Full opinion text
ORDER ORLANDO L. GARCIA, CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE Pending before the Court are the El Cenizo Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (docket nos. 24, 26, 154); San Antonio Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (docket nos. 55, 77, 151, 158); El Paso County Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (docket nos. 56, 149); City of Austin’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (docket nos. 57, 97, 103, 146); City of Dallas’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (docket no. 152); Travis County Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Junction (docket nos. 58, 79,148); City of Houston’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (docket no. 150); and Texas Association of Hispanic County Judges and County Commissioners’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (docket no. 144). Defendants have filed responses in opposition to all motions (docket nos. 91, 172). The United States has filed a Statement of Interest (docket no. 90); Harris County has filed an amicus brief and declaration in support of the motions (docket nos. 116, 166); and amici briefs have also been filed by the Major Cities Chiefs Association, Police Executive Research Forum, and United States Conference of Mayors (docket no. 165); The Anti-Defamation League (docket no. 125); the Immigration Reform Law Institute (docket no. 137); and The Episcopal Diocese of Texas, et. al. (docket no. 176). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on June 26, 2017. After considering the parties’ arguments and reviewing the evidence and the applicable law, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunction should be GRANTED as follows. I. Statement of the case This case involves the constitutionality of Senate Bill 4, which relates to immigration enforcement by local governmental entities, imposes duties and liabilities on certain persons in the criminal justice system, provides civil penalties, and creates a criminal offense. SB 4 was passed by the 85th Texas legislature and signed into law on May 7, 2017 and becomes effective on September 1, 2017. The full text of SB 4 is attached to this order. The City of El Cenizo and LULAC filed this lawsuit on May 8, 2017 and other plaintiffs subsequently joined in the lawsuit by intervention or consolidation. Plaintiffs then moved for preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin the implementation and enforcement of SB 4 before it becomes effective. II. Jurisdiction, Article III standing, and venue The Court has jurisdiction over the claims in this lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and 1367. The Court has remedial authority under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. The Court also has the equitable authority to enjoin enforcement of a state law that conflicts with federal law. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-156, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). Venue is proper in the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division. See docket no. 179. The parties invoking federal jurisdiction “must show an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 150 (5th Cir. 2015). “The presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article Ill’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Id. Article III standing is apparent from the face of the pleadings in this case. III. Standard and process of review To obtain a preliminary injunction, movants must establish each of the following four factors: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued; (3) the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any harm that will result if the injunction is granted; and (4) granting an injunction will not dis-serve the public interest. Texas v. U.S., 809 F.3d at 150. “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981). Preliminary injunctions that would change, rather than maintain, the status quo are generally disfavored and should not issue unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party. Martinez v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1243 (5th Cir. 1976). Senate Bill 4 has not been implemented or enforced; thus, Movants are seeking to preserve, not alter, the status quo. At the same time, Movants’ request for preliminary injunctive relief is timely and not premature. “A fundamental principle of preliminary injunctions [is that] [a]n injunction is of no help if one must wait to suffer injury before the court grants it.” Texas v. U.S., 809 F.3d at 173 n.137 (citing United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 262 (5th Cir. 2001)). This Court need not wait for an “early snapshot” of SB 4 enforcement before considering preliminary injunctive relief. Id. Given the limited purpose of a preliminary injunction, and given the haste that is often necessary if the status quo is to be preserved, “a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.” Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830. Ultimately, the decision to grant preliminary in-junctive relief rests in the sound discretion of the district court, and is “often dependent as much on the equities of [the] case as the substance of the legal issues it presents.” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 2080, 2087, 198 L.Ed.2d 643 (2017). IV. Substantial likelihood of success on the merits At this early juncture in the case, movants are not tasked with showing that they mil succeed on the merits, but they must show that they are likely to prevail on at least one of their claims at the merits stage of the proceedings. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). Plaintiffs assert, inter alia, that SB 4, on its face and as applied,. is preempted by federal law and violates the Supremacy Clause, the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, the. Fourth Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, and the Tenth Amendment. They also assert that SB 4 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Texas Constitution’s separation of powers, due course of law, freedom of speech, and home rule provisions. Because SB 4 does not take effect until September 1, .2017, the Court has limited its analysis to those claims that may be construed as facial challenges. There are numerous claims that the Court does not address, either because it is unnecessary to reach them or because they are “as applied” challenges. The Court’s findings herein are preliminary, based on the “likelihood of success” standard, and may be revised at the merits stage of the litigation. Federal Preemption A. Supremacy Clause State law that conflicts with federal law is “without effect.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 745-46, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981) (quoting U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 427, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819)). When reviewing constitutional challenges under the Supremacy Clause, courts must consider two cornerstones:- First, courts must “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless that [is] the1 clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947). Second, courts must consider “ ‘[t]he purpose of Congress [as] the ultimate touchstone’ ” of preemption analysis. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)). Congress’s intent may be “explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and -purpose.” Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). B. Three types of preemption When Congress has made clear it intends to occupy an entire field of regulation,' any state regulation of that field will be expressly preempted. Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Tr., — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1938, 1945, 195 L.Ed.2d 298 (2016), However, even without an- express preemption provision, the Supreme Court has found that state law must yield to a congressional act in at least two ■circumstances. When Congress intends federal law to “occupy the field,” state law in that area is preempted, California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100, 109 S.Ct. 1661, 104 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989) (describing field preemption); see also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S, 89, 115, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (citation omitted). And, even if Congress has not..occupied the field, state law is naturally preempted. to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941) (describing conflict preemption); ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. at 100-01, 109 S.Ct. 1661; Locke, 529 U.S. at 109, 120 S.Ct. 1135. The Supreme Court has found state law to be preempted when it is impossible to comply with- both state and federal law, see, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), and where “under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines, 312 U.S. at 67, 61 S.Ct. 399. Whether the state law presents a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67-68, 61 S.Ct. 399. 1.Express Preemption Congress can expressly preempt state law by including a preemption clause in a statute making it clear it intends to occupy an entire field of regulation. Franklin California Tax-Free Tr., 136 S.Ct. at 1945. Where a statute contains an express preemption clause,, the court’s task of statutory construction- must in the first instance focus on the plain wording, of the clause, which necessarily contains -the best evidence of Congress’s preemptive intent. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, a Div. of Brunswick Corp., 537 U.S. 51, 62-63, 123 S.Ct. 518, 154 L.Ed.2d 466 (2002). However, even inclusion of an express preemption clause in a statute does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption principles. Id. If a federal statute contains no express preemption provision, the state or local regulation will be sustained unless it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme, or unless the court discerns from the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the state. Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., 507 U.S, 218, 224, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 122 L.Ed.2d 565 (1993). 2.Field Preemption Field preemption precludes a state “from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012). Congress’s intent to occupy a field “can be inferred from a framework of regulation ‘so pervasive ... that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it’ or where there is a ‘federal interest ... so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’” Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)); see also English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990). Matters left unaddressed, however, in a “comprehensive and detailed” “scheme are presumably ... subject to the disposition” of state law. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85, 114 S.Ct. 2048, 129 L.Ed.2d 67 (1994). 3.Conflict Preemption Conflict preemption, on the other hand, preempts state laws which make “compliance with both federal and state regulations ... a physical impossibility.” Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142-43, 83 S.Ct. 1210 (citations omitted). It also preempts state laws which stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941); see also Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000). The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or whether the state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives. Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142, 83 S.Ct. 1210. C. Congress and Immigration Enforcement To determine whether a state law conflicts with Congress’s purposes and objectives, we must first ascertain the nature of the federal interest. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372-73, 120 S.Ct. 2288; Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. 483, 133 S.Ct. 1943, 1950, 186 L.Ed.2d 43 (2013). The Federal Government has broad, undoubted power over immigration which rests, in part, on its constitutional power to “establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization,” U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and on its inherent sovereign power to control and conduct foreign relations. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10, 102 S.Ct. 2977, 73 L.Ed.2d 563 (1982). Federal law specifies, among other things, categories of aliens who are ineligible to be admitted to the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1182; requires aliens to register with the Federal Government and to carry proof of status, §§ 1304(e), 1306(a); imposes sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized workers, § 1324a; and specifies which aliens may be removed and the procedures for doing so, § 1227. Removal is generally a civil matter, and one of its principal features is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for identifying, apprehending, and removing those classified by the INA as “deport-able aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a); Arizona, 567 U.S. at 387, 132 S.Ct. 2492. D. Analysis 1. Preemption of the Entire Statute- First, the Court will address Plaintiffs’ argument that SB 4 is preempted in its entirety. The City of Dallas argues that SB 4 should be preempted in its entirety because it authorizes local enforcement of all immigration law. However, the City of Dallas has not shown that Congress has entirely preempted state or local regulation in the field of immigration. In fact, the Supreme Court has found that states may regulate certain matters related to immigration. See, e.g., Arizona, 567 U.S. at 400, 132 S.Ct. 2492. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to show that SB 4 is likely preempted in its entirety. The Court will proceed to analyze each challenged provision of SB 4 to determine the likelihood that Plaintiffs will succeed on the merits of their preemption arguments. In order to determine if any part of SB 4 is preempted, the Court must determine which specific components of federal law conflict with the newly enacted state statute. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 611, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 180 L.Ed.2d 580 (2011) (“Pre-emption analysis requires us to compare federal and state law”). Plaintiffs argue SB 4 conflicts with federal law in several ways. First, Plaintiffs argue that SB 4 is preempted in its entirety because it “generally upsets the careful balance Congress has struck between encouraging local assistance and preserving local discretion.” Second, Plaintiffs argue that SB 4’s immigration status inquiry provision requires local officers to make immigration status determinations, thus invading the federal government’s exclusive control of immigration. Third, Plaintiffs claim SB 4’s enforcement assistance requirements conflict with federal law. Plaintiffs argue that SB 4 is in conflict with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357, 1373, and 1644. The provisions of SB 4 codified at Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(b) impose prohibitions against certain local policies relating to four topics: (1) immigration status inquiries (§ 752.053(b)(1)); (2) sharing and maintaining immigration status information (§ 752.053(b)(2)); (3) immigration enforcement assistance (§ 752.053(b)(3)); and (4) permitting immigration officers to enter local jails for immigration enforcement purposes (§ 752.053(b)(4)). Specifically, Section 752.053(b) prohibits local police departments and local entities from preventing their employees from: (1) Inquiring into the immigration status of a person under a lawful detention or under arrest. (2) With respect to information relating to the immigration status, lawful, or unlawful, of any person under a lawful detention or arrest, including information regarding the person’s place of birth: a. Sending the information to or requesting or receiving the information from United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or another relevant federal agency; b. Maintaining the information; or c. Exchanging the information with another local entity or campus police department or a federal or state governmental entity. (3) Assisting or cooperating with a federal immigration officer as reasonable or necessary, including providing enforcement assistance. (4) Permitting a federal immigration officer to enter and conduct immigration enforcement activities. The Court considers each challenged provision in turn to determine whether Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to be preempted. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 611, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 180 L.Ed.2d 580 (2011). 2. Immigration Status Inquiries (Section 752.053(b)(1)) Section 752.053(b)(1) prevents supervising officials from exercising discretion over their employees regarding inquiries about the immigration status of a person who is under lawful detention or arrest. Section 752.053(b)(1) shares some similarities with Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-1051(B), which was enacted as Section 2(B) of SB 1070. The Arizona statute was reviewed by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 400, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012). Section 2(B) provides: For any lawful stop, detention or arrest made by a law enforcement official ... where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status of the person[.] ... Any person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before the person is released. The person’s immigration status shall be verified with the federal government pursuant to [8 U.S.C. § 1373(c)], The provision of SB 4 codified at Section 752.053(b)(1) provides that: [A] local entity or campus police department may not prohibit or materially limit a person who is a commissioned peace officer ... a corrections officer, a booking clerk, a magistrate, or a district attorney, criminal district attorney, or other prosecuting attorney and who is employed by or otherwise under the direction or control of the entity or department from ... inquiring into the immigration status of a person under a lawful detention or under arrest. Plaintiffs argue there' are crucial distinctions between Arizona’s Section 2(B) and SB 4 that render SB 4 invalid even though the Supreme Court did not invalidate Section 2(B). For instance, Plaintiffs argue that SB 4 gives local officials, untrained in immigration enforcement and without supervision from federal officials, the power to question detainees about their immigration status regardless of whether the detainee is an enforcement priority under federal guidelines. Plaintiffs ■ argue that placing such power in the hands of local officers would interfere with Congress’s “deliberate effort to steer a middle path” in immigration enforcement and would “obliterate the voluntary federal scheme and replace'it with a system of unregulated enforcement.” Crosby, 530 U.S. at. 380, 120 S.Ct. 2288. Plaintiffs also argue that empowering. local officers to make these inquiries conflicts with 8 U.S.C, § 1357(a), which establishes the power of a defined group of federal officers to interrogate suspected aliens without a warrant. Plaintiffs’ argument raises issues of both field and conflict preemption. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). a. Field Preemption State or local regulations in a particular field are preempted if federal law so- thoroughly occupies the field ‘ “as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’ ” Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982). In Arizona the Supreme Court recognized that, under Section 2(B), mandatory , status inquiries and verification by local enforcement officials would not necessarily consider federal enforcement priorities, and that officers might make an inquiry “even in cases where it seems unlikely the Attorney General would have the alien removed.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 412, 132 S.Ct. 2492. Notwithstanding these observations, the Supreme Court concluded that'“if § 2(B) only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision likely would survive preemption.” Id. at 414,132 S.Ct. 2492 (rioting further that “[t]he accepted way to perform these status checks is to contact ICE). Since SB 4, like Section 2(B) of SB 1070, authorizes immigration status inquiries only within the context of a lawful detention or arrest, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown that it is likely field preempted. b. Conflict Preemption Plaintiffs also claim that Section 752.053(b)(1) authorizes local officers to make warrantless inquiries about immigration status, in conflict with 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1), which vests warrantless interrogation authority in a defined group of federal agents. Plaintiffs also argue that this case is distinguishable from Arizona because it is not the scope of the detentions under SB 4 that raise constitutional i concerns, but the grant to local officers of the authority reserved to federal agents under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1). Plaintiffs therefore argue that Congress intended that only immigration officials— or local officers participating in immigration enforcement activities pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)—would be authorized, to make immigration inquiries. However, in Arizona, the Supreme Court, confronted with similar statutory text, found that Section (2)(B) should not be preempted at the pre-enforcement stage. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 414, 422, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (“§ 2(B) of the Arizona law .,. adds nothing to the authority that Arizona law enforcement officers, like officers in all other States, already possess . under federal law.”). Notably, Section (2)(B) made immigration status inquiries mandatory, requiring that “a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status of the person.” By contrast, SB 4 does not mandate that immigration status inquires be made, but instead leaves the decision to make immigration inquiries at the discretion of local officers. Section (2)(B) also required that immigration status be verified with ICE. No parallel requirement exists in SB 4, where a local officer can decide whether or not to inquire and whether or not to verify or share the information obtained with ICE. The Court cannot find that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their preemption arguments regarding Section 752.053(b)(1). The immigration status inquiry permitted under SB 4 could only take place during an already lawful detention or arrest. However, it is crucial for the Court to note that SB 4 only permits immigration status inquiries during an already lawful detention or arrest. Section 752.053(b)(1) permits an immigration status inquiry when a person is lawfully detained or arrested, but does not purport to authorize local officers to effect arrests or prolong detentions in order to inquire about or investigate immigration status. SB 4⅛ immigration status inquiry provision does not create an independent ground for conducting a stop. Therefore under SB 4 an officer may not detain or arrest an individual for the sole purpose of making an immigration inquiry. 3. Information Sharing (Section 752.053(b)(2)) Section 752.053(b)(2) prevents local entities and campus police departments from adopting, enforcing, or endbrsing policies that would prohibit local' officials from maintaining immigration 'status information or exchanging it with federal,- state, or local government entities, Texas contends that this prohibition is “fully consonant with federal immigration statutes evincing a policy in favor of States sharing immigration-related information with the federal government.” Texas relies on the Arizona case for the proposition that consultation between federal, and state officials is not only constitutional but “an important part of the immigration system.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411, 132 S.Ct. 2492. Texas further seeks to assure the Court that “SB 4 promotes [federal immigration power] by encouraging greater cooperation between state and local officials and the federal government.” The Court also notes the similarities between Section 752.058(b)(2) and 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which states in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State, or local government entity from doing any of the following with respect to information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual: (1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving such information from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. (2) Maintaining such information. (3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or local government entity. Plaintiffs argue Section 752.053(b)(2) is preempted because it regulates the same activity as 8 U.S.C. § 1373 but in a different manner, because SB 4 eliminates local discretion regarding the sharing of information with ICE. Plaintiffs’ argument is one of conflict preemption, because they argue that implementation of Section 752.053(b)(2) would conflict with 8 U.S.C. § 1373. a. Conflict Preemption The Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona indicates that, under the scheme established by Congress for communication of immigration status immigration, there is room for state and local participation. The Supreme Court noted that “[c]onsultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system” and that Congress “has encouraged the sharing of information about possible immigration violations.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411-12, 132 S.Ct. 2492. The federal scheme thus leaves room for a policy requiring state and local officers to contact ICE as a routine matter. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 609-10, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 179 L.Ed.2d 1031 (2011). The Supreme Court further held that, “[c]onsultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system. In fact, Congress has encouraged the sharing of information about possible immigration violations.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(g)(10)(A), 1373(c)). The Supreme Court in analyzing Section 2(B) also recognized that while there are hypothetical situations in which Section 2(B) would be unconstitutional, there was a way for the statute to be read to comply with federal law. Here, because Plaintiffs make a facial challenge, it may “only succeed ... by establishing that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d Í51 (2008) (emphasis added)). In Arizona, the Supreme Court concluded it was improper to enjoin Section 2(B) before the state courts had an opportunity to construe it and without some showing that enforcement of the provision in fact conflicted with federal immigration law and its objectives. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 416, 132 S.Ct. 2492. Similarly here, this Court finds that under the Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona it would be improper to enjoin Section 752.053(b)(2) at the pre-enforcement stage. However, the Court finds that the only permitted— but not required—action under SB 4 following an immigration inquiry is sharing and maintaining information. If for example, during a lawful stop an officer obtains information that the detained individual is undocumented, the officer may not arrest the individual or prolong the detention on this basis. However, under SB 4, officers are permitted—again, not required—to share this information with ICE, or other appropriate federal agencies, or law enforcement entities. b. . Penalties Plaintiffs also argue that Section 752.053(b)(2) is preempted because its information-sharing requirements are enforced with penalties that Congress declined to impose. Plaintiffs argue that adding a penalty provision to 8 U.S.C. § 1373 is exclusively within Congress’s authority, and that Congress is currently considering whether to enact penalties for noncompliance with 8 U,S.C. § 1373. Like SB 4, Section 2(B) of Arizona’s SB 1070 included civil penalties for non-compliance. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-1051(H). Although the Supreme Court did not directly address the issue of penalties for non-compliance with information-sharing requirements of SB 1070, it did address penalty provisions attached to other sections of the Arizona statute and found them to be preempted because they either created penalties that interfered with Congress’s intent or invaded a field occupied by the Federal Government. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 403, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012) (state criminal penalties for violations of federal laws regarding unauthorized employment and carrying registration documents preempted both because they “ignore[] the basic premise of field preemption—that States may not enter, in any respect, an area the Federal Government has reserved for itself’ and also because “[pjermitting the State to impóse its Own penalties for’the federal offenses here would conflict with the careful framework Congress adopted”). In contrast, thé Supreme Court has allowed states to create additional penalties for conduct that violates federal law where the regulated conduct falls Within the regulatory power reserved to the state, rather than within an “area of dominant federal concern.” Whiting, 563 U.S., at 601, 604-05, 131 S.Ct. 1968. The crucial distinction between the penalties that were preempted in Arizona and those that were not in Whiting is that the preempted penalties were either attached to state regulation of matters that the Court found were reserved for Congress, or they conflicted with Congressional intent. SB 1070’s penalties for failing to comply with its mandatory information-sharing requirements were not preempted in •Arizona, and the Court found that the substantive requirement was not preempted either, because it did not intrude into an exclusively federal field and could operate in a manner that did not conflict with Congressional intent. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 412, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (“Congress has done nothing to suggest it is inappropriate to communicate with ICE in these situations. Indeed, it has encouraged the sharing of information about possible immigration violations.”). In light of the Supreme Courtis holding in Arizona, and the similarity in the substantive requirements, between Section 752..053(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1373, and the information-sharing provisions of Arizona’s SB 1070, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success" on the merits of their claim that Section 752.053(b)(2) is preempted. 4. Enforcement Assistance . (Section 752.053(b)(3)) . Plaintiffs argue that § 752.053(b)(3) conflicts with federal law because it allows state officials to perform the duties of immigration officers in a manner inconsistent with federal law under 8 U.S.C. § 1357. Section 752.053(b)(3) prevents local entities from prohibiting or materially limiting their employees from “[assisting or cooperating with a federal immigration officer as reasonable or necessary, including providing enforcement assistance.” The INA, on the other hand, sets forth a number of conditions that must be "satisfied in order for state and local officers to perform the functions of immigration enforcement officers. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). 8 U.S.C. 1367(g) states as follows: ' ■, (1) Notwithstanding section 1342 of Title 31, the Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is-determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States .(including the transportation of such aliens across State lines- to detention centers), may carry out such function at the expense of the State or political subdivision and to the extent consistent with State and local law. (2) Ah agreement under this subsection shall require that an officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State performing a function under the agreement shall have knowledge of, and adhere to,' Federal law relating to the function, and 'shall 'contain a written certification that the officers or employees performing the function-'tinder the agreement have received adequate training regarding the enforcement of relevant Federal immigration laws. (3) In performing a function under this subsection, an officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General. (4) In performing- ⅞ function under this subsection, an officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State may use Federal property or facilities, as provided in a written agreement between ' the Attorney General and the State or subdivision. (5) With respect to each officer or employee of a State or political subdivision who is authorized to perform a function under this subsection, the specific-powers and duties that may be, or ar.e .required to be, exercised or performed by the individual, the duration of the authority of the individual, and the position of the agency of the Attorney General who is required to supervise and direct the individual, shall be set forth in.a written agreement between, the .Attorney General and the State or political subdivision. (6) The Attorney General may not accept a service' under this subsection if the service will .be used to displace any Federal employee. (7) Except as provided in paragraph (8), an officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State'performing functions under this subsection shall not be treated as a Federal employee for any purpose other than for purposes of chapter 81 of Title 5 (relating to compensation for injury) and sections 2671 through 2680 of Title 28 (relating to tort claims). (8) An officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State acting under color of authority under .this subsection, or any agreement entered into under this subsection, shall be considered to be acting under color of Federal authority for purposes of determining the liability, and immunity from suit, of the officer or employee in a civil action brought under Federal or State law. (9) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require any State or political subdivision of a State to enter into an agreement with the Attorney General under this subsection. (10) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require an agreement under this subsection in order for any officer or employee of. a State or political subdivision of a State— (A) to communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of any individual, including reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not lawfully present in the United States; or (B) otherwise to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, , detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States. These requirements include a written agreement between federal immigration enforcement and the local entity, which provides “a written certification that the officers or employees performing the function under the agreement have received adequate training regarding the’ enforcement of relevant Federal immigration laws”; requires that the local officer or employee “shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General”; specifies “the specific powers and duties that may be, or are required to be, exercised or performed by the individual, the duration of the authority of the individual, and the position of the agency of the Attorney General who is required to supervise and direct the individual”; and imposes other specific requirements. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).' At , issue is whether 8 ' U.S.C. §. 1357(g)(9) and (10) ought to be interpreted as affirmatively authorizing local immigration enforcement or merely imposing twó' limitations on the rest of subsection (g). First, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(9) provides that subsection (g) does not “require any State or political subdivision of a State to enter into an agreement with the Attorney General under this subsection.” Second, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10) states that subsection (g) does not: require an agreement under this subsection in order for any officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State ... to communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of any individual, including reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not lawfully present in the United States; or .,. otherwise to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States. Plaintiffs argue that § 752.053(b)(3) conflicts with 8 U.S.C. 1357(g) in several ways. First, Plaintiffs claim that 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), read as a whole, requires that local entities enter into written agreements with the Attorney General before local law enforcement can systematically carry out the functions of immigration officers. Second, Plaintiffs argue that Section 752.053(b)(3) is preempted because it does not require local officials to act under the supervision and direction of the Attorney General and undergo training to perform the functions of immigration officers as required in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). Third, Plaintiffs argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10) should not be read in a way that negates the requirements imposed in the remainder of subsection (g). a. Formal Agreement, Training, and Oversight Plaintiffs argue that SB 4 goes beyond authorizing immigration status inquiries and information sharing, and places immigration enforcement into the hands of local officials without also requiring that they meet the requirements established by Congress for local participation in immigration enforcement. Plaintiffs have raised both field and conflict preemption arguments regarding immigration enforcement by local officials. Plaintiffs argue that Section 752.053(b)(3) is distinguishable from Section 2(B) in Arizona because SB 4 empowers local officials to go beyond the local cooperation and information-sharing that the Supreme Court approved, and into the field of enforcing immigration law. Plaintiffs argue that this distinction is evident from the structure of SB 4, which addresses local cooperation, information-sharing, and immigration enforcement in different subsections of Section 752.058(b). Finally, Plaintiffs argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10), contrary to Defendants’ arguments, does not negate the specific requirements set out in the rest of subsection (g). Defendants, on the other hand, read the formal agreement requirements set out in Section 1357(g) as one of the permissible ways for localities to cooperate with immigration officials. Defendants argue Section 1357(g) does not preempt other forms of local cooperation with federal immigration officials outside the context of a formal written agreement. Defendants further argue “Congress could not have legislated a ‘compulsory local role’ in federal immigration enforcement, because that would be unconstitutional commandeering under the Tenth Amendment.” Docket no. 91 p. 33 (internal citations omitted). The Court will address three issues raised by the parties’ arguments: (1) first whether the State may enact regulation creating their own requirements—or lack thereof—for local officers to participate in immigration enforcement in light of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (field preemption); (2) whether subsection (g)(10) can be read to create an exemption from the requirements outlined in § 1357(g)(1)—(5); and (3) whether SB 4’s enforcement provision creates a different system for cooperation (conflict preemption). i. Field Preemption Congress may “foreclose any state regulation in the area,” irrespective of whether state law is consistent or inconsistent with “federal standards.” Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 1591, 1595, 191 L.Ed.2d 511 (2015) (citing Arizona, 567 U.S at 401, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (emphasis added)). In such situations, Congress has forbidden the State to take action in the field that the federal statute pre-empts. Id. Congress’s intent to occupy a field “can be inferred from a framework of regulation ‘so pervasive ... that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it’ or where there is a ‘federal interest ... so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399, 132 S.Ct. 2492. The nature of the power exerted by Congress, the object sought to be attained, and the character of the obligations imposed by the law, are all important in considering the question of whether supreme federal enactments preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). Plaintiffs have argued Texas’s regulation of immigration' enforcement has impermis-sibly encroached upon a field that Congress exclusively reserved for the Federal government. Plaintiffs argue the extensive requirements set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) which delineate the training, supervision, and certification requirements for local officials to participate in immigration enforcement, coupled with Section li03(a)(10), extending local officials authority to enforce immigration laws in the event of an “imminent mass influx of aliens arriving off the coast of the United States”; and Section 1252c, granting local authority to arrest in criminal illegal reentry cases, “but only after the 'State or local law enforcement officials obtain appropriate confirmation,” makes clear Congress intended to prevent unilateral State involvement and State authorization of immigration enforcement. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hines' shed light on the factors courts should consider when analyzing preemption challenges. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 70, 61 S.Ct. 399. First, courts ought to consider the nature of the power exerted by Congress! Here, Congress set out exacting requirements to be met before involving local officers in immigration enforcement. These requirements indicate Congress intended for the Federal Government—the Attorney General in particular—to provide oversight and direction to local officers. Next, courts should' consider the object Congress sought to obtain, Hines, 312 U.S. at 70, 61 S.Ct. 399. The requirements of 8 U.S.C- § 1357(g) indicate supervision and direction are a crucial component of immigration enforcement by local officials. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immediate human concerns.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396, 132 S.Ct. 2492. Notably, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3) states “in performing a function under this subsection, an officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Attorney General.” Thus, subsection (g)(3) makes clear that a .local officer or employee of a state or political subdivision exercising authority granted under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) must be subject to the direction and supervision of -the Attorney General. Subsection (g)(3) states in clear terms it applies to functions exercised under the entire subsection (g), including subsection (g)(10). Because subsection (g) grants enforcement authority it can be' inferred Congress sought to ensure that the Attorney General and the Federal Government retained enforcement direction and discretion in all local enforcement efforts including those contemplated under subsection (g)(10). Third, the Court ought to consider the character of the obligations imposed by 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). Plaintiffs argue the requirement of formal agreements between the Attorney General and the State or locality illustrates the importance of Federal direction and supervision in immigration enforcement. Plaintiffs further argue the training and certification requirements in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) highlight the importance of creating uniform enforcement policies. In Arizona the Supreme Court reasoned that “authorizing state and local officers to engage in these enforcement activities as a general matter, [...] creates an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 410, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (finding state law authorizing state officers to make war-rantless arrests based on removability was preempted). In analyzing Section 6 in Arizona, the Supreme Court reasoned that “Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which state officers may perform the functions of an immigration officer.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (emphasis added). Further, “[tjhere áre significant complexities involved in enforcing federal immigration law.” Id. The Supreme Court’s analysis in Arizona made clear the importance of the supervising role of the Attorney General as well as the written certifications requirements. Id. at 409, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (noting that “agreements reached with the Attorney General must contain written certification that officers have received adequate training to carry out the duties of an immigration officer”). Thus, the Court finds merit in Plaintiffs’ argument that States should not be able to exempt themselves from the exacting requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) by creating State regulation that circumvents such requirements. The Court further finds, after examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects, that Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood that the federal interest in the field of immigration enforcement is so dominant that it may preclude enforcement of state laws on this subject and Tex. Gov’t Code § 752.053(b)(3) is likely to be field preempted. ii. Conflict Preemption Plaintiffs have also raised issues of conflict preemption. The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives. Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142, 83 S.Ct. 1210. Statutory interpretation requires more than concentration upon isolated words; rather, consideration must be given to the “total corpus of pertinent law and the policies that inspired ostensibly inconsistent provisions.” Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970) (citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962)); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285, 76 S.Ct. 349, 100 L.Ed. 309 (1956); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235, 61 S.Ct. 463, 85 L.Ed. 788 (1941)). Statutory interpretation requires courts to “rea[d] the whole statutory text, conside[r] the purpose and context of the statute,- and consult] any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.” Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486, 126 S.Ct. 1252, 163 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2006). An inquiry into statutory interpretation must consider “the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). The Court must therefore decide whether Section 1357(g)(10), when read in the context of the whole statute, creates a way for state and local police to “assist[] or cooperate] with a federal immigration officer” on a routine basis, circumventing the requirements Congress set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (g)(l)-(5). If Section 1357(g)(10) can be read to permit this, it would be unlikely that Section 752.053(b)(3) would be conflict preempted. However, if Section 1357(g)(10) does not permit this, and no other provision of federal law authorizes this type of informal participation in immigration enforcement by individual officers, Section 752.053(b)(3) would frustrate the purpose of the training and supervision requirements set forth in Section 1357 (g). 'To determine the intent of Congress, we first look to the statutory text. Section 1357(g) creates a comprehensive framework to permit local officials to perform the functions of immigration officers. The first requirement of this participation is that the Attorney General enter into “a written agreement” with “a State, or any political subdivision of a State[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1). That agreement must include a “written certification that the officers or employees performing the function under the agreement have received adequate training regarding the enforcement of relevant Federal immigration laws.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(2). Section 1357(g)(5) requires that the agreement set out the specific powers and duties to be exercised by the local officers or employees, the duration of their authority, and the details of their supervision by the Attorney General. And Section 1357(g)(10), even while appearing to excuse the requirement of an agreement, still requires that local or state officer or employee participation in “the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens” be in “cooperation] with the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. 1357(g)(10). Defendants’ proposed interpretation is that “§ 1357(g)(10) expressly contemplates the States’ inherent authority to cooperate with the federal government in enforcing immigration laws[.]” This argument conflates communication of immigration status information with cooperation in immigration enforcement. As the Court previously discussed, sharing of immigration information is expressly addressed by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1357(g)(10)(A). No separate statute exists that describes the involvement of local or state officials in routine immigration enforcement. The statute itself separates cooperation in sharing of information Section 1357(g)(10)(A) and cooperation in enforcement in Section 1357(g)(10)(B). Defendants’ argument that the states possess “inherent authority” to carry out immigration enforcement is at odds with the language of the INA, which contemplates the states, in the absence of a formal agreement, may only “cooperat[e] with the Attorney General[.]” Subsection (g)(10)(B) allows states to cooperate with the Attorney General absent a formal agreement; it does not place routine enforcement authority in the hands of the states. The Supreme Court in Arizona recognized there is ambiguity in what constitutes cooperation. Arizona, 567' U.S. at 410, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (“[t]here may be some ambiguity as to what constitutes cooperation under the federal law”). Such ambiguity is central to the determination of Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on their conflict preemption argument regarding Section 752.053(b)(3). Plaintiffs argue Texas cannot simply offer up local enforcement officials to routinely perform immigration enforcement and bypass the training, supervision, and certification requirements that Congress has established. DHS guidance Ulus-, trates that contemplated cooperation outside formal agreements conies in the form of pre-established programs or on a “case-by-case basis.” Further, the language of the statute indicates systematic cooperation should be at behest of the Attorney General rather than motivated by state law. In other words, there can be no rou-tine mandatory system established when the Attorney General has not requested it and will not supervise local enforcement. Defendants argue “Congress went right up to the line of what it could do without running afoul of the Tenth Amend-merit’s anti-commandeering doctrine” and that “Congress’s decision to encourage voluntary local cooperation could not have preempted State-enacted policies regulating—or even requiring—local cooperation.” The Court is not persuaded by this argument. Authority to regulate immigration enforcement rests with the Federal Government. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 444-45, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (the Federal Government retains the discretion that matters most— that is, the discretion to enforce [federal immigration] law in particular cases). Texas cannot—through state law—expand the “limited circumstances” in which local enforcement officials may perform the functions of immigration officers. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 387, 132 S.Ct. 2492. It is not the role of the State or the Court to speculate about what Congress would do in the absence of the Constitution’s limits on its authority. The Court cannot tailor its application of the Supremacy Clause based on such speculation. Defendants argue that the INA “contemplates the States’ inherent authority to cooperate [with the removal of aliens].” However, the enforcement examples listed in Section 1357(g)(10)(B), which include “identification, apprehension, detention, or removal” make clear this subsection was not intended to be an independent grant of power to the states. Under Texas’ interpretation, if subsection (g)(10) was a separate grant of state authority divorced entirely from the requirements listed in (g)(1)—(5), it. would vest states with the right to apprehend and ■ remove aliens without supervision and direction from the Federal Government. However, is clear that the removal of aliens is within the sole purview of the Federal Government, and that “Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which state officers may . perform the functions of an immigration officer.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408, 132 S.Ct. 2492. In Arizona the Supreme Court’s stated “principal example” of these limited circumstances “is when the Attorney General has- granted that authority to specific officers in a formal agreement with a state or local government.” Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1367(g)(1). Officers covered by these agreements are subject to the Attorney General’s direction and supervision. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3). Federal immigration law involves significant complexities, one of which is the determination of removability. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 569 U.S. 356, 379-80, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). For this reason, Congress has required that enforcement cooperation agreements under Section 1357(g) contain written certification that officers have received adequate training to carry out the duties t of an immigration officer. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(2); 8 CFR §§ 287.5(c) (arrest power contingent on training), 287.1(g) (defining the training). Although the Supreme Court in Arizona did not address Section 1357(g)(10)(B) in the broad context of enforcement, .it concluded there are “limited.circumstances in which state officers may perform the functions of an immigration officer.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 408-09, 132 S.Ct. 2492. It would be paradoxical to conclude that, despite the exacting requirements set out in Section 1357(g), and despite the “limited circumstances” recognized, by the Supreme Court, a state could establish its own cooperation scheme under which local officers and employees could routinely avoid the requirements imposed by Federal law. Although formal cooperation agreements are not always necessary, the Supreme Court drew a clear line distinguishing communication from enforcement cooperation. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411-12, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)(A)). The Supreme Court held that putting state officers in the position of holding aliens in custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction or supervision would disrupt the federal framework. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 413, 132 S.Ct. 2492 (“The program put in place by Congress does not allow state or local officers to adopt this enforcement mechanism.”). Similarly, this Court finds bypassing training, certification, and supervision and establishing a systematic local enforcement procedure would likely go against the program put in place by Congress. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that Section 752.053(b)(3) is conflict preempted. Violation of Free Speech The City of El Cenizo Plaintiffs, City of San Antonio Plaintiffs,. El Paso County Plaintiffs, Travis County Plaintiffs, City of Dallas, City of Austin, and City of Houston allege that SB 4 violates the First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge to SB 4 is three fold: the first is an overbreadth challenge; the second is a vagueness challenge; and the third is a viewpoint discrimination challenge. A. Standing to assert First Amendment claims Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ standing to assert their First Amendment claims, and there is no impediment under the law that would foreclose their ability to bring such claims. The record shows that several named plaintiffs face an imminent threat of censorship and run a real risk of punishment under the terms of SB 4. But even if the individual rights of these named plaintiffs were not implicated, the prudential limitations on standing are relaxed in the First Amendment context. LAPD v. United Reporting Pub. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38-39, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999), Maryland Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 Ú.S. 947, 954-58, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir. 2006). B. First Amendment protections “Státements by public officials on matters of public concern must be afforded First Amendment protection.” Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Public officials at the local level— whether elected, appointed, or otherwise employed—do not relinquish their First Amendment rights which they would otherwise enjoy as private citizens to comment on matters of concern. Lane v. Franks, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 2374, 189 L.Ed.2d 312 (2014); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731. Local governmental policy on the enforcement of immigration laws is a matter of legitimate public concern. Free and open debate on matters of public concern is a cornerstone of