Full opinion text
DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH, United States District Judge On October 1, 2017, a lone gunman fired several hundred rounds of ammunition at a crowd gathered for an outdoor concert in Las Vegas, killing 58 people and wounding hundreds more. According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), the gunman used multiple "bump stocks" in the attack, which increased his rate of fire. In response to this tragedy, the President, Members of Congress, and others urged ATF to reconsider its prior position that a bump stock is not a "machinegun" within the meaning of the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA). On December 26, 2018, ATF issued a final rule amending the regulatory definition of "machinegun" to include "bump-stock-type devices." As a result, if the rule becomes effective on March 26, 2019, as scheduled, bump stocks will be banned under the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986 (FOPA). To prevent the rule from taking effect, the plaintiffs-Damien Guedes, the Firearms Policy Coalition, David Codrea, and their co-plaintiffs-filed three motions for a preliminary injunction in which they raised overlapping statutory and constitutional challenges. All of the plaintiffs contend that ATF violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when it promulgated the rule. Guedes also argues that ATF violated certain procedural requirements in 18 U.S.C. § 926(b), which grants the agency rulemaking authority. Codrea further argues that the rule violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. And all of the plaintiffs contend that then-Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker lacked authority to promulgate the rule under either the Appointments Clause of the Constitution or 28 U.S.C. § 508 (the AG Act), a succession statute specific to the Office of the Attorney General. Because none of the plaintiffs' arguments support preliminary injunctive relief, the Court will deny all three motions. Most of the plaintiffs' administrative law challenges are foreclosed by the Chevron doctrine, which permits an agency to reasonably define undefined statutory terms. See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council , 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Here, Congress defined "machinegun" in the NFA to include devices that permit a firearm to shoot "automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger," 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b), but it did not further define the terms "single function of the trigger" or "automatically." Because both terms are ambiguous, ATF was permitted to reasonably interpret them, and in light of their ordinary meaning, it was reasonable for ATF to interpret "single function of the trigger" to mean "single pull of the trigger and analogous motions" and "automatically" to mean "as the result of a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of multiple rounds through a single pull of the trigger." ATF also reasonably applied these definitions when it concluded that bump stocks permit a shooter to discharge multiple rounds automatically with a single function of the trigger. That this decision marked a reversal of ATF's previous interpretation is not a basis for invalidating the rule because ATF's current interpretation is lawful and ATF adequately explained the change in interpretation. The Court also rejects the plaintiffs' procedural challenges. ATF adequately responded to the objections raised by the plaintiffs during the comment period, and ATF was not required to disclose evidence on which it did not rely when it promulgated the rule. Nor did ATF violate § 926(b) by refusing to hold an oral hearing. Finally, any error ATF may have committed by failing to extend the comment period by five days because of technical glitches was harmless. As for the Takings Clause challenge, the plaintiffs have not shown that preliminary injunctive relief rather than future compensation is appropriate. The plaintiffs' statutory and constitutional challenges to Whitaker's authority fare no better. As a statutory matter, the plaintiffs argue that the AG Act requires the Deputy Attorney General to serve as Acting Attorney General when there is a vacancy and that nothing in the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) empowers the President to change that result. The plain text and structure of both statutes, however, demonstrate that they were intended to coexist: the AG Act provides a line of succession, and the FVRA gives the President discretion to depart from that line, subject to certain limitations met here. As a constitutional matter, the plaintiffs argue that the Appointments Clause generally requires an acting principal officer to be either the principal officer's first assistant or appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. But that theory is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent and historical practice, both of which have long approved temporary service by non-Senate confirmed officials, irrespective of their status as first assistants. Separately, the plaintiffs argue that the Appointments Clause at a minimum requires the role of an acting principal officer to be filled by an inferior officer and not a mere employee. Whitaker, the plaintiffs contend, was not an officer because the FVRA did not authorize the President to "appoint" him and because his role as an acting official was temporary. The Court disagrees. Whitaker's designation under the FVRA was a Presidential appointment. And if the temporary nature of Whitaker's service prevented him from becoming an officer, then the President was not constitutionally obligated to appoint him at all. I. BACKGROUND A. Procedural History On December 18, 2018, Guedes, Firearms Policy Coalition (the Coalition), Firearms Policy Foundation, and Madison Society Foundation filed a complaint and a motion for a preliminary injunction. Guedes's Compl., Dkt. 1, No. 18-cv-2988; Guedes's Mot., Dkt. 2, No. 18-cv-2988. Although their complaint contained eight claims, they moved for a preliminary injunction only on the grounds that (1) ATF's rule violated the APA and 18 U.S.C. § 926(b), and (2) Whitaker lacked authority to promulgate the bump stock rule. Compare Guedes's Compl., with Guedes's Br., Dkt. 2-1, No. 18-cv-2988. At the parties' request, the Court extended the time for briefing and held a hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction on January 11, 2019. Minute Order, Dec. 21, 2018, No. 18-cv-2988. Less than a week after filing the motion, Guedes and the Coalition elected to pursue separate lawsuits. On December 26, 2018, the Coalition voluntarily dismissed its claims, Notice of Voluntary Dismissal at 2, Dkt. 8, No. 18-cv-2988, and Guedes filed an amended complaint that alleged the original eight causes of action minus the challenge to Whitaker's authority, Guedes's Am. Compl., Dkt. 9, No. 18-cv-2988. The Coalition simultaneously filed a new complaint in this District that elaborated on the original challenge to Whitaker's authority and raised several additional claims based on Whitaker's allegedly infirm designation as Acting Attorney General. See Firearms Pol'y Coal.'s Compl., Dkt. 1, No. 18-cv-3083. The Coalition also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Firearms Pol'y Coal.'s Mot., Dkt. 2, No. 18-cv-3083. In response to the recent government shutdown, the government filed unopposed motions to stay in each case in late December. See Gov't's Mot. for a Stay in Guedes , Dkt. 7, No. 18-cv-2988; Gov't's Mot. for a Stay in Firearms Pol'y Coal. , Dkt. 8, No. 18-cv-3083. Both motions were granted. Minute Order in Guedes , Dec. 27, 2018, No. 18-cv-2988; Minute Order in Firearms Pol'y Coal. , Dec. 27, 2018, No. 18-cv-3083. On January 3, 2019, Firearms Policy Coalition was transferred to the undersigned as a related case and, with the consent of the parties, consolidated with Guedes . See Reassignment of Civil Case in Firearms Pol'y Coal. , Dkt. 12, No. 18-cv-3083; Minute Order in Guedes , Jan. 8, 2019, No. 18-cv-2988. A few days later, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay and set a revised briefing schedule. Minute Order in Guedes , Jan. 11, 2019, No. 18-cv-2988. Meanwhile, on December 27, 2018, Codrea filed yet another action challenging the bump stock rule, and he moved for a preliminary injunction several weeks later on January 18, 2019. See Codrea's Compl., Dkt. 1, No. 18-cv-3086; Codrea's Mot., Dkt. 5, No. 18-cv-3086. Like the other plaintiffs, Codrea seeks to enjoin the rule on the grounds that ATF violated the APA and Whitaker lacked authority to promulgate the rule. Codrea's Br. at 13-14, Dkt. 5-1, No. 18-cv-3086. Codrea also argues that a preliminary injunction is appropriate because ATF violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 13. Codrea was transferred to the undersigned as a related case, see Reassignment of Civil Case in Codrea , Dkt. 14, No. 18-cv-3086, but at the request of the parties, the Court did not consolidate Codrea with Guedes . On February 6, 2019, the Court held a hearing in Guedes . On February 19, 2019, after briefing was complete, the Court held a second hearing in Codrea . This opinion resolves all three of the pending motions for a preliminary injunction. B. The Statutory Framework and Regulatory History of Bump Stock Prohibitions The National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA) and the Firearm Owners Protection Act of 1986 (FOPA) provide the statutory basis for the bump stock rule. The NFA provides the following definition for the term "machinegun": The term "machinegun" means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b). Congress later passed the FOPA, which generally makes it "unlawful for any person to transfer or possess" a newly manufactured "machinegun," 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), and incorporates the NFA's definition of that term, 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(23) ("The term 'machinegun' has the meaning given such term in ... the National Firearms Act."). The FOPA also amended a previous grant of rulemaking authority to provide that "[t]he Attorney General may prescribe only such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 926(a) ; see also Nat'l Rifle Ass'n v. Brady , 914 F.2d 475, 478 (4th Cir. 1990) (discussing the statutory change). The key question here is whether the NFA's definition of "machinegun" encompasses devices that are colloquially referred to as "bump stocks." The parties do not dispute the basic mechanics of standard bump stock devices. A bump stock replaces a semiautomatic rifle's standard stock-the part of the rifle that rests against the shooter's shoulder-and enables the shooter to achieve a faster firing rate. To use a bump stock as intended, the shooter must maintain forward pressure on the barrel and, at the same time, pull the trigger and maintain rearward pressure on the trigger. Once the shooter pulls the trigger, a bump stock helps harness and direct the firearm's recoil energy, thereby forcing the firearm to shift back and forth, each time "bumping" the shooter's stationary trigger finger. In this way, the shooter is able to reengage the trigger without additional physical manipulation, though the process may cause small involuntary movements of the trigger finger. ATF first began to regulate bump stocks in 2006 when it determined that the term "machinegun" encompassed the "Akins Accelerator," a specific bump stock model with an internal spring that pushed the firearm forward after the shooter pulled the trigger. See Akins v. United States , 312 F. App'x 197, 198 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). ATF initially determined in 2002 and again in 2004 that the Akins Accelerator did not qualify as a "machinegun" because it did not permit a shooter to discharge multiple rounds with a "single function of the trigger." Id. at 199. But the agency reversed course in 2006, when it reinterpreted a "single function of the trigger" to mean a "single pull of the trigger." Id. at 200. Under that new interpretation, ATF determined that the Akins Accelerator qualified as a "machinegun" because the device enabled the shooter to discharge multiple rounds with only one "pull," even though the trigger mechanically reset between rounds. Id. The Eleventh Circuit later upheld ATF's decision, reasoning that ATF's interpretation of "single function of the trigger" was "consonant with the [NFA] and its legislative history." Id. For years, ATF declined to classify as "machineguns" other standard bump stock models that did not include an internal spring. 83 Fed. Reg. at 66517. ATF reasoned that, although standard bump stock devices permit a shooter to discharge multiple rounds with a single function of the trigger, they do not operate "automatically." Id. But ATF's interpretation of the term "automatically" remained unclear. At times, ATF focused on whether a given bump stock device "initiate[d] an automatic firing cycle that continue[d] until either the finger [wa]s released or the ammunition supply [wa]s exhausted." Id. at 66518 (internal quotation marks omitted). Other times, it focused on whether the device had "automatically functioning mechanical parts or springs" or "performed ... mechanical functions when installed." Id. (alterations adopted and internal quotation marks omitted). C. The Final Bump Stock Rule The call for action in the wake of the 2017 mass shooting in Las Vegas, Nevada was immediate and widespread. Members of Congress and others requested that ATF reconsider its position with respect to standard bump stock devices. Id. at 66516. And after ATF issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, President Trump released a memorandum urging the Attorney General, "as expeditiously as possible, to propose for notice and comment a rule banning all devices that turn legal weapons into machineguns." Id. at 66517 (quoting Application of Machinegun to 'Bump Fire' Stocks and Other Similar Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 7949 (Feb. 20, 2018) ). On March 29, 2018, ATF proposed the bump stock rule and formally provided the public with 90 days, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 926(b), to submit written comments online, by mail, or by facsimile. Bump-Stock-Type Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. at 13442 (proposed Mar. 29, 2018). The first few days of the comment period did not go smoothly. According to Guedes, several commenters faced technological difficulties that prevented them from submitting online comments. Guedes's Br. at 22-25. Some online users, for example, received a "Comment Period Closed" notification on the proposed rule's FederalRegister.gov page-though the page also included a contradictory notice stating that the proposed rule had a comment period that would end several days in the future. Guedes's Am. Compl. Ex. A, at 14, Dkt. 9-1, No. 18-cv-2988. Meanwhile, a search for "bump stock" on another rulemaking website, Regulations.gov, directed commenters to the correct page, and ATF did in fact receive comments submitted during the first few days of the comment period. 83 Fed. Reg. at 66542. In addition to submitting written comments, a few of the plaintiffs sought an opportunity to participate in a public, oral hearing, Guedes's Br. at 6, but ATF refused those requests, 83 Fed. Reg. at 66542. ATF explained that "a public hearing would [not] meaningfully add data or information" that would assist the agency in drafting the final rule. Id. In the final rule published on December 26, 2018, ATF reversed its earlier position and concluded that a standard bump stock device is a "machinegun" as defined in the NFA. Id. at 66543, 66553. Consistent with its 2006 Akins Accelerator determination, ATF interpreted the term "single function of the trigger" to mean a "single pull of the trigger." Id. at 66553. ATF also interpreted "automatically" to mean "as the result of a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of multiple rounds through a single pull of the trigger." Id. Based on these definitions, ATF added a sentence to the regulatory definition of "machinegun" to make clear that the term "machinegun" in the NFA includes "bump-stock-type device[s]," which "allow[ ] a semi-automatic firearm to shoot more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger by harnessing the recoil energy of the semi-automatic firearm to which it is affixed so that the trigger resets and continues firing without additional physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter." Id. at 66553-54. Under the rule, "current possessors" of bump stocks must either destroy them or abandon them at an ATF office. Id. at 66530. The rule is set to become effective on March 26, 2019. D. The Constitutional and Statutory Framework for the Designation of Acting Attorneys General The Constitution's Appointments Clause provides that the President "shall appoint ... Officers of the United States" "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate," but "the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution does not provide clear guidance about whether and when an individual may temporarily serve as an acting principal officer without Senate confirmation. Instead, a series of statutes provide the primary framework for the designation of acting officers. See NLRB v. SW Gen. , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 929, 934, 197 L.Ed.2d 263 (2017). In 1868, Congress enacted the first Vacancies Act, a predecessor to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). Act of July 23, 1868, ch. 227, 15 Stat. 168 (1868). The Vacancies Act, which established the basic statutory framework that continues to operate today, created a default rule that in the case of a vacancy "of the head of any executive department of the government, the first or sole assistant thereof shall ... perform the duties of such head until a successor be appointed, or such absence or sickness shall cease." Id. § 1, 15 Stat. at 168. But the Vacancies Act also permitted the President to override that first-assistant default rule and designate another Senate-confirmed official to serve temporarily on an acting basis. Id. § 3; see also SW Gen. , 137 S.Ct. at 935. Until recently, with the enactment of the modern FVRA, the President could not invoke the override authority established in the Vacancies Act to designate an Acting Attorney General; the first-assistant default rule always applied. 5 U.S.C. § 3347 (1994) (providing that the President's authority to designate acting officials under the FVRA "d[id] not apply to a vacancy in the office of the Attorney General"). In addition to the Vacancies Act, Congress has enacted a series of agency-specific statutes, including the AG Act, 28 U.S.C. § 508. The AG Act provides that "[i]n case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney General, or of his absence or disability, the Deputy Attorney General may exercise all the duties of that office, and for the purpose [of the first-assistant default rule] the Deputy Attorney General is the first assistant to the Attorney General." Id. § 508(a). The AG Act then provides a further order of succession: "When by reason of absence, disability, or vacancy in office, neither the Attorney General nor the Deputy Attorney General is available to exercise the duties of the office of Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General shall act as Attorney General," and "[t]he Attorney General may designate the Solicitor General and the Assistant Attorneys General, in further order of succession, to act as Attorney General." Id. § 508(b). In 1998, Congress enacted the FVRA. Like the earlier Vacancies Act, the FVRA includes a first-assistant default rule, but it permits the President to override that rule in one of two ways. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1). First, "the President ... may direct a person who serves in an office for which appointment is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily." Id. § 3345(a)(2). Second, "the President ... may direct an officer or employee of such Executive agency to perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily" if that individual has served in the agency for at least 90 days in the 365-day period preceding the vacancy in a position that receives pay "equal to or greater than the minimum rate of pay payable for a position at GS-15 of the General Schedule." Id. § 3345(a)(3). In a break from the earlier Vacancies Act, the FVRA also eliminated the exception for the Office of the Attorney General, so the President can override the first-assistant default rule even for that Office. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 3347 (1994), with 5 U.S.C. § 3347 (2018). And the FVRA increased the amount of time during which an acting official may serve to 210 days, subject to certain statutory exceptions. See id. § 3346; see also SW Gen. , 137 S.Ct. at 935-36. The FVRA includes an exclusivity provision that explains how the FVRA interacts with agency-specific statutes like the AG Act. Under § 3347(a), the FVRA is "the exclusive means for temporarily authorizing an acting official to perform the functions and duties of any office of an Executive agency ... for which appointment is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, unless ... a statutory provision expressly" either "authorizes the President, a court, or the head of an Executive department, to designate an officer or employee" to serve in an acting capacity or "designates an officer or employee" to serve in an acting capacity. 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a). E. The Designation of Matthew Whitaker to Serve as Acting Attorney General On November 7, 2018, the Attorney General, Jefferson B. Sessions, III, resigned. Guedes's Compl. ¶ 50-51. The next day, the President invoked his authority under the FVRA and "directed" Whitaker, then the Attorney General's Chief of Staff, to "perform the functions and duties of the office of Attorney General, until the position is filled by appointment or subsequent designation." Firearms Pol'y Coal.'s Mot. App. A, Dkt. 2-2, No. 18-cv-3083. Whitaker served as Acting Attorney General until Barr was confirmed as Attorney General on February 15, 2019. See 165 Cong. Rec. S1397 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2019). While serving as Acting Attorney General, Whitaker issued the bump stock rule at issue here. See 83 Fed. Reg. at 66554. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Preliminary Injunctions A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Sherley v. Sebelius , 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council , 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) ). To prevail, a party seeking preliminary relief must make a "clear showing that four factors, taken together, warrant relief: likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, a balance of the equities in its favor, and accord with the public interest." League of Women Voters v. Newby , 838 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the plaintiff fails to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, the court "need not proceed to review the other three preliminary injunction factors." Ark. Dairy Coop. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. , 573 F.3d 815, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The plaintiff cannot prevail without a "substantial indication of likely success on the merits." Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 281 F.Supp.3d 88, 99 (D.D.C. 2017) ("[A]bsent a substantial indication of likely success on the merits, there would be no justification for the Court's intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review." (internal quotation marks omitted) ), aff'd , 897 F.3d 314 (D.C. Cir. 2018). B. Judicial Review of Agency Action The APA provides that a court must "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Under the familiar Chevron framework, "[i]f Congress has directly spoken to [an] issue, that is the end of the matter." Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell , 830 F.3d 552, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (discussing Chevron , 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ). "[T]he court, as well [as] the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Lubow v. U.S. Dep't of State , 783 F.3d 877, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Chevron , 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ). But if the text is silent or ambiguous, courts must "determine if the agency's interpretation is permissible, and if so, defer to it." Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. , 830 F.3d at 558. "This inquiry, often called Chevron Step Two, does not require the best interpretation, only a reasonable one." Van Hollen, Jr. v. FEC , 811 F.3d 486, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. ("We are bound to uphold agency interpretations regardless [of] whether there may be other reasonable, or even more reasonable, views." (alteration adopted and internal quotation marks omitted) ). Further, even when an interpretation is reasonable under Chevron , "agency action is always subject to arbitrary and capricious review under the APA." Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. , 830 F.3d at 559. An interpretation is arbitrary and capricious if the agency "relied on factors that Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation" that "runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." Agape Church v. FCC , 738 F.3d 397, 410 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. , 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) ). Put simply, "[t]he agency must 'articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.' " Nat'l Lifeline Ass'n v. FCC , No. 18-1026, 915 F.3d 19, 27, 2019 WL 405020, at *5 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 1, 2019) (quoting State Farm , 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856 ). Often the inquiry under Chevron Step Two overlaps with arbitrary and capricious review because "under Chevron step two, the court asks whether an agency interpretation is arbitrary and capricious in substance." Agape Church , 738 F.3d at 410 (alteration adopted) (quoting Judulang v. Holder , 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7, 132 S.Ct. 476, 181 L.Ed.2d 449 (2011) ). At bottom, a reviewing court must decide whether an agency action is "within the scope of [the agency's] lawful authority" and supported by "reasoned decisionmaking." Tripoli Rocketry Ass'n v. ATF , 437 F.3d 75, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. ("Not only must an agency's decreed result be within the scope of its lawful authority, but the process by which it reaches that result must be logical and rational." (internal quotation marks omitted) ). When an agency changes its position, it must "display awareness" of the change, but it is not required to meet a "heightened standard for reasonableness." Mary V. Harris Found. v. FCC , 776 F.3d 21, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy." Nat'l Lifeline Ass'n , 915 F.3d at 28, 2019 WL 405020, at *6 (alteration adopted and internal quotation marks omitted). But "[s]o long as any change is reasonably explained, it is not arbitrary and capricious for an agency to change its mind in light of experience, or in the face of new or additional evidence, or further analysis or other factors indicating that [an] earlier decision should be altered or abandoned." New England Power Generators Ass'n v. FERC , 879 F.3d 1192, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Put differently, the agency need only "show that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better" than the previous policy. Mary V. Harris Found. , 776 F.3d at 24-25 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). III. ANALYSIS None of the plaintiffs' challenges merit preliminary injunctive relief: the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their administrate law challenges; preliminary injunctive relief is not available for Codrea's Takings Clause challenge; and the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their statutory and constitutional challenges to the authority of then-Acting Attorney General Whitaker. A. Likely Success on the Merits of the Plaintiffs' Administrative Law Challenges The Court considers and rejects each of the plaintiffs' administrative law challenges in turn. First, it determines that ATF reasonably interpreted and applied the NFA's definition of "machinegun." Second, it explains that the agency did not violate the APA either by reversing its previous position that bump stocks were not machine guns or by failing to provide its previous interpretations in the rulemaking docket. Third, it explains that ATF did not deny commenters a meaningful opportunity to comment or adequate responses to their comments. Finally, it concludes that ATF did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 926(b) by refusing to hold an oral hearing and that any error it may have made by refusing to extend the comment period by five days was harmless. 1. ATF's Interpretation of the NFA's Definition of "Machinegun" As noted, the NFA defines "machinegun" as follows: The term "machinegun" means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger . The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (emphases added). Congress did not shed further light on the definition of "machinegun" in 1934, when it enacted the NFA, or in 1986, when it incorporated the NFA's definition into the FOPA, see 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(23) ("The term 'machinegun' has the meaning given such term in ... the National Firearms Act."). Invoking its general rulemaking authority under § 926(a), ATF promulgated the bump stock rule based on its interpretation of "single function of the trigger" and "automatically," two terms that Congress left undefined. ATF defined the phrase "single function of the trigger" to mean a "single pull of the trigger and analogous motions." 83 Fed. Reg. at 66553. And it defined "automatically" to mean "functioning as the result of a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of multiple rounds through a single function of the trigger." Id. Applying these definitions, it added a sentence to the regulatory definition of "machinegun" that explicitly states that the term "includes a bump-stock-type device," which "allows a semi-automatic firearm to shoot more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger by harnessing the recoil energy of the semi-automatic firearm to which it is affixed so that the trigger resets and continues firing without additional physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter."Id. at 66553-54. The plaintiffs suggest that ATF lacked the authority to state explicitly that the NFA's definition of "machinegun" includes bump stocks, and they take particular issue with the possibility that policy considerations may have influenced ATF's legal interpretation. Guedes's Br. at 17; Guedes's Reply at 3-5, Dkt. 5-1, No. 18-cv-2988; Codrea's Br. at 4; Codrea's Reply at 6-7, Dkt. 18, No. 18-3086. But these arguments are premised on a misunderstanding of the Chevron doctrine. Under Chevron , courts "presume that when an agency-administered statute is ambiguous with respect to what it prescribes, Congress has empowered the agency to resolve the ambiguity." Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA , 573 U.S. 302, 315, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014). Agencies are therefore entitled to deference when they reasonably define ambiguous terms-including ambiguous terms in a statutory definition-and apply those terms to new circumstances. See Loving v. IRS , 742 F.3d 1013, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("Under Chevron , we must accept an agency's authoritative interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision if the agency's interpretation is reasonable."); see also, e.g., Whitaker v. Thompson , 353 F.3d 947, 950-52 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (deferring to the Food and Drug Administration's interpretation of statutory definitions in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). Courts must defer even when agencies "make policy choices in interpreting [a] statute," "as long as [they] stay[ ] within [Congress'] delegation [of authority]." Arent v. Shalala , 70 F.3d 610, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ; see also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States , 562 U.S. 44, 55-56, 131 S.Ct. 704, 178 L.Ed.2d 588 (2011) (" Chevron recognized that the power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." (alterations adopted and internal quotation marks omitted) ). That is why courts have regularly recognized ATF's authority to interpret and apply the statutes that it administers, including the NFA's definition of "machinegun." See, e.g., Akins , 312 F. App'x at 200 (deferring to ATF's decision to classify the Akins Accelerator as a machine gun); see also York v. Sec'y of Treasury , 774 F.2d 417, 419-20 (10th Cir. 1985) (upholding ATF's decision to classify a particular firearm as a machine gun); cf. Brady , 914 F.2d at 480 (holding that ATF has discretion to define the term "business premises" in another firearms statute). The question is therefore not whether ATF considered the policy implications when it formulated the bump stock rule, but whether ATF exceeded its authority by either contravening the plain meaning of the NFA under Step One of the Chevron doctrine or adopting an unreasonable interpretation of ambiguous terms under Step Two. To determine "whether a statute is ambiguous" and "ultimately ... whether [an] agency's interpretation is permissible or instead is foreclosed by the statute," courts "employ all the tools of statutory interpretation." Loving , 742 F.3d at 1016. Most importantly, courts "interpret the words [of a statute] consistent with their ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute." Wisconsin Cent. Ltd. v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 2067, 2070, 201 L.Ed.2d 490 (2018) (alteration adopted and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 78 (2012) ("Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was adopted."). Generally, courts rely on dictionaries from the time statutes became law to interpret the words of a statute. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT & T , 512 U.S. 218, 228, 114 S.Ct. 2223, 129 L.Ed.2d 182 (1994) ; PHH Corp. v. CFPB , 881 F.3d 75, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment) (collecting cases demonstrating that the Supreme Court "generally begins [an interpretive task] with dictionaries"). a. A "Single Function of the Trigger" Unfortunately, dictionaries from the time of the NFA's enactment are of little help in defining a "single function of the trigger." The 1933 version of Webster's New International Dictionary defines "function" as "[t]he natural and proper action of anything." Webster's New International Dictionary 876 (1933). Similarly, the 1933 Oxford English Dictionary defines the term to mean "[t]he special kind of activity proper to anything; the mode of action by which it fulfills its purpose." 4 Oxford English Dictionary 602 (1933). Neither definition sheds any light on the key question here: whether, as the plaintiffs argue, a "single function of the trigger" means a mechanical act of the trigger, or whether, as ATF argued in the rule, a "single function of the trigger" means a single pull of the trigger from the perspective of the shooter. Under the first interpretation, each trigger function ends when the trigger resets. Under the second interpretation, a single act by the shooter-a single pull-is a "function." Because the statute does not provide any additional guidance on the correct interpretation, the Court concludes that the term is ambiguous. The question then becomes whether ATF's interpretation was reasonable. To be sure, the interpretation offered by the plaintiffs is reasonable. But the same is true of ATF's interpretation. Indeed, in 2009, the Eleventh Circuit upheld ATF's decision to treat Akins Accelerators as machine guns because "a single application of the trigger by a gunman"-a single pull-caused the gun with the affixed bump stock to "fire continuously ... until the gunman release[d] the trigger or the ammunition [wa]s exhausted." Akins , 312 F. App'x at 200. Tellingly, courts have instinctively reached for the word "pull" when discussing the statutory definition of "machinegun." The Supreme Court, for example, has explained that the statutory definition encompasses a weapon that "fires repeatedly with a single pull of the trigger ," meaning "once its trigger is depressed, the weapon will automatically continue to fire until its trigger is released or the ammunition is exhausted." Staples v. United States , 511 U.S. 600, 602 n.1, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (emphasis added). The Court then contrasted automatic machine guns with semiautomatic weapons that "fire[ ] only one shot with each pull of the trigger" and "require[ ] no manual manipulation by the operator to place another round in the chamber after each round is fired." Id. Likewise, the Tenth Circuit has held that a uniquely designed firearm was "a machine gun within the statutory definition" because "the shooter could, by fully pulling the trigger , and it only, at the point of maximum leverage, obtain automation with a single trigger function." United States v. Oakes , 564 F.2d 384, 388 (10th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added). Based on the above contemporaneous dictionary definitions and court decisions, the Court concludes that ATF acted reasonably in defining the phrase "single function of the trigger" to mean a "single pull of the trigger and analogous motions." 83 Fed. Reg. at 66553. b. "Automatically" Dictionary definitions of "automatically" are only marginally more helpful. The 1933 Webster's New International Dictionary provides that "automatically" is the adverbial form of "automatic," Webster's New International Dictionary, supra , at 157, and it defines the related, adjectival form as "self-acting or self-regulating," especially as applied "to machinery or devices which perform parts of the work formerly or usually done by hand," id. at 156. The 1933 Oxford English Dictionary likewise defines "automatic" as "[s]elf-acting under conditions fixed for it, going of itself," especially as applied to "machinery and its movements, which produce results otherwise done by hand." 1 Oxford English Dictionary, supra , at 574. Applying these definitions to the NFA's definition of "machinegun," the Seventh Circuit concluded that the "adverb 'automatically,' as it modifies the verb 'shoots,' delineates how the discharge of multiple rounds from a weapon occurs: as the result of a self-acting mechanism ... that is set in motion by a single function of the trigger and is accomplished without manual reloading." United States v. Olofson , 563 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 2009) (footnote omitted). Consistent with these contemporaneous dictionary definitions and the Seventh Circuit's decision in Olofson , ATF correctly defined "automatically" to mean "functioning as the result of a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of multiple rounds through a single function of the trigger." 83 Fed. Reg. at 66553. But even this definition retains a key ambiguity: how much of the "work formerly or usually done by hand" must be performed by the "self-acting or self-regulating device" for the automatic label to apply? Webster's New International Dictionary, supra , at 156. According to Webster's New International Dictionary , the "automatic" label applies when a device performs only "parts"-not all-of the work otherwise performed by hand. Id. And that definition comports with everyday experience. Automatic devices regularly require some degree of manual input. An automatic sewing machine, for example, still requires the user to press a pedal and direct the fabric. Because the statute does not specify how much manual input is too much, the Court concludes that the term "automatically" is ambiguous, with or without the gloss added by the rule. And as discussed below, ATF reasonably interpreted this ambiguous term to describe bump stocks. c. ATF's Application of the NFA's Definition of "Machinegun" to Bump Stocks After defining a "single function of the trigger" to mean a "single pull of the trigger" and "automatically" to mean "functioning as the result of a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of multiple rounds through a single function of the trigger," 83 Fed. Reg. at 66553, ATF added a sentence to the regulatory definition of "machinegun" to clarify that ATF considered bump stocks to be machine guns, id. at 66553-54. The plaintiffs advance two primary arguments to attack the reasonableness of this interpretation. Neither is persuasive. First , the plaintiffs suggest that bump stocks do not operate with a "single function of the trigger" because a shooter must still "manipulate" the trigger to discharge multiple rounds. Unless the trigger makes repeated contact with the shooter's finger, they assert, the firearm will not reset between rounds and fire multiple times. Guedes's Reply at 14; see also id. at 12; Codrea's Br. at 16. Repackaging the same argument, Guedes further argues that ATF's interpretation would bring all "semiautomatic" rifles, as that term is defined by statute, within the NFA's definition of "machinegun." Guedes's Reply at 5-6. In support, Guedes cites the Crime Control Act of 1990, which defines "semiautomatic rifle" to mean "any repeating rifle which utilizes a portion of the energy of a firing cartridge to extract the fired cartridge case and chamber the next round, and which requires a separate pull of the trigger to fire each cartridge." Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2204(a)(28), 104 Stat. 4789, 4857 (Nov. 29, 1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(28) ). The Court concludes that it was reasonable for ATF to determine that a bump stock operates with a single "pull" of the trigger because a bump stock permits the shooter to discharge multiple rounds by, among other things, "maintaining the trigger finger on the device's extension ledge with constant rearward pressure." 83 Fed. Reg. at 66532 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although operating a bump stock may cause slight movements of the trigger finger, it does not require a shooter to consciously and repeatedly exert force to depress the trigger multiple times. After the initial exertion of force, a shooter is able to discharge multiple rounds by maintaining constant pressure on the trigger. And contrary to Guedes's claim, ATF's determination will not bring all semiautomatic rifles within the NFA's definition of "machinegun" because, without a bump stock or similar device attached, semiautomatic rifles do "require[ ] a separate pull of the trigger to fire each cartridge." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(28). Second , the plaintiffs argue that ATF acted unreasonably because a bump stock does not operate "automatically." See, e.g. , Codrea's Reply at 12-13. Although this is a closer question, the Court also concludes that it was reasonable for ATF to determine that a bump stock relieves a shooter of enough of the otherwise necessary manual inputs to warrant the "automatic" label. To be sure, a firearm with an affixed bump stock requires some manual inputs: the shooter must "maintain[ ] constant forward pressure with the non-trigger hand on the barrel-shroud or fore-grip of the rifle, and maintain[ ] the trigger finger on the device's extension ledge with constant rearward pressure." 83 Fed. Reg. at 66532 (internal quotation marks omitted). But as noted, the definition of "automatically" does not mean that an automatic device must operate spontaneously without any manual input. ATF reasoned that a bump stock permits a firearm to function automatically by "directing the recoil energy of the discharged rounds into the space created by the sliding stock ... in constrained linear rearward and forward paths" so that the shooter can maintain a "continuous firing sequence." Id. at 66532 (internal quotation marks omitted). And it explained that "without [such a] device," the shooter would have to "manually capture, harness, or otherwise utilize th[e] [recoil] energy to fire additional rounds" and "bump fire" a gun. Id. In other words, the bump stock makes it easier to bump fire because it controls the distance the firearm recoils and ensures that the firearm moves linearly-two tasks the shooter would ordinarily have to perform manually. In this way, a bump stock creates a "self-acting mechanism" that permits "the discharge of multiple rounds" with "a single function of the trigger ... without manual reloading." Olofson , 563 F.3d at 658 (defining the term "automatically" in the NFA's definition of "machinegun"). Of course, even if an interpretation is reasonable under Chevron , all final agency actions must still survive review under the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard. See Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. , 830 F.3d at 559. Often, "[t]he analysis of disputed agency action under Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and capricious review is ... 'the same, because under Chevron [S]tep [T]wo, the court asks whether an agency interpretation is arbitrary or capricious in substance.' " Agape Church , 738 F.3d at 410 (alteration adopted) (quoting Judulang , 565 U.S. at 52 n.7, 132 S.Ct. 476 ). But in addition to the substantive reasonableness already addressed, the arbitrary and capricious standard also requires an agency to "articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." Nat'l Lifeline Ass'n , 915 F.3d at 27, 2019 WL 405020, at *5. The Court therefore turns to the plaintiffs' remaining challenges to the adequacy of ATF's explanation for the bump stock rule. 2. ATF's Treatment of Prior Interpretations The plaintiffs characterize ATF's new position as an unlawful departure from its previous interpretations, which excluded standard bump stocks from the NFA's definition of "machinegun." See, e.g. , Guedes's Br. at 12-14, 19, 26-27, 30-31; Codrea's Reply at 12; see also generally Guedes's Compl. Ex. B, Dkt. 22-1, No. 18-cv-2988. Guedes further challenges the lawfulness of ATF's rulemaking process on the ground that ATF failed to make public its previous interpretations. See Guedes's Br. at 21; Guedes's Reply at 7-8. Neither argument is persuasive. It is well established that an agency may change its prior policy if "the new policy [is] permissible under the statute, and the agency ... acknowledge[s] it is changing its policy and show[s] that there are good reasons for the new policy and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates." Nat'l Lifeline Ass'n , 915 F.3d at 28, 2019 WL 405020, at *6 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mary V. Harris Found. , 776 F.3d at 24 ("What the [agency] did in the past is of no moment ... if its current approach reflects a permissible interpretation of the statute."). ATF acknowledged in the final rule that it was "reconsider[ing] and rectify[ing]" its previous classification decisions based on its legal analysis of the statutory terms "automatically" and "single function of the trigger." 83 Fed. Reg. at 66516 (quoting Akins , 312 F. App'x at 200 ). It discussed the history of its regulation of Akins Accelerators and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Akins . Id. at 66517. It also explained that it had previously determined that "semiautomatic firearms modified with [standard] bump-stock-type devices did not fire 'automatically,' and thus were not 'machineguns.' " Id. at 66516. The mass shooting in Las Vegas then prompted ATF to reconsider its prior interpretations, id. at 66528-29, none of which provided "extensive legal analysis of the statutory terms 'automatically' or 'single function of the trigger,' " id. at 66516. Accordingly, ATF reviewed dictionary definitions of "automatically," relevant judicial decisions-including Staples , Olofson , and Akins -and the NFA's legislative history to determine whether standard bump stocks constitute machine guns. Id. at 66518-19. It then concluded that its previous interpretations "did not reflect the best interpretation of 'machinegun,' " id. at 66514, and that the rule's interpretations of "automatically" and "single function of the trigger" better "accord with the plain meaning of those terms," id. at 66527. This record reveals that ATF satisfied its obligation to "reasonably explain[ ]" its change of position. New England Power Generators Ass'n , 879 F.3d at 1201. Guedes's argument that ATF was required to release its previous interpretations as part of the rulemaking process is no more persuasive. True, the APA requires agencies to "ma[k]e public in the proceeding and expose[ ] to refutation" "the most critical factual material that is used to support the agency's position on review." Chamber of Commerce v. SEC , 443 F.3d 890, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n , 673 F.2d 525, 530-31 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("An agency commits serious procedural error when it fails to reveal portions of the technical basis for a proposed rule in time to allow for meaningful commentary."). But ATF's explanations for its prior legal interpretations are not "critical factual material[s]" that were "used to support the agency's position." Chamber of Commerce , 443 F.3d at 900 (internal quotation marks omitted). This case does not turn on any factual dispute; the parties agree about how a bump stock operates. And ATF's prior legal interpretations contradict rather than support its current interpretation. Thus, ATF was not required to release its prior opinions during the rulemaking process. 3. ATF's Responses to Comments and Its Consideration of Other Evidence The plaintiffs next raise a series of arguments challenging the transparency of ATF's rulemaking process and ATF's failure to consider other evidence. First , they argue that ATF relied on evidence that bump stocks were used in the Las Vegas shooting without releasing that evidence or any other evidence suggesting that bump stocks have been used to commit crimes. See, e.g. , Codrea's Reply at 9; Guedes's Br. at 21, 28. As explained, however, the bump stock rule was based on a legal, rather than a factual, determination; crime statistics did not play any role in ATF's analysis. The Las Vegas attack served as the impetus for ATF's decision to reconsider its legal interpretation of "machinegun," but it did not provide a factual basis for the rule. And under the APA, ATF was required to make public only "critical factual material." Chamber of Commerce , 443 F.3d at 900 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, Guedes argues that the "underlying premise" of the rule is "completely arbitrary and capricious" because certain "individuals can achieve, with greater accuracy, faster cyclic rates than [other individuals] utilizing bump-stock-devices." Guedes's Br. at 29. As noted, however, the "premise" of the rule was not the relative firing rates of guns with attached bump stocks (or any other factual determination for that matter); the rule change was based on ATF's legal interpretation of the statutory term "machinegun." See 83 Fed. Reg. at 66533 ("[ATF] disagrees with any assertion that the rule is based upon the increased rate of fire. While bump-stock-type devices are intended to increase the rate at which a shooter may fire a semiautomatic firearm, this rule classifies these devices based upon the functioning of these devices under the statutory definition."). Moreover, ATF did not represent that bump stocks always produce a faster rate of fire; it stated merely that bump stocks are used by individual shooters to produce a relatively faster rate of fire. Id. Third , Guedes takes issue with ATF's failure to respond to statements made by former ATF official Rick Vasquez and to an analytical video demonstrating how bump stocks operate. Guedes's Reply at 10-13. But although an agency must "respond to relevant and significant public comments," City of Portland v. EPA , 507 F.3d 706, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), it "is not required to discuss every item of fact or opinion included in the submissions made to it in informal rulemaking," Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FAA , 988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (alteration adopted and internal quotation marks omitted). An agency "need only enable [a reviewing court] to see what major issues of policy were ventilated and why the agency reacted to them as it did." Id. (alteration adopted and internal quotation marks omitted). The record reveals that ATF adequately addressed Guedes's arguments, including the argument that a bump stock requires the shooter to manipulate the trigger to discharge multiple rounds. For example, ATF explained in the rule that it "disagrees that a shooter repeatedly actuates, functions, or pulls the trigger of a semiautomatic firearm using a bump-stock-type device"; instead, "the shooter 'pulls' the trigger once and allows the firearm and attached bump-stock-type device to operate until the shooter releases the trigger finger or the constant forward pressure with the non-trigger hand." 83 Fed. Reg. at 6532. Fourth , the plaintiffs argue that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously because a shooter can also bump fire a gun using a rubber band or a belt loop. Guedes's Br. at 27; see also Codrea's Reply at 8. ATF did not specifically include such everyday items in the rule, as it did bump stocks, but it has not yet made a formal determination about whether they fall within the NFA's definition of "machinegun." See Feb. 6, 2019 Hr'g Tr. at 30. To the extent the plaintiffs are arguing that the agency failed to respond adequately and reasonably to comments highlighting the similarities between bump stocks and household objects that can be repurposed to facilitate bump firing, the Court disagrees. ATF explained in the rule that bump firing using a rubber band or belt loop does not involve automatic fire because "no device is present to capture and direct the recoil energy; rather, the shooter must do so." 83 Fed. Reg. at 66533. In other words, unlike a bump stock, a "belt loop or a similar manual method requires the shooter to control the distance that the firearm recoils and the movement along the plane on which the firearm recoils." Id. Although Guedes and Codrea "attack the merits of [ATF's] responses, [ATF] clearly thought about [their] objections and provided reasoned replies," which is "all the APA requires." City of Portland , 507 F.3d at 714. The related argument that ATF unreasonably distinguished between binary triggers and bump stocks, see, e.g. , Codrea's Br. at 6-7; Codrea's Reply at 7, fails for a similar reason. As ATF explained, binary triggers discharge one round when the shooter pulls the trigger and another when the shooter releases the trigger. Gov't's Opp'n in Codrea at 18, Dkt. 16, No. 18-cv-3086; Codrea's Br. at 6. ATF defined a "single function of the trigger" to mean a pull and analogous motions, such as pushing a button or flipping a switch. 83 Fed. Reg. at 66515, 66534-35, 66553. It then reasonably distinguished binary triggers, which in ATF's view require two functions of the trigger-a pull and a release-to discharge multiple rounds. See id. at 66534. In sum, ATF adequately and reasonably responded to comments arguing that the "proposed regulatory text encompasses ... binary triggers." Id. 4. The Length of the Comment Period and the Necessity of a Hearing Guedes makes two final procedural arguments based on the text of 18 U.S.C. § 926(b), which provides that "[t]he Attorney General shall give not less than ninety days public notice, and shall afford interested parties opportunity for hearing, before prescribing ... rules and regulations." Guedes argues that ATF violated § 926(b) by failing to provide commenters with a public hearing and by failing to provide an additional five days for public comment after some commenters experienced technical difficulties at the beginning of the scheduled comment period. Guedes's Br. at 22-25; Guedes's Reply at 8-10. The Court disagrees. First , Guedes assumes that all "hearings" must be oral hearings, but "[t]he term 'hearing' in its legal context ... has a host of meanings," including the mere opportunity to submit written comments. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. , 410 U.S. 224, 239, 93 S.Ct. 810, 35 L.Ed.2d 223 (1973) ; see also id. at 241-42, 93 S.Ct. 810. And it is well established that the requirement for a "hearing," as opposed to a "hearing on the record," generally does not require a formal, oral hearing. See id. at 251, 93 S.Ct. 810 ; Nat'l Classification Comm'n v. United States , 765 F.2d 1146, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ( [U]nder Florida East Coast there is a strong presumption that the procedural guarantees of [the notice-and-comment provisions] of the APA are sufficient unless Congress specifically indicates to the contrary."); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n , 483 F.2d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Although "[t]here is some danger in according too much weight to magic words such as 'on the record[,]' ... Florida East Coast ... emphasized the importance of this phrase and virtually established it as a touchstone test of when [formal, oral] proceedings are required."). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has held that the hearing requirement in § 926(b) requires only that the Secretary "provide interested parties with the opportunity to submit written comments." Brady , 914 F.2d at 485. The Court sees no reason to depart from that interpretation here. Second , any error ATF may have made by refusing to extend the comment period by five days was harmless. Section 706 of the APA requires courts to take "due account ... of the rule of prejudicial error." 5 U.S.C. § 706. The D.C. Circuit has therefore held that "[i]f [an] agency's mistake did not affect the outcome, if it did not prejudice the petitioner, it would be senseless to vacate and remand for r