Full opinion text
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM DECISION TENA CAMPBELL, District Judge. On April 1, 2007, after police officers’ high speed car chase and subsequent foot pursuit of Todd Murray on the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation (the Reservation), Mr. Murray suffered a gun-shot wound to the head. Mr. Murray, who was twenty-one-years old and a member of the Ute Indian Tribe, died that same day in a local hospital. Mr. Murray’s parents and Debra Jones, Mr. Murray’s mother and the executor of his estate, filed this civil rights lawsuit, alleging that his death was caused by the unconstitutional acts of local law enforcement. This matter comes before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that in all but one instance no unconstitutional violation occurred, and, in that one instance where a violation did occur, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ cross-motion is DENIED. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Plaintiffs bring civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 against the municipalities of Uintah County and the City of Vernal, and against law enforcement officers, in their individual, as well as their official, capacities. The individual officers are four troopers with the Utah State Highway Patrol (Jeff Chugg, Dave Swenson, Craig Young and Rex Olsen); three Uintah County Sheriff Deputies (Bevan Watkins, Troy Slaugh and An-thoney Byron); Sean Davis, who is an investigator with the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources (DWR); and Vance Norton, a detective with the Vernal City Police Department (collectively, the Individual Defendants). The Plaintiffs also allege two state law claims (assaultybattery and wrongful death) against Detective Norton individually. In their § 1988 claims against the Individual Defendants, the Plaintiffs allege illegal seizure, excessive force, and failure to intervene to prevent the officers’ unconstitutional acts. Under § 1985, they allege conspiracy to obstruct justice and conspiracy to violate Mr. Murray’s civil rights based on racial animus. (Vernal City is also named in the Plaintiffs’ § 1985 conspiracy claims.) All of the Individual Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on the basis that no constitutional right was violated, but even if there were a violation, they are entitled to qualified immunity from the suit. In response, the Plaintiffs filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment against the Individual Defendants on the illegal seizure, excessive force, and failure to intervene claims. The Plaintiffs also bring claims against Uintah County and the City of Vernal (collectively, the Municipalities), that employ many of the Individual Defendants. The Plaintiffs allege that the Municipalities failed to train or supervise their officers about jurisdictional limits on their law enforcement authority, probable cause to arrest, and the proper use of force, and failed to implement policies regarding the same. Uintah County and Vernal City filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that (1) there was no violation of Mr. Murray’s civil rights; (2) there is no responde-at superior liability under § 1983 and § 1985; (3) there is no evidence of a causal link between any constitutional violation and the Municipalities’ alleged failure to train, supervise, or implement policies; and (4) the jurisdiction arguments fail because there is no evidence that the officers knew Mr. Murray was a member of the Ute Tribe until after Mr. Murray was shot and examined by the EMTs. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. THE CAR CHASE On the morning of April 1, 2007, Mr. Murray was a passenger in a car driven by Uriah Kurip. Mr. Murray and Mr. Kurip were driving west on Highway 40 in Uin-tah County near Vernal, Utah. Trooper Dave Swenson of the Utah Highway Patrol was parked near mile marker 134. Mr. Murray and Mr. Kurip drove past Trooper Swenson’s parked patrol vehicle. Using his radar, Trooper Swenson recorded the car’s speed at 74 miles an hour in a 65 miles-per-hour zone. Trooper Swenson activated his overhead lights and began following the car, intending to make a traffic stop. Instead of stopping, Mr. Kurip drove faster. Trooper Swenson notified the dispatch officer that he was involved in a high-speed chase. For approximately thirty minutes, Trooper Swenson pursued the car, in and out of the Reservation’s boundaries. At times, the two cars reached speeds of approximately 125 miles an hour. At an area called “Pour Corners,” Mr. Kurip ran the car off the road. When Trooper Swenson tried to use his patrol car to block Mr. Kurip’s car, Mr. Kurip accelerated, struck the patrol car, and drove away. Trooper Swenson was able to see inside the car and described the occupants to dispatch as “two tribal males.” He continued his pursuit. Upon learning of the chase, other officers began heading to Trooper Swenson’s location to provide backup assistance. Detective Vance Norton, who was off-duty and driving in his own car, saw the two cars speed by. He says he saw the two men in the car and thought they were Hispanic. He called dispatch on his cell phone to ask what was happening, and the dispatch officer told him that it was a high speed chase but that other officers were not yet in the area. Detective Norton told dispatch that he would follow the chase until another officer arrived. He did not have a police radio in his car so he could not listen to regular dispatch reports. Detective Norton did not hear Trooper Swen-son say the two men in the car were “tribal males.” About the same time, Lieutenant Jeff Chugg, supervisor of the Utah Highway Patrol troopers, was at home when he received a call that one of his officers was involved in a highspeed chase. He began to monitor radio traffic and was on the phone with dispatch during the car chase. Soon after he began monitoring the pursuit, he saw on a CAD screen the words “Trooper Swenson had advise[d] that it was a car with two tribal males and Nevada plates.” At some point, he got into his car and drove to what had by then become a crash scene. Trooper Rex Olsen was on duty at the time of the car chase. He was in his patrol car when he heard over the radio about the high-speed chase. He drove toward Trooper Swenson’s location to provide backup. Deputy Troy Slaugh, from the Uintah County Sheriffs Department, also learned that the high speed chase was happening. He called his colleague, Deputy Bevan Watkins (who was a “K-9” officer at the time) to let him know that Uintah County officers were responding to help Trooper Swenson. Deputy Watkins testified that it “was very common to call out a canine when there was a pursuit taking place because it was common for individuals to bail out of a vehicle that was stopped.” Deputy Watkins called the dispatch operator to offer his assistance. He received “consent” to go to the scene with his dog. He then began driving in the direction of the high speed chase. About the same time, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources (DWR) Investigator Sean Davis was on patrol in a nearby area when he learned of the chase over the radio. He drove toward Trooper Swen-son’s location. Similarly, Trooper Young and Deputy Byron drove to the scene wheii they heard about the high speed chase. Both Trooper Young and Deputy Byron testified that they did not hear any reference to “tribal males.” B. THE FOOT CHASE The car chase ended when Mr. Kurip lost control of the car and came to a stop on Turkey Track Road, which is located on the Reservation. Both Mr. Kurip and Mr. Murray got out of the car and ran. Trooper Swenson arrived almost immediately after the Kurip car stopped and Mr. Kurip and Mr. Murray got out of the car. As they began running, Trooper Swenson got out of his car, pointed his gun at Mr. Kurip and Mr. Murray, and ordered them to get down on the ground. The men did not stop and continued running in different directions. Trooper Swenson did not see any weapons in the men’s hands or in their waistbands. Trooper Swenson took the keys from the Kurip car, returned to his own car, and then followed Mr. Kurip because Mr. Kurip was the driver of the vehicle. After a short drive, Trooper Swenson again got out of his car and began chasing Mr. Kurip on foot. He quickly caught and arrested Mr. Kurip. Detective Norton was the first officer (after Trooper Swenson) to arrive at the scene. He saw Trooper Swenson standing on a hill with a man in handcuffs (Mr. Kurip) and asked Trooper Swenson about the other man (Mr. Murray). (The court notes that none of the law enforcement officers on the scene knew Mr. Murray or Mr. Kurip.) Trooper Swenson told Detective Norton that the man had run away and pointed in the direction where Mr. Murray had fled. Detective Norton began his pursuit, first in his car and then on foot. Soon after, Deputy Byron and Trooper Young arrived at the crash scene in their separate cars. As Trooper Swen-son had done with Detective Norton, he asked the two officers to capture the fleeing passenger. The three officers, all of whom were armed, pursued Mr. Murray, first in their own patrol cars and then on foot. Trooper Swenson stayed at the crash scene with Mr. Kurip. Detective Norton, after driving a short distance, got out of his car when he saw Trooper Young and Deputy Byron. Trooper Young and Deputy Byron saw Detective Norton standing on the top of a nearby hill. The three men spoke and decided that they would take different routes to locate Mr. Murray. As Detective Norton was crossing over a hill, he saw Mr. Murray “coming around another hill.” Detective Norton believed that Mr. Murray had something, possibly a gun, in his hand. Mr. Murray ran towards Detective Norton. Detective Norton shouted at Mr. Murray, “Police, get on the ground.” Mr. Murray did not obey the command. When Mr. Murray was approximately 140 yards from Detective Norton, he fired at Detective Norton. Detective Norton saw the bullet hit the ground in front him and fired twice at Mr. Murray. Detective Norton testified that he “actually saw my rounds actually hit this dirt or this rock on each side of him — .” After firing the two shots, Detective Norton turned around and, still watching over his shoulder, ran back up the hill. When he reached a distance where he believed that Mr. Murray could not shoot him, he took out his cell phone to call dispatch. Detective Norton described what saw: Actually, I noticed that he actually put the gun up to his head, and I’m trying to dial with my left hand with my cell phone because I’ve got my gun in my right hand, and I’m trying to dial the numbers, and — I’ve thought about this a lot, and somebody actually asked me, Why didn’t you just call 911? I was actually calling dispatch’s number, and that’s 789-4222, and I was not hitting the numbers right because I was trying to do it left-handed, and so I made like three attempts to call before it actually went through, so ... And like I say, he put the gun to his head. And I think I told him — once or twice screamed, you know, Put the gun down, and then he pulled the trigger, and he just went straight down. In the meantime, before shots were fired, Deputy Byron and Trooper Young began walking through a wash. Deputy Byron did not see Mr. Murray at this time, but he saw Detective Norton standing on the top of a hill approximately 400 or 500 yards away talking on a cell phone. He then heard a crackling sound but he was not sure that it was the sound of gunfire, although he did hear a report over his radio that shots had been fired. He did not see who fired the shots, but he saw a person (later identified as Mr. Murray) about 200 yards away on a flat rock outcrop below, who was swinging or waving his arms. Then Deputy Byron heard more crackling sounds and saw Mr. Murray go “from walking to going down.” He could no longer see Detective Norton. But he saw Mr. Murray “behind some brush and some rocks.” He did not know whether Mr. Murray was crouched behind the bushes or was lying on the ground. In his deposition, he described the situation: We continue a short distance. I hear — I hear some crackling. I don’t see Norton on the top of the hill anymore. And it— at some point, a guy goes — the person goes from walking to going down. And I see this, but his distance is a good 200-plus yards from me. And I’m going off of memory here. And I can — I barely see like T-shirt or something through— behind some bush and some rocks. So we — we kind of stop. I hear broken radio traffic of shots fired. And it’s broken, but I hear it. I try to confirm it. I’m looking. I can — I can see behind some shrubbery, some rocks, I can see that person, and I don’t know if he’s stooped or what, but I — I watched him fall. And then I don’t see Vance [Norton] anymore. Deputy Byron did not see whether Mr. Murray had anything in his hands. In the meantime, Trooper Swenson had taken Mr. Kurip into custody, and Investigator Davis had arrived at the crash scene. At Trooper Swenson’s request, Investigator Davis drove his car down a dead-end road but did not see anyone. He drove back to the crash scene after hearing that shots had been fired and then walked to the shooting scene. During all this time, Lieutenant Chugg had been monitoring the radio and talking with dispatch. When he heard that shots had been fired, he left his home and drove to the crash scene. C. AFTER THE SHOOTING Deputy Byron and Trooper Young quickly returned to their cars and drove to the area where they had seen Detective Norton. When they reached Detective Norton, he was talking on his cell phone. Detective Norton told them that Mr. Murray had shot at him, that he had returned fire. He also stated that he had not shot Mr. Murray but that Mr. Murray had shot himself. Detective Norton pointed out where his bullet casings had fallen. Deputy Byron and Trooper Young went to the place where Mr. Murray was lying on the ground. Trooper Young, who had his gun drawn, followed behind Deputy Byron to provide cover. Deputy Byron saw Mr. Murray lying on the ground, bleeding from the head but still alive (but his breathing was labored). Deputy Byron saw a gun on the ground next to Mr. Murray. He identified himself to Mr. Murray as he approached. He did not know the extent of Mr. Murray’s injuries. He knew that the ambulance was on standby (it is police procedure to call an ambulance to stand by during a high-speed chase). Deputy Byron rolled Mr. Murray “onto his side, stomach” so he could put handcuffs on Mr. Murray. At the same time, Trooper Young pointed his gun at Mr. Murray and continued to provide cover to Deputy Byron. Deputy Byron described their actions: Made an approach with cover. Trooper Young was holding cover on me. Again, I didn’t know what to expect. I knew that, you know, get down, secure the scene. Obviously seeing that there was an injury, I didn’t know where — to what extent the injuries were. I made an approach safely, and I took him into custody, placed him in handcuffs. Deputy Byron stated the reasons he placed Mr. Murray in handcuffs: “Again, I didn’t know the extent of his injuries, and I just wanted to make sure it was a secure scene before we got medical on its way.” In the meantime, other officers were arriving at the shooting scene. Trooper Olsen, while driving to the scene, heard over the radio that shots had been fired. He arrived about twenty minutes later. He did not go to the shooting scene. He stayed at the crash scene, took an inventory of Mr. Kurip’s car, prepared a vehicle impound report, and interviewed Trooper Swenson. He did not have contact with Mr. Murray or Detective Norton at any point during the incident. While Deputy Watkins was on his way, he learned that the car chase was over and the driver had been taken into custody. He never heard Trooper Swenson say that “two tribal males” were in the car being chased. He did know that the BIA had been called and was en route. When Deputy Watkins arrived at the crash scene, Mr. Murray had already been shot and the ambulance had been called. He helped the ambulance get close to Mr. Murray and help the EMTs load Mr. Murray into the ambulance. He then stayed at the shooting scene until an agent with the F.B.I. arrived. Deputy Slaugh did not arrive at the shooting scene until after Mr. Murray had been shot. He went to stand by Detective Norton, where he found shell casings on the ground. He took photographs of the shell casings and Detective Norton. He and Detective Norton walked over to Mr. Murray’s body. He handed Detective Norton the camera, and Detective Norton took closeup photographs of Mr. Murray. Then the two officers walked back to Deputy Slaugh’s car, where they “stayed out of the scene.” At some point, Trooper Swenson asked Deputy Slaugh to take Mr. Kurip to a youth detention, and so Deputy Slaugh left the scene. He had no further involvement in the incident. After Mr. Murray was handcuffed, the EMTs were summoned from the waiting ambulance. By this time, other officers had arrived. Although Mr. Murray was unconscious, breathing laboriously, and bleeding from the head, no officer at the scene tried to assist or give medical aid to Mr. Murray. About thirty minutes after the shooting, the EMTs arrived at the shooting scene. While tending to Mr. Murray, they retrieved Mr. Murray’s identification card identifying him as an enrolled member of the Ute Tribe. It was only at that point that the officers knew that Mr. Murray was an enrolled member of the Ute Tribe. When Officer Davis arrived at the shooting scene, he saw Mr. Murray, who was already on the ground and handcuffed. He stayed at the scene, but did not assist Mr. Murray. Instead, he stood over some shell casings to make sure they were not disturbed. He also assisted a Uintah County Sheriff with obtaining GPS locations. He had no further involvement with the events that day. Deputy Watkins ordered Deputy Byron to accompany Mr. Murray to the hospital. Lieutenant Chugg arrived at the shooting scene after Mr. Murray had been taken to the hospital. D.THE HOSPITAL Mr. Murray was taken to a hospital in Vernal, Utah, where he was pronounced dead shortly after his arrival. Deputy Byron, who had accompanied the ambulance to the hospital, was joined there by Officer Ben Murray and BIA Officer Kevin Myore. After Mr. Murray’s death, the three men began collecting evidence: taking photographs of Mr. Murray’s body, gathering his clothing in bags, and putting bags over Mr. Murray’s hands. A member of the hospital staff drew a vial of blood from Mr. Murray’s body. One of the officers took Mr. Murray’s clothes and the blood. Deputy Byron placed his index finger in both of the wounds in Mr. Murray’s head. According to Deputy Byron, he did this to determine the location of the entrance wound and the exit wound. E. THE MORTUARY An employee from a nearby mortuary took Mr. Murray’s body to the mortuary. Several law enforcement officers — including Rex Ashdown, who was a special agent from the FBI, Gary Jensen, who was Vernal City Chief of Police, and Keith Campbell, who was both a deputy medical examiner for the Utah State Office of the Medical Examiner and a chief deputy for the Uintah County Sheriffs Office — were there. Chief Jensen twice tried, unsuccessfully, to take blood from Mr. Murray’s body. An employee from the mortuary then made incisions in the neck and jugular vein and drew two vials of blood which he gave to Chief Jensen. Mr. Murray’s body was not embalmed. F. THE MEDICAL EXAMINATION The following day, Mr. Murray’s body was taken to the Utah State Office of the Medical Examiner. Although FBI Special Agent Ashdown had requested that a full autopsy be performed, the Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, Dr. Edward Leis, who was to carry out the examination of Mr. Murray’s body, decided to do only a physical examination. According to Dr. Leis, he decided after doing a physical examination of Mr. Murray’s body and reading the Office of the Medical Examiner (OME) Investigative Report (which said that Mr. Murray had shot himself in the head), that a full autopsy was not necessary. Dr. Leis determined that the bullet had entered the left side of Mr. Murray’s head, to the rear of the left temple and above the left ear. When he described the entrance wound in his autopsy report, Dr. Leis wrote that he found “abundant soot at the inferior margin of the defect [the wound] and some marginal abrasion is also noted at the inferior margin.” Because of the soot and the abrasion, Dr. Leis concluded that the gun was “in close proximity to the skin surface when it was discharged.” But Dr. Leis went further. He explained why he believed that the gun was in contact with Mr. Murray’s head when it was fired: At the perimeter, there are several triangular shaped tears of the wound. That’s a result of the gun being pressed up against the skin surface when it’s discharged and gases causing the scalp to be separated from the underlying skull. When the scalp lifts up, it stretches and it tears and gets its characteristic stellae appearance. The smaller wound on the right side of Mr. Murray’s head was, in Dr. Leis’ opinion, the exit wound. Dr. Leis took a urine sample, an eye-fluid sample, and three blood samples from Mr. Murray’s body. He sent the samples to a toxicology laboratory for testing. Dr. Leis completed a death certificate that listed the cause of Mr. Murray’s death as suicide resulting from a gunshot wound to the head. Several weeks later, Dr. Leis received the results of the toxicology tests done on the fluids taken from Mr. Murray’s body. The tests showed the presence of ethanol, cannabinoids, amphetamine and methamphetamine. Dr. Leis issued an amended death certificate which added “Acute alcohol intoxication; recent methamphetamine use” as contributing to Mr. Murray’s death. After the examination at the Medical Examiner’s Office was completed, Mr. Murray’s body was released to his family for burial. III. ANALYSIS A. Standard of Summary Judgment Review Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is entitled to summary judgment if it demonstrates, through pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or affidavits, that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when, after viewing the record and making all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The opposing party’s response must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, and it “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court must view the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. See Lundstrom v. Romero, 616 F.3d 1108, 1118 (10th Cir.2010); Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d 1269, 1279 (10th Cir.2008). B. Non-Conspiracy Claims Against the Individual Officers Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Plaintiffs allege that the officers violated Mr. Murray’s Fourth Amendment and due process rights to be free from illegal seizure, excessive force, and the officers’ failure to intervene in ongoing violations of those civil rights. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, they allege that the Defendants conspired to obstruct justice in a state court proceeding and to violate equal protection rights, all while motivated by a racial animus directed at Native Americans. 1. Qualified Immunity Law enforcement officers who have been sued in their individual capacity for constitutional violations are entitled to qualified immunity “when they could not reasonably have known that their challenged actions violated the law.” Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 1354 (10th Cir.1990). Qualified immunity “provides ‘immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.’” Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200, 1203 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). The doctrine shields law enforcement officers from civil liability for discretionary actions if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1457 (10th Cir.1989) (same); Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 645 (10th Cir.1988) (same). Only after the plaintiffs satisfy their burden do the officers “assume the normal burden of a movant for summary judgment of establishing that no material facts remain in dispute that would defeat ... his claim of qualified immunity.” Powell, 891 F.2d at 1457. 2. Law Enforcement Jurisdiction Law enforcement jurisdiction on the Reservation is an important element of the Plaintiffs’ case. Apart from some limited exceptions discussed below, neither the State of Utah nor its political subdivisions have criminal jurisdiction in “Indian country,” such as the Reservation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (federal law of the United States “as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States ... shall extend to Indian country.”); Gardner v. United States, No. 93-4102, 1994 WL 170780 at *3, 1994 U.S.App. LEXIS 10090 at *10 (10th Cir. May 5, 1994). Although a cooperative law enforcement agreement between a state and a tribe may allow cross-deputized officers from Utah to exercise law enforcement authority on the Reservation, none of the officers involved in this incident were cross-deputized. Any seizure of Mr. Murray by any of the Individual Defendants, absent exigent circumstances, would as a matter of law be unconstitutional. See Ross v. Neff 905 F.2d 1349, 1354 (10th Cir.1990) (a “war-rantless arrest executed outside of the arresting officer’s jurisdiction [that is, on tribal land] is analogous to a warrantless arrest without probable cause” and is “presumptively unreasonable.”)- The court has already held that no exigent circumstances existed in this case. Accordingly, based on Ross, any seizure of Mr. Murray on the Reservation by the officers was unreasonable as a matter of law. 3. Claims of Illegal Seizure The Plaintiffs contend that officers Norton, Young, Byron, and Swenson seized Mr. Murray on the Reservation and so a violation of Mr. Murray’s Fourth Amendment rights necessarily occurred. They focus on the following events: (1) Trooper Swenson’s order to Mr. Kurip and Mr. Murray to stop after the car chase ended and the men got out of the car; (2) the forming of a police perimeter to entrap Mr. Murray; (3) Detective Norton firing at Mr. Murray twice; (4) when Detective Norton’s bullet allegedly entered Mr. Murray’s head; and (5) Deputy Byron handcuffing Mr. Murray while Trooper Young pointed his gun as cover for Deputy Byron. “Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (emphasis added), quoted in Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244, 1251 (10th Cir.2007). Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Murray was illegally seized either through a “show of authority” or physical force multiple times during the pursuit. As discussed below, the case law and facts do not support the Plaintiffs’ allegations. a. Trooper Swenson’s Verbal Command to Stop Plaintiffs assert that Trooper Swenson seized Mr. Murray when he ordered the two men to stop after Mr. Kurip ran the car off the road. Even though the two men were not physically restrained at that point, the Plaintiffs argue that the two men were seized by a show of authority when, after Trooper Swenson shouted to them to stop, Mr. Kurip and Mr. Murray hesitated before running away. Characterizing the incident as a “traffic stop,” they argue that the hesitation was a submission to Trooper Swenson’s command and, consequently, a seizure occurred. In California v. Hodari D., the United States Supreme Court defined the contours of the “show of authority” requirement. 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), cited in Reeves, 484 F.3d at 1252. In Hodari D., the Court held that a police officer’s command to halt is not a seizure until the person actually submits to the command. Id. at 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547. There, the Court held that because the suspect fled and refused to comply with the police command to stop, he was not seized at that point. Id. at 629, 111 S.Ct. 1547. A number of cases in the Tenth Circuit address the same issue and reach the same conclusion. See, e.g., Brooks v. Gaenzle, 614 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.2010) (noting that “one can reasonably conclude a ‘seizure’ requires restraint of one’s freedom of movement and includes apprehension or capture by deadly force.”); Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244, 1251-53 (10th Cir.2007) (holding that plaintiffs were not seized when gun was pointed at them because they pushed the gun away and ignored the officers’ commands); United States v. Harris, 313 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (10th Cir.2002) (holding that plaintiff was not seized because he ignored the officer’s request to produce identification and continued walking even when the officer followed him); Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that officer’s firing of gun shots that struck fleeing helicopter was an assertion of authority but that no seizure occurred because the shots did not cause the suspect to submit and or otherwise succeed in stopping the suspect). The video taken by the dashboard camera on Trooper Swenson’s patrol car captured the scene of the car stopping and Mr. Murray getting out of the car and running away from the officer. Plaintiffs suggest that Mr. Murray, upon getting out of the car, hesitated and glanced to the left toward Mr. Kurip as Trooper Swenson ordered them to stop. This hesitation, Plaintiffs assert, was a brief submission to Trooper Swenson’s authority and constituted a seizure of, admittedly, “short duration.” But the video does not support the Plaintiffs’ characterization of the events. They describe the incident through a play-by-play recitation of what Trooper Swenson remembered and articulated in his deposition. But the events happened much faster than Plaintiffs suggest. That is clear from the dash-cam video taken from Trooper Swenson’s car. Having reviewed the video, the court finds that Mr. Murray’s glance to the left as he fled on foot, to the extent it was a “hesitation,” was so slight that no reasonable jury could interpret it as a submission to Trooper Swenson’s commands. With no submission, Plaintiffs cannot establish that Mr. Murray was seized by Trooper Swenson. Accordingly, Trooper Swenson is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of fact on Plaintiffs’ claim of illegal seizure. b. Police Perimeter Plaintiffs next allege that Trooper Swenson, Detective Norton, Deputy Byron, and Trooper Young acted in concert to “erect[] a police perimeter to entrap Murray” when they “fanned out on foot,” “began searching for Murray with guns drawn, including three handguns, an AR-15 rifle, and a shotgun,” and “elos[ed] in on him.” But, the Individual Defendants contend, no police perimeter was formed, and even if one was formed, it was not a seizure. The court agrees. After Mr. Murray fled, Trooper Swen-son captured Mr. Kurip, handcuffed him, and brought him back to the police car at the crash scene. As Detective Norton, Deputy Byron and Trooper Young each arrived at the crash scene, Trooper Swen-son asked them to apprehend Mr. Murray. The three officers, all of whom were armed, pursued Mr. Murray on foot. But Trooper Swenson never left the scene of the crash. He stayed with Mr. Kurip. His only role in the foot chase was to ask officers from different law enforcement jurisdictions to chase and capture Mr. Murray. Trooper Swenson had no involvement in formation of the alleged perimeter. And even if one characterizes his request to the officers to pursue Mr. Murray as a command to form a perimeter, he still has no liability because, as discussed below, the formation of any such perimeter did not seize Mr. Murray. Indeed, the court is not convinced from the record that a reasonable jury could conclude that the three officers actually formed a perimeter that surrounded Mr. Murray and prevented his escape. The officers were one to two hundred yards away from Mr. Murray and did not have him surrounded. They were coming at him from the same direction, and, with the exception of Detective Norton, the officers did not definitively locate Mr. Murray until after the shooting. Deputy Byron’s view of Mr. Murray was partially obscured by a bush and his sighting of Mr. Murray occurred within seconds of Mr. Murray being shot. Trooper Young did not see Mr. Murray until after Mr. Murray had been shot. But even if they did form a perimeter, the record is not clear that Mr. Murray would have been aware of a police perimeter or would have had the knowledge that a group of police officers were pursuing him. As a group, they did not identify themselves to him. The only officer clearly visible to Mr. Murray was Detective Norton, and the presence of one officer does not form a perimeter. But even assuming the officers formed a police perimeter around Mr. Murray, they did not seize him, because Mr. Murray failed to submit to their law enforcement authority. Instead of submitting, Mr. Murray fired a shot at Detective Norton and then turned the gun on himself. See Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244, 1252-53 (10th Cir.2007) (no seizure occurred when police officers gave verbal commands and pointed their weapons at the plaintiffs outside a surrounded apartment building, because one plaintiff ran away and the other pushed the gun away, refusing to follow the officer’s command to go inside her apartment); Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 171 (1st Cir.2008) (holding that existence of police perimeter was not a seizure because there was no evidence that the suspect knew his house had been cordoned off, much less that he submitted to the officers’ authority). Because no reasonable jury could find that Mr. Murray submitted to a police perimeter, the court holds that no constitutional violation occurred. Trooper Swen-son, Detective Norton, Deputy Byron, and Trooper Young are entitled to qualified immunity from suit on that portion of Plaintiffs’ claim. c. Detective Norton’s Shooting at Mr. Murray The Plaintiffs contend that Detective Norton seized Mr. Murray when he (1) fired shots at Mr. Murray; and (2) according to Plaintiffs, shot Mr. Murray in the head. The record does not support their claim and no reasonable jury could find against Detective Norton. During the foot chase, when Detective Norton spotted Mr. Murray approximately 100 yards away, he held his gun (a .40 caliber weapon) in a “low ready position,” identified himself as a police officer, and ordered Mr. Murray to get down on the ground. In response, Mr. Murray fired two shots at Detective Norton, both of which hit the ground by Detective Norton. In return, Detective Norton fired two shots at Mr. Murray as he tried to distance himself from Mr. Murray by retreating back up the hill. Those shots also fell short of the target. Then Detective Norton saw Mr. Murray put a gun to his head, shoot himself, and drop to the ground. The gun found on the ground by Mr. Murray was a .380 handgun. Shots Fired As noted above, a seizure occurs when the individual is physically restrained by the officer or when the individual submits to the officer’s show of authority. Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244, 1251 (10th Cir.2007). Neither scenario occurred here. When Detective Norton identified himself as a police officer and told Mr. Murray to get to the ground, Murray resisted by firing two shots at Detective Norton. When Detective Norton responded by shooting back at Mr. Murray, his bullets hit the ground around Mr. Murray. Because Mr. Murray resisted Detective Norton’s order and because Detective Norton’s bullets missed the target (Mr. Murray), Detective Norton did not seize Mr. Murray at that point. See, e.g., James v. Chavez, 830 F.Supp.2d 1208, 1242-48 (D.N.M.2011) (holding that a shot that misses the intended target is not a seizure) (citing to Reeves, 484 F.3d at 1252-53). Plaintiffs contend Mr. Murray was waving his arms in an act of surrender and so he did submit to Norton’s show of authority. But the evidence on that point is inconclusive, and, more importantly, not material. The evidence clearly shows that Mr. Murray shot himself. The Bullet to Mr. Murray’s Head The Plaintiffs argue that Detective Norton seized Mr. Murray because he shot Mr. Murray in the head. But the Plaintiffs’ evidence is sparse, circumstantial, subject to more than one interpretation, and, at times, very speculative. Moreover, evidence to the contrary is strong and is consistent with a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Deputy Byron testified that he did not see Detective Norton next to Mr. Murray when Mr. Murray dropped to the ground. Detective Norton testified that he was up on a hill when he saw Mr. Murray shoot himself. The Deputy Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Edward Leis, who conducted the physical examination of Mr. Murray’s body, concluded in his report that the wound was caused by a gun shot “in close proximity to the skin surface when it was discharged.” He based his conclusion on “abundant soot at the inferior margin of the defect [the wound] and some marginal abrasion is also noted at the inferior margin.” In his testimony, he elaborated on his conclusion that the gun was in contact with Mr. Murray’s head when it was fired: At the perimeter, there are several triangular shaped tears of the wound. That’s a result of the gun being pressed up against the skin surface when it’s discharged and gases causing the scalp to be separated from the underlying skull. When the scalp lifts up, it stretches and it tears and gets its characteristic stellae appearance. The smaller wound on the right side of Mr. Murray’s head was, in Dr. Leis’ opinion, the exit wound. After Dr. Leis certified that Mr. Murray’s death was a suicide resulting from a gunshot wound to the head, he added an additional cause of death (based on results from testing of Mr. Murray’s bodily fluids). Because the tests showed the presence of drugs and alcohol in Mr. Murray’s system, Dr. Leis issued an amended death certificate which added “Acute alcohol intoxication; recent methamphetamine use” as contributing to Mr. Murray’s death. Detective Norton was more than 100 yards away when Mr. Murray was shot. Dr. Leis testified that there was no evidence that the wound could have been caused by a shot coming from that far away. Plaintiffs maintain that Detective Norton was not 100 yards away, but was right next to Mr. Murray and so he had the capability of inflicting the contact wound. But the actual evidence in the record (that is, testimony by Detective Norton and Deputy Byron) shows that Detective Norton was not right next to Mr. Murray when the fatal shot was fired. The Plaintiffs’ alternative contention that Mr. Murray shot himself in response to the pressure of a wrongful pursuit is not persuasive. Their theory is speculative. Moreover, such a situation would not be a seizure. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (“[A] Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is ... a governmentally caused and governmentally desired termination of an individual’s freedom of movement (the fleeing felon), but only when there is governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied”) (italics emphasis in original; underline emphasis added). Based on the evidence in the record, no reasonable jury could find that Detective Norton inflicted the mortal blow to Mr. Murray. Plaintiffs contend that Detective Norton shot Mr. Murray in the head at point blank range, but they offer speculation rather than evidence to support their claim. For instance, they point to Dr. Leis’ response (in his deposition) to a question that asked for an answer to a hypothetical. Specifically, the attorney asked, “So would it be possible — is it your opinion, Doctor, that this could be — looking at this wound [as depicted in a photograph], that it could be self-inflicted or an execution-style shooting?” After an objection, the attorney then asked, “Can you tell from this entrance wound, Dr. Leis, whether or not this was conclusively caused by a self-inflicted gunshot wound or an execution-style killing?” Dr. Leis said, “No.” But Dr. Leis was asked by Plaintiffs’ counsel whether he could conclusively say, based solely on examining the entrance wound with no other evidence to provide context, that the wound was caused by a self-inflicted gun shot wound rather than an execution-style killing. Furthermore, Dr. Leis’ answer based on the hypothetical offered to him is not supported by the facts in the record. Indeed, Dr. Leis, based on his examination of Mr. Murray and the data he gathered from tests of body fluids, opined that Mr. Murray had shot himself in the head. All of the direct evidence presented by the Defendants, including Dr. Leis’ testimony and report, supports the conclusion that Mr. Murray shot himself. Plaintiffs offer no more than speculation and no reasonable jury could find that Detective Norton shot Mr. Murray in the head at point-blank range. The Plaintiffs question Detective Norton’s version of the events that occurred. But veracity of a witness is not to be considered at the summary judgment stage. Moreover, independent evidence discussed above supports Detective Norton’s version of events. It is much more reasonable to infer that Mr. Murray’s acute intoxication rendered him irrational and that he pulled the trigger. Under all of the circumstances, no reasonable jury could accept the Plaintiffs’ theory about an execution-style killing. Because direct evidence (unrefuted by admissible evidence) that Mr. Murray’s gunshot wound was self-inflicted, it could not be a physical restraint imposed by Detective Norton. Consequently, the fatal shot was not a seizure by a law enforcement officer. For foregoing reasons, no reasonable jury could conclude that a seizure of Mr. Murray occurred during the shooting incident, and so his constitutional right to be free from illegal seizures was not violated. Detective Norton is entitled to qualified immunity on the seizure claim. d. Handcuffing of Mr. Murray at the Shooting Scene Deputy Byron Deputy Byron’s handcuffing of Mr. Murray was indisputably a seizure. Because that seizure occurred on the Reservation, where Mr. Murray was an enrolled member of the Ute Tribe, and because Deputy Byron was not cross-deputized, that seizure was a per se violation of Mr. Murray’s Fourth Amendment right, albeit a technical violation. See Ross v. Neff 905 F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that a warrant-less arrest made outside of the officer’s jurisdiction is a constitutional violation absent exigent circumstances). Consequently, the court must determine whether Deputy Byron violated a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable officer would have known. In other words, to determine whether the officers are entitled to the qualified immunity defense, the court “must determine whether a reasonable officer could have believed the manner of plaintiffs arrest and detention ... to be constitutionally permissible, in light of clearly established law and the information defendants possessed at the time.” Martin v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 909 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir.1990) (emphasis added). Even if the rule of law regarding an officer’s jurisdiction was clearly established in Ross, that decision did not address how or when a police officer must determine the tribal status of the suspect. Deputy Byron did not know Mr. Murray and he did not hear any reference to “tribal males” over the radio. When Deputy Byron handcuffed Mr. Murray, at that point there was no way he could determine whether Mr. Murray was a tribal member. He followed reasonable police procedure, and there is no legal rule prohibiting the procedure he followed. Moreover, an officer cannot tell whether a person is a registered tribal member just by looking at him. The officer needs official verification, which may or may not be in possession of the suspect. “It is the policy and practice of the State Defendants and the law enforcement agencies working near the reservation to stop individuals suspected of wrongdoing, and then determine whether the suspect is a registered member of a tribe.” Deputy Byron confirmed this practice when he testified that his employer’s policy was to handle situations requiring a quick response without regard to jurisdiction because the officers must provide assistance to whomever needs it without having to verify first whether the suspect was a member of the Ute Tribe. Deputy Byron reasonably believed that he had a factual basis to restrain Mr. Murray. It is not reasonable to expect him to ascertain Mr. Murray’s status before then. Trooper Young Plaintiffs also contend that Trooper Young violated Mr. Murray’s civil rights by pointing a gun at him. Trooper Young did not touch Mr. Murray and did not point his gun at Murray for longer than the time it took for Deputy Byron to approach Mr. Murray and handcuff him. Trooper Young did not make a show of authority to Mr. Murray, as Mr. Murray was unconscious and had no knowledge of the cover Trooper Young provided for Deputy Byron. Pointing a gun at a suspect, by itself, with no submission by the suspect, is not a seizure. See Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244, 1252-53 (10th Cir.2007) (finding no seizure when officers pointed weapons and made verbal commands without submission to authority); James v. Chavez, 830 F.Supp.2d 1208, 1243 (D.N.M.2011) (“[W]ithout evidence that a person has submitted to a show of authority, even an officer pointing a gun directly at a person’s head does not constitute a seizure.”) (citing Reeves, 484 F.3d at 1252-53). To the extent the Plaintiffs contend that Trooper Young’s action was a seizure because it was connected to (or perhaps facilitated by) Deputy Byron’s action, their claim fails, because, as discussed above, it was reasonable for Trooper Young to protect his fellow officer, whether the danger was real or not. He too had no reasonable basis for knowing that Mr. Murray was an enrolled member of the Tribe. An officer is not required to determine a person’s legal status before doing his duty to enforce the law in a situation requiring a quick response. For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Trooper Young did not violate Mr. Murray’s civil rights by pointing a gun at Mr. Murray and so he is entitled to qualified immunity on the seizure claim. 4. Claims of Excessive Force The Plaintiffs contend that the officers used excessive force against Mr. Murray when they (1) formed the “police perimeter to entrap and apprehend Murray at gunpoint”; (2) ordered Mr. Murray at gun point to get down on the ground; and (3) used deadly force to apprehend Mr. Murray (that is, when Detective Norton shot at Mr. Murray and then allegedly shot Mr. Murray in the head). Additionally, although it is not clearly laid out in the pleadings, it appears that the Plaintiffs also contend that Deputy Byron used excessive force when he handcuffed Mr. Murray. The Plaintiffs bring their excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment as well as the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A claim of excessive force occurring during a seizure must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test set forth in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). A claim of excessive force that occurs outside the course of a seizure is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process principles. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-44, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). Because the Plaintiffs challenge acts that occurred in both seizure and non-seizure circumstances, the court will analyze the claims of excessive force under both standards, as applicable. But, regardless of the standard that applies, no reasonable jury could find that any of the officers used excessive force on Mr. Murray. a. Excessive Force Claims Under the Fourth Amendment To find excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, the court must first find that a seizure occurred. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-44, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The only time Mr. Murray was seized was when Deputy Byron handcuffed him. Accordingly, that is the only act that must be analyzed under the standards applicable to the Fourth Amendment claim. To determine whether Deputy Byron used excessive force, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances and conduct “a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.... The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Id. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865. “The use of handcuffs is the use of force, and such force must be objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 103, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (Kennedy, J. concurring). Here, Deputy Byron did not know the identity of Mr. Murray or anything about him other than his involvement in the high-speed chase, his flight from a police officer, subsequent exchange of gun shots, and a gun on the ground next to Mr. Murray. He rushed onto the scene and had little time to assess the situation before he handcuffed Mr. Murray. He knew he had a wounded suspect and that emergency personnel were on the way. He secured the scene, as he was trained to do. Securing the scene, no matter what it might present, is a reasonable response by a police officer. Moreover, to succeed on a claim of excessive force for the manner of handcuffing, a plaintiff “must show ‘some actual injury that is not de minimis, be it physical or emotional.’ ” Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1247 (10th Cir.2011) (quoting Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1129 (10th Cir.2007)). There is no evidence of physical harm or emotional harm to Mr. Murray. The manner in which Deputy Byron handcuffed Mr. Murray was simple and the least intrusive way to secure the scene for the EMTs. b. Excessive Force Claims Under the Substantive Due Process Clause Plaintiffs alternatively claim that Mr. Murray’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated. The due process analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment applies to a claim of excessive force only when no seizure occurred. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842-43, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (holding that all claims of excessive force arising out an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, and that the substantive due process analysis applies only when the claim is not covered by the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (“[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.”); Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 922 (10th Cir.2007) (noting that substantive due process analysis is foreclosed if claim is covered by the Fourth Amendment). Because neither the pursuit of Mr. Murray on Reservation land nor Detective Norton’s shot at Mr. Murray resulted in a seizure, the court analyzes the Plaintiffs’ claims on those events by applying the substantive due process standard. “[T]he substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only when it ‘can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.’ ” County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 847, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)). And “only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’ ” Collins, 503 U.S. at 129,112 S.Ct. 1061. The substantive due process standard is “more onerous” than the Fourth Amendment standard. Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1054 (10th Cir.1993). Plaintiffs have not met this high threshold. All of the Plaintiffs’ claims of egregious behavior stem from their complaint that the actions took place on the Reservation and were aimed at an enrolled member of the tribe. The officers did not know, could not have known, and did not have the duty at that point to ascertain whether Mr. Murray was an enrolled member of the tribe. The pursuit was reasonable under the circumstances. Mr. Murray was part of a high speed chase and fled from Trooper Swenson. This information created sufficient concern in the officers’ minds about Mr. Murray’s motives for the flight and the danger he posed, if any. They reasonably believed he had committed at least one crime (flight from a police officer) and pursuing him for that was reasonable. Even though the BIA police had been called as a precaution, no BIA police officer was there at the time. It was completely reasonable to apprehend the. fleeing suspect so they could fully investigate and turn him over to the proper authorities, if necessary. There is no evidence that the officers were acting like a posse to capture the “Indian,” as Plaintiffs have argued. Although Plaintiffs paint it that way, they do so without evidence to support their theory. It was also reasonable under the circumstances for Detective Norton to fire his gun at Mr. Murray. Mr. Murray shot at Detective Norton first. Detective Norton was retreating to protect himself when he shot back. None of the officers’ actions were egregious or conscience shocking. Their attempt to apprehend Mr. Murray while protecting themselves — and the means they used to do so — were expected police behavior in light of the circumstances. 5. Claims of Failure to Intervene It is clearly established that every law enforcement officer has the duty to intervene if he sees a person’s constitutional rights being violated by a fellow officer and has an opportunity to do so. Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198, 1210 (10th Cir.2008). “ ‘Omissions as well as actions may violate civil rights’ ” and “ ‘under certain circumstances a state actor’s failure to intervene renders him or her culpable under § 1983.’ ” Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir.1997) (quoting Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir.1994)). An officer is hable under § 1983 for failure to intervene if he knows a constitutional violation is being committed and he had a “realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.” Id. at 477. Plaintiffs allege that the Individual Defendants failed in their duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of Mr. Murray. Specifically, they allege in their complaint that each of the Individual Defendants failed to intervene because they breached their “duty to protest” the “illegal pursuit and apprehension” of Todd Murray on the Reservation. Each [Individual] Defendant had a duty to protest to his fellow officers that each of them was outside their jurisdictional authority and was without any legal authority to pursue Murray on the tribal trust lands of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. The Plaintiffs further allege that: each of the [Individual] Defendants had a duty to protest to his fellow police officers that there existed neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to believe that Todd R. Murray had committed any crime, meaning that the officers’ pursuit of Murray — at gunpoint— was illegal on multiple Constitutional grounds. It appears from the Plaintiffs’ complaint that they focus the majority of their “failure to intervene” allegations on the pursuit of Mr. Murray. But based on their statements in briefs, the court liberally reads their pleadings and concludes that they also challenge the officers’ actions concerning the handcuffing of Mr. Murray. Accordingly, the court will look at the events that occurred at the shooting scene after Mr. Murray was shot. To find liability, the court must find that a duty to intervene exists and that the officer had an opportunity to intervene. But there can be no failure to intervene if a constitutional right has not been violated. See, e.g., Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir.2005) (“In order for there to be a failure to intervene, it logically follows that there must exist an underlying constitutional violation^]”); Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 494 (7th Cir.1997) (no constitutional violation and so no liability for failure to intervene), cited in Ford v. Fleming, 229 F.3d 1163, 2000 WL 1346392, at *2 (10th Cir. Sept. 19, 2000) (unpublished table case). The pursuit of Mr. Murray, both by car and on foot, did not constitute a violation, so the court need not determine whether there was a failure to intervene. See Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir.1992) (stating that “pre-seizure conduct is not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny”). As the court found above, the pursuit did not constitute a seizure (it did not result in submission to a show of authority or physical restraint of Mr. Murray). Second, pursuing Mr. Murray on Reservation lands after a high-speed car chase is not a violation of Mr. Murray’s rights because he was not seized and there was no reason for the police officers to know that Mr. Murray was an enrolled member of the tribe. Compare Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349, 1354 n. 6 (10th Cir.1990) (addressing an arrest (seizure) of a tribal member on Indian land, not pre-seizure conduct). Third, when Deputy Byron handcuffed Mr. Murray, neither Deputy Byron nor Trooper Young had any basis for knowing that Mr. Murray was an enrolled member of the Tribe. The same would apply to any other officer on the scene, either at the time of the handcuffing or immediately afterward. The handcuffing had already occurred by the time the officers arrived at the site. Accordingly, they did not have the ability to stop the handcuffing. Also, none of the officers had any basis for knowing that Mr. Murray was an enrolled member of the Tribe, and so they would not reasonably have known that a violation of the right recognized in Ross v. Neff had occurred. C. Co