Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER KELLY, Judge: This consolidated action comes before the court on USCIT Rule 56.2 motions for judgment on the agency record, challenging the Department of Commerce’s (“Department” or “Commerce”) determination in Certain Frozen Fish Fillets From the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 78 Fed. Reg. 17,350 (Dep’t Commerce Mar. 21, 2013) (final results of antidumping duty administrative review and new shipper reviews) (“Final Results ”), as amended, 78 Fed.Reg. 29,323 (Dep’t Commerce May 20, 2013) (“Amended Final Results”); see also Issues and Decision Memorandum for Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, A-552-801, (Mar. 13, 2013), available at http:// enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/ VIETNAM/2013-06550-l.pdf (last visited February 10, 2015) (“Decision Memo”). Vinh Hoan Corporation (“Vinh Hoan”) commenced this action pursuant to section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (2012). The court consolidated Vinh Hoan’s challenge with actions filed by Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers (collectively “VASEP”), Binh An Seafood Joint Stock Company (“Binh An”), Anvifish Joint Stock Company and Vinh Quang Fisheries Corporation (“Anvifish and Vinh Quang”), and Catfish Farmers of America, an association of processors and growers, and individual U.S. catfish processors, America’s Catch, Alabama Catfish Inc. dba Harvest Select Catfish, Inc., Heartland Catfish Company, Magnolia Processing, Inc. dba Pride of Pond, and Simmons Farm Raised Catfish, Inc. (collectively “Catfish Farmers of America”). In addition to the above named parties’ Rule 56.2 motions, Catfish Farmers of America filed a response, as a defendant-intervenor, in opposition to motions by VASEP, Vinh Hoan, Anvifish and Vinh Quang, and Binh An. See Def.-Intervenors’ Resp. Opp’n PL’s, Consol. Pis.’, and Pl.-Intervenor’s Rule 56.2 Mot. J. Agency R., May 22, 2014, ECF No. 79 (“Catfish Farmers of America’s Resp.”). Vinh Hoan also filed a response, as a defendant-intervenor, in opposition to Catfish Farmers of America’s motion. See Resp. Def.-Intervenor Vinh Hoan Corp. Opp’n Pis. Catfish Farmers of America, et al.’s Rule 56.2 Mot. J. Upon Agency R. Supp. PI. VASEP’s Rule 56.2 Mot. J. Upon Agency R., May 22, 2014, ECF No. 80 (“Vinh Hoan’s Resp.”). Given the length of this opinion, an outline of the issues discussed should be helpful to the reader. After a brief explanation of the background in the proceeding as well as the basis for jurisdiction and the standard of review the court will begin with a discussion of the legal framework for primary surrogate country selection. Part II of the opinion considers Commerce’s methodology in selecting a primary surrogate country as well as Commerce’s analysis of nonfish factors of production, financial statements and whole fish in selecting a primary surrogate country. Part III considers Commerce’s analysis of specific surrogate values. Part IV reviews Commerce’s treatment of certain sales as consignment sales. Part V addresses the inclusion of sample transactions in Commerce’s margin calculation. Part VI analyzes a challenge to Commerce’s normal value calculation for Vinh Hoan, specifically its refusal to adjust the ratio used to value Vinh Hoan’s FOPs. BACKGROUND On October 3, 2011, Commerce initiated this eighth antidumping (“AD”) duty administrative review covering subject imports entered during the period of review (“POR”), August 1, 2010 through July 31, 2011. See Certain Frozen Fish Fillets From the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 77 Fed.Reg. 56,180, 56,180 (Dep’t Commerce Sept. 12, 2012) (preliminary results of the eighth antidumping duty administrative review and ninth new shipper reviews, partial rescission of review, and intent to revoke order in part) (“Preliminary Results”). Because Commerce treats Vietnam as a nonmarket economy (“NME”) it selected a surrogate market economy country to value the factors of production of the subject imports. Id. at 56,183. During the preliminary results, Commerce chose Bangladesh as the primary surrogate country. Id. at 56,184. However, for the final results, Commerce chose Indonesia as the primary surrogate country. Final Results at 17,351. Commerce selected Anvifish and Vinh Hoan as mandatory respondents, assigning them respective rates of 1.34 dollars per kilogram (“USD/kg”) and 0.19 USD/kg. Final Results at 17,352-53. Further, in accordance with its practice, Commerce assigned the average of these rates, 0.77 USD/kg, to nonselected, separate rate respondents. Commerce also assigned a rate of 2.11 USD/kg to those who did not rebut the presumption of government control. Id. After receiving ministerial error allegations the Department revised the margin for Anvifish to 2.39 USD/kg and for the separate rate companies to 1.29 USD/kg. Amended Final Results at 29,-324. VASEP, Vinh Hoan, Anvifish and Vinh Quang, and Binh An challenge Commerce’s selection of Indonesia as the primary surrogate country. See Mem. Law Supp. Pl.’s Rule 56.2 Mot. J. Upon Agency R. 8-61, Nov. 14, 2013, ECF No. 37 (“VA-SEP’s Br.”); Mem. Law Supp. Vinh Hoan Corp.’s Mot. J. Upon Agency R. 54-60, Nov. 14, 2013, ECF No. 39 (“Vinh Hoan’s Br.”); Mem. P. & A. Supp. Anvifish Joint Stock Co. and Vinh Quang Fisheries Corp. J. Upon Agency R. 10-26, Nov. 14, 2013, ECF No. 42 (“Anvifísh’s & Vinh Quang’s Br.”); Mot. J. On Agency R. Under US-CIT Rule 56.2 1-3, Nov. 14, 2013, ECF No. 40 (“Binh An’s Mot.”). Vinh Hoan also challenges Commerce’s fish oil byproduct offset calculation, the values assigned to labor, two energy inputs and several byproducts, the inclusion of “freight-in” in the selling, general, and administrative expense ratio, the inclusion of sample transactions in Vinh Hoan’s margin calculation, the use of facts available on all óf Vinh Hoan’s consignment sales, and the inland freight and brokerage and handling calculation. Vinh Hoan’s Br. 7-54. Vinh Hoan further claims that if it were not for Commerce’s numerous errors, it would have been entitled to a de minimis margin which would have resulted in the revocation of the order as to Vinh Hoan. Vinh Hoan’s Br. 60. Anvifish and Vinh Quang challenge Commerce’s use of the Vitarich price quote to value Anvifísh’s byproducts and use of a Philippine company’s financial statement to calculate financial ratios. Av-ifish’s & Vinh Quang’s Br. 19-33. Binh An joins the arguments briefed by VA-SEP, Vinh Hoan, and Anvifish and Vinh Quang in all respects. Binh An’s Mot. 1. Catfish Farmers of America challenge Commerce’s refusal to make an adjustment to Vinh Hoan’s normal value (“NV’) and Commerce’s calculation of Vinh Hoan’s fish oil byproduct offset. Mem. Supp. Pis. Catfish Farmers of America, et al.’s Rule 56.2 Mot. J. Upon Agency R. 6-25, Nov. 14, 2013, ECF No. 44 (“Catfish Farmers of America’s Br.”). Defendant, United States (“Defendant”), responds that the court should sustain Commerce’s determinations except for Commerce’s calculation of Vinh Hoan’s fish oil byproduct offset for which Defendant requests a voluntary remand. Def.’s Resp. Pis.’ Mots. J. Upon Agency R. 2-3, May 22, 2014, ECF No. 77 (“Def.’s Resp.”). The court finds that Commerce’s primary surrogate selection is contrary to law and unsupported by substantial evidence. Further, the court grants the Defendant’s request for a voluntary remand to reconsider its fish oil byproduct calculation. The court also finds Commerce’s use of facts available for all of Vinh Hoan’s CCEP sales is unsupported by substantial evidence. Moreover, the court sustains Commerce’s inclusion of sample sales in Vinh Hoan’s margin calculation. Finally, the court finds that Commerce’s refusal to adjust Vinh Hoan’s NV was not supported by substantial evidence. The court reserves judgment on the remaining issues. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c)(2012), and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) and “shall hold unlawful any determination, finding or conclusion found ... to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law....” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i). DISCUSSION I. Primary Surrogate Country Selection: Legal Framework and Background In NME AD proceedings, Commerce generally calculates NV “on the basis of the value of the factors of production utilized in producing the merchandise ... [together with] an amount for general expenses and profit plus the cost of containers, coverings, and other expenses.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1). Commerce shall value the factors of production “based on the best available information regarding the values of such factors in a market economy country or countries considered to be appropriate by the administering authority.” Id. Moreover, to the extent possible, Commerce shall use “the prices or costs of factors of production in one or more market economy countries that are—(A) at a level of economic development comparable to that of the nonmarket economy country, and (B) significant producers of eomparable merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4). While Commerce has broad discretion in deciding what constitutes the best available information, see QVD Food Co. v. United States, 658 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed.Cir.2011) (noting the absence of a definition for “best available information” in the AD statute), it must ground its selection of the best available information in the overall purpose of the AD statute, calculating accurate dumping margins. See CS Wind Vietnam Co. v. United States, 38 CIT -, -, 971 F.Supp.2d 1271, 1277 (2014) (citing Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1185, 1191 (Fed.Cir.1990)); see also Parkdale Infl v. United States, 475 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir.2007). Commerce’s regulatory preference is to “value all factors in a single surrogate country.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(2)(2012). To implement this preference, Commerce selects a primary surrogate country, using a four step process. See Import Admin., U.S. Dep’t Commerce, Non-Market Economy Surrogate Country Selection Process, Policy Bulletin 04.1 (2004), available at, http:// enforcement.trade.gov/policy/bull04-l.html (last visited February 11, 2014) (“Policy Bulletin 04.1”). The process follows sequentially: (1) the Office of Policy (“OP”) assembles “a list of potential surrogate countries that are at a comparable level of economic development to the NME country”; (2) Commerce identifies countries from the list “with producers of comparable merchandise”; (3) Commerce “determines whether any of the countries which produce comparable merchandise are ‘significant’ producers of that comparable merchandise”; and (4) if more than one country satisfies steps (1)-(3), Commerce will select “the country with the best factors data.” See generally id. In this review, Commerce placed its list of potential surrogate countries on the record on November 22, 2011. See Anti-dumping Duty Administrative Review of Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (“Vietnam”): Surrogate Country List, PD 22 at bar code 3042499-01 (Nov. 22, 2011) (“OP List”). The OP List provided Per Capita GNI values for the year 2010 from the World Bank’s World Development Report 2012 for Vietnam and six other countries that were deemed “economically comparable.” Id. These GNI values were Vietnam $1,100, Bangladesh $640, Pakistan $1,050, Nicaragua $1,080, India $1,340, Philippines $2,050, and Indonesia $2,580. Id. In the preliminary results, Commerce explained that its longstanding practice is “to identify those countries which are at a level of economic development similar to Vietnam in terms of gross national income (“GNI”) data available in the World Development Report provided by the World Bank.” Preliminary Results at 56,183. Further, with respect to the countries on the list, the Department stated that it was “satisfied that they [were] equally comparable in terms of economic development .... ” Id.; see also Policy Bulletin 04.1 at n. 5 (explaining that Commerce treats countries on the OP list as equal in terms of economic comparability because “the statute does not require the Department to use a surrogate country that is at a level of economic development most comparable to the NME country”). Next, Commerce found all six countries to be significant producers of comparable merchandise based on 2009 export data for frozen fish fillets from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. Preliminary Results at 56,183. Because all six countries were economically comparable and significant producers of comparable merchandise, .Commerce turned to data considerations. Id. Commerce explained that Bangladeshi Department of Agriculture Marketing, Ministry of Agriculture, online pangas price data (“DAM data”) was the best available information on the record to value whole live fish, the factor of production which “accounted] for the largest percentage of the NV as fish fillets are produced directly from whole live fish.” Id. Based on this finding, Commerce selected Bangladesh as the primary surrogate country. Id. at 56,184. Commerce issued its preliminary results on September 12, 2012. After Commerce issued the preliminary results, the parties and Commerce continued to revisit the surrogate country selection. On November 8, 2012, Commerce extended the deadline for submitting “surrogate value comments” to November 20, 2012. Extension of Surrogate Value Submissions, PD 284 at bar code 3105147-01 (Nov. 8, 2012). On November 20, 2012, VASEP submitted potential primary surrogate country lists for the administrative review and new shipper reviews covering the POR August 1, 2011 to July 31, 2012 (“Subsequent Review GNI Lists”) in addition to GNI data for all countries from 2011 (“2011 GNI data”) and GDP data for all countries from 2010 (“2010 GDP data”). The petitioner below objected to VASEP’s submission of the Subsequent Review GNI Lists “because they [did] not contain information to value respondents’ factors of production.” Catfish Farmers of America’s Surrogate Value Rebuttal Data Cover Letter 1-2, PD 876 at bar code 3108782-01 (Dec. 4, 2012). VASEP responded by letter arguing that the exhibits should not be rejected. VASEP’s Response to Petitioners Post-Prelim Surrogate Value Rebuttal, PD 388 at bar code 3110023-01 (Dec. 11, 2012). The Department agreed with the petitioner. See Rejection of New Factual Information, PD 395 at bar code 3111617-01 (Dec. 21, 2012). VASEP resubmitted its submission excluding the Subsequent Review GNI Lists but including the 2011 GNI and 2010 GDP data. See VASEP’s Resubmission of Surrogate Value Submission of November 20, 2012, PD 404 at bar code 3112136-01 (Dec. 26, 2012). After the parties filed case briefs, Commerce issued its final results choosing Indonesia as the primary surrogate country. Commerce began its analysis by explaining that it was “satisfied that [all countries on the OP List were] equally comparable in terms of economic development,” and finding that all countries on the OP List were “exporters of frozen fish fillets and, thus, significant producers of comparable merchandise.” Decision Memo 3-10. Commerce then turned to data considerations to make its primary surrogate country selection. Commerce eliminated India, Nicaragua, and Pakistan, explaining that no party argued for valuing whole fish from those countries and, in any event, the record did not contain suitable information from those countries. Id. at 11. Next, Commerce set out to compare the data for whole fish values from Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines. At the outset, Commerce noted that it was in the unusual situation of having on the record three sources of information issued by governments, which represent official statements of those governments as to the price of whole live fish—i.e., the Philippines FS, Indonesian AS, and DAM Data sources, and one source from an international organization, relevant to our analysis—i.e., the FAO FIG-IS Data source. While we typically do not scrutinize official government statistics in such detail, the necessity to respond to the comments raised by interested parties and to select one of the sources compelled us to do so in this case. Decision Memo 12 (footnote omitted). In evaluating these sources, Commerce explained that it “considers several criteria, including whether the SV data is contemporaneous, publicly available, tax and duty exclusive, representative of a broad market average, and specific to the input.” Decision Memo 19 (citation omitted). Commerce found all sources to be contemporaneous, publicly available, and tax and duty and exclusive. Id. at 19-20. In its broad market average discussion, Commerce found all three sources to be broad market averages. Id. at 20-22 (disagreeing with respondents’ contentions regarding Philippines FS and FAO FIGIS Data). However, Commerce noted concerns with Philippines FS Data collection methods and found that it was a less robust data source than the other three. Id. at 20-21. Relying on this finding, Commerce found Philippines FS not to be the best available information on the record. Additionally, Commerce explained several differences between the DAM Data on the record of the current and prior administrative reviews. Id. 21-22. Commerce relied on these differences to find “DAM Data to not represent as broad a market average as it did in the last administrative review and not as broad a market average as the Indonesian AS.” Id. at 22. Next, Commerce discussed specificity. After a lengthy discussion, Commerce found “that the FAO FIGIS Data is not as species specific as the DAM Data or Indonesian AS.” Decision Memo 25. It explained that record evidence showed five species of pangasius were grown in Indonesia, with two species being commonly grown. Id. It was unclear which of these species were included in the FAO FIGIS Data. Id. Additionally, unlike Indonesian AS, FAO FIGIS Data did not list the types of aquaculture areas from which its data was collected. Id. This omission was relevant because the record showed that in Indonesia hypophthalmus (subject merchandise) was grown in ponds and cages whereas jambal (not subject merchandise) was grown in rivers. Id. at 24. Thus, using Indonesian AS, as opposed to FAO FIGIS Data, allowed Commerce to eliminate at least some of its concerns about inclusion of other species grown in Indonesia. Id. Relying on these findings and the fact that Indonesian AS was a primary source while FAO FIGIS Data was not, Commerce concluded that FAO FIGIS Data was not the best available information. Id. at 25. Commerce also expressed concerns about whether dead fish were included in DAM Data values. Commerce stated that respondents all indicated they only consume live fish. Id. at 23. Commerce further explained that “because dead fish sell for less than live fish, [it] harbor[ed] concerns that the DAM Data may understate the price of the whole live fish FOP.” Id. at 23. Relying on these findings, Commerce did “not find the DAM Data to be as specific as ...” Indonesian AS. Id. Next, Commerce considered reliability. First, it noted “that the DAM Data and Indonesian AS both have price fluctuations.” Decision Memo 26. It explained that it did not consider any of the “SV choices ... to be anomalous with regard to price variances and, thus, considered] all sources equal in this regard.” Id. However, Commerce found differences between the weekly and yearly average prices in the DAM Data. As a result, Commerce “requested information from DAM concerning its collection and collation methods,” to which DAM did not respond. Id. at 26. Commerce explained that it did not have the same concerns with regard to the Indonesian AS. Id. Concluding, Commerce explained Indonesian AS was the best available information on the record to value whole live fish because it did “not give rise to the unanswered questions posed by the extent to which dead fish is represented in the DAM Data, the extent to, and process by, which the DAM Data is examined for errors.” Decision Memo 27. Turning to considerations other than whole live fish, Commerce explained that “factors other than.whole fish and surrogate ratios account for a significant portion of direct materials and NV .... ” Decision Memo 10. This conclusion was based on findings that Vinh Hoan was substantially integrated, many Vietnamese exporters of subject merchandise had similar production experiences to Vinh Hoan, and Vinh Hoan was one of the largest exporters of subject merchandise. See id. at 9. It further explained that, “the far greater contemporaneity and demonstrated importance to the NV calculation of the additional FOP [sic] available from Indonesia” supported its primary surrogate country selection. Decision Memo 27; see also id. at 10 (finding that with two exceptions all surrogate values for Indonesia were more contemporaneous than their Bangladeshi counterparts). Finally, Commerce explained that it was selecting Indonesia as the primary surrogate country because it was economically comparable to Vietnam, a significant producer of comparable merchandise, provided the best available information to value whole live fish, and provided surrogate values for other factors of production that were much more contemporaneous than data from other potential surrogate countries. Id. at 27. II. Primary Surrogate Country Selection: Analysis Commerce’s primary surrogate country selection suffered from several deficiencies and must be remanded for reconsideration for the following reasons. Commerce’s refusal to consider 2011 GNI data that it had accepted as record evidence, refusal to consider relative economic comparability of potential surrogate countries, reliance on contemporaneity of nonfish factors to the exclusion of other data considerations, and failure to compare the relative quality of financial statements made its determination contrary to law. Additionally, these legal deficiencies caused Commerce to ignore relevant detracting evidence. Moreover, Commerce’s preference for Indonesian data to value whole live fish was not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, Commerce’s primary surrogate country selection is both contrary to law and not supported by substantial evidence. A. Primary Surrogate Country Selection: Data and Methodology 1. Commerce Must Consider 2011 GNI Record Evidence The parties dispute what evidence Commerce must consider in making its primary surrogate country selection. Commerce disregarded record evidence of 2011 GNI data, VASEP’s Resubmission of Surrogate Value Submission of November 20, 2012 Ex. 3C, PD 404-405 at bar code 3112136-01-02, (Dec. 26, 2012), and 2010 GDP data, VASEP’s First Surrogate Value Rebuttal Submission Ex. 20F, PD 212 at bar code 3081393-03 (June 18, 2012). See also VASEP’s Br. at 16. It also rejected submission of the Subsequent Review GNI Lists as untimely filed “new factual information.” Rejection of New Factual Information, PD 395 at bar code 3111617-01 (Dec. 21, 2012). VASEP argues Commerce’s decision to consider the 2010 GNI data from the OP List, but not to consider 2011 GNI data and 2010 GDP data, and to reject Subsequent Review GNI Lists was contrary to law. The court finds that Commerce’s decision to disregard the 2011 GNI data is contrary to law. However, the court sustains Commerce’s decisions to disregard the 2010 GDP data and reject Subsequent Review GNI Lists. Commerce set “November 22, 2011 through May 23, 2012” as the time for submitting “any information the Department should consider when selecting the surrogate country.” Decision Memo 4 (citing Commerce Letter Re: Deadline for Surrogate Country and Surrogate Value Submissions, PD 127 at bar code 3075253-01 (Apr. 27, 2012)). VASEP submitted new information on November 20, 2012. Commerce accepted the GNI data and GDP data onto the record, but rejected the Subsequent Review GNI Lists as untimely filed new factual information pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(b)(2). Despite accepting the 2011 GNI and 2010 GDP and putting it on the record, Commerce nevertheless refused to rely on that data when choosing a primary surrogate country explaining that it “considers the selection of potential surrogate countries to be similar to the selection of mandatory respondents in an administrative review ... [it] must be resolved early in the case in order to provide sufficient time for party participation and the necessary analysis.” Decision Memo 4. Commerce explained that the 2011 GNI and 2010 GDP data “was not available on the record of this review for the Department to use at the time we made our surrogate country selection.” Further, no party challenged the list of potential surrogate countries during that time. Finally, Commerce explained that,“[r]evising the list of surrogate countries at a later date would be potentially unfair to the parties and create undue administrative difficulties.” Decision Memo 5. The court sustains Commerce’s decision to disregard the 2010 GDP data. Commerce stated that its long-standing practice has been to evaluate “GNI data available in the World Development Report provided by the World Bank.” Decision Memo 3. See also Policy Bulletin 04.1 at n. 4. Defendant explains that Commerce’s decision not to consider GDP data was based on this past practice and apparent judicial affirmation. Def.’s Resp. 21-22. Additionally, Defendant argues that GDP data is unreliable because it is derived from two sources, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and there is nothing on the record showing these organizations reported GDP on a consistent basis with each other. Id. at 22. VASEP has not attempted to distinguish its arguments between Commerce’s disregard of the GDP data and its disregard of the GNI data. Thus, there is no challenge to Commerce’s preference and practice of relying on GNI data to make its economically comparable determination before the court. Thus, the court finds that Commerce has provided a reasonable explanation for disregarding 2010 GDP data. Commerce’s rejection of the Subsequent Review GNI Lists was in accordance with law. The Department’s regulations specify deadlines for when parties must make submissions. See e.g. 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(a) (providing that “[t]his section sets forth the time limits for submitting such factual information, including ... publicly available information to value factors in nonmarket economy cases”). In general for final results of administrative reviews, factual information is due “140 days after the last day of the anniversary month....” 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(b)(2). “Factual information” means “(i) [i]nitial and supplemental questionnaire responses; (ii) [d]ata or statements of fact in support of allegations; (iii) [o]ther data or statements of facts; and (iv) [documentary evidence.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.102(b)(21). In addition, notwithstanding 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(b)(2), interested parties may submit publicly available information to value factors of production within “20 days after the date of publication of the preliminary results of review.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(c)(3)(ii). Commerce rejected VASEP’s submission of the Subsequent Review GNI Lists explaining that, [tjhough styled as a submission filed pursuant to section 351.301(c)(3) of the Department’s regulations, we find that Vinh Hoan Corporation’s and VASEP’s submissions of November 20, 2012 do not only contain information to value respondents’ factors of production. Instead, these submissions contain new factual information pertaining to the selection of a surrogate country, and this factual information is untimely pursuant to section 351.301(b)(2) of the Department’s regulations. Rejection of New Factual Information, PD 395 at bar code 3111617-01 (Dec. 21, 2012). Here, Defendant elaborates on Commerce’s reasoning. It explains that VA-SEP’s characterization of the Subsequent Review GNI Lists as information to value factors of production was improper because Commerce does not have to consider relative economic comparability and the economic comparability of the potential surrogate does not factor into Commerce’s finding of what constitutes the “best available information” for calculating individual surrogate values. Commerce categorized the Subsequent Review GNI Lists as “factual information” under 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(b)(2) as opposed to “publicly available information to value factors” under 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(c)(3). It is undoubtedly true that the selection of the primary surrogate country is central to Commerce’s selection of sources to value a respondent’s factors of production. Thus, it follows that factual information submitted regarding the economic comparability of the primary surrogate country is at least indirectly tied to valuing a respondent’s factors of production. However, it is a reasonable application of 19 C.F.R. 351.301(c)(3) that “publicly available information to value factors” refers to information that will be used to directly, value a specific factor, rather than •indirectly value a specific factor because it influences the choice of the primary surrogate country. Thus, the court cannot say that Commerce arbitrarily or unreasonably applied its regulations. Moreover, in light of Commerce’s broad discretion in establishing rules and procedures including enforcing time limits, the court cannot say that Commerce abused its discretion. See e.g. Yantai Timken Co. v. United States, 31 CIT 1741, 521 F.Supp.2d 1356 (2007); Reiner Brack GmbH & Co. v. United States, 26 CIT 549, 206 F.Supp.2d 1323 (2002). The court cannot sustain Commerce’s decision to disregard the 2011 GNI data. Commerce must consider record evidence pertaining to economic comparability and its failure to do so here is contrary to law. The statute requires that Commerce must, to the extent possible, use surrogate data from a market economy country or countries that are at “a level of economic development comparable to that of the non-market economy country” and “significant producers of comparable merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4). Further, Commerce must base its analysis on the best available information. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(l). Here, Commerce had information on the record that informed the precise question in front of it and it chose to disregard it. This decision was contrary to law. Commerce justifies its position by erecting a straw man, namely that considering the data could only be used to revise the potential surrogate country list. First, Commerce explains that “[rjevising the list of surrogate countries at a later date would be potentially unfair to the parties and create undue administrative difficulties.” Decision Memo 5. Commerce’s implication is that Plaintiffs’ only reason to have Commerce consider the 2011 GNI data is to establish a new list of economically comparable countries. While Plaintiffs may or may not have desired such an outcome, they clearly wanted Commerce to choose a country other than the one it ultimately chose. Commerce confuses two separate determinations: (1) creating a list of potential countries; and (2) selecting a primary surrogate country. This confusion can be illustrated by two consecutive sentences in the Decision Memo: The World Bank GNI/GDP data submitted by VASEP was not available on the record of this review for the Department to use at the time when we made our surrogate country selection, as it is dated September 27, 2012, after the Department made its surrogate country determination. Thus, the Surrogate Country List which the Department released on November 22, 2011 contained the most up-to-date information accessible from the World Bank regarding countries economically comparable to Vietnam. Decision Memo 4 (emphasis added). Commerce would not have to revise the list of surrogate countries in order to take the 2011 GNI data into consideration when it made its primary surrogate country selection. The 2011 GNI data was record evidence, accepted by Commerce, that Plaintiffs contend could affect the primary surrogate country selection analysis. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue it could affect the analysis of the relative economic comparability of the countries on the list. The court agrees. As will be discussed below, Commerce’s premise that relative economic comparability is irrelevant cannot withstand scrutiny. Moreover, it is possible that Commerce could have considered the data to reassess whether Indonesia was economically comparable. Second, Commerce claims it will not consider the GNI data because “no party timely challenged the list....” Decision Memo 4. Commerce noted “that at no time during the surrogate country comment period did any party, including VASEP, submit any new information or in any way contest the Surrogate Country List.” Decision Memo 5. Commerce seems to argue that in conducting its analysis it will only consider record evidence submitted up to a point in time. Thus, Commerce contends that after the comment period for having a country remain on the OP List, the parties were foreclosed from submitting evidence and making any arguments related to the selection of a primary surrogate country. Defendant contends that it would be unfair for Commerce to have considered the GNI data without offering other interested parties the chance to comment on the data, and it would be inappropriate for Commerce to consider the data without such comment. Def.’s Resp. 23. Despite these arguments, Commerce clearly did not complete its analysis on May 23, 2012 because it changed its surrogate country selection after the preliminary results were issued on September 12, 2012. Moreover, Commerce considered data submitted after the preliminary results to make its selection. See supra n. 7. Commerce was still under an obligation to consider all the record evidence in conducting its analysis, which was obviously ongoing, even if the parties were foreclosed from offering arguments. Therefore, given that Commerce accepted the GNI data, was still in the process of selecting a surrogate country, and considered data submitted by other parties submitted on the same day, Commerce must consider the GNI data. The Court has previously rejected Commerce’s attempts to disregard record GNI data that should be considered in Commerce’s primary surrogate country analysis. See DuPont Teijin Films v. United States, 37 CIT -, -, 896 F.Supp.2d 1302 (2013) (“Dupont I ”) and Dupont Teijin Films v. United States, 37 CIT -, -, 931 F.Supp.2d 1297 (2013) (“Dupont II”) (collectively “the Dupont line”). In the Dupont line, which the court finds on point and persuasive, Commerce placed its OP List on the record with six countries that were economically comparable to China based on 2008 GNI data. Dupont I at 1304. The list included India. Plaintiff-petitioners timely submitted 2009 per capita GNI data and argued that it was the best available information on which Commerce should base its economic comparability decision. Id. at 1305. However, Commerce found India was economically comparable based on 2008 GNI data and chose India as the primary surrogate country. Id. In Dupont I, the court found that Commerce’s reliance on 2008 GNI data without a-reasonable explanation made its determination unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1307. After remand, Commerce provided a new explanation for disregarding the 2009 GNI data, “that although the 2009 GNI data wére placed on the record within the time permitted for submission of factual information, they were submitted too late in the proceedings to be considered by the OP when making its list of economically comparable coun-' tries.” Dupont II at 1300. The court rejected this rationale explaining that administrative burdens could not excuse Commerce from complying with statutory obligations including determining accurate dumping margins and using data from an economically comparable country. Id. at 1305. The court further explained that Commerce could create a new deadline for parties to submit GNI data, prior to the deadline for the submission of factual information, pursuant to the APA if administrative constraints so required. Id. at 1307. Here, like in the Dupont line, Commerce seeks to justify its refusal to consider 2011 GNI record evidence based on administrative constraints. There is nothing in the administrative record of this case that makes the reasoning in the Dupont line less compelling. In fact, here, Commerce’s justification, that “the selection of potential surrogate countries [is] similar to the selection of mandatory respondents in an administrative review—both are very important to the proceeding and must be resolved early in the case in order to provide sufficient time for party participation and the necessary analysis,” Decision Memo 4, is even further undercut by Commerce’s reversal of its primary surrogate selection between the preliminary and final results. Defendant attempts to distinguish the Dupont line based upon the timing of the submission in the instant case. Defendant argues that in the Dupont line, the information had been submitted prior to the prehminary results whereas here VASEP did not submit the information until much later in the proceeding. Def.’s Resp. 23. Additionally, in the Dupont line, Commerce “had the benefit of interested party comments on the data in both case and rebuttal briefs.” Id. at 24. Defendant goes so far as to state that “VASEP waited until January 11, 2013, when it filed its rebuttal brief, to put interested parties and Commerce on notice that it regarded the 2011 GNI data as relevant.” Id. (citation omitted). The Defendant’s timing argument is not only a post hoc rationale, it mischaraeter-izes the sequence of events and identifies a distinction that has no relevance in this case. VASEP originally submitted the data on November 20, 2012 and only resubmitted it on December 26, 2012 after Commerce rejected VASEP’s submission of the Subsequent Review GNI Lists. Moreover, in this case it would be nonsensical to rely upon the issuance of the preliminary results as a cutoff date for considering information. Here, Commerce changed its surrogate country selection after it issued the preliminary results. Clearly, Commerce did not finalize its primary surrogate country selection by May 23, 2012, the timeframe Commerce asked for comments and data on economic comparability, or by September 12, 2012, the date of publication for the preliminary results. Moreover, this is not a case where the parties advocated for a country that was not on the original OP List. All parties had the opportunity to submit surrogate value data from Indonesia, Bangladesh, and other countries. In fact, if the parties had relied on Commerce’s selection of Bangladesh in the preliminary results, they would not have submitted data or argument concerning the country that was ultimately selected. Commerce cannot ignore record data covering 7 out of 12 months of the POR, which may affect its choice of a primary surrogate country. In both the underlying proceeding in the Dupont line and here, Commerce accepted evidence on the record which it ignored in making its primary surrogate country selection, and that evidence was submitted after the time period Commerce set for surrogate country selection comments. The important difference between the Dupont line and this proceeding is that here, Commerce changed its selection, indicating that the primary surrogate country issue had not been resolved, like “mandatory respondents ... early in the case.” Thus, in this case, Commerce has even less justification for its actions than it did in the Dupont line. Finally, Defendant argues that Commerce’s determination in the final results to use Indonesia instead of Bangladesh as the primary surrogate country was based on data considerations, a separate inquiry from determining what countries are at a level of economic development comparable to Vietnam. Def.’s Resp. 24. This argument is unpersuasive and even further undermines Commerce’s other justifications. The idea that administrative constraints on the one hand restrict Commerce from considering GNI data that covers 7 out of 12 months of the POR, but do not restrict Commerce from considering new data from each potential primary surrogate country, such as the IAS data to .value whole live fish submitted on the same day, is nonsensical. Commerce fails to explain why its primary surrogate country analysis for its preliminary determination considers, economic comparability, significant production of comparable merchandise, and comparison of available data and its analysis for its final determination only analyzes data considerations. As such, its determination is not in accordance with law. 2. Relative Economic Comparability The parties dispute whether Commerce was required to, and did in fact, compare the relative economic comparability of the countries on its OP List. VASEP argues that the statute requires such a comparison and one was not done here. See generally VASEP’s Br. 21-22. Defendant argues that a comparison is not required but, that even if it were, Commerce has fulfilled any such obligation in this case because it “ ‘thoroughly analyzed’ the remaining surrogate country criteria.” Def.’s Resp. 25. The court finds that the record in this case requires Commerce to compare relative economic comparability with the data of the potential surrogate countries and here, Commerce has not done so. As previously discussed, the statute requires Commerce to value the “factors of production in one or more market economy countries that are (A) at a level of economic development comparable to that of the nonmarket economy country, and (B) significant producers of comparable merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4). Commerce has considerable discretion in applying these statutory requirements. Despite its admittedly broad discretion, Commerce cannot lose sight of the overall statutory goal, ie., to determine accurate dumping margins. See CS Wind Vietnam Co., 38 CIT -, -, 971 F.Supp.2d at 1277 (citing Rhone Poulenc, 899 F.2d at 1191); see also Parkdale Inten., 475 F.3d at 1380. Given this constraint on Commerce’s discretion, the court must determine whether Commerce’s application of its policy in this case was a reasonable approach to determine accurate dumping margins. The court finds that it was not. Commerce’s obligation to determine accurate dumping margins bounds its discretion. Commerce’s general policy is to consider all economically comparable countries to be equally comparable, eliminate countries which are not significant producers of comparable merchandise and then choose the country with the best factors data. This policy may often be a reasonable means to obtain accurate dumping margins; it was not here. Here, Commerce was faced with the “unusual situation of having on the record three sources of information issued by governments, which represent official statements of those governments as to the price of whole live fish—ie., the Philippines FS, Indonesian AS, and DAM Data sources, and one source from an international organization, relevant to [its] analysis—ie., the FAO FIGIS Data source.” Decision Memo 12. Commerce itself noted that “[w]hile [it] typically do[es] not scrutinize official government statistics in such detail, the necessity to respond to the corn-ments raised by interested parties and to select one of the sources compelled [it] to do so in this ease.” Id. In light of its obligation to determine accurate dumping margins, the statute requires Commerce to consider the relative economic comparability of the economically comparable countries and to weigh these differences against the strengths and weaknesses of the factors data. As both parties note in their briefs, the question of relative economic comparability was addressed by this Court in Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 36 CIT -, -, 882 F.Supp.2d 1366 (2012) (“Ad Hoc Shrimp I ”). In the underlying administrative proceeding of Ad Hoc Shrimp I, Commerce justified its refusal to compare relative GNIs by stating “the statute does not require Commerce to use a surrogate country that is at a level of economic development most comparable to the NME country____” Id. at 1374. The court rejected this justification, explaining that “Commerce’s policy of disregarding relative GNI differences among potential surrogates for whom quality data is available and who are significant producers of comparable merchandise is not reasonable, because it arbitrarily discounts the value of economic comparability relative to the remaining eligibility criteria.” Id. The court further elaborated that “[b]ecause none of Commerce’s three surrogate country eligibility criteria is preeminent, it follows that relative strengths and weaknesses among potential surrogates must be weighed by evaluating the extent to which the potential surrogates satisfy each of the three criteria.” Id. at 1374-1375. Implicit in the Ad Hoc Shrimp I holding is that Commerce’s justification ignores relevant sections of the statute and its overall purpose. Although Commerce is not required to choose a primary surrogate country that is the most economically comparable, Commerce is required to use the best available information to value the factors of production. See, e.g., Nation Ford Chemical Co. v. United States, 166 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed.Cir.1999) (explaining the flexibility provided by 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) but stating it “mandates that Commerce value the factors of production on the basis of ‘the best available information regarding the values of such factors in a market economy country.’ ” (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(l))). Commerce’s explanation segregates its choice of the best available information to value the factors of production from its selection of the primary surrogate country. However, these analyses are not wholly distinct. The reason Commerce chooses countries that are economically comparable is so that it can value a respondent’s factors of production with information from that country. The statute directs Commerce to value the factors of production based on the best available information from “a market economy country or countries,” thus leaving it to Commerce’s discretion whether to choose one primary surrogate country. However, as discussed above, Commerce has, by regulation, indicated its preference to use information from one primary surrogate country to value factors of production, see 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(2), and it did so here. See Decision Memo 30 (surrogate financial ratios); Decision Memo 31 (labor); Decision Memo 32 (sawdust); Decision Memo 33 (rice husk). The court expresses no opinion as to whether Commerce would be required under all circumstances to consider relative GNI in relation to data quality differences. Commerce dismisses the need to address relative economic comparability in this case, relying on its analysis of producers of comparable merchandise and data. Below, Commerce explained that [w]hile the Department continues to disagree with the Court that the statute requires it to compare relative GNI comparability in its analysis, in these reviews, the Department nevertheless has thoroughly analyzed whether the potential surrogate countries are significant producers of comparable merchandise and the availability of whole fish data in certain of the potential surrogate countries. Therefore, we view the scenario that the Court addressed in PRC Shrimp Remand is [sic] distinct from the instant reviews. Decision Memo 5. Based on the preceding, Commerce continued to treat all countries on the OP List as equally economically comparable. Id. at 6. Although Commerce claims that it “thoroughly analyzed” the statutory criteria, the record does not reveal that it did. In its comparison of the data for whole live fish, the factor with the most influence on respondents’ NV, Commerce noted that it “typically [does] not scrutinize official government statistics in such detail....” Decision Memo 12. Thus from the outset, Commerce indicated the unusual level of scrutiny it would need to apply to distinguish between otherwise usable data sets. Notably, nowhere did Commerce find that the DAM Data did not satisfy any one of its criteria (i.e., contemporaneous, publicly available, tax and duty exclusive, representative of a broad market average, and specific to the input). Instead, Commerce found that DAM Data did not represent as broad a market average as Indonesian AS, was not as specific as Indonesian AS and gave Commerce concerns about the extent to which DAM Data was examined for errors. As discussed more fully below, Commerce found Indonesian AS and DAM Data to be equally contemporaneous despite the fact that Indonesian AS covered the entire POR as well as 12 months outside the POR and DAM Data covered the POR precisely. Here, like in Ad Hoc Shrimp I, the record does not belie a finding that a comparison of the DAM Data and Indonesian AS makes the choice of Indonesia so clear cut that weighing the relative GNIs of the countries would not improve Commerce’s selection of the best available information. Defendant responds to Plaintiffs’ arguments by reiterating Commerce’s explanations, and arguing that Commerce’s practice of considering all countries on an OP list to be economically comparable “recognizes that the ‘level’ in an economic development context necessarily implies a range of per capita GNI, not a specific per capita GNI.” Def.’s Resp. 27 (citing Policy Bulletin 04.1; Decision Memo 3-4). Defendant further argues Commerce found that Indonesia was at the same level of economic development, a finding that satisfies the statutory requirement for using a country at a level of economic development comparable to the NME. Defendant also argues that the statute does not prohibit Commerce from relying upon data quality to choose among otherwise qualified countries. Defendant also characterizes Commerce’s analysis as finding Bangladesh data unreliable and Indonesian data superior to Bangladesh data. These arguments are unpersuasive for several reasons. First, Plaintiffs do not argue that Commerce should blindly choose the primary surrogate country based on which country is the “most” economically comparable. Nor does the court suggest that the analysis should hinge on which country is the “most” economically comparable. As discussed above, the ultimate question is what is the best available information to value the respondents’ factors of production? Thus, Commerce must choose the country that furthers this goal. The analysis suggested by Ad Hoc Shrimp /, and adopted here, is that Commerce must compare differences in economic comparability with differences in the other factors, including data quality, when the facts so require. Second, Defendant ignores the statutory framework by isolating Commerce’s economic comparability finding. As discussed above, that is not what the statute and regulatory scheme imposed by Commerce, through its preference of valuing factors from a single country, provide. Third, Defendant’s argument that Commerce found Bangladesh data unreliable, mischaracterizes Commerce’s actual findings as provided in the Decision Memo. Commerce did find that DAM Data for whole live fish was less broadly representative, less specific, and less reliable than Indonesian AS data for whole fish, but it did not find that DAM Data for whole live fish was not broadly representative, not specific or unreliable. If Commerce had found DAM Data for whole live fish was unreliable the court would consider whether Commerce’s finding in that regard was supported by substantial evidence, but here Commerce did not make any such finding. Additionally as discussed below, Commerce determined to make relative comparisons with respect to some of its criteria but refused to do so for contemporaneity where DAM Data for whole live fish covered the POR precisely and Indonesian AS data for whole live fish covered the POR and an additional 12 months. Finally, Commerce also explained that it considered the data for other factors including, for example, the surrogate financial ratios. In its analysis for choosing DSFI’s financial statement as the best available information to value financial ratios, Commerce specifically refused to discuss financial statements from Bangladesh “because [it had] a surrogate financial statement from the primary surrogate country....” Decision Memo 30. Thus, it is unclear if Indonesia provided better information to value financial ratios. A similar rationale was provided for several other surrogate values as discussed in Section II.B in this opinion. See infra section II.B. Defendant also cites to Jiaxing Bro. Fastener Co. v. United States, 38 CIT -, 961 F.Supp.2d 1323 (2014) to argue Commerce’s explanation that it must select its primary surrogate country early in the process is valid. In Jiaxing Bro., the plaintiff challenged Commerce’s methodology of using per capita GNI to measure economic comparability as opposed to a method proposed by the plaintiff. Id. at 1329-30. The court found Commerce’s methodology to be a reasonable reading of the statute under the second prong of Chevron. Id. However, as explained in Clearon Corp., the challenge at issue in Jiaxing Bro., was to the initial placement of a country on the potential surrogates list, not “the merits of each of the potential surrogates on the list relative to each other.” Clearon Corp., Slip Op. 14-88, 2014 WL 3643332, at *10-12. Moreover, the court in Jiaxing Bro., also expressed agreement with the Dupont line and Ad Hoc Shrimp I. Id. at 1329 (citing Dupont I at 1306-1310; Ad Hoc Shrimp I at 1374-76). The court takes no position as to the relative economic comparability of any of the countries on the OP List as compared to Vietnam. Additionally, the court does not take any position as to how the OP List countries’ relative differences in GNI compare to any relative differences in data quality. These findings are for Commerce to make in the first instance. However, on remand, Commerce should consider all GNI data on the record in connection with its other findings relating to the selection of the primary surrogate country, including data considerations. All these findings should be made with the ultimate goal in mind, valuing the respondents’ factors of production using the best available information so as to calculate accurate dumping margins. B. Primary Surrogate Country: Nonfish FOPs Plaintiffs argue that Commerce’s finding regarding the importance of non-fish FOPs was unreasonable. Further, in analyzing the contemporaneity of these non-fish FOPs, Plaintiffs claim Commerce acted contrary to law. Plaintiffs rely upon both of these arguments to challenge Commerce’s selection on Indonesia as the primary surrogate country. The court disagrees with Plaintiffs on its first challenge, but finds Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Commerce acted contrary to law in analyzing the contemporaneity of these non-fish ■FOPs. 1. Importance of Non-Fish for FOPs Plaintiffs argue that Commerce’s reliance on the contemporaneity of nonfish factors in its primary surrogate country selection was not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Commerce’s analysis regarding the significance of non-fish FOPs “failed to consider critical information” and thus was unreasonable. Anvifish’s & Vinh Quang’s Br. 12. Substantial evidence exists on the record when there is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed.Cir.2003) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126, 140 (1938)). However, the “substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. 456. Nevertheless, “the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not invalidate Commerce’s conclusion as long as it remains supported by substantial evidence on the record.” Zhaoqing New Zhongya Aluminum Co. v. United States, 36 CIT -, -, 887 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1305 (2012) (citing Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. 456). Substantial evidence also requires that Commerce “provide a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made ... [and] articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.’ ” Baroque Timber Industries (Zhongshan) Co. v. United States, 38 CIT -, -, 971 F.Supp.2d 1333, 1339-40 (2014) (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962); Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co. v. United States, 716 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2013)). As discussed above, in NME proceedings, Commerce generally calculates NV “on the basis of the values of the factors of production utilized in producing the merchandise” together with “an amount for general expenses and profit plus the cost of containers, coverings and other expenses.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(l). Commerce seeks “the best available information regarding the values of such factors ... in one or more market economy countries that are (A) at a level of economic development comparable to that of the nonmarket economy country, and (B) significant producers of comparable merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(l)-(4). In making this determination, Commerce prefers to value all factors in a single surrogate country. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.408(c)(2). To select a primary surrogate country, Commerce examines whether a country is economically comparable, a significant producer of comparable merchandise, and whether information on the record from that country is suitable for valuing factors. In comparing data sources from different countries, it may be the case that one country provides better data for one factor and a different country provides better data for another factor. Thus, when selecting which country should be the primary surrogate, Commerce considers which factor(s) contribute the most to the NV calculation. Here, unlike in past reviews, Commerce determined that nonfish factors were important to the NV analysis stating that “factors other than whole fish and surrogate ratios account for a significant portion of direct materials and NV....” Decision Memo 10. This conclusion was based on findings that Vinh Hoan was substantially integrated, many Vietnamese exporters of subject merchandise had similar production experiences to Vinh Hoan, and Vinh Hoan was one of the largest exporters of subject merchandise. See id. at 9. Thus, Commerce explained that in addition to its comparison of the record evidence for whole live fish and financial ratios, “the far greater contemporaneity and demonstrated importance to the NV calculation of the additional FOP [sic] available from Indonesia” supported its primary surrogate country selection. Decision Memo 27; see also id. at 10 (finding that with two exceptions all surrogate values for Indonesia were more contemporaneous than their Bangladeshi counterparts). Commerce’s determination regarding the importance of nonfish factors was in part based upon its analysis of Vinh Hoan, one of the two mandatory respondents, and one of the largest producers. See Decision Memo 9; see also Final Results Analysis Memorandum for Vinh Hoan 2, CD 261 at bar code 3124243-01 (Mar. 13, 2013). Anvifish, the other mandatory respondent, was not an integrated respondent as evidenced by Commerce not using any factors of production from the farming stage in the calculation of Anvifish’s NV. Anvifish’s & Vinh Quang’s Br. 7; see also Preliminary Results Analysis Memorandum for Anvifish 5, CD 204 at bar code 3095040-01 (Aug. 30, 2012). Moreover, Anvifish and Vinh Quang argue, and Defendant fails to refute, that Commerce’s statement that the other separate rate respondents were integ