Full opinion text
OPINION and ORDER POGUE, Senior Judge: This consolidated action arises from the United States Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) antidumping investigation of crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells (“CSPC”) from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC” or “China”). Plaintiff Jiangsu Jiasheng Photovoltaic Technology Company, Limited (“Jiasheng”) challenges Commerce’s determination, in its investigation, to reject Jiasheng’s application for “separate-rate status.” In addition, Plaintiff SolarWorld Industries America, Incorporated (“SolarWorld”) challenges 1) Commerce’s decision, in constructing a home market or “normal value”, to calculate the cost of aluminum frames (a component used to make the subject merchandise) based on goods classified under Thai Harmonized Tariff Schedule (“HTS”) Heading 7604, rather than Thai HTS Heading 7616; and 2) Commerce’s determination to grant separate-rate status to certain respondents. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 516A(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012), and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2012). For the reasons presented below, Commerce’s Final Results are sustained against the challenges presented here, except with regard to separate rate issues for which Commerce has requested a voluntary remand. Commerce’s request for remand is granted. Following a statement of the standard of review, each challenge to the Final Results presented in this action is addressed in turn. STANDARD OF REVIEW The court will sustain Commerce’s antidumping determinations if they are supported by substantial evidence and otherwise in accordance with law. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i). Substantial evidence refers to “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” SKF USA, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2008) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938), and the substantial evidence standard of review can be roughly translated tó mean “is the determination unreasonable?” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2006) (quotation and alteration marks and citation omitted). In this context, substantial evidence is “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966) (citations omitted)). “It is not for [the courts] to reweigh the evidence before the [agency],” Henry v. Dep’t of the Navy, 902 F.2d 949, 951 (Fed.Cir.1990), but there must be a rational connection between the facts found based on the record evidence and the choices made in the agency’s determination. See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962). Although the reviewing court “may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given, [the court] will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974) (citations omitted). In addition, where the agency is vested with discretion to set the procedures by which it administers its governing statute, the court reviews such decisions for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Dongtai Peak Honey Indus. Co. v. United States, — CIT —, 971 F.Supp.2d 1234, 1239 (2014). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, on factual findings that aré not supported by substantial evidence, or represent an unreasonable judgment in weighing relevant factors.” Id. (quoting WelCom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 36 CIT —, 865 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1344 (2012) (citing Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed.Cir.2005))). In abuse of discretion review, “an agency action is arbitrary when the agency offers insufficient reasons for treating similar situations differently.” See SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 263 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed.Cir.2001). DISCUSSION I. Commerce’s Rejection of Jiasheng’s Application for Separate-Rate Status• A. Background Because Commerce considers the PRC to be a non-market economy (“NME”), when investigating merchandise from China, the agency presumes that the export operations of all Chinese producers and exporters are controlled by the PRC government, unless respondents show otherwise. As a result, Commerce’s practice is to assign to all exporters from the PRC a single “countrywide” antidumping duty rate unless they affirmatively demonstrate eligibility for a “separate rate.” Applying this practice, in announcing the initiation of this investigation, Commerce reminded respondents that to obtain “separate-rate status,” exporters and producers must submit a separate-rate application (“SRA”), and that a timely response to Commerce’s questionnaire regarding the quantity and value of exported merchandise (“Q & V questionnaire”) is a pre-requisite to separate-rate eligibility. Commerce sent Q & V questionnaires to 75 PRC-based producers and exporters. The United Parcel Service (“UPS”) confirmed delivery of the Q & V questionnaire to Respondent-Plaintiff Jiasheng on November 12, 2011, seventeen days prior to the stated response deadline. This correspondence apprised Jiasheng of Commerce’s investigation and requested information on the quantity and U.S. dollar value of Jiasheng’s sales of subject merchandise to the United States during the POI. The cover letter sent with the questionnaire informed Jiasheng that its response was due no later than November 29, 2011, and the questionnaire warned that failure to timely respond would forfeit Jiasheng’s opportunity to be considered for separate-rate status in this investigation. In addition, the cover letter notified Jiasheng that instructions for responding to the Q & V questionnaire were included in the package as Attachment III, and advised Jiasheng to utilize the included check list (Attachment V) “to make certain [that Jiasheng] fully eomplie[s] with all filing requirements.” Paragraph A.1 of the General Instructions included in Attachment III to the Q & V questionnaire received by Jiasheng states that “[a]ll submission's must be made electronically using [Commerce’s] IA ACCESS website at http://iaaccess.trade.gov.” Paragraph A.3 explains that “[a]n electronically filed document must be received successfully in its entirety by IA ACCESS by 5 p.m. Eastern Time (ET) on the due date, unless an earlier time is specified.” The check list included in Attachment V warns respondents: “Do not submit your response via email or facsimile. Your response must be electronically filed using IA [ACCESS] unless you meet one of the exceptions listed under the ‘Manual Filing’ section of the General Instructions.” Commerce received timely-filed Q & V questionnaire responses from 80 exporters — who all filed their responses using Commerce’s IA ACCESS website — but not from Jiasheng. Rather, on November 30, 2011, at 10:59 local time (i.e., after the November 29, 2011, deadline), Jiasheng sent an email message to one of the contact persons listed on the Q & V questionnaire. This email invited the official to “check the attachment” and apologized for the late submission, without providing any explanation. Nine days after receiving the questionnaire responses through IA ACCESS, on December 8, 2011, Commerce completed its analysis of the 80 submissions and selected two respondents for individual examination (the “mandatory respondents”), pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2)(B). In doing so, Commerce made its selection without relying on data from a number of companies that had timely but deficiently submitted their responses through IA ACCESS. Rather, Commerce permitted those companies to properly re-file their Q & V questionnaire responses by December 14, 2011, in order to preserve their eligibility for a separate rate. Because Jiash-eng did not timely submit its Q & V questionnaire response through IA ACCESS, Jiasheng was neither contacted by Commerce nor permitted an opportunity to preserve separate-rate eligibility by properly filing its Q & V questionnaire response. Jiasheng then retained counsel and ultimately filed its Q & V questionnaire response through IA ACCESS on December 12, 2011. Because this was the first filing of Jiasheng’s response within the electronic filing system for this investigation, Commerce rejected the filing as untimely. Meanwhile, in December 2011 through January 2012, Commerce received 68 timely-filed SRAs from companies who had also timely filed their Q & V questionnaire responses through IA ACCESS. Although Jiasheng also submitted an SRA by the applicable deadline, using IA ACCESS, Commerce rejected the submission because Jiasheng had not timely filed .a Q & V questionnaire response. In explaining its decision to reject Jiasheng’s SRA, Commerce emphasized that both the notice of initiation for this investigation and the specific Q & V questionnaire received by Jiasheng explicitly required respondents to timely file Q & V questionnaire responses as a precondition for separate rate eligibility. Those respondents that timely filed their Q & V questionnaire responses through IA ACCESS and whose separate-rate applications demonstrated sufficient independence from government control were ultimately assigned an antidumping duty cash deposit rate of 25.96 percent, which was lower than that assigned to the PRC-wide entity. This lower 25.96 percent separate rate reflected an average of the rates calculated for the two mandatory respondents, who also qualified for separate rates. The PRC-wide entity, on the other hand, comprised of all the remaining companies that did not qualify for a separate rate, including Jiasheng, was assigned a 249.96 percent rate based on an adverse inference. Commerce judged this rate, which was the highest dumping margin alleged in the petition to initiate these proceedings, to be derived from data that were “within the range of the U.S. prices and normal values for the respondents in this investigation.” Jiasheng now challenges Commerce’s determination to reject its SRA and assign to Jiasheng the PRC-wide rate. See Jiasheng’s Br., ECF No. 41. Jiasheng does not challenge the PRC-wide rate itself, claiming only that this rate was improperly applied to Jiasheng. See id.; Oral Arg. Tr., ECF No. 83, at 13 (Jiash-eng’s confirmation that it is not challenging the China-wide rate). B. Analysis Commerce has discretion to set and enforce deadlines and reject untimely filed submissions, and may make its determinations “us[ing] facts otherwise available” when, inter alia, a respondent “fails to provide [requested] information by the deadlines for submission of the information or in the form and manner requested.” 19 U.S.C. 1677e(a)(2)(B). Here, Commerce used facts otherwise available (i.e., the presumption of .government control attaching to all exporters from NME countries like the PRC) because Jiasheng failed to provide information requested of it by the applicable deadline. See I & D Mem. cmt. 45 at 105. Jiasheng argues that its SRA, which was filed using IA ACCESS by the deadline provided for respondents who timely filed Q & V responses, contained the information necessary to determine Jiasheng’s actual separate-rate eligibility, in the form and manner requested by Commerce. Jiasheng therefore contends that Commerce inappropriately used “facts otherwise available” when the actual information was in fact timely and properly submitted on the record of this investigation. But as Commerce explained, the agency unambiguously and consistently requires respondents to properly and timely file Q & V responses as a precondition for separate-rate eligibility, because doing so prevents respondents from circumventing the mandatory respondent selection process and benefitting from the all-others separate rate without the risk or burden of individual investigation. Because Commerce has broad discretion to set the procedures it needs in order to adequately perform and enforce its regulatory role, and because the agency’s basis for this particular procedure is reasonable, Commerce’s policy of requiring timely .Q & V responses as a precondition of separate-rate eligibility is not a prima facie abuse of the agency’s discretion. Because Commerce’s policy of predicating the timeliness of separate-rate applications on timely Q & V data submission is not a prima facie abuse of discretion, the next question raised by Jiasheng’s challenge is whether Commerce’s application of its policy in this case amounts to an abuse of discretion. In evaluating such an as-applied challenge to Commerce’s timeliness requirements and procedures, the court asks “whether the interests of aecu-racy and fairness outweigh the burden [resulting from the late submission] placed on [Commerce] and the interest in finality.” In support of its argument that Commerce abused its discretion by rejecting Jiash-eng’s SRA in the circumstances presented here, Jiasheng relies on this Court’s decisions in Grobest, — CIT —, 815 F.Supp.2d 1342, and Artisan Mfg. Corp. v. United States, — CIT —, 978 F.Supp.2d 1334 (2014). But the facts of this, case are distinguishable from the issues presented in those actions. In Grobest, an NME company that was wholly-owned by a market economy company had qualified for a separate rate in an antidumping investigation, and had then maintained separate-rate status in three subsequent administrative reviews by timely filing certifications of no material changes. Then, in the fourth review, that company untimely submitted the same certification that it had consistently used over all the years during which its merchandise had been subject to the anti-dumping duty order. Under such circumstances, Commerce’s sudden rejection of the certification, without any evidence of an intervening change and where “every indication suggested] that the burden of reviewing the [separate rate certification] would not be great,” was an abuse of discretion. But Jiasheng’s case is not analogous. Here Commerce had'no prior history to rely on, and the issue before the court is not the rejection of a certification of continued separate rate eligibility in the absence of changed circumstances, but rather the untimely attempt to establish such eligibility in the first instance, under circumstances that would impose a significant burden on the agency (requiring Commerce to either begin its already-completed mandatory respondent selection process anew, or else undermine the agency’s policy objective by permitting Jiash-eng’s effective circumvention of that process). Nor is this case analogous to the facts in Artisan, where Commerce abused its discretion by rejecting a response filed via IA ACCESS after 5:00pm on the day of the deadline but before 9:00am on the following day. Here, rather than properly submitting its response via IA ACCESS before the start of business on the day after the deadline, Jiasheng emailed its late response, despite clear instructions not to do so, and made no IA ACCESS filings until two weeks after the deadline. Commerce’s instructions, received by Jiasheng seventeen days before the filing deadline, clearly stated that 1) Q & V questionnaire responses were to be filed only by using the IA ACCESS website, and were not to be emailed under any circumstances; and 2) failure to timely file the Q & V questionnaire response would forfeit the opportunity to be considered for a separate rate. Moreover, at the close of the IA ACCESS filing deadline, Commerce had received data from 80 respondents, which it then processed to select mandatory respondents within nine days, in order to adhere to a schedule for completing the investigation within the statutory time limitations. Then, just as Commerce was compiling, organizing, and analyzing all of this information, Jiasheng sent a brief, uninformative email, with no explanation, attempting to submit its questionnaire response as an attachment, despite very clear instructions — followed by the vast majority of the respondents in this investigation — not to do so. By the time of Jiasheng’s actual untimely response, filed using IA ACCESS on December 12, 2011, the investigation was already well under way. Jiasheng’s failure to follow Commerce’s instructions and file its response through IA ACCESS by the November 29, 2011, deadline is also what distinguishes Jiash-eng from the nine respondents who had timely, though deficiently, filed their Q & V questionnaire responses through IA ACCESS, and who were therefore permitted an opportunity to re-file and thus preserve their separate-rate eligibility. Accordingly, Commerce’s disparate treatment of Jiasheng vis-a-vis these nine companies is not arbitrary, as Jiasheng suggests, because it has a reasonable basis. The nine companies that followed instructions and timely filed their responses through IA ACCESS were included within Commerce’s initial data compilation and analysis, whereas Jiasheng did not enter that system until two weeks later. Given this distinction, Commerce did not act arbitrarily in treating Jiasheng differently from these nine companies. Finally, while Commerce’s use of “facts otherwise available” (here, the presumption of government control) pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2)(B) is subject to the requirements of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677m(c)(l), 1677m(d), and 1677m(e), none of these latter provisions is applicable on the facts presented. Section 1677m(c)(l) provides that if an interested party promptly notifies Commerce that it is unable to comply with the agency’s request, “together with a full explanation and suggested alternative forms in which such party is able to submit the information,” then Commerce “shall consider the ability of the interested party to submit the information in the requested form and manner and may modify such requirements to the extent necessary to avoid imposing an unreasonable burden on that party.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(c)(l). This provision is not applicable here because, although Jiasheng received Commerce’s request seventeen days prior to the submission deadline, Jiasheng neither notified Commerce of any anticipated difficulties nor provided any explanation therefor or offered any alternatives. Similarly, Section 1677m(e) — which provides that Commerce “shall not decline to consider information that is submitted by an interested party and is necessary to the determination but does not meet all the applicable requirements established by [Commerce]” if the five conditions listed in 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(e)(l)-(5) are met — is inapplicable because Jiasheng did not submit the information requested of it “by the deadline established for its submission,” see 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(e)(l), and did not demonstrate “that it acted to the best of its ability in providing the information and meeting the requirements established by [Commerce],” see id. at § 1677m(e)(4). .Finally, Section 1677m(d) requires the agency to promptly inform a party whose submission is determined to be deficient and, “to the extent practicable, provide that person with an opportunity to remedy or explain the deficiency....” 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d). Commerce satisfied this requirement when it informed Jiasheng that its December 12, 2011, IA ACCESS filing was untimely, and reasonably determined that permitting Jiasheng’s tardy entry into the investigation was no longer practicable by the time of its late IA ACCESS submission, “in light of the time limits established for the completion of investigations.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d); I & D Mem. cmt. 45 at 104. Accordingly, Commerce reasonably applied Section 1677e(a) to rely on facts otherwise available when Jiasheng failed to timely submit the information requested of it and did not properly submit such information until a time when its consideration was no longer practicable. II. Commerce’s Valuation of Aluminum Frames A. Background In its investigation, Commerce calculated surrogate values for the factors of production (“FOPs”) used by the two mandatory respondents, Trina Solar and Wuxi Suntech, to produce subject merchandise. Commerce valued all surrogate FOPs using data from Thailand, the primary surrogate market economy country selected for this investigation. Among the FOPs required for producing the subject merchandise are the aluminum frames used to encase photovoltaic cells into solar panels. For the Final Results of this investigation, Commerce “valued Trina [SolarJ’s and Wuxi Suntech’s aluminum frames using Thai HTS categories covering alloyed aluminum profiles.” Specifically, Commerce valued Trina Solar’s frames using Thai HTS subheading 7604.29.90001 (aluminum alloy non-hollow profiles), based on Trina Solar’s verified description of its frames as non-hollow alloyed aluminum profiles. Because Wuxi Suntech described its frames as hollow alloyed aluminum profiles, Commerce valued Wuxi ■ Suntech’s frames using Thai HTS subheading 7604.21 (aluminum alloy hollow profiles). SolarWorld argues that these determinations are not supported by substantial evidence, contending that the sole reasonable choice of-“best available” information regarding this FOP was to value Trina Solar and Wuxi Suntech’s aluminum frames using Thai HTS category 7616.99 (articles of aluminum not elsewhere specified). To SolarWorld, HTS category 7616.99 is the sole reasonable choice here because of a ruling issued prior to the POI by U.S. Customs' and Border Protection (“Customs”), in response to a request by Wuxi Suntech’s U.S. affiliate for guidance on classifying its “extruded aluminum frames for solar panels” for U.S. tariff assessment purposes. In this ruling, Customs determined that, based on the description provided by Wuxi Suntech, its aluminum frames would be assessed tariff rates based on USHTS subheading 7616.99.5090 (articles of aluminum, other). In its preliminary determination, however, Commerce explained that it “is not. bound by U.S. Customs classifications for U.S. imports when selecting import values from surrogate countries” but must instead “select a value using the best available information.” Commerce determined that HTS subheading 7616.99 was not the best information available regarding the market value of Trina Solar and Wuxi Suntech’s aluminum frames because “HTS category 7616.99 is an ‘other’ category and could reflect imports of numerous types of products” — such as pencil ferrules, textile yarn spools, or spouts and cups for latex collection — that are very different (in nature and value) from the aluminum frame inputs in question. Instead, Commerce determined that because “aluminum window frames are structurally similar to the frames used in modules,” the best information for valuing aluminum frames is provided by Thai HTS category 7610.10 (“aluminum doors, .windows and their frames and thresholds for doors”.), “which reflects imports of a product most similar to the aluminum frames used [by the respondents].” In its final determination (reached after considering additional briefing from interested parties), however, Commerce changed course and concluded that HTS category 7610.10 did not in fact provide the best available information for valuing the aluminum frames used to manufacture the subject merchandise, because that category covers items specific to doors and windows rather than the type of aluminum used in solar panel frames. Instead, Commerce determined to value Trina Solar’s frames using Thai HTS subheading 7604.29.90 (other aluminum alloy 'non-hollow profiles), and to value Wuxi Suntech’s frames using Thai HTS subheading 7604.21 (aluminum alloy hollow' profiles), noting that “both respondents have consistently described their aluminum frames as alloyed aluminum profiles.” In continuing to reject Solar-World’s proposal to value the aluminum frames using HTS category 7616.99, Commerce reiterated its prior position that this category did not provide the best available information regarding the market value of the aluminum frames in question because “HTS category 7616 covers a number of inputs, such as ferrules used in pencils, slugs, bobbins, spools, reels, spouts, cups, handles for traveling bags, cigarette cases or boxes, and blinds, which are dissimilar to the aluminum frames used by respondents.” B. Analysis SolarWorld argues that Commerce’s decision to classify Wuxi Suntech and Trina Solar’s aluminum alloy frames under Thai HTS category 7604 is not reasonable because 1) Commerce did not choose to calculate surrogate market economy values for the frames by using the same HTS category as that chosen by Customs for U.S. tariff assessment; 2) other Customs rulings purportedly demonstrate that HTS category 7604 “covers base level products of uniform shape that require further working and processing before assembly into finished goods” whereas the frames at issue are not of uniform cross-section and are “fully processed units, ready for simple and final assembly”; and 3) Commerce’s determination to value the mandatory respondents’ aluminum frames using Thai HTS category 7604 does not follow from the reasons provided by the agency, because category 7616, like category 7604, also covers alloyed aluminum products, such that the alloyed constitution of respondents’ aluminum frames cannot serve as a basis for determining to value such merchandise using category 7604 rather than 7616. Each argument is addressed in turn below. 1. Customs Ruling N139353 SolarWorld first argues that Customs Ruling N139353 was the best available information regarding the surrogate market value of the aluminum frames used to produce the subject merchandise. So-larWorld’s Br., ECF No. 44, at 10-14. SolarWorld claims that Commerce has an established practice of relying on Customs classification rulings in similar eases, from which it has here deviated without adequate justification. But while Solar-World emphasizes that Commerce has often used Customs’ U.S. tariff classification rulings to support Commerce’s determinations when calculating surrogate FOP values, both in past cases and with regard' to other surrogate values in this case, Commerce explains that its “practice,” in those cases as here, is to “carefully consider the available evidence in light of the particular facts of each industry when undertaking its analysis of valuing the FOPs on a case-by-case basis.” The fact that Commerce has at times found support for its surrogate value choices in Customs classification rulings does not lead to the conclusion that Commerce must follow such rulings in every case. On the contrary, as this Court has previously held, “[t]he statute’s silence regarding the definition of ‘best available information’ provides Commerce with ‘broad discretion to determine the ‘best available information’ in a reasonable manner on a case-by-case basis.’ ” 2. Appropriateness of Thai HTS Category 7604 Next, SolarWorld argues that Thai HTS category 7604 was an unreasonable choice for calculating appropriate surrogate market economy values for respondents’ aluminum frames because So-larWorld interprets that category to cover solely products with a “uniform cross-section along their whole length,” which must also “require further working and processing before assembly into finished goods,” whereas respondents’ frames require only simple assembly and are not of uniform cross-section by virtue of having been mitered for assembly. But as Commerce explains, SolarWorld’s claim — which relies on Customs rulings applying HTS category 7604 to unfinished aluminum articles — is unpersuasive. The fact that HTS category 7604 has been applied in the past to unfinished articles does not support the conclusion that Thai HTS category 7604 covers solely unfinished merchandise that is different in nature and value from the aluminum frames at issue. “While other HTS categories identify whether they contain finished or unfinished items, HTS category 7604 does not specify whether it contains finished or unfinished aluminum profiles.” Moreover, Note 1(b) to Chapter 76 (“Aluminum and Articles Thereof’) of the HTS provides that'aluminum profiles (such as those covered by category 7604 (“aluminum bars, rods and profiles”)) includes products that “have been subsequently worked after production (otherwise than by simple trimming or descaling), provided that they have not thereby assumed the character of articles or products of other headings.” This description reasonably supports Commerce’s decision that Thai HTS category 7604 covers products most similar in nature and value to the aluminum solar panel frames in question, despite the fact that such frames have been mitered, drilled, and notched in the ways described in the record evidence cited by SolarWorld. 3. Alloyed Aluminum Profiles Finally, SolarWorld argues that Commerce’s determination to value the mandatory respondents’ aluminum frames using Thai HTS category 7604 does not follow from the reasons provided by the agency, because category 7616, like category 7604, also covers alloyed aluminum products, such that the alloyed constitution of respondents’ aluminum frames cannot serve as a basis for Commerce’s decision to value such merchandise using category 7604 rather than 7616. But Commerce did not choose HTS category 7604 over category 7616 based simply on the alloyed nature of respondents’ aluminum frames, but rather it did so based on its determination that category 7604 covers products most similar in nature and value to the aluminum frames at issue, whereas category 7616.99 covers many diverse products whose natures and values are not reasonably comparable to such frames. Commerce weighed the available information before it and reasonably determined that the best available information regarding the market value of respondents’ aluminum frames is provided by merchandise covered by Thai HTS category 7604 (“aluminum bars, rods, and profiles”), rather than Thai HTS category 7616.99 (“Other articles of aluminum: Other” ) because “both [mandatory] respondents have consistently described their aluminum frames as alloyed aluminum profiles” and category 7604 specifically covers alloyed aluminum profiles, whereas category 7616.99 is a catch-all category that covers many diverse aluminum products — such as reels, cups, bag handles, and cigarette eases — -whose value is not reasonably comparable to that of respondent’s aluminum solar panel frames. Because this determination comports with a reasonable reading of the record evidence in this case, it is sustained. III. Commerce’s Determination to Grant Separate-Rate Status to Certain Respondents As noted above, when investigating merchandise from NME countries, Commerce presumes that all companies operating within such countries are controlled by the government and should accordingly receive a single countrywide rate, unless respondents affirmatively demonstrate both de jure (in law) and de facto .(in fact) autonomy during the POI. Commerce’s essential inquiry with regard to whether a particular respondent’s circumstances warrant the grant of separate-rate status focuses on whether, “considering the totality of circumstances,” the respondents in question “had sufficient independence in their export pricing decisions from government control to qualify for separate rates.” To that end, the relevant de jure autonomy “can be demonstrated by reference to legislation and other governmental measures that decentralize control,” and the relevant de fac-to autonomy “can be established by evidence that [the] exporter sets its prices independently of the government and of other exporters, and that [the] exporter keeps the proceeds of its sales.” In both its de jure and de facto determinations, Commerce may make reasonable inferences from the record evidence. See Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1511, 1520 (Fed.Cir.1993) (explaining that substantial evidence may include “reasonable inferences from the record”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, recognizing that “within the NME entity, companies exist which are independent from government control to such an extent that they can independently conduct export activities,” I & D Mem. cmt. 6 at 26 (citation omitted), Commerce granted a number of separate-rate applications in this investigation, finding that “the evidence placed on the record of this investigation by [these respondents] ... demonstrates both de jure and de facto absence of government control with respect to each company’s respective exports of the merchandise under investigation.” Final Results, 77 Fed. Reg. at 63,794. SolarWorld claims that Commerce’s determinations to grant some of these SRAs were not supported by substantial evidence. SolarWorld’s Br., ECF No. 44, at 22-40. Specifically, SolarWorld challenges (1) Commerce’s determination to grant separate-rate status to certain companies that either did not disclose the full extent of their ownership or “for whom [China’s State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (‘SA-SAC’) ] appears at some point in the chain of ownership,” arguing that these companies categorically failed to rebut the presumption of de jure government control; and (2) Commerce’s determination to grant separate-rate status to certain companies whose chain of ownership included the SA-SAC, the Communist Party of China (“CPC”), the National People’s Congress (“NPC”), and/or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (“CPPCC”), contending that the record does not support Commerce’s findings that these companies operated free from de facto “direct government involvement in the activities of the board members or in the day to day operations of the company” during the POI, and claiming that Commerce improperly failed to address “significant arguments and evidence which seriously undermine[ ] its reasoning and conclusions.” Commerce has requested a voluntary remand to reevaluate the evidence and reconsider the separate rate eligibility of four specific separate-rate recipients whose separate-rate status SolarWorld challenged. As this motion is both unopposed and based on a “substantial and legitimate” concern, Commerce’s motion for a voluntary remand to reconsider the separate rate eligibility of these four respondents is granted. SolarWorld’s remaining challenges to Commerce’s grant of separate rates in this case are addressed in turn below. A. Commerce’s De Jure Determinations 1. De Jure Autonomy of Companies Indirectly Owned by China’s •’ SASAC SolarWorld argues that four of the separate-rate recipients failed to establish de jure autonomy from the PRC government because, although none of these companies is directly owned by China’s SASAC, the SASAC appears at some point in these companies’ chain of ownership, such as when the company is owned by other companies that are in turn SASAC-owned. Because this portion of SolarWorld’s challenge concerns the same four respondents with respect to whose separate rate eligibility the court has now granted Commerce’s voluntary remand request, the court will reserve judgment in this respect until Commerce has had an opportunity to effect its reconsideration and the parties have had an opportunity to submit their comments. In the interest of expedition, ■however, some clarification may be relevant here. ■ Specifically, SolarWorld argues that Commerce gave insufficient weight to evidence that Chinese laws permit the government to intervene in Chinese companies’ operations in a variety of ways. But by definition, the laws of an NME country will generally permit the government of such country to intervene in the operations of its companies. Thus to require NME companies to prove complete legal autonomy would introduce an internal inconsistency into the analysis. Instead, as Commerce explained in this case, the agency determines whether the legal possibility exists to permit the company in question to operate as an autonomous market participant, notwithstanding any residual authority for potential governmental intervention, and if so, whether that company should be exempted from the NME system-wide analysis because it in fact managed its production, pricing, and profits as an autonomous market participant. Here, Commerce first determined that, as a matter of de jure possibility, the respondents in question could have acted as sufficiently autonomous market participants to deserve separate rates; then, having made this threshold determination, Commerce determined that the evidence in the record reasonably supported the conclusion that these respondents in fact did act sufficiently autonomously in terms of managing production and profit and setting prices during the POI. Commerce requests and is granted permission to reconsider the record evidence regarding whether certain respondents were sufficiently autonomous from the Chinese government in the conduct of their export activities as to qualify for rates separate from the PRC-wide entity. In doing so, Commerce need not require proof of complete freedom from any mere legal possibility of government control. 2. De Jure Autonomy of Companies that Did Not Disclose the Full Extent of their Ownership SolarWorld also argues that Commerce’s decision to grant separate-rate status to certain respondents that did not provide exhaustive details of their indirect ownership was unreasonable and arbitrary in light of Commerce’s prior practice. Specifically, SolarWorld argues that a number of respondents who received separate rates “revealed that they were ultimately held by a legal entity, such as a holding company or limited partnership,” but then “failed to disclose the controlling shareholders' of such entities.” Solar-World contends that Commerce must deny separate-rate status to respondents “who failed to report the ultimate owner(s) of their parent company because the ultimate ownership of the company could point to relevant government control.” In response, Commerce explains that the weight of the evidence on record supports the agency’s determination that these separate-rate recipients operated their export activities independently of government control during the POI. Commerce emphasizes that the agency is neither required, nor permitted by its resource constraints, to exhaustively detail every aspect of a company’s indirect ownership when the evidence is otherwise sufficient to reasonably find the existence of relevant autonomy over export activities. For example, Trina Solar — a De-fendanNIntervenor in this action and one of the respondents whose separate-rate status is challenged by S'olarWorld on grounds of failure to provide exhaustive details of ultimate ownership — submitted evidence, which was verified by Commerce, that its parent company is a foreign entity incorporated outside of China, in the Cayman Islands, which “has been listed on the New York Stock Exchange since December 2006.” Ownership of this parent company was in turn revealed to be “in two forms: ordinary shares and ADRs [American Depository Receipts] (one ADR is the equivalent of 50 ordinary shares),” and Commerce examined the ordinary share ownership, which was tracked by the parent company’s “secretary company,” and the ownership of ADRs by institutional shareholders, which was “tracked by Ipreo, a market intelligence company, at the beginning of the POI, and by Bank of New York Mellon at the end of the POI.” Although Trina Solar was unable to identify the ultimate shareholders of its parent company’s largest shareholder, and noted that “holders of ADRs are not obligated to identify their individual shareholders,” Commerce found that the evidence was sufficient to conclude that there was no “Chinese government ownership among [Trina Solar’s parent company’s] top 75 institutional shareholders or among the largest ordinary shareholders, which together represent approximately 70 percent of all outstanding shares of [Trina Solar’s publicly traded non-Chinese parent company].” In another example, Hanwha Solarone (Qidong) Company, Limited (“Hanwha”)— another Defendant-Intervenor/respondent in this action whose separate-rate status SolarWorld challenges on grounds of failure to provide exhaustive details of ultimate ownership — submitted evidence that, during the POI, it was wholly owned by a company domiciled in Hong Kong, which was in turn wholly owned by a company domiciled in the British Virgin Islands, which was in turn wholly owned by a company registered in the Cayman Islands and listed on the NASDAQ exchange. The Government maintains that, as with Trina Solar and Hanwha, Commerce obtained sufficient information regarding the ownership of each separate-rate recipient in this investigation to reasonably conclude that the Chinese government did not exercise control over these companies’ export activities during the POI. And while So-. larWorld speculates that, notwithstanding all this evidence, the Chinese government is nevertheless exerting control over these companies through ownership of shares at least two steps removed from the companies themselves (e.g., in the case of Trina Solar, shares invested in a company which in turn holds shares in a company which ultimately owns the company in question), Commerce has determined that the weight of the evidence suggests the contrary conclusion, and SolarWorld has not pointed to any specific non-speculative evidence to cast doubt upon this determination. Accordingly, because Commerce has considered and relied upon sufficient evidence to reasonably support the agency’s conclusion that the respondents in question were sufficiently autonomous from government control over their export activities to qualify for a separate rate, and because Solar-World presents no specific evidence to impugn these reasonable determinations, Commerce’s findings with regard to these separate-rate recipients are supported by substantial evidence. SolarWorld also argues that Commerce’s decision to grant separate-rate status to these respondents was arbitrary because, in the past, Commerce has denied such status to respondents who submitted ownership evidence that was later contradicted at verification. But the issue presented here is not analogous to the prior decisions on which SolarWorld relies because the respondents in those cases had submitted ownership information that was contradicted at verification, whereas here there was no similar impeachment of any of the evidence submitted by the challenged separate-rate recipients. In both of the prior cases upon which SolarWorld’s argument relies, the record revealed material discrepancies between the information initially provided by the respondents and that ultimately obtained at verification. These material discrepancies impugned the reliability of evidence that had been previously accepted to preliminarily rebut the presumption of government control. Finding such evidence to have been discredited, Commerce found that the record did not contain reliable evidence to rebut the presumption of government control, and accordingly denied those respondents separate-rate status. Here, on the other hand, the record contains credible evidence- — which was not subsequently invalidated or discredited— of a de jure space for the respondents’ de facto autonomy from government control. Based on this evidence, Commerce concluded that the presumption was rebutted. Specifically, the respondents “placed on the record laws, regulations, business licenses, export licenses, and other documents demonstrating [sufficient] de jure independence from the government on the relevant issues” to satisfy Commerce’s threshold inquiry, and therefore to reasonably support Commerce’s decision to move on to consider whether these companies in fact availed themselves of the autonomy that these legal documents appear to permit. Given these circumstances, Commerce reasonably determined that its threshold de jure criteria were satisfied by the challenged separate-rate recipients who submitted sufficient proof of legal autonomy without providing even more extensive information regarding their ultimate chain of ownership (e.g., not reporting some far-removed ultimate owners) of their respective parent companies), and the agency moved on to examining the evidence of these companies’ de facto autonomy. As Commerce explained, “[alb-sent evidence of de facto control over a company’s export activities, even if one of the respondents in question had identified the government among one of its ultimate owners, government ownership alone would not have warranted denying the company separate rate status.” Accordingly, Commerce’s challenged de jure determinations with regard to these respondents are also sustained. B. Commerce’s De Facto Autonomy Determinations SolarWorld additionally argues that Commerce improperly granted separate-rate status to certain respondents whose senior managers and/or board directors held membership or positions in certain state-owned enterprises or governmental entities during the POI. Essentially, SolarWorld believes that the potential for governmental control through such managers or board directors categorically precludes a finding that such companies in fact acted autonomously in conducting their own export activities. The core of SolarWorld’s argument is that these respondents failed to establish de facto autonomy because 1) some of these companies’ shareholders are SOEs (i.e., wholly state-owned companies), with the power to recommend or appoint the company’s board members and senior managers; and 2) some of these companies’ senior managers or board directors contemporaneously also held membership or positions within organizations such as the CPC, NPC, and/or CPPCC. But these facts alone are not dispositive of the de facto autonomy inquiry, because they speak solely to the ’possibility for governmental control over export activities through these persons, not whether such control was in fact reasonably likely to have been exercised during the POI. Fundamentally, SolarWorld’s arguments regarding the de facto autonomy of the challenged separate-rate recipients suffer from the same analytical defect as its arguments regarding de jure autonomy— namely that, in an NME country, there will usually be state involvement and authority to intervene in commercial affairs. But this’ fact alone does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that all NME producers and exporters should be categorically treated as in fact setting their prices according to some centralized strategy. Here, each of the challenged separate-rate recipients submitted evidence that “(1) [t]heir [export prices] are not set by, and are not subject to, the approval'of a governmental agency; (2) they have authority to negotiate and sign contracts and other agreements; (3) they have autonomy from the government in making decisions regarding the selection of management; and (4) they retain the proceeds of their export sales and make independent decisions regarding the disposition of profits or financing of losses.” Moreover, “[a]ll of the separate rate respondents at issue reported that neither SASAC nor the government was involved in the activities of the board of directors.” Upon examination of this record, Commerce concluded that, despite Solar-World’s challenges to the agency’s analysis in the Preliminary Results, “the evidence placed on the record of this investigation by the [separate [r]ate [applicants that were granted separate rate status in the Preliminary Determination [continues to demonstrate] both de jure and de facto absence of government control with respect to each company’s respective exports of the merchandise under investigation.” Final Results, 77 Fed. Reg. at 63,794. “The record does not show that the membership or position of senior managers or board directors of certain [separate-rate applicants] in [organizations such as the CPC, CPPCC, or NPC] resulted in a lack of autonomy on the part of the respondents] to set prices, negotiate and sign agreements, select management, or decide how to dispose of profits or financing of losses,” I & D Mem. cmt. 6 at 35, and “there is no record evidence of PRC government direction with respect to the day-to-day export related operations of any of the companies with senior board members or managers in the CPC, CPPCC, [or] NPC....” Id. at 36. Our standard of review does not require more. Commerce has reasonably exercised its responsibility for investigating, questioning, and verifying the respondents’ submitted data and evidence, as ■ well as for determining the appropriate treatment •for producers and exporters from NME countries. Because Commerce possesses both expertise and relevant first-hand knowledge — sending follow-up questionnaires and conducting on-sight verification as needed' — the court will not reweigh the evidence before the agency. Here, Commerce relied on certifications from the companies, each of which affirmed that they independently managed their own sales negotiations and set their own export prices. As neéded, Commerce sent follow-up inquiries, all of which were answered to Commerce’s satisfaction. The agency’s conclusion was that, despite the systemic cross-contamination of personnel between the government and the commercial sector within the PRC, these companies exhibited sufficient localized control over their own export activities during the POI to warrant individualized rates. Beyond emphasizing the legal and practical possibility that the company officials who are also in some capacity government officials could have influenced these companies’ export sales negotiations during the POI, SolarWorld has not pointed to any specific evidence that, in influencing the companies’ operations pursuant to their duties as company officials (including through the selection of management and preparation of profit distribution plans), these persons were directing the companies’ export pricing decisions based on the will of the PRC government. Commerce concluded that, on the evidence presented, it was more likely that these companies had autonomy over their own export price negotiations, and that grouping them within the countrywide entity would be accordingly inappropriate. Commerce credited evidence, which was never persuasively contradicted, that the companies themselves negotiate and set their U.S. export prices, notwithstanding the dual roles played by some company officials as both company managers and members of government, and the agency concluded that these companies negotiated and set their U.S. export prices during the POI separately, both from each other and from any centralized countrywide mind. This conclusion is at least as reasonable as the one SolarWorld suggests Commerce should have reached instead — i.e., that the relatively low-level government officials holding high-level positions within these companies were in fact all conduits effectuating a countrywide governmental price-setting scheme. Accordingly, because Commerce’s conclusions regarding these companies’ defac-to autonomy to set export prices during the POI are consistent with a reasonable reading of the record presented here, these conclusions are supported by substantial evidence, and are therefore sustained. CONCLUSION For all of the foregoing reasons, this matter is remanded for reconsideration of the separate rate eligibility of the four respondents named in Commerce’s request for voluntary remand, consistent with this opinion. Commerce’s Final Results are sustained against all other challenges presented in this consolidated action. Commerce shall have until February 18, 2015, to file its remand results. The parties shall have until March 4, 2015, to file their comments, and until March 18, 2015, to file any replies. It is SO ORDERED. . See [CSPC], Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, from the [PRC], 77 Fed. Reg. 63,791 (Dep’t Commerce Oct. 17, 2012) (final determination of sales at less than fair value, and affirmative final determination of critical circumstances, in part) [‘Final Results”) and accompanying Issues & Decision Mem., A-570-979, Antidumping Duly ("AD”) Investigation (Oct. 9, 2012) ("/ & D Mem."). The subject merchandise includes solar cells used to make solar energy panels and modules. See [CSPC], Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, from the [PRC], 76 Fed. Reg. 70,960, 70,965 (Dep't Commerce Nov. 16, 2011) (initiation of antidumping duty investigation) ("Notice of Initiation") (Appendix I: Scope of the Investigation) (providing a full description of the merchandise covered by this investigation); id. at 70,960 (noting that the period of investigation ("POI”) was April 1, 2011, through September 30, 2011). . Mem. of L. in Supp. of Pl.'s Rule 56.2 Mot. for J. on the Agency R., ECF No. 41 ("Jiash-eng’s Br.’’). See infra Discussion Section I.A of this opinion (explaining “separate-rate status”). . See infra note 65 (explaining the process for constructing "normal” comparison prices in investigations of merchandise from the PRC). . See Pet'r-Pl.’s Rule 56.2 Mot. for J. on the Agency R., ECF Nos. 43 (conf. version) & 44 (pub. version) (“SolarWorld's Br.”). . Further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to the relevant provisions of Title 19 of the U.S.Code, 2012 edition. . These Final Results are also subject to challenges presented in two additional actions before this Court, SolarWorld Indus. Am., Inc. v. United States, Ct. No. 13-00219, and Changzou Trina Solar Energy Co. v. United States, Consol. Ct. No. 13-00009. See Severance & Consolidation Order June 12, 2013, ECF No. 18. . Def.’s Mot. for Voluntary Remand, ECF No. 81 ("Def.’s Mot.”). . See also, e.g., Tehnoimportexport, UCF Am. Inc. v. United States, 16 CIT 13, 18, 783 F.Supp. 1401, 1406 (1992) ("When Commerce is faced with the decision to choose between two reasonable alternatives and one alternative is favored over the other in their eyes, then they have the discretion to choose accordingly."). . See, e.g., Yantai Timken Co. v. United States, 31 CIT 1741, 1755, 521 F.Supp.2d 1356, 1370 (2007) ("Commerce has broad discretion to establish its own rules governing administrative procedures, including the establishment and enforcement of time limits.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). . See Notice of Initiation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,962 ("The presumption of NME status for the PRC has not been revoked by [Commerce] and, therefore, in accordance with [19 U.S.C. 1677(18)(C)(i) ], remains in effect for purposes of the initiation of this investigation.”). . See Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co. v. United States, 716 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2013) ("[In] [proceedings involving a non-market economy, such as China, ... Commerce begins with a rebuttable presumption that all respondents in the investigation are under foreign government control and thus should receive a single countrywide dumping rate.”) (citation omitted); [CSPC], Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, from the [PRC], 77 Fed. Reg. 31,309, 31,315 (Dep't Commerce May 25, 2012) (preliminary determination of sales at less than fair value, postponement of final determination and affirmative preliminary determination of critical circumstances) (“Prelim. Results ”) ("In proceedings involving NME countries, [Commerce] has a rebut-table presumption that all companies within the country are subject to government control and thus should be assessed a single AD rate.”) (citation omitted). . See Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 294 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2002) (“Commerce determined that NME exporters would be subject to a single, countrywide antidumping duty rate unless they could demonstrate legal, financial, and economic independence from the Chinese government (referred to by Commerce as 'the NME entity’).... Under [this] NME presumption, a company that fails to demonstrate independence from the NME entity is subject to the countrywide rate, while a company that demonstrates its independence is entitled to an individual rate as in a market economy.”) (relying on Sigma Corp. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1401, 1405 (Fed.Cir.1997) ("[I]t was within Commerce’s authority to employ a presumption of state control for exporters in a nonmarket economy.”)) (additional citations omitted). . Initiation Notice, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,964 (citing Import Admin., U.S. Dep’t Commerce, Separate-Rates Practice & Application of Combination Rates in Antidumping Investigations Involving Non-Market Economy Countries, Policy Bulletin No. 05.1 (Apr. 5, 2005) ("Commerce Policy 5.1 ”), available at http:// enforcement.trade.gov/policy/bull05-l .pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2014)); Commerce Policy 5.1 at 4 ("Firms to whom [Commerce] sends a Quantity and Value (‘Q & V') questionnaire, which is used in certain investigations to select mandatory respondents, must respond to the Q & V questionnaire to receive consideration for a separate rate.”). . Notice of Initiation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,964. . See Mem. re Issuance of Quantity and Value Questionnaires, [CSPCJ, Whether or Not Assembled into [Modules,] from the [PRC], A-570T979, AD Investigation (Dec. 8, 2011), reproduced in Pub. App. of Docs, in Supp. of Def.’s Opp’n to Pis.’ Mots, for J. on the Agency R. ("Def.’s App.”), ECF No. 56-1 at P.D. 225 (listing UPS tracking number 1ZA610W90498461594 for the Q & V questionnaire sent to Jiasheng, and listing that tracking number as delivered and signed for on November 12, 2011, at 4:10pm); Notice of Initiation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,964 ("A response to the quantity and value questionnaire is due no later than November 29, 2011.”) (footnote omitted). . Quantity & Value Questionnaire, [CSPC], Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, from the [PRC], A-570-979, AD Investigation (Nov. 9, 2011) ("Jiasheng Q & v. Quest."), reproduced in App. to Br. in Supp. of PL's Rule 56.2 Mot. for J. Upon the Agency R. ("Jiash-eng’s App.”), ECF No. 45 at Doc. 15. . Cover Letter to Jiasheng Q & v. Quest., ECF No. 45 at Doc. 15. . Jiasheng Q & v. Quest., ECF No. 45 at Doc. 15, at 2 (“[Commerce] will not give consideration to any separate-rate status application made by parties that fail to timely respond to the Quantity and Value Questionnaire....”). . Cover Letter to Jiasheng Q & v. Quest, ECF No. 45 at Doc. 15. . Attach. Ill to Jiasheng Q & V Quest., ECF No. 45 at Doc. 15. . Id. . Attach. V to Jiasheng Q & v. Quest., ECF No. 45 at Doc. 15, at ¶ 4. (emphasis in original). The manual filing exceptions apply to unusually large documents or data files, or when the IA ACCESS system is unable to accept filings. See Attach. Ill to Jiasheng Q & v. Quest., ECF No. 45 at Doc. 15, at ¶ C.l. It is undisputed that these manual filing exceptions are not relevant to this case. See Oral Arg. Tr., ECF No. 83, at 7 (Jiasheng’s counsel’s concession that the manual filing exceptions refer to a "different issue”). . Mem. re Resp’t Selection, [CSPC], Whether or Not Assembled into Modules, from the [PRC], A-570-979, AD Investigation (Dec. 8, 2011) ("Resp’t Selection Mem.”), reproduced in Def.’s App., ECF No. 56-1 at P.D. 275, at 2 (noting also that nine of the 80 Q & V questionnaire responses were rejected as improperly filed and those respondents were provided .with an opportunity to correct the filing deficiencies, as well as that "many of the companies to which [Commerce] issued Q & V questionnaires did not respond to the questionnaire”). But see Prelim. Results, 77 Fed. Reg. at 31,309 ("Commerce received timely responses to its Q & V questionnaire from 76 companies.”). . See Ex. A (email correspondence) to Letter re Commerce’s Rejection of Jiasheng’s Q & V Resp. & Separate Rate Appl., [CSPC],