, should be disclosed in time for the public to comment on those purported facts. That some of those facts may have been derived from classified information does not change the analysis. If the agency wants to act—and justify its final rule publicly—on the basis of some key fact (even if the fact is stated in more general terms than in its classified form), that fact must have been disclosed in time for commenters to challenge its veracity and weight. With these standards in mind, the Court proceeds to assess FBME’s challenge to FinCEN’s Second Final Rule. It will first elaborate on FinCEN’s procedural obligations under the APA before finding that the agency failed to fully comply with two notice obligations in this case. The Court concludes, however, that FinCEN’s errors were ultimately harmless. The Court will then discuss FinCEN’s obligation to consult with other agencies as part of the Section 311 rulemaking process, determining that FinCEN did in fact undertake the required consultations. The Court will next turn to the issue of constitutional due process. It finds that FBME, as a foreign bank with few connections to the U.S., has likely not met its burden to demonstrate an entitlement to due process protections, and that, even assuming due process applies, the Bank was not entitled to additional procedures beyond those afforded during the rulemaking. The Court will proceed to consider FBME’s arbitrariness- and-capriciousness challenge to the Second Final Rule. Although the Court believes that FinCEN’s reasoning in support of the Rule is largely sound, it concludes that FinCEN failed adequately to respond to certain significant comments made by FBME concerning the agency’s reliance on data drawn from Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) submitted by other financial institutions concerning transactions with the Bank. Finally, the Court will address the appropriate remedy. Because FinCEN’s errors with regard to its notice obligations were harmless, the Court does not remand the Rule with respect to those. It will remand, however, for the agency to properly respond to certain comments by FBME. Because it is quite possible that FinCEN will be able to substantiate its decision, and vacating the rule would cause needless disruption and impose a disproportionate hardship on the agency, the Court will remand without vacating the Rule and simply stay its implementation until proceedings on remand are complete. A. FinCEN’s Compliance with Statutory Procedural Requirements FBME contends that FinCEN failed to comply with a number of non-constitutional procedural obligations in formulating the Second Final Rule. First, the Bank argues that FinCEN’s rulemaking was “adjudicatory in nature” and that principles of administrative law thus required FinCEN to provide FBME with more process than would typically be called for in an informal rulemaking. Second, FBME claims that FinCEN denied it the opportunity to meaningfully comment on its proposed rule by failing to disclose certain unclassified evidence and unveiling new accusations for the first time after the close of the comment period. The Court will first explain FinCEN’s obligations under the APA before discussing whether FinCEN complied with them here. 1. Whether FinCEN Complied with its Obligations Under the APA a. Informal Versus Formal Rulemaking As noted above, Section 311 of the PATRIOT Act provides that the fifth special measure “may be imposed only by regulation.” 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(a)(2)(C). This language implicates the informal rule-making process, rather than the formal rulemaking process, which is triggered only when “the statute requires that the rulemaking procedure take place ‘on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.’ ” United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 241, 93 S.Ct. 810, 35 L.Ed.2d 223 (1973) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)). When the statute does not so provide, “a court cannot require that the [agency] adopt formal rulemaking proceedings.” Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1221 (D.C.Cir.1984). Whereas formal rulemaking typically implicates some sort of hearing, informal rulemaking involves the much more common notiee- and-comment procedures specified in 5 U.S.C. § 553. In FBME’s view, this particular proceeding operates as a rulemaking in name only. It is actually adjudicatory in nature, FBME claims, “because adjudicative, rather than legislative, facts are involved and the agency’s action focused on a particular individual ... rather than ... a class of individuals.” Pis.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Pis.’ MSJ”) 19 (citing Aaska Arlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 545 F.2d 194, 200 (D.C.Cir.1976)). FinCEN, the argument goes, must therefore provide procedural protections that more closely align with the formal rather than the informal rulemaking framework. This argument lacks a basis in statute or case law. As the D.C. Circuit has explained, the Supreme Court’s opinion in the landmark Vermont Yankee case precludes [a] [c]ourt from imposing procedural requirements on agency rulemakings beyond that required by statute. ... In its unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court unambiguously cautioned this court against imposing its own notions of proper procedures upon an administrative agency entrusted with substantive functions by Congress. The Court declared that so long as an agency abided by the minimum procedural requirements laid down by statute, this court was not free to impose additional procedural rights if the agency did not choose to grant them. Except in “extremely rare” circumstances, the Court stated, there is no justification for a reviewing court to overturn agency action because of the failure to employ procedures beyond those required by Congress. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 391-92 (D.C.Cir.1981) (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978)). Under Vermont Yankee, then, at least where the Constitution is not implicated, this Court may not impose upon FinCEN requirements beyond those called for by the APA’s informal rulemaking procedures and the relevant provisions of Section 311. FBME is therefore not entitled “to more process than the APA requires,” such as a hearing or other procedures that typically accompany formal rulemakings, simply because of the adjudicative aspects of the rulemak-ing. Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs.’ MSJ”) 19. b. Notice-and-Comment Procedures Athough the parties agree that Fin-CEN had to provide the public (and FBME) with notice of its proposed rule and an opportunity to comment on it, they disagree sharply on the contours of Fin-CEN’s notice-and-comment obligations. The Court’s earlier discussion on this point, in the context of FinCEN’s nondisclosure of certain unclassified materials in the first rulemaking, bears repeating: Given FinCEN’s [admitted] reliance on ... non-classified, non-protected documents, its failure to publicly disclose them during the notice-and-comment period appears to constitute a procedural error under the APA. To fulfill its obligation to provide adequate notice, an agency must “make available to the public, in a form that allows for meaningful comment, the data the agency used to develop [its] proposed rule.” Am. Med. Ass’n [v. Reno], 57 F.3d [1129,] 1133 [ (D.C.Cir.1995) ] (quoting Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 899 (D.C.Cir.2006)). Agencies are required to make these disclosures in order to “allow[ ] the parties to focus on the information relied on by the agency and to point out where that information is erroneous or where the agency may be drawing improper conclusions from it.” Id. (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095, 1121 (D.C.Cir.1984)). Additionally, the D.C. Circuit has set a floor for disclosure, holding that, “in informal rulemaking, at least the most critical factual material that is used to support the agency’s position on review must have been made public in the proceeding and exposed to refutation.” Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C.Cir.1984) (emphases added). The touchstone remains whether the agency has disclosed enough of the evidentiary basis and supporting documentation for its rule to allow parties to comment meaningfully and contest the basis on which an agency reached the result that it did. See Am. Med. Ass’n, 57 F.3d at 1129. Especially in light of the fact that FBME was not and could not have been privy to the classified and statutorily protected material on which FinCEN relied, it was entitled at a minimum, it would seem, to ■view and comment on all of the non-classified, non-protected material on which FinCEN relied. FBME I, 125 F.Supp.3d at 121 (emphases added). Importantly, the Court did not, nor did it purport to, require FinCEN to go beyond the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. The Court’s point was simply that FinCEN was not relieved “of its obligation to adhere to the APA’s procedural requirements” just because its ultimate decision did not appear to be arbitrary and capricious. Id at 114. Even though the APA typically does not require agencies to disclose in informal rulemakings all non-classified, non-privileged material on which they rely, the Court found that agencies have an obligation to do so in those highly unusual rulemaking proceedings where the predominant source of information is classified; otherwise, there would be no way for parties to have a meaningful opportunity to comment. Despite the Court’s attempt to elucidate its holding in its earlier opinion, FinCEN claims that the Court has conflated APA and due process requirements. Not so. Given the need to evaluate whether FBME and the public had a meaningful opportunity to comment on FinCEN’s proposed rule—as required by the APA—the Court simply sought guidance in due process jurisprudence from a similar context to determine what a meaningful opportunity for comment looks like when an agency bases its action on both classified and unclassified materials. In that vein, the Court looked to cases like People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. U.S. Department of State (“PMOI I”), 182 F.3d 17 (D.C.Cir. 1999) and National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of State (“NCOR”), 251 F.3d 192 (D.C.Cir.2001), which dealt with another kind of targeted designation, and determined that a meaningful opportunity to comment in such situations requires the commenter to be able to view and challenge the unclassified material upon which the agency relies in making its determination. The Court continues to find that analysis relevant and reaffirms its earlier holding here as to FinCEN’s notice obligations. It now turns to whether Fin-CEN in fact complied with those obligations. 2. Whether FinCEN Adequately Put FBME on Notice of the Basis for the Second Final Rule a. FinCEN’s Nondisclosure of Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) In the course of its investigation of FBME, FinCEN reviewed numerous Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) filed by other financial institutions concerning transactions involving the Bank. FinCEN did not disclose the individual SARs to FBME, citing its obligation under the Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-2 (1970), to maintain the confidentiality of SARs, except in limited circumstances. FBME I, 125 F.Supp.3d at 120. Instead, the agency summarized the aggregate information it derived from these reports in its NOF, noting that from “April 2013 through April 2014, FBME conducted at least $387 million in wire transfers through the U.S. financial system that exhibited indicators of high-risk money laundering typologies, including widespread shell company activity, short-term ‘surge’ wire activity, structuring, and high-risk business customers.” 79 Fed. Reg. 42640. The Notice continued that “FBME was involved in at least 4,500 suspicious wire transfers through U.S. correspondent accounts that totaled at least $875 million between November 2006 and March 2013.” Id. FBME seeks to challenge FinCEN’s use of SARs in formulating the Second Final Rule without fully disclosing them to FBME. Unsatisfied with FinCEN’s summary of information the SARs contained, FBME contends that, “[t]o the extent that FinCEN would hold each specific suspicious transaction against FBME, it is only fair that FBME receive notice of each specific transaction flagged in each SAR so that it can investigate and respond with specifics.” Pis.’ MSJ 23-24. FBME explains that “[a] summary that does not identify particular transactions but instead confines itself to a high level of generality—as FinCEN’s does by discussing what all of the SARs, as a whole, purportedly indicate numerically—is insufficient.” Id. at 24 (citation omitted). The Court addressed this concern in its previous opinion, concluding that FBME could not claim inadequate notice of FinCEN’s consideration of SARs, or the material they contained, because the NOF adequately summarized that information. See FBME I, 125 F.Supp.3d at 120. Moreover, FinCEN points not to specific transactions that support its determination that FBME is of primary money-laundering concern, but rather to the aggregate information derived from SARs—such as that “FBME was involved in at least 4,500 suspicious wire transfers through U.S. correspondent accounts that totaled at least $875 million between November 2006 and March 2013.” Id. (quoting NOF, 79 Fed. Reg. 42640). Thus, FBME had notice of what FinCEN was considering with respect to SARs— aggregate information available not in specific activity reports, but rather summary data that FinCEN disclosed in the NOF. It is also worth noting that FinCEN’s observations about shell corporations, high-risk customers, and “suspicious” wire transfers are significant primarily in the context of the agency’s more general concern regarding deficiencies in the Bank’s AML controls, particularly its faulty customer due diligence procedures. The agency made FBME aware of this concern, engaged in a “thorough, point-by-point review of the deficiencies,” and came away unpersuaded by FBME’s responses. 81 Fed. Reg. 18488. FBME therefore had ample opportunity to satisfy, or at least defuse, FinCEN’s concerns about the aggregate SARs data by demonstrating that the Bank maintained adequate AML controls, yet it failed to do so. Access to the individual SARs would not have helped its case in that regard. b. FinCEN’s Failure to Produce a Privilege Log of Otherwise Privileged or Protected Information FBME also complains that Fin-CEN has withheld from the administrative record other materials related to its rule-making, besides the classified evidence and the SARs. FinCEN must, according to FBME, “provide a privilege log so that there is a complete record of the documents and privileges at issue and FBME can challenge specific withholdings.” Pis.’ MSJ 25. As FinCEN notes, however, the most FBME can muster in support of this proposition is an order issued on remand in a case involving the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”). See Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 1:12-cv-01513 (D.D.C. filed Sep. 12, 2012). CFIUS reviews and potentially investigates foreign investments in the U.S. that implicate national security. If CFIUS finds that a foreign investment should be prohibited, it sends a report to the President, who then has the authority to void the investment. Unsurprisingly, such a report often contains both classified and unclassified information. See Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 302-03 (D.C.Cir.2014). In Ralls Corp., “the district court sua sponte set a schedule for disclosure of ... unclassified material from the record and directed the Government to provide Plaintiffs with a privilege log of any unclassified material withheld on the basis of the Executive privilege.” Defs.’ Opp’n Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) 30 n.19 (citing Order, Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., No. 12-1513 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2014), ECF No. 65). That unique case notwithstanding, it is far from the norm to require agencies to produce privilege logs when they exclude material from an administrative record. In fact, the general rule is that when “documents are not part of the administrative record”—having been omitted on privilege grounds—“an agency that withholds these privileged documents is not required to produce a privilege log to describe the documents that have been withheld.” Nat’l Ass’n of Chain Drug Stores v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 631 F.Supp.2d 23, 27 (D.D.C.2009); see also Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 71 F.Supp.3d 109, 122 (D.D.C.2014) (“In this Circuit, requests for privilege logs of documents that may have been withheld from an administrative record on grounds of privilege or deliberative process are routinely denied.”). Even though FBME “claim[s] to seek a privilege log so that [it] can participate in the process of determining what documents are and are not part of the administrative record,” the idea “that a plaintiff and the Court should be permitted to participate in an agency’s record compilation as a matter of course [through review of a privilege log] contravenes ‘the standard presumption that the agency properly designated the Administrative Record.’ ” Chain Drug Stores, 631 F.Supp.2d at 27-28 (quoting Amfac Resorts, L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 143 F.Supp.2d 7, 12 (D.D.C.2001)). The Court will therefore not compel FinCEN to produce a privilege log here. c. FinCEN’s Alleged Nondisclosure of New Accusations and Information FBME further complains that FinCEN never disclosed to FBME a host of new, unclassified accusations and information until it issued its Second Final Rule in March 2016. These purported “allegations” included the following: that (i) FBME employees obscured or concealed information from regulators in late 2014; (ii) FBME identified the wrong customer connected to a sanctioned Syrian entity; (iii) FBME failed to demonstrate AML improvements in its Tanzanian headquarters; (iv) FBME failed to substantiate its purported AML compliance improvements; (v) an alleged Hezbollah associate held accounts at FBME as of early 2015; and (vi) FBME completed review of only three percent of its high-risk files as of June 2014. The Court will discuss each issue in turn, i. Obscuring of Information by FBME Employees The Second Final Rule states that “in late 2014,” after FinCEN made its initial finding that FBME was of primary money-laundering concern, “FBME employees took various measures to obscure information.” 81 Fed. Reg. at 18482, 18486, 18489; see also id. at 18482 (finding that “this behavior may have been part of an effort to reduce scrutiny over FBME’s operations following the issuance of the NOF and increased regulatory scrutiny). As FinCEN acknowledges, “this precise statement did not previously appear in the July 2015 Final Rule,” Defs.’ Opp’n 32, or in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. Yet the allegation partly underlies FinCEN’s conclusion in the Second Final Rule that it simply cannot trust FBME to comply with certain conditions or to provide it with accurate information. See 81 Fed. Reg. at 18490 (“Given this past behavior, FinCEN cannot reasonably rely on a proposed resolution that depends on FBME’s candid provision of complete, credible, and accurate information.”). And FinCEN cited FBME’s alleged untrustworthiness and deceptiveness as its justification for why the most extreme version of the fifth special measure, in particular, was appropriate. It is somewhat problematic, then, that FBME never had the opportunity to comment on this purported fact, especially considering that FBME was not and could not be privy to any classified or privileged material in the record that may support it. FinCEN counters that FBME was at least on notice of FinCEN’s general concerns about FBME’s apparent propensity for evading AML oversight, citing to Fin-CEN’s prior statement in the July 2014 NOF that “FBME took active steps to evade oversight by the Cypriot regulatory authorities.” 79 Fed. Reg. 42639-40 (July 22, 2014). True as this may be, it is nonetheless concerning that FinCEN did not disclose to FBME or the public this additional piece of evidence until the comment period had closed and Second Final Rule had been issued. If FBME employees in fact tried to conceal information from regulators following FinCEN’s 2014 NOF, it would imply that FBME attempted to stymie FinCEN in this very rulemaking and would be unwilling to work in good faith with U.S. regulators in the future. The only reason FinCEN offers for why this information was not disclosed during the comment period is that it “was cleared [for public disclosure] relatively late or recently ... prior to the rule.” Hr’g Tr. at 70:16-17. The Court appreciates that Fin-CEN sought to have declassified what general information it could and that the declassification process takes time. But if FinCEN was able to make this information available only when issuing the Rule, as part of the public justification for its action, the agency should have extended or reopened the comment period, and if necessary, moved the Court to enlarge the time allotted to issue the Second Final Rule. FinCEN took none of those steps here. The bottom line is this: At the preliminary-injunction stage, the Court found that “FinCEN’s authority to impose conditions [as part of the fifth special measure] was an obvious potential alternative to a full prohibition on opening or maintaining correspondent accounts on behalf of FBME.” FBME I, 125 F.Supp.3d at 125. FinCEN, in its new Rule, proposed to take the same action as before, basing its decision to impose the more-severe version of the fifth special measure on its distrust of FBME’s willingness to candidly provide complete, credible, and accurate information. Fin-CEN justified its distrust of FBME in part on the alleged fact that FBME employees acted to conceal information even after FinCEN issued its NOF—a piece of information that was ultimately deemed unclassified, although the supporting information was not. FBME and the public were never made aware of this unclassified allegation against FBME and had no meaningful opportunity to contest it during the comment period. Thus, this piece of the factual foundation of FinCEN’s Second Final Rule escaped public scrutiny during the rulemaking process. Nevertheless, when an agency fails to disclose supporting documents or information, a plaintiff must “show that [the] error was prejudicial” by “indi-eat[ing] with reasonable specificity ... how it might have responded if given the opportunity.” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 494 F.3d 188, 202 (D.C.Cir. 2007) (quoting Gerber, 294 F.3d at 182). Furthermore, a plaintiff “must ‘show that on remand [it] can mount a credible challenge ... and [was] thus prejudiced by the absence of an opportunity to do so before’ the agency.” Id (quoting Gerber, 294 F.3d at 184) (alterations in original). FBME has done neither here. The closest FBME has come to indicating how it would have responded to this evidence is to explain that it would have conducted an internal investigation in an attempt to decipher what incident or incidents FinCEN may have been referencing and then try to rebut FinCEN’s interpretation. It has not, as far as the Court is aware, undertaken any such investigation or suggested what its response might be. The Court also finds it exceedingly unlikely that FBME could mount a credible challenge on this point. Having reviewed the entire record, including the classified and unclassified portions, the Court is persuaded that FinCEN has strong enough support for its factual assertion in this regard that any comment from FBME would not make a difference. Finally, FinCEN had a more-than-sufficient basis, apart from this new allegation of fact, to conclude that it could not “reasonably rely on a proposed resolution that depends on FBME’s candid provision of complete, credible, and accurate information.” 81 Fed. Reg. 18490. Specifically, Fin-CEN discusses “FBME[’s] previous[ ] disregard[ ] [for] the instructions of its AML regulator” and its pattern of “engaging] in opaque and suspicious money transfers” as reasons why it could not trust FBME. Id. at 18489-90. The fact that FBME employees may have acted to obscure information from regulators in late 2014 is simply “extra icing on a cake already frosted.” Yates v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1093, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting). The Court thus concludes that FinCEN’s error in this regard was harmless. ii.FBME’s Failure to Identify a Customer FinCEN claimed in its NOF that an unidentified FBME customer was connected to the Scientific Studies and Research Center (“SSRC”), a U.S.-sanctioned organization. See 79 Fed. Reg. 42640. FBME investigated this allegation, provided FinCEN information about the customer it believed FinCEN was referencing, and, during the comment period, asked FinCEN whether the Bank had correctly identified the individual in question. Fin-CEN responded that it was “unable to release additional information in response to this question beyond the statements within the Notice of Finding.” A.R. 2656. Yet when FinCEN issued the Second Final Rule, it evidently was able to release additional information—i.e., that FBME had not correctly identified that individual. See 81 Fed. Reg. at 18486 (“[T]he sanctioned entity referenced in FinCEN’s Notice of Finding was not the individual identified by FBME.”). FBME’s frustration here is understandable, given that it could not investigate further because FinCEN refused to confirm or deny FBME’s identification until after the comment period had closed. But this simple statement in the Second Final Rule—that FBME did not correctly identify a particular customer— hardly counts as an accusation or as a new part of the evidentiary basis for the Rule to which FBME must be permitted to respond. Rather than a new, substantive fact on which FinCEN based its decision, it merely constitutes FinCEN’s response to a question posed to it by FBME: whether FBME had correctly identified the problematic individual referenced in the NOF. Because FinCEN was under no legal obligation to engage in an active dialogue with FBME on this point, its failure to answer FBME’s inquiry at an earlier stage of the process was not erroneous. iii.FBME’s Lack of AML Improvements in Tanzania FBME also claims to have been blindsided by FinCEN’s assertion in the Second Final Rule that FBME did “not demonstrate[ ] any AML improvements with respect to its headquarters in Tanzania.” 81 Fed. Reg. 18490. As FinCEN points out, however, it would be unreasonable to think that the public and FBME were not on notice that the AML controls at the Bank’s headquarters would be relevant to Fin-CEN’s determination of which special measure to impose. FBME knew that Fin-CEN had criticized its AML controls as weak, see, e.g., NOF, 79 Fed. Reg. 42640, meaning that FBME cannot claim unfair surprise when FinCEN faults it in the Second Final Rule for this very problem. To the extent that FBME’s weak AML controls served as a basis for FinCEN’s action, FBME had notice and could meaningfully comment on that issue. iv.FBME’s Failure to Substantiate Compliance Improvements In the Second Final Rule, FinCEN stated—apparently for the first time—that FBME had not provided “meaningful information or documentation” to support its claimed AML improvements. 81 Fed. Reg. at 18483. But all FinCEN appears to be saying here is that FBME did not sufficiently support its own claim that it promptly and consistently adopted auditors’ suggestions to establish an AML compliance program exceeding applicable legal requirements. This simply represents FinCEN’s assessment that FBME’s comments and submissions were inadequate; it hardly qualifies as a new accusation, piece of information, or part of the evidentiary basis underlying the Second Final Rule. v. FBME’s Maintenance of an Alleged Hezbollah Associate’s Account FBME complains that five times in the Second Final Rule, FinCEN states that “[a]s of early 2015, an alleged Hezbollah associate and the Tanzanian company he managed owned accounts at FBME.” 81 Fed. Reg. at 18482; see also id. at 18483-84, 18488-89. Yet when FinCEN notified FBME of this 'factual allegation, before the comment period closed, its disclosure looked like this: “Finally [redacted] as of [redacted] 2015 [redacted] alleged Hezbollah [redacted] and the Tanzanian company [redacted] owned accounts at FBME.” Pis.’ MSJ 31 (citing A.R. 4490). According to FBME, this statement did not make clear that it was referencing an alleged Hezbollah connection different from the one referenced in Fin-CEN’s initial notice. Nor did it specify that the alleged Hezbollah associate managed or owned the Tanzanian company with accounts at FBME, which was new information that could have guided a renewed, targeted forensic audit. Most importantly, FinCEN said nothing whatsoever about this allegation in its 2015 Notice, nor suggested it would matter to its remand deliberations—much less be central to them, as the Second Final Rule now indicates it was. As for Fin-CEN’s prior notices, the 2014 Notice of Finding contained what we now know to be a different allegation that an FBME customer received hundreds of thousands of dollars from a financier for Hezbollah, which allegation FinCEN then reiterated in its First Final Rule. Id. (emphasis added). FBME’s argument, then, is that FinCEN did an insufficient job of putting it (and the public) on notice that FBME allegedly maintained accounts for multiple Hezbollah associates and it therefore could not meaningfully comment on this finding as a factual basis supporting FinCEN’s Rule. The Court shares FBME’s confusion as to why FinCEN could make this fact public in its entirety when it issued the Second Final Rule, but could release only a heavily-redacted form during the notice-and-comment period. FinCEN’s tendency to make available in .its Second Final Rule declassified information that it disclosed only in limited form in its NOF or Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is hardly a best practice, because it carries with it the taint of unfair surprise. Moreover, FinCEN benefits from its ability to publicly justify its Rule on the basis of the unredacted information, while hampering (albeit perhaps inadvertently) public comment through the advance disclosure of heavily-redacted information. While the redacted version of this material may well have provided FBME with sufficient notice that FinCEN was basing its action, in part, on FBME’s potential association with multiple Hezbollah financiers, this particular allegation appears somewhat important in its own regard: As FBME observes, it appears five times in the Second Final Rule. As with the assertion that Fin-CEN employees acted to obscure information in late 2014, however, FBME has again failed to demonstrate prejudicial error. It has not explained how it would rebut this particular allegation of fact or what comment it would make to the agency about it. Moreover, this new fact—while certainly serious in isolation—must be considered in the context of the body of material on which the agency relied and that was properly disclosed. Although the agency should have allowed for comment on the unredacted material if it wished to hold up that material as justification for its Second Final Rule, this information adds little in the context of the other evidence against FBME. In other words, FinCEN has adequately justified its concern over FBME’s ties to Hezbollah (and to illicit international actors in general), even in the absence of this fact. A persuasive criticism of this particular assertion by FBME would almost certainly not have changed the agency’s ultimate determination. As a result, the Court finds any error in this regard to have been harmless. vi. FBME’s Inadequate Review of High-Risk Files Finally, FBME takes issue with Fin-CEN’s remark in the Second Final Rule that the agency “remainfed] troubled by the fact that as of June 2014, FBME had completed its review of only three percent of its high-risk customer files.” 81 Fed. Reg. 18483. FBME acknowledges, though, that this statistic comes from a September 2015 letter sent to FBME from its Cypriot regulator of which FBME was obviously aware. FBME cannot claim, then, to have lacked notice of this piece of potential evidence against it. FinCEN has committed no error here. 3. Whether FinCEN Met Its Obligation to Undertake Required Consultations FinCEN must clear an additional procedural hurdle before it may impose any special measure contemplated by Section 311: It must consult with several specified executive-branch agencies. First, before making a finding that an institution is of primary money-laundering concern, Fin-CEN is directed to “consult with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.” 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(c)(l). Then, if FinCEN finds an institution to be of primary money-laundering concern, it is required “[i]n selecting which special measure or measures to take” to consult with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, any other appropriate Federal banking agency (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Aet)[,] the Secretary of State, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the National Credit Union Administration Board, and in the sole discretion of the Secretary, such other agencies and interested parties as the Secretary may find to be appropriate. Id. § 5318A(a)(4)(A). Finally, if FinCEN elects to impose the fifth special measure, it must again consult with “the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.” Id. § 5318A(b)(5). FBME contends that the administrative record lacks sufficient support for the Court to conclude that FinCEN undertook the required consultations. The Bank relies primarily on Campanale & Sons, Inc. v. Evans, 311 F.3d 109 (1st Cir.2002), where the First Circuit found “insufficient evidence in the record to show that the Secretary [of Commerce] complied with Congress’ explicit procedural requirement to consult with the appropriate [regional fishery-management] councils before implementing regulations governing fishing in” a particular offshore zone. H. at 121. Campanale & Sons indeed lends support for the idea that when a statute requires an agency to engage in consultation in concert with its rulemaking, it must provide independent evidence in the record that it engaged in those consultations. Fin-CEN, by contrast, argues that a lone statement that an agency undertook the “required consultations” should suffice. 81 Fed. Reg. 18488. The Court finds the agency’s obligation to lie somewhere in between. When a statute specifically requires an agency to consult with an outside entity during the course of a rulemaking, the administrative record should contain some evidence that such a consultation took place. But the evidence needed will vary depending on the context, especially the extent to which the consultations implicate the agency’s deliberative-process privilege. The required consultations in Cam-panale & Sons evidently did not involve predecisional interagency deliberations. See 311 F.3d at 116-17 (describing the relevant consultation requirement as obligating the agency to consult with “appropriate Councils,” id. at 116 (emphasis omitted), such as the New England Fishery Management Council and the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council, id. at 117). One would thus expect evidence of consultations to be included in the administrative record in that circumstance. There is little doubt, however, that the interagency deliberative-process privilege would protect the results of the consultations that Fin-CEN must undertake pursuant to Section 311, disclosure of which “would undermine the confidentiality of that process, potentially implicating sensitive agency perspectives on matters of diplomacy, law enforcement, national security, and finance.” Defs.’ Suppl. Reply Mem. On Consultations 10. Any such records would qualify as predecisional, deliberative materials that do not belong in an administrative record. See Elec. Frontier Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 739 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C.Cir.2014); San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 789 F.2d 26, 45 (D.C.Cir.1986). A court therefore should not expect to see work product from those interagency consultations in the record. At the same time, a court reviewing a Section 311 rulemaking should be able to conclude from the record before it that FinCEN met its obligations to consult the right agencies at the right stage of the rulemaking process. A plain statement to the effect that FinCEN has engaged in the “required consultations” will not do. A more detailed explanation is required. a. FinCEN’s Contention That FMBE Is Precluded from Raising This Argument Before the Court reaches the merits of FBME’s argument that FinCEN failed to demonstrate compliance with the consultation requirements, it must first address two arguments that FinCEN advances for why FBME should not be allowed to argue the issue at all. First, Fin-CEN notes that FBME never raised the issue before the agency during the administrative process. Defs.’ Opp’n 38 (citing Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1297 (D.C.Cir.2004) (“[I]ssues not raised before an agency are waived and will not be considered by a court on review.”)). This argument makes little sense. The problem FBME identifies is with the materials and documentation that the agency included in the record submitted to the Court, which is obviously not something FBME could have commented on earlier. Moreover, FBME would have had no way of knowing during the administrative process that FinCEN potentially failed to undertake the required consultations; indeed, FinCEN could have undertaken those consultations the day before promulgating its rule and after the comment period had closed. The Court thus rejects FinCEN’s first argument. Second, FinCEN contends that any interest FBME has falls outside the zone of interests protected or regulated by the interagency-consultation provisions in Section 311. FinCEN points to Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, in which the Supreme Court explained that to be “adversely affected or aggrieved ... within the meaning” of a statute, the plaintiff must establish that the injury he complains of (his aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon him) falls within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint. 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). The Court illustrated the point with a hypothetical: the failure of an agency to comply with a statutory provision requiring “on the record” hearings would assuredly have an adverse effect upon the company that has the contract to record and transcribe the agency’s proceedings; but since the provision was obviously enacted to protect the interests of the parties to the proceedings and not those of the reporters, that company would not be “adversely affected within the meaning” of the statute. Id. In FinCEN’s view, the consultation provisions self-evidently are not intended to protect the interests of FBME or other banks against whom special measures are imposed. This position finds support in a congressional conference-committee report discussing a prior version of the consultation requirements. The report explains: “Among other things, this consultation is designed to ensure that the [Treasury] Secretary possesses information on the effect that any particular special measure may have on the domestic and international banking system” and to allow the Secretary to “better understand the impact of any particular special measure on those entities” that would have to take steps to comply with whatever special measure is imposed. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-728, at 22 (2000) (Conf. Rep.). The purpose of Section 311’s consultation requirements in isolation is not the determinative point, however. “To demonstrate prudential standing, [a plaintiff] ‘must show that the interest it seeks to protect is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question’ or by any provision ‘integrally] relat[ed]’ to it.” Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 179 (D.C.Cir.2012) (emphases added) (quoting Nat’l Petrochem. & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 287 F.3d 1130, 1147 (D.C.Cir.2002) (per curiam)); see also Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n. 16, 107 S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987) (“The principal cases in which the ‘zone of interest’ test has been applied are those involving claims under the APA, and the test is most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of [the APA’s judicial-reidew provision.]”). FinCEN’s line-by-line approach is therefore too narrow. Indeed, FinCEN does not dispute that FBME can challenge the Second Final Rule by alleging violations of a number of other requirements imposed by Section 311 that might render the rule unlawfully promulgated. Nor does it contest that FBME’s interest is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by Section 311 as a whole or by its integral rulemaking provision. Because FBME may bring suit to invalidate the rule as promulgated in violation of Section 311, it may raise the issue of FinCEN’s alleged failure to comply with the interagency-consultation requ