Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER PAUL G. GARDEPHE, District Judge: In this qui tarn action, Relator Oswald Bilotta alleges that Defendant Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation (“Novartis”) violated the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(l)(A)-(B) and related state laws by (1) causing false claims for reimbursement for patient prescriptions— that were written in exchange for kickbacks in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b and related state laws — to be submitted to federal and state health care programs (“the kickback claims”); and (2) promoting the drug Val-turna for off-label use, thereby causing the submission of false claims to federal and state health care programs (“the off-label promotion claims”). The United States (the “Government”) and the State of New York (collectively, the “Government Entities” or “Plaintiffs”) have intervened as to the kickback claims. Novartis has moved to dismiss the Government’s Amended Complaint-in-Intervention, New York’s ComplainL-in-Inter-vention, and the Relator’s Third Amended Complaint. For the reasons stated below, Novartis’s motions will be denied in part and granted in part. BACKGROUND I. FACTS A. The Alleged Kickback Scheme Plaintiffs allege that from January 2002 through at least November 2011, Novartis systematically bribed doctors to induce them to prescribe drugs from Novartis’s cardiovascular division for their patients. {See U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 1, 66; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶2, 3, 57) These drugs include Lotrel, Diovan, Diov-an HCT, Tekturna, Tekturna HCT, Ex-forge, Exforge HOT, Valturna, Tekamlo, and Starlix. (See U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 66; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 57) Novartis sold these drugs through a network of sales representatives who met with health care professionals throughout the United States. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 67; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 58) Novartis induced doctors to prescribe these drugs primarily through the use of “sham” speaker events. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 1-3; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 2^1) According to Novartis’s internal policies, speaker events were intended to be educational programs; Novartis would pay doctors to educate other doctors and health care professionals about Novartis drugs by presenting slides prepared by Novartis. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 2; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 4) These events were organized and conducted by Novartis sales representatives. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 72; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 69) They chose the speaker, topic, and venue for the events, as well as the attendees. (See U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 72-73, 81; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 6, 69) Novartis held thousands of speaker events at which few or no slides were shown, however, and at which the attendees spent little or no time discussing the drugs that were allegedly the focus of the programs. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 2, 95; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶4, 82) These events thus served as little more than upscale social outings designed to induce doctors to write prescriptions for Novartis drugs. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 1, 77, 121, 135-36; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 2, 4, 82, 86-87) According to Plaintiffs, the sham nature of these events was apparent from the attendees, speakers, subject matter, and venues. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 95; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶82) Frequently, groups of the same doctors would repeatedly attend speaker events on the same topic within a short period of time, with the doctors taking turns in the roles of attendees and “speakers.” (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 95-120, 126; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 82-85) For example, one doctor attended the same presentation ten times between July 2010 and October 2011, and the same three doctors were consistently present at nine of those events. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 97; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶84) Moreover, Novartis hosted many of its speaker events at high-end restaurants or sports bars without private rooms, making it difficult or impossible to hear the speaker or show slides; it was common for no slides to be shown at such events. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 121, 125-28, 130, 133-34; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 86-90) Other venués were similarly inappropriate for the types of “educational” events that Novartis purported to be hosting, such as “round table” programs at Hooters restaurants and fishing trips. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 122-24) Sales representatives frequently asked speakers who they should invite as attendees to these events, and doctors used this as an opportunity to invite their friends. (Id. ¶ 136; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 91) Often the drug that was supposed to be the subject of the speaker program was never discussed. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 137; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 92) The doctors who Novartis designated as “speakers” for these events were paid “ho-noraria” by Novartis, even though they spent little or no time discussing the drugs that were supposedly the subject of the programs. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 3, 78; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶4, 92) “Speakers” were paid between $750 and $1500 for each event, with some speakers being paid as much as $3000. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 79; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 67) In some instances, speaker events reflected in Novartis records never took place, or doctors recorded as attending were not, in fact, present; nevertheless, the designated “speakers” were compensated for these non-existent events. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 138-44; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 93) Novartis’s internal analysis showed that its speaker programs had a high “return on investment,” as doctors who attended the events — as either speakers or attendees — wrote an increased number of prescriptions for Novartis drugs. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶3, 145-48; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 94-96) Novartis found that the more incentives doctors received in the form of meals, entertainment, and honoraria from these events, the more Novartis prescriptions the doctors would write. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 147; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 95) The highest return on investment came from doctors who were paid to “speak” at the events. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 3) Novartis considered its speaker programs to be a “key component of [Novartis’s] promotional activities aimed at increasing its sales of drugs” from 2002 to at least 2011. (Id. ¶ 71; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 61) Novartis spent more than $65 million for more than 38,000 speaker programs ostensibly about Lotrel, Starlix, and Valturna between January 1, 2002 and November 2011. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 71; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 61) Novartis intended its speaker programs to increase prescription-writing, and doctors knew this. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 147-50; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 97-99) Doctors were chosen to be speakers if they wrote a high number of prescriptions for Novartis cardiovascular division drags, and they had to maintain or increase that level of prescription-writing in order to be invited to appear as a “speaker” again. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 149; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 98) Accordingly, once they began receiving honoraria, many doctors significantly increased the number of prescriptions that they wrote for Novartis drugs, or started prescribing Novartis drags if they had not done so before. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 150-58; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 99-124) Doctors often continued to increase their prescription-writing as the amount of honoraria they received increased. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 150-58; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 99-124) Novartis placed no limit on the number of programs a doctor could attend or how often a doctor could attend the same program. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 84; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) 171) Novartis also encouraged sham events by creating incentives for its sales representatives to host them. Sales representatives in the cardiovascular division were compensated based upon the number of prescriptions that doctors wrote for Novartis drugs. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 75; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 6, 64) They were given budgets to use on speaker events, and they were pressured to exhaust their budgets for such events. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶76) Although Novartis policies provided for caps on the price per meal for attendees at these events, sales representatives could avoid these caps by attributing costs that exceeded the caps to “unmet minimums,” ie., the difference between a restaurant’s minimum spending requirement for an event and the amount that sales representatives were permitted to spend per attendee under the caps. (Id. ¶¶ 87-88; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 74-75) By inviting few attendees and attributing the excess to a restaurant’s “unmet minimum” cost, speakers could spend lavishly on food and alcohol well beyond the caps. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 88; NY. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 75) Accordingly, spending for dinners frequently exceeded the caps, with hundreds of dollars being spent on each individual attendee’s meal. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶88, 130-32; see N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 75) Novartis also turned a blind eye as to whether its speaker programs were being used for illegitimate purposes. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶5; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 6) Novartis did not require signatures on attendance sheets at speaker events, and it was the sales representatives themselves who were responsible for reviewing the accuracy of receipts from speaker event venues. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 91-92; NY. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 78-79) There was no system in place to prevent sales representatives from repeatedly selecting the same doctors as attendees at speaker programs on the same topics, or to prevent them from arranging for the same doctors to take turns speaking and attending each other’s programs repeatedly. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 84; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 71) When sales representatives were reported for misconduct, Novartis’s only punishment was a “slap on the wrist,” such as placing a “conduct memo” in the employee’s file. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 5, 169-71; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 6) In some circumstances, sales representatives who were reported for noncompliance were even later promoted. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 5; NY. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 6) When doctors wrote increased prescriptions for Novartis drugs as a result of kickbacks — which pharmacies then filled, submitting claims for reimbursement to federal and state healthcare programs— they violated federal and state anti-kickback laws. According to Plaintiffs, compliance with these laws is a precondition for reimbursement. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 17-18, 175-82; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 135-44) Accordingly, as a result of the kickbacks it offered to physicians, Novartis caused thousands of false claims to be submitted for payment to federal healthcare programs — including Medicare, Medicaid* TRICARE, and the Veterans Administration healthcare program, (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 6, 20-56, 175) — and state healthcare programs, including New York Medicaid. (N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶7, 135-46) B. Alleged Off-Label Promotion Novartis allegedly promoted one of its cardiovascular — Valturna—for off-label use. (Relator Third Am. Cmplt. (“TAC”) ¶¶ 104-25) Prior to June 2010, Novartis had been selling Diovan, a “blockbuster” hypertension drag. (See id. ¶¶ 104, 108) Diovan generated more than $4 billion for Novartis in 2009. (Id. ¶ 104) Novartis’s patent for Diovan was set to expire in 2012. (Id.) To make up for anticipated losses resulting from the expiration of the Diovan patent, Novartis sought to build the market share of Valturna. (Id. ¶ 105) Novartis’s strategy was to market Valturna to diabetic patients who might experience high blood pressure, as opposed to hypertensive patients who were already adequately controlled on existing therapies. (Id. ¶ 106) Novartis did so by training sales representatives in off-label sale and marketing practices, and using promotional materials and speaker events to suggest that hypertensive diabetics would benefit from Valturna, even though the drug was not indicated for that particular patient population. (Id. ¶¶ 109-11, 113) Novartis’s promotional materials also included data from trials on rodents; sales representatives were instructed to present the data in such a way that doctors would assume that the data reflected results in humans. (Id. ¶ 112) When healthcare providers prescribed Valturna and subsequently submitted claims for payment, they were required to certify — as a pre-condition to payment— that the services for which they were billing were “medically indicated and necessary for the health of the patient.” (Id. ¶ 114) Relator alleges that Novartis’s off-label promotion of Valturna caused healthcare providers to submit claims for reimbursement that were false, because the drag was neither medically indicated nor necessary for the treatment of diabetic patients. (Id.) C. Novartis’s 2010 Settlement In September 2010, Novartis entered into an agreement with the United States Department of Justice and several states, including New York, to settle a number of FCA claims that had been brought against it. (See U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 4; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 5) In the settlement agreement, Novartis acknowledged that it had “provided illegal remuneration, through mechanisms such as speaker programs, advisory boards, and gifts (including entertainment, travel and meals), to health care professionals to induce them to promote and prescribe the [Novartis] drags Diovan, Zelnorm, Sandos-tatin, Exforge, and Tekturna, in violation of the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b).” (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 63; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 54) By offering kickbacks to health care professionals, Novartis had caused false claims — in the form of claims for reimbursement for prescriptions for those drugs — to be submitted to federal and state healthcare programs. (See U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 4; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 5) In connection with the 2010 settlement, Novartis signed a Corporate Integrity Agreement (“CIA”) with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Inspector General’s Office in which Novartis agreed to implement a rigorous compliance program to comply with the Anti-Kickback Statute and the FCA. (See U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 4; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 5) The CIA required Novartis to “ensure that [its] Policies and Procedures address ... appropriate ways to conduct Promotional Functions in compliance with all applicable Federal healthcare program requirements, including, but not limited to the federal anti-kickback statute ... and the False Claims Act,” and to enact polices and procedures that “address ... programs to educate sales representatives, including but not limited to presentations by [health care professionals]” in order “to ensure that the programs are used for legitimate and lawful purposes. ...” (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 64; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 55) The CIA further required Novartis to enact compliance policies that “address ... compensation (including ... salaries, bonuses, and contests) for ... sales representatives” “to ensure that financial incentives d[id] not inappropriately motivate such individuals to engage in improper promotion, sales, and marketing of Novartis’[s] Government Reimbursed Products.” (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 65; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 56) II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Relator Oswald Bilotta — a former Novartis sales representative — filed the qui tarn Complaint in this action on January 5, 2011. (Relator Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 1)) According to Bilotta, in paying kickbacks to doctors, Novartis caused the submission of false claims in relation to drugs other than those named in the 2010 settlement, and Novartis did not disclose this fact during the settlement -negotiations. Bilotta further claims that Novartis continued its unlawful practices even after the 2010 settlement, with respect to drugs that were named in the settlement, as well as additional drugs. Bilotta also alleges that Novartis caused false claims to be submitted-by promoting Valturna for off-label use. Bilotta — as Relator — asserted claims on behalf of the United States, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, the District of Columbia, the City of Chicago, and the City of New York. On April 26, 2013, the United States elected to intervene as a plaintiff in this case — but only as to the kickback claims— and filed a Complainb-in-Intervention. (Dkt. Nos. 13, 16) On July 10, 2013, Relator filed a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) asserting both the kickback and off-label promotion claims. (Dkt. No. 50) On August 26, 2013, New York State filed a Complainh-in-Intervention, electing to intervene as to the kickback claims only. (N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61)) All other states and municipalities declined to intervene. In July 2013, Novartis submitted a pre-motion letter indicating that it intended to move to dismiss the Government’s Com-plaini>-in-Intervention. A pre-motion conference was held on July 18, 2013. Although it had not yet intervened, New York attended this conference. The Court questioned whether the Government’s Complainh-in-Intervention satisfied the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), because the pleading did not “contain any allegations about who submitted the [false or fraudulent] claims, how they were submitted and paid, or when they were submitted, and in particular when they were paid within the 11-year time frame cited in the complaint.” (July 18, 2013 Tr. (Dkt. No. 53) at 11). This Court granted the Government leave to amend its pleading. (Dkt. No. 51) After this conference, the Government filed an Amended Complaint-in-Intervention. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62)) The Amended Complaint includes 316 pages of spreadsheets that list allegedly false or fraudulent claims for reimbursement — relating to prescriptions that were written for Novartis drugs — that were submitted by pharmacies to specific federal programs. (See U.S. Am. Complt. (Dkt. No. 62), Exs. A-O) The Government asserts claims for violations of Sections 3729(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) of the FCA, as well as a common law claim for unjust enrichment. (Id. ¶¶ 183-92) On August 26, 2013, New York filed its Intervenor Complaint (the “New York Complaint”). (N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61)) New York asserts claims for (1) violation of the New York False Claims Act (“NY FCA”), N.Y. State Fin. Law § 189(l)(a), relating to the filing of false claims for Medicaid reimbursement; (2) violation of the NY FCA, N.Y. State Fin. Law § 189(l)(b), involving use of false records; (3) violation of New York Social Services Law § 145 — b), (4) violation of New York Executive Law § 63(12) by engaging in repeated and persistent fraud; (5) violation of New York Executive Law § 63-c; and (6) unjust enrichment. (Id. ¶¶ 148-67) The New York Complaint includes 249 pages of spreadsheets that list allegedly false or fraudulent claims, “certification statements” executed by doctors who had written the prescriptions that resulted in the submission of those false claims, and signed certification statements for the pharmacies that submitted those claims. (See id., Exs. A-C) On October 24, 2013, Novartis moved to dismiss the Government’s Amended Complaint and the New York Complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 79, 81) On December 20, 2013, Novartis moved to dismiss the Relator’s TAC. (Dkt. No. 98) DISCUSSION I. LEGAL STANDARD A. Pleading Standards on Motion to Dismiss 1. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Standard “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “In considering a motion to dismiss ... the court is to accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint,” Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir.2007) (citing Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir.2002)), and must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Fernandez v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir.2006)). A complaint is inadequately pled “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955), and does not provide factual allegations sufficient “to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Ne., Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir.2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir.2010) (citing Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir.2002); Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir.1999)). 2. FedR.Civ.P. 9(b) Standard “Because the False Claims Act is an anti-fraud statute, ‘claims brought under the FCA fall within the express scope of Rule 9(b).’ ” United States v. New York Soc. for the Relief of the Ruptured & Crippled, Maintaining the Hosp. for Special Surgery, No. 07 Civ. 292(PKC), 2014 WL 3905742, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2014) (quoting Gold v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 68 F.3d 1475, 1477 (2d Cir.1995)). Rule 9(b) provides that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). “The purpose of Rule 9(b) is threefold — it is designed to provide a defendant with fair notice of a plaintiffs claims, to safeguard a defendant’s reputation from ‘improvident charges of wrongdoing,’ and to protect a defendant against the institution of a strike suit.” O’Brien v. Nat’l Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir.1991) (quoting Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819, 823 (2d Cir.1990)). “Rule 9(b) does not impose a ‘one size fits all’ list of facts that must be included in every FCA complaint.” U.S. ex rel. Kester v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 23 F.Supp.3d 242, 258, 2014 WL 2324465, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2014) (quoting In re Cardiac Devices Qui Tam Litig., 221 F.R.D. 318, 337-38 (D.Conn.2004)). “Ultimately, whether a complaint satisfies Rule 9(b) ‘depends upon the nature of the case, the complexity or simplicity of the transaction or occurrence, the relationship of the parties and the determination of how much circumstantial detail is necessary to give notice to the adverse party and enable him to prepare a responsive pleading.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 972 F.Supp.2d 593, 616 (S.D.N.Y.2013)). This “is a fact-specific inquiry.” Id. B. False Claims Act 1. Federal False Claims Act “The FCA facilitates restitution to the federal government when money is fraudulently taken from it.” New York Soc., 2014 WL 3905742, at *8. “The FCA permits a relator to bring a qui tarn action ‘for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government. The action [is] brought in the name of the Government.’ ” Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)). “[WJhile the False Claims Act permits relators to control the False Claims Act litigation, the claim itself belongs to the United States.” United States ex rel. Mergent Services v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir.2008).. “At the same time, ‘the United States is a “party” to a privately filed FCA action only if it intervenes in accordance with the procedures established-by federal law.’” New York Soc., 2014 WL 3905742, at *8 (quoting United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 933, 129 S.Ct. 2230, 173 L.Ed.2d 1255 (2009)). “If the United States declines to intervene, and the relator successfully pursues the action, the relator may receive between 25 and 30 percent of any recovery.” Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2)). “If the Government proceeds with an action ... [the relator] shall ... receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). “The relator may bring an action [under the FCA] against any person who ‘knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval....’” New York Soc., 2014 WL 3905742, at *9 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)). “A relator also may bring claims against any person who ‘knowingly makes, uses or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government.’ ” Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B)). “Claim” means “any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property and whether or not the United States has title to the money or property, that ... is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient, if the money or property is to be spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a Government program or interest, and if the United States Government — [1] provides or has provided any portion of the money or property requested or demanded; or [2] will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2). 2. New York False Claims Act “The NY FCA, enacted on April 1, 2007, is closely modeled on the federal FCA.” U.S. ex rel. Pervez v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 736 F.Supp.2d 804, 816 (S.D.N.Y.2010). It “provides for liability with respect to any person who, inter alia, (1) knowingly presents a false or fraudulent claim to the State or a local government for payment, [or] (2) knowingly makes a false statement to get a false claim paid....” Id. “New York courts rely on federal FCA precedents when interpreting the NYFCA.” New York Soc., 2014 WL 3905742, at *11. II. STANDARD FOR PLEADING FALSE CLAIMS The parties dispute the degree of particularity that is required to plead the false or. fraudulent claims that form the basis of an FCA cause of action. The United States, New York, and Relator argue that the Fifth Circuit’s relaxed pleading standard — set forth in U.S. ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir.2009) — should apply here. The Grubbs court held that “to plead with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud for a False Claims Act § 3729(a)(1) claim, a relator’s complaint, if it cannot allege the details of an actually submitted false claim, may nevertheless survive by alleging particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually submitted.” Id. Courts in this District have rejected Grubbs, concluding that it violates Second Circuit precedent requiring that fraud claims be pled with particularity. See New York Soc., 2014 WL 3905742, at *15 (“Grubbs would likely not be accepted as the law of this Circuit.”); Kester, 23 F.Supp.3d at 255, 2014 WL 2324465, at *11 (“[T]he Grubbs standard borders on requiring no particularity for the ‘claim’ element at all. It allows the plaintiff to make fairly conclusory allegations that claims were submitted for medical services pursuant to a standard billing practice.... A complaint’s description of a fraudulent scheme paired with information about a defendant’s standard billing practice is not enough ‘particular’ information to fulfill the purposes of Rule 9(b); the plaintiff must provide a detañed factual basis to support his allegation that the defendant submitted a false claim in this specific instance, not just that the defendant had a custom of submitting claims.”) (emphasis in original). Courts in this Circuit have held that “to satisfy Rule 9(b), an FCA claim must allege the particulars of the false claims themselves, and that allegations as to the existence of an overall fraudulent scheme do not plead fraud with particularity.” New York Soc., 2014 WL 3905742, at *11 (emphasis added); see also Kester, 23 F.Supp.3d at 255, 2014 WL 2324465, at *12 (“[A] plaintiff must plead both the particular details of a fraudulent scheme and ‘details that identify particular false claims for payment that were submitted to the government.’ ” (quoting U.S. ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 232 (1st Cir.2004) (emphasis in Kester)) Accordingly, “both the fraudulent scheme and the submission of false claims must be pled with a high degree of particularity.” Kester, 23 F.Supp.3d at 255, 2014 WL 2324465, at *12). In reaching this conclusion, courts have looked to the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) and the intent of the FCA. “Generally speaking, Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff alleging fraud to: 1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent; 2) identify the speaker; 3) state where and when the statements were made; and 4) explain why the statements were fraudulent.’ ” U.S. ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 04-CV-0704 (ERIC), 2009 WL 1456582, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2009) (quoting Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir.2004)). Under the FCA, liability attaches “ ‘not to the underlying fraudulent activity or to the government’s wrongful payment, but to the claim for payment.’ ” Id. at *5 (United States v. Rivera, 55 F.3d 703, 709 (1st Cir.1995)). Accordingly, FCA pleadings are “inadequate unless they are linked to allegations, stated with particularity, of actual false claims submitted to the government that constitute the essential element of an FCA qui tam action.” Kawelas, 360 F.3d at 232; see also Polansky, 2009 WL 1456582, at *5 (collecting eases). As the Eleventh Circuit explained in United States ex rel. Clausen v. Laboratory Corporation of America, Inc., [t]he submission of a claim is ... the sine qua non of a False Claims Act violation. As such, Rule 9(b)’s directive that “the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity” does not permit a False Claims Act plaintiff merely to describe a private scheme in detail but then to allege simply and without any stated reason for his belief that claims requesting illegal payments must have been submitted, were likely submitted or should have been submitted to the Government.... [I]f Rule 9(b) is to be adhered to, some indicia of reliability must be given in the complaint to support the allegation of an actual false claim for payment being made to the Government. 290 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir.2002) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)). Accordingly, in this Circuit, courts have held that the complaint must provide details that identify particular false claims for payment that were submitted to the government.... [D]etails concerning the dates of the claims, the content of the forms or bills submitted, their identification numbers, the amount of money charged to the government, the particular goods or services for which the government was billed, the individuals involved in the billing, and the length of time between the alleged fraudulent practices and the submission of claims based on those practices are the types of information that may help a [plaintiff] to state his or her claims with particularity. These details do not constitute a checklist of mandatory requirements that must be satisfied by each allegation included in a complaint. However, ... some, of this information for at least some of the claims must be pleaded in order to satisfy Rule 9(b). Polansky, 2009 WL 1456582, at *5; (quoting Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 232-33); see also Kester, 23 F.Supp.3d at 257-58, 2014 WL 2324465, at *14 (“In line with the weight of authority in this Circuit, I adopt the Karvelas standard — plaintiffs asserting subsection (a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) claims must plead the submission of a false claim with a high enough degree of particularity that defendants can reasonably ‘identify particular false claims for payment that were submitted to the government.’ ”) (quoting Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 232). This Court joins the other courts in this Circuit that have rejected Grubbs, and holds that in order to sufficiently plead violations of the FCA, Plaintiffs must allege the false claims themselves with sufficient particularity to satisfy Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b); merely alleging a fraudulent underlying scheme with particularity is not enough. III. KICKBACK CLAIMS A. Effect of Government’s Intervention on Relator’s Federal Kickback Claims Given the Government’s intervention in this action, the status of Relator’s federal FCA claims related to the kickback scheme must be addressed. Novartis has moved to dismiss these claims, arguing that “[w]here the government partially intervenes in a qui tarn action, a relator may proceed only with those claims in which the government declined to intervene.” (Def. MTD-Relator Br. (Dkt. No. 99) at 6) Relator claims that “it is more accurate to deem the federal kickback claims asserted in the TAC to be superseded by the Government’s intervention (as opposed to dismissed) as a technical matter.” (Relator Br. (Dkt. No. 105) at 7) “Relator acknowledges that the Government’s Complaint supersedes the Relator’s Complaint for all intervened claims[,] [and] [t]hus ... the Government has primary responsibility for prosecuting the claims upon which it has intervened, while the Relator’s role and position becomes essentially derivative to the claims upon which the Government has intervened.” (Id. at 7 n. 5) While Relator acknowledges that he may not “engage in any disruptive, repetitious or otherwise counterproductive actions,” he objects to any limitation on his participation in this action with respect to the federal kickback claims. (Id.) Novartis responds that its “present motion does not pertain in any way to Relator’s ability to continue to participate in the Government action. Rather, it relates to whether the Relator has standing to maintain, separate from the Government, any kickback claims alleged in his Complaint.” (Def. MTD-Relator Reply Br. (Dkt. No. 102) at 2) The Government takes the position that its claims have superseded Relator’s federal kickback claims, but acknowledges that Relator remains a party as to these claims. (See Jan. 17, 2014 U.S. Ltr. (Dkt. No. 96)) Neither the United States nor New York seeks to limit Relator’s participation in this action. (Jan. 17, 2014 U.S. Ltr. (Dkt. No. 96); Jan. 17, 2014 N.Y. Ltr. (Dkt. No. 97)) The False Claims Act provides that “[i]f the Government proceeds with the action, it shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action, and shall not be bound by an act of the person bringing the action. Such person shall have the right to continue as a party to the action, subject to [certain] limitations set forth in [the Act].” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1). Accordingly, courts have held that “by automatic operation of the statute, the Government’s complaint in intervention becomes the operative complaint as to all claims in which the government has intervened.” United States ex rel. Sansbury v. LB & B Associates, Inc., No. CV 07-25KEGS), — F.Supp.3d -, -, 2014 WL 3509789, at *6 (D.D.C. July 16, 2014); see also U.S. ex rel. Feldman v. City of New York, 808 F.Supp.2d 641, 648 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (“[W]hen the Government decides to intervene in .a qui tarn action, the Government’s claims become the operative claims insofar as they are duplicative of those of the relator.”). “However, a relator’s ... complaint continues to be the operative complaint for all non-intervened claims[,] and relators remain a party to the Government’s intervened claims and continue to have rights to participate in those claims under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) and to receive any relator’s recovery permitted by 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d), subject to the limitations of the FCA and the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” Sansbury, — F.Supp.3d at-, 2014 WL 3509789, at *6; see also Feldman, 808 F.Supp.2d at 648 (“[I]f the Government only partially intervenes in an action, a relator may retain standing to prosecute those aspects of his or her complaint as to which the Government has not intervened.”). In FCA qui tarn cases in which the Government has intervened, a number of courts have dismissed the relator’s claims on which the Government intervened. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 950 F.Supp.2d 888, 895 n. 1 (E.D.Va.2013) (“Count I of Relator’s Complaint is superseded by the Government’s Complaint and therefore dismissed....”); U.S. ex rel. Robinson-Hill v. Nurses’ Registry & Home Health Corp., No. Civ. A. 5:08-145-KKC, 2012 WL 4598699, at *9 (E.D.Ky. Oct. 2, 2012), reconsideration denied, No. Civ. A. 5:08-145-KKC, 2013 WL 1184370 (E.D.Ky. Mar. 20, 2013) (“[T]he qui tarn Complaint’s FCA claims must be dismissed to the extent that the Government’s Complaint supersedes those claims.... Dismissal of the qui tarn Complaint’s FCA claims does not, however, diminish the Relators’ statutory rights under § 3730.... ”); Feldman, 808 F.Supp.2d at 649 (“[T]he Court can identify no material aspect of the Relator’s Amended Complaint not covered by the Government’s Amended Complaint. The Court concludes that Feldman’s Amended Complaint is superseded in its entirety by the Government’s Amended Complaint and therefore dismisses Feldman’s Amended Complaint for want of standing. The Court notes, however, that this dismissal in no way diminishes Feldman’s continuing statutory rights delineated in § 3730 of the FCA_”). These decisions provide little insight as to why the procedural mechanism of dismissal was chosen, however. The District Court for the District of Columbia recently considered the question and concluded that dismissal is unnecessary, because the Government’s claims automatically supersede identical claims asserted by the relator. See Sansbury, — F.Supp.3d at —, 2014 WL 3509789, at *6-7. The court observed that “dismissal is by no means required especially where, as here, Defendants have made no showing that the Relators’ participation during the course of the litigation will cause them undue burden or expense that would justify limiting their participation.” Id. at -, at *7. Rather than dismiss the relator’s claims, the court concluded that “because the Government’s complaint in intervention supersedes Rela-tors’ complaint with respect to the intervened claims, and because Relators have the right to continue as parties to this action, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Relators’ claims, to the extent that they are duplicative of the Government’s claims, as moot.” Id. Although the procedural mechanism adopted here will make no practical difference, the D.C. District Court’s approach is logical. All of the parties agree that the Government’s federal kickback claims have superseded Relator’s federal kickback claims, and no party seeks to limit the Relator’s participation as to those claims. By definition, “superseded” means “[t]o annul, make void, or repeal by taking the place of.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed.2009). Because Relator’s kickback claims under the federal FCA have already been superseded by the Government’s kickback claims under the federal FCA, there is — as to the Relator’s federal kickback claims — nothing to dismiss. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Relator’s kickback claims under the federal False Claims Act will be denied as moot. B. Whether the Government Entities’ FCA Kickback Claims Have Been Pled with Sufficient Particularity Under Rule 9(b) Novartis moves to dismiss the kickback claims under the FCA and New York FCA in the Government’s Amended Complaint and in the New York Complaint, respectively, for failure to plead with sufficient particularity under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). (Def. MTD-U.S. Br. (Dkt. No. 80) at 6-22; Def. MTD-N.Y. (Dkt. No. 82) at 5-18) Because Novartis makes essentially the same arguments as to each pleading, the two complaints will be considered together. 1. Pleading of the Underlying Anti-Kickback Statute Violations Novartis contends that the Government Entities have failed to plead the anti-kickback violations underlying their FCA and New York FCA claims with sufficient particularity. (Def. MTD-U.S. Br. (Dkt. No. 80) at 6-13; Def. MTD-N.Y. (Dkt. No. 82) at 5-11) In particular, Novartis claims that the pleadings are deficient in that they (1) rely on only a handful of sham speaker events as examples of the alleged nationwide kickback scheme, (2) improperly premise the alleged anti-kickback violations on violations of Novartis’s internal policies and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America’s Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals (the “PhRMA Code”), and (3) do not plead facts adequate to demonstrate the requisite scienter. a. Federal and New York Anti-Kickback Statutes Where an FCA claim is premised on violations of the anti-kickback statute, plaintiff must “plead with particularity the ‘who, what, when, where and how’ of the fraudulent ... scheme.” U.S. ex rel. Mooney v. American, Inc., No. 06-CV-1806 (FB)(VVP), 2013 WL 1346022, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2013). “The [federal Anti-Kickback Statute] makes it illegal to ‘knowingly and willfully offer[ ] or pay[ ] any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) ... to any person to induce such person’ to ‘purchase or ... recommend purchasing’ a drug that is covered by a federal health care program.” Kester, 23 F.Supp.3d at 262, 2014 WL 2324465, at *19 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2)). “The [Statute] defines ‘remuneration’ as including ‘transfers of items or services for free or for other than fair market value.’ ” U.S. ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., No. 05 Civ. 5393(RPP), 2011 WL 1330542, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2011), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 734 F.3d 154 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6)). “[T]he [Statute] [also] outlaws ‘knowingly and willfully soliciting] or receiving] any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate)’ ‘in return for purchasing ... or recommending purchasing’ a drag covered by a federal health care program.” Kester, 23 F.Supp.3d at 262, 2014 WL 2324465, at *19 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(l)). “Thus, the [Statute] forbids offering, paying, soliciting, or receiving kickbacks in exchange for recommending drugs covered by [federal health care programs].” Id. “A 2010 amendment to the Anti-Kickback Statute, which became effective on January 1, 2011, states that a claim for services that violates the Anti-Kickback Statute also violates the FCA.” New York Soc., 2014 WL 3905742, at *10 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1320a~7b(g)). New York’s anti-kickback statute similarly provides that [n]o medical assistance provider shall: (a) solicit, receive, accept or agree to receive or accept any payment or other consideration in any form from another person to the extent such payment or other consideration is given: (i) for the referral of services for which payment is made under title eleven of article five of this chapter; or (ii) to purchase, lease or order any good, facility, service or item for which payment is made under title eleven of article five of this chapter; or (b) offer, agree to give or give any payment or other consideration in any form to another person to the extent such payment or other consideration is given: (i) for the referral of services for which payment is made under title eleven of article five of this chapter; or (ii) to purchase, lease or order any good, facility, service or item for which payment is made under title eleven of article five of this chapter[.] N.Y. Soe. Serv. Law § 366-d(2). A medical assistance provider is “any person, firm, partnership, group, association, fiduciary, employer or representative thereof or other entity who is furnishing care, services or supplies under” the New York Medicaid program. Id. § 366-d(l). b. The Government Entities Have Sufficiently Pled the Underlying Anti-Kickback Violations Here, the Government Entities allege that Novartis used sham speaker events as a vehicle to provide remuneration to doctors in order to induce them to write prescriptions for Novartis cardiovascular division drugs. As discussed above, both the United States and New York have described in their pleadings — in detail — how this scheme worked. {See, e.g., U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 1-2, 77; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 3, 65) They allege that Novartis hosted lavish events that— while ostensibly intended to “educate” attendees about Novartis cardiovascular division drugs — actually provided little to no information about the drugs. Instead, the events constituted upscale, all-expense paid social outings for the doctors, as evidenced by the fact that (1) Novartis sales representatives repeatedly invited the same participants and “speakers” to attend events concerning the same drug or topic in a short span of time; (2) Novartis spent exorbitant amounts of money on these events, both at the macro level and at the individual event level; (3) doctors were paid thousands of dollars to “speak” at these events, even when Novartis drugs were not discussed or the events did not take place; and (4) the events were held in venues that were not appropriate for their purported “educational” purpose, such as at crowded sports bars and restaurants, at Hooters restaurants, and on fishing trips. The Government Entities further claim that Novartis intended to use the sham speaker events to induce doctors to write more prescriptions for its cardiovascular division drugs. According to Plaintiffs, Novartis’s return-on-investment analyses revealed that this strategy was successful in inducing prescription-writing. Accordingly, Novartis used the sham speaker events as a key mechanism to promote its drugs. In doing so, Novartis allegedly violated its own internal policies governing speaker programs. Novartis also created incentives for its sales representative to hold more sham events, by basing representatives’ compensation on the number of prescriptions that doctors wrote and by turning a blind eye to the sham nature of the events. The Government Entities further allege that Novartis invited doctors to be speakers — and therefore receive additional compensation — based on the number of prescriptions they wrote for Novartis drugs, and that the doctors were aware of this practice. According to the Government Entities, the Novartis drugs that these doctors then prescribed in exchange for remuneration from Novartis were covered by federal and state healthcare programs, and claims for reimbursement for the prescriptions the doctors wrote were submitted to these programs. Both the Government’s Amended Complaint and the New York Complaint describe specific examples of alleged sham speaker events, as well as specific doctors who were repeat speakers or attendees. In particular, the United States lists twelve doctors who were paid as speakers by Novartis to give the same presentation to the same group of doctors over short periods of time. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 97-120) The Amended Complaint identifies the time period during which each doctor attended these speaker events, the name of the presentations, the number of repeat attendees, the doctor’s geographic location, and — for several of the speakers — the amount of compensation they received from Novartis. (See id.) The Amended Complaint also describes several additional “clusters” of doctors who repeatedly attended Novartis events on the same topic within a short period of time, and who exchanged roles as attendees and speakers at these events. The Government has also identified the geographic location of these events. (Id. ¶¶ 107, Ill, 114) The United States has also provided the dates and locations of two fishing trips that were allegedly speaker events; the dates and locations of seven Hooters “round table” events; the dates and locations of seventeen events at high-end restaurants that resulted in exorbitant bills (including the amount of the bills and, in some instances, the doctors who attended identified by initials); and the dates and locations of at least 22 events that were inaccurately reported by Novartis sales representatives, either because they were not held at all or because not all the doctors who reportedly attended actually attended. (Id. ¶¶ 121-44) The Amended Complaint also identifies at least ten doctors who began prescribing Novartis drugs, or increased their prescriptions for Novartis drugs, after attending speaker events and/or receiving honoraria for speaking at Novartis events, the time periods during which the doctors attended the events, and the change in their prescribing of Novartis cardiovascular division drugs during these time periods. (Id. ¶¶ 153-54, 157) The New York Complaint describes four New York doctors who were paid as speakers by Novartis to give the same presentation to the same doctors over a short period of time. (N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 84-85, 103-05, 110-11) The Complaint identifies the speakers, the names of the repeated presentations, the time frame during which the presentations were given, and the repeat attendees. (See id.) The New York Complaint also describes two lavish dinners Novartis hosted at upscale restaurants in New York City, listing the dates of the events, the number of attendees, and the restaurants. (See id. ¶¶ 89-90) The New York Complaint also describes two scheduled events that did not take place, but for which Novartis compensated the “speaker.” (Id. ¶ 93) Once again, New York has listed the date the event was supposed to occur, the speaker by name, and the compensation Novartis paid to the “speaker.” (See id.) New York’s Complaint also describes the increase in the prescription-writing of the four doctors who were attendees and/or speakers for Novartis speaker events during the time that these events were taking place, identifying the doctors by name, the dates of these events, the purported topics of these events, and the change in the number of prescriptions for Novartis drugs these doctors wrote compared to their earlier prescription-writing. (See id. ¶¶ 84-85, 100-01,103-16) Given these particularized examples and the specificity with which the pleadings describe the manner in which sham speaker events were conducted, the Government Entities have described the underlying kickback scheme with sufficient particularity to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b). c. The Representative Examples Set Forth in the Government Entities’ Complaints are Adequate to Plead the Underlying Anti-Kickback Violations Novartis argues that the facts the Government Entities have alleged are not sufficient to plead the underlying anti-kickback violations with sufficient particularity. Courts in this Circuit have repeatedly held, however, that “[i]n cases where the alleged fraudulent scheme is extensive and involves ‘numerous transactions that occurred over a long period of time, ... it [is] impractical to require the plaintiff to plead the specifics with respect to each and every instance of fraudulent conduct [to comply with Rule 9(b) ].’ Pleading the specifics of thousands of claims would be ‘cumbersome, unwieldy, and would accomplish no purpose.’ ” Kester, 23 F.Supp.3d at 258, 2014 WL 2324465, at *15 (quoting In re Cardiac Devices, 221 F.R.D. at 333, 338); see Mooney, 2013 WL 1346022, at *3 (“Courts in this Circuit have ... relaxed the pleading requirement ‘in cases involving complex fraudulent schemes or those occurring over a lengthy period of time(quoting U.S. ex rel. Tiesinga v. Dianon Sys., Inc., 231 F.R.D. 122, 123 (D.Conn.2005))). Rather, “in setting forth a ‘complex and far-reaching scheme’ the government need allege only ‘representative samples’ of fraudulent conduct to satisfy Rule 9(b).” United States v. Bank of New York Mellon, 941 F.Supp.2d 438, 481-82 (S.D.N.Y.2013). Here, the alleged kickback scheme took place over nine years and involved thousands of sham speaker events that took place nationwide. To require Plaintiffs to plead the details of every one of those events or every one of the doctors who was a speaker or attendee at those events would be “ ‘cumbersome, unwieldy, and would accomplish no purpose.’ ” Kester, 23 F.Supp.3d at 258, 2014 WL 2324465, at *15 (citation omitted). The doctors identified in the Amended Complaint and in the New York Complaint were either attendees or speakers at lavish Novartis speaker events for Novartis’s cardiovascular division drugs. At these events, no substantive presentation or discussion about Novartis drugs took place, but the doctors who were “speakers” were nonetheless compensated, while the same attendees repeatedly appeared at the same sham programs. During the time period that these doctors were being paid as “speakers” and/or enjoying lavish dinners, they wrote more prescriptions for Novartis’s cardiovascular division drugs. The drugs referenced in these prescriptions later became the subject of claims for reimbursement that were submitted to federal and New York healthcare programs. This Court concludes that the examples provided in the Government Entities’ complaints of the doctors who were “speakers” for or attended sham speaker events are sufficiently representative of the widespread kickback scheme to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b). See U.S. ex-rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Centers of Am., Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d 258, 267-68 (D.D.C.2002) (“The Fourth Amended complaint describes a twelve year fraudulent scheme in which [defendant] ran diabetes centers in various hospitals, and appointed doctors to serve as medical directors.... The hospitals in which the centers were housed paid DTCA a per-patient fee, which Relator alleges was a kickback of the type prohibited by the Anti-Kickback laws. Then the hospitals submitted reimbursement claims to Medicare for the care provided to the patients.... Here, Relator has set out a sufficiently ‘detailed description’ of the specific scheme and its ‘falsehoods.’ The time and place are alleged with less specificity, the time given is a twelve year range, and while the scheme is alleged to be nationwide the only specific place mentioned is West Paces Medical Center. The Court finds that this is sufficient. ...”). d. The Government Entities Rely on More than Internal Policies and Industry Standards to Demonstrate the Underlying Anti-Kickback Violations Novartis argues that the Government Entities have not sufficiently alleged the underlying kickback scheme because their pleadings cite Novartis’s internal policies and the PhRMA Code as evidence of what a proper speaker program should entail, and violations of internal policies are not sufficient to demonstrate an anti-kickback violation. (Def. MTD-U.S. Br. (Dkt. No. 80) at 11-12; Def. MTD-N.Y. Br. (Dkt. No. 82) at 9-10) This argument is merit-less. While the policies may bolster Plaintiffs’ argument that Novartis knew that the speaker events were improper and illegal, the Amended Complaint and the New York Complaint present facts that independently show the “sham” nature of the speaker events. These facts include the repeat attendance of the same doctors at the same speaker events over short periods of time; the fact that doctors were compensated for events that did not occur; the inappropriate venues where the events were held; the fact that speaker invitations were extended based on the number of prescriptions that a doctor had written for Novartis drugs; and the fact that the speaker events were nothing more than lavish social outings for doctors that involved no substantive discussion of Novartis drugs. Plaintiffs have alleged more than mere violations of internal policies; they have pleaded facts demonstrating that doctors violated the anti-kickback laws when they wrote prescriptions for Novartis cardiovascular division drugs— knowing that claims for reimbursement would be submitted in connection with those prescriptions — in exchange for “speaker” fees and the opportunity to attend lavish dinners and other social events, e. The Government Entities Have Sufficiently Pled Scienter for the Underlying Anti-Kickback Violations Novartis also argues that the Government Entities have not pled facts sufficient to adequately allege the requisite scienter for an anti-kickback violation. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Here, the Government Entities have -alleged that Novartis sales representatives provided compensation and lavish dinners to doctors in exchange for the doctors writing more prescriptions for Novartis drugs. The allegations in the pleadings also link the sales representatives’ conduct to Novartis’s senior management: the complaints allege that Novartis encouraged its sales representatives to host sham events by basing representatives’ compensation on doctors’ prescription-writing; by failing to monitor events; and by imposing no discipline when sales representatives were reported for non-compliance with Novartis policies and the anti-kickback laws. The pleadings further allege that Novartis’s Ethics and Compliance Policies— which were issued in 2003 and re-issued in January 2006 — describe the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute’s prohibition of bribes and kickbacks, and state that “[ijnterac-tions with Healthcare Professionals should be focused on providing information about [Novartis] products, providing scientific and educational information[,] and supporting medical research and education in venues that are conducive to such discussions.” (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶¶ 57-58; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶¶ 46-48) In instructing that speaker programs must be held at venues “conducive to an exchange of medical information,” Novartis’s policies provide that food and beverages should be “ancillary to meaningful discussion” and modest in quantity and cost. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 60; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 50) The policies also require speakers to make a presentation using slides provided by Novartis, and require at least three health care professionals and one sales representative to be present at every speaker program. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 62; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 61) ¶ 53) Novartis’s conduct — as alleged in the pleadings — violates each of these policies, raising a strong inference that Novartis acted knowingly and willfully in using the speaker events to induce prescription-writing in violation of the anti-kickback laws. Plaintiffs have also alleged that the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers ’ of America — a trade organization of which Novartis is a member — issued the PhRMA Code in 2004, and that Novartis is a signatory to and certified that it is in compliance with this Code. (U.S. Am. Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 62) ¶ 59; N.Y. Cmplt. (Dkt. No.