Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION (October 30, 2017) COLLEEN KÓLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge . On July 26, 2017, President Donald, J. Trump,issued a statement via Twitter announcing that “the United States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.” A formal, Presidential Memorandum followed on August 25, 2.017. Before the Presidential Memorandum, the Department- of Defense had announced that openly transgender individuals would be allowed to enlist in the military, effective January 1, 2018, and had prohibited the discharge of service members based solely on their gender identities. The Presidential Memorandum reversed these policies. First, the Memorandum indefinitely extends a prohibition against transgender individuals entering the military, a process formally referred to as “accession” (the “Accession Directive”). Second, the Memorandum requires the military to authorize, by no later than March 23, 2018, the discharge of' transgender service members (the “Retention Directive”). The Department of Defense is required to submit a plan implementing the directives of the Presidential Memorandum by February 21, 2018. On September' 14, 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis promulgated Interim Guidance establishing Department of Defense policy toward transgender service members until the directives of the Presidential Memorandum take effect. Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum and the Interim Guidance, the protections afforded to transgender service members against dischargé lapse early next year. Plaintiffs are current and aspiring service members who aré transgender. Many have years of experience in the military. Some have decades. They have been deployed on active duty in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have and continue to serve .with distinction. All fear that the directives of the Presidential Memorandum will have devastating impacts on their careers and their families. They have moved the Court to enjoin the directives of the Presidential Memorandum, believing that these' directives violate the fundamental guarantees of due process afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the United States'Constitution. Defendants have moved to dismiss this case, principally on the basis that the Court lacks jurisdiction. Although highly technical, these jurisdictional arguments reduce to a few simple points: the Presidential Memorandum has not effected a definitive change in military policy; rather, that policy is still subject to review; until that review is complete, transgender service members are protected; and any prospective injuries are too speculative to require judicial intervention. These arguments, while perhaps compelling in the abstract, wither away under scrutiny. The Memorandum unequivocally directs the military to prohibit indefinitely the accession of transgender individuals and to authorize their discharge. This decision has already been made. These directives must be executed by a date certain, and there is no reason to believe that they will not be executed. Plaintiffs have established that they will be injured by these directives,- due both' to the inherent inequality they impose, and the risk of discharge and denial of accession that they engender. Further delay would only' serve to harm the Plaintiffs. Given these circumstances, the Court is in a position to preliminarily adjudicate the propriety of these directives, and it does so here. The Court holds that Plaintiffs are likely to' succeed on their Fifth Amendment claim. As a form of government action that classifies people based on their gender identity, and disfavors a class of historically persecuted and politically powerless individuals, the President’s directives are subject to a fairly searching form of scrutiny. Plaintiffs claim that the President’s directives cannot survive such; scrutiny because they are not genuinely based on legitimate concerns regarding military effectiveness or budget constraints, but are instead driven by a desire to express disapproval of transgender people generally. The Court finds that a number of factors— including the sheer breadth of the exclusion ordered by the directives, the unusual circumstances surrounding the President’s announcement of them, the fact that the reasons given for them do not appear to be supported by any facts, and the recent rejection of those reasons by the military itself—strongly suggest that Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim is meritorious. Accordingly, following an exhaustive review of the record, the pleadings, and the relevant authorities, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Defendants shall be preliminarily enjoined from enforcing the Accession and Retention Directives, corresponding with sections 1(b) and 2(a) of the Presidential Memorandum, until further order of the Court or until this case is resolved. The effect of the Court’s Order is to revert to the status quo with regard to accession and retention that existed before the issuance of the Presidential Memorandum— that is, the retention and accession policies established in a June 30, 2016 Directive-type Memorandum and later modified by Secretary of Defense James Mattis on June 30,2017; The Court also GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The Court has jurisdiction over and reaches the merits of Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim as it pertains to the Accession and Retention Directives. Plaintiffs have also challenged the Presidential Memorandum’s prohibition against the expenditure of military resources on sex reassignment surgeries. Because no Plaintiff has established a likelihood of being impacted by that prohibition, the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the propriety of this directive. Finally, Plaintiffs have also claimed relief under a theory of estop-pel. At this time, that claim will be dismissed without prejudice because the Amended Complaint lacks allegations of the sort of particularized representations, reliance, or government misconduct that could justify estoppel against the government. Plaintiffs may file a further amended complaint with respect to estoppel. I. BACKGROUND A. The Military’s Policy Toward Transgender Service 1. Military Policy Prior to 2014 Accession , Prior to 2014, Department of Defense Instruction (“DODI”) 6130.03 “contain[ed] a list of disqualifying physical and mental conditions that preclude[d] applicants from joining the military ....” Lamb Deck, Ex. B (Palm Center Report of the Transgender Service Commission), at 7. Disqualifying conditions included “defects of the genitalia including but not limited to change of sex,” and “[cjurrent or history of psycho-sexual conditions, including but not limited to transsexualism, ... .transvestism, .,. and other paraphilias.” Id.; see also Defs.’ Mem. at 4 (“For decades, [disqualifying] conditions [under DODI 6130.03] have included ‘transsexualism.’ ”). DODI 6130.03 also requires that the “Secretaries of the Military Departments and Commandant of the Coast Guard shall ... [authorize the waiver of the standards in individual cases for applicable reasons and ensúre uniform waiver determinations.” Lamb Decl., Ex. B, at 7. Service-specific implementing rules set forth the waiver process for each branch of the military. For example, under the applicable Army regulations, “[e]xaminees initially reported as medically unacceptable by reason of medical unfitness ,.. may request a waiver of the medical fitness standards in accordance with the basic administrative directive governing the personnel action.” Army Reg. 40-501 (Standards of Medical Fitness), ¶ 1—6(b); see also Lamb Decl., Ex. B, at 7. Although Defendants contend that transgender-related conditions were and remain subject to waiver, see Defs.’ Mem. at 4, evidence in the record suggests otherwise. At least under the pertinent regulations as they existed prior to 2014, “because some conditions related to transgender identity [were] grounds for discharge, and because recruiters [could not] waive a condition- upon enlistment that would be disqualifying for retention, transgender individuals [could not] obtain medical waivers for entrance into the military.” Lamb Decl., Ex. B, at 8. A March 2014 report was unable to find “any instances in which transgender-related conditions have been waived for accession[,]” id., and Defendants have adduced no ■ evidence of waivers ever being- granted for this purpose. ■ ■■ Retention ‘ Pertinent regulations prior to 2014 also appear to have provided military commanders with discretion to separate enlisted personnel for transgender-related conditions. In particular, DODI 1332.14, which “controls administrative separations for enlisted persons,” provided that a “service member may be separated for the convenience of the government and at the discretion of a commander for ‘other designated physical or mental conditions/ á category defined to include ‘sexual gender and identity disorders.’ ” Lamb Decl., Ex, B, at 8. Furthermore, DODI 1332.38, “which contains rules for retiring or separating service members because of physical disability” provided that “service members with conditions ‘not constituting a physical disability ... can be separated administratively from military service at a commander’s discretion, without the opportunity to demonstrate medical fitness for duty or eligibility for disability compensation.” Id. This category of conditions, under prior iterations of the instruction, included “Sexual Gender and Identity Disorders, including Sexual Dysfunctions and Paraphilias.” Id. 2. August 2014 Regulation and July 28, 2015 Memorandum At least -with respect to retention, changes to this regulatory scheme were first enacted in August 2014, when “the Department of Defense issued a new regulation, DODI 1332.18, Disability Evaluation System (DES).” Fanning Decl. ¶ 12. According to Former Secretary of the Army Eric K. Fanning and Former Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James, the new regulation > eliminated a DoD-wide list of conditions that would disqualify persons from retention in -military service, including the categorical ban on open service by transgender persons. This new regulation instructed each branch of the Armed Forces to reassess whether disqualification based on these conditions, including the ban on service, by transgender persons, was justified. As of August 20U, there was no longer a DoD-wide position on whether transgender persons should be disqualified for retention. Id. (emphasis added); James Decl, ¶ 8.. Subsequently, on July 28, 2015, then-Secretary of Defensé Ash Carter issued a memorandum to the secretaries of the military departments directing that “[effective as of July 13, 2015, no Service member shall be. involuntarily separated or denied reenlistment or continuation of active or reserve service on the basis of their gender identity, without the personal approval of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.” Carson Decl,, Ex. A. The memorandum further ordered the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to “chair a working group composed of senior representatives from each of the Military Departments, Joint Staff, and relevant components from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to formulate policy options for the DoD regarding the military service of transgender Service members.” Id. 3. The Working Group and the RAND Report The working group convened by the Undersecretary (“the Working Group”)'consisted of senior uniformed officers and sén-ior civilian officers from each department of the military. Carson Decl. ¶9. The Working Group sought to identify any possible issues related to open military service of transgender individuals. Id. ¶ 22. It considered a broad range of information provided by senior military personnel, various types of experts, health insurance companies, civilian employers, transgender service members themselves, and representatives from the militaries of other nations who allow open service by transgender people. Id. ¶ 10. Finally, the Working Group commissioned the RAND Corporation’s National Defense Research Institute to conduct a study-on the impact of permitting transgender service members to serve openly. Id. ¶ 11. RAND is a nonprofit research institution that provides research and analysis to the Armed Services. Id. ■ The RAND Corporation subsequently issued a 91-page report entitled “Assessing the Implications-of Allowing Transgender Personnel to Serve Openly.” Carson Deck, Ex. B (“RAND Report”). The RAND Report found no evidence that allowing transgender individuals to serve would have any effect on “unit cohesion,” and concluded that any related costs or impacts on readiness would be “exceedingly small,” “marginal” or “negligible.” Id. at xi-xii, 39-47, 69-70. The RAND Report also found that “[i]n no case” where foreign militaries have allowed transgendér individuals' to serve “was there any evidence of an effect on the operational effectiveness, operational readiness, or cohesion of the force.” Id. at xiii. Based on all of the information it collected, the Working Group unanimously concluded that transgender people should be allowed to serve openly in the military. Not only did the group conclude that allowing transgender people to serve would not significantly affect military readiness or costs, it found that prohibiting transgender people from serving undermines military effectiveness and readiness because it excludes qualified individuals on a basis that has no relevance to one’s fitness to serve, and creates unexpected vacancies requiring expensive and time-consuming recruitment and training of replacements. The Working Group communicated its conclusion to the Secretary of Defense, along with detailed recommendations for policies and procedures for open transgender service. 4. June 30, 2016 Directive-Type Memorandum 16-005 On June 30, 2016, the Secretary of Defense Ash Garter issued a Directive-type Memorandum (“DTM”) establishing a policy, assigning responsibilities, and prescribing procedures for “the retention, accession, separation, in-service transition and medical coverage for transgender personnel serving in the Military Services.” James Deck, Ex. B, at 1. The DTM took effect immediately. Id. In the DTM, the Secretary of Defense stated his conclusion that open service by transgender Americans was “consistent with military readiness and with strength through diversity.” Id. at 2. Accordingly, the DTM stated that it was the policy of the Department of Defense that “service in the United States military should be open to all who can meet the rigorous standards for military service and readiness” and that, “consistent with the policies and procedures set forth in [the DTM], transgender individuals shall be allowed to serve in the military.” Id. Retention The DTM set forth procedures for the retention and accession of transgender military service members. It stated that “[e]ffective immediately, no otherwise qualified Service member may be involuntarily separated, discharged or denied reenlistment or continuation of service, solely on the basis of their gender identity,” or on their “expressed intent to transition genders.” James Deck, Ex. B, Attach. (Procedures), at 1. The DTM stated that “Transgender Service members will be subject to the same standards as any other Service member of the same gender; they may be separated, discharged, or denied reenlistment or continuation of service under existing processes and basis, but not due solely to their gender identity or an expressed intent to transition genders.” Id. Accession With respect to accession procedures, the DTM stated that by no later than July 1, 2017, DODI 6130.03 would be updated to allow for the accession of (i) individuals with gender dysphoria, (ii) individuals that have received medical treatment for gender transition, and (iii) individuals that have undergone sex reassignment surgeries. Id. at 1-2. The policies and procedures generally provided that these conditions would be disqualifying unless the acceding service member was medically stable in their chosen gender for at least 18 months. Id. The DTM also provided that, effective October 1, 2016, the Department of Defense would “implement a construct by which transgender Service members may transition gender while, serving.” Id. at 2. Equal Opportunity Finally, the DTM stated that it is “the Department’s position, consistent with the U.S. Attorney General’s opinion, that discrimination based on gender identity is a form of sex discrimination.” Id. at 2. 5. June 30, 2016 Remarks by Secretary, of Defense Ash Carter On June 30, 2016, then-Secretary of Defense Ash Carter announced from the Pentagon briefing room that “we are ending the ban on transgender Americans in the United States military.” Lamb Dec!., Ex. F. He stated that “[e]ffective immediately, transgender Americans may serve openly, and they can no longer be discharged or otherwise separated from the military just for being transgender.” Id. Secretary Carter also announced that he had “directed that the gender identity of an otherwise qualified individual will not bar them from military service, or from any accession program.” Id. The Secretary stated that on June 30, 2017, after a year-long implementation period, “the military services will begin acceding transgender individuals who meet all standards—holding them to the same physical and mental fitness standards as everyone else who wants to join the military.” Id. ' Secretary Carter gave three reasons for the Department’s decision. First, he stated that “the Defense Department and the military need to avail ourselvé's of all talent possible in order to remain what we are now—the finest fighting force the world has ever known.” Id. He added that “[w]e invest hundreds of thousands of dollars to train and develop each individual, and we want to take the opportunity to retain people whose talent we’ve invested in and who have proven themselves.” Id. Second, he stated that “the reality is that we have transgender service members serving in uniform today,”, and they and their commanders need “clearer and more consistent guidance than is provided by current policies.” Id. And third, he stated that, as a matter of principle, “Americans who want to serve and can meet our standards should be afforded the opportunity to come to do so.” Id. 6. September 30, 2016 Publication of “Transgender Service in the U.S. Military: An Implementation Handbook” and Military Department Policies Consistent with the directives of Secretary Carter in his July 2016 memorandum and June 2016 memorandum and policy announcement, Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Peter Levine published an “implementation handbook” entitled “Transgender Service in the U.S. Military.” Mabus Deck, Ex. F; see also James Decl,, Ex. D. The document was “the product of broad collaboration among the Services” and was intended to serve as a “practical day-to-day guide” to assist Service members and commanders to understand and implement the policy of open transgender military service. James Deck, ¶ 34. The handbook is a lengthy, exhaustive document, providing an explanation of the basics of what it means to be transgender and to undergo gender transition; guidance on how transgender service members can request an in-service transition and communicate with their leadership about their transition process; and guidance for commanders interacting with transgender service members. It also includes extensive question-and-answer and hypothetical scenario sections, as well as a “roadmap” for gender transition for military personnel. Individual implementing memoranda were subsequently issued by the' branches of the Armed Forces. On November 4, 2016, the Secretary of the Navy issued SECNAV Instruction 1000.11, the stated purpose of which was to “establish Department of Navy ... policy for the accession and service of transgender Sailors and Marines, to include the process for transgeh-der Service Members to transition gender in-service.” Mabus Decl., Ex. D, at 1; The memorandum stated that “transgender individual shall be allowed to serve openly in the [Department of the Navy].” Id. at 2. The Air Force issued a Policy Memorandum on October 6, 2016, which stated that “[i]t is Air Force policy that service in the United States Air Force should be open to all who can meet the rigorous standards for military service and readiness. Consistent with the policies set forth in this memorandum, transgender individuals shall be allowed to serve in the Air Force.” James Decl., Ex. C, The Army issued Directive 2016-30 (Army Policy on Military Service of Transgender Soldiers) on July 1, 2016. Fanning Decl., Ex. D. The Directive stated' that it is Army policy to allow open service by transgender Soldiers.- The Army is open to all who- can meet the standards for military service and remains committed to treating all Soldiers with dignity and respect while ensuring good order and discipline. Transgender Soldiers will be subject to the same standards as any other Soldier of the same gender. An otherwise qualified Soldier shall not be involuntarily separated, discharged, or -denied reenlistment or continuation of service solely on the basis of gender identity. Id. at 1. Army Directive 2016-35 was promulgated on October 7, 2016. Fanning Decl., Ex. E. It stated that “The Army allows transgender Soldiers to serve openly.” Id. at 1. 7. June 30, 2017 Press Release by Secretary James Mattis On June 30, 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis deferred acceding transgender applicants into the military until January 1, 2018, stating that the “services will review their accession plans and provide input on the impact to the readiness and lethality of our forces.” Lamb Decl., Ex. C. 8. July 26, 2017 Statement by President Donald J. Trump On July 26, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued a statement via Twitter,,in which he announced that . . 9. August 25, 2017 Presidential Memorandum On August 25, 2017, President Trump issued a memorandum entitled “Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security.” Lamb Decl., Ex. A (the “Presidential Memorandum”). The memorandum begins by stating that until “June 2016, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (collectively, the Departments) generally prohibited openly transgender individuals from accession into the United States military and authorized the discharge of such individuals.” Presidential Memorandum § 1(a). According to the memorandum, “[s]hortly before President Obama left office, ... his Administration dismantled the Departments’ established framework by permitting transgender individuals to serve openly in the military, authorizing the use of the Departments’ resources to fund sex-reassignment surgical procedures, and permitting accession of such individuals after July 1, 2017.” Id. The President stated that “the previous Administration failed to identify a sufficient basis to conclude that terminating the Departments’ longstanding policy and practice would not hinder military effectiveness and lethality, disrupt unit cohesion, or tax military resources, and there remain meaningful concerns that further study is needed to ensure that continued implementation of last year’s policy change would not have tliose negative effects.” Id. The memorandum has two operative sections, one general, and the other more specific. Section 1(b) directs “the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to the U.S. Coast Guard, to return to the longstanding policy and practice on military service by transgender individuals that was in place prior to June 2016 until such time as a sufficient basis exists upon which to conclude that terminating that policy and practice would not have the negative effects discussed above.” Id. § 1(b). As already stated, the memorandum defines the pre-June 2016 policy as one under which the military “generally prohibited openly transgender individuals from accession into the United States military and authorized the discharge of such individuals.” Id. § 1(a). The directive set forth in section 1(b) takes effect on March 23, 2018. Id. § 3. The memorandum provides that the “Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the Secretary of Homeland Security, may advise [the President] at any time, in writing, that a change to this policy is warranted.” Id. § 1(b). Section 2 contains two specific directives to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security. First, section 2(a) directs the Secretaries to “maintain the currently effective policy regarding accession of transgender individuals into military service beyond January 1, 2018, until such time as the Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the Secretary of Homeland Security, provides a recommendation to the contrary that [the President finds] convincing .... ” Id. § 2(a). This section takes effect on January 1, 2018, Id. Second, section 2(b) directs the Secretaries to “halt all use of DoD or DHS resources to fund sex reassignment surgical procedures for military personnel, except to the extent necessary to protect the health of an individual who has already begun a course of treatment to reassign his or her sex.” Id. § 2(b). This section, like section 1(b), takes effect on March 23, 2018. Id § 3. By February 21, 2018, the Secretaries must submit a plan to the President “for implementing both the general policy set forth in section 1(b) of this memorandum and the specific directives set forth in section 2 of this memorandum.” Id. § 3. This implementation plan must “determine how to address transgender individuals currently serving in the United States military.” Id. Until that determination is made—and it must be made as part of the implementation plan, which must be submitted by February 21, 2018—“no action may be taken against such individuals under the policy set forth in section 1(b) of this memorandum.” Id. That is, only after February 21, 2018, may the Secretaries take actions toward reverting to the pre-June 2016 policy, which by the terms of the memorandum is a policy under which the military “generally prohibited openly transgender individuals from accession into the United States military and authorized the discharge of such individuals.” Id. § 1(a). Retention Directive In sum, by March 23, 2018, the Secretaries are required by the plain text of the President’s directive to revert to a policy under which the military “authorized the discharge of [transgender] individuals.” Id. §§ 1(a), 1(b), 3. The protections of the memorandum with respect to discharge and other adverse action expire on February 21, 2018. Id. § 3. Accession Directive With respect to accession, the memorandum indefinitely delays the implementation of the accession policy of the June 2016 DTM, which was previously set for implementation on January 1, 2018, and by March 23, 2018, requires the Secretaries to revert to a policy by which the military “generally prohibit[s] openly transgender individuals from accession .... ” Id. §§ 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), 3. 10. August 29, 2017 Statement by Secretary Mattis On August 29, 2017, Secretary Mattis issued a statement concerning the Presidential Memorandum. Lamb Deck, Ex. D. He wrote that “[t]he [Department of Defense] will carry out the president’s policy direction, in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security,” and that “[a]s directed,” the Department of Defense will “develop a study and implementation plan, which will contain the steps that will promote military readiness, lethality, and unit cohesion, with due regard to budgetary. constraints and consistent with applicable law.”. Id. The plan, Secretary Mattis wrote, “will address accessions of transgender individuals and transgender individuals currently serving in the United States military.” Id. Secretary Mattis stated that he would “establish a panel of experts serving within the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to provide advice and recommendations on the implementation of the president’s direction.” Id. After the “panel reports its recommendations and following ... consultation with the secretary of Homeland Security,” Secretary Mattis “will provide [his] advice to the president concerning implementation of his policy direction.” Id. In the interim, “current policy with respect to currently serving members will remain in place.” Id. 11. September 14, 2017 Interim Guidance On September 14, 2017, Secretary Mat-tis issued interim guidance that took “effect immediately and will remain in effect until [he] promulgate^] DoD’s final policy in this matter.” Defs.’ Mem., EOF No. -45, Ex. 1 (“Interim Guidance”). The Interim Guidance states that “[n]ot iater than February 21, 2018, [Secretary Mattis] will present the President with a plan to implement the policy and directives in the Presidential Memorandum.” Id. at 1. The “implementation plan will establish the policy, standards and procedures for transgender individuals serving in the military.” Id. Accession With respect to accession, the Interim Guidance -provides that the procedures previously set forth in a 2010 policy instruction, “which generally prohibit the accession of transgender individuals into the Military Services, remain in effect .... ” Id. at 2. Medical Care and Treatment With respect to medical care and treatment, the Interim Guidance provides that “[s]ervice members who receive a gender dysphoria diagnosis from a military medical provider will be provided treatment for the diagnosed medical condition,” but that “no new sex reassignment surgical procedures for military personnel will be permitted after March 22, 2018, except to the extent necessary to protect the health of an individual who has already begun a course of treatment to reassign his or her sex.” Id. Retention With respect to the separation or retention of transgender service members, the Interim Guidance provides that “[a]n otherwise qualified transgender Service member whose term of service expires while this Interim Guidance remains in effect, may, at the Service member’s request, -be re-enlisted in service under existing procedures.” Id. (emphasis in original). Finally, the Interim Guidance states that “[a]s directed by the [Presidential] Memorandum, no action may be taken to involuntarily separate or discharge an otherwise qualified Service member solely on the basis of a gender dysphoria diagnosis or transgender status.” Id. B. The Plaintiffs 1. Jane Doe 1 Plaintiff Jane Doe 1 has served in the Coast Guard since 2003. Looney Deck, Ex. A (“Redacted Jane Doe 1 Deck”), ¶ 1. Jane Doe 1 is transgender. The Coast Guard has made a substantial investment in educating and training Jane Doe 1, and she has done her “best to - be hardworking, faithful, and loyal to the Coast Guard!” Id. ¶ 11. She is married and is the primary wage earner for her family. She and her spouse receive health insurance coverage, called TRICARE, based on her enlisted status. Id. ¶12. When she came to the realization of her transgender identity, Jane Doe 1, with her spouse’s support, sought professional help. Id. ¶ 14. She paid for this help herself, fearing that' she may be separated from the Coast Guard if she went through military health channels. Id. She was diagnosed with gender dysphoria and has received medical treatment for this condition. Id. ¶15. However, because TRICARE does not provide comprehensive gender transition healthcare, following the issuance of the June 2016 DTM, she was required to obtain waivers from the Defense Health Agency to. obtain treatment. Because this process often led to delays, Jane Doe 1 has continued to pay for her care herself, including surgical care. Id. ¶ 21. Following the President’s statement regarding transgender service members, issued via Twitter, Commandant of the Coast Guard Paul F. Zukunft stated, with respect to transgender service members, that “[w]e have made an investment in you and you have made an investment in the Coast Guard and I will not break faith.” Id. ¶ 23. . According to Jane Doe 1, the Presidential Memorandum has disrupted her medical care, and has had “serious consequences for [her] financial future.” Id. ¶¶ 29-30. For one, separation from the Coast Guard would mean loss of substantial pension benefits, and health insurance for her and her family. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. Separation also means the loss of “a central part of [her] identity.”. Id. ¶ 36. In her own words: “As much as the Coast Guard has invested in me, I have invested in the Coast Guard. I love serving, ... I had expected to continue serving as a Coast Guard officer for many years.” Id. 2. Jane Doe 2 Jane Doe 2 joined the Army National Guard in 2003, when she was 17. Looney Deck, Ex. B (“Redacted Jane Doe 2 Decl.”), ¶ 3. She met her wife while serving, who soon became pregnant. Jane Doe 2 then “made-the decision to go on active duty with the U.S. Army so [she] could obtain health care benefits to support [her] growing family.” Id. ¶5. She now has three children. Id. While on active duty, she served in South Korea and was deployed to Kandahar in Afghanistan. Id. ¶ 7. During active duty, Jane Doe 2 came out to her wife as transgender. Id. ¶ 9. She felt more connected to her wife and she stopped drinking. Id. After the Department of Defense promulgated new regulations in late 2015, she made a public post on Facebook stating that she was transgender. Redacted Jane Doe 2 Deck ¶10. Her company commander was very supportive. Id. ¶ 11. She began to see an Army therapist, and following the June 2016 DTM, she obtained a formal gender dysphoria diagnosis which permitted her to receive transition treatment from military healthcare providers, and' she began receiving hormone treatment. Id. ¶ 13. Following the President’s statement and the Presidential Memorandum, Jane Doe 2 believes that she has received an unfavorable work detail to keep her “separated from the rest of [her] unit because [she is] transgender and because of the President’s ban, as [she] never had any problems with this kind of treatment in [her] old unit' and [does] not know of any other reason [why] she would be treated this way.” Id. ¶ 15, She also fears the loss of retirement benefits, which accrue following 20 years of service, and access to “health care services for [her] family on base.” Id. ¶ 16. She has already accrued 12 to 13 years of service toward these benefits. Id. ¶¶16, 18. The directives of the Presidential Memorandum have “left [her] feeling excluded, and it hurts [her] that people like [her] are being singled out and told that [they] aren’t good enough to serve oui country based on a characteristic that has no relevance at all to our abilities or fitness to serve.” Id. ¶ 19. Jane Doe 2 “loves this country and [has] served it faithfully and well.” Id.. For her, to “be told that [she is] no longer worthy to serve is a terrible blow. It affects how [she sees herself] .... ” Id. “All [she wants] is to be allowed to serve [her] country and to be evaluated based on [her] job performance rather than on [her] status as a transgender person.” Id. ¶ 20, 3. Jane Doe 3 Jane Doe 3 serves in the Army. After completing her basic training, she was deployed to Afghanistan for six months. Looney Decl., Ex. C (“Redacted Jane Doe 3 Deck”), ¶4. She is currently scheduled to deploy again to Iraq, where she will be going as a team leader, with soldiers reporting to her. Id. ¶ 6. Jane Doe 3 has received a gender dys-phoria diagnosis from an Army therapist. Id. ¶ 7. Although she has developed a transition plan in coordination with medical professionals, she has not begun any pf the treatment steps, which include surgery. Id. ¶ 9. "■ '' Before the President’s statement regarding transgender individuals, Jane Doe 3 “had not come out to anyone in [her] chain of command.” Id. ¶ 10. However, after the statement, she had a conversation with her company - commander, believing that she would receive support based on the June 2016 DTM. Id. She told her company commander that she was worried that she would not be deployed, and that she was committed to .being deployed. Id. The commander was not supportive— expressing shock and surprise—but she has received support from her squad leader, the platoon sergeant, and another friend in her unit. Id. ¶11. Since that conversation; she has continued to prepare for deployment, with the understanding that she will not be able to begin her treatment until she returns. Id. ¶ 12. In her words, she “will not put [her] personal needs ahead of the needs of the mission and [her] fellow soldiers.” Id. Jane Doe 3 has “not told anyone else at [her] rank or below .that [she] is transgender.” Id. ¶ 16. As a result, she “was able to hear an unfiltered reaction to the President’s announcement right after he tweeted it.” Id. “Some made ugly remarks about transgender service members, while others remarked [that] people who kill transgender people should not be punished.” Id. According to Jane Doe 3, after “the tweets, people seemed emboldened to express hostility to transgender people.” Id. ¶ 16. 4. Jane Doe 4 Jane Doe 4 serves in the Army National Guard, but wap previously on active duty with the Army. After basic training, she served in South Korea, and subsequently served a tour in Iraq after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Looney Deck, Ex. D (“Redacted Jane Doe 4 Deck”), ¶¶ 6-6. After she returned from Iraq, Jane Doe 4 enlisted in the Army National Guard, and then joined the Active Guard Reserve. Id. ¶ 7. In that capacity, she has been employed as a specialist by the Department of Defense. Id. ¶ 10. Following the June 2016 DTM, Jane Doe. 4 decided to come out as transgender to her chain of command. Id. ¶ 13. She first spoke to the senior- non-commissioned officer of her unit, who said she supported her decision “100%.” She then spoke with her commanding officer, a Major, “who acknowledged that he was not very knowledgeable about the experiences of transgender people, but told [her] that he and the rest of [her] unit would support and work with [her] through the process .... ” Id. According to Jane Doe 4, the “change in policy allowing transgender soldiers to serve openly ... changed [her] life in the military.” Id. ¶ 14. Her “fellow soldiers in [her] unit and [her] senior leaders ... told [her] that they ... noticed how much happier [she was].” Id. The President’s statement regarding transgender service members has been “devastating” to her, making her feel “ashamed” and “deeply saddened that he was ordering the Army, which [she] had been a part of for so long and which [she] loved so much, to stop treating [her] with respect.” Id. ¶ 15. She “went to work each day wondering whether [she] would be discharged, not because of any problem with [her] job performance or [her] commitment to serve this country, but solely because of [her] gender identity.” Id. Jane Doe 4 reenlisted effective August 24, 2017, and has extended her commitment to the Army until February 2020. See Defs.’ Mem. at 11 (citing Sealed Decl. relating to Jane Doe 4, EOF No. 56-^4). 5. Jane Doe 5 “Jane Doe 5 has been an active duty member of the United States Air Force for nearly twenty years, serving multiple tours of duty abroad, including two in Iraq.” Am. Compl, EOF No. 9, ¶ 30. After June 2016, she notified her superiors that she is transgender. Id. ¶ 31. Her “livelihood depends on her military service[,]” and “[separation from the military w[ould] have devastating financial and emotional consequences for her.” Id. ¶ 32. 6. John Doe 1 John Doe 1 serves in the Army. His family has “a proud history of serving in the Armed Forces.” Looney Decl., Ex. E (“Redacted John Doe 1 Deck”), ¶3. His great grandfather served in Europe in World War II. Id. His father served in the Air Force and was awarded the Bronze Star for valor. His uncle was a United States Marine who was wounded and paralyzed by an improvised explosive during Operation Desert Storm. His aunt served in the military as well. Id. John Doe 1 has idolized military service since childhood. Id. John Doe 1 entered college on a full academic scholarship. Id. ¶ 4. After graduating magna cum laude, he entered the Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (“ROTC”) program while pursuing a master’s degree. Id. ¶ 5. His fellow cadets in the program knew that he was transgender and were supportive, and his superiors were generally supportive as well. Id. ¶ 6. He was ranked third in his ROTC class, and was allowed to wear a male dress uniform as part of his duties for the ROTC Color Guard. Id. ¶ 6. While serving in the ROTC program, John Doe 1 also joined the National Guard. Id. ¶7. He met his future wife, with whom he has a two-year-old son. Id. ¶ 9. He graduated in the top 20% of his ROTC class. Id. ¶ 12. Following the June 2016 DTM, John Doe 1 began training at the Basic Officer Leadership Course (“BOLC”), at which time he came out to his platoon instructors, who were very supportive and treated him as male despite his official gender designation. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. After the BOLC, John Doe 1 was stationed as the executive officer for his unit, performing administrative tasks on behalf of and reporting directly to his commanding officer. Id.. ¶ 16. He serves as both the maintenance and supply officer for his unit. Id. He is also in charge of preparing his unit for deployment. Id. Until recently, John Doe 1 was preparing to deploy to the Middle East with his unit in mid-2018. Id] Am. Compl. ¶ 33. During his first meeting with his commanding officer, John Doe 1 came out as transgender.. Redacted John Doe 1 Decl. ¶17. He stressed that his “first priority was being a soldier, and that in crafting an approved plan for medical treatment under the new policy, it was extremely important to [him] to make sure that [his] plan would not interfere with [his] duties.” Id. Both his - company and battalion commanders have been very supportive “beyond [his] greatest expectations.” Id. John Doe 1 has received an approved treatment plan, which includes a planned surgery. The surgery- was “encouraged and supported by [his] command team at every level up to and including [his] Brigade Commander.” Id. ¶ 18. His official gender designation- has been changed to male. Id. ¶ 19. John Doe 1 is scheduled for transition-related surgery on January 4, 2018. Defs.’ Mem. at 11 (citing Sealed Declaration relating to John Doe 1). John Doe 1 has been “devastated by the President’s cancellation of the policy [he] had relied upon to notify command of the fact that [he is] transgender and to take steps forward in treatment for gender transition.” Redacted John Doe 1 Decl, ¶ 26. If he is discharged, he fears serious financial and medical consequences for him and his family. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. 7. Regan Kibby Plaintiff Regan Kibby is a 19-year-old midshipman at .the United States Naval Academy. Kibby Decl. ¶ 1. Kibby’s father served in the Navy, and Kibby has wanted to follow in his footsteps from an early age. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. He spent his summers in high school attending seminars at military academies. Id. ¶ 5. Despite being accepted with full scholarships to other schools, Kibby immediately decided to enroll at the Naval Academy when he was accepted. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. He has now successfully completed his first two years of school and hopes to become a Surface Warfare Officer in the Navy after graduation. Id. ¶ 9. Kibby is transgender. Id. ¶ 1. After Secretary of Defense Carter announced that transgender people could not. be separated on the basis of their gender identity during his first year at the Naval Academy, Kibby began to come out. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Kibby’s Company Officer was very accepting and supportive, and put Kibby. in contact with the Brigade Medical Officer to begin the process of preparing a medical treatment plan. Id. ¶¶ 16-19. The first step was to receive an official diagnosis, which Kibby did./d ¶ 20. / Working with the Brigade Medical Officer, Kibby determined that in order to comply with the 18 month stability requirement of the recently announced accession policy for transgender service members, he would have to take a year off from the Naval Academy to ensure that he had completed his transition plan prior to graduating and acceding. Id. ¶24. His Commandant and the Superintendent officially approved Kibby’s medical transition plan and his request for a year-long medical leave of absence. Id. 1126. Kibby is now on medical leave undergoing his medical transition and plans to return to the Academy in the-fall of 2018. Id. ¶ 28. When Plaintiff Kibby saw the President’s Tweet he “was devastated” and felt that “[t]he entire future [he] had been planning for [himself] was crumbling around [him].” Id. 1131. When Kibby came out, he was relying on the recent pronouncements by the Secretary of Defense and the Navy that he would be able to enlist despite being transgender. Id. ¶ 33. He is now living in a state of uncertainty and great distress because if the Presidential Memorandum is allowed to stand, he will never be able to serve in the Armed Forces—something he has strived for since he was a child. Id. ¶¶ 33-34.. 8. Dylan Kohere Plaintiff Dylan Kohere is an 18-year-old student and member of the Army ROTC at the University of New Haven. Kohere Decl. ¶1. Both of Dylan’s grandfathers served in the military,’ and Dylan has wanted to serve since he was a young child. Id. ¶ 2. He entered the ROTC program to obtain the career opportunities that come with being a commissioned officer. Id. ¶ 2. Dylan is transgender, and has come out as such to his Sergeant. Id. ¶9. He lias started to work with medical professionals to begin a treatment plan for his transition. Id. ¶ 10. When the President declared on Twitter that transgender service members would no longer be allowed to serve in the military in any capacity, Dylan felt that the plan he had made for his life had been “thrown out the window.” Id. ¶¶ 12-13. He had come out as transgender in the ROTC in reliance. on the military’s- announcement that transgender people could serve openly. Id. ¶¶ 11, 15. He feels disheartened that if the Presidential Memorandum remains in force, he will “be denied an opportunity to serve based on something that has nothing to do with [his] ability or performance.” Id. ¶ 15. If .he is prevented from serving or completing ROTC because of his transgender status, he will lose educational and career opportunities, as well as the opportunity to apply for an ROTC scholarship. Id. ¶ 18. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction When a motion to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is filed, a federal court is required to ensure that it has “the ‘statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate [the] case[,]’” Morrow v. United States, 723 F.Supp.2d 71, 77 (D.D.C. 2010) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998)). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and can adjudicate only those cases or controversies entrusted to them by the Constitution or an Act of Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). In determining whether there is jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss, the Court may “consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed , facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Coal for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citations omittecl)., “Although, a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint when reviewing a' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),” the factual allegations in the complaint “will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6)' motion for failure to state a claim.” Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F.Supp.2d 163, 170 (D.D.C. 2007) (citations omitted). B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a pleading on the grounds that it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. ft.. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders .‘naked assertionfs]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Rather, a complaint, or counterclaim, must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. C. Motion for Preliminary Injunction Preliminary injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008)). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction “must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Sherley, 644 F.3d at 392 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365) (alteration in original; quotation marks omitted)). When seeking such relief,' “ ‘the movant has the burden to show that all four factors, taken together, weigh in favor of the injunction.’ ” Abdullah v. Obama, 753 F.3d 193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). “The four factors have typically been evaluated on a ‘sliding scale.’ ” Davis, 571 F.3d at 1291 (citation omitted). Under this sliding-scale framework, “[i]f the movant makes an unusually strong showing on one of the factors, then it does not necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another factor.” Id. at 1291-92. III. DISCUSSION, The Court’s Opinion will be divided into three parts. The first part of the Opinion assesses the Court’s jurisdiction and addresses Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiffs lack standing and that their claims are not ripe. The second part of the Opinion dismisses Plaintiffs’ estoppel cause of action for failure to state a claim. Finally, in the third part of the Opinion; the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction; A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of this Court to the adjudication of “Cases” and “Controver-síes.” U.S. Const., Art. Ill, § 2. “In an attempt to give meaning to Article Ill’s case-or-eontroversy requirement, the courts have developed a series of principles termed ‘justiciability doctrines,’ among which are standing [and] ripeness.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1428, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). Defendants challenge the Court’s jurisdiction on the basis of standing and ripeness. Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing jurisdiction, and each “element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2334, 2342, 189 L.Ed.2d 246 (2014) (“SBA List”) (internal quotation marks omitted). On a motion for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff “must show a substantial likelihood of standing[,]” while on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must merely “state a plausible claim that they have suffered an injury in fact fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision on the merits.” Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Although Defendants have pressed their jurisdictional arguments in a motion to dismiss, the Court also has an independent duty to assess its jurisdiction for purposes of Plaintiffs’ pending motion for preliminary injunction. Consequently, the Court proceeds by applying the higher burden necessitated by a motion for preliminary injunction. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the propriety of the directives of the Presidential Memorandum with respect to the accession and retention of transgender individuals for military service, which corresponds with sections 1(b) and 2(a) of the Presidential Memorandum (i.e., the Accession and Retention Directives). The Court does not have jurisdiction over section 2(b), which prohibits the use of military resources to fund sex reassignment surgical procedures, because no Plaintiff has demonstrated that they are substantially likely to be impacted by this directive (the “Sex Reassignment Surgery Directive”). 1. Standing Standing is an element of the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and requires, in essence, that a plaintiff have “a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy .... ” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). A plaintiff cannot be a mere bystander or interested third-party, or a self-appointed representative of the public interest; he or she must show that the defendant’s conduct has affected them in a “personal and individual way.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). “The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.” SBA List, 134 S.Ct. at 2341-42 (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the standing analysis is “especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force [the court] to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013). The familiar requirements of Article III standing are: (1) that the plaintiff have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that there be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court;' and (3) that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). The parties disagree only over the first element of standing: ■ injury in fact. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs have carried their burden of demonstrating a substantial likelihood of standing on the basis of at least two distinct injuries. First, Plaintiffs are subject to a competitive barrier that violates equal protection. Second, they are subject to a substantial risk of being denied . accession, or being discharged from the military, due to their transgender status. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have demonstrated satisfactorily that both of these injuries are caused by the directives of the Presidential Memorandum, and that they are redressable by this Court. a. The Import of the Presidential . Memorandum Before turning to the legal basis of the two injuries-that support Plaintiffs’ standing, the Court first addresses the crux of Defendants’' arguments regarding standing, and indeed, this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction more generally. According to Defendants, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction with respect to the directives of the Presidential Memorandum because Plaintiffs have merely “brought a. constitutional challenge to the President’s policy directive to conduct further study before the military changes its longstanding policies regarding service by transgender individuals.” Defs.’ Mem. at 15. According to Defendants, Plaintiffs “challenge a notional policy- regarding military service by transgender individuals, but as they concede, that policy is currently being studied and has not been implemented or applied to anyone, let alone Plaintiffs.” Defs.’ Reply at 1. Defendants also highlight the protections afforded by the Interim Guidance: “Secretary of Defense Mattis has put in place Interim Guidance that, by its terms, maintains the status quo for both current service members and those who seek to accede into the military.” Id. In Defendants’ view, the Court is being-asked “to prejudge the constitutionality of a future Government policy regarding military service by transgender individuals and issue the extraordinary relief of a worldwide preliminary injunction.” Defs.’ Mem. at 1. They further contend that “it is unclear whether those currently serving members will be affected by the future policy regarding service by transgender individuals once it is finalized and implemented.” Id. at 2. According to Defendants, the President has only “directed the Secretary of Defense to determine how to address transgender individuals currently serving in the military and that no action be taken against such individuals until after a policy review is completed.” Id. at 1 (emphasis in original). In their words: “Secretary Mat-tis’s Memorandum is unambiguous: The Interim Guidance is the operative policy and will remain so until he promulgates DoD’s final policy regarding service by transgender individuals.” Defs.’ Reply at 3. “The- Interim Guidance is equally clear: Transgender service members, including the. service member Plaintiffs, continue to serve fully in the military.” Id, With respect to .accession, Defendants contend that the operative policy is not a “ban” because transgender individuals are “subject to the normal waiver process.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, Defendants argue that, Plaintiffs disregard the actual policy regarding transgender service members, and instead rely “on a hypothetical future policy on transgender military service.” Id. Ultimately, all of these contentions can be summarized into a few overarching points: the Presidential Memorandum merely commissioned an additional policy review; that review is underway; nothing is set in stone, and what policy may come about is unknown; and regardless, Plaintiffs are protected by the Interim Guidance. And while accession by transgender individuals is not permitted, they may obtain waivers. In the Court’s view, the government’s jurisdictional arguments are a red herring. The President controls the United States military. The directives of the Presidential Memorandum, to the extent they are definitive, are the operative policy toward military service by transgender service members. The Court must and shall assume that the directives of the Presidential Memorandum, will be faithfully executed. See Na