Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD, District Judge. INTRODUCTION On March 29, 2013, we issued a Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaints, which alleged that they suffered injury based on the defendants’ manipulation of the London InterBank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”). In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 935 F.Supp.2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“LIBOR /”). Among, other determinations relevant to the pending motions, we dismissed exchange-based plaintiffs’ claims under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) to the extent that they were based on Eurodollar futures contracts entered into between August 2007 and May 29, 2008, but allowed those based on contracts entered into between May 30, 2008 and May 2010 to proceed. On August 23, 2013, we issued a second Memorandum and Order in response to a series of additional motions addressed to the complaints. In re LIBOR-Based, Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 962 F.Supp.2d 606 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (“LIBOR II”). In LIBOR II, we made the following rulings: (1) denied exchange-based plaintiffs’ motion to add allegations with respect to trader-based manipulation; (2) denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration of our finding that plaintiffs had adequately pled scienter under the CEA, but did so without prejudice to defendants filing an additional motion that responded to specific concerns; (3) granted defendants leave to move to dismiss, on statute of limitations grounds, CEA claims arising out of contracts entered into between May 30, 2008 and April 14, 2009; (4) granted OTC plaintiffs’ motion for leave to reassert their unjust enrichment claim and to add a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (5) granted exchange-based plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to add Société Générale (“SG”) as a defendant. Presently before the Court are seven motions. Six of these motions were contemplated by our decision in LIBOR II: (1) exchange-based plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration of our decision denying them leave to add allegations of day-today, trader-based manipulation; (2) exchange-based plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint to include new, heretofore unpled allegations of trader-based conduct; (3) defendants’ motion for reconsideration of our finding that plaintiffs had pled scienter; (4) defendants’ motion to dismiss exchange-based plaintiffs’ claims based on contracts purchased between May 30, 2008 and April 14, 2009; (5) defendáis’ motion to dismiss OTC plaintiffs’ clájms for unjust enrichment and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (6) defendant SG’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The seventh is defendants’ motion to strike the declaration that exchange-based plaintiffs submitted in connection with its motion for reconsideration (the “Kovel Declaration”). For the reasons stated below, exchange-based plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is denied, but their motion for leave to amend their complaint to add certain allegations of day-to-day, trader-based manipulation is granted; defendants’ motion for reconsideration of our holding that exchange-based plaintiffs have adequately pled scienter is denied; defendants’ motion to dismiss claims based on contracts purchased between May 30, 2008 and April 14, 2009 is granted; defendants’ motion to dismiss OTC plaintiffs’ claims for unjust enrichment and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is granted in part and denied in part; defendant SG’s motion to dismiss is granted; and defendants’ motion to strike the Kovel Declaration is granted. Because the facts underlying this case have been thoroughly discussed in LIBOR I and then elaborated upon in LIBOR II, we will proceed directly to our consideration of the pending motions. DISCUSSION I. Legal Standards A.Motion for Reconsideration “Reconsideration is appropriate only where a court has overlooked controlling decisions or facts presented in the underlying motion which, had they been considered, might reasonably have altered the result of the initial decision.” In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 815 F.Supp.2d 649, 651-52 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (citing Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995)). Because the remedy of reconsideration does not provide relief “where a party failed to present relevant factual or. legal arguments,” a party seeking reconsideration “may not advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the Court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Reconsideration is “an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly,” given “the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” Small v. Nobel Biocare USA, LLC, Nos. 05 Civ. 3225(NRB), 06 Civ. 683(NRB), 2012 WL 952396, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2012) (quoting In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F.Supp.2d 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y.2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is within “the sound discretion of the district court.” Aczel v. Labonia, 584 F.3d 52, 61 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). B. Motion for Leave to Amend Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court should freely give leave” to a party to amend its complaint “when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). “Generally, a district court has discretion to deny leave for good reason, including futility, bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir.2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, “the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); see also In re CRM Holdings Sec. Litig., No. 10 CIV 00975(RPP), 2013 WL 787970, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2013) (“The grant or the denial of an opportunity to amend a complaint falls squarely within the discretion of a district court.”). C. Motion to Dismiss When deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences .in plaintiffs favor. Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir.2009); Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir.2007). Nevertheless, a plaintiffs “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Once a court accepts all of the plaintiffs factual allegations as true, those allegations must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” in order to pass muster under Rule 12(b)(6). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). If a plaintiff has “not nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In the context of claims for commodities manipulation, such as those alleged by the exchange-based plaintiffs, a plaintiff must also meet the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See LIBOR I, 935 F.Supp.2d at 713-14; In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F.Supp.2d 513, 535 (S.D.N.Y.2008) ("Amaranth I”); In re Crude Oil Commodity Litig., No. 06 Civ. 6677(NRB), 2007 WL 1946553, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007) (“Crude Oil I”). Rule 9(b) provides that, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). “This pleading constraint serves to provide a defendant with fair notice of a plaintiffs claim, safeguard his reputation from improvident charges of wrongdoing, and protect him against strike suits.” ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d Cir.2007) (citing Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 171 (2d Cir.2004)). While courts generally relax Rule 9(b)’s requirements in the context of manipulation claims, “Allegations that are conclusory or unsupported by factual assertions are insufficient.” Id. II. Trader-Based Conduct A. Procedural Background In LIBOR I, we addressed plaintiffs’ argument that their claims properly related not only to alleged persistent suppression of LIBOR, but also to day-to-day, trader-based manipulation intended to benefit the banks’ respective trading positions in the Eurodollar futures market. Plaintiffs’ assertions were based largely on the Barclays settlements made public on June 27, 2012, which included admissions of efforts to manipulate LIBOR by individual traders. As a result, we granted plaintiffs leave to move to amend their complaint to include allegations of day-to-day manipulation derived from the Barclays settlements. LIBOR I, 935 F.Supp.2d at 709. We also expressed our preliminary view that plaintiffs’ potential claims based on contracts bought prior to the start of the Class Period (pre-August 2007) were not time barred, whereas those based on contracts purchased after August 2007 were likely time barred, since those plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of their injury by May 29, 2008. Id. On May 23, 2013, plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to amend their complaint to include claims based on day-to-day manipulation. We addressed this motion in LIBOR II, finding that plaintiffs’ proposed amendments failed to “adequately allege[ ] that they suffered an injury as a result of defendants’ alleged trader-based conduct, and thus plaintiffs lack[ed] standing under the CEA to pursue such claims.” LIBOR II, 962 F.Supp.2d at 619. We also found that “although loss causation is not an element of a commodities manipulation claim, private plaintiffs must still plead actual damages in order to have standing to bring suit under the CEA,” a requirement that plaintiffs in this case had not met. Id. at 619 n. 16. In contrast to the persistent suppression claims, the trader-based claims alleged that LIBOR was manipulated in a way that was “episodic and varying in direction.” Id. at 620. Plaintiffs therefore needed to plead that they suffered actual damages by plausibly alleging “(1) that they transacted in Eurodollar futures contracts on days on which Eurodollar futures contract prices were artificial as a'result of trader-based manipulation of LIBOR, [and] (2) that their positions were such that they were injured.” Id. at 620-21. Instead, plaintiffs only offered “broad allegations” that were “insufficient to allege actual damages.” Id. at 621. Consequently, plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint to add allegations of trader-based manipulation of Eurodollar futures contracts was denied. Plaintiffs then made two further motions. The first, filed on September 6, 2013, was a motion for reconsideration of “that portion of [LIBOR II] denying Exchange-Based Plaintiffs’ motion to [amend their complaint] to include allegations based on trader-based manipulation during the period January 1, 2005 through the beginning of August 2007.” Pis.’ Notice of Mot. for Reeons. of the Court’s Aug. 23, 2013 Mem. & Order at 1. The second, filed on September 10,' 2013, was a motion for leave to file an amended complaint that would include new allegations of trader-based conduct from pre-August 2007. Pis.’ Sept. 10, 2013 Letter at 3. It was not until plaintiffs’ reply brief on the reconsideration motion that plaintiffs furnished examples of specific dates when plaintiffs traded in Eurodollar futures and were allegedly harmed by artificial LIBOR fixes. In order to fully explore this issue, we solicited further briefing from both parties, and those sur-replies were filed by October 22, 2013. Then, while these motions were pending, defendant Coópera-tieve Céntrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. (“Rabobank”) settled with various government regulators — including the U.S. Department of Justice and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission — for conduct relating to LIBOR manipulation. Again, to ensure a full record, we granted plaintiffs leave to supplement their motion for reconsideration with information obtainéd from the Rabobank settlement documents. We also permitted defendants to respond, which they did by January 21, 2014. To recap, plaintiffs filed in support of their motion for reconsideration a moving brief, a reply, a sur-reply, and a supplemental brief; defendants filed an opposition, a sur-reply, and a supplemental brief of their own. Also fully briefed is plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint. We address both motions concerning trader-based claims below. B. Analysis 1. Motion for Reconsideration In LIBOR II, we denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint to include trader-based claims, finding that the claims asserted at that time “could not withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” LIBOR II, 962 F.Supp.2d at 619 (quoting Lucente v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir.2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs now assert that this Court erred in denying leave to add the proposed amendments because they can “address the deficiencies identified by the court and allege facts sufficient to support [their] claim[s].” Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 347 Fed.Appx. 617, 622 (2d Cir.2009). Plaintiffs further maintain that our finding of futility warrants reconsideration because we overlooked two cases from the Southern District of New York, including our own decision in LI-BOR I. For the reasons stated below, we reject these arguments and deny plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. First, plaintiffs’ reliance on Panther Partners is misplaced. Panther Partners has been interpreted not “as an intervening change in the controlling law justifying reconsideration of the denial of leave to amend,” but rather as an “affirm[ation] [of] the familiar rule that a district court always has discretion to grant leave to amend.... ” In re CRM Holdings, 2013 WL 787970, at *8 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Panther Partners reiterates that “[gjranting leave to amend is futile if it appears that plaintiff cannot address the deficiencies identified by the court and allege facts sufficient to support the claim.” Panther Partners, 347 Fed.Appx. at 622. As we stated in LIBOR II, “despite the fact that plaintiffs indisputably have access to their own Eurodollar futures contract trading records, the [Proposed Second Amended Complaint] [was] devoid of any references to particular Eurodollar contracts.” LIBOR II, 962 F.Supp.2d at 621. Given plaintiffs’ access to this necessary information and their failure to incorporate it into their pleadings, it was reasonable for this Court to assume that plaintiffs would be unable to amend their complaint to include allegations of trader-based conduct that could survive a 12(b)(6) motion. Therefore, Panther Partners is not an appropriate basis for reconsideration of our denial of leave to amend in LIBOR II. Second, plaintiffs’ argument that we failed to consider LIBOR I in reaching our decision in LIBOR II is meritless. Putting aside the absurd notion that this Court failed to consider an opinion that we had written mere months prior, our analysis of plaintiffs’ claims has remained consistent: plaintiffs must plead actual damages to state a claim under the CEA. See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1); LIBOR I, 935 F.Supp.2d at 714; LIBOR II, 962 F.Supp.2d at 620. Plaintiffs inexplicably fail to grasp, however, that claims based on defendants’ persistent suppression of LIBOR require different allegations to survive than do those based on day-to-day, trader-based manipulation. In the former scenario, we can assume LIBOR’s artificiality over a given time period, which in turn would necessarily impact the price of Eurodollar futures contracts purchased or sold in the relevant window. In the latter scenario, since LIBOR was allegedly artificial only for discrete days during the Class Period, by their own reckoning, plaintiffs may have transacted on many days when LIBOR was “true.” Moreover, because the manipulation was allegedly varying in direction, there may be some days when plaintiffs were actually helped, rather than harmed, by the alleged artificiality, depending on their position in the market. Thus, while plaintiffs’ damages are “plausible” based on a persistent suppression theory, even without allegations of specific transactions, damages are merely “conceivable” — and thus insufficiently pled — if LIBOR was allegedly being manipulated in different directions on different days and plaintiffs fail to provide details of their own positions in the market. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). Notwithstanding plaintiffs’ contentions to the contrary, in LIBOR II, we imposed the same requirement for plausible allegations of actual damages as we did in LIBOR I. Plaintiffs twice failed to meet that burden with regard to trader-based claims, a fact in no way obscured by their current attempt to mischaracterize our prior opinions. Such a manufactured contradiction shall not be the basis for reconsideration of our holding in LIBOR II. Third, plaintiffs’ assertion that we overlooked In re Crude Oil Commodity Futures Litigation, 913 F.Supp.2d 41 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (“Crude Oil II”), in reaching our decision in LIBOR II fails as well. As a threshold matter, Crude Oil II is not a controlling decision and is therefore an improper basis for granting a motion for reconsideration. See Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[R]econsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked.”). Moreover, plaintiffs misapprehend the applicability of Crude Oil II to this case. It is true that the manipulation in Crude Oil II, like the alleged trader-based manipulation here, was varying in direction. See Crude Oil II, 913 F.Supp.2d at 61 (noting that the manipulation alleged “increased and decreased prices at different times”). But the key difference is that the Crude Oil II manipulation was not episodic in the same way as the alleged manipulation here. Whereas in Crude Oil II the Court could reasonably assume that the plaintiffs transacted at artificial prices because “the artificiality lasted for months after the alleged misconduct ended,” the same cannot be presumed here. Id.; see also In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 269 F.R.D. 366, 380 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (suggesting that “because plaintiffs transacted at artificial prices, injury may be presumed” (emphasis added)). In this case, traders’ alleged manipulation of LIBOR operated on a day-to-day basis such that manipulation on any given day would have had no impact on the next day’s published LIBOR, and LIBOR on some — if not most — days would have been unaffected by the alleged manipulation. Thus, as we indicated in LIBOR II, it was necessary for plaintiffs to plead that they had transacted on specific days when LIBOR was manipulated, a requirement that is not abrogated by Crude Oil II. In support of their motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs have relied on obviously flawed arguments, implausibly suggesting that this Court had forgotten its own opinions and that the requirements that we outlined in those opinions were unclear or inconsistent. But before having put pen to paper — or, as it happens, fingers to keyboard — in this most recent attempt to shift the blame away from themselves for their insufficient pleadings, plaintiffs’ counsel would have done well to consider the words of William Shakespeare: “The fault ... is not in our stars, [b]ut in our-, selves.... ” William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar act 1, sc. 2. The exchange-based plaintiffs’, motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. 2. Motion for Leave to Amend Although their motion for reconsideration must fail, plaintiffs have also made a parallel motion for leave to amend their pleadings to include allegations of trader-based conduct. They claim that they are now able, “under the reasoning of [LIBOR II ], [to] identify specific Eurodollar futures trades on days” when plaintiffs can allege actual damages. Exchange-Based Pis.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Their Mot. for Recons, of the Court’s Aug. 23, 2013 Mem. & Order (“Pis.’ Trader-Based Mem.”) at 4. While the “standard for granting a motion for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule 6.3 is strict,” Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976(NRB), 2012 WL 3686289, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012), “[i]t is settled that the grant of leave to amend the pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(a) is within the discretion of the trial court.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330, 91 S.Ct. 795, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971); see also Gurary v. Winehouse, 235 F.3d 792, 801 (2d Cir.2000) (“A district court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant leave to amend.... ”). Given this broad grant of discretion — as well as the fact that the exchange-based plaintiffs have attempted to plead day-today, trader-based manipulation just once before, after the publication of the Bar-clays settlements — we will evaluate plaintiffs’ latest round of proposed amendments on the merits. See In re Refco Capital Mkts., Ltd. Brokerage Customer Sec. Litig., Nos. 06 Civ. 643(GEL), 07 Civ. 8686(GEL), 07 Civ. 8688(GEL), 2008 WL 4962985, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2008) (finding that “[t]o the extent that plaintiffs’ submissions now fill [the] lacuna” identified by the Court, “it would be shortsighted not to take these developments into account”). As we have maintained throughout this litigation, plaintiffs must plead “(1) that they transacted in Eurodollar futures contracts on days on which Eurodollar futures contract prices were artificial as a result of trader-based manipulation of LIBOR, [and] (2) that their positions were such that they were injured.” LIBOR II, 962 F.Supp.2d at 620-21. We find that finally, after numerous attempts, plaintiffs have met this two-prong test, but their ability to plead trader-based claims is nonetheless subject to significant limitations. First, in light of the content of their most recent submissions, plaintiffs may advance claims against only Barclays and Rabobank. Plaintiffs do not cite a single example from the Rabobank settlements that implicate any other defendant banks. With regard to the Barclays settlements, they reveal only that “Barclays swaps traders communicated with swaps traders at other Contributor Panel banks ... about requesting LIBOR ... contributions that would be favorable to the trading positions of Barclays swaps traders and/or their counterparts at other financial institutions.” Settlement Agreement Between Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div., and Bar-clays (June 26, 2012), Appendix A, ¶ 23; see also id. ¶ 24 (“Barclays swaps traders made requests of traders at other Contributor Panel banks for favorable LIBOR or EURIBOR submissions ... [and] Bar-clays swaps traders received requests from traders at other banks for favorable LIBOR or EURIBOR submissions from Barclays rate submitters.”). These statements provide no basis to impute Bar-clays’s actual conduct to other particular defendants, and there is nothing in the settlement documents that indicate which defendant banks, if any, allegedly submitted manipulated rates along with Barclays. “In situations where multiple defendants are alleged to have committed fraud, the complaint must specifically allege the fraud perpetrated by each defendant, and ‘lumping’ all defendants together fails to satisfy the particularity requirement.” Crude Oil I, 2007 WL 1946553, at *6. The bare allegations against the other defendant banks are therefore insufficiently particular to meet the pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal, and certainly those of Rule 9(b). Thus, plaintiffs may not, at this stage, amend their complaint to include allegations of day-to-day, trader-based manipulation against defendant banks other than Barclays and Rabobank. Second, plaintiffs must do more than merely allege that they transacted on days when Barclays and/or Rabobank attempted to manipulate LIBOR. Although we have stated as much before, it bears repeating: as private actors, plaintiffs have a distinct and more demanding pleading burden than does the government. See LI-BOR I, 935 F.Supp.2d at 739 (“[TJhere are many requirements that private plaintiffs must satisfy, but which government agencies need not.”); LIBOR II, 962 F.Supp.2d at 621 n. 18 (“Whereas a CEA claim brought by the CFTC is focused wholly on defendants’ conduct, such that the injury suffered by individual traders is irrelevant, a CEA claim brought by private plaintiffs pursuant to section 22 is focused both on defendants’ conduct and on whether that conduct caused plaintiffs’ injury.” (emphasis in original)). Thus, it is not enough for plaintiffs to assert that Barclays and Rabo-bank submitted artificial quotes on certain dates; in addition, those quotes must have potentially had an impact on the published LIBOR fix because only then could plaintiffs have plausibly suffered damages. Third, plaintiffs may not include claims for trader-based manipulation that fall outside the January 2005-August 2007 window, as they have repeatedly attempted to do. See, e.g., Pis.’ Trader-Based Reply at 4; Exchange-Based Pis.’ Supplemental Mem: of Law Regarding Rabobank and in Further Supp. of Their Mot. for Recons, of the Court’s Aug. 23, 2013 Mem. & Order (“Pis.’ Rabobank Mem.”) at 6; Tr. of Oral Arg. 10:21-11:16. Even putting aside the statute of limitations bars, see Part IV infra, the scope of the motion for leave to amend was limited to the time period before August 2007. See Pis.’ Sept. 10, 2013 Letter at 1, 3. It would be manifestly unjust and contrary to established practice to allow plaintiffs to “shift the goalposts” and add amendments that fall outside the time period that was the focus of the initial motion. Cf. Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.1993) (“Arguments may not be made for the first time in a reply brief.”). Therefore, plaintiffs may amend their complaint to include claims of trader-based manipulation based only on conduct that allegedly occurred between January 2005 and August 2007. Once we apply the foregoing restrictions to plaintiffs’ proposed amendments, a limited number of examples of day-to-day, trader-based manipulation remain: Direction of Quartile Plaintiff Plaintiff Date Bank Alleged Request Position_Harnted_Position 9/29/05 Barclays_Upward_Upper_Atlantic Trading_Seller 4/7/06 Barclays Downward Lower Atlantic Trading & Buyer _303030 Trading __ 6/30/06 Rabobank_Upward_Interquartile Atlantic Trading_. Seller 8/17/06 Rabobank Downward_Lower_Atlantic Trading ■ Buyer 9/1/06 Rabobank Upward Lower Atlantic Trading & Seller _303030 Trading_ 10/26/06 Barclays_Downward_Lower_Atlantic Trading_Buyer 11/29/06 Rabobank_Upward_Lower_Atlantic Trading_Seller 12/22/06 Barclays_Downward _Lower_Atlantic Trading_Buyer 2/28/07 Barclays_Upward_Upper_Atlantic Trading_Seller 7/30/07 Barclays_Upward_Upper_Atlantic Trading_Seller 8/6/07 Barclays_Upward Upper_Atlantic Trading_Seller As circumscribed, the proposed amend-merits meet the two-prong test articulated by this Court in LIBOR I. First, these examples sufficiently demonstrate that plaintiffs traded on days when LIBOR was impacted by trader-based manipulation. Although plaintiffs cannot be certain that LIBOR was artificial on the aforementioned dates, as Barclays and Rabobank are but two of sixteen submitters on a given day, it is certainly plausible that the published fix deviated from what otherwise would have been “true” LIBOR as a result of those banks’ conduct. Therefore, even if Barclays and Rabobank acted alone, plaintiffs have plausibly pled that their conduct impacted the rate. Second, on each of the dates listed, there is a named plaintiff whose activity in the Eurodollar futures market was such that it was plausibly harmed by the alleged manipulation. As a result, based on the test for actual damages that we have maintained throughout this litigation, the addition of claims for trader-based manipulation that are as particular as the ones enumerated in the chart above would not be futile. We therefore grant plaintiffs leave to add such claims to their complaint. In reaching this conclusion, the Court has considered and rejected defendants’ opposition arguments. For instance, defendants assert that even if Barclays and Rabobank were able to alter LIBOR on a given date based on their individual submissions, the incremental change as a result of the manipulation would have been too small to actually impact the published rate. See Defs.’ Sur-Reply at 6 & n. 11. It is true that the minimum price increment for Eurodollar futures contracts is one quarter of an interest rate basis point, and none of plaintiffs’ examples suggest that Barclays or Rabobank could have manipulated LIBOR one quarter of an interest rate basis point on their own. See id.; Frederick- Sturm, Eurodollar Futures: The Basics at 2 (Sept.2011), available at http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-rates/files/eurodollar-futures-the-basics. pdf. However, we find it plausible that manipulation of less than the Eurodollar futures contract price increment could have impacted the published LIBOR fix, and thus the contract price itself, because of the use of rounding in calculating the LIBOR fix. Thus, even if the magnitude of Barclays’s and Rabobank’s alleged manipulation did not equal the Eurodollar futures contract price increment, plaintiffs may still have experienced a loss due to these defendants’ conduct. Defendants further argue that none of “the hypothetical minuscule changes to LI-BOR” resulting from trader-based conduct could have possibly impacted plaintiffs’ future behavior in such a way as to have resulted in actual damages. Defs.’ Sur-Reply at 7. However, it would be too demanding, at this stage of the litigation, to require plaintiffs to plead all the ways in which an artificial LIBOR on a particular date caused them harm. Instead, it is sufficient for plaintiffs to plead that they were either net purchasers of contracts on days when LIBOR plausibly was suppressed, even by a small amount, or that they were net sellers on days when LI-BOR plausibly was inflated — put simply, plaintiffs may plead that they either paid too much for Eurodollar futures contracts on certain dates or earned too little by selling them.. That is what plaintiffs have done for the dates listed above, and it is why we now find that the possibility that they sustained some actual damages rises “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Accordingly, claims based on plaintiffs’ activity in the Eurodollar futures market that are pled with the level of specificity as those in the chart above would not be ripe for dismissal. Although we have permitted plaintiffs to amend their complaint as specified, they still face many hurdles before recovery; chief among them, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they actually sustained damages as a result of defendants’ improper conduct, a burden that “pose[s] a serious challenge.” LIBOR I, 935 F.Supp.2d at 719. However, with their latest round of briefing, plaintiffs have finally articulated a claim that trader-based manipulation at least plausibly caused them actual injury. Thus, plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint is granted insofar as they may add allegations, comporting with the standards outlined above, of day-to-day, trader-based manipulation against defendants Barclays and Rabobank based on conduct that occurred between January 2005 and August 2007. III. Scienter A. Procedural Background In LIBOR I, we found that the exchange-based plaintiffs “adequately alleged that defendants manipulated the price of Eurodollar contracts and that this manipulation caused [plaintiffs] actual damages.” LIBOR I, 935 F.Supp.2d at 719. To reach this conclusion, we applied the Second Circuit’s four-part test for pleading manipulation under the CEA: a plaintiff must show “(1) that [defendant] had the ability to influence market prices; (2) that [he] specifically intended to do so; (3) that artificial prices existed; and (4) that [defendant] caused the artificial prices.” DiPlacido v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 364 Fed.Appx. 657, 661 (2d Cir.2009) (citation omitted). With regard to the second element — scienter—we determined that “plaintiffs plausibly allege[d] that defendants specifically intended to manipulate the price of Eurodollar futures contracts,” as they were in a position to gain “concrete benefits” from the manipulation. LIBOR I, 935 F.Supp.2d at 715. Further evidence of these potential concrete benefits emerged from the Barclays settlement documents, the contents of which “do not describe merely a generalized interest in appearing profitable, but rather identify concrete economic benefits that defendants stood to gain from manipulating the price of Eurodollar futures contracts.” Id. Thus, based on plaintiffs’ “showing that the defendants had both motive and opportunity” to manipulate the prices of Eurodollar futures contracts, we found that the scienter element of the manipulation test was satisfied. Id. In LIBOR II, defendants moved for reconsideration of our holding that plaintiffs had adequately pled scienter, and the authority that defendants cited “rais[ed] serious questions] regarding whether plaintiffs’ allegations [were]' sufficient.” LIBOR II, 962 F.Supp.2d at 616. In particular, we expressed concerns about plaintiffs’ argument that motive, for scien-ter purposes, could be established at the pleadings stage based on defendants’ holding significant positions in the Eurodollar futures market. Id. at 616-17 (citing In re Commodity Exch., Inc., Silver Futures & Options Trading Litig., No. 11 Md. 2213(RPP), 2012 WL 6700236 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2012) (“Silver Futures /”); Crude Oil I, 2007 WL 1946553). Furthermore, we rearticulated our view that we did not “accept the notion that intentionally submitting false LIBOR quotes is tantamount to intending to manipulate Eurodollar futures contracts,” especially given plaintiffs’ allegations that “one of the primary goals of each defendant in submitting false LIBOR quotes was to protect the market’s perception of that defendant’s financial health.” Id. at 616 n. 8. At that time, we denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration without prejudice because there were issues that had not been adequately briefed. We advised defendants that, if they decided to refile, they should address three questions. First, we asked for more extensive briefing on whether plaintiffs had adequately pled scienter. Id. at 618. At the time, we understood this question to have two sub-parts: (1) whether plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants held positions in the Eurodollar futures market was sufficient to plead scienter, and (2) given the multiple motives that plaintiffs had pled for defendants’ actions in suppressing LIBOR, what burden did plaintiffs bear in pleading that defendants’ actions were actually motivated by a desire to profit in the Eurodollar futures market. Id. at 618 n. 13. Second, assuming that plaintiffs had failed to properly plead scienter, we asked whether plaintiffs’ informational handicaps should have lessened their pleading burden. Id. at 618-19. And third, to the extent that both previous questions were answered in the negative, we sought briefing on whether this analysis should be applicable to all defendants. Id. at 619. Defendants then refiled their motion for reconsideration of the scienter issue on September 20, 2013, and the motion was fully briefed by October 17, 2013. B. Analysis In their complaint, the exchange-based plaintiffs make two sets of allegations against defendants: (1) persistent suppression of LIBOR throughout the Class Period and (2) day-to-day, trader-based manipulation. Both sets of claims are brought pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), which prohibits any person from “manipulating] or attempting] to manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate commerce.” 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2). To state a claim for manipulation under the CEA, a plaintiff must plead that defendants “specifically intended” to cause the artificiality that existed in the relevant market. In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 730 F.3d 170, 183 (2d Cir.2013). This specific intent requirement, also known as scienter, “may be alleged generally,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), though plaintiffs must still allege facts that “give rise to a strong inference of scienter,” In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 612 F.Supp.2d 376, 384 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“Amaranth II”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007)). Plaintiffs may plead scienter “either (a) by alleging facts to show that defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.” Crude Oil I, 2007 WL 1946553, at *8 (quoting Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F.3d 273, 290-91 (2d Cir.2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., No. 12-cv-3419 (GBD), 2014 WL 1280464, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014) (same). The first issue is whether plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants held positions in the Eurodollar futures market are sufficient to plead scienter under either prong. We find that they are not. “[M]arket power by itself is not enough to establish a CEA violation.” In re Commodity Exch., Inc. Silver Futures & Options Trading Litig., 560 Fed.Appx. 84, 86, 2014 WL 1243851, at *2 (2d Cir.2014) (“Silver Futures II”). A theory of scienter that consists of “stating that defendants had a large presence in the [relevant] market” amounts to only “a generalized motive ... [which] is insufficient to show intent.” Crude Oil I, 2007 WL 1946553, at *8. In order to create a strong inference of scien-ter, allegations of market presence must be coupled with pleading “specific actions which exhibited an actual intent to bring about” the manipulation at issue. Silver Futures I, 2012 WL 6700236, at *10, aff'd, Silver Futures II, 560 FedAppx. 84. Thus, plaintiffs’ allegation that defendants held positions in the Eurodollar futures market is not, in and of itself, sufficient to plead the requisite scienter under the CEA. Having found it insufficient to. plead merely that defendants held positions in the Eurodollar futures market, we next ask what burden plaintiffs bear in pleading that defendants’ LIBOR submissions were actually motivated by a desire to profit from Eurodollar futures contracts. For their claim to survive, plaintiffs must plead either: (1) that defendants were motivated by their desire to profit in the Eurodollar futures market and had the opportunity to influence the price of contracts, or (2) that defendants consciously or recklessly manipulated the price of Eurodollar futures contracts through their LIBOR submissions. We first consider whether plaintiffs have sufficiently pled scienter via the motive and opportunity prong. The complexity in applying this theory to the case at bar arises because of plaintiffs’ allegation that all defendants had twd coexisting motives for submitting artificially low LI-BOR figures to the British Bankers’ Association (“BBA”): (1) to protect their reputations and appear financially stable and (2) to profit in the Eurodollar futures market. See Exchange-Based Pis.’ Second Consolidated Am. Compl. (“Exchange-Based SAC”) ¶¶ 73-78. We recognize that plaintiffs are entitled to plead in the alternative or even inconsistently. Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(d)(2)-(3). However, the ability to plead in the alternative does not obviate the need for each of plaintiffs’ motive allegations to be “plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955; see also TechnoMarine SA v. Jacob Time, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 0790(KBF), 2012 WL 2497276, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2012) (“While a plaintiff may assert claims in the alternative, doing so does not relieve it of its burden to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegality for each claim asserted.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., 151 F.Supp.2d 371, 406 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (noting that the ability, to plead in the alternative “cannot be construed as an invitation to incoherent, self-contradictory pleadings”). Put simply, plaintiffs’ dual motive assertions as to all defendants are implausible. Throughout this litigation, the parties have consistently maintained that “defendants were competitors outside the BBA.” LIBOR I, 935 F.Supp.2d at 688; see also LIBOR II, 962 F.Supp.2d at 627 (“[Plaintiffs have identified a market in which defendants are, in fact, competitors.”). With this in mind, it is implausible that all defendants would maintain parallel trading positions in the Eurodollar futures market across the, Class Period and that those positions, in turn, motivated their daily LIBOR submissions. There may be a single defendant, or some subset of defendants, that held trading positions such that a suppressed LIBOR quote both aided its reputation and generated profit for the bank in the Eurodollar futures market. But the notion that all defendants were positioned in such a way as to benefit from the unidirectional movement of LIBOR at all times during the Class Period is belied by the fact that they were competitors. And if defendants held different positions, then it is implausible that their motives regarding the Eurodollar futures market were uniformly aligned. The far “more likely explanation ]” is that, to the extent all defendants engaged in parallel manipulation of LIBOR, the conduct was motivated by reputational concerns, not by the banks’ positions in the Eurodollar futures market. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Thus, plaintiffs have failed to plead specific intent under the motive and opportunity prong. Given the implausibility of plaintiffs’ motive allegations, we now consider whether plaintiffs have adequately pled scienter through the conscious misbehavior or recklessness prong. “Where motive is not apparent, it is still possible to plead scienter by identifying circumstances indicating conscious behavior by the defendant, though the strength of the circumstantial allegations must be correspondingly greater.” Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 142 (2d Cir.2001). To plead scienter based on conscious misbehavior or recklessness, “plaintiffs must allege facts supporting an inference that defendants deliberately or recklessly engaged in illegal conduct ... [or] conduct that is highly unreasonable and ‘an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care ... to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.’” In re BISYS Sec. Litig., 397 F.Supp.2d 430, 441 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (quoting Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 308 (2d Cir.2000)). “Thus, an express allegation of deliberate misconduct can be sufficient to plead scienter.” Amaranth II, 612 F.Supp.2d at 383. In LIBOR II, we rejected plaintiffs’ assertion that they had pled scienter through evidence of defendants’ conscious misbehavior or recklessness. See LIBOR II, 962 F.Supp.2d at 615 n. 7 (finding that plaintiffs did not satisfy the conscious misbehavior or recklessness standard because the “only alleged action of defendants that might qualify as ‘conscious misbehavior or recklessness’ is their alleged submission of artificial LIBOR quotes to the BBA ... [and] merely submitting artificial LIBOR quotes does not by itself indicate an intent to manipulate Eurodollar futures contract prices”). However, upon further reflection, we now reach a different conclusion. First, plaintiffs have more than adequately pled that defendants “consciously misbehaved” by submitting artificial LIBOR quotes to the BBA. See, e.g., Exchange-Based SAC ¶¶ 72-121 (documenting this conduct under the headline “Defendants Misreported LIBOR During The Class Period”). Second, plaintiffs have also pled that the “danger” of submitting artificial LIBOR quotes — the manipulation of the price of Eurodollar futures contracts — was either known to the defendant banks or so obvious that they must have been aware of it. See, e.g., id. ¶ 449 (“Each Defendant well knew, from its financial sophistication and its familiarity with CME Eurodollar futures contracts ... that such contracts traded with reference, and settled to, USD-LIBOR.”). We still find it implausible that all defendants acted with the common motive of profiting off Eurodollar futures contracts, but it is plausible that all defendants, regardless of their positions in the market, manipulated LIBOR for reputational purposes while knowing that such conduct would impact the price of Eurodollar futures. Therefore, we find that plaintiffs have adequately pled scienter based on a conscious misbehavior or recklessness theory. Defendants argue that knowledge is not enough. See Reply Mem. of Law in Further Supp. of Mot. for Recons, of Mar. 29, 2013 Order on Mot. to Dismiss at 4; Tr. of Oral Arg. 63:12-13 (“[M]ere knowledge of an effect is not enough to satisfy the intent requirement.”). We agree that “only intent, not knowledge, can transform a legitimate transaction into manipulation.” Amaranth I, 587 F.Supp.2d at 539 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (emphasis added); see also Silver Futures II, 560 Fed.Appx. at 86-87, 2014 WL 1243851, at *2. Such an intent requirement in that context makes sense: when a defendant’s conduct is potentially legitimate, a plaintiff should have a greater burden in demonstrating that the conduct was actually manipulative. But this case does not concern defendants’ legitimate’ transactions. Because the conduct alleged has no legitimate purpose, plaintiffs need not demonstrate that defendants acted with bad intent to distinguish the complained of conduct from potentially lawful activity. Rather, it may suffice for plaintiffs to allege that defendants knowingly engaged in unquestionably illegitimate conduct while fully comprehending the consequences in the market. See In re Natural Gas Commodity Litig., 358 F.Supp.2d 336, 344-45 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (finding that allegations that defendants knowingly delivered false reports to trade publications were sufficient to state a CEA claim). In sum, plaintiffs have pled that: (1) defendants knew that they were submitting inaccurate LIBOR quotes, (2) defendants understood the impact on Eurodollar futures contract prices from doing so, and (3) there is no conceivably legitimate purpose for submitting inaccurate LIBOR quotes. Taken together, these three factors demonstrate .defendants’ “conscious misbehavior or recklessness.” As a consequence, plaintiffs have pled scienter as to all defendants under the CEA, and defendants’ motion for reconsideration is denied. IY. Statute of Limitations The question of whether some of the exchange-based plaintiffs’ CEA claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations has been an issue since the earliest motions to dismiss, occupying forty pages of our opinion in LIBOR I. To summarize, at the outset, we determined that a “discovery accrual rule” was applicable to claims under the CEA wherein “discovery of the injury, not discovery of the other elements of a claim, is what starts the clock.” Koch v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555, 120 S.Ct. 1075, 145 L.Ed.2d 1047 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying the corollary doctrine of “inquiry notice,” a court must “ask at what point the circumstances were such that they ‘would suggest to [a person] of ordinary intelligence the probability that she has been defrauded.’ ” LIBOR I, 935 F.Supp.2d at 698 (quoting Koch, 699 F.3d at 151). After reviewing the numerous articles which suggested that LIBOR had been at artificial levels since the start of the Class Period, we concluded that the plaintiffs were on inquiry notice no later than May 29, 2008. Utilizing that date and the applicable two-year statute of limitations under the CEA, we divided the Class Period into three segments: (1) the start of the Class Period until the date of inquiry notice, i.e. August 2007 to May 29, 2008 (“Period 1”); (2) the day after inquiry notice was triggered until two years and one day before the complaint was filed, i.e. May 30, 2008 to April 14, 2009 (“Period 2”); and (3) two years before the filing of the complaint through the end of the Class Period, i.e. April 15, 2009 to May 2010 (“Period 3”). We found that claims based on contracts entered into during Period 1 were time barred, having not been brought within two years of inquiry notice, whereas claims based on contracts purchased during Period 3 had been brought within two years of inquiry notice and were therefore timely. Id. at 711-12. As for those claims based on contracts purchased during Period 2, we stated that we could not reach a decision based on the information available to us at that time. Our decision in LIBOR I also rejected exchange-based plaintiffs’ claims that they could have reasonably relied on the reassurances-of the BBA and defendants themselves to dissipate their duty of inquiry, as well as their assertion that the statute of limitations under the CEA should be tolled due to fraudulent concealment. See id. at 705, 709. In LIBOR II, we observed that defendants in their briefs seemed to argue that we should dismiss “persistent suppression” claims based on contracts entered into at times other than Period 1. LIBOR II, 962 F.Supp.2d at 624. Thereafter, we granted defendants’ request for leave to make a renewed motion to dismiss Period 2 claims. That motion, to which we will soon turn, was filed on September 20, 2013. However, before we resolve the motion properly before the Court, we will address plaintiffs’ attempt, without the support of a timely motion, to reargue our decision in LIBOR I on Period 1 claims. Apart from any procedural flaw, of which there are several, plaintiffs’ effort does not approach the substantive standard to sustain a motion to reargue. At the outset, we have no intention of addressing plaintiffs’ recycled arguments that we resolved in LIBOR I. While they claim to have amended their pleading, again without leave, “to include many new allegations related to Period 1,” plaintiffs, in reality, have proffered just three new articles for the Court’s consideration. Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss the Exchange-Based Pis.’ Period 2 CEA Claims (“Pis.’ Period 2 Opp’n”) at 6. These few articles do not change our calculus: despite plaintiffs’ interpretations to the contrary, each of these articles references the ongoing questions about the reliability of LIBOR, and they certainly would not, in the context of the surfeit of publicly available information suggesting LIBOR manipulation during Period 1, have dissipated an ordinary investor’s duty of inquiry. See LIBOR I, 935 F.Supp.2d at 700-04 (reviewing the multitude of articles that triggered inquiry notice during Period 1). There is, however, one aspect of plaintiffs’ memorandum addressed to our decision in LIBOR I that is worthy of further discussion. Apparently not fully appreciating the consequences for their case on the merits, plaintiffs suggest that the articles relied upon by this Court focused only on false LIBOR reports, rather than on manipulated Eurodollar futures contracts prices, and that those articles were therefore insufficient to place plaintiffs on inquiry notice. Pis.’ Period 2 Opp’n at 5 n. 5. However, that the LIBOR fix directly impacts the price of Eurodollar futures contracts is not only a fact, but is also the centerpiece of plaintiffs’ CEA claims. See, e.g., Exchange-Based SAC ¶ 182 (citing evidence that several banks manipulated LIBOR with “the express purpose of manipulating Eurodollar futures”); id. ¶ 271 (“Each Defendant knew that such extensive misreporting [of LIBOR] was manipulating Eurodollar futures contract prices.”). Moreover, plaintiffs’ complaint acknowledges that an ordinary investor would have made a direct connection between LIBOR and the price of k Eurodollar futures contract. See, e.g., id. ¶ 159 (claiming that a change in LIBOR would have communicated information to “the reasonable person of ordinary intelligence who was thinking of investing m Eurodollar futures”). Thus, plaintiffs’ argument that defendants must produce articles that explicitly discuss Eurodollar futures manipulation and not simply possible LIBOR manipulation would, if accepted, undermine the claims asserted in the complaint and is utterly meritless for the purposes of our statute of limitation analysis. In short, “when a court has ruled on an issue, that decision should generally be adhered to by that court in subsequent stages of the same case unless cogent and compelling reasons militate otherwise.” Johnson v. Holder, 564 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1225 (2d Cir.2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the arguments offered by plaintiffs are less than cogent and far from compelling. Having not been persuaded that our decision in LIBOR I was incorrect, we reaffirm our decision that claims brought by plaintiffs based on contracts purchased during Period 1 are time barred under the CEA. We turn now to the motion that is properly before this Court: whether ex- . change-based plaintiffs’ claims arising out of contracts purchased between May 29, 2008 and April 14, 2009 — during Period 2 — are timely. Based on “the totality of the objective evidence,” we find that they are not. Woori Bank v. Merrill Lynch, 923 F.Supp.2d 491, 497 (S.D.N.Y.2013). When we declined to dismiss Period 2 claims in LIBOR I, we assumed that Period 2 investors had not purchased contracts earlier than Period 2 and therefore “may not have had reason to follow LIBOR-related news.” LIBOR I, 935 F.Supp.2d at 712. However, there is now some dispute as to whether there are actually any plaintiffs who purchased Eurodollar futures contracts during Period 2 who had not previously transacted during Period 1. Defendants maintain that “all named Plaintiffs traded during Periods 1 and 2, and were thus on inquiry notice as of May 29, 2008.” Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ Renewed Mot. to Dismiss the Exchange-Based Pis.’ Period 2 CEA Claims at 9. Defendants are correct that our analysis must hinge on whether there exists a named plaintiff, not merely a hypothetical or an unnamed plaintiff, that first transacted during Period 2. See In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 117, 122-23 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“If the named plaintiffs have no cause of action in their own right, their complaint must be dismissed, even though the facts set forth in the complaint may show that others might have a valid claim.”) (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs counter that “several individual funds, which assigned their claims to [named] Plaintiff Metzler, only transacted in Eurodollar futures contracts after May 2008.” Pis.’ Period 2 Opp’n at 22; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 29:3-15. We need not resolve the factual question of whether there are, in fact, any named plaintiffs who first transacted during Period 2 since, in any event, all claims based on contracts purchased during Period 2 would be time barred. We address first those plaintiffs who purchased Eurodollar futures contracts in Period 2 after also having done so during Period 1. We begin with the proposition that it would be nonsensical to assume that the minds of Period 1 purchasers — who were on inquiry notice — were wiped clean and became blank slates before they transacted against during Period 2. See Shah v. Meeker, 435 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir.2006) (finding that it was unreasonable for a plaintiff to rely on the price of stock after he was already on inquiry notice of the company’s fraudulent practices). Thus, for their claims to survive, plaintiffs who purchased contracts in Period 1 have the burden of demonstrating that their duty to inquire dissipated; defendants are not required to prove that the information made public during Period. 2 reached some critical mass to create inquiry notice anew. To determine whether plaintiffs’ duty to inquire dissipated during Period 2, we examine (1) the significance of the disclosed problems, (2) how likely it is that those problems are of a recurring nature, and (3) how substantial are the reassurances announced to avoid their recurrence. LC Capital Partners, LP v. Frontier Ins. Grp., Inc., 318 F.3d 148, 155 (2d Cir.2003). Each of these prongs supports the conclusion that inquiry notice did not dissipate. First, there is no question that the alleged problems were significant: as plaintiffs themselves plead in their complaint, “given the vast universe of financial instruments LIBOR impacts, ‘even a small manipulation’ of the rate ‘could potentially distort capital allocations all over the world.’ ” Exchange-Based SAC ¶ 12 (quoting Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & Albert D. Metz, How Far Can Screens Go in Distinguishing Explicit from Tacit Collusion ? New Evidence from the Libor Setting, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, March 2012). Second, hs illustrated below, much of the information published during Period 2 suggested the problems with LIBOR that had emerged during Period 1 would likely be “of a recurring nature” because financial authorities were doing very little to prevent the continued manipulation of the rate: _Author_Title _Publication_Date_ Michael Mackenzie “Libor Remarks Fail to Put Financial Times June 2, 2008 & Gillian Tett_Unease to Rest”_ Gavin Finch & Ben “Libor Overhaul May Fail Bloomberg June 11, 2008 Livesey to Restore Confidence in _Rate”__ Laurence Norman “Changes to Libor Reject- Wall Street Jour- August 6, 2008 ed — U.K. Bankers Group nal Sticks to Definition of Rate _Benchmark” _ Justin T. Wong LIBOR Left in Limbo; A North Carolina February 22, 2009 Call for More Reform Banking Institute Third, to the extent that there were any reassurances, they were not substantial enough to assuage the concerns of an ordinary investor. In addition to the aforementioned articles, all of which criticized the inaction of the BBA in addressing the potential ongoing manipulation of LIBOR, other articles expressed serious doubts that the calculation of the rate was going to change in a significant way: _Author_Title_Publication_Date_ Carrick “British Group Largely Wall Street May 31, 2008 Mollenkamp & Maintains Libor Journal Laurence Norman_Procedures”_ Adam Bradbery “Libor Revamp Is Urged Wall Street July. 11,2008 _by Money-Market Group”_Journal_ Laurence Norman “2nd UPDATE: BBA Re- Dow Jones August 5,2008 & Deborah Lynn jects Key Proposals For International Blumberg_Libor Process Change”News Despite the existence of these articles, plaintiffs argue that inquiry notice dissipated due to “the BBA’s numerous, specific protestations of innocence” and defendants’ “own statements of reassurance.” Pis.’ Period 2 Opp’n at 14-15. This argument is unavailing. The popular press during Period 2 recognized that these reassurances rang hollow in light of the BBA’s continued failure to implement meaningful changes to the management of LIBOR, and there is no reason to believe that a reasonable investor during Period 2 would have given the statements any credence. Plaintiffs’ sel