Full opinion text
Re Document No.: 60, 63, 68 MEMORANDUM OPINION GraNting Federal-Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Granting In-tervenor-Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge I. INTRODUCTION On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon, a deep-water exploratory oil rig, exploded, caught fire, and sank in the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in the largest oil spill in the United States in modern history. Less than two years later, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”), approved two lease sales in the area where the Deepwater Horizon spill occurred. The plaintiffs bring this action challenging BOEM’s approval of those lease sales under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Endangered Species Act. The plaintiffs also bring suit against the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) for failing to issue a Biological Opinion in the wake of the oil spill in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. All parties moved for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant all the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and deny the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Statutory Landscape I. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) The Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) “is an area of submerged lands, subsoil, and seabed that lies between the outer seaward reaches of a state’s jurisdiction and that of the United States.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 472 (D.C.Cir.2009). In 1953, Congress enacted the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq., “to authorize federal leasing of the OCS for oil and gas development.” Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 336, 104 S.Ct. 656, 78 L.Ed.2d 496 (1984). In 1978,- the OCSLA was amended “to provide for the ‘expeditious and orderly development, subject to environmental safeguards,’ of resources on the OCS.” Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3)). The OCSLA provides a four-step process for the development of the OCS. See id. at 337, 104 S.Ct. 656; see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 473. The first stage of the development process requires the Department of the Interior (“Department”) to create a nationwide five-year leasing program. See 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (“The Secretary ... shall prepare and periodically revise, and maintain an oil and gas leasing program.... The leasing program shall consist of a schedule of proposed lease sales ... which he determines will best meet national energy needs for the five-year period following its approval or reapproval.”). The second stage allows the Secretary to solicit bids and issue leases for offshore leasing areas. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337. After a lease is approved, a lessee may conduct ancillary activities, which include geological and geophysical explorations and development, and surveys. See 30 C.F.R. § 550.207. The third stage is known as the exploration stage; during this stage, the Secretary reviews the lessee’s exploration plan (“EP”). See 43 U.S.C. § 1340. The final stage is known as development and production, and during this stage, the Secretary reviews the development and production plan of the lessee for the purposes of actually producing oil and gas from the leaseholds. See 43 U.S.C. § 1351. The phase at issue in this case is the second stage — the lease sale stage. 2. National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) NEPA was enacted in 1970 “to promote efforts -which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere .... ” 42 U.S.C. § 4321. The Act provides that federal agencies shall “include in every recommendation or report on ... major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action; (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, [and] (iii) alternatives to the proposed action....” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). This is known as the Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). NEPA regulations explain that the “primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in the Act are infused into the.ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. The “heart of the environmental impact statement” is the analysis of alternatives. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 provides that the agency shall, inter alia, “[rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives,” “[d]evote substantial treatment to each alternative considered,” and “[i]nclude the alternative of no action” in its analysis. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(a), (b), (d). 3. Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) Section 7(a) of the ESA requires federal agencies to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species.... ” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). In fulfilling this obligation, “each agency shall use the best scientific and commercial data available.” Id. If a proposed agency action “may affect” a listed species, federal agencies are required to formally consult with either the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) or the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”), depending on whether the species is marine or terrestrial, see PL’s Mot. Summ. J. 5 n.3, ECF No. 60; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). Following formal consultation, the NMFS (in this case) must issue a written statement known as a Biological Opinion, explaining how the proposed action will affect the species or its habitat. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 158, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A)). Section 7(d) of the ESA states that “[a]f-ter initiation of consultation,” the relevant agency “shall not make any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources .with respect to the agency action which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternative measures which would not violate subsection (a)(2) of this section.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d). B. Lease Sales in the Gulf of Mexico The Gulf of Mexico (“GOM”) is a unique and important part of the American landscape and economy. It “includes one of the most extensive estuary systems in the world,” “produces more than one-third of the nation’s domestic seafood supply,” and is home to many endangered species, such as the sperm whale, the West Indian manatee, several species of sea turtles, beach mice, the whooping crane, and the gulf sturgeon. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-45. At the same time, the OCS of the Gulf of Mexico is responsible for 20% of total U.S. crude oil production. See Intervenor-Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 17, ECF No. 68. To understand the importance of the lease sales at issue here, it is helpful to wade into the Gulf of Mexico’s recent OCS lease sale history. In April 2007, BOEM published a Multisale EIS, which covered eleven lease sales planned for in the Gulf of Mexico. See Am. Compl. ¶ 46, see also Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), Western' and Central Gulf of Mexico (GOM), Oil and Gas Lease Sales for Years 2007-2012, 72 Fed. Reg. 18,667 (April 13, 2007). Three of these eleven Lease Sales, Lease Sales 206, 216, and 222, were located in the Central Planning Area (“CPA”) of the Gulf of Mexico — where the Deepwater Horizon spill took place. See Am. Compl. ¶ 46. Another one of the eleven leases was located in the Western Planning Area (“WPA”) of the Gulf of Mexico, Lease Sale 218. Am. Compl. ¶ 47. In September 2008, after Congress repealed a moratorium on drilling, BOEM issued a Supplemental EIS for seven lease sales that had been covered in the 2007 Multisale EIS, called the 2009-2012 Supplemental EIS. Am. Compl. ¶ 57; see also AR2433-2917. On April 20, 2010, a deep-water exploratory oil rig known as the Deepwater Horizon, caught fire and exploded, releasing almost five million barrels of oil into the Gulf over the course of many weeks and months. “The Deepwater Horizon blowout produced the largest accidental marine oil spill in U.S. history, an acute human and environmental tragedy.” See National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Deepwater: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Report to the President, at 173. As of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, there were two lease sales remaining in the Gulf under the 2007 Multisale EIS: Lease Sale 218 and Lease Sale 222 (which was combined with Lease Sale 216 in 2012). Am. Compl. ¶ 58. In light of the spill, on November 10, 2010, BOEM issued a notice of intent to prepare a Supplemental EIS (“SEIS”) for Lease Sale 216/222 and Lease Sale 218. See Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), Western and Central Planning Areas, Gulf of Mexico (GOM) Oil and Gas Lease Sales for the 2007-2012 5-Year OCS Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,122 (November 10, 2010). The purpose of undertaking the SEIS was “to consider new circumstances and information arising, among other things, from the Deepwater Horizon blowout and spill.” See 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,122. BOEM explained that the focus of the SEIS would be “on updating the baseline conditions and potential environmental effects of oil and natural gas leasing, exploration, development, and production in the WPA and CPA.” Id. On July 1, 2011, BOEM issued a Draft SEIS for Lease Sale 216/222. See 76 Fed. Reg. 38,676 (July 1, 2011). Meanwhile, on December 14, 2011, BOEM held the first lease sale since the Deepwater Horizon explosion in the Gulf of Mexico — for Lease Sale 218. See Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), Western Planning Area (WPA) Gulf of Mexico Oil and Gas Lease Sale 218, 76 Fed. Reg. 70,473-01 (Nov. 14, 2011). On January 20, 2012, BOEM issued the final SEIS for Lease Sale 216/222 (“2012 SEIS”). See AR5438-6673. This 2012 SEIS concluded that “[n]o substantial new information, with the exception of archeological resources, was found that would alter the impact conclusions as presented in the Multisale EIS and the 2009-2012 Supplemental EIS for a CPA lease sale.” AR5448. BOEM also explained that “[i]t is important to note that, barring another catastrophic oil spill, which is a low probability accidental event, the adverse impacts associated with the proposed CPA lease sale are small, even in light of the DWH event.” AR5624. Lease Sale 216 had been scheduled to take place in 2011 and Lease Sale 222 had been scheduled for 2012. See Federal-Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 6, ECF No. 63. Following the Deepwater Horizon incident, BOEM decided to postpone proposed Lease Sale 216 and combine it with proposed Lease Sale 222. After the 2012 SEIS was published, BOEM held Lease Sale 216/222 in June 2012. Id. C. Endangered Species Act consultation In 2007, the NMFS completed a Biological Opinion (“BO”) for five Gulf of Mexico lease sales, including Lease Sale 218 and Lease Sale 216/222. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 9. In response to the Deepwater Horizon spill, on July 30, 2010, the BOEM reinitiated consultation with the FWS and the NMFS because BOEM explained that “the spill volumes and scenarios used in the analysis for the existing NMFS BO need to be readdressed given the ‘rare event’ of a spill exceeding 420,000 gallons as referenced in the current NMFS BO....” AR7351. BOEM noted that as a result, the “affects to and the status of some listed species or designated critical habitats may have been altered as a result of the DWH incident and therefore require further consideration.” Id. To date, the consultation, has not yet been completed. However, BOEM and NMFS have developed an interim consultation process until the new Biological Opinion is issued. “That process gives NMFS the opportunity to review and comment on certain-post lease activities (such as exploration plans).”’ See Federal-Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 9; see also DOI 7496-7501, 7557-58, 7561 (all describing the interim consultation process). NMFS anticipates a March 2015 .date of completion of the BO. See Bernhart Decl., ECF No. 75-1. III. ANALYSIS The plaintiffs, various environmental organizations, brought suit against BOEM and NMFS alleging NEPA, ESA, and APA violations. They argue that (1) BOEM violated NEPA and was arbitrary and capricious in issuing its 2012 SEIS because it failed to take a “hard look” at the environmental impacts of Lease Sale 216/222 and failed to consider a no action alternative; (2) that BOEM violated the ESA by failing to insure against jeopardy to listed species in issuing Lease Sales 216/222 and 218; and (3) that NMFS violated the APA by unreasonably delaying the issuance of the Biological Opinion. The Court turns to the relevant legal standards and analyzes each argument in turn. A. APA Standard of Review Under the APA, a reviewing court may set aside agency action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Agency action is considered “arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). “Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). Under NEPA, the court’s role is “simply to ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97-98, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983). “An environmental impact statement is reviewed to ensure that the agency took a hard look at the environmental consequences of its decision to go forward with the project.” Nat’l Comm. for the New River v. F.E.R.C., 373 F.3d 1323, 1327 (D.C.Cir.2004) (citations omitted). “When an agency is evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise, an extreme degree of deference to the agency is warranted.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Meanwhile, judicial review of agency action under the ESA is governed by the arbitrary and capricious standard. See Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 685 (D.C.Cir.1982) (“Since the ESA does not specify a standard of review, judicial review is governed by section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act.”); accord WildEarth Guardians v. Salazar, 670 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.2009). B. NEPA Claims The plaintiffs argue that BOEM violated NEPA in three ways: (1) by failing to gather information essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives in violation of 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22; (2) by failing to adequately consider new analyses of the risks of another large oil spill; and (3) by failing to consider a true “no action” alternative. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 13. Each one of these arguments is addressed below. 1. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 The plaintiffs first argue that BOEM determined that certain information was essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives, and yet made no effort (1) to obtain the essential information or (2) demonstrate that the cost of obtaining it was exorbitant. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 15. As set forth above, under NEPA, when an agency prepares an EIS, it must “[rjigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives.... ” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a). In undertaking such an analysis, “[w]hen an agency is evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the human environment in an [EIS] and there is incomplete or unavailable information, the agency shall always make clear that such information is lacking.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22. If the missing information is “essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and the overall costs of obtaining it are not exorbitant, the agency shall include the information in the [EIS] ” Id. § 1502.22(a). If, on the other hand, the missing information cannot be obtained “because the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or the means to obtain it are not known,” the agency must include within the EIS: “(1) [a] statement that such information is incomplete or unavailable; (2) a statement of the relevance of the incomplete or unavailable information to evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts on the human environment; (3) a summary of existing credible scientific evidence which is relevant to evaluating the reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts on the human environment; and (4) the agency’s evaluation of such impacts based upon theoretical approaches or research methods generally accepted in the scientific community.” Id. § 1502.22(b). The Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) promulgates binding regulations on federal agencies to help them implement NEPA. See National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,-618-01 (April 25, 1986). The CEQ explains that “[t]he term ‘incomplete information’ refers to information which the agency cannot obtain because the overall costs of doing so are exorbitant. The term ‘unavailable information’ refers to information which cannot be obtained because the means to obtain it are not known.” 51 Fed. Reg. at 15,621. The CEQ regulations further note that the term “overall costs” is intended to encompass “financial costs and other costs such as costs in terms of time (delay) and personnel.” Id. at 15,622. It also “intends .that the agency interpret ‘overall costs’ in light of overall program needs.” Id. Finally, the CEQ guidelines provide that the phrase “ ‘the means to obtain it are not known’ is meant to include circumstances in which the unavailable information cannot be obtained because adequate scientific knowledge, expertise, techniques or equipment do not exist.” 51 Fed. Reg. at 15,622 (emphasis added). In addition, other NEPA regulations provide that “[i]n circumstances where the provisions of 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 apply, bureaus must consider all costs to obtain information. These costs include monetary costs as well as other non-monetized costs when appropriate, such as social costs, delays, opportunity costs, and non-fulfillment or non-timely fulfillment of statutory mandates.” 43 C.F.R. § 46.125. In Chapter 4 of the 2012 SEIS, BOEM explained that for thirteen resources, there is “incomplete or unavailable information that is relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts; however, it is not essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives.” AR5624. For eleven other resources, however, BOEM concluded that “there is incomplete or unavailable information that is relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts and may be essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives.” Id. BOEM analyzed each of those eleven resources, which are Seagrass Communities, Live Bottoms, Topographic Features, Marine Mammals (the sperm whale and the West Indian manatee, specifically), Sea Turtles, Coastal and Marine Birds, Gulf Sturgeon, Fish Resources and Essential Fish Habitat, Commercial Fisheries, Environmental Justice, and Diamondback Terrapins. See AR5624-25. Because the plaintiffs take issue with BOEM’s treatment of each of these eleven resources for which there was “incomplete or unavailable [yet essential] information,” the Court must examine what, exactly, BOEM did to determine whether it complied with the requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b). With respect to Seagrass Communities, BOEM concluded the following: [T]here remains uncertainty regarding the impacts of the DWH event on submerged vegetation.... BOEM cannot definitively determine that the incomplete or unavailable information being developed through the NRDA process would not be essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives. Nevertheless, the ongoing research on submerged vegetation after the DWH event is being conducted through the NRDA process. These research projects may be years from completion, and data and conclusions have not been released to the public. Regardless of the costs involved, it is not within BOEM’s ability to obtain this information from the NRDA process within the timeline of this Supplemental EIS. In light of this incomplete and unavailable information, BOEM subject-matter experts have used credible scientific information that is available and applied it using scientifically accepted methodology. AR5709-10. BOEM made similar statements regarding the Live Bottom (Pinnacle Trend) habitat, see AR5721; Topographic Features, see AR5781; Marine Mammals, see AR5839; Sea Turtles, see AR5858-59; Coastal and Marine Birds, see AR5879; Gulf Sturgeon, see AR5907; Fish Resources and Habitat, see AR5922; Commercial Fishing, see AR5938; Environmental Justice, see AR6010; and Diamondback Terrapins, see AR6060-61. BOEM explained the 'methodologies it relied on generally, and then explained the scientific studies it relied on specifically for each of the eleven resources. Generally, BOEM included the following section as to its methodology in Appendix B of the SEIS: Two general approaches are utilized to analyze a catastrophic event under NEPA. The first approach is a bounding analysis for each individual resource category (e.g., marine mammals, sea turtles, etc.). A bounding analysis involves, selecting and evaluating a different set of factors and scenarios for each resource in the context of a worst-case analysis. The second approach involves the selection of a single set of key circumstances that, when combined, result in catastrophic consequences. The second approach is used for a site-specific analysis and, consequently, its possible application is more limited. Accordingly, this analysis combines the two approaches, relying on a generalized scenario while identifying site-specific severity factors for individual resources. This combined approach allows for the scientific investigation of a range of possible, although not necessarily probable, consequences of a catastrophic blowout and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. AR6562. On the more specific level, BOEM relied on various studies, both dated pre- and post-oil spill, and made evaluations of the environmental impacts to the particular resource in light of those studies. See, e.g., AR5707 (“The panhandle [of Florida] was exposed to oil and tarballs from the DWH event, but the majority of the seag-rass beds in south Florida received little impact from the DWH event (USDOC, NOAA, 2010e). It is assumed these communities will be similar to how they were before the DWH event unless a significant delayed impact occurs.”); AR5711 (citing to, explaining, and apply various studies with respect to seagrass communities); AR5839-40 (stating that “BOEM subject-matter experts have used available scientifically credible evidence in this analysis and based upon accepted scientific methods and approaches” and, citing to and applying a Waring et al. (2009) study on sperm whales, to discuss the impacts of both the proposed action and the DWH spill on sperm whales); AR5858 (citing to studies post-Ixtoc I oil spill off the coast of Mexico to compare effects of spills on sea turtles in the Gulf of Mexico, and citing to various other scientific studies both before and after the spill to discuss impacts to sea turtles of the proposed action); AR5874 (“peer-reviewed modeling of bird mortality was completed by Antonio et al. (2011)_ If physical oiling of individuals or local groups of birds occurs, some degree of both acute and chronic psychological stress associated with direct and secondary uptake of oil would be expected.”); AR5907 (“Based on the publicly available information found in the OSAT and OSAT-2 reports (OSAT, 2010; OSAT-2, 2011), it was noted that, after August 2010, the more toxic oil components were limited to an area ... [and] sediment samples did not reach USEPA’s exceedances for aquatic life benchmarks.”); AR5922 (“Based on existing research, adult fish have been observed to actively avoid contact with oil in the water column (Wannamaker and Rice, 2000). Nevertheless, information on effects of the DWH event on fisheries is unavailable or incomplete at this time.... ”); AR5940 (“In a recent study of the concentrations of the bioavailable form of mercury in drill mud, Trefry et al. (2003) found concentrations did not vary significantly between near-platform and far-platform sites.... As such, any impact to commercial fisheries would likely be indistinguishable from exposure to background concentrations.”); AR6061-62 (explaining effects of 1990 oil spill on population of diamondback terrapins and explaining that effects of DWH oil spill “may have potentially impacted the terrapin community” but noting that such effects cannot be quantified at this time). a. BOEM disclosed what was unavailable The plaintiffs first argue that BOEM failed to comply with 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 because it did not explain why the overall costs to obtaining the essential missing information were exorbitant. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 first requires that “[w]hen an agency is evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the human environment in an environmental impact statement and there is incomplete or unavailable information, the agency shall always make clear that such information is lacking.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) goes on to state that if the essential, missing, information “cannot be obtained because the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or the means to obtain it are not known,” then the agency must include four particular statements in the EIS. BOEM stated that certain information that may be essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives was incomplete or unavailable. See'supra, at 155. The plaintiffs argue that BOEM did not satisfy 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 because BOEM failed to demonstrate or explain why the overall cost to obtaining the essential information was exorbitant. See PL’s Mot. Summ. J. 15; PL’s Reply 3-4. But 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 itself does not require such a demonstration — it only requires that “[i]f the information ... cannot be obtained because the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant,” then the agency must disclose the four enumerated statements in § 1502.22(b) in the EIS (emphasis added). § 1502.22(b) does not impose a requirement that the agency explain why the “overall costs of obtaining [the missing, essential information] are exorbitant or the means to obtain it are not known” — -just that it provide the four enumerated statements in the EIS if the costs to obtaining the information are exorbitant. See Oregon Envt’l Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 495-96 (9th Cir.1987) (“The omission of an explicit exposition of the agency’s determination of exorbitance does not warrant deeming this EIS legally inadequate.”). And regardless of whether the regulation required such an explanation, BOEM nevertheless provided one. In the 2012 SEIS, BOEM repeatedly stated that the essential unavailable research may take years to complete, and that it was not within BOEM’s ability to obtain the information within the timeframe contemplated by the SEIS, thus stating that “the means to obtain [missing information] are not known.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b). BOEM also repeatedly stated that “[r]egardless of the costs of acquiring these data, given the realities of the NRDA process, these data will not be available within the timeframe contemplated for this NEPA analysis.” AR5941. See also AR5942 (explaining that, with respect to the impact on eom-.mercial fisheries, “impacts from the DWH event may be difficult or impossible to discern from other factors. Therefore, it is not possible for BOEM to obtain this information within the timeframe contemplated in this Supplemental' EIS”); AR562S-24 (“Credible scientific data regarding the potential short-term and long-term impacts on CPA resources is slowly becoming available but remains incomplete at this time, it could take many years before this information becomes available via the Natural Resources Damage Assessment (NRDA) process, BOEM’s Environmental Studies Program, and numerous studies by academia.”). BOEM also referenced the experience of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the fact that it took so many years to get viable scientific information after that disaster, as an example. See, e.g., AR5839 (“even 20 years after the Exxon Valdez spill, long-term impacts to marine mammal populations are still being investigated (Matkin et al., 2008). Therefore it is not possible for BOEM to obtain this information within the timeline contemplated in this Supplemental EIS, regardless of the cost or resources needed.”). BOEM thus explained that the reason the information could not be obtained was because of the ongoing .research being conducted post-oil spill, and that regardless of cost, it was not within BOEM’s ability to obtain the information from the NRDA process. BOEM’s discussion of its inability to obtain the essential information because the data was not yet available from the NRDA, and might not be for years, therefore suffices for purposes of demonstrating that the “means to obtain[ing]” the information were not known. And BOEM’s discussion of the delay in timing of the information being available suffices for purposes of determining whether “the overall costs” were exorbitant (regardless of whether BOEM had to “demonstrate” exorbitance or not), per the CEQ guidelines. .The CEQ regulations further provide that “one of the costs that must be weighed by decisionmakers is the cost of uncertainty — i.e., the costs of proceeding without more and better information.” 51 Fed. Reg. at 15,624 (quoting Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 473 (D.C.Cir.1978), vacated on other grounds by Western Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922, 99 S.Ct. 303, 58 L.Ed.2d 315 (1978)). To be sure, BOEM could have waited until all the essential post-oil spill data became available before it moved forward with the lease sales. But nothing in 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 requires the agency to halt action in the face of uncertain information— it just requires disclosure that such information is lacking, and commands the agency to provide as comprehensive an analysis it can with the information available to it. Courts have recognized that “NEPA does not require that complete information about the environmental impact of a project be obtained before a project is undertaken.” N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F.Supp. 326, 330 (D.D.C.1979); see also Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F.Supp. 1291, 1318 (W.D.Wash.1994), aff'd, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir.1996) (“It is not required ... that action be deferred until all studies have been done that might be done.”). The administrative record shows that BOEM gathered as much information as it could and comported with the initial requirements of 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22. b. BOEM evaluated impacts based on theoretical approaches or research methods generally accepted in the scientific community The plaintiffs next argue that even if BOEM had satisfied the requirement to demonstrate that it could not obtain essential information due to exorbitant cost, see Pl.’s Reply 4, it still failed to comply with the final step of 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b), which required BOEM to “evaluate] ... such impacts based upon theoretical approaches or research methods generally accepted in the scientific community.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4). Contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument that the agency did not use the scientific methodologies to make a “true prediction of impacts based on” the methodologies it studied, see Pl.’s Reply 5 n.3, the Court finds that BOEM did evaluate impacts based on “theoretical approaches or research methods generally accepted in the scientific community.” For each of the eleven resources for which BOEM determined there was essential, unavailable information, BOEM analyzed the impacts to those species in light of the information it did have available to it. For instance, with respect to sea turtles, BOEM cited an OSAT 2010 study and then determined that “[i]t is likely that there were effects on individual sea turtles in the vicinity of the DWH event spill caused by spilled oil and/or response activities .... [but] [wjithout any further data than what exist [sic] from NMFS and FWS (which have jurisdiction over sea turtles in water and on land, respectively), it is impossible to determine if the spill has led to population-level effects or if sea turtles are experiencing chronic effects or persistent adverse impacts from the spill at the population level.” AR5854. With respect to the gulf sturgeon, BOEM cited to an OSAT 2010 and 2011 study as well as an FWS study from 2010 that discussed the effects of the oil spill on the gulf sturgeon’s critical habitat. AR5912. BOEM then concluded that “critical habitat from Lake Borgne to the Florida/Alabama State line has at least been exposed to oil from the DWH event .... but did not exceed USEPA’s benchmarks for aquatic life in either sediments or water.” Id. For birds, BOEM explained that it had no peer-reviewed studies of the impacts of oil spills on birds in the Gulf of Mexico, but in place of that, “investigations of spills in other areas, mathematical modeling, and laboratory tests (e.g., toxicity tests and veterinarian studies of rehabilitation) are used for insight into DWH impacts on all life history stages of birds.... Although information from the DWH event would be useful, it is not expected to significantly change this existing body of science.” AR5885. BOEM thus applied the scientific information it had before it to discuss what impacts Lease Sale 216/222 would have on the effected resources. Moreover, BOEM included a Catastrophic Spill Event Analysis in Appendix B of the 2012 SEIS. There, BOEM cited its general “Methodology,” quoted above (see AR6562), and proceeded to apply that methodology to the rest of Appendix B, which analyzed the effects of a Catastrophic Spill on every resource identified in the Gulf of Mexico. See AR6563-6612. BOEM also included a 100-page bibliography in Appendix B, compliant with CEQ guidelines for “literature searches and peer review,” see 51 Fed. Reg. at 15,622, illustrating that BOEM’s subject matter experts relied upon consultation with outside sources, including scientists, to complete the 2012 SEIS. See AR6315-6412. BOEM then spent over fifty pages evaluating the environmental impacts of a catastrophic spill based upon the various sources of credible scientific evidence it cited. See AR6563 (“[TJhis analysis, based on credible, scientific evidence, identifies the most likely and most significant impacts from a high-volume blowout and oil spill that continued for an extended period of time.”). 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4) requires that the' agency “use[] available data to explore the potential impacts and articulate[] the basis for its decision.” Cabinet Res. Grp. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 465 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1100 (D.Mont. 2006). BOEM did just that. As such, it complied with 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22, and did not violate NEPA on these grounds. BOEM did repeatedly state in somewhat boilerplate fashion that “BOEM subject-matter experts have used available scientifically credible evidence in this analysis and based it upon accepted scientific methods and approaches.” See supra, at 157. The plaintiffs argue that “[i]t is insufficient for BOEM to simply state that it used such methodologies without record evidence,” see PL’s Reply 5. But Chapter 4 of the 2012 SEIS, along with Appendix B reference numerous studies and evaluate what information BOEM did have in light of the proposed impact of the lease sales going forward. Just because BOEM did not specifically re-cite and evaluate those studies in the sections where the above-quoted language comes from does not mean that it did not make the requisite evaluations at all. ' On the contrary, BOEM stated generally that it was relying on accepted scientific methods and approaches and then specifically applied relevant studies for each effected resource it examined throughout the 2012 SEIS. Finally, the plaintiffs argue that BOEM did not gather the essential information required by 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22. The vast administrative record and foregoing discussion undermines this contention. To be sure, BOEM lacked certain information, which it disclosed in the SEIS, because many of the effects of the oil spill on the environment are still unknown. However, in every place it reasonably could, BOEM updated its analyses in light of the information it did have available. BOEM took a hard look at the effects of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and incorporated all the information it reasonably could in the 2012 SEIS. As such, it did not violate 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22. 2. BOEM considered new analyses about the risks of catastrophic oil spills The plaintiffs next argue that BOEM failed to adequately consider new information about the risks of future oil spills. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 17. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that BOEM (1) failed to incorporate critical information from its new spill risk analysis prior to the completion of the SEIS, (2) significantly downplayed the Gulf spill in the analysis it did perform, and (3) failed to conduct new modeling in light of the spill and its new analysis. Id. at 18. Before diving into the depths of the studies and tables, some background information is useful. NEPA regulations provide that agencies are allowed to “tier their environmental impact statements to eliminate repetitive discussions of the same issues and to focus on the actual issues ripe for decision at each level of environmental review.” See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20. As BOEM explained, the 2012 SEIS “tiers from” the 2007 Multisale EIS and the 2009-2012 Supplemental EIS. AR5445. The main oil spill study relied upon by BOEM in the 2007 Multisale EIS, the 2009-2012 Supplement, and the Draft SEIS was a study by Anderson and La-belle (2000). AR5556. The Anderson and Labelle study was updated by BOEM’s own draft report, entitled “Update of Oil Spill Occurrence Rates for Offshore Oil Spills” [hereinafter “Draft Report”]. See id. (“Anderson and Labelle (2000) have [sic] been updated by DOI’s draft report, Update of Oil Spill Occurrence Rates for Offshore Oil Spills (USDOI, BOEMRE, 2011a).”). BOEM also explained that in light of this update, “[p]latform and pipeline spill rates and likely spill sizes published in the Multisale EIS have thus become outdated. Readers should note that Tables 4-13, 4-14, 4-16, and 4-35 of the Multisale EIS and Table 3-6 of the 2009-2012 Supplemental EIS use the 2000 spill rates and sizes rather than the 2011 spill rates and sizes.” Id. The Draft Report incorporated new data based on the Deepwater Horizon spill (called the “Macondo” spill in the report) into BOEM’s figures for oil spill occurrences. See DOI REF 48326-48339. BOEM generally structures its analysis in terms of oil spill size. The relevant spill sizes for purposes of this case are the larger spill sizes: > 1,000 bbl and > 10,000 bbl (bbl standing for barrel). After updating its calculations to include oil spills up through 2010 (including the Macondo spill), BOEM concluded, inter alia, that: (1) spill rates for OCS Platforms were unchanged for spills > 1,000 bbl at 0.32 spills per bbl, but improved from 0.12 to 0.06 spills > 10,000 bbl when examined over the entire record (1964-2010) and adjusted for a trend. DOI REF 48326. (2) spill rates for OCS platforms doubled when comparing the most recent 15 years [of] data (1996-2010 data) to the last 15 years [of] data in the previous analysis (Anderson & LaBelle 2000: 1985-1999 data) from 0.13 to 0.25 spills per bbl for spills > 1,000; and from 0.05 to 0.13 spills per bbl for spills > 10,-000 bbl. These rates are still relatively low and include a spill from Hurricane Rita (2005) and the Ma-condo spill in 2010. Id. The 2012 SEIS references this Draft Report in the following places (that either the Court can find or that the parties cite to): AR5556, AR5575, AR5576, AR6471. a. BOEM incorporated new information The plaintiffs first argue that BOEM completed an updated risk analysis in light of the Deepwater Horizon spill — the Draft Report — and yet did not provide data from that new analysis in the 2012 SEIS. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 19. The plaintiffs’ argument focuses on Table 3-5, provided at AR6471. Table 3-5 is entitled “Mean Number and Sites of Spills Estimated to Occur in OCS Offshore Central Planning Area Waters from an Accident Related to Rig/Platform and Pipeline Activities Supporting a CPA Proposed Action Over a 40-Year Time Period.” See id. The significance of the table is that it provides “[t]he risk of various sizes of oil spills occurring in the CPA.” See, e.g., AR5822. The plaintiffs take issue with Table 3-5’s exclusion of the > 10,000 bbl category from the table’s body itself. In the 2007 Multisale EIS, the risk of various oil spills occurring in the CPA was provided in Table 4-35, and in the 2009-2012 Supplement EIS performed, it was moved to Table 3-6. See AR5578. As BOEM explained in the 2012 SEIS, these figures use the 2000 spill rates rather than the updated 2011 spill rates. AR5556. In these prior iterations, the tables provided a category for oil spills > 10,000 bbl. In addition, the SEIS for Lease Sale 218 as well as the Draft SEIS for Lease Sale 216/222 include a table that includes a > 10,000 bbl category. Essentially, of all the EISs or SEISs performed in the Gulf of Mexico CPA and WPA for the 2007-2012 leasing period, the 2012 SEIS is the only one that excludes a >10,-000 bbl category in the table body estimating mean number and sizes of oil spills. Instead, in the notes section directly under the table, BOEM states “[a] spill size group for > 10,000 bbl was not included in the table, because the catastrophic Deep-water Horizon oil spill (4.9 million bbl) was the only spill this size range during 1996-2010, and thus meaningful statistics (such as median spill size) could not be calculated.” AR6471. In the Draft Report, BOEM gave the following explanation for its treatment of the > 10,000 bbl category: In the case ,of OCS Platform spills, spill size averages and medians were calculated through to 2009 rather than 2010. [sic] because the Macondo spill size overwhelms the rest of the record in any calculation using spill volume. The Ma-condo well spilled an estimated 4.9 million barrels in the Gulf of Mexico — about 8.5 times’ the roughly 750,000 bbl of petroleum previously spilled (spills' > 1 bbl) between 1964 and 2009 from OCS oil and gas activities. Unfortunately, the Macondo spill was a ‘worst case’ spill — a complete loss of well control due to multiple failures on a well with a very large reservoir under very high pressures ,that released uncontrolled for months. New wells would be capable of this size release even under the worst of circumstances. It is appropriate to .count the Macondo spill in the spill rates for spills of 1, 000 and 10, 000 bbl or greater. Means (averages) and medians are statistical measures that are frequently used to characterize a ‘typical’ event. In the interest of characterizing the size of a ‘typical’ or ‘representative’ OCS spill it would be best to exclude the Macondo spill volume in the calculation of mean (average) or median spill size. DOI REF 48339 (emphasis added). Thus, BOEM included the Macondo spill in Table 3-5 for spill rates statistics for spills > 1,000 bbl, but excluded the Macondo spill from median spill size statistics for spills > 1,000, explaining that using the 4.9 million barrel figure would overwhelm the record. And BOEM did not include separate statistics in the table for spills > 10,000 bbl at all, because it determined that it could not meaningfully provide them, given that the Macondo spill was the only spill in that category for the relevant 15-year period. The plaintiffs’ concern with this category’s exclusion from the body of the table is understandable. Given that every prior version of the table includes the > 10,000 bbl category, the Court is puzzled as to why BOEM decided in the 2012 SEIS— which was only undertaken to account for changes in light of the Deepwater Horizon spill (a spill > 10,000 bbl) — to exclude that figure from the table body itself. While the Court likely would not have relegated that category to the “Notes” section of the table, and, for the sake of consistency, have kept the category in the table as it appeared in the Draft SEIS (with updated figures — regardless of whether or not they were “meaningful”), see AR4861, the Court cannot say that BOEM excluded the category from consideration in the 2012 SEIS altogether, as the plaintiffs would have the Court find. Even if the body of Table 3-5 itself does not provide statistics for a > 10,000 bbl category spill occurring, the 2012 SE-IS still does. For instance, in Chapter 4 of the SEIS, BOEM states repeatedly that “[t]he risk of various sizes of oil spills occurring in the CPA is presented in Table 3-5. The possibility of a spill over 10,000 bbl in the OCS of the CPA is estimated to be > 1-1 spill, over the 40-year cycle for the proposed action for the 5-Year Program.” AR5807, AR5622 (same); see also AR5822 (“The possibility of a spill > 10,000 bbl in the CPA is estimated to be up to one spill in the 40-year period for the proposed action.”), AR5831 (same). And even though the body of Table 3-5 itself does not include the > 10,000 bbl category, the note directly under it does, stating that “[a] spill size group for > 10,000 bbl was not included in this table, because the catastrophic Deep-water Horizon oil spill (4.9 million bbl) was the only spill size in this size range during 1996-2010, and thus meaningful statistics (such as median spill size) could not be calculated.” See AR6471. Thus, the relevant figures are not hidden from the public, but rather, they just appear in á different place. And the > 1,000 bbl category’s spill rate accounts for the Macondo spill. See DOI REF 48339. Moreover, BOEM thoroughly considered the > 10,000 bbl spill category in its Draft Report, which it cited to several times, and included in the administrative record. While the plaintiffs argue that the Draft Report was not disclosed, and the record reflects that BOEM may have been hesitant about sharing it— perhaps because it was in draft form, the Report was ultimately included in the administrative record, and was referred to in the 2012 SEIS. See AR5556, AR5575, AR5576, AR6471, DOI REF 48326-48377; see also AR6141 (explaining that the Anderson and LaBelle (2000) study has been recently updated, even though it is still in draft form). Though BOEM did not necessarily create a table and conduct its analysis the way the Court might have, it still took a “hard look” at the > 10,000 bbl category, and in turn the Deepwater Horizon spill in the 2012 SEIS generally. As such, BOEM was not arbitrary and capricious in excluding the > 10,000 bbl category from the body of the table itself — a single table within an SEIS of over 1,100 pages in length. See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974) (‘While we may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given, we will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Wilderness Soc’y v. Salazar, 603 F.Supp.2d 52, 59 (D.D.C.2009) (“The court’s role is to ensure that the agency takes a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences of an action, not to interject its own judgment as to the course of action to be taken.”) (quoting Hammond v. Norton, 370 F.Supp.2d 226, 240 (D.D.C.2005)); see also Miami-Dade Cnty. v. EPA 529 F.3d 1049, 1065 (11th Cir.2008) (“courts must be extremely deferential when an agency’s decision rests.on the evaluation of complex scientific data within the agency’s technical expertise .... although a reviewing court may not rubber stamp an agency decision, it must look at the agency’s decision not as the chemist, biologist, or statistician that it is qualified neither by training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court exercising ... certain minimal standards of rationality”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). BOEM took a hard look at the Deepwater Horizon event in the 2012 SEIS and its exclusion of a > 10,000 bbl category from Table 3-5 does not undermine that conclusion. See Ore gon Envt’l Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 492 (9th Cir.1987) (“The reviewing court may not fly speck an EIS and hold it insufficient on the basis of inconsequential, technical deficiencies” (citation omitted)). b. BOEM considered impacts of deepwater drilling The plaintiffs next argue that BOEM ignored its duty to assess the risks of deepwater drilling. See Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 21. The administrative record shows that BOEM did consider the risks of deep-water drilling, throughout the 2012 SEIS. BOEM first noted that “[i]n response to increasing deepwater activities in the GOM, this Agency developed a comprehensive strategy to address NEPA compliance and environmental issues in the deepwater areas. A key component of that strategy was the completion of a Programmatic EA [environmental assessment] to evaluate the potential effects of the deepwater technologies and operations.” AR5488. BOEM also explained that it “prepared a series of technical papers that provide a summary description of the different types of structures that may be employed in the development and production of hydrocarbon resources in the deepwater areas of the GOM (Regg et al., 2000). The Programmatic EA and technical papers were used in the preparation of this Supplemental EIS.” Id. . The Draft Report, relied upon by BOEM in the 2012 SEIS, also discussed the move into deepwater drilling. BOEM stated that spill rates for OCS platform spills > 1,000 bbl increased over time, “due to the Macondo spill.” DOI REF 48335. BOEM explained, “[t]hese rates are still relatively low.... Prior to these two spills, the last OCS Platform spill > 1,000 bbl occurred in 1980, and the last OCS Platform spill > 10,000 bbl occurred in 1970.” DOI REF 48326. BOEM acknowledged that “[i]t is worth noting that this most recent 15-year period spans the move of OCS oil production into deepwater (> 1,000 ft water depth). In 1996, deep-water oil production in the Gulf of Mexico was just under 20% of the total oil production in the region. In 2010, that percentage had increased to 81%.” DOI REF 48335. In addition, BOEM explained that it calculates spill rates “based on the assumption that spills occur in direct proportion to the volume of oil handled and are expressed as number of spills per billion barrels of oil handled.” AR5576. And in the Draft Report, BOEM found that after taking the Deepwater Horizon spill into account, “tests indicate the volume of oil handled between OCS platform spills still appears to be nonrandom,” thus showing that spills are correlated with the volume of production, not with the depth of production. See DOI REF 48334. BOEM thus explained that the increase in spill rates over the 15-year period was attributable almost exclusively to the Ma-condo spill, and not to any other trend in the data suggesting that as offshore drilling goes into deeper water so too does the frequency of oil spills. See id.; see also AR6280 (“BOEM uses data on past OCS production and spills, along with estimates of future production, to evaluate the risk of future spills. Data on the numbers, types, sizes, and other information on past spills, including those that are relevant to ultra-deepwater wells, were reviewed to develop the spill scenario for analysis in this Supplemental EIS. Past spill data used in the model indicate that there is no trend of increased number of spills based on exploration in deeper water prior to Macondo.”) (emphasis added). In their comments to the draft SEIS, but not in their briefs, the plaintiffs indicated that high pressure and high temperature wells, which occur in deepwater in the Gulf of Mexico “are extremely dangerous and add exorbitant risk to drilling, completion, and workover operations.” AR7435. In the 2012 SEIS, BOEM addressed this deepwater concern, explaining that “[n]either high-temperature/high-pressure conditions nor water depth are used to calculate the risk of future spills because these are postlease operational issues that cannot be reasonably predicted at the lease stage without site-specific information. In the postlease stage, applicants submit site-specific data on conditions, and BOEM technical staff reviews this data to determine whether conditions on approval, based on well data are appropriate.” AR6280. As the intervenor-de-fendants persuasively argue, and as discussed infra, this is “consistent with the staged environmental review dictated by the structure of offshore leasing under the OCSLA.” See Intervenor’s Reply 15 n.3 (citing Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 483). In light of the fact that there was no trend indicating the increased risk of oil spills in deepwater, and BOEM’s consideration of the risks of deep-water spills in both the 2012 SEIS, and the Draft Report, it is evident that BOEM did take a hard look at the risks of deepwater spills. c. BOEM incorporated Deepwater Horizon into its spill modeling The plaintiffs also argue that “the Bureau failed to conduct a new OSRA run taking the Deepwater Horizon spill into account.” Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 22. OSRA is the Oil Spill Risk Analysis Model BOEM uses “to estimate the likely trajectory] of hypothetical offshore spills > 1,000 bbl. The trajectories, combined with estimated spill occurrence, are used to estimate the risk of future spills occurring and contacting environmental features.” AR5577. In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, BOEM conducted a “special OSRA run ... in order to estimate the impacts of a possible future catastrophic or high-volume, long-duration oil spill.” AR6635. BOEM explained that “overall OSRA is designed for use as a risk-based assessment, [but] for this analysis, only the conditional probability, the probability of contact to the resource, was calculated. The probability of a catastrophic spill occurring was not calculated; thus the combination of the probability of a spill and the probability of contact to the resources from the hypothetical spill locations were not performed.” Id. BOEM continued by noting that “[r]esults from this trajectory analysis provide input to the final product by estimating where spills might travel on the ocean’s surface and what land segments might be contacted if and when another catastrophic spill occurs, but it does not provide input on the probability of another catastrophic spill occurring.” Id. (emphasis added). In the results section, BOEM notes that “[i]t should be reiterated that these are conditional probabilities; the condition being that a spill is assumed to have occurred.” AR6638. The plaintiffs take issue with BOEM’s concession that “the probability of a catastrophic spill occurring was not calculated.” AR6636; see also Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 23. They cite to a 2010 internal document that explained that “[d]ue to time constraints and catastrophic spills not being the focus of the supplemental EIS, OSRA will not be rerun for spills > 1,000 barrels.” AR3005. That same document stated “[d]ue to the remote possibility of a catastrophic spill occurring, ‘conditional’ results will be used. ‘Combined’ probabilities will not be useful.” Id. BOEM and the intervenor-defendants argue that the OSRA “run was conducted in order to estimate the impacts of a possible future catastrophic or high-volume, long-duration oil spill,” and was “never intended to estimate the risk of future spills occurring.” Federal-Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 22 (emphasis in original). The plaintiffs do not persuasively explain why BOEM had to calculate the probability of a catastrophic oil spill within the OSRA run. They argue that the failure to calculate the probability of a > 10,000 bbl spill occurring in the OSRA run means that “the only information given to the public is that the spill rate for an oil spill over 1,000 bbls is 1.13 and the estimated spill size is 2,200 bbl, which is actually lower than the spill size stated in the Multisale EIS 2007. Compare AR5576 to 1872.” Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. 23. But the public was provided with more information than just that regarding spill rates. As set forth above, though the four corners of Table 3-5 itself do not provide an estimated spill rate for spills > 10,000 bbl, the notes underneath the table disclose to the public the size of the Deepwater Horizon spill (4.9 million bbls), and the table includes the Deepwater Horizon spill in the data for spill rates for spills > 1,000 bbl. See DOI REF 48339. And in several places, the 2012 SEIS references the probability of a catastrophic oil spill occurring. See, e.g., AR5822 (“The possibility of a spill > 10,000 bbl in the CPA is estimated to be up to one spill in the 40-year period for the proposed action.”); AR5831 (same). Thus, the failure to calculate the probability of a catastrophic oil spill occurring within the OSRA run did not preclude BOEM from making meaningful disclosures about probabilities and updating its data in light of the Deepwater Horizon event in the 2012 SEIS. As to the smaller spill size identified in Table 3-5, BOEM explained that the 2,200 bbl figure was based on updated data from the Draft Report, which included information up through 2010, whereas the previous version only included information from 1985-1999, see AR5576, and that the smaller number in Table 3-5 was due to the fact that Table 3-5 only represents median spill size for that particular area of the CPA, whereas prior versions of the table represent median spill size for the entire CPA and the WPA. See Federal-Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 23. On technical calculations such as these, the Court must defer to the agency. See Miami-Dade Cnty., 529 F.3d at 1065 (“although a reviewing court may not ruti’ber stamp an agency decision, it must look at the agency’s decision not as the chemist, biologist, or statistician that it is qualified neither by training nor experience to be, but as a reviewing court exercising ... certain minimal standards of rationality”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). ' More importantly, however, BOEM took a “hard look” at the Deepwater Horizon spill because it still conducted a special OSRA run for the specific purpose of “estimating] the impacts of a possible future catastrophic spill.” AR6636. BOEM assumed — a 100% probability in other words — that a catastrophic spill would occur and sought out to analyze the impacts of such a spill. BOEM’s approach was therefore not arbitrary and capricious — it took a hard look at the Deepwater Horizon event by running a catastrophic spill run in the first instance to determine what the impacts of another catastrophic spill occurring would be. The plaintiffs conclude their “hard look argument” by arguing that BOEM’s “oil spill risk analysis does not satisfy NEPA’s requirement for scientific integrity or informed