Full opinion text
OPINION CONTI, Chief District Judge I. INTRODUCTION Pending before the court are the motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 113) filed on behalf of defendant Collectcents, Inc., o/a Credit Bureau of Canada Collections (“Collectcents”) and the motion for summary judgment (ECF No; 119) filed on behalf of defendant Commerce Energy, Inc. d/b/a Just Energy (“Commerce Energy”). This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. In his third amended complaint (ECF No. 95), plaintiff Jeffrey Frank Klein (“Klein”) claims that numerous telephone calls made to him by Collectcents on behalf of Commerce Energy violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., and constituted negligence and invasion of privacy under Pennsylvania law, Specifically, Klein sues Collect-cents for: a) violation of the TCPA (Count I); b) common law invasion of privacy under intrusion upon seclusion theory (Count II); and c) negligence (Count III). Klein sues Commerce Energy for: a) violation of the TCPA (Count IV); and b) “vicarious liability” for violátion of the TCPA and invasion of privacy by Collect-cents (Count V). By order dated November 18, 2016, (ECF No. Ill), and as indicated in- the court’s memorandum opinion issued with respect to Commerce Energy’s partial motion to dismiss the third amended complaint, the negligence claims against Commerce Energy, directly and vicariously, under Counts V and VI of the third amended complaint were dismissed. Klein v. Just Energy Group, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 14-1050, 2016 WL 6822810, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2016). In support of their present motions for summary judgment, Collectcents filed its brief in support of its motion, (ECF No. 114), its concise statement of material facts, (ECF No. 115), an appendix, (ECF No. 116), a reply brief, (ECF No. 134), and a reply concise statement of material facts, (ECF No. 135), and. Commerce Energy filed its brief in support of its motion, (ECF No. 120), its concise statement of material facts, (ECF No. 121), an appendix, (ECF No. 122), a reply brief, (ECF No. 136), and a reply concise statement of material facts. (ECF No. 137). Klein filed a response in opposition to Collectcents’ motion (ECF No. 125), a response to Collect-cents’ concise statement of material facts (ECF No. 129), a response in opposition to Commerce Energy’s motion (ECF No. 124), and a response to Commerce Energy’s concise statement of material facts. (ECF No. 128). In accordance with this court’s procedures, Klein and Collectcents filed a Combined Concise Statement of Material Facts (“Collectcents CCSMF”) (ECF No. 140) and Klein and Commerce Energy filed a Combined Concise Statement of Material Facts (“Commerce Energy CCSMF”). (ECF No. 141). The Combined Concise Statement of Material Facts filed by Collectcents and the Combined Concise Statement of Material Facts filed by Commerce Energy indicate uncontested facts, disputes about certain facts and disputes about whether the responses of Klein to certain of the facts asserted by Collectcents and Commerce Energy in their respective Concise Statements of Material Facts are adequate to dispute those facts under the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and the Chambers’ Rule of this court. See e.g., (ECF No. 140 at 8 (citing LCvR 56.E and this court’s Chambers’ Rule S.F.cii)); (ECF No. 141 at 10 (citing LCvR 56.C.l.a and this court’s Chambers’ Rule 3.F.C.Ü)). These motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition. Because Klein cannot show that he was charged for any of the calls, because his claims for invasion of privacy are untimely, and because Klein’s claims do not fall within the four scenarios for negligence causing emotional distress, as more fully explained below, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Collectcents and Commerce Energy with respect to all claims remaining against them. II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On August 13, 2014, this court granted plaintiff, who was proceeding pro se at that time, leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Klein’s original complaint sued Just Energy Group, Inc., Just Energy Limited, Just Energy Pennsylvania Corp., and Just Energy Ohio, LLC (collectively, the “Just Energy Defendants”). The Just Energy Defendants responded to the pro se complaint by filing a partial motion to dismiss the complaint, seeking dismissal of claims for private nuisance and negligence for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 17). By order dated May 27, 2015, this court granted Just Energy Defendants’ motion to dismiss the counts for private nuisance and negligence without prejudice. (ECF No. 22). The court determined in its accompanying memorandum opinion that Pennsylvania does not recognize private nuisance claims outside the land context, and that, with respect to the negligence claim, Klein failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations to invoke any of the four scenarios under which a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress can proceed under Pennsylvania law and also failed to allege the required physical manifestation of his emotional distress. (ECF Nos. 21 at 8-9). In the May 27, 2015 order, this court granted Klein leave to file an amended complaint. Klein, who was still proceeding pro se, filed the amended complaint on June 12, 2015. (ECF No. 24). The amended complaint contained claims against the Just Energy Defendants for violation of the TCPA, invasion of privacy under intrusion upon seclusion theory, and negligence. On November 16, 2015, counsel for Klein entered his appearance and Klein no longer proceeded pro se. (ECF No. 42). On January 20, 2016, with leave of court requested on January 8, 2016, Klein through his counsel filed a second amended complaint and added Collectcents and Data Exchange, Inc. as defendants to this action. (ECF Nos. 48, 51; (Minute Entry 1/19/16)). The Just Energy Defendants filed their answer to the second amended complaint on January 26, 2016. (ECF No. 52). After filing that answer and concluding discovery, on February 26, 2016, the Just Energy Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 57). Defendant Data Exchange responded to the second amended complaint on May 17, 2016 by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (ECF No. 75) and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 77). Defendant Collect-cents responded to the second amended complaint by filing its answer on June 21, 2016. (ECF No. 85). By order dated June 29, 2016, the court granted the Just Energy Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 87). Klein filed a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint on July 7, 2016 (ECF No. 88), seeking to add Commerce Energy as a defendant to this action and to assert claims against Collectcents, Data Exchange, Commerce Energy and Just Energy Group, Inc., despite the fact that Just Energy Group, Inc. had obtained summary judgment. After argument on the pending motions to dismiss and for leave to amend, the court granted Data Exchange’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which was consented to by Klein, denied as moot Data Exchange’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and granted in part and denied in part Klein’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. (Minute Entry 9/7/2016). Klein was not granted leave to file any further claims against Just Energy Group, Inc. (Minute Entry 9/7/2016). Klein filed his third amended complaint on September 8, 2016 (ECF No. 95), which contained only claims against Collectcents and Commerce Energy. Commerce Energy responded to the third amended complaint on September 23, 2016 by filing a motion to dismiss the claims against it based on negligence, including the claim for vicarious liability for the negligence of Collectcents. (ECF No. 96). Col-lectcents responded to the third amended complaint with its answer and affirmative defenses on September 26, 2016. (ECF No. 100). By order dated November 18, 2016, the court granted Commerce Energy’s motion to dismiss the claims against it for negligence and vicarious liability for negligence. (ECF No. 111). Thus, remaining in this action are: the claims against Collectcents for violation of the TCPA, invasion of privacy, and negligence; and the claims against Commerce Energy for its violation of the TCPA and for its vicarious liability for the violation of the TCPA and invasion of privacy by Collectcents. Collectcents filed its motion for summary judgment on November 21, 2016. (ECF No. 113). Commerce Energy filed its answer to the remaining claims against it on November 30, 2016, and filed its motion for summary judgment on December 12, 2016. (ECF No. 119). III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND At the outset, the court is constrained, again, to address certain issues about the filings with respect to the statements of material facts required for filing and responding to a motion for summary judgment. Collectcents and Commerce Energy each filed their Concise Statement of Material Facts in accordance with Local Rule 56.B.1. (ECF Nos. 115, .121). In response to each Concise Statement of Material Facts, Klein filed his Response Concise Statements of Material Facts. (ECF Nos. 128, 129). With respect to Collectcents’. statement of facts, Klein indicates that he denies the facts numbered 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36. (ECF No. 129). With respect to the facts numbered 28, 34, 35, and 36, he states that he denies the fact and in support only cites to his third amended complaint as opposed to any evidence in the.record or admission by pleading of Collectcents. With respect to the. facts numbered 30, 31, 32, and 33, Klein denies each fact and cites only to Section A of his opposition brief addressing his argument that the TCPA applies to calls made to his free Google voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) service number ending in 0702 (“Klein’s VoIP number”). With respect to Commerce Energy’s statement of facts, Klein indicates that he denies the facts numbered 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, and 54, and admits in part and denies in part the facts numbered 34 and 41 (ECF No. 128). With respect to the facts numbered 48, 49, 50, and 51, he denies each fact and cites only to the argument in Section A of his opposition brief addressing the application of the TCPA to VoIP. With respect to the facts numbered 52, 53 and 54, Klein states that he denies each fact and in support cites only to his third amended complaint as opposed to any evidence in the record or admission by pleading of Commerce Energy. Klein admits in part and denies in part the facts 'numbered 34 and 41 with respect to the claimed independent contractor relationship status with Commerce Energy of the entity who made the data verification call and of the' debt collection-agency, Collectcents, stating that the supporting documents cited to and relied on by Commerce Energy do not establish the lack of an agency relationship. (ECF No. 128 ¶¶ 34, 41). Argument in Klein’s brief and the reference back to the allegations in his third amended complaint are not evidence and are not sufficient to show a genuine dispute of fact exists. Beyond the local rule and this court’s procedures, the United States Supreme Court has instructed that reliance on the party’s own pleading is insufficient to dispute a fact supported by evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Schultz v. United States, Civ. Act. No. 15-454, 2017 WL 635289, at’*4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2017). Klein simply directs the court to his brief containing his argument that the TCPA applies to calls made to his free Google VoIP service number ending in 0702 and restates the allegation made in his third amended complaint that the calls to his VoIP number were charged to him based on his assertion that they were forwarded by him from his VoIP service to the Verizon Wireless phone account for which he pays. Klein does not dispute that he was not charged by Google for his VoIP service and that the service to him is free. (ECF Nos. 140 ¶ 30; 141 ¶ 48). Additionally, he does not provide evidence or point to any evidence in the record to show any'charge for a call from Collect-cents, whether from Collectcents directly, from a blocked number or from a call forwarded from his VoIP number to his cell phone, though he still argues and alleges he was called by a blocked number and that he was charged. (ECF Nos. 140 ¶¶ 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36; 141 ¶¶49, 51, 52, 53, 54). Local Civil Rule of Court 56.B.1 requires the party moving for summary judgment to file a separate concise statement of material facts and requires that the party cite “to a particular pleading, deposition, answer to interrogatory, admission on file or other part of the record supporting the party’s statement, acceptance, or denial of the material fact.” W.D. Pa. LCvR 56.B.1. In further support, the moving party must file an appendix with the documents supporting that party’s concise statement of material facts. W.D. Pa. LCvR 56.B.3. The opposing party also is to provide a separately filed concise statement admitting or denying the facts in the moving party’s concise statement, W.D. Pa. LCvR 56.-C.l.a, setting forth the basis for a denial of the moving party’s concise statement with reference to the record, W.D. Pa. LCvR 56.C.l.b, and providing any additional material facts that are necessary for the court’s ruling on the motion. W.D. Pa. LCvR 56.C.1.C. This court’s Chambers’ Rule 3.F.C.Ü requires that the opposing party file a separate document in response to the moving party’s concise statement indicating which facts are disputed and citing and attaching the evidence in support of any disputed facts. Local Civil Rule of Court 56.E specifically provides that the facts claimed to be undisputed and material in a party’s concise statement “will for the purpose of deciding the motion for summary judgment be deemed admitted unless specifically denied or otherwise controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing party.” W.D. Pa. LCvR 56.E. Collecteents and Commerce Energy supported their concise statements with cites to the record and provided sufficient evidentiary materials in their appendices in support of the stated facts (ECF Nos. 115, 121), in compliance with Local Civil Rule of Court 56.B.1 and 56.B.3. Under these circumstances and for the purpose of resolving the present motions for summary judgment, Collecteents’ facts numbered 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36 and Com- ■ merce Energy’s facts numbered 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, and 54 will be deemed admitted. With respect to the dispute about independent contractor status, Commerce Energy’s facts numbered 34 and 41 and Klein’s argument about the import of certain undisputed facts will be addressed later in this opinion. A. Just Energy Entities and Master Services Agreements Just Energy Group, Inc., a Canadian corporation, is a natural gas and electricity retailer, (Collecteents CCSMF ¶ 13; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶ 23), and has multiple affiliated entities. Collecteents CCSMF ¶¶ 14, 15, 16, 20; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶¶ 24, 25, 27, 31. The other entities include Commerce Energy, (Col-lectcents CCSMF ¶ 14, Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶ 24), and Just Energy Corporation, which is not a defendant in this lawsuit. Collecteents CCSMF ¶ 20; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶ 31. Just Energy Corporation, when it was known as Ontario Energy Savings Corporation, entered into a Master Collection Agency Services Agreement dated September 10, 2008 (“colléction MSA”) with Collecteents, operating as the Credit Bureau of Canada Collections. Collecteents CCSMF ¶¶ 17; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶¶ 25, 40. Pursuant to the collection MSA, Collecteents provided debt collection services to Commerce Energy for its customer accounts. Collect-cents CCSMF ¶¶ 17, 26; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶ 40. Just Energy Corporation also entered into a Master Services Agreement effective July 21, 2009 with Quick Response Outsourcing, LLC (“QRO”) under which QRO provided customer verification and information services to Just Energy Corporation and its affiliates (“customer verification MSA”). Collect-cents CCSMF ¶¶ 20, 21; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶¶ 31, 32. B. Account of P.S. and Customer Call and Verification Process On June 17, 2013, Cedric Frisco (“Frisco”), who worked as an independent contractor for Just Energy Marketing Corporation, which is not a defendant here, signed up P.S. as a customer of Commerce Energy. Collectcents CCSMF ¶ 18; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶ 29. As part of the process of signing up P.S. as a customer, Frisco on or about June 17, 2013, provided to QRO the correct phone number for P.S. during a verification call with QRO, the third-party verification services company. Collectcents CCSMF ¶¶ 19, 22; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶¶ 30, 32, 33, 35, 36. The individual from QRO participating in the verification call with Frisco regarding the Commerce Energy account of P.S. incorrectly recorded P.S.’s phone number. Col-lectcents CCSMF ¶ 23; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶ 37. The number recorded was Klein’s VoIP number ending in 0702, which was assigned to him for his Google VoIP service. Collectcents CCSMF ¶¶ 23, 24, 29; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶¶ 37, 38, 47. Klein’s Google VoIP service is a free service. Collectcents CCSMF ¶¶29, 30, 31; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶¶ 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54. Klein also has Verizon cell service with the number ending in 7489 as-signéd to that service. Collectcents CCSMF ¶ 32; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶ 50; (ECF No. 122-7). Commerce Energy does not directly place calls to consumers for the purpose of verifying customer information when marketing energy to customers or for the purpose of collecting delinquent accounts. Col-lectcents CCSMF ¶¶ 16, 19; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶ 26. All of Just Energy Group, Inc.’s affiliates and subsidiaries, including Commerce Energy, use third parties, such as QRO, to verify customer information and use third parties, such as Collectcents, for the purpose of collecting delinquent accounts. Collectcents CCSMF ¶¶ 16, 17, 26, 27; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶ 26, 27, 28, 40. C. Numerous Phone Calls to Klein’s VoIP number In September 2013, the account of P.S. with Commerce Energy became delinquent. Collectcents CCSMF ¶ 25; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶ 39. Pursuant to the collection MSA, Commerce Energy utilized Collectcents for all the debt collection phone calls related to the account of P.S.; Commerce Energy did not place any debt collection calls. Collectcents CCSMF ¶26; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶¶ 40, 43, 44, 45. Because Klein’s VoIP number had been erroneously recorded as the number for P.S., Commerce Energy provided Klein’s VoIP number to Collectcents for the purpose of collecting the amount owing on P.S.’s account with the belief that the number provided was the correct number. Col-lectcents CCSMF ¶¶ 27, 29; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶42. Collectcents made the debt collection calls that related to P.S.’s account beginning on September 30, 2013, and continuing until August 2014. Collectcents placed the calls to Klein’s VoIP number — not P.S.’s phone number— because that was the number Commerce Energy gave to Collectcents for collection calls. Collectcents CCSMF ¶¶28, 29; Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶¶42, 43, 44, 47. Klein’s VoIP records show calls coming from a number ending in 7575 or an “unknown” number related to various voice mail messages left by Collectcents. (ECF Nos. 116-7, 124-3, 125-3). The number ending in 7575 is not directly associated with Commerce Energy. Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶46. Numerous phone calls were made by Collectcents to Klein’s VoIP number attempting to collect the debt owed by P.S. During the course of this litigation, on September 24, 2014, Just Energy Defendants served on Klein their Objections and Responses to First Set of Requests to Admit, their Objections and Responses to First Set of Interrogatories, and their Objections and Responses to First Set of Requests to Produce Documents. Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶ 55. The Just Energy Defendants’ response to Klein’s interrogatory number 2 states that “upon information and belief [P.S.] is a customer of Commerce Energy, Inc. d/b/a Just Energy.” (ECF No. 122-9 at 13). In response to interrogatory number 4, the Just Energy Defendants state that “none of the [Just Energy Defendants (nor any of their subsidiaries/related parties) have placed telephone calls to [P.S.] and/or the phone number [0702] for the purposes of debt collection calls,” (ECF No. 122-9 at 14), and in response to interrogatory number 3 the Just Energy Defendants state that they “use a third-party independent contractor collection agency for debt collection purposes and therefore do not make outbound telephone calls for the purposes of collecting debts.” (ECF No. 122-9 at 13-14). IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment may only be granted where the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute about any material fact, and that judgment as a matter of law is warranted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the 'court must enter summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish ah element essential to his or her case, and on which he or she will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In evaluating the evidence, the court must interpret the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in his or her favor. Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144,147 (3d Cir. 2007). The burden on a motion for summary judgment is initially on the moving party to demonstrate that the evidence contained in the record does not create a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004); Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could render a finding in favor of the nonmoving party. McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial; the moving party may meet its burden by showing that the admissible evidence contained in the record would be insufficient to carry the nonmoving party’s burden of proof or that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007). Once the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” and to present sufficient evidence demonstrating that there is indeed a genuine and material factual, dispute for a jury to. decide. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party must go beyond his or her pleadings and designate specific facts by the use of affidavits, depositions, opposing party admissions or answers to inteiv rogatories showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party cannot defeat, a well-supported motion for summary judgment by simply reasserting unsupported, factual allegations contained in his or her own pleadings. Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989). One of the principal purposes of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The summary judgment inquiry asks whether there is a need for trial — “whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be . resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor, of either party.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations or to determine the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citing decisions); Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 643 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998). The mere existence of a factual dispute, however, will not necessarily defeat a motion for summary judgment. Only a dispute over a material fact — that is, a fact that would affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law — will preclude the entry of summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A defendant who moves for summary judgment is not required to refute every essential element of the plaintiffs claim; rather, the defendant must only point out the absence or insufficiency of plaintiffs evidence offered in support of one or more those elements. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the evidence the nonmovant produces is “merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,” the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The-nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). To survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every challenged] element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Furthermore, “[w]hen opposing summary judgment, the non-movant may not rest upon mere allegations, but rather must ‘identify those facts of record which would contradict the facts identified by the movant.’ ” Corliss v. Varner, 247 Fed.Appx. 353, 354 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2002)). Inferences based upon speculation or conjecture do not create a material factual dispute sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990). V. DISCUSSION Collectcents and Commerce Energy initially argue that Klein’s TCPA claims against them fail because-' 'Klein cannot show that he "was charged for his VoIP service or even that he-was charged for any of the challenged calls. They further argue that any claim for invasion of privacy fails because the undisputed- evidence shows that the calls were-unintentionally made to Klein and because the claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Commerce Energy argues with respect to vicarious liability urged only against it, that Klein cannot establish its vicarious liability for the conduct of'Col-lectcents under agency principles. Collect-cents argues with respect to the negligence claim remaining only against it, that it is entitled to summary judgment because Klein cannot show a duty owed to him, it breached any duty, or he suffered damages as a result of any breach and because the court previously dismissed the same negligence claim. Finally, Collect-cents argues that the statute of limitations bars the negligence claim with respect to calls made before January 20,2014. A. TCPA Claim (Counts I, IV and.V) Klein seeks to hold Collectcents and Commerce Energy liable under the TCPA for Collectcents’ violation of § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by using- an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial prerecorded voice in making numerous calls to him. (ECF Nos. 95 ¶¶ 25, 26, 53). The dispute under the TCPA centers on whether the calls to Klein’s VoIP number constituted calls “to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other -radio common-carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). In its prior opinion, the court left for another day. the question whether the calls to Klein’s VoIP number were subject to the TCPA under the charged call provision of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), “or any service for which the called party is charged for the call,” because Klein’s particular VoIP service from Google is free. Klein v. Just Energy Group, Inc., 2016 WL 3539137, at *14 (W.D. Pa. June 29, 2016). That day now has come. The TCPA provides in pertinent part: (b) Restrictions on use of automated telephone equipment (1) Prohibitions. It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States, or any person outside the United States if the recipient is within the United States— (A) to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice— (i) to any emergency telephone line...; (ii) to the telephone line of any guest room or patient room of a hospital, health care facility, elderly home, or similar establishment; - or (iii) to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized- mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.... 47. U.S.C. § 227(b)(1) (emphasis added). The TCPA provides a private right of action for violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1): (3) Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State— (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The section relating to residential telephone subscribers is 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) and governs calls to the National Do-Not-Call Registry. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1) (authorizing the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to initiate rulemak-ing concerning the privacy rights of residential telephone subscribers). Section 227(c)(5) provides for a private right of action for § 227(c) violations where a person has received more than one telephone call “by or on behalf of’ the same entity in violation of § 227(c). 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). To prevent evasion of the TCPA’s call prohibitions, the FCC has treated calls made by a third party on behalf of a company as if the company itself made the call, whether in relation to collection or solicitation calls subject to § 227(b) or in rules governing solicitation calls addressed in § 227(c). With respect to collection calls under § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) made to wireless numbers, the FCC explained: To ensure that creditors and debt collectors call only those consumers who have consented to receive autodialed and prerecorded message calls, we conclude that the creditor should be responsible for demonstrating that the consumer provided prior express consent. The creditors are in the best position to have records kept in the usual course of business showing such consent, such as purchase agreements, sales slips, and credit applications.... [A] creditor on whose behalf an autodialed or prerecorded message call is made to a wireless number bears the responsibility for any violation of the Commission’s rules. Calls placed by a third party collector on behalf of that creditor are treated as if the creditor itself placed the call. In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Request of ACA Int’l for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 23 FCC Rcd. 559, 564 ¶ 10 (2008) (footnotes omitted). In its ruling, the FCC noted that the prohibitions on the use of autodialers in § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) apply regardless of the content of the call, as opposed to the separate restrictions of § 227(c) on “telephone solicitations” that do not apply to calls that are solely for the purpose of collecting a debt. 23 FCC Rcd. at 565 ¶ 11. As a remedial consumer protection statute, Gager v. Dell Financial Services, LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2013), the TCPA’s language is to be construed “broadly to effect its purpose.” Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 993, 997 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying principal in context of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act “FDCPA” case). If proposed interpretations of the TCPA are equally plausible, the scales tip in favor of the consumer. Leyse v. Bank of America Nat. Ass’n, 804 F.3d 316, 327 (3d Cir. 2015). Considering the TCPA, the Supreme Court has explained: Voluminous consumer complaints about abuses of telephone technology — for example, computerized calls to private homes — prompted Congress to pass the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA or Act), 47 U.S.C. § 227.... The Act bans certain practices invasive of privacy and directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) to prescribe implementing regulations. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 370-71, 132 S.Ct. 740, 181 L.Ed.2d 881 (2012). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed that “Congress passed the TCPA to protect individual consumers from receiving intrusive and unwanted calls.” Gager, 727 F.3d at 268 (citations omitted). The legislative history of the TCPA refers to prerecorded calls as “an intrusive invasion of privacy” and indicates that the TCPA is aimed at protecting individuals’ privacy rights while balancing legitimate telemarketing practices. Leyse, 804 F.3d at 325-26 (citing Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-243, § 2(5) — (6), (10), 105 Stat. 2394 (note following 47 U.S.C. § 227); § 2(9), (12)-(13)). Debt collection calls as well as tele-marking calls are within the TCPA’s purview. Gager, 727 F.3d at 273; Fenescey v. Diversified Consultants, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 14-347, 2014 WL 2526571, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 4, 2014); Forrest v. Genpact Services, LLC, 962 F.Supp.2d 734, 736 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (holding plaintiff stated a claim under both the TCPA and the FDCPA for excessive debt collection calls). For purposes of the TCPA, it does not matter that P.S. was the intended recipient of the calls. In Leyse, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the individual who answers the robocall has standing to sue. 804 F.3d at 327. The aggrieved persons under the TCPA’s provisions include the actual recipient of the telephone call, 804 F.3d at 325-26, because “[i]t is the actual recipient, intended or not, who suffers the nuisance and invasion of privacy.” Leyse, 804 F.3d at 326. VoIP service, which is the service used by Klein and the service to which his 0702 number is assigned, is becoming more commonly used and is provided over broadband connection, cable modem, fiber to the premises (FTTP), digital subscriber line (DSL) or other wireline, and fixed wireless or other connections. FCC Releases New Local Telephone Competition Data: Third Collection to Comprehensively Include Interconnected VoIP, 2011 WL 97677, at *1-2 (FCC Jan. 11, 2011). Interconnected VoIP service represents an important and rapidly growing part of the U.S. voice service market. [It] enables voice communications over a broadband connection and allows users both to receive calls from, and place calls to, the public switched telephone network, like traditional phone service. Providers of the service include companies like Vonage as well as cable and telephone companies that own their own networks. Id. “The technology converts voice into a digital signal that travels through the internet.” Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP), https://www.fcc.gov/generaVvoice-over-internet-protocol-voip (last visited June 13, 2017). “VoIP can be used with either a telephone (mobile.or-land-line) or a PC as the user terminal. This gives different modes of operation: PC to PC, PC to telephone, telephone to PG -and telephone to telephone or mobile-to-mobile, all via the internet.” Rebecca Wong, Daniel B. Garrie & Gerald S. Levine, Voice-over Internet Protocol — the Continuing Difficulties in Neutrality and Privacy, 4 J. Legal Tech. Risk Mgmt. 41, 43 (2009). There is no dispute that the challenged calls were made to Klein’s VoIP, number. Collectcents and Commerce Energy, however, dispute that either of them can be held liable under the TCPA for any of the calls 'because Klein cannot show that his VoIP service is a service for which lie is charged for’calls or even that he otherwise was charged ‘for any of the calls. (ECF Nos. 114 at 7; 120 at 10-11). 1. VoIP Service and TCPA’s Charged Call Provisions Klein relies on four decisions, Lozano v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 702 F.Supp.2d 999 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Abbas v. Selling Source, LLC, No. 09-CV-3413, 2009 WL 4884471 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2009); Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B, 746 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2014); and. Lynn v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., 953 F.Supp.2d 612 (D. Md. 2013), aff'd, 586 Fed.Appx. 103 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam), in arguing that the TCPA applies to the calls made by Collectcents on behalf of Commerce Energy to his VoIP service. (ECF Nos. 124 at 3-4; 125 at 3-4). Klein cites Lozano for the proposition that § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) does not require him to show that he was charged for any of the challenged calls because with respect to the catchall provision which includes the phrase “or any service for which the called party is charged for the call,” the terms “for which the called party is charged for the call,” under statutory interpretation principles only modifies the words “or any service.” (ECF Nos. 124 at 2-3; 125 at 2-3). In Lozano, the court applied the last antecedent rule of, statutory construction, observing: “[d]ue to the occurrence of two disjunctive prepositions in the relevant portion of § 227, the phrase ‘for which the called party is charged for the call’ only modifies ‘any service.’ ” Lozano, 702 F.Supp.2d at 1009-10; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26, 124 S.Ct. 376, 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (2003) (“a limiting clause or phrase ... should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows”). In Lozano, the court determined that the TCPA did not require that the plaintiff expressly allege that he was charged by his cellular phone company for receipt of challenged text messages sent by the defendant. 702 F.Supp.2d at 1009. The problem with Klein’s reliance on Lozano is that the calls in Lozano were made to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service, rendering the catchall provision inapplicable. It was sufficient in Lozano that the “call,” which the court determined included a text message, was made to a number assigned to a cellular telephone service. Klein’s reading appears to attempt to eliminate altogether application of the phrase “for which the called party is charged for the call.” If the phrase applies neither to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service under the last antecedent rule nor apparently as a relevant modifier to “any service,” then it is improperly rendered meaningless. See Massie v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev., 620 F.3d 340, 352 (3d Cir. 2010) (that no provision shall be superfluous or insignificant is a core tenet of statutory interpretation). Klein cites Abbas for the .proposition that if the TCPA only prohibited calls to numbers that result in a charge to the called party, then it would have been unnecessary for Congress to give the FCC the authority to create exemptions for uncharged calls under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C). In accordance with the statutory language, Abbas concluded: “the court finds that the TCPA does not require that a party called via a number assigned to a cellular telephone service must be charged for the call to make that call actionable.” Abbas, 2009 WL 4884471, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2009) (emphasis added). Klein’s argument wholly ignores that the statutory reference to calls to a number assigned to a cellular telephone service without requiring a charge for the call is inapplicable here because the number called by Collectcents is assigned to Klein’s VoIP service, and thus, the catchall provision “or any service for which the called party is charged for the call” is relevant here. That Congress gave authority for the FCC to create exemptions for uncharged calls made to a number assigned to a cellular service actually bolsters the distinction as applied to Klein’s VoIP number. It is Klein’s interpretation that would render ineffective statutory construction of the catchall provision. Osorio also does not support Klein’s position. In Osorio, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the “rule of punctuation” and the “rule of last antecedent” in determining that a plaintiff did not have to show a charge for each and every robocall made to the number assigned to the plaintiffs cellular telephone service. In so ruling, the court stated: In the end, we go back to the basic question of whether the TCPA itself exempts all autodialed calls for which there is no charge. The applicable canons of construction indicate that it does not. To repeat the key language, the Act prohibits autodialed calls “to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(A)(1)(iii). The rule of the last antecedent requires the phrase “for which the called party is charged for the call,” id., to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding [i.e., “any service”], and ... not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote; namely, “paging,” “cellular telephone,” or “mobile radio” services, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (A) (1)(iii). We therefore presume that Congress did not intend the phrase “for which the called party is charged for the call” to apply to cellular telephone services. Nevertheless, [w]here the modifier is set off from two or more antecedents by a comma, the supplementary “rule of punctuation” states that the comma indicates the drafter’s intent that the modifier relate to more than the last antecedent. This rule is, however, inapplicable to the language in question. The modifier in this case, “for which the party is charged,” is not set off from the series by a comma. That is, for the rule of punctuation to apply, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) would have to read “to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service, for which the called party is charged for the call.” Because the final comma emphasized in the above iteration does not appear in the statute, we conclude that the phrase “for which the called party is charged for the call” modifies only “any service” and not the other terms of the series. Reading [it this way] also comports with the canon against superfluity. The canon against superfluity instructs that [i]t is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute. If the phrase “any service for which the called party is charged for the call” requires that the party be charged per call for the “paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service” in order for the party to prohibit autodialed calls, then the listing of these services would be superfluous because they are already included under the term “any service for which the called party is charged.” On the other hand, reading “any service for which the called party is charged for the call” as an additional item beyond any call to a “paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service,” regardless of whether the called party is charged, gives independent meaning to each term. An interpretation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (1) (A) (iii) that exempts all au-todialed calls to cellular phones for which the called party is not charged per call, moreover, would clash with § 227(b)(2)(C) of the same statute. This latter section specifies that the FCC may, by rule or order, exempt from the requirements of paragraph (1)(A)(iii) of this subsection calls to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service that are not charged to the called party, subject to such conditions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary in the interest of the privacy rights this section is intended to protect. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C). The provision allowing for the promulgation of exemptions would be meaningless if, as State Farm proposes, § 227(b) (1) (A) (iii) already exempts all calls for which the party is not charged per call. Osorio, 746 F.3d at 1257-58. Klein argues that he subscribes to Google’s VoIP, which he has admitted is free to him, and also has a cellular telephone plan through Verizon Wireless that instead of assessing a per use fee for each call simply allows him certain minutes and data per month. (ECF Nos. 124 at 3; 125 at 3-4). He insists that it matters naught whether the consumer is charged for the call on the front end as with a limited bundle of minutes or on the tail end as an itemized charge for each call. See Thomas v. Dun & Bradstreet Credibility Corp., 100 F.Supp.3d 937, 947 (C.D. Ca. 2015) (depletion of allocated minutes results in a loss of economic value); Telephone Science Corp. v. Asset Recovery Solutions, LLC, No. 15 C 5182, 2016 WL 47916 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2016) (involving plaintiffs VoIP service that charged him $.0075 for each inbound call); see also In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14115 (June 26, 2003) (“The Commission has long recognized, and the record in this proceeding supports the same conclusion, that wireless customers are charged for incoming calls whether they pay in advance or after the minutes are used. Wireless subscribers who purchase a large ‘bucket’ of minutes at a fixed rate nevertheless are charged for those minutes, and for any minutes that exceed the ‘bucket’ allowance.”). The court does not disagree that a call charge on the “front end” might qualify for purposes of the charged call provision under the TCPA. Nevertheless, the called party must be charged for the call for there to be a violation of § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) where the calls are made to a number not assigned to certain enumerated services, ie., a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service or other radio common carrier service. Relying on Lynn, 953 F.Supp.2d 612, Klein asserts that “[c]alls made to a VoIP number with limited minutes/data should be treated the same as calls to a cellphone under the TCPA.” (ECF No. 124 at 3; 125 at 3). Klein’s reliance on Lynn is misplaced. In Lynn the plaintiff submitted evidence that he actually was charged for each of the challenged calls by his particular VoIP service provider; he was charged a monthly fee as well as a per call fee, 953 F.Supp.2d at 616-617, whereas Klein’s VoIP service is free — meaning he is not charged for the calls to his VoIP number by his VoIP service provider at all. Under the statute a VoIP service is treated differently, though still potentially covered, because it falls within the catchall provision and does not fall within the specifically enumerated services in the series. Collectcents did not ’ make calls to a number assigned to Klein’s cell service, the calls were made to a number assigned to another service, his VoIP service, and then allegedly forwarded by him to his cell service. Klein contends that he should be considered to have been charged for the calls to his VoIP number because he also has wireless service for which he pays a monthly fee for service and the VoIP number is forwarded to his wireless service, that he describes as a “linking” of the numbers. (ECF Nos. 124 at 3-4; 125 at 3-4). This “linking” by him does not mean the VoIP number constitutes or is rendered a number assigned to a cellular telephone service. Even under Klein’s apparent alternative reading that creatively would cover calls forwarded by a plaintiff where the plaintiff is charged for the call by the service to which the call is forwarded, (ECF Nos. 124 at 3; 125 at 3), Klein— because of the catchall phrase’s applicability — still must show a charge for the VoIP call. The evidence submitted simply does not show that Klein was charged for any of the challenged calls to his VoIP number and his argument is not evidence. For example, Klein attached copies of his Verizon Wireless bills for calls made for the period from December 19, 2012 through December 18, 2013 in.appendices to his opposition to the motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 124-4; 125-4). His additional Verizon Wireless bills covering calls from December 19, 2013 through February 18, 2014 are .included in the. appendices to the Collectcents’ and Commerce Energy’s Concise Statement of Material Facts. (ECF Nos. 122-7, 123-7). Therefore, the court will consider all Klein’s Verizon Wireless bills in the record. Klein provided recordings of twelve voice mail messages, presumably representing the general nature of the offending calls. (ECF Nos. 124-1; 125-1). Other than the twelve voice messages and the Verizon Wireless bills, Klein does not attempt to point to any evidence in the record in -support of his assertion that he was charged for the calls. None of Klein’s Verizon Wireless bills, which were provided by Klein, Collectcents and Commerce Energy, are sufficient to establish that Klein paid for any of the challenged calls to his VoIP number because the bills do not upon review reflect any calls originating from the 7575 number, a blocked number or even from Klein’s VoIP number 0702 as a forwarded call. The voice mail messages of the twelve calls to Klein’s VoIP number provided by Klein when considered with the other submissions on summary judgment also do not show any charges for the calls to his VoIP number whether on a per call basis or simply as a recorded charge anywhere on the bills. The voice messages submitted by Klein as representative of the challenged calls all appear to be messages that only were left on Klein’s free Google VoIP’s message service an.d there is no evidence of any voicemails left on his Verizon cell phone voicemail. Compare, e.g. (ECF Nos. 124-1; 125-1 [scan indicating dates of mp3 recordings provided to court]), (ECF Nos. 124-3, 125-3 [Google Voice service log of calls and messages]) and (ECF, No. 124-4 [Verizon Wireless bills] ). The record evidence simply would not support a reasonable jury finding that Klein was charged for the calls as required to establish his TCPA claim under the catchall phrase of § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Klein asserts that his VoIP service is not an unlimited calls/flat fee plan and therefore any calls deplete his store of minutes, meaning he is “charged” for the call. (ECF Nos. 124 at 4; 125 at 4). The problem with Klein’s argument is not with a flat fee plan versus an itemized VoIP minute plan; rather, it is that his argument wholly contradicts the record evidence that his actual Google VoIP service, which assigned him the number erroneously called, is free. Klein confronts the same problem with his argument that he is charged when the calls are forwarded to his Verizon Wireless service, arguably resulting in a violation of the TCPA, because the Verizon Wireless bills do not show any charges or any deduction from a bundle of minutes for the challenged Collectcents’ calls made to Klein’s VoIP number, whether forwarded or not. Klein failed to provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that he was charged for any of the challenged calls as required by § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Accordingly, Collect-cents is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Count I for violation of the TCPA and Commerce Energy is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Count IV for violation of the TCPA and the portion of Count V asserting a claim for vicarious liability for violation of the TCPA, 2. Additional Arguments on Vicarious Liability under the TCPA Although the court will grant summary judgment to Commerce Energy on both the claim under Count IV for direct violation of the TCPA and the claim under Count V for vicarious liability under the TCPA because his evidence is insufficient to establish that he was charged for the calls, the court addresses Commerce Energy’s additional arguments with respect to vicarious liability for violation of the TCPA for completeness and because much of the same analysis applies to vicarious liability for the. remaining state law claims. Klein relies on various FCC rulings to assert that Commerce Energy is -vicariously liable for violations of the TCPA under an agency theory. The FCC posits that federal common law agency principles providing for vicarious liability for calls initiated by a third party advances the goals of the TCPA. In the Matter of the Joint Petition Filed by Dish Network, LLC., 28 FCC Rcd at 6587 ¶ 35. The United States Supreme Court in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 663, 193 L.Ed.2d 571 (2016), held that a party may, be liable under the TCPA in accordance with tort-related vicarious liability rules. 136 S.Ct. at 674 (the Court had no cause to question the FCC’s ruling that vicarious liability applies under the TCPA). “[W]hen Congress creates a tort action, it legislates against a legal background of ordinary tort-rfelated vicarious liability rules and consequently intends its legislation to incorporate those rules.” Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285, 123 S.Ct. 824, 154 L.Ed.2d 753 (2003). “It is well established that traditional vicarious liability rules ordinarily make principals or employers vicariously liable for acts of their agents or employees in the scope of their authority or employment.” 537 U.S. at 285, 123 S.Ct. 824. “[A] defendant may be held vicariously liable for TCPA violations where the plaintiff establishes an agency relationship, as defined by federal common law, between the defendant and a third-party caller.” Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2014), aff'd — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 663, 193 L.Ed.2d 571 (2016). Vicarious liability under the TCPA may be established under a broad range of agency theories, including formal agency, apparent authority and ratification. 28 FCC Rcd. at 6582 ¶ 24, 6584 ¶ 28, 6588 ¶ 37. The relationship between the parties is paramount in determining whether there can be vicarious liability. Gomez, 768 F.3d at 878. a) Formal Agency and Independent Contractor Status In Commerce Energy’s Combined Concise Statements of Material Facts, Commerce Energy refers to Col-lectcents as an “independent contractor,” citing the collection MSA in support. Commerce Energy CCSMF ¶¶ 41. Commerce Energy argues that it cannot be held vicariously liable for Collecteents’ actions based on any alleged “employment or agency” relationship because Collecteents is an independent contractor. (ECF No. 120 at 17). “[A]n employer may be liable for the intentional torts committed by a servant, but not for those committed by an independent contractor.” Woolfolk v. Duncan, 872 F.Supp. 1381, 1392 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Klein disputes the use of the term “independent contractor” to refer to the status of Collecteents. Commerce Energy aptly points out that the party asserting the agency relationship or seeking vicarious liability bears the ultimate burden of its proof at trial. I.H. ex rel. Litz v. County of Lehigh, 610 F.3d 797, 802 (3d Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, the moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a dispute of material fact. This court instructed on Just Energy Defendants’ motion for summary judgment: Whether an individual or entity is an “independent contractor” such that the party contracting with that individual or entity would not be liable for the conduct of that individual or entity or an “agent” such that Collecteents would be liable for the conduct of its agent depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Castle Cheese, Inc. v. MS Produce, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 04-878, 2008 WL 4372856, at *6-9 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2008) (discussing distinction between independent contractor, principal-agent and master-servant relationship and observing that status of agent and independent contractor are not mutually exclusive). Despite their dispute, neither party attempts any analysis about the possible independent contractor status of Collecteents. As a result of the moving parties’ failure to engage in the analysis, the court declines to accept their characterization of Collecteents ... as independent contractor[] for purposes of resolving the summary judgment motion. Klein v. Just Energy Group, Inc., 2016 WL 3539137, at *10. The collection MSA pursuant to which Collectcents performs debt collection services, including debt collection calls, labels the status of Collectcents as an “independent contractor,” but a label or express denial of status by the parties to a contract is not alone determinative and the court must consider the actual practice between the parties. Zeno v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 480 F.Supp.2d 825, 841-848 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (discussing no-agency clause in contract between automobile dealer and manufacturer and citing Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.02 (“Parties’ Labeling and Popular Usage Not Controlling”) cmt. b. (“The parties’ agreement may negatively characterize the relationship as not one of agency, or as one not intended by the parties to create a relationship of agency or employment. Although such statements are relevant to determining whether the parties consent to a relationship of agency, their presence in an agreement is not determinative and does not preclude the relevance of other indicia of consent.”)); see Safarian v. American DG Energy, Inc., 622 Fed.Appx. 149, 150 (3d Cir. 2015) (reversing and remanding where court granted summary judgment to defendant but did not reason through factors determining employment status under applicable federal and New Jersey law); see also Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 1476, 91 L.Ed. 1772 (1947) (label not determinative); First Liberty Inv. Group v. Nicholsberg, 145 F.3d 647, 652 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting tyranny of labels in arbitration matter, considering characterization in agreement and indicating “[w]hat rather controls is the parties’ total relationship.”); Sharkey v. Ultramar Energy Ltd., Lasmo plc, Lasmo (AUL Ltd.), 70 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 1995) (employment status in ERISA matter not determined solely by the label used in the parties’ contract); Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488, 1492 (11th Cir. 1993) (label insufficient); Swartz v. Eberly, 212 F.Supp. 32, 34 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (“[Wjhether one is an independent contractor or an employee of another is not to be decided by the label which they place upon their relationship. It is determined on an independent examination of all of the surrounding circumstances.”); Beckman v. Vassall-Dillworth Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 321 Pa.Super. 428, 468 A.2d 784, 790-91 (1983) (considering “no-agency” clause and lack of eviden