Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION JOHN D. BATES, District Judge. This case, brought by Yassin Abdullah Kadi, a citizen and permanent resident of Saudi Arabia, involves a challenge to the decision of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) to designate him as a “specially designated global terrorist (“SDGT”).” Presently pending are (1) defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment; (2) Kadi’s motion for discovery under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(f); and (3) Kadi’s motion to amend his complaint. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment, deny Kadi’s motion for discovery under Rule 56(f), and deny Kadi’s motion to amend the complaint. BACKGROUND I. Statutory and Regulatory Background The listing of SDGTs is governed by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (“IEE-PA”), and Executive Order 13,224 (66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001)) (“EO 13,224”). IEEPA “authorizes the President to declare a national emergency when an extraordinary threat to the United States arises that originates in substantial part in a foreign state.” Holy Land Found, v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 159 (D.C.Cir.2003). Such a declaration provides the President with extensive authority set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 1702, which permits the President to block property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Specifically, the President is authorized to: investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.... 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). IEEPA further provides that, in the event of “judicial review of a determination made under this section, if the determination was based on classified information ... such information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera.” Id. § 1702(c). After September 11, 2001, the President issued EO 13,224 invoking his authority under IEEPA and the United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287c. The Executive Order declared a “national emergency” with respect to “grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, including the terrorist attacks ... committed on September 11, 2001, ... and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on United States nationals or the United States.” Id. EO 13,224 ordered the blocking of property of twenty-seven specific terrorists and terrorist organizations identified in an Annex. Id. § 3. The Secretary of the' Treasury is authorized to designate additional persons whose property or interests in property should be blocked, where the Secretary finds that such persons “act for or on behalf of’ or are “owned or controlled by” designated terrorists, or they “assist in, sponsor, or provide ... support for” (including “financial ... support” or “financial ... services”) or are “otherwise associated with” them. Id. § l(c)-(d). The Secretary has delegated his authorities under the Executive Order to the Director of OFAC. 31 C.F.R. § 594.802. Persons designated pursuant to the Executive Order are referred to as “specially designated global terrorists” (SDGT). See 31 C.F.R. § 594.310. II. Procedural History and Designation Kadi is a citizen and permanent resident of Saudi Arabia and a self-described “prominent Saudi Arabian businessman and philanthropist.” Compl. ¶ 1; AR 94. On October 12, 2001, OFAC designated Kadi a SDGT pursuant to the IIEPA and EO 13,224, Compl. ¶ 20, which, by operation of law, resulted in the blocking of all of his property and interests in property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. It is undisputed that OFAC did not give notice to Kadi before blocking his assets. The designation was made known to Kadi and to the public through a press release instructing financial institutions to freeze Kadi’s assets. Compl. ¶ 20; AR 123-26. A press release was also issued by authorities in the United Kingdom. Compl. ¶ 20. By letter dated October 15, 2001, OFAC also mailed Kadi a “Notice of Blocking” providing direct notice of the designation and blocking and advising him of the administrative procedures available to challenge OFAC’s action. AR 2784-85. Notice of the designation was also published on October 26, 2001 in the Federal Register. See 66 Fed.Reg. 54404 (Oct. 26, 2001). Kadi thereafter sought judicial review in the High Court in London. Compl. ¶¶ 22-23. In response to a request for information by the United Kingdom, the United States Treasury Department faxed a two-page document to United Kingdom officials in October 2001 (“two-page fax”), which Kadi learned about during his court proceeding^ in London. Compl. ¶ 24. Kadi places much emphasis on this two-page fax, which summarized unclassified information relating to Kadi’s financial support of terrorist activities through a charitable organization known as the Muwafaq Foundation and his other ties to terrorists and terrorism financing. AR 39-40. Kadi claims that around May 23, 2002, he met with OFAC staff at the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia, where OFAC denied knowledge of the two-page fax. Compl. ¶ 25. However, there is no dispute that Kadi received a copy of the two-page fax, reviewed it, and proceeded to refute various contentions as part of his petition for reconsideration. See Compl. ¶ 29. Kadi petitioned OFAC for reconsideration on December 21, 2001. AR 23. In the months and years thereafter, he has submitted several witness statements and other materials in support of his petition and has engaged in a series of exchanges with OFAC. On March 12, 2004, OFAC issued a twenty-page unclassified memorandum denying Kadi’s request for reconsideration (“OFAC Memorandum”). Compl. ¶ 30. AR 3-40. Kadi maintains that this is the only formal written statement he has received from the United States government. Compl. ¶31. Based on these events, Kadi filed this action on January 16, 2009, challenging the evidentiary basis for his designation and the freezing of his assets, and raising an array of constitutional claims. Specifically, he claims violations under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., the IEEPA, and the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. On May 22, 2009, defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Kadi opposes the motion and seeks discovery under Rule 56(f). Kadi also seeks leave to file an amended complaint. The Court heard argument with respect to the pending motions on April 9, 2010, and thereafter requested supplemental briefing, which has now been completed. STANDARD OF REVIEW All that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require of a compláint is that it contain “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, to provide the “grounds” of “entitle[ment] to relief,” a plaintiff must furnish “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955; see also Papasan v. Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C.Cir.2009). A complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This amounts to a “two-pronged approach” under which a court first identifies the factual allegations entitled to an assumption of truth and then determines “whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 1950-51. The notice pleading rules are not meant to impose a great burden on a plaintiff. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161. L.Ed.2d 577 (2005); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff’s factual allegations must be presumed true and should be liberally construed in his or her favor. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); Phillips v. Bureau of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 968 (D.C.Cir.1979); see also Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The plaintiff must be given every favorable inference that may be drawn from the allegations of fact. Scheuer. v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C.Cir.2000). However, “the court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Nor does the court accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” or “naked assertions [of unlawful misconduct] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 129 S-.Ct. at 1949-50 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.2008) (explaining that the court has “never accepted legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations”). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the evidence demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. In a case involving review of a final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, however, the standard set forth in Rule 56(a) does not apply because of the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative record. See Nat’l Wilderness Inst. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 2005 WL 691775, *7 (D.D.C.2005); Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F.Supp. 96, 105 (D.D.C.1995), amended on other grounds, 967 F.Supp. 6 (D.D.C.1997). Under the APA, it is the role of the agency to resolve factual issues to arrive at a decision that is supported by the administrative record, whereas “the function of the district court is to determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” See Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769-70 (9th Cir.1985); see also Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of Agriculture, 18 F.3d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir.1994) (“[T]his case involves review of a final agency determination under the [APA]; therefore, resolution of th[e] matter does not require fact finding on behalf of this court. Rather, the court’s review is limited to the administrative record.”). Summary judgment thus serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review. See Richards v. INS, 554 F.2d 1173, 1177 & n. 28 (D.C.Cir.1977), cited in Bloch v. Powell, 227 F.Supp.2d 25, 31 (D.D.C.2002), aff'd, 348 F.3d 1060 (D.C.Cir.2003). Plaintiffs challenge Kadi’s designation as a SDGT as violating the requirements of the APA, IIEPA, and EO 13,224. The APA requires that the Court “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The “scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn, of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). The court must be satisfied that the agency has “ ‘examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ ” Alpharma, Inc. v. Leavitt, 460 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir.2006). The agency’s decisions are entitled to a “presumption of regularity,” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), and although “inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.” Id. at 416, 91 S.Ct. 814. The Court’s review is confined to the administrative record, subject to limited exceptions not applicable here. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973) (“[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”). DISCUSSION I. APA Claim A. Standard for Motion for Summary Judgment and Discovery Before addressing the merits of Kadi’s APA claim, the Court first considers Kadi’s preliminary argument that summary judgment is inappropriate because there are disputed issues of material fact. Alternatively, he claims that the motion for summary judgment is premature because he has not been provided an opportunity to obtain discovery on his claims. See Opp’n at 64-69. In general, summary judgment “is proper only after the plaintiff has been given adequate time for discovery.” First Chicago Int’l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1380 (D.C.Cir.1988). However, a party opposing summary judgment and seeking to obtain discovery under Rule 56(f) has the burden of stating “concretely why additional discovery is needed to oppose a motion for summary judgment.” Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 762 (D.C.Cir.2006); see also Byrd v. EPA 174 F.3d 239, 248 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1999) (party seeking discovery has the burden of identifying which facts to be discovered would create triable issue, as well as the reasons why discovery is necessary to challenge the summary judgment motion). Kadi argues that because the classified record was not made available to him, he is unable to respond to the motion for summary judgment. Moreover, he claims that because subsequent decisions by other countries “vindicated him,” the administrative record is therefore incomplete, and he contends that he should be given an opportunity to supplement' it. The Court rejects these arguments. Subsequent to the 2004 decision, Kadi has had several years and opportunities to petition OFAC to supplement the administrative record, but he has not done so. Moreover, absent “evidence that the agency has given a false reason ... discovery is inappropriate in cases under the APA.” See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Seidman, 786 F.Supp. 1041, 1046 (D.D.C.1992). Although Kadi attempts to argue that OFAC has acted in bad faith, nothing in the record supports Kadi’s contention. Even if the Court permitted discovery, it is doubtful that it would garner additional facts that would help to decide whether the agency action was arbitrary and capricious, given the deferential review of such actions. See Camp, 411 U.S. at 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241 (“[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”); Seidman, 786 F.Supp. at 1046 n. 11 (“The Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the decision-making agency.”) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856). Accordingly, the Court will deny Kadi’s motion for discovery under Rule 56(f) with respect to the APA claim and will proceed to resolve it. B. Merits of the APA Claim Kadi’s APA claim primarily challenges OFAC’S decision to continue his SDGT designation as arbitrary and capricious, as based on a lack of sufficient procedural safeguards, for insufficiency of the evidence in the administrative record, and for OFAC’s misplaced reliance on the facts that were in the record. See Compl. ¶¶ 51-54. In considering the merits of the claim, the Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions, the arguments made by the parties at the hearing before the Court, and the entire administrative record, which consists of both the classified and unclassified record. In reviewing a challenge to the agency’s decision as arbitrary and capricious, the Court bears several considerations in mind. The D.C. Circuit has stated that “a highly deferential review applies” to examination of a SDGT designation. Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C.Cir.2007); Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 162. As previously stated, the “scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its 'judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856. The agency’s decisions are entitled to a “presumption of regularity,” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), and although “inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.” Id. at 416, 91 S.Ct. 814. The Court, then, “must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” Id. Courts are particularly mindful that their review is highly deferential when matters of foreign policy and national security are concerned. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 734 (“[0]ur review — in an area at the intersection of national security, foreign policy, and administrative law — is extremely deferential.”); Zarmach Oil Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 750 F.Supp.2d 150, 155 (D.D.C.2010) (“[C]ourts owe a substantial measure of ‘deference to the political branches in matters of foreign policy,’ including cases involving blocking orders.”) (citing Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 82 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984)); Holy Land Found, y. Ashcroft, 219 F.Supp.2d 57, 84 (D.D.C.2002) (“Blocking orders are an important component of U.S. foreign policy, and the President’s choice of this tool to combat terrorism is entitled to particular deference.”) 1. Overview of the OFAC Decision and Kadi’s Arguments After petitioning OFAC for reconsideration in December 2001, Kadi and the agency engaged in several meetings and Kadi provided numerous statements and submissions. On March 12, 2004, OFAC notified Kadi that his petition for reconsideration was denied and that his name would remain on the list of SDGTs. AR 1. OFAC emphasized that its determination rested on the “totality of the record” (both classified and unclassified), which showed that Kadi had financial relationships — primarily through the Muwafaq Foundation, but also through other Kadi companies— with many persons and organizations that were designated SDGTs by OFAC: No one element, no one contact, no one accusation of funding is taken as being determinative of the assessment that AL-QADI has been providing support to terrorists through his actions. Rather, when considering the number of sources, the numbers of activities and length of time, the totality of the evidence, both classified and unclassified, this provides a reason to believe Yasin AL-QADI has funded terrorist and extremist individuals and operations. AR 22. In deciding that Kadi’s continued designation was warranted, OFAC considered an administrative record of over 2800 pages, which included fhe extensive submissions Kadi made to OFAC during the reconsideration process, as well as other documents. OFAC also considered a classified record. Based on its assessment of all this evidence, ÓFAC determined that “a reasonable basis remains to continue the designation of [Kadi] under E.O. 13224.” AR 1. OFAC invoked each of the three grounds authorized in EO 13,224, finding that there was “reason to believe” that Kadi was: • acting for or on behalf of al Qaida, Osama Bin Laden, and Makhtab alKhidamat, persons listed in the Annex to E.O. 13,224; • assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, among others, al Qaida, Osama Bin Laden, Makhtab al-Khidamat, Hamas, the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, Al-Haramayn (Bosnia), Chafiq Ayadi, and Wa’el Julaidan, persons subject to E.O. 13,224; and • associated with, among others, al Qaida, Osama Bin Laden, Makhtab alKhidamat, Hamas, the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, Al-Haramayn (Bosnia), Chafiq Ayadi, and Wa’el Julaidan .... AR 22. Although OFAC invoked all three grounds, and emphasized its decision to continue the designation based on the totality of the record, OFAC’s decision appears to rely primarily on Kadi’s financial support of terrorism. Neither Kadi nor the Government take the position that all three criteria must be satisfied in order to uphold the designation. Kadi acknowledges the highly deferential review accorded to OFAC’s decision. But he claims that the administrative record, even when viewed in its totality, shows that “there is no ‘substantial evidence’ ... of any sort” to support the designation, see Opp’n at 48, and he argues that the evidence underlying OFAC’s decision is unreliable. Specifically, Kadi claims that the administrative record fails to support OFAC’s findings that he (1) provided support to terrorism through his leadership in the Muwafaq Foundation; (2) provided financial or other support to SDGTs; or (3) had any other ties to justify the sanctions imposed against him. Opp’n at 49. As part of his attack on the sufficiency of the evidence, Kadi takes issue with OFAC’s reliance on his own statements as evidenced in the frequent reference to them in the OFAC Memorandum. He also protests OFAC’s use of classified information to support the continued designation. Finally, Kadi continues to dispute the accuracy and reliability of certain pieces of evidence in the record, notably the two-page fax, news articles, and the affidavit submitted by FBI Agent Richard Wright. He also points to subsequent decisions by other countries, with varying procedural postures, as purported indicators of OFAC’s error in continuing his designation. Kadi argues that the two-page fax sent by the United States to the United Kingdom contained “substantially erroneous” information.- He further claims that the fax’s reliance on “non-evidential sources” such as news articles and information from websites constituted hearsay. Compl. ¶ 24. But Kadi’s argument that the Government is categorically foreclosed from considering “hearsay” sources is wrong. Courts, including the D.C. Circuit, have held that hearsay evidence can be considered as part of the administrative record. See Holy Land Found,., 333 F.3d at 162 (rejecting the contention that OFAC may not rely on hearsay evidence, and stating that designations can be based on a broad range of evidence, including intelligence data and hearsay declarations); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C.Cir.200l); Al Haramain Islamic Found, v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 585 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1258 (D.Ore.2008) (“Al Haramain I”) (“The APA permits the agency’s use of ‘any oral or documentary evidence’ so long as the evidence is not irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence.”) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)). Accordingly, OFAC’s reliance on newspaper articles, whether in the two-page fax or in the administrative record generally, was entirely proper. Kadi also alludes to the findings by other investigative bodies around the world that, according to him, have considered the same or similar terrorism allegations against him, and “vindicated” him in every forum. See Opp’n at 4-5. However, the decisions cited by Kadi all post-date the March 2004 OFAC decision under review and are not part of the administrative record. Notwithstanding the impropriety of considering such decisions, the Court would, in any event, be reluctant to rely on the decisions of other countries based on information that likely differed from the administrative record compiled by and available to OFAC. Moreover, these decisions may have been reached under different standards of proof or review, which further undermines any persuasiveness they would have. 2. Kadi’s Involvement in the Muwafaq Foundation The Court now turns to the evidentiary basis for OFAC’s conclusion that Kadi provided support — particularly financial support — to terrorist causes and to other SDGTs. OFAC emphasizes Kadi’s leadership in the Muwafaq Foundation in its March 2004 decision. Accordingly, the Court looks first to Kadi’s relationship with that entity. The Muwafaq Foundation — Arabic for “Blessed Success” or “Holy Success” — was founded in the Channel Islands on May 31, 1992 as a charitable foundation. Sudan was the first country in which Muwafaq was active; it subsequently operated in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Albania, Austria, and Germany. AR 707. Kadi refers to Muwafaq as a “highly decentralised operation” that “carried out separate activities in various countries or regions”; therefore, it had “no central administration,” and “no central accounting systems nor any central bank accounts.” AR 1357-58. Muwafaq reportedly terminated operations in 1996 or 1997, but the OFAC Memorandum states that Muwafaq “continued to operate until mid-2001 under the umbrella of Makhtab al-Khidamat ... considered to be the precursor to al-Qaida,” before Makhtab al-Khidamat dissolved and was absorbed into Osama Bin Laden’s organization, and that “Muwafaq ... joined [alQaida].” AR 14-15. Kadi’s submissions also note that Muwafaq is still registered in Holland and Belgium. AR 708-09. The administrative record reflects that Kadi played a significant leadership role in Muwafaq. Kadi is one of six trustees, and the others “delegated ... the running and operation of the Foundation” to Kadi, who “was the driving force behind the administration of the foundation.” AR 1357. He effectively conceded that he directly supervised the individual country offices. Kadi “selected the managers responsible for the various countries”; worked with them to determine “which charitable activities to engage in”; helped “raise money for those activities”; and, “[w]henever possible,” he visited the country locations where Muwafaq operated “to meet with the country managers regarding the activities of the Foundation,” “about 3-4 times a year” for each country. AR 1359. Significantly, in addition to choosing and managing Muwafaq’s personnel, Kadi also transferred funds to the organization. He concedes that he made those transfers, but argues that they were “solely and exclusively for the charitable purposes of the foundation.” Opp’n at 52. OFAC relied on Kadi’s involvement in Muwafaq and, in particular, activities claimed to have occurred in Bosnia, Albania, Sudan, and Pakistan, to conclude that Kadi financially supported terrorist activities, primarily through Muwafaq, but also through other Kadi-owned entities. It considered Kadi’s relationships with, and financial transfers to, designated terrorists Abdul Latif Saleh, Wa’el Julaidan, and Chariq Ayadi — who were all involved in Muwafaq. a. Activities in Albania and Bosnia and Kadi’s Relationship to Saleh OFAC pointed to Kadi’s activities in Albania, through Muwafaq and other Kadiowned entities, as evidence of Kadi’s financial support of terrorist activities and other SDGTs. OFAC also concluded that “[s]ome involvement in the financing of these activities had also been provided by Osama Bin Laden.” AR 9. According to OFAC’s findings, Muwafaq gave logistical and financial support to Al-Gama’at Al-Islamiya, a mujahadin battalion in Bosnia that was designated as a SDGT on October 31, 2001. The organization also transferred $500,000 to terrorist organizations in the Balkans in the mid-1990s. AR 9. OFAC also found that Muwafaq was involved in arms trafficking from Albania to Bosnia. And OFAC concluded that as of late 2001, Kadi had continued to finance institutions and organizations in the Balkans after Muwafaq ceased operations there, including two entities that were designated as SDGTs in early 2002 — The Revival of Islamic Heritage Society’s Pakistan and Afghanistan offices and the Bosnia-Herzegovina branch of the Al-Haramain Foundation. AR 9-10. Kadi also owned several Albanian companies, which, according to OFAC, “tunneled money to extremists or employed extremists in positions where they controlled the firms’ funds.” AR 11. In addition, “Bin Laden allegedly provided the working capital for four or five of AL-QADI’s companies in Albania.” Id. In 1992, Kadi met Abdul Latif Saleh at a medical conference, and soon thereafter entered into several business ventures with him, including Karavan, an Albanian construction and property development company, and what OFAC characterizes as Kadi’s main Albanian firm. AR 766-767. According to OFAC, Saleh was general manager of all of Kadi’s businesses in Albania and held 10% of Kadi Group investments in Albania. AR 10-11. He was also an “official signer” for Karavan and its bank accounts, and had authorization to withdraw money directly from Kadi’s bank accounts and transfer funds. AR 1367. Saleh was also the head of Muwafaq’s Albanian operations. AR 10, 737-41. Kadi himself admits that money was taken from his local businesses “to make payments to support [Muwafaq’s] activities.” AR 1367. Money was often taken from Karavan’s accounts to fund Muwafaq, and Karavan’s accounts were also used to make contributions to other nongovernmental organizations; Kadi would then reimburse Karavan. Id. This arrangement was confirmed by OFAC’s interviews with two Karavan employees-Violet Spaho, a financial manager, and Amr Al Zainy (aka Amr al-Zaini), who was Karavan’s director and Kadi’s financial representative in Albania. According to OFAC, when Kara-van was ready to send a large sum of money back to Saudi Arabia as profits, the main office in Saudi Arabia instructed Karavan to give the funds to charitable causes, which included Muwafaq. AR 12. OFAC pointed to large wire transfers in and out of Kadi’s personal bank accounts, as well as large cash withdrawals made from Karavan accounts and large payments to Saleh. AR 12. In 1999, Saleh was deported from Albania. Kadi claimed that Saleh was deported as a matter of mistaken identity — he shared the same name with an Egyptian citizen who was “a member of the Jihad Group.” AR 10 & 739-40. However, OFAC had a different account. It found that Saleh was expelled because of his ties with known terrorists, including Osama Bin Laden, and stated that Saleh’s number had been found in the phone books of Bin Laden associates who had targeted the U.S. Embassy in Tirana in 1998. OFAC, based on an interview with Al Zainy, noted that when Wa’el Julaidan, a SDGT characterized by OFAC as a “Bin Laden associate,” visited Albania, Saleh treated Julaidan as his boss. AR 12. OFAC also believed that Saleh had founded and organized the Albanian Islamic Jihad (AIJ). AR 10-11. OFAC claimed that Kadi was an active supporter and fundraiser for AIJ, and noted that Muwafaq operated a school in Kukes in 1997, where several students had been selected for membership in AIJ. AR 9-11. Kadi confirmed that Muwafaq financially supported the. school, and that Saleh was involved in running it, but stated that it shut down due to financial problems. AR 743. b. Involvement in Other Countries and Other Muwafaq Ties OFAC also considered Muwafaq’s involvement in other countries such as Pakistan and Sudan, and other connections that indicated that Muwafaq was tied to terrorist activities and SDGTs. Muwafaq’s Pakistan operation was established in Islamabad in 1992, and Kadi hired Amir Mehdi tó be its local director. AR 720 & 723-24. As director, Mehdi’s responsibilities included handling and distributing Muwafaq funds. Mehdi turned out not to be a good choice. Kadi himself conceded that the Pakistan Government raided Muwafaq’s office in Islamabad on March 21, 1995, and that subsequently “the officials of the FIA (the Pakistan security services) arrested Amir Mehdi on March 29, 1995.” , AR 724. Kadi’s only explanation was that FIA had also conducted raids and targeted other Muslim charities working in Pakistan. Id. According to OFAC, however, the reason for the raid was Mehdi’s involvement in terrorist activities. Specifically, one of Mehdi’s telephone numbers had been used by associates of terrorists in Pakistan and abroad, and open source reporting had indicated that the raid was triggered by Ramzi Yousefs arrest for the first World Trade Center bombing. AR 11. Kadi claimed that he terminated Mehdi’s, employment following his release from arrest in 1995. AR 725. The Pakistan offices were permanently closed in 1997. Id. OFAC also pointed to ties between Muwafaq’s office in Sudan and Osama Bin Laden, as well as Kadi’s claimed acknowledgment that Muwafaq’s Sudan office had “provided assistance to jihad activities in the Middle-East and the Balkans.” AR 12. The administrative record reflects that Sudan was the first country in which Muwafaq was active, and that it had an office in Khartoum. AR 709, 714. OFAC stated that when Muwafaq opened in Sudan, around 1991 to 1993, Osama Bin Laden was based in the country. Kadi closed the office in 1996, apparently having become embroiled in accusations of terrorism. AR 718. The Africa Confidential had implicated Muwafaq in terrorism, but Kadi and the publication eventually settled a libel action. OFAC considered that resolution, but rejected Kadi’s claim that it supported a finding that Muwafaq was not involved in supporting terrorist activities orSDGTs. AR 12. OFAC also considered Muwafaq’s relationship to Makhtab al-Khidamat, an umbrella organization established in the early 1980s that was believed to be the precursor to al-Qaida. OFAC found that “Muwafaq was part of Makhtab al-Khidamat and continued to operate under the Makhtab al-Khidamat umbrella until mid-2001, when the latter dissolved and was absorbed into Osama Bin Laden’s organization. Subsequently, a number of Arab [NGOs] and organizations formerly affiliated with Makhtab al-Khidamat ... joined Al-Qaida. These included Muwafaq.” AR 14-15. Kadi denies this claim, noting that Muwafaq had ceased operating by 1998 at the latest. Opp’n at 51 (citing Defs.’ Mot. at 10). c. Kadi’s Arguments Kadi disputes OFAC’s findings and maintains that Muwafaq was an organization engaged in charitable activities, not in supporting terrorism. He claims that he provided a legitimate explanation for any expenditures through Muwafaq, which OFAC simply ignored, and accuses OFAC of drawing a conclusory connection between Muwafaq (and by extension, Kadi) and terrorism, by failing to consider “all of the good works done by the Foundation.” Opp’n at 50-51. Although Kadi admits that he transferred large amounts of cash to certain Muwafaq personnel who were implicated in terrorist activities, Kadi claims no knowledge of their involvement and states that, in any case, his involvement with them predated their designations as SDGTs. Kadi surmises that the “principal source” for accusations against Muwafaq was likely the October 19, 1999 USA Today article authored by Jack Kelley. Opp’n at 51. The article, titled “Saudi Money Aiding Bin Laden Businessmen Are Financing Front Groups,” described how prominent businessmen in Saudi Arabia were transferring tens of millions of dollars to Bin Laden-linked bank accounts, and identified “Blessed Relief’ as a “front” for Bin Laden. See AR 161-62. Kadi contends that this article was unreliable because USA Today later conceded that it had “several errors” and because Kelley was subsequently found “to have fabricated several high-profile stories.” See Opp’n at 10, 51; Brown Deck, Ex. I. To the extent Kadi contends that newspaper articles cannot be relied upon by the Government at all, that proposition is not well-grounded. As already stated, reliance on hearsay is plainly allowed. Furthermore, reliance on newspaper articles has been permitted to “fill in evidentiary gaps when there is corroboration,” as well as to provide background information. See Awad v. Okama, 646 F.Supp.2d 20, 25 (D.D.C.2009) (applying this principle in reviewing a habeas petition of a Guantanamo detainee). This is consistent with the generally recognized principle that reliability of evidence and reasonableness are the touchstones of measuring the agency’s decision, in contrast to Kadi’s assumption that newspapers are per se unreliable. More to the point, Kadi does not claim that Kelley fabricated any assertions in the article that would be relevant here. And, although USA Today ultimately corrected some errors that appeared in the article, the published correction post-dated OFAC’s decision and hence is not part of the administrative record. The same reasoning applies to Kadi’s reliance on Kelley’s subsequent resignation. Moreover, OFAC does not appear to rely significantly on Kelley’s article. And Kadi, as part of his submissions, provided OFAC with his version of the claims made in the Kelley article, see, e.g., AR 711-14. OFAC therefore had the benefit of Kadi’s account which it then reasonably discredited based on the evidence in the record as a whole. Contrary to Kadi’s argument that OFAC “failed to consider” the good works of Muwafaq, both the March 2004 OFAC Memorandum and the administrative record indicate otherwise. OFAC acknowledged that Kadi had provided evidence of Muwafaq’s involvement “in substantial charitable activities.” Nevertheless, OFAC concluded that this evidence “by no means undermines the determination that the charity was, in addition, used to fund terrorism.” AR 2788. It was not unreasonable for OFAC to conclude that charitable organizations that perform good works could also concurrently act as conduits for terrorist activities. In its Memorandum, OFAC cited to the April 12, 2002 testimony by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorism and Violent Crime before the House Financial Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: Investigation and analysis by enforcement agencies have yielded information indicating that terrorist organizations sometimes utilize charities to facilitate funding and to funnel money. Charitable donations to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are commingled and then often diverted or siphoned to groups or organizations that support terrorism.... Though these charities may be offering humanitarian services here or abroad, funds raised by these various charities are sometimes diverted to terrorist causes. This scheme is particularly troubling because of the perverse use of funds donated in good will to fuel terrorist acts. AR 21. Simply because Muwafaq was a charitable organization or performed charitable deeds does not make it immune to designation by OFAC. Indeed, other courts have upheld OFAC’s designations of charitable organizations, notwithstanding their status or involvement in good deeds. See Islamic Am. Relief Agency, All F.3d at 736-37 (focus is on charitable organization’s support of terrorism); Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 164-65 (same); Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 578 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir.2009) (“Humanitarian Law Project III ”) (“[M]oney is fungible; giving support intended to aid an organization’s peaceful activities frees up resources that can be used for terrorist acts.”) (citing Humanitarian Law Project I, 205 F.3d at 1133; see also Humanitarian Law Project IV, 130 S.Ct. at 2725 (citing and relying on evidence provided by government affidavit that concluded the following: “Muddying the waters between its political activism, good works, and terrorist attacks, Hamas is able to use its overt political and charitable organizations as a financial and logistical support network for its terrorist operations.”)). As for Kadi’s argument that he did not intend to provide financial support to SDGTs or for terrorist acts through Muwafaq or his other companies, that claim is unavailing. Kadi’s intent in donating to terrorist causes or to SDGTs is not relevant here. See, e.g., Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 735-36 (intent to aid unlawful acts was inapplicable in the context of donations to terrorist groups, “because the money could be used for unlawful activities regardless of donor intent”). Moreover, the Court rejects Kadi’s contention that OFAC should have disregarded any pre-designation information about individuals or organizations. See, e.g., Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 162 (“[I]t was clearly rational for Treasury to consider [Holy Land Foundation’s] genesis and history, which closely connect it with Ha-mas.”). The Court has reviewed the evidence both in the classified and unclassified records. The record, taken as a whole, and with references to various sources over different periods of time, confirms Kadi’s close involvement in Muwafaq and, in turn, Muwafaq’s involvement in the financing of terrorist activities and support of SDGTs, despite whatever charitable works the foundation may also have undertaken. Evidence in the unclassified record indicates that Kadi was integrally involved in running Muwafaq, including the hiring and placement of SDGTs in key roles in the foundation, who then had the authority and ability to receive money from Kadi, to access Kadi’s funds, and to designate and divert those funds to other sources and causes. Kadi himself admitted to transferring funds to such Muwafaq personnel, or allowing them access to his personal funds. Although he claimed in every instance that either the funds were accessed for charitable purposes or that he had no knowledge to what ends the funds may have actually been used, OFAC reasonably concluded that Kadi’s claims were incredible considering all the other evidence in the record. And although the Court cannot cite to any specific information in the classified record, the Court’s careful review confirms that there is substantial evidence in the record before OFAC that Kadi was involved,. through Muwafaq, in providing financial support for terrorists. 3. Financial Support to other SDGTs Substantial evidence in the record also supports OF AC’s conclusion that Kadi provided financial support to other SDGTs, including Muhammad Salah, Chafiq Ayadi, and Wa’el Julaidan. In each instance, Kadi claims that his association with these individuals pre-dated their designations and that the transfers of money he provided to them were all for legitimate purposes. He claims that these relationships were benign, that he “worked with individuals who he knew, trusted, and respected, based on their track records in the relevant charitable or humanitarian field,” Opp’n at 51, and that OFAC had no basis to conclude that any of these individuals “were connected with terrorism in any way” because they were designated years after Kadi had known them. Id. Some of these contentions have already been addressed by the Court, but they are unavailing in all respects and unsupported by the evidence in the record. OFAC’s findings are briefly summarized below. a. Wa’el Julaidan Julaidan was designated a SDGT on September 6, 2002. Kadi stated that he has known Julaidan as a family friend, and that their relationship predated Julaidan’s SDGT designation by twenty years. AR 2026. According to Kadi, Julaidan came from a reputable family and had a reputation for trustworthiness. AR 2026-29. Julaidan was the head of the Saudi Joint Relief Committee in Kosovo and had assisted Kadi in creating a women’s teachers’ college for Croatian and Bosnian refugees. AR 747. While Kadi admits to a longstanding personal and business relationship with Julaidan, he contends that there is no basis for the allegations that Julaidan was an associate of Osama Bin Laden or that Kadi himself was aware of this fact. Opp’n at 58-60; AR 747. Kadi admitted that he provided significant financial benefits to Julaidan. For example, he stated that he gave shares of a business he owned, “KA Stan,” to Julaidan as a “reward for the assistance he provided to [Kadi’s] charitable activities in Bosnia.” AR 772. The only shareholders in KA Stan were Kadi, Julaidan, and Chariq Ayadi, another SDGT. See id. Kadi also acknowledged that he transferred $1.25 million through Karavan directly to Julaidan’s personal account between February 24, 1998 and August 3, 1998. AR 2022. Kadi stated that the money was intended to fund the creation of housing units for A1 Emam University in Sanaa, Yemen, a project that was being overseen by Julaidan’s company Maram. AR 2022-23. Kadi also admitted that he transferred the funds at issue to Julaidan’s personal account, AR 2032, but claimed it was “solely and exclusively for the purpose of supporting the University Housing Project, and not for any other purpose,” AR 2033. He explained that he did not transfer the funds to Maram, because he “had entrusted the University Housing Project to ... [Julaidan] alone.” Id. This explanation is puzzling, particularly because Maram was Ju'laidan’s own company, and Kadi had relied on a table of information purporting to show that Julaidan made payments of substantially the same amounts to his company soon thereafter. Kadi’s table was submitted to OFAC to demonstrate that the funds had a legitimate purpose, corroborated by timing. The table shows that after each of the five payments to Julaidan, Julaidan then made a payment to Maram of substantially the same amount, to correspond with construction invoices for the same figures. AR 2034-35. However, there are several problems with Kadi’s version of events, and with the information he provided to OFAC. For instance, $100,000 appears to be unaccounted for in the table. Id. Although Julaidan received a total of $1.25 million from Kadi, the table reflects that only $1.15 million was transferred to Mar-am. AR 2035. Footnote 2 to Kadi’s table also states that “[a]ccording to bank statements of Maram’s account ... [one] sum [$300,000] was never received in Maram’s account” Kadi presumably believes this is not a problem because his table still shows “invoices” and “demands” to Maram totaling $1,249 million. But the mere existence of invoices (and “demands”) does not necessarily show that Kadi’s transfers to Julaidan were used to pay those specific invoices, particularly because “money is fungible.” See Humanitarian Law Project IV, 130 S.Ct. at 2725-26 (agreeing with propositions that “money is fungible” and that “funds raised ostensibly for charitable purposes have in the past been redirected by some terrorist groups to fund the purchase of arms and explosives”) (internal quotations omitted); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 82 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984) (affirming President’s decision to ban travel to Cuba on the basis of “curtailing] the flow of hard currency to Cuba — currency that could then be used in support of Cuban adventurism”). OFAC also reasonably discredited Kadi’s claim that he did not know of Julaidan’s relationship to Osama Bin Laden. Kadi himself conceded that it was “common knowledge” that both Julaidan and Bin Laden had known each other through their involvement in repelling the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. See AR 1378. Kadi explained, though, that he had no knowledge whether this association continued. However, Kadi also stated that he asked Julaidan on “several occasions” whether he had an ongoing relationship with Bin Laden, which Julaidan had denied. AR 1379. It is somewhat disingenuous, then, for Kadi to claim that he had no knowledge or suspicion at all that Julaidan may have continued working with Bin Laden. Kadi also acknowledged that the Saudi Arabian government had frozen Julaidan’s assets in 2002 based on its finding that Julaidan had supported Osama Bin Laden’s terrorism network. The administrative record contained a press release from the Saudi Embassy in DC issued on September 10, 2002 that referred to Julaidan as a “Bin Laden operative” and stated: “Julaidan, a Saudi fugitive is believed to have funneled money to al-Qaeda.... Osama Bin Laden and a top al-Qaeda lieutenant, Abu Zubaida, have acknowledged Julaidan as a known associate for their operations. Julaidan, who fought with Bin Laden in Afghanistan during the 1980s, allegedly provided financial and logistical support to the al-Qaeda network.” AR 2690-91. Kadi’s only response to this evidence was that the incident occurred years after the transaction at issue. That argument is not compelling. See, e.g., Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 162 (stating that it was “clearly rational” for OFAC to consider information that predated a SDGT designation and information regarding a SDGT’s “history and genesis”); Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 734 (“An entity’s genesis and history may properly be considered by OFAC in making the designation or blocking,” at least where there is no indication that ties have been severed) (citing Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 162). Kadi also does not rebut OFAC’s observation that Osama Bin Laden referred to a close relationship with Julaidan in a 1999 interview on AI-Jazeera TV, where Bin Laden reportedly said: “We are all in one boat, as is known to you, including our brother Wa’el Julaidan,” when referring to the assassination of al-Qaida “co-founder” Abdullah Azzam. AR 5. Ultimately, OFAC concluded that Kadi’s explanation for why he transferred $1.25 million to Julaidan, and conveyed other-financial benefits to Julaidan, should not be credited, and that his continued designation was warranted on the basis of his support of and relationship with SDGT Julaidan. OFAC also rejected Kadi’s excuse that he knew Julaidan before he was designated, and his plea that transactions or activities he engaged in with Julaidan prior to Julaidan’s designation should be disregarded. AR 7-8, 11-12, 14 & 22. OFAC’s conclusions were substantially supported by the record, both classified and unclassified, and are consistent with the caselaw in this Circuit. See, e.g., Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 162; Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 734. b. Chariq Ayadi Ayadi was designated a SDGT on October 12, 2001 — the same day as Kadi. He was hired by Kadi to run Muwafaq’s European operations, based on Julaidan’s recommendation. Ayadi oversaw Muwafaq’s European operations from 1992 to around 1995 or 1996. Kadi acknowledged transferring significant sums to Ayadi’s personal bank account during that time. As with Julaidan, Kadi maintained that these transfers were solely for charitable purposes. AR 8 & 98-99. Kadi also entrusted Ayadi with other aspects of his business. In early 1996, Kadi purchased a majority holding in the now-closed Sarajevo-based Depositna Bank. Kadi designated Ayadi the “nominee” for the shares.- AR 1377. He explained that he chose Ayadi as his representative because Ayadi was of Bosnian nationality, and under local law, shareholders of a bank must be of Bosnian nationality. AR 770. OFAC regarded Depositna Bank as suspect for other reasons. It “has been associated with Islamic extremists,” including serving as the site for planning sessions for an attack against a U.S. facility in Saudi Arabia in the mid-1990s. AR 11. As previously stated, Ayadi was also one of three shareholders, along with Julaidan and Kadi, in KA Stan. AR 772. OFAC also cited to Ayadi’s expulsion from Tunisia for his involvement in the Tunisian Islamic Front. As with Julaidan, Kadi admitted to transferring the funds to Ayadi’s personal accounts, but claimed they were intended for legitimate charitable purposes. He also claimed that he knew Ayadi nine years prior to his designation and had never heard of the Tunisian Islamic Front or any allegations linking Ayadi to the organization until he was designated a SDGT in October 2001. In short, Kadi maintained that he had no knowledge of Ayadi’s involvement with the Tunisian Islamic Front or terrorist activities. AR 1375,1388. c. Muhammad Salah Kadi also admitted to transferring funds to Muhammad Salah, who was designated a SDT on July 27,1995 pursuant to Executive Order 12,947, and a SDGT on October 31, 2001 pursuant to EO 13,224. Defs.’ Mot. at 19; AR 299. Salah is a self-declared Hamas operative. Yet again, as with Julaidan and Ayadi, Kadi claimed that the transfer of funds he made to Muhammad Salah was for legitimate and charitable reasons. Opp’n at 57. OFAC’s March 2004 Memorandum and its motion to dismiss focus a great deal on an $820,000 land deal involving Salah. See AR 16-20; Defs.’ Mot. at 21. The details of the land deal are complicated and muddled, but the most salient facts that OFAC considered can be summarized briefly. In July 1991, Kadi, via his company Qadi International, wired $820,000 from the Swiss branch of Faisal Finance to the Quranic Literacy Institute (QLI) in Chicago. The money was used to purchase and develop land in Woodridge, Illinois. Salah, a QLI “employee”/volunteer, was involved in the flow of money that followed the land deal. He was arrested by the Israeli government on January 25, 1993, around the time Kadi was wiring money to him, and pled guilty to illegally channeling funds for Hamas in Israeli military court in January 1995. Kadi did not dispute that the deal occurred, nor did, he dispute that he was transferring money to Salah. See, e.g., AR 299-308. Kadi admitted that although he only met Salah on two or three occasions “at the most,” AR 300, in less than a one-year period he transferred $167,000 directly to Salah’s personal account. AR 301. He maintained that the money was intended for various QLI expenses “and mainly to support individuals working for QLI.” AR 299. He claimed that he sent the money to Salah personally at the request of another individual, Dr. Zaki, with whom he had longstanding ties. AR 299. Kadi presented extensive documentation (and briefing) in support of his interpretation of the deal as legitimate. He claimed he had no idea that Salah was involved in Hamas. The breakdown of money transferred by Kadi directly to Salah was as follows: (1) $27,000 on March 16, 1992; (2) $30,000 on July 3, 1992; (3) $50,000 on October 7, 1992; and (4) $60,000 around February 1993. AR 301. Upon learning that Salah was arrested in January 1993, Kadi instructed his bank to stop the last transfer but, according to Kadi, the transfer proceeded regardless. AR 303. Kadi claimed that he ceased making transfers to Salah after he was arrested, but admitted that he continued to transfer funds to QLI. AR 304. In 1994, QLI sold the Woodridge land, but did not repay the $820,000 “loan” to Kadi. In 1999, the Government brought a civil forfeiture action against QLI, Muhammad Salah, and his wife in federal court in the Northern District of Illinois, which included allegations against Kadi. The proceeds of the land deal were tied up in that litigation. On a motion to dismiss, the district judge concluded, based in part on the 1998 affidavit of FBI Special Agent Robert Wright, that “the circumstances surrounding the Woodridge land deal, the relationship between QLI and Salah, and the efforts of QLI to provide financial support to Salah all raise the inference that QLI ordered Kadi to transmit the money used to purchase the Woodridge land with the intent that it would be used to support Salah in his activities on behalf of Hamas.” United States v. One 1997 E35 Ford Van, 50 F.Supp.2d 789, 805-06 (N.D.Ill.1999). Kadi spent much time refuting the assertions made in the Wright affidavit submitted in the forfeiture action, and maintained that he never intended to obfuscate the details of the land purchase or his involvement in it. AR 310-35. He claimed that in April 2005 Wright “was under investigation for disciplinary conduct, was suspended and his employment was subsequently terminated by the FBI.” Opp’n at 57-58. However, Kadi did not contend that Wright’s problems were probative of the reliability of his statements contained within the administrative record. Moreover, those problems occurred in April 2005, subsequent to OFAC’s March 2004 decision challenged by Kadi here, and are therefore not part of the administrative record. See, e.g., Jifry v. Federal Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1181 (D.C.Cir.2004) (“The court’s review is limited ... to the administrative record that was before the [agency].”); Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d at 733 (“we shall limit our review of the designation to the administrative record”); see also Al Haramain I, 585 F.Supp.2d at 1250 (review of OFAC’s SDGT determination is limited to the administrative record, subject to narrow exceptions). Once again, Kadi claims that all the transfers he made were to support legitimate charitable objectives, not terrorism. Here too, based on the evidence in the classified and unclassified records, including the findings in the forfeiture action and the Wright affidavit, OFAC reasonably rejected Kadi’s explanation for why he was transferring funds to SDGT Salah’s personal accounts, and the overall structuring of the deal, as well as Kadi’s contention that he had no knowledge of Salah’s affiliation with Hamas or other terrorist activities. 4. Financial Support and Ties to Bin Laden Kadi disputed having ties to Osama Bin Laden, and contended that he neither managed money nor businesses for Osama Bin Laden directly, or for his benefit. AR 15; AR 1372. Kadi also asserted that Bin Laden, in turn, had no financial interest in any of Kadi’s businesses. AR 1372. Kadi claimed that he met Bin Laden on a few occasions ending in 1993, but that those encounters did not involve or concern terrorism. AR 1373-74. However, OFAC reasonably relied on other evidence in the record, which indicated that Kadi’s ties with Osama Bin Laden may have continued, including reference to a letter found in 2002 that was addressed to Bin Laden and referred to Kadi as “managing money for Bin Lad[e]n in Sudan.” AR 15. OFAC noted that Kadi opened up a Muwafaq office in Sudan around the same time Bin Laden was based in the country. AR 12. The letter, according to OFAC, also appeared to generally refer to Kadi as one of Bin Laden’s “former managers.” 5. Other Acts of Financial Support and Investment OFAC pointed to other acts of financial support and investments by Kadi with individuals who have ties to terrorist activities, although OFAC did not appear to rely on these ties directly in applying the criteria of EO 13,224 to Kadi. The OFAC Memorandum described Kadi’s involvement in BMI, Inc. as further support for Kadi’s ties to terrorists. OFAC claimed that one of Kadi’s co-investors in BMI was a SDT named Mousa Abu Marzook, a Hamas leader also associated with Muhammed Salah. Kadi maintained that his investment in BMI was “passive” and “entirely innocent.” He claimed that he was not aware of a relationship between BMI and Marzook. AR 784. OFAC also concluded that Kadi made use of entities other than Muwafaq to send