Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER Barnett, Judge: Before the court in this classification case are cross-motions for summary judgment. Confidential Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and Confidential Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“PL’s MSJ”), ECF No. 96; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and Def.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to PL’s Mot. for Summ. J. and in Supp. of Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s XMSJ”), ECF No. 91-1. Plaintiff Ford Motor Company (“Plaintiff’ or “Ford”) contests the denial of protest number 1303-13-100060 challenging U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (“Customs” or “CBP”) liquidation of the subject imports, Model Year (“MY”) 2012 (“MY2012”) Ford Transit Connect vehicles with vehicle identification numbers (“VINs”) containing either a number 6 or 7 in the sixth digit (hereinafter “Transit Connect 6/7”), under subheading 8704.31.00 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”), as “motor vehicles for the transport of goods.” Compl. ¶¶ 7, 10-11, 25, ECF No. 6 (alteration omitted); PL’s MSJ at 3; Def.’s XMSJ at 5. There is only one entry at issue, Entry Number 300-8620018-3, which entered at the Port of Baltimore on December 26, 2011 and which Customs liquidated on May 3, 2013. Summons at 1, ECF No. I. The court previously denied the pending motions due to the presence of genuine issues of material fact regarding the characteristics of the Transit Connect 6/7’s cost-reduced rear seat. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 40 CIT -, 181 F.Supp.3d 1308 (2016). Thereafter, Parties filed a Joint Supplemental Rule 56.3 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Joint Supplement”), see Confidential Joint Rule 56.3 Suppl. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Filed in Conjunction with Pl.’s and Def.’s Mots. For Summ. J. (“Joint Suppl.”), ECF No. 132, and asked the court to reconsider the Parties’ cross-motions in light of the supplemental facts, see Docket Entry, ECF No. 138. Cf. USCIT Rule 54(b). The court agreed to reconsider its prior ruling based upon the additional facts and, upon that reconsideration, the court finds that Customs’ ruling lacks persuasive force. In order to avoid any confusion as between the prior opinion and this opinion, and because this opinion restates any relevant portions of the prior opinion, the court vacates its prior opinion and order, grants Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, and denies Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Background I. Overview In the 1960s, the United States and Europe were involved in a “trade war.” Def.’s XMSJ at 2 n.l (citing Def.’s Ex. 5). Europe increased the duty on chicken imported from the United States, and the United States responded by placing a 25% tariff on trucks imported from Europe. Id. This retaliatory duty on trucks, colloquially referred to as the “chicken tax,” was still in place when Ford began importing the subjéct merchandise into the United States from its factory in Turkey in 2009. Id.; Confidential Def.’s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There Are No Genuine Issues to Be Tried (“Def.’s Facts”) ¶ 13, ECF No. 92-7; Confidential PI. Ford Motor Co.’s Resp. to Def.’s R. 56.3 Statement of Material Facts (“Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts”) ¶ 13, ECF No. 97-12. By contrast, the duty on imports of passenger vehicles is 2.5%. HTSUS Heading 8703; see also Summons at 2. As detailed below, Ford manufactures the Transit Connect 6/7s in Turkey and imports them into the United States. Although these vehicles are made to order and are ordered as cargo vans, Ford manufactures and imports them with a second row seat, declaring the vehicles as passenger vehicles subject to subheading 8703.23.00 and a 2.5% duty. After clearing customs but before leaving the port, Ford (via a subcontractor) removes the second row seat and makes other changes, delivering the vehicle as a cargo van. Defendant United States (“Defendant” or “United States”) determined that the inclusion of the second row seat is an improper artifice or disguise masking the true nature of the vehicle at importation and that such vehicle is properly classified under subheading 8704.31.00 and subject to a 25% duty. Ford contends that this is legitimate tariff engineering. II. Procedural History The sole entry at issue is Entry Number 300-8620018-3, which entered at the Port of Baltimore on December 26, 2011 and Customs liquidated pursuant to subheading 8704.31.00, with a 25% duty rate on May 3, 2013. Summons at 1. Ford timely and properly protested, claiming that the subject merchandise should have been liquidated pursuant to subheading 8703.23.00, with a duty rate of 2.5%, asserting that “CBP did not follow 19 U.S.C § 1315(d) or 1625 procedures in changing the classification.” Id. at 2. CBP denied the protest on June 4, 2013, and, on August 19, 2013, Ford timely commenced this case. Id. at 1-2; see also HQ H220856 (Customs’ explanatory ruling). After several amendments to the scheduling order, Parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the court held oral argument on June 8, 2016. See Oral Argument, ECF No. 104. On October 5, 2016, the court denied the cross-motions. Ford, 181 F.Supp.3d at 1321-22. The court explained that Parties had provided insufficient information about the cost-reduced rear seat for the court to properly conduct the analysis required by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (“Federal Circuit”) decision in Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 35 F.3d 530 (1994), which spoke to the distinction between passenger vehicles and cargo vehicles for the purpose of tariff classification. Ford, 181 F.Supp.3d at 1319, 1321. The court concluded that “[additional information and evidence regarding [the cost-reduced car] seat [would] better enable [it] to determine whether the vehicle’s intended purpose of transporting persons, as imported, outweighs an intended purpose of transporting goods.” Ford, 181 F.Supp.3d at 1321 (citing Marubeni, 35 F.3d at 535). Thereafter, following a telephone conference, on October 13, 2016, the court ordered Parties to submit the Joint Supplement regarding the cost-reduced rear seat. Docket Entry, ECF No. 112. As noted above, submission of the Joint Supplement — and the additional undisputed material facts stated therein — has prompted the court to reconsider the Parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. III. Material Facts Not in Dispute The court’s rule regarding summary judgment requires the moving party to show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” USCIT Rule 56(a). Movants should present material facts as short and concise statements, in numbered paragraphs and cite to “particular parts of materials in the record” as support. USCIT Rule 56(c)(1)(A). In responsive papers, the opponent “must include correspondingly numbered paragraphs responding to the numbered paragraphs in the statement of the movant.” USCIT Rule 56.3(b). Concurrent with briefing their respective summary judgment motions, Parties submitted separate facts, which contained mixtures of disputed and undisputed phrases or sentences within a numbered paragraph. And, as previously noted, Parties submitted the Joint Supplement containing supplemental facts specific to the cost-reduced rear seat. Upon review of Parties’ voluminous separate and joint facts and supporting documents, the court finds the following undisputed and material facts regarding the subject merchandise. A. History of the Subject Merchandise The subject merchandise consists of Transit Connect 6/7s. Def.’s Facts ¶ 1; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 1. Ford derived the Transit Connect 6/7s from a line of vehicles designed and manufactured in Europe with the V227 designation. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 2; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 2. When considering whether to expand the European V227 line to the United States, “Ford researched the European ISV [integrated style vans] market for approximately six months, including researching who the competitors were and how big the market was” and explored targeting “both personal and commercial customers — such as cleaning services, florists, newspaper carriers, telephone repair, and food delivery.” PL’s Facts ¶¶ 15-16; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff “identified owners of the Chevrolet Astro/Safari, a minivan used for both passengers and cargo but that was no longer in production, as possible customers for the Transit Connect.” PL’s Facts ¶ 17; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 17. Ford initially considered whether it would be feasible to manufacture the vehicles in the United States, but decided to import a vehicle built on the European V227 production line already in use at its Otosan plant in Kocaeli, Turkey, because it was more efficient to use an existing line and the vehicle could be brought to market sooner. PL’s Facts ¶ 19; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 19. “Every Transit Connect manufactured in Turkey was built on the same production line.” PL’s Suppl. Facts ¶ 258; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Suppl. Facts ¶ 258. Ford’s plant in Otosan used the VIN as a plant inventory control number. PL’s Facts ¶ 35; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 35. Transit Connect 6/7s received a VIN “during the manufacturing process ... then going forward that’s how the vehicle [was] managed. That [was] the vehicle identification from that point forward.” Def.’s Facts ¶ 31; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 31. The vehicles in Ford’s European V227 line included the “double-cab-in-van (DCIV),” which was also called the European Tourneo Connect or Transit Connect, “depending on the country where sold,” and the “Cargo Van.” Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 9, 11; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 9, 11. Ford based the subject merchandise on its European V227 DCIV, not its Cargo Van. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 21; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 21. “When Ford began product planning for the Transit Connect it did not know what the ‘take rate’ — product mix — would be between retail or fleet, and cargo or passenger, sales.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 20; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 20. Before it could be imported into the United States as the Transit Connect 6/7, the European V227 DCIV had to be modified to meet U.S. safety standards, “including the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (‘FMVSS’).” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 25; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 25. Ford modified the European V227 DCIV to comply with all relevant U.S. safety standards and imported the modified vehicle as the Transit Connect. Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 26, 32; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 26, 32. To meet U.S. safety standards, Ford “redesigned the underbody support structure for the second row of seats.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 29; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 29; Joint Suppl. ¶ 22. Ford also “added a side-impact beam to the sliding side door to meet FMVSS 214” and “a side-impact foam block to the sliding side door to meet [the] Insurance Institute of Highway Safety (TIHS’) standards.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 28; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 28. Other safety modifications included making changes “to the vehicle lighting, turn signals and vehicle labels.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 27; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 27. Ford designed the Transit Connect on the Ford Focus platform, which means that it has “the same chassis and drivetrain [as] the Ford Focus passenger vehicle.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 4; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 4. During the February 2008 Chicago Auto Show, “Ford displayed Transit Connect models” and “conducted focus groups with potential customers in order to learn their reactions to the Transit Connect.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 90; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 90. The following year at the same auto show, Ford displayed the following configurations of the Transit Connect: two-passenger, four-passenger, and five passenger. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 91; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 91. “From May to June 2009, Ford conducted a 13-city tour where potential customers were able to drive Transit Connects,” and “[i]n six of the cities, Ford also did a press event for the Transit Connect.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 97; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 97; Pl.’s Suppl. Facts at 8 (clarification of Pl.’s Fact ¶ 97); Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Suppl. Facts at 8-9 (response to clarification of Pl.’s Fact ¶ 97). “Ford advertised the Transit Connects in magazines and on auto shopping websites.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 99; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 99. The Transit Connect was “a vehicle that could be readily adapted to suit different customer demands.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 20; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 20. “Each Transit Connect was built to order.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 33; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 33. Ford “imported the Transit Connect in two trim series, XL, the base trim series, and XLT, the upgraded trim series.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 34; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 34. All the differences between the various configurations and trim levels of the Tran: sit Connect 2012 models that were available for sale are identified in the MY2012 Brochure, procured by CBP from the Ford website in February 2012. Pl’s Facts ¶ 69; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 69. B. Description of the Subject Merchandise The Transit Connect 6/7 “was a multipurpose vehicle manufactured in Turkey and imported into the United States from 2009-2013.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 1; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 1. The subject imports are “part of Ford’s U.S. Transit Connect vehicle line.” Def.’s Facts ¶ 11; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 11. Transit Connect 6/7s were “designated within Ford as the V227N.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 1; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 1. “The V227N vehicles [were] LWB (long wheel base).” Def.’s Facts ¶ 62; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 62. The V227N line “included a van model (Transit Connect Van) in two trim levels and a Wagon model (Transit Connect Wagon) in two trim levels,” but “only the Transit Connect Vans are at issue in this action.” Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 15, 16; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 15, 16. All Transit Connects are imported with second row seats, but the Transit Connect 6/7s are delivered to the customer as a two seat cargo van. Def.’s Facts ¶ 17; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 17. As imported into the United States, the subject merchandise had a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (“GVWR”) of 5005 pounds. Def.’s Facts ¶ 45; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 45; Joint Suppl. ¶ 63. A GVWR of 5005 pounds is specific to the two-passenger Transit Connect 6/7s; five-passenger Transit Connect 9 vehicles are assigned a GVWR of 4695 pounds. Joint Suppl. ¶ 63. Every Transit Connect contained a Duratec 2.0L, four cylinder gasoline engine, which is a spark-ignition internal combustion reciprocating piston engine with a cylinder capacity of 1999 cc. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 36; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 36. In its condition as imported into the United States, every Transit Connect included: a steel unibody construction with an interi- or volume of approximately 200 cubic feet, which translates to just under 6m3; front-wheel drive; rear passenger seats with seat anchors; and underbody bracing. Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 38-39, 43, 45; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 38-39, 43, 45. The Transit Connects had Macpherson strut front suspension, ground clearance of 8.2 inches, and over 50 inches of space from floor to ceiling in the rear. Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 41, 54-55; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 41, 54-55. At the time of importation into the United States, the Transit Connect 6/7s had “swing-out front doors with windows, second-row sliding doors with windows, and swing-out rear doors, some of which had windows.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 49; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 49. The sliding side doors met federal safety standards for passenger vehicles. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 50; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 50. At the time of importation into the United States, no Transit Connect 6/7s “had a panel or barrier between the first and second row of seats.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 52; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 52. As imported into the United States, the Transit Connect 6/7s included: second row seats; seat belts for every seating position; permanent bracing in the side pillars of the car body; child-locks in the sliding side doors; dome lighting in the front, middle, and rear of the vehicle; a full length, molded cloth headliner; coat hooks in the second row; and á map pocket attached to the rear of the front driver seat. Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 44, 47-48, 51, 57-60; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 44, 47-48, 51, 57-60. The Transit Connect 6/7s also had “front vents” and “front speakers.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 68; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 68; Pl.’s Suppl. Facts at 7 (clarification of Pl.’s Fact ¶ 68); Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Suppl. Facts at 6 (response to clarification of PL’s Fact ¶ 68); Def.’s Facts ¶ 118; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 118. There were “two cupholders in the center console and a compartment at the rear of the center console to create an optional third cupholder.” Pl.’s Suppl. Facts ¶ 255; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Suppl. Facts ¶ 255. The Transit Connect 6/7s had carpeted footwells in front of the second row seat. PL’s Facts ¶ 53; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 53; PL’s Suppl. Facts at 7 (clarification of PL’s Fact ¶ 53) & ¶ 255; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Suppl. Facts at 5 (response to clarification of PL’s Fact ¶ 53) & ¶ 255. As explained below, the second row seats in the Transit Connect 6/7s did not include “headrests, certain [seatback] wires, a tumble lock mechanism[,] or accompanying labels,” and were “wrapped in a cost[-]reduced fabric.” PL’s Facts IT 44; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 44; see also Def.’s Facts ¶ 114; PL’s Resp. to Defi’s Facts ¶ 114. The Transit Connect 6/7s did not have rear (behind the front seats) vents, speakers, and handholds. Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 19-21; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 19-21; Def.’s Facts ¶ 118; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 118. The subject imports did not have side airbags in the area behind the front seats. Def.’s Facts ¶ 18; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 18. The Transit Connect 6/7s did not come with a cargo mat and the painted metal floor of the cargo area was left exposed. Def.’s Facts ¶ 119; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 119. The XL trim line of the Transit Connect 6/7s “did not have front map lights, a CD player, a power equipment group (including windows, locks, exterior mirrors[,] and remote keyless-entry with fobs), 12V pow-erpoint in the rear[,] or cruise control.” PL’s Facts ¶ 67; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 67. Ford also manufactured the XLT (and XLT Premium) trim line of the Transit Connect 6/7 that included such features. Plaintiffs Ex. A ¶82 (Ex. 79, T-1227) (Transit Connect Order Guide). The subject entry contained Transit Connect 6/7s in both trim levels. Joint Suppl. ¶ 4. After importation into the United States, but before leaving the port, the Transit Connect 6/7s “were labeled with Monroney labels, commonly known as window stickers, Smog Labels and Loose Item/Ramp labels.” PL’s Facts ¶ 75; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 75; Def.’s Facts ¶ 123; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 123; Oral Arg. Tr. 91:3-14 (stipulating “to the fact that Monroney labels, were in fact, attached to the subject Transit Connect 6/7s after they cleared customs, but before they left the port facility”). The Transit Connect 6/7s were finally “delivered to customers as two-seat cargo vans.” Def.’s Facts ¶ 130; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 130; see also Joint Suppl. ¶ 89. C. Development of the Cost-Reduced Rear Seat From MY2010 to MY2012 1. The MY2010 Transit Connect 6/7 In 2009, Ford began importing MY2010 Transit Connect 6/7s. Joint Suppl. ¶ 5. At the time of importation, MY2010 Transit Connect 6/7s contained a two-passenger rear seat that “was the same as the ‘60’ portion of the ‘60/40 three-passenger rear seat in the [MY2012] Transit Connect 9 vehicles.” Joint Suppl. ¶¶6-7, 97. “The seat structure and folding mechanisms of the [MY2010 Transit Connect 6/7] [r]ear [s]eat were designed to meet Ford’s internal durability standards, which are intended to ensure a lifetime of trouble-free use, or approximately 150,000 miles of normal use.” Id. ¶ 8. The MY2010 Transit Connect 6/7 rear seat had a seatback frame and a cushion frame (for the bottom of the seat). Id. ¶ 9. The rear seatback frame “was constructed of 40mm diameter steel tubing ... with a vertical tubular reinforcement” that “support[ed] the seatbelt retractor and seat foam.” Id. ¶ 10. Welded to the seatback frame were: (1) a “retractor mount for the right seating position,” (2) a “seatbelt shoulder guide for the right seating position,” and (3) a “seatback latch mechanism.” Id. ¶ 10(a),(b),(d). The seatbelt retractor mount, shoulder guide, and seatback latch mechanism were designed and built to withstand a collision. Id. ¶ 10(c)(ii),(d)(ii). “The seatback frame had seven seatback wires welded to it.” Id. ¶ 10(e)(footnote omitted). “[S]eatback wires provided lumbar support, passenger comfort, support for cargo when folded flat, and support for the seat foam and fabric.” Id. ¶ 10(e)(i). The torsion bar assembly and torsion bar mount, which helped to “hold[ ] the back of the seat down when folded against the seat cushion,” were located in the seatback frame, id. ¶ 11, along with a “short, eighth wire[,] that worked in conjunction with the torsion bar assembly,” id. ¶ 10(e)(iii). The cushion frame “was constructed of formed 25mm diameter steel tubing” with “an additional 25mm steel tube running down the center of the seat.” Id. ¶ 14. The cushion frame contained “[s]eat bottom wires” that “crisscrossed across the seat cushion frame from top to bottom and side to side” and helped to “keep the seat foam in place and provide support for the passengers.” Id. ¶ 14(f)-(g). The LATCH .system, which enables a LATCH-equipped child car seat to be fitted to the seat, and which satisfies federal motor vehicle safety standards, was welded to the cushion frame. Id. ¶ 14(a). Two floor latches secured the seat to the floor. Id. ¶ 14(b). The rear seatback and seat cushion contained high density polyurethane foam. Id. ¶ 15. The side of the foam coming into contact with passengers was contoured for lumbar and lateral support; the frame side was contoured to fit into the seat frame. Id. ¶ 15(a). The frame contours, seat cushion, seatback wires, and seat cover held the foam in place. Id. ¶ 15(b). Other than the rear-facing portion of the back seat, which contained a backrest reinforcement pad, the seatback and cushion were covered in the same flame retardant fabric as the front seats. Id. ¶¶ 16, 16(b), 17. The bottom of the rear seat was covered with black mesh fabric. Id. ¶ 18. Black paint covered the visible, metal portions of the rear seat. Id. ¶ 19. The rear seat came equipped with seat-back pivot brackets, which operated as a hinge enabling the seatback to fold down onto the seat cushion, id. ¶ 13, and a tumble lock mechanism, which held the seat in place when it was folded forward against the front seats, id. ¶ 24(b). The tumble lock mechanism consisted of a cover, strut rod assembly, tumble lock mechanism assembly, and vaidous screws, pins, and labels. Id. ¶ 24(a). The rear seat included a label that “illustrate[d] how to flip the seat forward and contained an illustration referencing the owner’s manual,” and “two red indicator flags on the rear floor latches that showed whether the seat was locked into .place.” Id. ¶¶ 24(c), 25. The rear seat also came equipped with a small rubber pad on the rear leg to decrease noise and vibration around the rear floor latches. Id. ¶ 26. The rear seat had seatbelts for each seating position, id. ¶ 27, and “an adjustable head restraint,” though “head restraints are not'required to satisfy the FMVSS,” id. ¶¶ 28, 28(a). 2. Cost-reduced Seat Version 1 In late 2008, “Ford and Otosan began investigating the creation of a cost[] reduced car seat for use in Transit Connect 6/7 vehicles.” Id. ¶ 29. During the investigation, the North American V227 Program Manager stated that the “[cjheaper seat still needs to meet all crash requirements. Thought is that, for example, it does not fold or tumble forward. Dont [sic] touch cushion or fabric.” Id. ¶ 86. In mid-MY2010, Ford created its first cost-reduced seat (“CRSV-1”) for use in Transit Connect 6/7s. Id. ¶ 32. The implementation of CRSV-1 resulted in the removal of the head restraints, torsion bar assembly and mount, tumble lock mechanism and associated labels, and backrest reinforcement pad from the MY2010 Transit Connect 6/7 rear seat. Id. 133(a)-(d). “Ford and Otosan used engineering judgment in lieu of physical testing to assert compliance with all applicable FMVSS.” Id. ¶ 34. Ford and Otosan determined that physical testing, of the CRSV-1 was not necessary because “the main frame of the seat structure [was] not changed,” the removed components had “no effect on the compliance of strength tests” associated with certain FMVSS, and compliance with FMVSS 202 is only required when “there [are] head restraint[s].” Id. ¶ 34; Confidential Joint Ex. 30, ECF No. 132-3 (letter from Ford/Oto-san engineers explaining why engineering judgment was relied upon); see also Joint Suppl. ¶ 35 (physical testing was limited to that performed on the original MY2010 rear seat). Ford also did not conduct consumer testing or surveys before installing the CRSV-1 in Transit Connect 6/7s. Joint Suppl. ¶ 37. Ford briefly imported Transit Connect 6/7s with the CRSV-1 installed at the time of importation into the United States. Id. ¶ 38. 3. Cost-reduced Seat Version 2 In 2009, “Otosan began considering ways to further reduce the cost” of the Transit Connect 6/7 rear seat. Id. ¶ 39. In March 2010, an Otosan engineer sent Michael Andrus, of Ford’s Automotive Safety Office, the following email: I am D & R engineer of V227 (transit connect) seats in Ford-Otosan Turkey. We have a cost reduction study for 2nd row seats. We have decided to delete some parts at V227 NA vehicle 2nd row seats as cost reduction item which will be scrapped in US. Tumble mechanism, torsion bar and headrests were deleted at the first cost reduction study of 2nd row seats. I want to share some delete part opportunities with you for the second cost reduction study and need your decisions if any test required for these changes. Again I want to remind that, these seats will be scrapped in US, will not be used anytime, however we should send the seats with meeting requirements. Id. ¶ 41; see also id. ¶ 87 (referring to statement by Otosan engineer that seats shipped to the United States should “meet all applicable seat requirements”). In late 2010, Ford created its second cost-reduced seat (“CRSV-2”), id. ¶42, which incorporated the following changes from CRSV-1: (1) removal of four of the seven seatback wires, including three vertical wires and one horizontal wire, and a fifth short wire associated with the torsion bar assembly, which had been removed in the CRSV-1; (2) wrapping of the seat in a cost-reduced fire-resistant grey woven cover originally used only on the back of the MY2010 Transit Connect 6/7 rear seat, and which is not the same as the fabric used to cover the front seat; (3) replacement of the front leg seat anchor cover, which was designed to attach to the tumble lock mechanism, “with a cover that did not contain a space for the [t]umble [ljock [m]echanism”; (4) removal of the red indicator flags and housings associated with the tumble lock mechanism “to leave a bare metal lever”; and (5) removal of the small rubber pad from the rear seat leg intended to decrease noise and vibration from around the rear floor latches, id. ¶ 44(a)-(f). At some time, Ford also removed the fabric mesh covering the rear seat bottom and stopped applying black paint to the visible, metal portions of the seat frame. Id. ¶ 45(a)-(b). The MY2012 Transit Connect 6/7s at issue in this litigation contained the CRSV-2 installed at the time of importation. Id. ¶¶ 43, 88. “Ford did not conduct consumer testing or surveys” before implementing the CRSV-2. Id. ¶ 51. Ford and Otosan used physical testing and engineering judgment to determine that the CRSV-2 did not require additional testing. Id. ¶¶52, 61. Specifically, Otosan directed the CRSV-2 supplier to conduct “H-Point” testing to determine whether any changes, including the fabric change and removal of seatback wires, resulted in changes to the original hip point. Id. ¶¶ 53, 55. If H-Point testing reflected changes from the original hip point, then additional tests or engineering changes may be necessary to confirm FMVSS compliance. Id. ¶ 58. Based on the H-Point test results, Otosan engineers concluded that the fabric change and removal of seatback wires did not affect the CRSV-2’s FMVSS compliance. Id. ¶ 59; see also id. ¶ 60 (Otosan engineers stated that removing seatback wires did not affect the strength of the seat); Id. ¶ 64 (other than the H-Point test, Ford conducted no other additional physical testing beyond the testing performed on the original seat). Ford affixed a safety certification label to each Transit Connect 6/7 at issue certifying that the vehicle complied with all applicable FMVSS requirements. Id. ¶ 62. D. Post-Importation Processing of Subject Merchandise After subject imports cleared Customs, but were still within the confines of the port, processing procedures were conducted on all Transit Connects and, additionally, certain features were removed or altered in the Transit Connect 6/7s. “The port processing procedures carried out on all Transit Connect vehicles included removing Rap-Gard, a protective covering during shipment; disengaging Transportation Mode; and checking for low fuel.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 74; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 74. For Transit Connect 6/7s, additional post-importation processing entailed: the second-row seat was unbolted and removed,[] along with the associated second row safety restraints. A steel panel was then bolted into the second row footwell to create a flat surface behind the first rows of seats. A molded cargo mat was placed over the floor behind the first row. Scuff plates were added inside the second-row doors. In some vehicles the sliding door windows were replaced with a solid panel. PL’s Facts ¶ 78; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 78. Prior to the subject merchandise being ordered or manufactured, “Ford had entered into a contract with its port processor” to conduct the post-importation processing. Def.’s Facts ¶ 125; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 125. The following features remained in the Transit Connect 6/7s after the post-importation processing: underbody second-row seat support; anchors and fittings for the second-row seat, permanent bracing in the side pillars to support the removed safety restraints; and the beam and foam in the side sliding doors for rear passenger crash protection. PL’s Facts ¶ 80; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 80; PL’s Suppl. Facts ¶ 255; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Suppl. Facts ¶ 255; Joint Suppl. ¶ 91. E. CBP’s Investigations of Subject Merchandise “Between April 17, 2009, and 2013,” Ford imported the Transit Connects through the Ports of Baltimore, Maryland, Jacksonville, Florida, Los Angeles-Long Beach, California, and Port Hueneme, California. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 137; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 137. From March 1, 2010 through November 23, 2012, “there were 477 liquidations of entries containing Transit Connect vehicles classified under subheading 8703.23.00, HTSUS, with 446 entries as bypass liquidations, ie., unre-viewed, and 31 entries reviewed by CBP personnel” without a physical inspection of the goods by an import specialist. Def.’s Facts ¶ 139; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 139. As part of Customs’ compliance validation, Customs reviewed “Ford’s entry documents” for at least nineteen entries, and of those nineteen validated entries, eight were “found to be compliant.” PL’s Facts ¶¶ 142^13; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶¶ 142-43. In the winter of 2011 to 2012, CBP Supervisory Import Specialist Gerald Stro-ter and Import Specialists Tamiko Bates and Jeremy Jackson conducted a Trade Compliance Measurement Review as part of Tamiko Bates’ training at the Port of Baltimore. PL’s Facts ¶ 151; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 151. One of the entries covered in the Trade Compliance Measurement Review was of a Transit Connect 6/7. PL’s Facts ¶ 152; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 152. Mr. Stroter noticed that “the difference between the passenger version and the cargo version of the Transit Connect appeared to be that the passenger version had a rear seat and the cargo version did not.” PL’s Facts ¶ 155; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 155. As a result of the aforementioned review, Import Specialists “believed that the [Transit Connect 6/7s] were being misclassified.” PL’s Facts ¶ 157; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 157; PL’s Suppl. Facts at 8-9 (clarification of PL’s Fact ¶ 157); Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Suppl. Facts at 14 (response to clarification of PL’s Fact ¶ 157). On February 6, 2012, Mr. Jackson submitted a QUICS query to the National Import Specialists describing the Transit Connect 6/7 “based on what was shown on Ford’s website.” PL’s Facts ¶¶ 158-59; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶¶ 158-59. On February 9, 2012, Mr. Stroter, Mr. Jackson, and CBP Officer. Eric Dausch went to the Port of Baltimore “to physically inspect a [Transit Connect 6/7],” and at this time, Mr. Jackson “noticed that some Transit Connect vehicles had rear windows and some did not.” PL’s Facts ¶¶ 160-61; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶¶ 160-61. Mr. Stroter and Mr. Jackson learned that “vehicles with VIN’s containing the characters S6 or S7 ... were consistently discovered to be 2-passenger cargo vans while those with the characters S9 were identified as 5-passenger vehicles.” PL’s Facts ¶ 166 (internal quotations omitted); Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 166. That day, Mr. Jackson “emailed Richard, Laman, the National Import Specialist responsible for reviewing Jackson’s earlier QUICS message,” describing “the vehicles that he physically inspected, and included the pictures that were taken of the vehicles during his visit.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 163; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 163. Mr. Jackson viewed Mr. Laman “as responsible for setting the policy for how the Transit Connect [6/7] would be classified.” Pl.’s Facts ¶ 163; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Facts ¶ 163. On February 22, 2012, the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Baltimore was notified of the “Investigation into Proper Classification of Ford Connect Vans.” PL’s Facts ¶ 169; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 169. On February 23, 2012, the Port of Baltimore notified Ford that CBP had “initiated an investigation into Ford Motor Company importations” and the “declaration of vehicles classified under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of United States (HTSUS) headings 8704 and 8703.” PL’s Facts ¶ 172; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 172. On February 24, 2012, CBP Officer Benjamin Syzmanski contacted Mr. Stroter and informed him for the first time that cargo vans “are imported in [sic] as passenger vans.” PL’s Facts ¶ 185; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 185. Mr. Syzmanski explained that “the Transit Connéet vans make entry into the port and then are fully released by CBP. Only after the vans have been released by CBP ... does Ford move the vans to a facility within the Baltimore Port limits and select vans are gutted/stripped/altered to become cargo vans.” PL’s Facts ¶ 185 (internal quotations omitted); Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 185. On June 8, 2012, the Assistant Director for Trade Operations of the Port of Baltimore, Thomas Heffernan, requested Internal Advice from CBP’s Office of Regulations and Rulings regarding the proper classification of the Transit Connect 6/7s. PL’s Facts 1H(87d, 216; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶¶ 87d, 216; Def.’s Facts ¶ 145; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 145. On January 30, 2013; in response to Mr. Heffer-nan’s request for Internal Advice, CBP Headquarters issued ruling HQ H220856 to the Baltimore Field Office. PL’s Facts ¶ 237; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 237; Def.’s Facts ¶ 146; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 146. HQ H220856 held that the Transit Connect 6/7s were “properly classifiable as ‘Motor vehicles for the transport of goods,’ under subheading 8704.31.00, HTSUS, dutiable at the rate of 25% ad valorem.” Def.’s Facts ¶ 147; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s Facts ¶ 147. Jurisdiction and Standard op Review The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)(2012). Jurisdiction is uncontro-verted in this case. PL’s Facts ¶ 244-49; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s Facts ¶ 244-49. The Court may grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,” and “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); USCIT R. 56(a). The court’s review of a classification decision involves two steps. First, it must determine the meaning of the relevant tariff provisions, which is a question of law. See Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); see also id. at 1366 (characterizing the first step as “construing] the relevant (competing) classification headings”). Second, it must determine “what the mer-ehandise at issue is,” which is a question of fact. Id. at 1366. When no factual dispute exists regarding the merchandise, summary judgment is appropriate and resolution of the classification turns solely on the first step. See id. at 1365-66; id. at 1365 (“The ultimate question in a classification case is whether the merchandise is properly classified under one or another classification heading,” which is “a question of law[ ] ... because what is at issue is the meaning of the terms set out in the statute ....”) (citations omitted); see also Sigma-Tau HealthScience, Inc. v. United States, 838 F.3d 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). The court reviews classification cases on “the basis of the record made before the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a). While the court accords deference to Customs’ classification rulings relative to their “ ‘power to persuade,’ ” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)), it has “an independent responsibility to decide the legal issue of the proper meaning and scope of HTSUS terms,” Warner-Lambert Co. v. United States, 407 F.3d 1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Rocknel Fastener, Inc. v. United States, 267 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). It is “the court’s duty to find the correct result, by whatever procedure is best suited to the case at hand.” Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Discussion I. Legal Framework The General Rules of Interpretation (“GRIs”) provide the analytical framework for the court’s classification of goods. See N. Am. Processing Co. v. United States, 236 F.3d 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “The HTSUS is designed so that most classification questions can be answered by GRI 1.” Telebrands Corp. v. United States, 36 CIT -, -, 865 F.Supp.2d 1277, 1280 (2012), aff'd 522 Fed.Appx. 915 (Fed. Cir. 2013). GRI 1 states that, “for legal purposes, classification shall be determined according to the terms of the headings and any [relevant] section or chapter notes.” GRI 1, HTSUS. “Absent contrary legislative intent, HTSUS terms are to be ‘construed [according] to their common and popular meaning.’” Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. United States, 182 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Marubeni 35 F.3d at 533 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Courts may rely upon their own understanding of terms or consult dictionaries, scientific authorities, and other reliable information. Brookside Veneers, Ltd. v. United States, 847 F.2d 786, 789 (Fed. Cir. 1988); BASF Corp. v. United States, 35 CIT -, -, 798 F.Supp.2d 1353, 1357 (2011). For additional guidance on the scope and meaning of tariff headings' and chapter and section notes, the court also may consider the Explanatory Notes to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, developed by the World Customs Organization. See Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. United States, 714 F.3d 1363, 1367 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Although Explanatory Notes do not bind the court’s analysis, they are “indicative of proper interpretation” of the tariff schedule. Lynteq, Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 693, 699 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 549 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1582) (quotation marks omitted). II. Competing Tariff Provisions Customs liquidated the subject imports as motor vehicles for the transport of goods pursuant to subheading 8704.31.00. See HQ H220856 at 13. Defendant contends Customs correctly classified the subject imports, and that Customs’ ruling deserves deference. Subheading 8704.31.00 covers: 8704 Motor vehicles for the transport of goods: Other, with spark-ignition internal combustion piston engine: 8704.31.00 G.V.W. not exceeding 5 metric tons. 25% Ford contends the subject imports are motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons, classifiable under subheading 8703.23.00. That subheading covers: 8703 Motor cars and other motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons (other than those of heading 8702), including station wagons and racing cars: Other vehicles, with spark-ignition internal combustion reciprocating piston engine: 8703.23.00 Of a cylinder capacity exceeding 1,500 cc but not exceeding 3,000 cc ...2.5% When GRI 1 analyses demonstrate that merchandise is prima facie classifiable under two or more headings, it will be classified under “[t]he heading [that] provides the most specific description.” GRI 3(a). Here, heading 8703 affords the most specific description; thus, if the Transit Connect 6/7s satisfy the requirements of heading 8703, “there is no need to discuss [heading] 8704.” See Marubeni, 35 F.3d at 536. However, if the Transit Connect 6/7 is not classifiable under heading 8703, it falls within heading 8704. III. Classification is Based on the Article’s Condition at the Time of Importation Parties agree that the Federal Circuit’s test for distinguishing between passenger vehicles and cargo vehicles governs this court’s resolution of the instant dispute. See, e.g., Pl.’s MSJ at 25-29; Def.’s XMSJ at 16; see also Marubeni, 35 F.3d 530. In Marubeni, the court decided the proper classification of the 1989 and 1990, two-door, two-wheel, and four-wheel drive Nissan Pathfinder when the sports utility vehicle first entered the market. 35 F.3d at 532. The Marubeni court considered two possible HTSUS headings — 8703 and 8704 — the same two headings at issue in the instant case, id. at 533, and concluded that to be “principally designed for the transport of persons,” the vehicle must “be designed ‘more’ for the transport of persons than goods,” id. at 534 (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged (1986) (defining “principally” as “in the chief place, chiefly,” and defining “designed” as “done by design or purposefully”); see also id. at 535 (classification under heading 8703 requires “that a vehicle’s intended purpose of transporting persons must outweigh an intended purpose of transporting goods.”). The Marubeni court held that the proper classification of the Nissan Pathfinder was under heading 8703, encompassing motor cars and other motor vehicles principally designed for the transport of persons, and affirmed the Court of International Trade’s (“CIT”) decision. Id. at 532 (affirming Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States, 17 CIT 360, 821 F.Supp. 1521 (1993)). In so doing, the Federal Circuit spoke to the test to determine “whether a vehicle is principally designed for a particular purpose, not uniquely designed for a particular purpose,” by looking “at both the structural and auxiliary design features, as neither by itself are determinative.” Id. at 535. Unlike the instant dispute, however, Marubeni did not involve post-importation processing of the subject merchandise, concomitant allegations of resort to disguise or artifice to evade higher duties, see Def.’s XMSJ at 20-23; Def.’s Corrected Reply Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and in Further Supp. of Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Reply”) at 6, 7-9, ECF No. 93-1 (condition of the Transit Connect 6/7s at the time of importation “was a ruse to fool CBP into believing that the vehicles were ‘principally designed for the transport of persons’ ”), or competing claims of legitimate tariff engineering, Pl.’s MSJ at 32-36; Confidential Mem. of P & A in Opp’n to Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. and Reply in Supp. of PL’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“PL’s Reply”) at 10-15, ECF No. 97. Accordingly, the court first discusses the relevance of those legal principles to the test set forth in Marubeni, before turning to its Marubeni analysis. It is a well-settled tenet of customs law that “[i]n order to produce uniformity in the imposition of duties, the dutiable classification of articles imported must be ascertained by an examination of the imported article itself, in the condition in which it is imported.” Worthington v. Robbins, 139 U.S. 337, 341, 11 S.Ct. 581, 35 L.Ed. 181 (1891). In 1881, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the principle that a manufacturer may purposely manufacture goods in such manner as to evade higher duties. Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U.S. 694, 701-02, 704, 26 L.Ed. 896 (1881) (a case involving the importation of sugar, which had been darkened with molasses during its manufacture to escape higher duties assigned to lighter-colored sugar). According to the Court, “[s]o long as no deception is practised, so long as the goods are truly invoiced and freely and honestly exposed to the officers of customs for their examination, no fraud is committed, no penalty is incurred.” Id. at 704. Seeberger v. Farwell, 139 U.S. 608, 11 S.Ct. 650, 35 L.Ed. 297 (1891) is in accord. In Seeberger, the manufacturer produced garments using a mixture of cotton (6%) and wool (94%) to avoid higher tariffs associated with pure wool garments. 139 U.S. at 609-10, 11 S.Ct. 650. The Customs Service (then called the “collector”) determined that the small addition of cotton had not changed the character of the goods and the plaintiffs claim to a lower rate of duty “[w]as an attempt to defraud the revenue.” Id. at 610-11, 11 S.Ct. 650. The trial court disagreed, and the Supreme Court concurred, finding that the manufacturer “had the right to ... manufacture the goods with only a small percentage of cotton, for the purpose of making them dutiable at the lower rate.” Id. at 611, 11 S.Ct. 650. Merritt and Seeberger involved permanent alterations to the composition of their respective merchandise; neither case addressed, as occurred here, post-importation alterations to the subject merchandise. In Citroen, however, the Supreme Court did not regard the pre- or post-importation condition of the subject import as material to the classification analysis. United States v. Citroen, 223 U.S. 407, 32 S.Ct. 259, 56 L.Ed. 486 (1912). Citroen concerned the importation from France of 37 unset and unstrung pearls, divided into five separate lots. Id. at 413, 32 S.Ct. 259. Prior to importation, the pearls had been strung and worn as a necklace by their eventual owner. Id. at 413-14, 32 S.Ct. 259. After importation into the United States and delivery to the owner, the pearls were strung to “form[] the necklace she desired.” Id. at 414, 32 S.Ct. 259. The Customs Service had classified the pearls under the provision for “pearls set or strung,” and the importer appealed. Id. at 413, 32 S.Ct. 259. The Court discussed, and dismissed, the idea that the pre-importation stringing of the pearls or any post-importation plan to string the pearls into a necklace determined the correct classification. See id. at 415-16, 32 S.Ct. 259 (“Had these pearls never been strung before importation, no one would be heard to argue that they fell directly within the description of paragraph 434 [applicable to set or strung pearls] because they could be strung, or had been collected for the purpose of stringing or of being worn as a necklace.”)) (emphasis added); Id. at 416, 32 S.Ct. 259 (“Nor can it be said that pearls, imported unstrung, are brought within the description of paragraph 434 because, at some time, or from time to time, previous to importation, they have been put on a string temporarily for purposes of display.”). The Citroen Court created a bright line test for classification cases: “[d]oes the article, as imported, fall within the description sought to be applied?” Id. at 415, 32 S.Ct. 259 (emphasis added). It is also well settled, however, that articles cannot escape a prescribed rate of duty “by resort to disguise or artifice.” Id. at 415, 32 S.Ct. 259. In other words, when the article is described by a particular tariff provision at the time of importation, “an effort to make it appear otherwise is simply a fraud on the revenue, and cannot be permitted to succeed.” Id. at 415, 32 S.Ct. 259 (emphasis added) (citing Falk v. Robertson, 137 U.S. 225, 232, 11 S.Ct. 41, 34 L.Ed. 645 (1890) (a case involving the importation of high quality tobacco hidden in a bale of inferior quality tobacco, in which the importer had tried to classify the entire bale under the provision applicable to the inferior tobacco)). In contrast, the purposeful manufacture or preparation of an article to avoid higher tariffs is not disguise or artifice; rather, that is legitimate tariff engineering. See id. at 415, 32 S.Ct. 259 (“But when the article imported is not the article described as dutiable at a specified rate, it does not become dutiable [at that rate] because it has been manufactured or prepared for the express purpose of being imported at a lower rate.”) (citing Merritt, 104 U.S at 704, Seeberger, 139 U.S. at 611, 11 S.Ct. 650); HQ H220856 at 11 (defining legitimate tariff engineering). The CIT has previously addressed competing claims of legitimate tariff engineering and disguise or artifice in a case involving post-importation processing. See Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States (“Heartland I”), 23 CIT 754, 74 F.Supp.2d 1324 (1999), rev’d, 264 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Heartland IF). Heartland I concerned the correct classification of sugar syrup to which molasses was added during manufacturing and then extracted after importation. Heartland I, 23 CIT at 756, 74 F.Supp.2d at 1328. The plaintiff, Heartland By-Products, Inc. (“Heartland”), claimed classification under subheading 1702.90.40 of the HTSUS, which covers “sugar syrups ... containing soluble non-sugar solids [excluding foreign substances] greater than 6 percent by weight of the total soluble solids,” and which was not subject to the relevant tariff rate quota, Id. at 760, 74 F.Supp.2d at 1332, “because [the product] contained] more than 6% by weight of soluble, non-sugar solids with no foreign substances,” Heartland II, 264 F.3d at 1129. Customs initially agreed. Heartland I, 23 CIT at 755, 74 F.Supp.2d at 1327 (citation omitted). However, the domestic sugar industry filed a petition seeking reclassification of the subject merchandise, arguing, inter alia, that classification under subheading 1702.90.40 “defeated the purpose of the 6% solids content provision of 1702.90.20 HTSUS[, which] .... was adopted to ensure that sugar syrups containing less than 6% non-sugar solids would be subject to the TRQ because such syrups compete directly with sugar.” Heartland II, 264 F.3d at 1130. Pursuant to that petition, Customs determined that the molasses constituted a “foreign substance” and should be disregarded in determining the amount of soluble non-sugar solids in the syrup. Heartland I, 23 CIT at 762, 74 F.Supp.2d at 1333 (citation omitted); Heartland II, 264 F.3d at 1131. Customs also determined that the addition of molasses was not a “genuine step” in the process of manufacturing the sugar syrup, and, thus, its inclusion constituted disguise or artifice. Heartland I, 23 CIT at 767-69, 74 F.Supp.2d at 1337-38 (citation omitted); Heartland II, 264 F.3d at 1131 (citation omitted). Accordingly, Customs revoked its prior ruling, Heartland I, 23 CIT at 756, 74 F.Supp.2d at 1329, and classified Heartland’s sugar under subheading 1702.90.10/20, Heartland II, 264 F.3d at 1131-32 (citation omitted). On appeal from Customs’ revocation, the CIT concluded that molasses is not a foreign substance because it is “composed of the same chemical ingredients” as raw sugar and the subject sugar syrup, but in different proportions. Heartland I, 23 CIT at 762-64, 74 F.Supp.2d at 1333-35. The CIT also disagreed with Customs’ finding that the addition of molasses was not a genuine step in the manufacturing process. Id. at 767-69, 773, 74 F.Supp.2d at 1338-39, 1342 (“The record evidence indicates and does not contradict that combining raw sugar with molasses is a legitimate step in the refining process.”). According to the CIT, Merritt and its progeny “have accepted artificial steps in the manufacturing process done to obtain the lowest rate of duty.” Id. at 771, 74 F.Supp.2d at 1341 (“[T]he motive of the importer in fashioning his or her merchandise is simply not a relevant inquiry. In fact, to the extent motive is relevant, an importer who intends to fashion merchandise solely for the purpose of obtaining the lowest rate of duty is within his or her legal right.”). Moreover, following Worthington and subsequent cases standing for the proposition that classification is determined based upon the condition of the article at the time of importation, the court faulted Customs for considering post-importation use of the syrup in its revocation decision. Id. at 772-73, 74 F.Supp.2d at 1341-42 (“Plaintiffs operation falls directly within the line of cases which hold that an importer has the right to stop production at the most favorable time for duty purposes.”). The Federal Circuit reversed the CIT on the basis that Customs’ determination that the term “foreign substances” in subheading 1702.90.10/20 included the molasses Heartland had added to its sugar syrup merited Skidmore deference. Heartland II, 264 F.3d at 1134. The majority opinion declined to address the parties’ arguments concerning the materiality, if any, of the syrup’s post-importation processing to the classification analysis. See id. at 1134 (declining to address other arguments raised in the appeal). Those arguments were addressed by Senior Circuit Judge Friedman, who wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 1137-39 (Friedman, J., concurring). The concurrence opined that record evidence supported Customs’ factual finding that the molasses was “added to the sugar in this case to achieve a desired level of soluble non-sugar solids for the avoidance of quota,” and its conclusion that the importation of the sugar syrup with molasses was disguise or artifice. Id. at 1138-39 (Friedman, J., concurring) (citation omitted). According to the concurrence, because the addition and removal of the molasses from the sugar served no manufacturing or commercial purpose, the conclusion is irresistible that the only purpose of this strange arrangement was to create a fictitious product that, because of the temporary presence of the molasses, qualified for the lower rate of duty on sugar imports containing specified amounts of non-sugar solids. Id. at 1138 (Friedman, J., concurring). Though recognizing that concurring opinions are not binding on this court, Parties to the instant litigation dispute the application of Judge Friedman’s concurrence to this case and the correctness of CBP’s reliance on the concurrence in the underlying ruling. See Pl.’s MSJ at 32-33; Pl.’s Reply at 11; Def.’s XMSJ at 21-23; see also HQ H220856 at 11-13. Plaintiff distinguishes the Heartland II concurrence on the basis that, in that case, the sugar syrup “was not a real product in its condition as imported because there was no market for molasses-impregnated sugar,” whereas here, “there is a very real market for passenger vans.” PL’s MSJ at 33. Defendant contends the Heartland II concurrence squarely applies: “[a]s in Heartland, Ford’s program constitutes a disguise or artifice by creating a fictitious product to obtain a lower duty rate.” Def.’s XMSJ at 22-23 (arguing that “[b]y Ford’s own design, [the Transit Connect 6/7] with rear seating is a fiction” because it cannot be ordered by-.or sold to a customer and, thus, “is not a commercial reality”). The court finds that neither party’s respective position on, nor Customs’ analysis of, the Heartland concurrence is persuasive. For several reasons, however, the court declines to adopt the view espoused in the concurrence. First, the concurring opinion’s focus on the purported lack of “manufacturing or commercial purpose” to the addition and removal of the molasses, Heartland II, 264 F.3d at 1138, appears, to the court, to run counter to the Supreme Court’s view that “a manufacturer [has the] right to make [its] goods as [it] pleases,” Merritt, 104 U.S at 701. Second, calling upon CBP to examine the purpose and genuineness of steps in the manufacturing process as part of its classification process would impair the timely and sound administration of the customs laws. See id., 104 U.S at 702 (“Uncertainty and ambiguity are the bane of commerce. Discretion in the custom-house officer should be limited as strictly as possible.”); Citroen, 223 US at 414-15, 32 S.Ct. 259 (uniform imposition of duties depends upon classification of the article based on its condition at importation). Finally, the Supreme Court’s guidance on disguise or artifice emphasizes changes to the appearance, not the physical characteristics, of the article. See Citroen, 223 U.S. at 415, 32 S.Ct. 259 (when the article is described by a particular tariff provision at the time of importation, “an effort to make it appear otherwise is simply a fraud on the revenue, and cannot be permitted to succeed”) (emphasis added). Cf. Merritt, 104 U.S. at 704 (“honest[ ] expos[ure]” of the goods to the customs officers may preclude a finding of fraud). This guidance makes sense in light of the general rule that a manufacturer has the right to make its goods as it chooses. See id., 104 U.S. at 701. Parsing manufacturing steps and the reasons behind those steps in an effort to uncover disguise or artifice threatens to turn the concept of legitimate tariff engineering on its head. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the few cases finding disguise or artifice involve post-manufacture, pre-importation efforts to conceal the nature of the imported article. See Falk, 137 U.S. at 231-32, 11 S.Ct. 41 (good quality tobacco packed with inferior quality tobacco); Irwin, 78 F. at 802-03 (gun stocks and barrels, shipped and imported together, properly classified as complete guns, not parts). Cf. Merritt, 104 U.S. at 704-05 (suggesting that the artificial addition of color to sugar after manufacturing, and “especially after being put up in packages,” might constitute a “fraud on the revenue” because the sugar would have a different color from when it was manufactured). Parties have not supplied, nor has the court located, any case law tracing disguise or artifice to the manufacturing process. The question the court must now resolve is how the above-described framework guides the application of Marubeni to the facts of this case. As previously noted, determining “whether a vehicle is principally designed for a particular purpose” requires as assessment of both “structural and auxiliary design features.” Marubeni, 35 F.3d at 535. In reviewing the trial court’s findings, the Federal Circuit noted that the CIT considered “design intent and execution” as part of its analysis of structural and auxiliary design features. Id. at 536. The Federal Circuit also approved of the CIT’s evaluation of “marketing and engineering design goals (consumer demands, off the line parts availability, etc.).” Id. at 536 (“It is evide