Full opinion text
OPINION JEROME B. SIMANDLE, U.S. District Judge Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION... 713 II. BACKGROUND...714 A. Historical Perspective on Bail in New Jersey.. .714 B. The Criminal Justice Reform Act.. .716 1. The Pretrial Release Decision.. .716 2. The Risk Assessment Instrument. . .718 3. The Pretrial Detention Hearing. . .720 C. Effect of the CJRA on New Jersey’s Criminal Justice System... 721 D. Plaintiff Holland... 721 E. Plaintiff Lexington... 723 F. The State Defendants... 723 G. Procedural History.. .724 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW... 724 IV. DISCUSSION...726 A. Preliminary Issues... 726 1. Standing.. .726 2. Younger Abstention... 732 3. Habeas v.s 1983... 737 4. Summary of Preliminary Issues ...739 B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits... 739 1. Eighth Amendment... 739 2. Fourteenth Amendment.. .743 3. Fourth Amendment.. .746 4.Summary of Likelihood of Success Prong...747 C. Probability of Irreparable Harm,.. 748 D. Balance of Harms... 748 E. Considerations of the Public Interest. . .749 F. Summary of Preliminary Injunction Factors... 749 I. INTRODUCTION This dispute centers on the constitutionality of New Jersey’s recently-enacted Criminal Justice Reform Act (“CJRA”). The matter is presently before the Court upon the motion of Plaintiffs Brittan B. Holland (“Holland”) and Lexington National Insurance Corporation (“Lexington”) for a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants Kelly Rosen, the Team Leader for Pretrial Services in the Criminal Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey; Mary E. Colalillo, the Camden County Prosecutor; and Christopher S. Porrino, the Attorney General of New Jersey, (collectively, “the State Defendants” or “Defendants”), as well as their agents, “from taking any actions to enforce statutory provisions [of the CJRA] ... that allow imposition of severe restrictions on the pre-trial liberty of presumptively innocent criminal defendants without offering the option of monetary bail.” (PI. Proposed Order.) Holland is presently on pretrial release from the Superior Court of New Jersey on conditions including home confinement (except for employment) and electronic monitoring, but not cash bail, as he faces charges for second-degree aggravated assault. Lexington is a bail bond provider that alleges its business in New Jersey has essentially dried up since the CJRA took effect on January 1, 2017, although it does not allege it has a bonding relationship with Holland or any other person processed under the CJRA. The primary issue before the Court is whether Plaintiffs have a “reasonable probability of eventual success” on their claims that the CJRA violates Holland’s Fourth, ■ Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendment .rights under the U.S. Constitution. This inquiry necessarily requires the Court to also consider jurisdictional issues, such as whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring their constitutional claims and whether the Court must abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), in light of Holland’s ongoing state prosecution. The Court heard oral argument at a Preliminary Injunction Hearing held on August 22, 2017 [Docket Item 42], and no testimony was offered beyond various affidavits and attached documents. After careful consideration, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction will be denied for the reasons explained below. The following constitute the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law upon Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(a). II. BACKGROUND A. Historical Perspective on Bail in New Jersey As under, the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the New Jersey State Constitution (“State Constitution”) provides; “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.” N.J. Const, art. 1, ¶ 12. For more than a century, the State Constitution additionally required: “[a]ll persons. shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption great.” N.J. Const, of 1844, art. I,’ ¶ 10; see also N.J. Const, of 1947, art. I, ¶11 (2016) (retaining same language from 1844 Constitution). Thus, New Jersey has long considered the right of an individual to bail before trial to be “a fundamental one.” State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 355, 294 A.2d 246 (1972). The constitutional guarantee that a criminal defendant be “bailable by sufficient sureties” produced tension in New Jersey’s criminal justice system. On one hand, “any defendants—even those who posed a substantial risk of flight or danger to the community—could be released if they had access to untainted funds to post as bail.” State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 52-53, 160 A.3d 1 (2017). On the other hand, “poorer defendants accused of less serious crimes, who presented .minimal risk, were held in custody if they could not post even modest amounts of bail.” Id. at 53, 160 A.3d 1. For example, a 2013 Report revealed that on a particular day in 2012, a total of 13,003 inmates were housed in 20 of New Jersey’s 22 county jails. Marie VanNost-rand, Ph.D., Luminosity & the Drug Policy Alliance, New Jersey Jail Population Analysis 8 (Mar. 2013), https://university, pretrial.org/viewdocument/new-jersey-jail-popu) [hereinafter, “VanNostrand Report”]. About 9,500. inmates (or 73% of the sampled jail population) were confined because they were awaiting trial or sentencing in either Superior or Municipal Court. Id. at ll. Most importantly, more than 5,000 inmates (or 38.5% of the sampled jail population) were in custody simply because they could not afford bail. Id. at 13. A total of 1,547 of those inmates (or 12% of the sampled jail population) were in pretrial custody because they could not afford $2,500 or less, including about 800 inmates who could have secured their release for $500 or less. Id. “In other words, one in eight inmates, who posed little risk, sat in jail pretrial because they were poor, while defendants charged with serious crimes who posed a substantial risk of danger or flight could be released into the community without monitoring so long as they could make bail.” Robinson, 229 N.J. at 53, 160 A.3d 1. In 2012, Governor Chris Christie called for a constitutional amendment to reform New Jersey’s pretrial detention system. Id. Chief Justice Stuart Rabner of the New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently established a Joint Committee on Criminal Justice (“the Joint Committee”) to examine “issues relating to bail and the delays in bringing criminal cases to trial.” Joint Committee, Report of the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice at 1 (Mar. 10, 2014), available at https://www.judiciary.state.nj. us/courts/assets/criminal/flnalreport 3202014.pdf. The Joint Committee was comprised of members from all three branches of state government and included judges, prosecutors, public defenders, private counsel, court administrators, and staff from the Legislature and Governor’s office. Id. On March 10, 2014, the Report of the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice was issued. Id. According to the Joint Committee: the current system presents problems at both ends of the spectrum: defendants charged with less serious offenses, who pose little risk of flight or danger to the community, too often remain in jail before trial because they cannot post relatively modest amounts of bail, while other defendants who face more serious charges and have access to funds are released even if they pose a danger to the community or a substantial risk of flight. Id. at 2. To that end, the Joint Committee first recommended that “New Jersey should move from a largely ‘resource-based’ system of pretrial release to a ‘risk-based’ system of pretrial release.” Id. at 8. Among several other proposals, the Joint Committee further recommended that “[a] statute should be enacted requiring that an objective risk assessment be performed for defendants housed in jail.pretrial, using an assessment instrument that determines the level of risk of a defendant,” and “[njonmonetary conditions of release that correspond to the level of risk should be established.” Id. After conducting hearings on the Joint Committee’s findings and recommendations, the State Legislature proposed and passed the Criminal Justice Reform Act, S. 946, A. 1910 (2014). On August 11, 2014, Governor Christie signed the CJRA into law. L. 2014, c. 31 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26). Enforcement of the CJRA was predicated on ratification of a proposed amendment to the State Constitution that would authorize New Jersey courts to deny the pretrial release of certain defendants. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 Note. In a state-wide referendum held on November 4, 2014, New Jersey voters approved such an amendment by a vote of 68% to 32%. Div. of Elections, Dep’t of State, Official List: Public Question Results for 11/04/2014 General Election Public Question No. 1 (Dec. 2, 2014), http://nj.gov/state/elections/ 2014-results/2014-official-general-public-question-l.pdf. The amendment, which took effect on January 1, 2017, replaced Article 1, Paragraph 11 of the State Constitution (which had previously guaranteed all criminal defendants the right to be “bailable by sufficient sureties”) with the following: All persons shall, before conviction, be eligible for pretrial release. Pretrial release may be denied to a person if the court finds that no amount of monetary bail, non-monetary conditions of pretrial release, or combination of monetary bail and non-monetary conditions would reasonably assure the person’s appearance in court when required, or protect the safety of any other person or the community, or prevent the person from obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. It shall be lawful for the Legislature to establish by law procedures, terms, and conditions applicable to pretrial release and the denial thereof authorized under this provision. N.J. Const, art. 1, ¶ 11. Notably, the amendment did not affect the “excessive bail” clause of the State Constitution, N.J. Const, art. 1, ¶ 12. B. The Criminal Justice Reform Act Through enactment of the CJRA, New Jersey sought to promote three separate goals in considering conditions of pretrial release: (1) reasonably assuring the person’s appearance in court; (2) protecting the community and persons; and (3) preventing the obstruction of justice by persons awaiting trial. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15. To that end, the CJRA modified New Jersey’s previous criminal justice system in several ways. First, the CJRA permits judges to order the pretrial detention of certain defendants if the court “finds clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions can reasonably assure the effectuation of [the CJRA’s] goals.” Id.; see also N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(l). Second, the CJRA shifts New Jersey’s bail system away from one that is resource-based (he., posting money bail) and towards one that relies upon an objective evaluation of an individual defendant’s level of risk. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-17, - 25(d); see also Report of the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice at 8 (recommending that “New Jersey should move away from a largely ‘resource-based’ system of pretrial release to a ‘risk-based’ system of pretrial release”). Finally, the CJRA establishes speedy trial deadlines for defendants who are detained pending trial, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-22, which is not at issue in this case. 1. The Pretrial Release Decision Once a complaint-warrant is issued based on a judicial officer’s finding of probable cause, an “eligible defendant” “shall be temporarily detained to allow the Pretrial Services Program to prepare a risk assessment with recommendations on conditions of release.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(a). Within 48 hours of a defendant’s commitment to jail, the court must make a “pretrial release decision.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(b)(l). In making a pretrial release decision, the court must impose “the least restrictive condition, or combination of conditions, that the court determines will reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required, the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, and that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162—17(d)(2). Thus, the purposes of pretrial release are enlarged to address concerns not only of appearance in court but also protection of the safety of other persons and the community and deterring obstruction of the criminal justice process—concerns not normally addressed through monetary bail. To assist in the pretrial release decision-making process, the CJRA provides a five-stage, hierarchical process for courts to follow. Robinson, 229 N.J. at 55-57, 160 A.3d 1. First, the court must order that a defendant be released on his own personal recognizance or an unsecured bond if such release is adequate to ensure the defendant’s appearance in court and safety of the public. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(b)(2)(a), - 17(a). Second, if release on personal recognizance is inadequate, the court may release the defendant on “a non-monetary condition or conditions, with the condition or conditions being the least restrictive condition or combination of conditions” that are adequate to ensure the defendant’s appearance in court and the safety of the public. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(b)(2)(b), -17(d)(2) (emphasis added.) Third, if non-monetary conditions are inadequate, the court may release the defendant subject to monetary bail, but only to reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance in court. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(b)(2)(c), -17(c). Fourth, if the above non-monetary conditions are insufficient, the court may release the defendant subject to a combination of monetary and non-monetary conditions reasonably calculated to assure the defendant’s appearance in court and safety of the public. N.J.S.A. 2A:62-16(b)(2)(c), -17(d). Fifth, if the prosecutor has moved for pretrial detention and a judge determines no combination of monetary and non-monetary conditions are adequate to ensure the defendant’s appearance in court or safety of the public, the court may order that the defendant remain detained pending a pretrial detention hearing. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(b)(2)(d), -18(a)(1). Before making any pretrial release decision for an eligible defendant, a judge is required to consider, but is not bound by, the Pretrial Services Program’s risk assessment and recommendations on conditions of release (described below). N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16. “If the court enters an order that is contrary to a recommendation made in a risk assessment when determining a method of release or setting release conditions, the court shall provide an explanation in the document that authorizes the eligible . defendant’s release.” N.J.S.A. 2A:162-23(emphasis added). 2. ■ The Risk Assessment- Instrument Under the CJRA, the Pretrial Services Program’s risk assessment must be conducted using a “risk assessment instrument” that is approved by the Administrative Director of the New Jersey Courts, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25(c). This instrument must be “objective, standardized, and developed based on analysis of empirical data and risk factors relevant to the risk of failure to appear in court when required and the danger to the community while on pretrial release.” N.J.S.A, 2A:162~25(c)(l). In partnership with the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, the New Jersey courts adopted an automated risk assessment instrument that contains a risk measurement component, called the Public Safety Assessment (“PSA”), as well as a risk management component, called the Decision Making Framework (“DMF”). Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D., New Jersey Courts, 2016 Report to the Governor and Legislature at 4 (Dec. 31, 2016), available at https://www. judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/ 2016cjrannual.pdf. a. The Public Safety Assessment Under the risk assessment instrument adopted by the New Jersey courts, the state police must first gather criminal history information from various law enforcement and court databases, including the NJ State Police criminal case history system, the PROMIS/GAVEL criminal database, the MACS municipal court database, and other sources. State v. C.W., 449 N.J.Super. 231, 238-39, 156 A.3d 1088 (2017) (citing N.J. Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2016-6 at 15-16 (October 11, 2016), available at http:// www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/ 2016-6JL.aw-Enforcement.pdf). The PSA then uses the information derived from these sources to address nine risk factors: (1) the defendant’s age at the time of arrest; (2)-whether the offense charged is “violent”; (3) other charges pending against the defendant at the time of the alleged offense; (4) prior disorderly persons convictions; (5) prior indictable convictions; (6) prior “violent” convictions; (7) prior failures to appear at a pre-deposition court date within the two years preceding the alleged offense; (8) prior failures to appear at a pre-disposition court date more than two years preceding the alleged offense; and (9) prior sentences to incarceration of 14 days or more. C.W., 449 N.J.Super. at 239, 156 A.3d 1088; see also ACLU of New Jersey, NACDL, and NJ Office of the Public Defender, The New Jersey Pretrial Justice Manual at 8 (Dec. 2016), available at https://www;nacdl,org/ NJPretrial/. These objective risk factors are race and gender neutral, and do not require the police to interview the defendant. 2016 Report to the Governor and Legislature at 4. Using an algorithm, the automated process generates the PSA, which “scores” three different categories:- (1) Failure to Appear (“FTA”); (2) New Criminal Activity (“NCA”); and (3) New Violent Criminal Activity (“NVCA”). i. Failure to Appear Score A defendant’s FTA score, which is used to calculate the risk that a defendant will fail to appear at future court proceedings, is calculated using the following framework: (1) if the defendant has a pending chai’ge against him he receives one point; (2) one point is added if the defendant has a prior conviction; (3) another point is added if the defendant failed to appear at a pre-disposition, court date more than two years ago; and (4) if the defendant failed to appear at a pre-disposition court date within two years of the alleged offense, two point are added (and if the defendant failed to appear at more than one predisposition court dates within the past two years, four points are added). The New Jersey Pretrial Justice Manual at 8. The defendant’s raw score is then converted into a six-point scale, with one being the lowest score a defendant-can receive, and six being the highest. Id. ii. New Criminal Activity Score A defendant’s NCA score, which is used to predict the risk that the defendant will commit new criminal activity while on release, is calculated using the following framework: (1) if the defendant is 22 years old or younger he receives two points; (2) three points are added if there were pending charges against the defendant at' the time of the arrest; (3) one point is added if the defendant has a prior disorderly persons offense; (4) another point is added if the defendant has a prior conviction for an indictable offense; (5) one more point is added if the defendant has been convicted of a “violent” crime. on one or two occasions (if there are three or more, convictions for crimes of violence, two points are added); (6) if the defendant failed to appear at a pre-disposition court date within two years of the alleged offense, one point is added (and if the defendant failed to appear at more than one pre-disposition court dates within the past two years, two points are added); and (7) if the defendant has previously been sentenced to a term of incarceration,- two' more points are added. Id. Again, the defendant’s raw score is converted into a six-point scale, with one being the lowest score a defendant can receive and six being the highest. Id. iii. New .Violent Criminal Activity Flag Finally, a score is generated to determine if a criminal defendant should be flagged for NVCA, which indicates that there is a greater statistical likelihood the defendant will engage in new violent criminal activity if released. A defendant receives a NVCA flag if he scores four or more points under the following framework: 1) a defendant receives two points if the current offense is considered “violent”; 2) one point is added if the offense is “violent” and the defendant is under 21; 3) an additional point is added when the defendant has pending charges against him at the time of the alleged .offense; 4) one point is added if the defendant has a prior conviction; and 5) one more point is added if the defendant has one or two prior “violent” convictions (if the defendant has three or more he receives, two points). Id. at 9. Under the CJRA,. a NVCA flag “make[s] release less likely,” and criminal defendants “who are released after receiving a flag will be released under more onerous conditions.” Id. . b. The Decision Making Framework After the PSA scores are calculated, the Pretrial Services Agency provides a recommendation to‘the judge in a “Decision Making Framework” about whether' a defendant should be released pending trial and, if so, under what conditions'. Id at 10. The Decision Making Framework recommends a Pretrial Monitoring Level (“PML”) for each criminal defendant, which ranges from release on one’s own recognizance (“ROR”) to pretrial detention. Id. A defendant released ROR will have no conditions or restrictions placed on them. Id At PML 1, a defendant is required to report to a pretrial services officer by phone once per month. Id At PML 2, a defendant must report to a pretrial services officer, once a month in person, once a month by telephone, -and be subject to monitored conditions such as a curfew. Id At PML 3, a .defendant -is monitored in-person or by phone every week, and he is subject to additional monitored conditions. Id At PML 3 Plus Electronic Monitoring or Home Detention (“PML 3 + ”), a defendant is subject to all the same conditiops previously described, but may also be confined to their home and/or required to wear a GPS monitoring device on their ankle at all times. Id. Finally, as an option of last resort, a defendant will be detained in jail pending trial. Id. The DMF is a four-step process. First, as described in See Section II.B.2.a, supra, the defendant’s PSA is completed to produce FTA and NCA scores and a flag for NVCA. RL Second, the court determines whether the pending charges are serious enough on their own to warrant a recommendation of “release not recommended; if released maximum conditions,” irrespective of the PSA. Id. Such charges include murder, aggravated manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault, and carjacking. Id. Pretrial detention (or PML 3 + , if released) is also recommended when the defendant receives an NVCA flag in the PSA and the charged offense is “violent.” Id. Third, the court applies the FTA and NCA scores to a DMF matrix. Id. at 11 (chart describing DMF matrix.) Fourth, the court determines whether the defendant has been charged with a No Early Release Act crime. Id. (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, 30:4-123.51(b)). If so, the recommended PML is increased by one level (e.g., from ROR to PML 1 or from PML 1 to PML 2). The New Jersey Pretrial Justice Manual at 11. 3. The Pretrial Detention Hearing If a prosecutor applies for pretrial detention, the court must hold a pretrial detention hearing no later than the defendant’s first appearance or within three days of the prosecutor’s motion. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(d)(l). The court may, however, grant a continuance of up to three days upon request by the prosecutor or up to five days upon request by the defendant. Id. At the pretrial detention hearing, the defendant has a right to be represented by counsel and, if indigent, have counsel appointed. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(l). The defendant also has the right to testify, present witnesses, cross-examine any of the prosecutor’s witnesses, and present information by proffer. Id. The prosecutor, meanwhile, carries the burden to establish probable cause that the eligible defendant committed the predicate offense. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2). Ultimately, the court may order the defendant detained only if the judge finds by “clear and convincing evidence that no amount of monetary bail, non-monetary conditions of pretrial release[,] or combination of monetary bail and conditions” are adequate to ensure the defendant’s appearance in court, the safety of the public, and that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(l), -19(e)(3). In making a pretrial detention hearing determination, the court may take into account information including: (a) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (b) the weight of the evidence against the eligible defendant; (c) the history and characteristics of the eligible defendant; (d) the nature and seriousness of the danger that would be posed by the eligible defendant’s release; (e) the nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process that would be posed by the eligible defendant’s release; and (f) the PSA and DMF prepared by the Pretrial Services Program (described above). N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20. Thus, at the detention hearing, the PSA and DMF scores are not binding or even presumptive of the judge’s determination of detention or release, but are factors that must be considered, along with others, to adjudicate whether the prosecution has met its burden of detention. If the court orders a defendant detained pending trial, the judge must “include written findings of fact and a written statement of ... reasons” in an order. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-21(a). If the court authorizes a defendant’s release contrary to the Pretrial Services Program’s recommendation, “the court shall provide an explanation” in the order of release. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-23(a)(2). A defendant has the right to appeal a judge’s pretrial detention hearing decision. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(c). Any such appeal “shall be heard in an expedited manner.” Id. Additionally, under the New Jersey Court Rules, “a Superior Court may review the conditions of pretrial release ... on its own motion, or upon motion by the prosecutor or the defendant alleging that there has been a material change in circumstance that justifies a change in conditions.” N.J.S.A. 3:26-2(c)(2). Under this Rule, any review of conditions “shall be decided within 30 days of the filing of the motion.” Id. C. Effect of the CJRA on New Jersey’s Criminal Justice System The Criminal Justice Reform Act took effect on January 1, 2017. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15. This reform has shown great success in placing persons into pretrial release who would previously have been held in jail for failure to meet monetary bail and because pretrial monitoring options were largely unavailable. As a result, many fewer defendants are being detained in jail as they await trial, as shown by the following statistics. According to statistics published by the New Jersey Courts, on June 30, 2017, there were 5,717 inmates pending trial. New Jersey Courts, CJRA Statistics, Chart C, available at https://www.judiciary. state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/cjrearly reportl.pdf. By comparison, on the same day in 2015, there were 8,845 inmates waiting for trial. Id. This drop in the pretrial jail population represents a 35.4% decrease over a two-year period. Id.; see also Smith Decl. at ¶ 12. Between January 1 and June 30, 2017, 9.9% of eligible defendants were released on their own recognizance, 21.5% were released under PML 1, 14.7% were released under PML 2, 25.8% were released under PML 3, 10.8% were released under PML 3 + , and only 14.2% were detained. CJRA Statistics, Chart A. Furthermore, detention motions have not been automatically granted. Over the same six-month period, for example, 60% of prosecutors’ detention motions were granted, while 40% were denied. CJRA Statistics, Chart B. D. Plaintiff Holland On April 6, 2017, Holland was arrested and charged with second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(B)(1). (Exs. A, B, & C to Feldman Decl.) According to police records, Holland engaged in an altercation with an unnamed individual in the parking lot of Joe’s Tavern in Sickler-ville, New Jersey. (Holland Deck at ¶7; Ex. C to Feldman Deck) First, Holland allegedly struck the unnamed individual in the face, causing him to fall to the ground. (Id.) Then, once the unnamed individual was on the ground, Holland allegedly “continued to strike [him] repeatedly about the head and face causing serious bodily harn [sic][,]” including multiple face fractures. (Id.) According to police records, Holland fled the scene and was later arrested at his home, where “[h]is clothing was covered in fresh blood.” (Id.) The Pretrial Services Program in Camden County collected information for Holland’s Public Safety Assessment for determination of detention or release by the judge. As the parties acknowledged at oral argument, Holland ultimately received a PSA score of 2 (out of 6) for Failure to Appear, a score of 2 (out of 6) for New Criminal Activity, and was flagged for NVCA. [Docket Item 42; see also Docket Item 43.] Due to the NVCA flag, the DMF generated by the Pretrial Services Program recommended that Holland be detained pending trial. (Feldman Deck ¶7.) . . Consistent with the CJRA and Attorney General Directive 2016-6, Section 7.4,1, Camden County Assistant Prosecutor Leo Feldman prepared a motion for Holland’s pretrial detention. (Feldman Deel. at ¶ 8.) On April 7, 2017, Assistant Prosecutor Geraldine Zidow submitted a Notice to the Camden County Superior Court, explaining that the State planned to.move for Holland’s pretrial detention. (Ex. E of Feldman Deck) Assistant Prosecutor Zi-dow also filed a Certification, affirming that Holland “is charged with a crime and there is a serious risk that: the defendant will not appear in court as required [and] the defendant will pose a danger to any other person or the community.” (Id.) ■ Prior to Holland’s pretrial detention hearing, Assistant Prosecutor Feldman met with Holland’s court-appointed attorney, Brad Wertheimer,' Esq. (Feldman Deck ¶ 9.) At this meeting, Mr. Wertheimer agreed to recommend to his client that, in exchange for Prosecutor Feldman withdrawing the prosecution’s motion for pretrial detention, Holland would agree to be released under PML Level 3 + , which would include house arrest (except for employment), electronic monitoring by GPS monitoring device, weekly reporting, and no contact with the victim. (Id. at ¶ 10.) On April 11, 2017, a pretrial detention hearing was. held, before the Honorable Kathleen Delaney, J.S.C. (Id. at ¶ 14; Ex. G to Feldman Deck) During the hearing, Holland agreed to a level PML 3+ in exchange for the State withdrawing its application for detention. (Id. at 4:17-26; 6:1-8.) After finding that Holland was indigent, the court waived the cost of the ankle bracelet. (Id. at 5:18-190 The court also granted Holland permission to go to work. (Id. at 4:1-6; 5:1-2.) Holland was subsequently released, subject to the PML Level 3+ terms outlined above. (Holland Decl. at ¶ 18.) According to Holland,' under home detention, he “cannot shop for food or other necessities,” nor can he take his son to baseball practices, “which is an important aspect of [his]- custodial responsibilities and efforts to bond with [his] child.” (Id* at ¶¶ 21-22.) Under electronic monitoring, Holland must wear a GPS tracking, device around his ankle at all times, including within cord-length of an electrical outlet, while the ankle bracelet charges, for two hours each day. (Id. at ¶ 24.) Holland also avers that the ankle bracelet is “a source of public stigma and shame,” and “is bulky, uncomfortable, restrictive, and makes it more difficult to live [his] life and do [his job].” (Id at ¶¶ 25-26.) Finally, Holland explains that the bi-monthly, in-person reporting requirement “requires [him] to leave [his] job and travel to the pretrial services office, even if the trip would interfere with [his] work.” (Id at ¶ 28.) Collectively, Holland states, these conditions have “severely restricted [his] liberty, disrupted [his] family life, made [him] concerned about [his] job security, and made [him] feel that [his] life is up in the air.” (Id. at ¶ 29.) Holland has never sought a judicial determination of his conditions of release, nor has he sought modification in the Superior Court of the conditions to which he agreed. E. Plaintiff Lexington Lexington National Insurance Corporation is a Florida Corporation based in Maryland. (Wachinski Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4.) Lexington operates across the country, primarily for the purpose of underwriting bail bonds and acting as a surety of bail bonds. (Id at ¶6.) In New Jersey, Lexington operates through independent insurance producers (bail bondsmen), who are licensed by the state’s Department of Banking and Insurance and registered with the Superior Court Clerk. (Id. at ¶8.) Lexington alleges that, as a result of the CJRA, its business has been “severely harmed.” (Id. at ¶ 9.) According to Lexington, the CJRA “dramatically reduc[ed] the number of defendants given monetary bail and thus dramatically reduefed] [Lexington’s] opportunity to act as surety on bail bonds.” (Id.) That the CJRA has. all but eliminated the use of money bail and bail bonds to secure pretrial release is indeed demonstrated by the data, as discussed above. F. The State Defendants Defendant Kelly Rosen is the Team Leader for Pretrial Services in the Criminal Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey. (Compl. at ¶ 18.) In this capacity, Defendant Rosen is responsible for enforcing the pretrial release conditions authorized by the. CJRA and imposed on Holland. (⅛) Defendant Mary Eva Colalillo is the Camden County Prosecutor. (Id. at ¶ 19.) As Camden County Prosecutor, Defendant Colalillo is responsible for enforcing New Jersey laws, including the CJRA, in Camden County. (Id.) Defendant Christopher S. Porrino is the Attorney ' General of New Jersey. (Id. ¶20.) As Attorney General, Defendant Porrino is ultimately responsible for enforcing New Jersey’s laws, -including the CJRA, across the state. (Id.) G. Procedural History On June 14, 2017, Plaintiffs simultaneously filed a class action Complaint and a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. [Docket Items 1, 3.] On July 28, 2017, the State Defendants filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. [Docket Items 23, 24.] On August 7, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Reply Brief to the State Defendants’ Opposition. [Docket Item 29.] On July 21, 2017, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), on behalf of themselves and the ACLU of New Jersey, Drug Policy Alliance, Latino Action Network, and National Association for the Advancement of Colored People—New Jersey Conference, filed a motion for leave to appear as amicus curiae. [Docket Item 18.] On August 8, 2017, the Court granted the ACLU’s request to submit a brief and participate as amicus curiae in oral argument with regard to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. [Docket Item 31.] On August 22, 2017, the Court convened the Preliminary Injunction Hearing. [Docket Item 42.] III. STANDARD OF REVIEW A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy ... which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). A preliminary injunction “should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted; emphasis in original). “[T]he requirement for substantial proof’ is much higher for “a plaintiffs motion for preliminary, injunctive relief’ than it is for a “defendant’s motion for summary judgment^]” where “one would demand some evidence ... in order to avoid a nonsuit.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Schuchardt v. President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 351 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2015) for proposition that “summary judgment imposes a lighter burden than the ‘substantial likelihood of success’ necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction”). To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party must show as a prerequisite: (1) a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation, and (2) that it will be irreparably injured ... if relief is not granted.... [In addition,] the district court, in considering whether to grant a preliminary injunction, should take into account, when they are relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Del. River Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1974) (further internal citations omitted)). “[A] district court—in its sound discretion— should balance th[e]se four factors so long as the party seeking the injunction meets the threshold on the first two.” Reilly, 858 F.3d at 176. In order to meet the threshold to establish the first factor, the moving party “must demonstrate that it can win on the merits (which requires a showing significantly better than negligible but not necessarily more likely than not).” Id. at 179. However, “more than a mere possibility of relief is required” to make the required showing; the moving party must show “a reasonable probability of eventual success.” Id. at 179 n.3 (internal quotations omitted). To satisfy the second factor, the moving party “must demonstrate ... the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Frank’s GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal quotations omitted). “In order to demonstrate irreparable harm the plaintiff must demonstrate potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial. The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). The moving party must demonstrate that it is likely to suffer “actual or imminent harm which cannot otherwise be compensated by money damages,” or it “fail[s] to sustain its substantial burden of showing irreparable harm.” Frank’s GMC, 847 F.2d at 103; see also Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (“Our frequently reiterated standard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.”) (emphasis in original). In short, “a movant for preliminary equitable relief must ... demonstrate ... that it is more likely than not to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” Reilly, 858 F.3d at 179 (footnote omitted). The third factor requires the court to “balance the parties’ relative harms; that is, the potential injury to the plaintiffs without this injunction versus the potential injury to the defendant with it in place.” Issa v. School Dist. of Lancaster, 847 F.3d 121, 143 (3d Cir. 2017). The court should also, at this stage, take into account “the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction.” Reilly, 858 F.3d at 176 (quoting Del. River Port Auth., 501 F.2d at 920 (further citations omitted)). “[W]hen considerable injury will result from either the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, these factors to some extent cancel each other[.]” Del. River Port Auth., 501 F.2d at 924. Finally, the Supreme Court has noted that “parts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.” Instant Air Freight, 882 F.2d at 803 (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552, 57 S.Ct. 592, 81 L.Ed. 789 (1937)). “In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982). While weighing whether the public interest favors a preliminary injunction “is often fairly routine,” Issa, 847 F.3d at 143 (internal quotations omitted), “ ‘where an injunction is asked which will adversely affect a public interest for whose impairment, even temporarily, an injunction bond cannot compensate, the court may in the public interest withhold relief until a final determination of the rights of the parties, though the postponement may be burdensome to the plaintiff.’” Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 312-13, 102 S.Ct. 1798 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944)). IV. DISCUSSION A. Preliminary Issues 1. Standing Defendants argue that a preliminary injunction should be denied because both Holland and Lexington lack standing under Article III. (Def.. Opp. Br. at 2-23; Amici Br. at 10-19.) If standing is doubtful at this stage, and pending a final determination, this factor should weigh strongly against granting a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs contest this, stating that Holland has first-party standing and Lexington has both standing in its own right and third-party standing to assert the constitutional rights of potential customers. (PL Rep. Br. at 2-5.) In order to demonstrate that it has standing under Article III, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) an injúry-in-fact, (2) a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that -the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). These elements of constitutional standing may be referred to as injury (or injury-in-fact), traceability,, and redressa-bility, respectively. See Toll Bros., Inc. v. Township of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137-42 (3d Cir. 2009). The Court will address the standing of each plaintiff in turn. a. Plaintiff Holland The State Defendants argue that Holland “lacks standing because he has failed to demonstrate that his alleged injury -will be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.... [E]ven if the Court ruled in Holland’s favor on his request for imposition of monetary bail to address flight, the challenged non-monetary conditions likely would still be imposed .... His alleged injury therefore would not be redressed.” (Def. Opp. Br. at 21.) In response, Plaintiffs claim that the State Defendants’ position that the same challenged conditions “likely would still be imposed” is “pure speculation and legally irrelevant.” (PI. Rep. Br. at 3.) Plaintiff claims that he has a constitutional right to “a process where [monetary] bail was considered on an equal footing with other options to secure his release.... [H]is injury would be redressed without regard to the outcome of a constitutionally-compliant process. That is enough to satisfy redress-ability. ... [T]his Court certainly does not need to conduct the very bail proceeding Holland was denied to resolve the threshold question of standing.” (Id.) The Court is mindful of the requirement under Article III that as to redressability, the plaintiff must show that “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal quotations omitted). It is true.that the ultimate outcome of any subsequent hearing that is or may be held in the state court with regard to Holland’s conditions of pretrial release is, as yet, unknown. Any court holding such a hearing might continue the complained-of restrictions on his liberty, regardless of giving consideration to monetary bail. In other words, despite imposing monetary bail as a restriction addressing risk of flight, there could continue to be such.non-monetary conditions as restrictions on associations, curfew, in-person reporting and the like that would still need to be considered to address the risk his release may pose to the community or to other persons. However, Holland claims that his injury is not simply the restriction on his liberty, but rather the imposition of that restriction after a hearing that violated his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He claims that such injury will be sufficiently redressed should the Court order that a hearing respecting those constitutional rights (as he understands them) be held, regardless of the ultimate outcome of such a hearing. Should the Court order such a hearing to be held, the relief then would not be speculative. He claims that he was injured by the holding of a hearing that did not afford him his constitutional rights, including the alleged right to have monetary bail considered as a primary condition of release pending trial, and that ordering a new hearing that does afford him those rights will redress that injury. The Court finds that analysis persuasive to establish Holland’s standing to assert his claims. The redress he seeks is a hearing to set conditions of release where monetary bail is given a primary consideration. "Whether he is likely to accomplish his objectives at a Superior Court hearing is a question for the merits, not one of standing to assert the right to such a hearing. Accordingly, the Court finds that Holland has adequately pled the necessary elements of Article III standing, including redressability. b. Plaintiff Lexington Lexington’s standing presents a more complex and closer question. The parties first contest whether Lexington may assert first-party standing. (Def. Opp. Br. at 21-22; PI. Rep. Br., at 3-4; Amici Br. at 11-12.) The parties then address whether Lexington may proceed with third-party standing under Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990) (Def. Opp. Br. at 22-23; PL Rep. Br. at 4-5; Amici Br. at 12-19.) State Defendants and Plaintiffs also contest whether Lexington has prudential standing, Le., whiether Lexington’s interests, are within the “zone of interests” intended to be protected by the statute at issue. (Def. Opp. Br. at 22; PI. Rep. Br. at 4.) The Court will address these in turn. i. First-Party Standing of Lexington Amici argue that- Lexington does not, in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, allege a violation of its own rights.’ (Amici Br. at 11.) Specifically, the Complaint alleges a violation of the right to monetary bail under the Eighth Amendment (as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment), a violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment based on an alleged deprivation of liberty to criminal defendants, ■ and a violation • of the right against unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment (as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). Amici urge that “none of those claims . directly addresses the rights of Lexington National,” as the Eighth Amendment’s excessive bail clause protects the rights of criminal defendants, the Fourteenth Amendment’s “liberty clause is likewise inapplicable to corporate sureties in this context,” and the Fourth Amendment claim relates to the burden on Holland of wearing a GPS monitor. (Id. at 11-12.) The State Defendants add that Lexington lacks first-party standing because its alleged injury is not concrete and particularized, but rather is generalized and abstract, which is an injury “shared by many others in the bail bonds industry that are similarly situated.” (Def. Opp. Br. at 21.) Lexington, they note, does not assert that it had an agreement in place with Holland or any other criminal defendant to provide a bail bond, that it could not consummate due to the allegedly unlawful actions of Defendants; rather, it only asserts “that it ‘likely would have been able to help Holland post money bail.” (Def. Opp. Br. at 17, citing Compl. at ¶ 5.) In response, Plaintiffs argue that “Lexington has standing in its own right,” as it has “suffered a concrete and particularized injury—the ‘collapse of [its] business,’ a paradigmatic economic injury.’ ... That Lexington’s injury is shared by others in the industry does not make it any less cognizable.” (PI. Rep. Br. at 3-4 (internal citation omitted).) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Lexington has adequately alleged a concrete and particularized injury. Plaintiffs have submitted an affidavit of Nicholas J. Wachinski, the CEO of Lexington, wherein he avers that “[t]he ... CJRA [ ] has severely harmed Lexington National’s business by dramatically reducing the number of defendants given the option of monetary bail and thus dramatically reducing Lexington National’s opportunity to act as surety on bail bonds.” (Wachinski Decl. at ¶ 9.) The Court agrees that this injury is concrete and particularized enough to constitute an injury-in-fact. See Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2005) (“While it is difficult to reduce injury-in-fact to a simple formula, economic injury is one of its paradigmatic forms.”). However, the Court finds that Lexington does not, in fact, assert violations of its own constitutional rights that led to such an injury. The injury-in-fact requirement mandates that there be “an invasion of a legally protected interest.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Cf. Danvers, 432 F.3d at 292 (“The complaint is replete with assertions of cognizable harm ... [describing] ‘Ford dealers who have suffered economic injury-in-fact as a result of ... the invasion by Defendant ... of its dealers’ legally protected interests .... ’ ”); Out Front Productions, Inc. v. Magid, 748 F.2d 166, 168 (3d Cir. 1984) (plaintiff “claims a direct economic injury traceable to defendants’ actions that allegedly violated the antitrust laws.”); White v. United States, 601 F.3d 545, 555 (6th Cir. 2010) (plaintiffs “still must demonstrate an injury-in-fact to a legally protected interest”). This invasion is what must result in the injury to the plaintiff. Here, Lexington has alleged that it has been harmed. The Court nevertheless finds that the harm it has allegedly suffered is not alleged to be the result of an invasion of Lexington’s legally protected interest. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392, 108 S.Ct 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988) (“Even if an injury in fact is demonstrated, the usual rule is that a party may assert only a violation of its own rights”). The Court is persuaded that the Eighth Amendment’s bail clause protects the interests of criminal defendants, not corporations who seek to provide bail bonds to them. See Johnson Bonding Co., Inc. v. Com. of Ky., 420 F.Supp. 331, 337 (E.D. Ky. 1976) (a bail bond company “does not seek to vindicate its right to be free from excessive bail. A corporation cannot go to jail. Rather, plaintiff seeks to continue in the bail bonding business”) (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960) (“a litigant may only assert his own constitutional rights or immunities”)); United States v. Chaplin’s, Inc., 646 F.3d 846, 851 n.15 (11th Cir. 2011) (where corporation claims a court order constitutes an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment, court “assumes, but does not hold, that the Eighth Amendment applies to corporations” as the “Supreme Court has never held that this amendment applies to corporations”); see also Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989) (“We think it clear ... that the Eighth Amendment places limits on the steps a government may take against an individual, whether it be keeping him in prison, imposing excessive monetaiy sanctions, or using cruel and unusual punishments”) (emphasis added). This is especially true where Lexington is not named as a criminal defendant, is not confined, and does not identify a constitutional right that it holds as a corporation that it seeks to vindicate. Similarly, the Court does not see how the Due Process or Fourth Amendment claims in Plaintiffs’ Complaint constitute an invasion of Lexington’s legally-protected interests, despite the harms to Lexington’s business that will allegedly result from the CJRA’s application to Lexington’s potential customers. The Court agrees with Amici that Lexington does not “assert[] its own constitutional rights.” (Amici Br. at 12.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Lexington lacks first-party standing on the basis of an alleged violation of its constitutional rights. ii. Third-Party Standing of Lexington Defendants and Amici argue that Lexington also lacks third-party standing. (Def. Opp. Br. at 22-23; Amici Br. at 12-19.) Plaintiffs respond that Lexington “has third-party standing to assert the constitutional rights of potential customers denied bail under the CJRA.” (PI. Rep. Br. at 4-5.) The parties agree that the Third Circuit recognizes third-party standing, see Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 288 (3d Cir. 2002), and that Triplett, 494 U.S. at 720, 110 S.Ct. 1428, provides an appropriate basis to assess whether Lexington has such standing in this case. However, the parties’ argument primarily lies within the bounds of contesting whether or not Lexington meets the standard for third-party standing as described in Triplett, and does not fully address whether the other “preconditions” for third-party standing, as described in Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y, are met. The Court notes at the outset that “[t]he restrictions against third-party standing do not stem from the Article III ‘case or controversy’ requirement, but rather from prudential concerns ... which limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim.” Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y, 280 F.3d at 287-88. “It is a well-established tenet of standing that a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Id. at 288. The Third Circuit has described third-party standing as an exception to this “well-established tenet”: In particular, if a course of conduct prevents a third-party from entering into a relationship with the litigant (typically a contractual relationship), to which relationship the third party has a legal entitlement, third-party standing may be appropriate. Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y, 280 F.3d at 288 (quoting Triplett, 494 U.S. at 720, 110 S.Ct. 1428). The parties’ briefs devote substantial effort toward arguing about whether the CJRA and Defendants’ alleged unlawful actions prevent criminal defendants (here, the third party) from entering into a contractual relationship with Lexington (here, the litigant), to which relationship the criminal defendants have a legal entitlement. A finding of that situation might satisfy Triplett, but it does not end the inquiry. As the Third Circuit has stated: The Supreme Court has found that the principles animating these prudential concerns [about third-party standing] are not subverted if the third party is hindered from asserting its own rights and shares an identity of interests with the plaintiff,... More specifically, third-party standing requires’ the satisfaction of three preconditions: 1) the plaintiff must suffer injury; 2) the plaintiff and the third party must have a “close relationship”; and 3) the third party must face some obstacles that prevent it from pursuing its own claims. It remains for courts to balance these factors to determine if third-party standing is warranted. Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y, 280 F.3d at 288-89 (internal quotations omitted); see also The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 362 (3d Cir. 2000) (if same three preconditions are met, “a plaintiff who meets all these criteria, but who would' otherwise lack Article III standing to sue because his or her own legally protected rights were not injured, may assert the rights of .a third party.”); Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 397-98, 118 S.Ct. 1419, 140 L.Ed.2d 551 (1998) (same “three preconditions” must be satisfied to assert the rights of a third party); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (same “three important criteria” must be satisfied). Assuming, without deciding, that criminal defendants (like Holland) are prevented from entering into a contractual relationship with a bail bonds company like Lexington, and that those defendants have a constitutional entitlement to that relationship and/or to monetary bail, thereby satisfying the dictates of Triplett, Lexington still does not articulate how it can satisfy the third necessary precondition to third-party standing under clear Third Circuit precedent. As discussed above, the Court finds that Lexington has suffered an injury that gives it “a ‘sufficiently concrete interest’ in the outcome of the issue in dispute.” Powers, 499 U.S. at 411, 111 S.Ct. 1364. This satisfies the first precondition. Whether Lexington satisfies the second precondition of a “close relationship” between the plaintiff and the third party whose rights it purports to. assert is a. closer question. The, factual allegations here do not establish a “close relationship” in the colloquial or commonsense meaning of the phrase (as Lexington does not allege an existing contractual relationship with Holland or any criminal defendant whose rights have been violated, and avers only that it “would be ready, willing, and ,able to act as a bail bonds surety” for criminal defendants in New Jersey if monetary bail “were again an option” for them). However,, the Third Circuit has stated that “[t]o meet this standard, this relationship must permit the [proposed plaintiff] to operate fully, or very nearly, as effective a proponent of [the third parties’ rights] as the [third parties] themselves.” Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y, 280 F.3d at 289. Here, the Court will assume that the relationship between Lexington and the criminal defendants is sufficiently close that Lexington “could efficaciously advocate their ... interests.” Id. However; Plaintiffs do not contend, and the Court does not see how they can do so, that the criminal defendants “face some obstacles,” id., or that there is “some hindrance,” Campbell, 523 U.S. at 397, 118 S.Ct. 1419, in pursuing their own claims. It is undisputed that Holland is one such criminal defendant, and he has apparently faced no obstacle nor hindrance in asserting his claim that his rights were violated. Indeed, the Court has already found that Holland has standing under Article III. See Sectioh IV.A.l.a, supra. Holland is a named plaintiff in this action and has been pursuing claims that his constitutional rights were violated with strength and vig- or. The Court cannot discern a basis, then, to allow for third-party standing for Lexington (as a matter of prudential standing, rather than Article III standing), where the “third party” is actually a named plaintiff actively participating in the instant case. Accordingly, the Court finds, at the present juncture, that it appears unlikely that Lexington has satisfied the necessary preconditions to establish third-party standing in this action. However, as noted above, the Court may nevertheless proceed in its assessment of the arguments on the merits as the “presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article Ill’s case-or-controversy requirement!.]” Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 52 n.2, 126 S.Ct. 1297. Ho