Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge: Plaintiff 523 IP LLC (“Plaintiff’ or “523 IP”) brought this action, claiming that the “Patient Portal” product of Defendant Cu-reMD.Com (“Defendant” or “CureMD”) is infringing 523 IP’s patient-to-physician Internet messaging system, which was assigned Patent No. 7,702,523 (the “'523 Patent”). CureMD responds that its product does not infringe the '523 Patent and, further, that the Patent itself is invalid. Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment with respect to infringement, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to non-infringement and invalidity, Plaintiffs applications to exclude witness testimony made within its motion for partial summary judgment, and Defendant’s separate motion to exclude portions of Plaintiffs expert’s testimony. For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, the Court (i) denies both parties’ motions for summary judgment without prejudice to refiling; (ii) grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs applications to exclude; and (iii) grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s motion to exclude. BACKGROUND Because the record in this case is substantial, this Opinion is divided into three sections: the first sets forth the undisputed facts related to the invention, the accused product, and the procedural history of the ease; the second sets forth the Court’s claim construction; and the third sets forth the Court’s findings on the parties’ competing applications to exclude witness testimony and other evidence. A. The Invention and the Accused Product 1. The '523 Patent 523 IP alleges that CureMD’s Patient Portal infringes its patent for a “Website Messaging System,” the '523 Patent. The allegedly infringed patent includes 35 claims: three independent claims (Claims 1, 16, 31) and 32 dependent claims. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 4). Claim 31, an “apparatus” claim, is the only claim that 523 IP asserts Cu-reMD is infringing, and the Patient Portal is the only CureMD product that 523 IP asserts infringes the '523 Patent. (PL 56.1 Opp. ¶¶ 5-6). At base, Claim 31 describes an apparatus by which a patient can send messages to a physician using a webpage. The Summary of the '523 Patent describes the invention as follows: A method and apparatus are provided for processing a message from a patient for one of a plurality of physicians through a web site. The method includes the steps of providing one or more web pages to the patient from the web site containing indicia of identity for each physician of the plurality of physicians and detecting selection by the patient of a physician of the plurality of physicians. The method further includes the steps of determining an information content of the message and routing the message based upon the determined information content and a predetermined routing criteria provided by the selected physician. ('523 Patent col.l 1.38-48). Claim 31 comprises a preamble and six elements, as follows: 31. An apparatus for routing a message from a requestor to a physician through a web site, such apparatus comprising: a plurality of message destinations provided by the physician; a respective criteria provided by the physician for routing messages to each of the plurality of message destinations; a form downloaded by the requestor from the web site; an at least partially complete form created by the requestor from the downloaded form and returned to the web site as a message to the physician; a content processor adapted to determine an information content of the message received from the patient and that selects a message destination of the plurality of message destinations by matching the routing criteria of the selected destination with the determined information content; and a routing processor adapted to route the message to the selected message destination based upon the determined information content and routing criteria provided by the selected physician. (Id. at col.12 1.4-25). The specification of the '523 Patent (the “Specification”) contains a description of an embodiment of the invention that is about three and one-half pages in length and is accompanied by 10 figures. (Id. at col.2-9, Figs. 1-10). The prosecution of the '523 Patent took eight years, from 2002 to 2010. (PI. 56.1 Reply ¶¶ 1-3). Sameh filed U.S. Patent Application No. 10/ 115,393, entitled “Website Messaging System,” with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the “PTO”) on April 3, 2002. (PI. 56.1 Reply ¶ 1). In 2006, the PTO patent examiner (the “Examiner”) issued an initial rejection of the '523 Patent as anticipated by the prior art, and Sameh filed an amended patent in response. (PH Amend. A). In this amendment, Sameh revised, inter alia, Claims 1, 16, and 31, “similarly limiting]” them in corresponding ways. (Id. at 10). Sameh amended Claim 31 as follows: 31. An apparatus for routing a message from a patient-to one of a plurality of-physicians requestor to a physician through a web site, such apparatus comprising: website-adapted- to provide one or more web pages ■■■■to the-patient-from-the-web site containing-indicia of identity — for each physician of the plurality of physi-cirh8j a patient interface adapted to detect selection by--the-patient of a physician-of the plurality of-physieiansf a plurality of message destinations provided by the physician; a respective criteria provided by the physician for routing messages to each of the plurality of message destinations; a form downloaded by the requestor from the web site; an at least partially complete form created by the requestor from the downloaded form and returned to the web site as a message to the physician; a content processor adapted to determin determine an information content of the message received from the patient and that selects a message destination of the plurality of message destinations by matching the routing criteria of the selected destination with the determined information content; and a routing processor adapted to route the message to the selected message destination based upon the determined information content and a predetermined routing criteria provided by the selected physician. (Id. at 7-8). This amendment brought the claims to their current, as-patented form. On February 7, 2008, the Examiner issued a final rejection of Sameh’s amended application, again finding that its claims were obvious in light of prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103. (PL 56.1 Opp. ¶ 60; PH Fin. Reject.). Sameh appealed the Examiner’s final rejection to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the “Board”), filing his appeal brief on March 24, 2008. (Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 61; PH App. Br.). On October 30, 2009, after consideration of briefing from both Sameh and the Examiner, and oral argument from Sameh’s attorney, the Board reversed the Examiner’s rejection, finding that Sameh’s patent was not anticipated by prior art. (Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶¶ 61, 116-22; PH Board Dec.). In accordance with this decision, the Examiner issued a “Notice of Allowance” on January 11, 2010. (Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 123; PH All. Not.). Following the Notice of Allowance, the '523 Patent issued on April 20, 2010. (Pl. 56.1 Opp. 56.1 ¶ 125; '523 Patent, at [45]). On February 11, 2011, Sameh assigned all rights in the '523 Patent to 523 IP LLC, of which he is the managing partner. (Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶¶ 6-7). 2. The CureMD Patient Portal CureMD was eo-founded by brothers Kamal and Bilal Hashmat in 1999 with the mission of providing doctors with medical office solutions in one system. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 158-59; Feb. 28, 2014 Hashmat Decl. ¶ 3). That same year, the company developed a suite of integrated software products for administering billing, scheduling, and electronic medical records in a doctor’s medical practice (the “All-in-One Suite”). (Def. 56.1 ¶ 160). By 2007, Cu-reMD advertised the “Patient Portal” as a component of its All-in-One Suite. (Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 161). The current Suite contains three modules: an electronic medical records (“EMR”) module, a practice management (“PM”) module, and the Patient Portal module. (Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶¶ 44, 46; Apr. 25, 2014 Hashmat Decl. ¶ 38). CureMD’s Patient Portal provides an online platform for patients to post or send messages to the staff of a given medical practice. (Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶ 22; Pl. Opp. 56.1 ¶¶ 162-63). The message composition screen within Patient Portal resembles that of an email: there is a “to” field, an optional “cc” field, a “subject” field, an attachment function, a field for the message itself, a handful of text-formatting options, and a “send” button. (Apr. 25, 2014 Hashmat Decl. Ex. A; Pl. Reply 8; Pl. 56.1 Reply 23). When using the “message” function in Patient Portal, a patient selects a recipient from a list of physicians and other medical office personnel. (Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 18; Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶¶23, 27). Each individual is identified by' his or her name and role in the practice (e.g., physician, attending physician, billing clerk); the list does not provide any contact information, such as an email address or phone number. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ Opp. 19; Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶ 27). After the patient sends the message, it is stored in a database. (Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 16). The recipient of a message from a patient within Patient Portal accesses that message from within CureMD’s application. (Feb. 28, 2014 Hashmat Decl. ¶ 28 & Ex. F). Messages from a patient are also automatically saved to the patient’s electronic medical chart. (Id. at ¶ 30 & Ex. F). However, because the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-191, 110 Stat.1936 (“HI-PAA”), limits who within a medical practice may legally view a patient’s electronic medical records, the CureMD system allows a provider to restrict access to the medical chart and, by extension, to a patient’s messages saved to that chart. (Apr. 25, 2014 Hashmat Deck ¶ 29; Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶ 29). Within the Patient Portal; there are discrete forms for certain frequently-occurring events, such as prescription refills, appointment requests, update requests, and registration requests. (Apr. 25, 2014 Hashmat Decl. ¶¶ 27-28). A patient chooses which type of form to use for his or her particular request on the website. (Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶ 41). Hashmat explains, and 523 IP does not contest, that when a patient performs an action such as a refill request, the patient is limited in what he or she can communicate using the website, and, in particular, is not given an opportunity to submit a narrative message (termed “freeform” messaging in this Opinion). (Apr. 25, 2014 Hashmat Decl. ¶ 47). Instead, the patient can select from a list of available refills and submit the request, which shows up in the EMR module’s refill request inbox for clinical staff to process. (Id.). Similarly, appointment request forms go to an appointment request inbox, update request forms go to an update request inbox, and registration request forms go to a registration request inbox. (Pl. 56.1 Reply ¶ 46). These inbox-es are also restricted to certain individuals or categories of individuals, for both legal, security, and practical reasons (e.g., a billing clerk does not need access to refill requests). (Id. at ¶¶ 31-32; Apr. 25, 2014 Hashmat Decl. ¶¶ 31, 33). B. Procedural Background On April 6, 2011, counsel for 523 IP sent CureMD a letter alleging that CureMD’s Patient Portal was using the patented technology of the '523 Patent, and enclosing a preliminary claim chart purporting to apply the elements of Claim 31 to the Patient Portal product. (Pl. 56.1 Opp. ¶¶ 8-9; Feb. 28, 2014 Hashmat Decl. Ex. A). On July 12, 2011, Bilal Hashmat sent a response to 523 IP’s counsel denying the allegations of infringement and identifying the elements of the '523 Patent that he believed were not present in the Patient Portal product. (PI. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 10; Feb. 28, 2014 Hashmat Decl. Ex. B). On August 26, 2011, 523 IP’s counsel sent a letter in response, requesting documents in support of Hashmat’s assertion that the Patient Portal was noninfringing. (PI. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 12; Feb. 28, 2014 Hashmat Decl. Ex. C). Having apparently received no documents in response, on November 3, 2011, 523 IP’s counsel sent a letter demanding access to CureMD’s application and enclosing a draft complaint. (PI. 56.1 Opp. ¶ 13; Feb. 28, 2014 Hashmat Decl. Ex. D). Shortly thereafter, Hashmat prepared and sent to 523 IP a response to 523 IP’s claim chart, in which he outlined why he believed the Patient Portal was nonin-fringing. (PL 56.1 Opp. ¶ 14; Feb. 28, 2014 Hashmat Decl. Ex. E). On December 30, 2011, 523 IP filed the instant action against CureMD, alleging direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), indirect infringement by inducement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), and contributory infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), and seeking damages, injunctive relief, and fees. (Dkt. # 1). 523 IP amended the complaint on June 21, 2012 (Dkt. # 10), and CureMD answered on August 2, 2012, denying infringement and asserting six affirmative defenses: failure to state a claim; non-infringement; invalidity; prosecution history estoppel; laches, estoppel, acquiescence, or waiver; and unclean hands (Dkt. # 15). CureMD asserted no counterclaims. 523 IP moved for partial summary judgment with respect to infringement, seeking to leave damages issues for trial, on February 28, 2014. (Dkt. # 50). Included in that motion and in subsequent responsive papers were applications for the exclusion of CureMD witnesses’ testimony. {See Dkt. # 50, 65, 78). On March 6, 2014, CureMD filed its motion for summary judgment with respect to non-infringement and invalidity. (Dkt. #55). Both summary judgment motions were fully briefed on May 16, 2014. (Dkt. # 65, 66, 75, 78). CureMD then filed a separate Daubert motion on May 20, 2014, seeking the exclusion of portions of the testimony of Joseph Sameh, 523 IP’s expert and the inventor of the '523 Patent. (Dkt. # 81). That motion was fully briefed on June 8, 2014. (Dkt. # 90, 91). CLAIM CONSTRUCTION Claim construction is required before a determination regarding infringement can be made where there is a dispute between the parties over claim meaning. See Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“A determination of infringement requires a two-step analysis. First, the court determines the scope and meaning of the patent claims asserted and second, the properly construed claims are compared to the allegedly infringing device.” (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted)); see also PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Inti, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed.Cir.2004) (declining to construe uncontested claims in determining the scope of an invention). At a May 17, 2013 conference before the Honorable William H. Pauley III, the United States District Judge to whom this case was previously assigned, counsel for 523 IP indicated its position (not disputed by counsel for CureMD) that there was no need for a claim construction hearing because “the facts are pretty clear,” but committed to advising the Court promptly if such a hearing were needed. (May 17 Tr. 8). The parties’ briefing on their respective summary judgment motions belies counsel’s assertion. The parties do not agree on the correct interpretation of the claim at issue, Claim 31. 523 IP argues that the language of Claim 31 is clear as written and needs no further construction. (PI. Reply 3). CureMD, however, argues that the terms of Claim 31 have no plain and ordinary meaning, are ambiguous, and need construction. (Def. Opp. 6-7). The Court agrees. 523 IP is attempting to have its cake and eat it too: while arguing that no claim construction is necessary, 523 IP implicitly gives the claims a construction — and an impermissibly over-broad one at that — in support of its infringement arguments. A. Applicable Law “It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation omitted). Patent construction is a question of law, the interpretation of which is entrusted to judges. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). However, “district courts are not (and should not be) required to construe every limitation present in a patent’s asserted claims.” 02 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2008) (citing U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed.Cir.1997)). Rather, “[c]laim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Surgical, 103 F.3d at 1568 (“[Claim construction] is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.”)). In construing a patent claim, a court “should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.” PC Connector Solutions LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed.Cir.2005) (citation omitted). “The inquiry into how a person of ordinary skill in the art understands a claim term provides an objective baseline from which to begin claim interpretation.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. “In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Id. at 1314. Additionally, “the context in which a claim term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Id. (noting, as an example, that the claim at issue refers to “steel baffles,” strongly implying that the term “baffles” does not inherently mean objects made of steel). Other than the language of the patent claim itself, “the specification is the single best guide to the meaning of a claim term” to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir.2006). In other words, “claims must be read in view of the specification,, of which they are a part.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (citation omitted). Within the specification, a patentee “can act as his own lexicographer to specifically define terms of a claim contrary to their ordinary meaning.” Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2006) (citation omitted). Although courts use the specification “to interpret the meaning of a claim,” they must “avoid the danger of reading limitations from the specification into the claim” itself. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. The task is “captur[ing] the scope of the actual invention,” rather than “strictly limiting the scope of the claims to the embodiments disclosed in the specification or divorcing the claim language from the specification.” Id. at 1324. The prosecution history may also “inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Indeed, because the prosecution history includes the applicant’s express representations made to the PTO examiner, it may be “of critical significance in determining the meaning of the claims.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996). The prosecution history’s instructive value is mitigated, however, by the fact that it “represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant ... [and] often lacks the clarity of the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. Disclaimers made during prosecution may define the scope of a claim, where there is a “clear and unambiguous disavowal of claim scope.” Saffran v. Johnson & Johnson, 712 F.3d 549, 559 (Fed.Cir.2013) (citation omitted), cert, denied, ■ — ■ U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1023, 188 L.Ed.2d 138 (2014). Applicants need not “submit affirmative disclaimers along the lines of T hereby disclaim the following ... ’ during prosecution ... to meet the applicable standard.” Id. Instead, a statement that “extends beyond illuminating ‘how the inventor understood the invention,’ [and] providefs] an affirmative definition for the disputed term” can constitute a prosecution disclaimer. Id. (citation omitted) (finding patentee’s statement made in distinguishing prior art that “the device used is a sheet rather than a preformed chamber” not only disclaimed “chambers,” but also affirmatively defined the device recited in the claims as a “sheet” (citations omitted)); see also Suno-vion Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 1271, 1277 (Fed.Cir.2013) (holding that “repeated and definitive remarks” in prosecution history sufficed to provide a definition of a claim term (citation omitted)); Uship Intellectual Properties, LLC v. United States, 714 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir.2013) (finding that any statement by the applicant “to the PTO characterizing [the] invention may give rise to a prosecution disclaimer”). .In construing claims, the district court should not “redefine claim recitations or [] read limitations into the claims to obviate factual questions of infringement and validity.” Am. Piledriving Equip., Inc. v. Geoquip, Inc., 637 F.3d 1324, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2011). Rather, the role of the district court in claim construction is to “give meaning to the limitations actually contained in the claims, informed by the written description, the prosecution history if in evidence, and any relevant extrinsic evidence.” Id. “The claims, specification, and file history, rather than extrinsic evidence, constitute the public record of the patentee’s claim, a record on which the public is entitled to rely.” Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583. Thus, “[i]n those cases where the public record unambiguously describes the scope of the patented invention, reliance on any extrinsic evidence is improper.” Id. B. Analysis Claim 31 consists of a preamble, the transition term “comprising,” and six elements or limitations. Only certain terms and limitations are disputed by the parties; the Court will therefore only construe disputed terms and terms that are necessary to the construction of disputed terms. 1. The Preamble of Claim 31 Does Not Limit the Claim The preamble of Claim 31 reads, “An apparatus for routing a message from a requestor to a physician through a web site, such apparatus.” ('523 Patent col. 12 1.4-5). CureMD argues that the term “web site” in the preamble should be construed to limit the claimed apparatus to handling messages that a requestor sends from a web site on the Internet. (Def. Br. 19). 523 IP does not dispute that the apparatus necessarily involves a “web site,” but argues that construing the preamble “would be a pointless exercise in redundancy.” (PI. Opp. 21 n. 3 (citing U.S. Surgical Corp., 103 F.3d at 1568)). The Court agrees, in view of the content of the preamble and the applicable law. As a threshold issue, whether and to what extent a preamble limits a patent claim is unsettled; the general rule is that preamble language acts only as a limitation on the claim when it “recites essential structure or steps, or if it is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim.” Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed.Cir. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted). This determination is made on a case-by-case basis. “When limitations in the body of the claim rely upon and derive antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary component of the claimed invention.” Id. “A preamble is not limiting, however, where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.” Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1288 (Fed.Cir.2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The preamble of Claim 31 identifies the kind of invention as an apparatus (as opposed to, for example, a process) and describes the purpose of the invention as that of a means to route messages from a re-questor to a physician through a web site. Basically, it “only [ ] state[s] a purpose” of the invention. Symantec Corp., 522 F.3d at 1288. That the invention is online as part of a website is already apparent from the name of the patent, “Website Messaging System” ('523 Patent, at [54]), and from the context of the claim, and is in any case uncontested by 523 IP (PI. Opp. 21 n. 3). CureMD could argue (although it does not) that, as in Eaton Corp., the “limitations in the body of the claim rely on and derive antecedent basis from the preamble.” 323 F.3d at 1339 (finding that, where a limitation stated “during the gear shift ratio,” it referred back to the particular sequence defined by the preamble (emphasis in Eaton Corp.)). The first, second, and fourth elements of Claim 31 all refer to “the physician”; the third element refers to “the requestor”; and the third and fourth refer to “the web site.” However, while it is true that each of these uses of the definite article “the” refers back to the use of the term in the preamble, the preamble itself serves merely as a reference point. Unlike Eaton Corp., the preamble here does not contain substantive, structural descriptions. Nothing in Claim 31’s preamble gives the claim “life, meaning, and vitality.” Id. The Court will therefore not consider the preamble as a limitation to the claimed invention or further construe its meaning. 2. “Comprising” Means “Including But Not Limited To” The meaning of the term “comprising” is not disputed by the parties, but the Court construes it here because, as the word appears in patents, it has a distinct legal meaning that aids the Court in delineating claim scope. As used in a patent’s preamble, “comprising” means including but not limited to — it “raises a presumption that the list of elements is nonexclusive.” Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed.Cir.2007). Notably, however, “‘[c]omprising’ is not a weasel word with which to abrogate claim limitations.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Spectrum Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed.Cir.1998)). Where “ ‘comprising’ appears at the beginning of the elaim[,] ... [it] indicates ... that an infringing process could practice other steps in addition to the ones mentioned.” Id. All the enumerated steps or elements, however, must be practiced “as recited in the claim for a process to infringe.” Id. Thus, the Court construes Claim 31 as necessarily including the six enumerated limitations, while acknowledging that elements in addition to those recited may be found in an apparatus within the scope of the claim. 3. Multiple Recipients Within a Single System Do Not Constitute a “Plurality of Message Destinations Provided by the Physician” The proper construction of Claim 31’s limitation of “a plurality of message destinations provided by the physician” is hotly disputed by the parties. ('523 Patent col.12 1.6-7). CureMD contends that the Court should construe “a plurality of message destinations” to mean “communication devices” — such as a cell phone, pager, palm pilot, or computer — “selected by the physician under any of a number of communication formats to deliver messages to the physician.” (Def. Br. 20-21). Arguing prosecution disclaimer, CureMD further asserts that Sameh, in prosecuting his patent, asseverated that a single database that permits access to messages by multiple recipients did not constitute a “plurality of message destinations.” (Id. at 20, 26). 523 IP also relies on the prosecution history, but argues from it that the term “plurality of message destinations” should be construed broadly to include not only devices, but also other individuals (“other physicians, residents, staff’), as well as multiple staff members selected as recipients by patients accessing messages on a “unified database.” (PI. Opp. 22 (citing PH App. Resp. 5)). Based upon consideration of the claim language, as well as a review of the Specification and the prosecution history, the Court agrees with CureMD that “message destinations” means devices external to the patented system; agrees with 523 IP that such devices can belong to individuals other than the physician; and disagrees with 523 IP that multiple recipients within a single system constitutes “a plurality of message destinations.” Accordingly, the Court adopts its own construction of the limitation as described below. First, the Court considers the language of the claim itself: “a plurality of message destinations , provided by the physician.” A “plurality” necessarily means more than one message destination. This suggests that storage of messages on a “unified database” within the system itself, and accessed only through the system, does not constitute a “plurality of message destinations.” (See Def. Br. 26). But 523 IP argues that multiple recipients within a database means multiple destinations because the messages are routed to the appropriate destination (recipient) within the database. (See PL Opp. 22). Either construction is reasonable given the claim language alone, so it is necessary to consult other intrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity. Every reference in the Specification to a “message destination” is to one that exists outside the patented invention. For example, the Specification refers to: “any of a number of communication formats (e.g., Internet, voice channel through the public switched telephone network (PSTN), voice channel through a cellular system, data through a cellular system, pager, palm pilot, etc.)” ('523 Patent col.2 1.46-50); “a computer terminal, a telephone console and a cell phone” (id. at eol.2 1.60-61); “communication devices of other physicians or non-physicians” (id. at eol.3 1.12-13); a “list of communication devices” (id. at col.8 1.5); a “pager” (id. at col.8 1.29); a “computer” (id. at col.8 1.33, 50); and “a cell phone or a telephone” (id. at col.8 1.55). The Specification repeatedly refers to “communication devices” (see id. at col.2 1.55; col.3 1.3-4, 8,11,12, 15; col.8 1.5), and touts the ability of the claimed invention to “accommodate the mobile nature of physicians” by “altering] [the physician interface] to include [a] changing range of communication devices” (id. at col.3 1.6-8). Additionally, Figure 10 of the Specification illustrates a web page, a “Routing Entry Form,” on which the physician can enter “message destinations” and order them according to the priority level of the message. ('523 Patent Fig.10). The examples of message destinations illustrated by the form are telephone, pager, email, and the on-call doctor — all destinations outside the patented system. (Id.). While the Specification makes clear that a given communication device can belong to someone other than the physician himself or herself (see, e.g., id. at col.3 1.12-13 (“communication devices of other physicians or nonphysicians”); col.6 1.11 (“a nurse or other assistant”); col.6 1.45 (“an office of the physician”)), it never teaches a message destination within the patented invention itself. See Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. AGA Med. Corp., 717 F.3d 929, 936 (Fed.Cir.2013) (confirming that the specification supported the district court’s claim construction because “every single embodiment disclosed in the [] patent’s drawings and its written description is made up of two separate disks”; the specification never taught a single-piece construction). Because the Specification “repeatedly, consistently, and exclusively” refers to “message destinations” as communication devices outside the patented invention itself, it defines the claim term thusly by implication. In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 1150 (Fed.Cir.2012) (finding that where the specification “repeatedly, consistently, and exclusively” depicted sensors with no external cables, it defined the claim term by implication as wireless sensors (citation omitted)). The prosecution history only confirms this reading. It makes clear that “plurality of message destinations” refers to destinations external to the patented invention, and not to multiple recipients retrieving messages from a single database. First, in response to the Examiner’s first rejection and in order to distinguish Ms invention from the prior art, Sameh added the instant limitation to Claim 31 at the same time he deleted two others, as follows: 31. An apparatus for routing a message from a patient to one of a plurality of physicians requestor to a physician through a web site, such apparatus comprising: website adapted- to provide one or more web pages to the patient from the-web site.....containing — indicia of identity for cians; a patient interface adapted to detect selection by-the-patient of a physician of the plurality^of-physicians; a plurality of message destinations provided by the physician ... (PH Amend. A 7-8). These deletions amount to Sameh’s clear disavowal that the patient’s selection of a recipient from a group of physicians constitutes a “plurality of message destinations.” Subsequent to this amendment, on appeal from the final rejection of his application by the Examiner, Sameh again gave only examples of “a plurality of message destinations to which the messages may be delivered” that were external to the patented system itself: “an office phone of the physician, a home phone of the physician, a cell phone, a pager, another physician on call for the physician, or any other communication system destination that the physician desires.” (PH App. Br. 3). Finally, and contrary to 523 IP’s current contentions (see PL Opp. 22; PL Reply 6), Sameh’s attorney announced clear disclaimers in oral argument before the Board on appeal: multiple “destinations” within a single “database” did not constitute “a plurality of message destinations” as contemplated by the patent. First, Sa-meh’s attorney described the two prior art systems. In the first system, he explained, the consumer selects a physician from a list of physicians, and then is able to send a request for an appointment to that physician within that system. (PH Hr’g Tr. 4). The second system has a database that acquires data from medical devices and puts them into reports; the reports are then distributed to “various destinations that the technician or administrator at the web site or at the data base provides for them to go.” (Id.). Then came the disclaimer: “Both of them are database systems, whereas the invention is completely different in nature” — that is, it is not a database system. (Id.). Sameh’s attorney further distinguished the prior art, clarifying that selected recipients within a single system were not the same as the “destinations” contemplated by the claim: [The Examiner’s rejection] completely changes the essential meaning of [the term “a plurality of destinations provided by the physician”] by citing [the prior art’s] selection of a physician from a list of physicians instead of a destination from a plurality of destinations which changes the terminology from destinations to physicians. When you look at the first element of the claim, physicians providing a plurality of message destinations, makes it clear that physician .is not the same as the destination. The destination, if we look at the flow chart of the claim, the destinations are these communication end points, the cell phone of the physician, the PDA of the physician, the physician’s office, and so forth. There are numerous destinations set out in the specification. (PH Hr’g Tr. 5). Having thus explicitly declared that the claimed invention is “completely different in nature” from a “database system” in order to obtain the patent, and that selecting a physician from a list of physicians within that system is not a “destination,” 523 IP cannot now argue that multiple message recipients on a closed database system constitutes “a plurality of message destinations provided by the physician.” See Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir.2003) (noting that “[t]he doctrine of prosecution disclaimer ... precludes] pat-entees from recapturing through claim interpretation specific meanings disclaimed during prosecution”). Given the foregoing review of the claim language, the Specification, and the prosecution history, the Court finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the first limitation, “a plurality of message destinations provided by the physician,” as follows: “more than one communication device or end point that is external to the patented system and can belong to someone other than the physician, which device or end point is supplied by the physician for the delivery of messages.” 4. “Routing Criteria” Are Based on Priority The parties’ disputes over the construction of the term “message destinations” were a minor skirmish; their disputes over the construction of “routing criteria” are an all-out war. The '523 Patent’s second limitation provides for “a respective criteria provided by the physician for routing messages to each of the plurality of message destinations” ('523 Patent col.121.8-10), and the fifth and sixth limitations refer back to these as “routing criteria” (id. at col.12 1.18, 23). CureMD argues that the term “routing criteria” should be construed to mean priority-based criteria supplied by the physician that instructs where a message should be sent based on its importance. (Def. Br. 21). It requests that the Court adopt the following construction: “the physician makes the decision or exercises judgment as to the message destination where the message is routed based upon the relative importance assigned to the nature and content of the message as determined by the physician.” (Id. at 21-22). 523 IP argues that “routing criteria” should be construed to include the restrictions and permissions imposed by a physician — or a staff member operating with a physician’s authority — on various end users of a messaging system. (PL Opp. 22-24; PL Reply 6-7). For example, 523 IP argues that “routing criteria” are applied where software is configured to prevent billing staff from seeing prescription refill requests and to permit them to see billing inquiries. (Pl. Opp. 22-24; Sameh Report ¶¶ 74-77). 523 IP argues further that while priority of message is one sort of criteria, Figure 8 of the '523 Patent lists many more. (PL Opp. 23-24; Pl. Reply 7). Again, the Court declines to adopt either party’s construction of the claim term and espouses its own based upon its independent review of the claim language, the Specification, and the prosecution history. There are three iterations of the disputed limitation in the claim language itself: (i) “a respective criteria provided by the physician for routing messages to each of the plurality of message destinations” ('523 Patent col.12 1.8-10), (ii) “the routing criteria of the selected destination” (id. at col.12 1.18-19), and (in) “routing criteria provided by the physician” (id. at col.12 1.23-24). In the first iteration, the words “respective” and “to each” teach that the routing criteria are specific to each individual “message destination.” The reference to “the routing criteria of the selected destination ” (emphasis added) in the fifth limitation reinforces this construction. The criteria are “for routing messages.” “Routing,” as it is commonly understood, goes beyond “sending” or “transmitting”; it connotes a more active role in directing the message to a particular location or by a particular route. See generally Dealer-track, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1324-25 (Fed.Cir.2012). The coupling of “routing” with “criteria” introduces ambiguity: what constitutes “routing criteria” in the context of the patent is not clear without further clarification from other intrinsic sources. The Court also turns to the Specification and prosecution history to construe the term “provided by the physician”: the claim language’s repeated refrain that the routing criteria must be “provided by the physician,” does not alone exclude the possibility that it could be provided by someone acting with the physician’s authority, such as a practice manager. As described in the “Background of the Invention” section of the Specification, the claimed invention is an improvement over the “traditional method of contacting a physician after hours ... an answering service.” ('523 Patent col.l 1.17-18). An answering service takes messages on the physician’s behalf, so the physician need not provide after-hours contact information directly to patients. (Id. at col.l 1.17-19). This is useful for taking and receiving messages, the patentee says, but problematic in that “some calls could be handled without the physician’s involvement.” (Id. at col.l 1.24-26).' The rub is that “only the physician is qualified to make a decision regarding the handling of his patients by others,” so the physician must be involved in deciding whether an after-hours call merits immediate attention by the physician. (Id. at col.l 1.26-28). Sameh’s invention is intended to solve that very problem: it allows a physician to make a judgment call about the importance of a patient’s message “without the physician’s involvement.” This suggests that the “routing criteria” operate as an automated stand-in for the physician’s own judgment about the degree to which an after-hours message is important and should be brought to the attention of the physician. The corollary to the statement “only the physician is qualified to make a decision regarding the handling of his patients by others,” is that only the physician himself or herself — and not another individual — is qualified to set “routing criteria” that determines how the patient’s message can be appropriately delegated. The remainder of the Specification only confirms this reading. The Specification never teaches anyone other than the physician himself or herself setting the routing criteria, nor even suggests that such deputation might be appropriate. Additionally, the words “priority” or “importance” in association with routing messages are together mentioned over 40 times in the three-and-one-half-page Embodiment. The only criteria even contemplated by the Specification to route messages are priority-related, and the Specification affirmatively characterizes criteria as such: “The criteria [are] necessarily subjective because the relative importance of information elements varies from one physician’s practice to another physician’s practice and in accordance with the preferences of one physician over another physician.” ('523 Patent col.5 1.61-65 (emphasis added)). In accordance -with this characterization, the Embodiment illustrates the physician’s providing of “routing criteria” in two overall steps: first, the physician categorizes message types by priority level; next, the physician provides “routing instructions” for each particular priority level, indicating to which device(s) messages of that priority level should be routed. The first step is illustrated by Figures 8 and 9. As an initial matter, and contrary to 523 IP’s assertion that Figure 8 of the patent “lists many more” types of criteria other than priority (PI. Reply 7), it does not. As the Embodiment expressly states, Figure 8 illustrates a web page screen listing various “message type[s]” — not the criteria by which to route them. ('523 Patent col.7 1.6). The “message types” listed in Figure 8 include, for example, “refill requests,” “billing requests,” “emergency per caller,” “problems with medication,” “fever over: _“next day surgery questions,” and “my wife Jane Jones.” (Id. at Fig. 8). Indeed, Figure 8 strongly supports a construction of “routing criteria” that necessarily implicates message importance and priority. The Embodiment explains how the screen represented by Figure 8 can be “used by the physician to establish a multi-level message forwarding methodology ... [in which] any number of priority levels could be used.” ('523 Patent col.6 1.26-33). But, “[f]or purposes of simplicity,” the Embodiment continues, “the system will be described as being based upon a two-level system of priorities.” (Id. at col.6 1.31-33). The Embodiment then goes on to describe how the criteria effectuate the routing of various messages types: “At a highest, first level of importance, messages may be routed directly to a physician’s sphered] At the second level, requests may be routed to a secondary destination (e.g., an office of the physician).” (Id. at eol.6 1.41-44). As an example, the Embodiment provides, “The message type STANDARD HOLD FOR OFFICE CALLS would always be classified as low priority unless the physician indicated otherwise.” (Id. at col.7 1.8-10). The Embodiment also describes how a freeform “other” entry field allows a physician to identify non-standard content— such as a spouse’s name — for “high routing priority.” (Id. at col.7 1.23-52 & Fig. 9). The second step for a physician to provide “routing criteria” is illustrated by Figure 10. Figure 10 represents a web page, a “Routing Entry Form,” on which the physician can indicate the priority level of message that each “message destination” receives. ('523 Patent Fig. 10). For each destination, .various fields allow the physician to list the “current content of the physician routing instructions,” to provide an “ordering number,” and to assign a “priority ranking.” (Id. at col.8 1.20-38). For example, for message content of the “highest priority,” if the physician wishes to be paged first, the physician would number the priority ranking of the pager as “1” (route highest priority content to this device) and the ordering number of the pager also as “1” (route to this device first). (Id. at col.8 1.28-38). If the physician also wished simultaneously to receive an email, such that he or she could review the content of the message when responding to the page, the physician could also list the priority ranking and ordering number of his email address as “1” for that type of content. (Id.). The Specification teaches an unambiguous meaning of “routing criteria”: a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that “routing criteria” involve both the priority and importance of the message and must, as a standin for a physician’s judgment, be provided exclusively by the physician. But, to slay the slain, the Court has also examined the prosecution history, which reveals that Sameh made numerous, clear prosecution disclaimers confirming that routing criteria were priority-based and provided by the physician only: • Initially, arguing that his amendments distinguished his invention from the prior art identified in the Examiner’s rejection, Sameh stated: “As now amended, independent claims 1,16, and 31 are dearly limited to the routing of messages based upon a message routing criteria established by the physician based upon the relative (and subjective) importance that the physician places upon each type of message.” (PH Amend. A 11 (emphases added)). • Sameh employed a similar argument to refute the claim that his invention was not obvious in light of the combination of two prior art references: “[N]one of the cited references provide any teaching or suggestion of any method or system that allows a physician to route messages based upon a set of priorities established by the physician.” (PH Amend. A 16 (emphasis added)). • In his appeal brief to the Board after the Examiner’s final rejection, Sa-meh again distinguished his invention from the prior art by explaining that the prior art “fails to provide a criteria for ... conditional routing based upon urgency or priority.” (PH App. Br. 21 (emphasis added)). • In the same document, Sameh offered the following additional differentiation: “The claimed invention solves the very important problem of how to route messages such as patient requests or conveyance of clinical information to a physician or his/ her staff based upon the information within the message and the priority established by the physician.” (PH App. Br. 23 (emphases added)). • Still distinguishing Claim 31 from the prior art, Sameh argued: “[P]ri-ority is implicit in a physician’s ability to route messages.” (PH App. Br. 24 (emphasis added)). Specifically, Sameh asserted that “[t]he priorities of the patient and/or physician or the need to dynamically route messages from patients/re-questors to one of a number of destinations defined by the physician based upon priority is not recognized in the cited references.... ” (Id. (emphases added)). • In his response to the Examiner’s answer, Sameh emphasized that, in his invention, the physician, not the patient, controls the criteria: “[The prior art] teaches of a patient selecting a physician. Therefore, if there is a criteria under [the prior art], then [those criteria are] exclusively under the control of the patient.... [The prior art] does not involve a criteria for routing a message provided by the physician.” (PH App. Resp. 4 (emphasis added)). Later, Sameh declared: “The claimed invention uses content based intelligence to route messages based upon their importance to the message recipient.” (Id. at 10 (emphasis added)). • In a paragraph defining “routing criteria,” Sameh argued: “[T]he term ‘criterion’ is defined as ‘a standard on which a decision or judgment may be based’ (Webster’s 3rd New International Dictionary (1993)). As such, a routing criteria is a standard on which a routing decision or judgment is based.... [T]he criteria for routing messages provides a standard upon which a decision can be made about whether the message is to be routed at a relatively high priority or a lower priority.” (Id. at 11 (emphasis added)). In sum, the Specification unambiguously describes “routing criteria” in terms of the priority and the importance of the message. What is more, in order to obtain his patent, Sameh clearly and unambiguously told the PTO that the claimed “routing criteria” were based on priority. In both the patent itself and in the prosecution of the patent, Sameh “repeatedly, consistently, and exclusively,” In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696 F.3d at 1150, referred to the criteria as “provided by the physician.” That is the point: for the criteria to act as a stand-in for the judgment of the physician. ('523 Patent col.l 1.26-28 (“[0]nly the physician is qualified to make a decision regarding the handling of his patients by others.”)). The Court thus construes the claim limitation “a respective criteria provided by the physician for routing messages to each of the plurality of message destinations,” along with the antecedent references to “routing criteria,” to mean: “Standards provided by a physician, and no one else, upon which a decision can be made about which of a plurality of message- destinations to route a message based upon the importance and priority of that type of message to that physician.” 5. “Downloaded” Is Broadly Construed to Include Viewing on a Browser Screen The parties also disagree on the appropriate construction of the claim limitation “a form downloaded by the request- or from the web site.” ('523 Patent col.12 1.11). To some extent they argue past each other: CureMD asserts a construction that centers around the term “downloaded,” while . '523 IP retorts with one that centers on the word “form.” Specifically, CureMD argues that the Specification and prosecution history teach narrow construction of the limitation that involves automatically identifying the patient by retrieving a Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”), suggesting the following construction: “upon access to a physician’s web site the requestor downloads a form from a web page to the patient’s browser to enable the physician to identify whether the requestor is an existing patient or a new patient and thereby allow the patient to make a choice based on a number of criteria.” (Def. Br. 22). CureMD also asserts, “The fact that a form appears on the user’s screen is not evidence that the form is downloaded.” (Def. Reply 7). In its papers, '523 IP conflates claim construction and infringement analysis to such a degree that it is difficult to ascertain its preferred construction, but it appears to argue implicitly that, as used in the '523 Patent, the “downloading]” of a “form” should be construed to mean the same thing as accessing or viewing a form or a message screen on a web page and nothing more. (PI. Opp. 24-25). After reviewing the Specification, the Court generally agrefes with '523 IP, but adopts its own construction. The plain language of the limitation is fairly generic: “a form downloaded by the requestor from the web site.” ('523 Patent col.12 1.11). The use of “a” suggests no specific form, but rather multiple potential embodiments. “Form” itself suggests something fillable by a human being (the “requestor”). Additionally, the context of Claim 31, which involves the processing of the content of a message, suggests that the form must be capable of allowing the requestor to enter a unique message, as opposed to merely clicking boxes or selecting from a list. But the word “form” itself is so generic as to demand some clarification from other intrinsic sources. See Microsoft Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 731 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed.Cir.2013), reh’g denied (Dec. 11, 2013) (finding that where a term, like “state,” is especially “general on its facet,] ... it begs for clarification from the specification”). Likewise, a reading of the plain language leaves the term “downloaded” ambiguous — it could mean nothing more than viewing a form from the web site on the computer screen of the request- or, or it could mean something more, as CureMD suggests. Turning next to the term “form,” the Specification provides some illumination. Every illustration of a form for a requestor to send a message to a physician includes a freeform textbox where the requestor can provide a unique, narrative message. ('523 Patent Figs. 4-7). It is apparent from the labelling of these textboxes that they are, in fact, freeform: “PLEASE DESCRIBE THE PROBLEM” (id. at Fig. 4), “DESCRIBE YOUR SYMPTOMS” (id. at fig. 5), and “PLEASE SUMMARIZE” (id. at Figs. 6, 7). Further, the descriptions of these illustrations indicate that they are for the purpose of entering a freeform message, for example: “a text box ... for entry of a description of the problem” (id. at col.5 1.11-12); “a large text box ... for entry of descriptive information” (id. at col.5 1.21-23); and “text box ... for entry of a message regarding the patient” (id. at col.5 1.40-41). Finally, as further discussed below, as described by the Specification, the very purpose of the “content processor” is to digest and understand non-uniform content of messages. (See, e.g., id. at col.7 1.36-63). The term “form” as it is used in Claim 31 is therefore understood to include at least one field allowing the entry of a freeform message by the requestor. With regard to the term “downloaded”: throughout the Specification, in almost every instance of the terms “downloaded” or “downloaded to,” those words could be replaced with “accessed,” “accessed on,” or “accessed by,” and the meaning in the context of the patent would be precisely the same. For example: • “a screen (web page) ... may be downloaded to l/accessed on] a browser of a patient or other re-questor” ('523 Patent col.3 1.46-47); • “the web page ... may be downloaded to [/accessed by] the patient” (id. at col.41.43-44); • “a screen of FIG. 5 may be downloaded to [/accessed by] the requester” (id. at col.5 1.14-15); • “If the requester should activate the OTHER box, then a single blank text box may be downloaded [/accessed].” (id. at col.51.44-45); • “Once the physician downloads [/accesses] the screen ...” (id. at col.8 1.36-37). CureMD’s argument that “downloaded” means “automatically identifying] the patient by retrieving the URL of the patient” finds its source in a few paragraphs in the Embodiment that discuss alternative ways the patient might be identified when using the claimed invention. These paragraphs discuss storing “cookies” (i.e., text files that gather information about a computer user’s internet habits) in the patient’s browser, retrieving a URL, or simply having the patient fill out a form with personal information. ('523 Patent col.3 1.30-50). Significantly, however, this idea of “retrieving the URL of the patient” is discussed only once in the Embodiment, and then only in the alternative; it is not discussed at all in any of the 35 claims, the Background of the Invention, or the Summary; and it is not represented in any of the drawings. It is not put forward by the Specification as serving the underlying purpose of the patent, nor does it. It is unambiguous from the Specification that the inventor intended the mention of “retrieving the URL of the patient” to be merely a potential embodiment, not a critical aspect of the invention. CureMD’s cites to the prosecution history do not even mention this idea of identifying the patient with the URL as a critical part of the downloaded form. The prosecution history does, however, provide support for the idea that the term “form,” as it is used in the limitation, necessarily includes a field for freeform information entry. In distinguishing his invention from a prior art reference that included a fixed form allowing a patient to select a physician and submit an appointment request, Sameh emphasized that in the prior art, in contrast to his invention, there is “no form and no determination of a message content of the form.” (PH App. Br. 22). Thus, in light of the Specification and prosecution history, the Court construes the limitation “a form downloaded by the requestor from the web site” to mean: “a form containing at least one field for free-form message entry that can be accessed by the requestor on the web site.” 6. A “Content Processor” Dynamically Interprets the Content of a Message, Determines Its Priority, and Decides Where It Needs to Go Based on Priority The next disputed limitation is “a content processor adapted to determine an information content of the message received from the patient and that selects a message destination of the plurality of message destinations by matching the routing criteria of the selected destination with the determined information content.” ('523 Patent col. 12 1.15-20). This limitation is the crux of the claimed invention: it pulls together the “message destinations,” the “routing criteria,” and the content of the patient’s message. Moreover, it was the function of the content processor that the Board found to be absent from the prior art, and that served as the basis for the overturning of the Examiner’s final rejection. (See PH Board Dec. 4; see PH All. Not. 2 (“[The Board] reversed the Examiner’s rejection of the claims [in view of the prior art] for failing to teach ‘routing a message by determining information content and routing criteria provided by the physician.’ ”)). Pointing to the Specification, CureMD argues that the Court should construe a “content processor” as “a system interface device for determining the information content of a message from a requestor and then selecting a message destination based on matching routing criteria set by the physician with the determined message content.” (Def. Br. 23). Here, too, 523 IP’s opposing claim construction arguments are so mixed up with its infringement arguments that it is difficult to parse them out. 523 IP seems to argue that “the content processor determines content, not routing”; that a device that sends separate entry forms designated for a partic