Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER WILLIAM M. CONLEY, District Judge Between 2008 and 2012, Applica Consumer Products, Inc. (“Applica”), received roughly 1,600 reports from U.S. consumers that the carafes distributed as part of its Black & Decker SpaceMaker line of coffeemakers were suddenly cracking, separating and breaking at the handle. Some of these handle failures included reports of burns and lacerations. By virtue of its acquisition of Applica’s parent company in 2010 and eventual merger with Applica in 2014, the defendant, Spectrum Brands, Inc., assumed legal responsibility for Ap-plica’s obligation, if any, to report these potential defects in the carafe handles under the Consumer Product Safety Act (“the Act” or “CPSA”). Congress designed the CPSA to “protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products.” 15 U.S.C. § 2051. To achieve that goal, section 15(b) of the Act requires manufacturers, retailers and distributors of consumer products to report “immediately” to the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) “information which reasonably supports the conclusion that [a] product contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard ... [or] creates an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b). While the CPSA obligates companies to self-report information about potentially defective products, the plain language of section 15(b) does not require companies to report every potential defect. Under the operative regulations, companies are directed to undertake a two-step evaluation process before reporting by fii-st determining whether a “defect” may exist, and then whether that defect could create a substantial product hazard. 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b)(3); 16 C.F.R. § 1115.4. The parties agree that the answer to the first question is “yes,” so the present dispute centers on whether the defective coffee pot handles could create a substantial product hazard. In this lawsuit, the United States of America seeks civil penalties and permanent injunctive relief against Spectrum, alleging its delay in informing the CPSC about these apparently defective handles violated reporting requirements under section 15(b) of the CPSA. Spectrum argues that the defects in the carafes were never a substantial product hazard sufficient to give rise to a reporting obligation under section 15(b). Alternatively, Spectrum argues that the government’s claims are now procedurally barred for a variety of reasons, including statute of limitations, vagueness and denial of due process generally. Pending before the court are dispositive motions from both sides, each asserting a right to judgment as a matter of law based on undisputed facts. For the reasons explained below, the court finds Spectrum’s procedural defenses unpersuasive and that it violated the statute, having failed to submit a section 15(b) report until years after its reporting obligation originally arose. UNDISPUTED FACTS A. The parties The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed this suit on behalf of the government, specifically the CPSC, an independent federal agency charged with enforcing the CPSA, after its five-member commission unanimously voted to refer this enforcement action to DOJ. Spectrum is a corporation organized under Delaware law with its principal place of business located in Middleton, Wisconsin. In June of 2010, Spectrum acquired 100% of Russell Hobbs, Inc. By virtue of that acquisition, another company, Applica, also became Spectrum’s wholly owned subsidiary. When Spectrum and Applica merged in 2014, Spectrum assumed all of Applica’s assets and liabilities. Therefore, the parties treat Spectrum and Applica as the same entity for the purposes of this lawsuit, as will the court. Between July of 2008 and April of 2012, Applica imported from China, and then sold in the United States, a line of Black & Decker SpaceMaker Under-the-Cabinet Coffeemakers. While Applica created the specifications for the coffeemakers, an approved Chinese vendor, Yamada, designed, tested and manufactured them. The carafes included- with the coffeemakers were glass, with a molded plastic handle attached to the glass pot with a single screw near the top and a metallic bracket encircling the pot near the bottom. Applica’s specifications for the handles required them to be capable of withstanding approximately 182 ounces, double the maximum capacity of the carafes, along with the wear and tear caused by 10,000 “test” or “brew” cycles. In addition, the coffeemakers were designed to brew a full carafe of coffee at a temperature lasting between 165°F and 195°F for up to two minutes, and a half carafe between 160°F and 195°F up to thirty minutes. B. Initial reports from consumers Between 2008 and 2012, Applica received customer complaints about its products via phone or email through a call center operated by Fox International Ltd., Inc. (“Fox”). Fox provided Applica, and therefore effectively Spectrum, with daily reports about quality or safety concerns raised by customers. These were then regularly reviewed by the company’s directors and legal counsel. There is no factual dispute as to Appli-ca’s (or Spectrum’s imputed) contemporaneous knowledge of consumer complaints concerning the carafe handles. Applica began receiving complaints in November of 2008, when a customer reported a broken handle. By February of 2009, reports of at least fifteen other failures followed, including a notice from a customer stating that her husband’s hand was burned when the handle broke and offering to send the broken carafe to Applica so that it could be “studied.” (PL’s Reply PFOF (dkt. # 114) ¶ 96.) In March of 2009, Applica performed a “returned product analysis” on a customer’s broken carafe at the direction of Peter Taube, Applica’s Product Assurance Director. In a report summarizing the results of that analysis, an Applica staff engineer stated: Plastic catches (Photo' 2, 3) on the upper carafe housing are broken on both sides[.] Additionally, the .upper screw boss is fractured as is the plastic directly below the boss. This allows the carafe to slip forward while pour- ' ing coffee. The material thickness of this catch, the strength of ’the boss and the plastic material brittleness may be contributing factors in this failure. (Id. at ¶ 107.) After Applica received another report about a broken handle, Taube sent an email to Stuart Slugh, Applica’s Senior Director of Consumer Services, and Leslie Campbell, Applica’s Vice President of Engineering. Dated April 4, 2009, Taube expressed his hope to “escalate” the issue of a potential defect. (Id. at ¶¶ 110-11.) Around April 16, 2009, Taube also requested that another product analysis be performed on a returned carafe. The summary of that analysis described findings similar to the first: Unit received with the carafe handle separation from mounting ring on the carafe bottom and broken upper handle (Photo 1). Plastic catch on upper housing carafe is broken on one side (Photo 2). Additionally, the upper screw boss is fractured (Photo 3) and several plastic cracks are found in carafe spout, plastic catch and handle cover, and housing (Photo 4, 5, 6, & 7). The broken screw boss was also fractured on both sides (Photo 8.) (Pl.’s PFOF Ex. 6 (dkt. # 79-6).) By May of 2009, Applica had received more reports of broken handles, totaling at least 60, including four reports of resulting burns. C. Remedial measures and additional reports On April 1, 2009, Applica asked Yamada to find the causes of and suggest corrections for the three issues identified in the March returned product analysis—the thickness of the catch, the strength of the boss and the brittleness of the plastic. Yamada proposed four “permanent corrective actions,” which Applica developed into and issued as an “Engineering Change Request” (“ECR”), intending to implement changes to strengthen the handles. That ECR included a “STOCK-SCRAP” order, which required Yamada’s remaining inventory be discarded. Taube also followed-up by email, emphasizing that: (1) the handle changes were “mandatory”; and (2) Appli-ca would not accept carafes that did not implement the new design. By May of 2009, Applica had tested the newly designed carafes and began stocking them as part of a “rolling change,” meaning that they would be shipped to consumers as the inventory of the old design was exhausted. According to Taube, Applica monitors consumer complaints regarding a product more closely after implementing an engineering change. With the complaints continuing, Applica began receiving letters concerning the carafes from the CPSC itself. In particular, the CPSC notified Ap-plica’s counsel by letter dated June 30, 2009, about a complaint it received from the same consumer whose report to Appli-ca was the basis of Taube’s email from April 4, 2009. The letter specifically identified an apparent failure of the screw securing the handle to the carafe, and further admonished as follows: The reports we have provided you may—either alone or with other information you now have or may later receive—reasonably support a conclusion that the product contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard, or creates an unreasonable risk of death or serious injury. If so, you are required under section 15(b) of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. 2064(b), to notify the Office of Compliance and Field Operations at the CPSC. (Decl. of Thomas John Schroeder Ex. B1 (dkt. #80-2) (emphasis added).) By the end of 2009, Applica had received at least 300 complaints about broken handles, including fourteen reports of resulting burns or lacerations. On or around February 26, 2010, the CPSC sent Applica two more notifications about broken handles, which were then followed by two more on or around March 31, another on September 30, and two more on December 31, 2010. Each of these notifications included the same warning to Applica regarding the section 15(b) reporting requirement. Applica received more reports of broken handles directly from customers throughout 2010, culminating in over 1,000 reports, including forty-nine involving burns or lacerations. The following year, those numbers climbed to over 1,500 reports, sixty-four of which involved burns or lacerations. D. Spectrum reports to the CPSC In March of 2012, Spectrum was served with a class action complaint that alleged the carafes were defectively designed. In response, Spectrum ordered a “review of the product history” of the coffeemakers. This resulted in Spectrum ordering Appli-ca to voluntarily recall them. By the time Spectrum submitted a section 15(b) report to the CPSC on April 3, 2012, it had received approximately 1,600 reports of broken handles, 66 reports of burns and three reports of lacerations since November of 2008. Along with the report, Spectrum requested a “fast track recall,” explaining in a letter to the CPSC that it did so as a “strategic response to a lawsuit without merit,” since under a fast track procedure, “there is no determination by the staff that the product presents a substantial product hazard or unreasonable risk of serious injury or death.” (Pl.’s PFOF Ex. 4 (dkt. # 79-4) at 10.) Spectrum submitted an amended, supplemental report on April 27, 2012. The CPSC issued a press release announcing a recall of the coffeemakers on or around June 1, 2012. In January of 2013, the CPSC went further, issuing an updated release to reflect that consumers would receive a full refund rather than a replacement carafe. Since both recalls were a type of “voluntary corrective action” under the CPSA, Spectrum worked together with the CPSC to issue the recall. OPINION Section 15(b) of the CPSA requires companies to report certain information about a potentially defective or dangerous product: Every manufacturer of a consumer product ... distributed in commerce, and every distributor and retailer of such product, who obtains information which reasonably supports the conclusion that such product— (3) contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard described in subsection (a)(2) of this section; or (4) creates an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death, shall immediately inform the Commission of such ... defect, or of such risk, unless such manufacturer, distributor, or retailer has actual knowledge that the Commission has been adequately informed of such defect ... or such risk. 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b). Any manufacturer that “knowingly” violates the CPSA’s reporting requirement “shall be subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 for each such violation,” up to a maximum penalty of $15,000,000 “for any related series of violations.” 15 U.S.C. § 2069. The CPSA also gives district courts jurisdiction to “[restrain any violation” of section 15(b) through equitable means. 15 U.S.C. § 2071(a)(1). The government seeks summary judgment on its claims that Spectrum violated the CPSA by failing to report the defective carafe handles sooner. Spectrum moves for dismissal of plaintiffs claims as barred by the statute of limitations. It also moves for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) the CPSA’s reporting requirements are unconstitutionally vague; (2) the CPSC failed to provide fair notice that a report was required in light of its investigations involving other coffeemakers distributed by Spectrum; (3) the CPSC’s determination that Spectrum violated the reporting requirements was arbitrary and capricious; and (4) Spectrum had no obligation to report the handle failures because the CPSC was already “adequately informed” within the meaning of section 15(b). Spectrum also seeks leave to file: (1) additional evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment; and (2) an additional motion for summary judgment, based on its purported discovery of new evidence that the CPSC “failed to satisfy a mandatory statutory precondition for bringing suit.” (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. Judg. (dkt. # 140) at 2.) Given their variety, the court will first address defendant’s threshold procedural arguments before turning to the substantive merits. I. Procedural Arguments A. Motions for leave In the preliminary pretrial conference order entered September 28, 2015, the court established May 6, 2016, as the dispositive motions deadline and July 15, 2016, as the discovery deadline. (Dkt. # 15.) Spectrum submitted its first set of interrogatories to the government on October 12, 2015, including interrogatory number five, which is set forth below. State the amount of the civil penalty you seek in each count of your Complaint, and describe in complete detail the CPSC’s consideration of the factors set forth in section 20(b) of the [CPSA], 15 U.S.C. 2096(b), and 16 F.F.R. Part 1119, including, without limitation, how each factor was weighed in making the determination of the amount of the penalty to be sought. (Pl.’s Mot. for Leave (dkt. # 140) at 2.) On November 16, 2015, the government responded as follows: If Spectrum is found liable under Sections 2068(a)(2)(B) and (a)(4) of the CPSA, the United States will make a specific request for a civil monetary penalty based on the facts illuminated through discovery. The United States’ request will explain the basis of the requested civil monetary penalty. Accordingly, Interrogatory 5 is also premature. (Id. (citing Decl. of James Hemmings Ex. 1 (dkt. # 126-1).) After Spectrum objected to the adequacy of this original response, the government provided a supplemental response at Spectrum’s request on July 1, 2016, further explaining that: The Commissioners deliberated based on a legal memorandum provided by the CPSC’s Office of General Counsel and discussions with attorneys of that office ..., and upon considering the section 20(b) factors decided to seek up to the maximum civil penalty authorized by law. (Decl. of Timothy L. Mullin Ex. B (dkt. # 130-2) at 5.) In this supplement, the government also presented its own analysis of the section 20(b) factors, though again maintaining that the actual amount of the civil penalty it seeks depends on the findings as to liability. (Id. at 4-10.) Finding this response to still be inadequate, Spectrum filed a motion to compel “a full response” on July 8, 2016. (Def.’s Mot. to Compel (dkt. #129) at 1.) Along with a response to Spectrum’s motion provided on the discovery deadline, the government filed a declaration from Elliot Kaye, the Chairman of the CPSC, in which he confirmed that “there is no written analysis of the Commissioners’ consideration of the factors, and that the Commissioners deliberated individually.” (Decl. of Elliot F. Kaye (dkt. # 136) ¶ 3.) During the hearing on that motion, Spectrum’s counsel conceded that the legal memorandum was privileged 'and, therefore, not subject to production. (Tr. of Mot. Hr’g (dkt. #138) at 8.) Given this concession, this court denied Spectrum’s motion to compel. (Dkt. # 137.) Nevertheless, based on supposedly “new evidence” in Kaye’s declaration, Spectrum: (1) seeks leave to bolster its argument that the CPSC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in authorizing this action for civil penalties, as demonstrated by the “Justice Department’s takeover of the Commission’s statutorily-prescribed function to assess penalties” (Def.’s Mot. for Leave (dkt. # 131) at 2); and (2) moves for summary judgment on the additional basis that the CPSC “failed to make a formal determination of the appropriate amount of penalties to seek in this matter, in violation of both the [CPSA] and the Commission’s own regulations.” (Def.’s Mot. for Leave (dkt. # 140) at 2.) The court will deny both motions. The initial question governing both of defendant’s motions is whether the evidence is “new.” See Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A renewed or successive summary judgment motion is appropriate, especially if one of the following grounds exists: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence or an expanded factual record; and (3) the need to correct a' clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Ordinarily, to constitute “new evidence,” the moving party must show not only that the evidence was newly discovered, but also that it could not have been timely discovered “with reasonable diligence.” See, e.g., Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996); Exec. Ctr. III, LLC v. Meieran, 823 F.Supp.2d 883, 897 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (“In other words, it is not enough to show only that one has obtained new evidence; rather, the party moving the Court for reconsideration must also show that the evidence was not reasonably available at the time the original summary judgment motion was pending.”). Spectrum claims that the reason for its late assertion of new evidence is that the government’s initial response to interrogatory number five “led Spectrum to believe that some documentation of the Commission’s consideration of the civil penalty factors actually existed, but that the Government was not producing it at that time.” (Defi’s Br. in Supp. of Additional Mot. for Summ. Judg. (dkt. #140-2) at 1 n.1.) Therefore, Spectrum claims, only after the government filed its brief in opposition to its motion to compel and Kaye’s declaration did “Spectrum finally learn[] that there is no record of the Commission’s collective consideration of the civil penalty factors and that, indeed, the individual Commissioners apparently considered the civil penalty factors ‘individually.’” (Id. (emphasis in original).) Spectrum’s claim of misdirection is dubious at best. The government’s offer to “explain the basis of [its] requested monetary penalty” in the event that defendant was found liable for violating section 16(b) in no way suggests that it would (or even could) later produce some contemporaneous record “of the Commission’s collective consideration of the civil penalty factors.” If anything, it confirms that in referring the matter for prosecution, the Commission authorized the Department of Justice to seek whatever penalty it saw fit up to the statutory maximum, depending on the facts adduced at trial. Regardless, Spectrum’s asserted “new evidence” turns out to be neither new, nor undiscoverable before the dispositive motions deadline. Indeed, Spectrum already knew all it needed to bring its motion timely. The court, therefore, denies defendant’s motions for leave to file additional evidence and an additional motion for summary judgment. Even if the court were to consider this “new” evidence, along with Spectrum’s additional motion for summary judgment, the result would be the same. Spectrum’s essential argument appears to be that the CPSC could not refer this matter for prosecution without a formal, recorded presentation of evidence and deliberations that Spectrum could challenge in court. ■ The statutory language on which Spectrum bases this argument is found in 16 U.S.C. § 2069(b): In determining the amount of any penalty to be sought upon commencing an action seeking to assess a penalty for a violation of [the section 15(b) reporting requirements], the Commission shall consider the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation, including the nature of the product defect, the severity of the risk of injury, the occurrence or absence of injury, the number of defective products distributed, the appropriateness of such penalty in relation to the size of the business of the person charged, including how to mitigate undue adverse economic impacts on small businesses, and such other factors as appropriate. Spectrum similarly points to the regulation issued by the CPSC interpreting the factors to be considered, which also includes the same “upon commencing” language. 16 C.F.R. § 1119.4. Spectrum first emphasizes that the words “shall” and “will” connote mandatory (i.e., not optional) tasks, but it is .axiomatic -that “[t]he legislature’s use of terms such as ‘shall’ and ‘must,’ rather than ‘may,’ does not automatically require that the provision be construed as mandatory, much less jurisdictional.” Milwaukee County v. Donovan, 771 F.2d 983, 990 (7th Cir. 1985). Instead, “[a] variety- of factors should be considered in determining the effect to be given the statute, including whether a mandatory construction would yield harsh or absurd results.” Bartholomew v. United States, 740 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 627-28 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Moreover, the CPSC credibly represents that the commissioners considered the civil penalty factors, albeit individually, based on a memo prepared by its Office of General Counsel, which included an analysis of those factors. (PL’s Opp’n Br. (dkt. # 135) at 3.) Nevertheless, Spectrum cries foul—not with respect to the commissioners considering the required factors, but rather the manner in which they did so—arguing that the commissioners’ consideration of the evidence, deliberations and reasoning had to be contemporaneously recorded. {See Def.’s Opening Br. (dkt. # 78) at 21 (“Moreover, when the matter was presented to the five Commissioners for a decision as to whether there was a violation warranting penalties, they did not generate any written record explaining and justifying their decision to seek penalties. Apparently the only documentation of the final decision is the set of minutes recording the Commissioners’ votes.”).) Similarly, Spectrum takes issue with the lack of specificity with which the Commission determined the civil penalty amount to be sought in this case, arguing that it is not sufficient for it to authorize an action up to the maximum penalty and give the DOJ discretion to seek some lower amount. However, nothing in the CPSA or the regulations mandates how the Commission should consider the civil penalty factors, nor expressly limits the civil penalty amount ultimately sought by the Department of Justice, and Spectrum’s policy arguments in support of its interpretation are certainly not enough to persuade the court that dismissal is required. Far from it, Spectrum is effectively arguing for robust due process rights with regard to the Commission’s decision to prosecute, including binding the Department of Justice to seeking a specific monetary penalty regardless of the evidence at trial, while having all its rights to again dispute liability and. the amount of any penalty before this court. Rarely would a party be extended such sweeping due process rights in a civil administrative proceeding without at least some deference given in any subsequent, judicial challenge, yet the defendant here is certainly seeking de novo review and all its due process rights before this court. Defendant nevertheless argues that reading in a statutory requirement for the commissioners to deliberate publicly over the civil penalty factors before referring a matter for civil action would insure that the CPSC “exercise[s] judgment about the seriousness of each alleged violation,” since otherwise “every manufacturer of appreciable size will be potentially liable for the $15 million maximum penalty.” (Def.’s Br. in Sppt. of Additional Mot. for Summ. Judg. (dkt. # 140-2) at 3.) Of course, most prosecutorial decisions, including seeking the gravest criminal penalties, are done in private, just as they were here. Even a grand jury’s deliberations are conducted in private without anyone present, including a court reporter. Other than pointing to large monetary penalties, which pale in comparison to life in prison or capital punishment, Spectrum offers little basis for invading that discretion here, especially since the actual decision as to the appropriate penalty is not left to the CPSC, but rather to the courts, and then only after the Department of Justice has presented sufficient evidence that Spectrum (or any other manufacturer) is deserving of the penalty sought. Finally, nothing about the commissioners’ votes to authorize the DOJ to seek up to the maximum penalty in this case reflects a failure to appreciate the relative severity of the alleged violations. Spectrum also argues that the commissioners’ consideration of the factors works hand-in-hand with 16 C.F.R. § 1119.5, which calls for written notice to a manufacturer of the CPSC’s intention to seek a civil penalty. But Spectrum again fails to explain how consideration in the manner suggested is statutorily required or materially different than receiving: (1) the CPSC staffs detailed letter notifying defendant of its intention to recommend a civil penalty action to the commissioners (Deck of James Hemmings Ex. G (dkt. # 34-7)); or (2) the two settlement offers the government made before litigation. (Def.’s Opp’n Br. (dkt. # 135) at 5.) Again, the only difference is that Spectrum wants an opportunity to reduce its downside risk administratively before disputing both its liability and any monetary penalty at trial in this court. Spectrum next argues that Congress required the CPSC to issue a regulation providing further detail about its interpretation of the civil penalty factors to promote transparency. Again, neither the statute nor the regulations demand this. As the CPSC explains in its published Anal interpretive rule regarding the civil penalty factors, the requirement in the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (“CPSIA”) for the Commission “to interpret the civil penalty factors gives transparency to the regulated community about the framework the Commission will use to guide its penalty calculations in the enforcement process and may provide incentives for greater compliance.” 75 Fed. Reg. 15993-01 (Mar. 31, 2010) (emphasis added). Obviously, transparency with respect to the factors the CPSC uses as a framework to determine what amount of civil penalties to seek is a far cry from transparency in the form of detailed, written records chronicling the commissioners’ actual decision-making in any particular referral for a civil enforcement action. Finally, none of the cases Spectrum cites suggest that dismissal is required because the government here “failed to satisfy a mandatory statutory precondition on bringing suit,” or acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). (See Def.’s Mot, for Leave to File Additional Evid. (dkt. # 131) at 3-4; Def.’s Br. in Sppt. of Additional Mot. for Summ. Judg. (dkt. # 140-2) at 5-8.) Spectrum principally refers this court to a decision by the U.S. Court of Intel-national Trade in United States v. Robert E. Landweer & Co., 816 F.Supp.2d 1364 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2012). In that case, U.S. Customs and Border Protection failed to perfect civil penalties assessed administratively against a customs broker before seeking enforcement in court. Of particular relevance, as the government acknowledged in that case, Customs failed to allege the specific violations of its regulations in the meticulously detailed, pre-penalty notice and process expressly required by that statute, and so the court could not conclude that the defendant was aware of its potential liability for those violations. Id. at 1373-74. In other words, the Court of International Trade would not permit recovery of the civil penalty (originally imposed administratively) because the defendant was not afforded the notice and process demanded by statute as part of the administrative penalty proceeding below. Id. at 1375; see also United States v. Optrex Am., Inc., Court No. 02-00646, 2005 WL 3447611, at *4 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2005) (“The statute was designed to give an importer the opportunity to fully resolve a penalty proceeding before any action in this Court[.]”). Thus, the doctrine articulated by the Court of International Trade in Optrex and followed in Landweer bears little relationship to that before this court, where the CPSC is not empowered to impose civil penalties administratively, but rather must refer a matter to the Department of Justice for possible enforcement in district court. See Athlone Indus., Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 707 F.2d 1485, 1490-92 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In contrast to the detailed, statutorily mandated process afforded customs brokers, the CPSA sets forth a set of pre-enforcement factors for the CPSC to consider internally before filing suit, not unlike the factors a state prosecutor might consider before making a charging decision. In either case, the court will not interfere with its decision-making process. Defendant’s APA challenges fail for similar reasons. The defendant argues that by failing to record the reasons for seeking civil penalties, the CPSC- cannot demonstrate that “the decision was the process of ‘reasoned decisionmaking.’” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 656 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)). In Owner-Operator, the Seventh Circuit vacated as arbitrary and capricious the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s final rule regarding monitoring devices for commercial vehicles after holding a single, con-clusory sentence representing that the agency “ha[d] taken the[] statutory requirement[] into account throughout the final rule” was insufficient to satisfy Congress’s mandate that the agency “shall ensure that the devices are not used to harass vehicle operators.” Owner-Operator, 656 F.3d at 588 (alterations in original). Moreover, in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration acted “arbitrarily and capriciously” by revoking its rule requiring automobile manufacturers to install passive restraints without first considering an airbags-only requirement, which was a known technological alternative already found by the agency to produce significant safety benefits. Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 49-51, 103 S.Ct. 2856. Similarly, in another case cited by defendant, the district court held that the defendants, including the U.S. Department of Transportation, acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to explain adequately their conclusions as to the environmental impact of the planned construction of a new toll road. Sierra Club, Ill. Chapter v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 962 F.Supp. 1037, 1043-44 (N.D. Ill. 1997). In contrast to the CPSA and its enabling regulations, which fail to prescribe the manner in which the CPSC must consider the enumerated § 2069(b) factors, each of the statutes in the above cited cases do just that. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (noting after summarizing the well-established standard for arbitrary and capricious review under the APA, that “[f]or purposes of these cases, it is also relevant that Congress required a record of the rulemaking proceedings to be compiled and submitted to a reviewing court, 15 U.S.C. § 1394, and intended that agency findings under the Act would be supported by ‘substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole’ ”) (citations omitted); Owner-Operator, 656 F.3d at 588 (“The Agency concedes that it would be arbitrary and capricious not to consider this factor or fail to explain its conclusion about the risk of harassment.”); Sierra Club, 962 F.Supp. at 1043 (“[T]his court merely holds that information about the growth inducing impact of tollroad construction is crucial to a reasoned conclusion as to alternatives and that the final impact statement was at least required to explain in some meaningful way why such a study was not possible.”). Finally, another district court already rejected a similar challenge to “the Government’s failure to consider certain specific factors in determining the amount of penalty to be sought upon commencement of the action,” explaining that: (a) the CPSA did not require the CPSC to specify the amount of penalty sought “as a jurisdictional prerequisite”; and (b) it was difficult for the defendant to show prejudice because “the amount of the penalty will ultimately be a matter for the Court.” United States v. Advance Mach. Co., 547 F.Supp. 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 1982). While defendant argues that the district court erred in analyzing whether the determination was a “jurisdictional prerequisite,” rather than a “statutory precondition on bringing suit,” Congress did not disrupt the Advance Machine court’s interpretation of the CPSA’s civil penalty factors in enacting the CPSIA, even though the CPSIA required the CPSC to issue additional guidance on the meaning of those factors. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.”) (internal citations omitted). Likely, this is because the court’s basic reasoning in Advance Machine held up to scrutiny by Congress, just as it does before this court. The CPSA does not describe the manner in which the CPSC must analyze the factors with the specificity defendant desires. Lacking any indication that Congress intended to demand a transparent, deliberative process before the CPSC can file suit, the court finds defendant’s motions for leave to challenge that process to be meritless. B. Other procedural arguments 1. Vagueness In two related, but not identical arguments, defendant also moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs civil penalty claims on the grounds that: (1) imposing a civil penalty on Spectrum would violate its due process rights; and (2) the CPSC’s decision to seek a civil penalty was arbitrary and capricious. Both arguments border on the frivolous. First, with respect to due process, defendant principally argues that the CPSA’s reporting requirements are so vague that they violate due process. Defendant further contends that the CPSC’s inconsistency in determining whether defects and injuries similar to the ones involved in this case qualify as requiring a report is violative of its due process right to fair notice. This insufficient guidance, defendant argues, violates both due process concerns protected by the void for vagueness doctrine: “first that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second ... that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2317, 183 L.Ed.2d 234 (2012). Defendant’s facial vagueness argument would reduce the CPSA and the accompanying regulations to the absurd: First, Spectrum could not have known what was required of them in 2009 when the CPSC says that Spectrum should have reported in this case because the Spacemaker coffee carafe “could” create a “substantial product hazard.” Since any condition “could” theoretically present a substantial product hazard, it is a standardless requirement. Under this standard, makers of envelopes would be required to report paper cuts because their products may be used by hemophiliacs and “could” present a “substantial product hazard’ to those users.” (Def.’s Opening Br. (dkt. # 78) at 9 (footnote omitted).) Contrary to this caricature, the CPSA and interpretive regulations establish an enforceable standard for a “substantial product hazard”—defined as a “substantial risk of injury to the public.” See 15 U.S.C. § 2064(a); 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(g) (both listing as considerations the pattern of defect, the number of defective products distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk and “other considerations”). A ready response to defendant’s complaint that this guidance leaves it uncertain as to the scope of its reporting obligation is obvious: when in doubt, report. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the statute, the CPSC and the courts are not talking about existential doubt, but rather about concrete, quantifiable doubt born out of the existence of the factors identified in the statute and regulations, including the potential hazard created, the number of reported defects and injuries, and the number of potentially defective products that are in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 2064(a)(2); 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(f). While defendant would prefer a more specific, unambiguous standard, defined and enforced by the CPSC itself, Congress chose not to take that route, perhaps out of concern that the governing agency could be coopted over time, or perhaps out of the realization that the manufacturers and distributors were the ones with inexpensive and ready access to the information that is required for a meaningful analysis of those factors. See generally Neil K Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy (1994). While Congress erred on the side of overreporting by leaving the ultimate consideration of whether a violation should be found and penalties assessed under a more general standard, the alternative is to adopt a more exacting standard that shifts the burden of un-derreporting to unwary consumers wholly uninformed as to the larger risk. Indeed, the common law, state and federal statutes and regulations are all replete with such so-called “vague” standards that shift the burden to the party with the most information, which in this case, is the manufacturer. Regardless, adopting defendant’s argument that the CPSA and the CPSC’s interpretive regulations violate due process principles because they fail to provide sufficient clarity as to what constitutes a “substantial” or “unreasonable” risk of injury, would also render many criminal statutes—never mind commercial regulations—void for vagueness. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2561, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) (“As a genex-al matter, we do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the application of a qualitative standard such as ‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct; ‘the law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly ... some matter of degree.’ ”) (alteration in original) (quoting Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377, 33 S.Ct. 780, 57 L.Ed. 1232 (1913)); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968) (upholding criminal statute prohibiting picketing “in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress”) (emphasis added); United States v. Article of Drug Labeled “White Quadrisect”, 484 F.2d 748, 749 (7th Cir. 1973) (rejecting vagueness challenge to “current good manufacturing practice” provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). Finally, defendant attempts to cast its challenge of the CPSA’s standards as involving “compelled speech” in hopes of implicating the First Amendment, and thereby avoiding an obvious bar to its facial vagueness argument. See, e.g., United States v. Pitt-Des Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976, 986 (7th Cir. 1999) (“When, as here, a statute or regulation does not implicate the First Amendment rights of a defendant, its vagueness is determined on an ‘as applied’ basis.”) (citations omitted). Again, however, defendant’s argument proves too much. Courts have consistently allowed impingement on commercial speech where a significant public policy exists. See, e.g., Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[CJommercial speech is constitutionally protected but governmental burdens on this category of speech are scrutinized more leniently than burdens on fully protected noncommercial speech.”). 2. Due process Defendant also contends. that imposing civil penalties violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, at least without fair notice of its duty to report information to the CPSC. Specifically, defendant argues that “prior to this litigation, the Commission consistently found there to be no substantial product hazard in numerous coffeemaker cases that involved a number of thermal burns with severities comparable to or worse than the minor injuries reported here,” establishing a “track record” upon which defendant was entitled to rely. (Def.’s Reply Br. (dkt. # 119) at 7.) As support, defendant points to two previous CPSC investigations into “Home Café” coffeemakers manufactured by Applica, neither of which ultimately resulted in a finding of a substantial product hazard or civil penalty enforcement action, “even though those products had reportedly caused burns more severe than those caused by the Carafe Handle Issue, and in similar or greater numbers[.]” (Id. at 8.) Defendant further likens the CPSC’s decision to seek civil penalties against Spectrum, after its decision to take no action against the Home Café coffeemakers, to the FCC’s seeking sanctions against television networks for broadcasting “fleeting expletives and momentary nudity” after taking no similar action against such content or displays in the past. See Fox Television Stations, 132 S.Ct. at 2320. In Fox, however, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the FCC sanction because the networks “lacked notice at the time of their broadcasts that the material they were broadcasting could be found action-ably indecent under then-existing policies.” Id. Here, the defendant’s primary argument is that the CPSC lacked an established policy regarding the types of defects and injuries associated with coffeemakers that would require a section 15(b) report, at least with respect to Spectrum’s situation. The parties are in essential agreement about the facts surrounding the investigations themselves. In February of 2005, the CPSC notified Applica that it had received information about at least two incidents of its HCC100 coffeemaker expelling hot steam and coffee, potentially causing burns. (Def.’s Reply PFOF (dkt. # 120) ¶¶ 44-45.) At that time, Applica submitted a section 15(b) report in response. (Id. at ¶46.) By 2008, there were 531 product failures resulting in multiple injuries to children, and forty-five burns, including multiple second-degree burns. (Id. at ¶¶ 48, 51-52, 54^56.) The CPSC sent Applica a letter dated February 7, 2008, advising that “the nature and degree of the risk of injury presented by [the HCC100 coffeemaker did not ] necessitate action by the Commission under Section 15 of the CPSA.” (Decl. of James Hemmings Ex. 8 (dkt. # 76-8) at 1.) The CPSC compliance officer who handled the investigation recommended a finding of no “substantial product hazard” because the product presented an “unlikely risk,” and her supervisor accepted that recommendation. (Def.’s Reply PFOF (dkt. # 120) ¶ 59-60.) Similarly, after receiving reports of the coffeemaker spraying hot water, steam and coffee on consumers, the CPSC opened an investigation into another Home Café coffeemaker, model GT300, in March of 2007. (Def.’s Reply PFOF (dkt. # 120) ¶ 62.) Injuries associated with the GT300 coffeemaker also included multiple reports of second-degree burns. (Id. at ¶¶ 64-67.) Nevertheless, the investigation into the model GT300 coffeemaker again resulted in no further action against Applica, and though the CPSC did not formally inform Applica that the investigation was closed, Applica assumed as much in light of the passage of time. (Id. at ¶ 68.) Defendant now argues that it was entitled to rely on this lack of action regarding Home Café coffeemakers in deciding not to report the failures of the SpaceMaker coffeemakers, particularly since the Home Café coffeemakers caused similar, if not more severe, safety risks. In response, plaintiff argues that defendant reads too much into the Home Café investigations, both because: (1) the threshold for reporting a potential defect is lower than the standard that the CPSC applies to determine whether a defect rises to a substantial product hazard; and (2) the results of those investigations should not be interpreted as establishing any particular “policy.” As to the first argument, plaintiff argues that manufacturers are required under section 15(b) to report “information which reasonably supports the conclusion that [a consumer] product ... contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard.” 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (emphasis added). On its face, this is a lower standard than whether a substantial product hazard actually exists. See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(1). As plaintiff also points out, this difference is confirmed in practice, as less than 20% of non-fast track section 15(b) reports result in the CPSC finding that a substantial product hazard exists. (Decl. of Robert Jackson Howell, Jr. (dkt. # 98) ¶ 11). Finally, plaintiff directs the court to the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Mirama Enterprises, Inc., 387 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2004), which rejected a manufacturer’s argument that the government must prove that a product is actually defective before obtaining civil penalties for a notice violation under § 2064(b): Where a manufacturer fails to report a potential defect, but it turns out that no actual defect exists, the Commission may decide not to seek a penalty. That does not mean, however, that there was no violation of section 2064(b). It makes sense for Congress to have imposed fines for reporting failures even when a product turns out not to be defective. Information about a possible defect triggers the duty to report, which in turn allows the Commission either to conclude that no defect exists or to require appropriate corrective action. Congress’s decision to impose penalties for reporting violations without requiring proof of a product defect encourages companies to provide necessary information to the Commission. Id. at 988-89. In reply, defendant argues that there must be some minimum standard of risk below which a company need not report and emphasizes that the CPSC’s “Recall Handbook” informs companies that the CPSC “undertakes the same product hazard analysis as that requested of firms” by first assessing whether there is a defect, and then “assessing] the substantiality of the risk presented to the public, using the criteria listed in section 16.” (Def.’s Reply PFOF (dkt. #120) ¶ 22.) But this just begs the question as to what that floor is, and defendant offers no support in the language of the statute, case law or policy that it should be the same, or even a similar, standard. Plaintiff does not contend that companies must report all potential defects regardless of their seriousness. Moreover, the passage from the handbook merely encourages companies to analyze the section 16 factors before deciding whether to report; it does not contradict § 2064(b), which expressly requires a company to report even when no substantial product hazard may actually exist, and certainly does not render the CPSC’s decision to seek a civil penalty for defendant’s failure to report the SpaceMaker carafes a violation of Spectrum’s due process rights for lack of fair notice. Defendant’s other argument that the Home Café investigations established a “policy” governing injuries caused by defective coffeemakers is no more persuasive. Even crediting defendant’s premise that the CPSC staffs closures of investigations may establish CPSC policy over time regarding certain types of defects or injuries, the CPSC determines on a case-by-case basis whether a defective product presents a substantial product hazard by applying several, general factors. Therefore, even if multiple cases involve products of a similar type or design and present similar risks of injury, a number of factors, including the nature of the defect, as well as the number and severity of injuries, could reasonably lead to different results in analogous cases. 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12 (noting that any one factor could create a substantial product hazard). Here, the CPSC compliance officer assigned to investigate the HCC100 coffeemaker based her “no substantial product hazard” recommendation on at least two material factors that do not apply to the SpaceMaker coffeemakers: (1) “based on independent testing by Exponent laboratories, the failure scenario is not likely to be forceful and energetic enough to justify [a finding] that an injury is likely to occur”; and (2) “it does not appear likely that a consumer would be in close proximity of the product at the time of failure.” (Def.’s Resp. Supp. PFOF (dkt. #121) ¶26.) Accordingly, in contrast to the fleeting expletive and momentary nudity that appeared consistent with long-standing regulatory policy in Fox Television Stations, 132 S.Ct. at 2318, Spectrum can point to no established CPSC policy regarding a threshold for a substantial hazard involving defective coffeemakers that the Space-Maker carafes plainly did not meet, much less relieving it of a duty to report the possible defects in the carafes’ handles. Defendant also makes a related argument invoking the APA, contending the “Commission’s conclusion that Spectrum violated Section 15(b) of the CPSA is arbitrary and capricious, both because the Commission did not (1) ground its analysis in terms of the Act and the governing regulations, and (2) explain why it was deviating from its consistent prior decisions deeming burn hazards posed by coffeemakers like the Spacemaker not to be substantial product hazards or unreasonable risks of serious injury under Section 15(b).” (Def.’s Opening Br. (dkt. #78) at 20 (emphasis in original).) With respect to the first argument, defendant contends that the CPSC’s decision to refer this case to the DOJ was arbitrary and capricious because the commissioners “did not generate any written record explaining and justifying their decision to seek penalties” and failed to follow “basic, well-accepted risk assessment principles.” (Id. at 21.) Recasting its argument under the APA does not change the result for reasons already discussed—neither the CPSA or the CPSC’s regulations require the commissioners to reduce their consideration of the factors for seeking a civil penalty to a formal writing, nor do those same authorities require the CPSC to apply the particular standards and procedures defendant would implement. The court likewise rejects defendant’s second assertion that the CPSC’s failure to explain its “departure” from the results of the Home Café investigations renders its referral of Spectrum for prosecution arbitrary or capricious. As already discussed, the Home Café decisions do not amount to contrary or controlling “precedent” with respect to Spectrum’s decision not to give the CPSC notice of the defect in the handle of SpaceMaker coffeemakers. C. Statute of limitations Defendant further moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs civil penalty claims as time-barred. The parties agree that since the CPSA does not have its own statute of limitations, the default statute of limitations for civil penalty enforcement actions requires plaintiff to file suit “within five years from the date when the claim first accrued.” 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Under section 15(b), a manufacturer, retailer or distributor of a consumer product is obligated to “immediately” inform the CPSC of a defect “unless” it has “actual knowledge that the Commission has been adequately informed of such defect[.]” Based on this language, defendant argues, “the obligation to report under section 15(b) first accrues or arises upon receipt of information from which one could reasonably conclude the existence of a substantial product hazard or an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death.” (Def.’s Opening Br. (dkt. # 80) at 4.) Since plaintiff contends that defendant should have filed a section 15(b) report by- May of 2009, then defendant argues that plaintiffs civil penalty claims, filed on June 17, 2015, are a year too late. In contrast, plaintiff interprets this same language from § 2064(b) as meaning that defendant’s violation of section 15(b) began when it failed to report information it was obligated to report but “continued ‘unless’ Spectrum had actual knowledge the CPSC was adequately informed.” (PL’s Opp’n Br. (dkt. # 40) at 9.) In other words, plaintiff contends that “Spectrum’s reporting violation was ongoing.” (Id.) In support of its statute of limitations argument, defendant cites two cases for the proposition that the general five-year statute of limitations is to be applied without tolling by the “continuing violations” doctrine. In Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 138 S.Ct. 1216, 185 L.Ed.2d 297 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s application of the discovery rule to toll § 2462’s statute of limitations in an action for civil penalties brought by the SEC for violations that “sounded in fraud.” 133 S.Ct. at 1220, 1224. In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted several “good reasons why the fraud discovery rule has not been extended to Government enforcement actions for civil penalties,” including that the government: (1) has investigative tools not available to private parties; (2) seeks penalties rather than recompense; and (3) can assert several privileges to make it difficult to determine what knowledge it had at any given time. Id. at 1221-24. In the second case cited by defendant, United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC, 720 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2013), the Seventh Circuit similarly rejected the government’s argument that the defendant’s failure to obtain a construction permit before modifying its coal-fired power plants in violation of the Clean Air Act created a “continuing violation.” Id. at 646. In particular, the court concluded that defendant did not commit “fresh violations” every day the plants operated because the plain text of the act required a plant operator to act “before constructing or modifying” á plant. Id. at 647. In other words,, the particular violation of the Clean Air Act alleged was “complete when construction commence[d] without a permit in hand,” since the relevant provision of the act only concerned “conditions precedent to construction or modification.” Id. In reaching its holding, the Seventh Circuit explained that Gabelli “teaches us not to read statutes in a way that would abolish effective time constraints on litigation.” Id. In response, plaintiff cites two cases of its own. In Advance Machine, the district court rejected a manufacturer’s argument that the lawsuit was time-barred. See 547 F.Supp. at 1089. The court concluded that a cause of action under section 15(b) of the Act “first accrues” when the manufacturer fails to timely report, but further explained that “[a]s this is a continuing duty, however, the statute of limitations does not start running until a report is filed or the manufacturer acquires actual knowledge that the Commission is adequately informed.” Id. at 1091. Similarly the district court in United States v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-1203, 2016 WL 1090666 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2016), denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the government’s CPSA civil penalty claims as time-barred, agreeing with the government that “the violations first began when Michaels obtained the information regarding the vases’ defect in the expert report and continued until Mi-chaels obtained actual knowledge that the Commission was adequately informed of the defect or risk of injury.” Id. at *2. The court is persuaded that plaintiffs interpretation is correct. Although Gabelli and Midwest Generation require courts to avoid extending the § 2462 statute of limitations where inconsistent with the text of the statute and sound policy, neither require the plaintiff to file suit before the alleged violation is “complete.” With respect to the SEC enforcement action in Gabelli, the Court stated that “[t]he question is whether the five-year clock begins to tick when the fraud is complete or when the fraud is discovered,” holding that the former triggered the statute of limitations. 133 S.Ct. at 1219 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit declared in Midwest Generation that “[t]he violation [of the preconstruction permitting requirement] is complete when construction commences without a permit in hand.” 720 F.3d at 647 (emphasis added). In contrast, a company’s violation of section 15(b) is not “complete” if it fails to immediately report a defect; instead, it is complete once the company actually submits a late report or “has actual knowledge that the Commission has been adequately informed of such defect[.]” Id. Certainly, defendant would not argue that its section 15(b) obligation to report a possibly defective product expires twenty-four hours after that duty first arises. See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.14 (defining “immediately” in section 15(b) as “24 hours”). Although both cases defendant cites require careful application of the continuing violations doctrine, neither precludes its application to the causes of action at issue here. Indeed, after Midwest Generation, the Seventh Circuit posited that the continuing violations doctrine may apply in the context of a securities disciplinary action. See Birkelbach v. SEC, 751 F.3d 472, 479 n.7 (7th Cir. 2014) (raising but not addressing the possibility that the continuing violations doctrine may “permit the SEC to consider untimely violative conduct so long as there was some timely violative conduct and the conduct as a whole can be considered as a single course of conduct”) (citing Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 690 (7th Cir. 2001)). That is certainly true with respect to violations of section 15(b), which instructs courts to penalize an ongoing failure to report as a “related series of violations,” not as a single violation. 15 U.S.C. § 2069(a)(1). Moreover, it is consistent with Seventh Circuit principles underlying the continuing violations doctrine to consider plaintiffs claims timely here. In the Title VII context, the Seventh Circuit has explained that “[t]he continuing violations doctrine allows a court to consider as timely all discriminatory conduct relevant to a claim, so long as there is sufficient evidence of a pattern or policy of discrimination.” Haugerud, 25