Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER JAMES O. BROWNING, District Judge. THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed March 7, 2014 (Doc. 35) (“Motion”). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on May 20, 2014, and May 21, 2014. The Court heard the parties’ arguments on the Motion on August 19, 2014. The primary issues are: (i) whether Defendant Jason Loera may seek suppression of the child pornography found on Loera’s laptop computer and compact discs (“CDs”); (ii) whether the Search and Seizure Warrant, issued November 19, 2012, submitted to the Court at the May 20, 2014, evidentiary hearing as Government’s Hearing Exhibit 9 (“First Warrant”), satisfies the particularity requirement in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America; (iii) whether Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Special Agent Aaron Cravens’ and Special Agent Brian Nishida’s on-site preview of Loera’s CDs during the execution of the First Warrant on November 20, 2012, was within the First Warrant’s scope; (iv) whether the agents conducted an unlawful search when they continued searching Loera’s CDs for evidence of computer fraud and electronic mail hijacking after they discovered child pornography; (v) whether the agents acted in good faith when they continued to search for evidence of computer fraud and electronic mail hijacking after discovering child pornography; (vi) whether Cravens was permitted to open files on .Loera’s CDs on November 27, 2012, for the limited purpose of providing a United States Magistrate Judge a description of four images depicting the sexual abuse of a child; (vii) whether, even if Cravens was not permitted to open the files on November 27, 2012, and even if those descriptions are excised from the affidavit in support of the Second Warrant, probable cause to issue the Search and Seizure Warrant (issued November 29, 2012), submitted to the Court at the May 20, 2014, evidentiary hearing as Government’s Hearing Exhibit 10 (“Second Warrant”) still exists; (viii) whether, even if the Second Warrant suffered from an incurable defect, Nishida relied on that warrant in good faith when he searched Loera’s CDs and laptop for child pornography; and (ix) whether, even if the Second Warrant contained an incurable defect and Nishida did not execute the Second Warrant in good faith, the agents inevitably would have discovered child por-, nography. The Court will deny the Motion. The Court concludes that Loera may seek suppression of the child pornography evidence, because he admitted that the CDs and laptop on which the agents discovered child pornography were within his control and possession when the agents seized them. ' The Court holds that the First Warrant satisfies the particularity requirement in the Fourth Amendment, because it limited the agents’ search to evidence of computer fraud and electronic mail hijacking. The Court concludes that the agents’ on-site preview of Loera’s CDs during the execution of the First Warrant on November 20, 2012, was within the warrant’s scope, because the warrant authorized the agents to open image and video files, and files with last modified and created'dates before July 29, 2011. The Court further holds that, while the Court is concerned with the soundness of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s law related to computer searches, under that law, which the Court, as a district court, must faithfully apply, the agents conducted an unlawful search when they continued searching for evidence of electronic mail hijacking and computer fraud on Loera’s CDs after they discovered child pornography. The Court concludes, however, that the agents acted in good faith when they did so. The Court holds that Cravens was not permitted to open files on Loera’s CDs on November 27, 2012, for the limited purpose of providing a United States Magistrate Judge a description of four images depicting the sexual abuse of a child. The Court concludes, however, that, even if Cravens was not permitted to open the files on November 27, 2012, and even if those descriptions are excised from the Affidavit in Support of an Application Under Rule 41 for a Warrant to Search and Seize (issued November 29, 2014), submitted to the Court at the May 20, 2014, evidentiary hearing as Government’s Hearing Exhibit 9 (“Second Affidavit”), probable cause to issue the Second Warrant still existed. The Court holds that, even if the Second Warrant suffered from an incurable defect, Nishida relied on that warrant in good faith when he searched Loera’s CDs and laptop for child pornography. Finally, the Court holds that, even if the Second Warrant contained an incurable defect and Nishida did not execute the second warrant in good faith, the agents inevitably would have discovered child pornography on Loera’s CDs and laptop. Accordingly, the Court will deny the Motion, and not exclude the child pornography evidence from the trial. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the Court to state its essential findings on the record when deciding a motion that involves factual issues. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(d) (‘When factual issues are involved in deciding a motion, the court must state its essential findings on the record.”). This Memorandum Opinion and Order’s findings of fact shall serve as the Court’s essential findings for rule 12(d) purposes. The Court makes these findings under the authority of rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires a judge to decide preliminary questions relating to the admissibility of evidence, including the legality of a search or seizure, and the voluntariness of an individual’s confession or consent to search. See United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1269-70 (10th Cir.1982) (“[Ujnder Rule[] 104(a) ..., the district court ‘is not bound by. the Rules of Evidence except those with respect to privilege.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 174, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974)). In deciding such preliminary questions, the other rulés of evidence, except those with respect to privileges, do not bind the Court. See Fed.R.Evid. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.”). Thus, the Court may consider hearsay in ruling on a motion to suppress. See United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d at 1269 (“The purpose of the suppression hearing was, of course, to determine preliminarily the admissibility of certain evidence allegedly obtained in violation of defendant’s rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In this type of hearing the judge had latitude to receive it, notwithstanding the hearsay rule.”); United States v. Garcia, 324 Fed.Appx. 705, 708 (10th Cir.2009) (unpublished) (“We need not resolve whether Crawford [v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)]’s protection of an accused’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right applies to suppression hearings, because even if we were to assume this protection does apply, we would conclude that the district court’s error cannot be adjudged ‘plain.’ ”); United States v. Ramirez, 388 Fed.Appx. 807, 810 (10th Cir.2010) (unpublished) (“It is beyond reasonable debate that Ramirez’s counsel were not ineffective in failing to make a Confrontation Clause challenge to the use of the confidential informant. The Supreme Court has not yet indicated whether the Confrontation Clause applies to hearsay statements made in suppression hearings.”). Cf. United States v. Hernandez, 778 F.Supp.2d 1211, 1226 (D.N.M.2011) (Browning, J.) (concluding “that Crawford v. Washington does not apply to detention hearings”). 1. The November 20, 2012 Searches. 1. On November 19, 2012, United States agents applied for a search warrant for Loera’s residence, seeking evidence that Loera committed computer fraud and hijacked electronic mail transmissions. See Application for Search Warrant at 1 (issued November 19, 2012), submitted to the Court at'the May 20, 2014, evidentiary hearing as Government’s Hearing Exhibit 9 (“First Application”). 2. The United States filed an affidavit in support of the First Application. See Affidavit in Support of an Application Under Rule 41 for a Warrant to Search and Seize (issued November 19, 2014), submitted to the Court at the May 20, 2014, evidentiary hearing as Government’s Hearing Exhibit 9 (“First Affidavit”). 3. The First Affidavit alleges that Lo-era possessed electronic mail transmissions intended for New Mexico Governor Susana Martinez and her staff that had been sent through Martinez’ gubernatorial campaign website, www.susana2010.com (“the Domain”). See First Affidavit ¶ 28 at 10. 4. The First Affidavit .states that one of Martinez’ supporters created the Domain on July 18, 2009, and registered the website for two years with the website hosting company GoDaddy.com (“GoDaddy”). See First Affidavit ¶ 5, at 2. 5. According to the First Affidavit, during the 2010 gubernatorial campaign, Martinez and her staff used the Domain to, among other purposes, communicate with each other and individuals outside of the campaign through electronic mail transmissions. See First Affidavit ¶ 6, at 2-3. 6. The First Affidavit alleges -that only the individual or individuals who had the Domain’s username and password could renew the Domain when it expired in July, 2011. See First Affidavit ¶ 7, at 3. 7. According to the First Affidavit, Jamie Estrada maintained the username and password for the Domain during Martinez’ 2010 gubernatorial campaign. See First Affidavit ¶ 8, at 3. 8. According to the First Affidavit, at some point before the election, Martinez discovered Estrada reading her electronic mail transmissions and removed him from the campaign. See First Affidavit ¶ 8, at 3. 9. The First Affidavit reports that, after Martinez was elected governor in November, 2010, Martinez and her staff continued to use the electronic mail accounts linked to the Domain. See First Affidavit ¶ 10, at 4. 10. The First Affidavit alleges that, on or about July 18, 2011, however, Martinez’ staff began receiving reports that electronic mail transmissions sent to their Domain addresses were not being delivered. See First Affidavit ¶ 10, at 4. 11. The First Affidavit states that Martinez’ staff determined that the electronic mail transmissions were not being delivered, because the Domain had expired. See First Affidavit ¶ 10, at 4. 12. According to the First Affidavit, Martinez’ staff tried to re-register the Domain, but none of the staff had the Domain’s username and password. See First Affidavit ¶ 11, at 4. 13. The First Affidavit states that Martinez’ staff contacted Estrada for the user-name and password, but Estrada refused to provide the information. See First Affidavit ¶ 12, at 4. 14. According to the First Affidavit, due to Estrada’s. refusal to provide the username and password, Martinez’ staff could not re-register the Domain. See First Affidavit ¶ 12, at 4. 15. The First Affidavit asserts that, after unsuccessfully attempting to re-register the Domain, Martinez and her staff transitioned to a new domain,' www. susanapac.com. See First Affidavit ¶ 13, at 4. 16. The First Affidavit states that, after this transition, Martinez and her staff believed that the Domain had expired and was no longer in use. See First Affidavit ¶ 13, at 5. 17. According to the First Affidavit, in or about June, 2012, local media outlets obtained and published an electronic mail transmission that was sent to Martinez’ Domain electronic mail account on or about May 2, 2012. See First Affidavit ¶ 14, at 5. 18. According to the First Affidavit, the release of this electronic mail transmission prompted Martinez and her staff “to believe that the Domain had not in fact expired, but was still being used by someone unaffiliated with Martinez’s organization.” First Affidavit ¶ 14, at 5. 19. The First Affidavit stated that, whoever re-registered the Domain was redirecting electronic mail transmissions to “another account unassociated with the Domain.” First Affidavit ¶ 14, at 5. 20. According to the First Affidavit, the United States learned that the Domain expired on July 18, 2011, that it had a forty-two day grace period thereafter, and that, on July 29, 2011, a GoDaddy account that listed “Sylvia Tacori” as the account-holder re-registered the Domain. See First Affidavit ¶¶ 16-17, at 6. 21. The First Affidavit stated that the address for the Tacori account belonged to a Chipotle restaurant. See First Affidavit ¶ 18, at 6. 22. The First Affidavit asserted that the United States could not identify anyone living in the United States with the name Sylvia Tacori. See First Affidavit ¶ 18, at 6. 23. The First Affidavit stated that, based in part on this information, the United States concluded that the Tacori account was “fictitious.” First Affidavit ¶ 18, at 6. 24. According to the First Affidavit, the Tacori account was created with a cellular telephone assigned to Estrada. See First Affidavit ¶ 20, at 7. 25. The First Affidavit states that, two days after the July 29, 2011, re-registration of the Domain, Estrada’s telephone logged into the Tacori account. See First Affidavit ¶ 20, at 7. 26. According to the First Affidavit, the United States learned of a July 15, 2012, electronic mail transmission from the electronic mail address OMMARRAVEN HERST@GMAIL.COM (“OMAR”) that contained information from Martinez’ electronic mail account at the Domain. See First Affidavit ¶ 21, at 7-8. 27. The First Affidavit states that, based in part on this information, the United States received a search warrant for the OMAR ■ account. See First Affidavit ¶ 22, at'8. 28. According to the First Affidavit, the execution of the OMAR search warrant “confirmed that the [OMAR] account did in fact contain numerous emails that were intended for Governor Martinez and her staff during the period of time the Domain is believed to have been comprised by the subject(s).” First Affidavit ¶ 23, at 8. 29. According to the First Affidavit, the United States discovered “several emails sent from the OMAR account to JASONLOERA@GMAIL.COM [ (“JA-SONLOERA”)] ... which included ... emails intended for Governor Martinez and/or her staff.” First Affidavit ¶ 26, at 9. 30. The First Affidavit alleges that the JASONLOERA account is registered to Loera and “is regularly accessed from the ... same IP address used to access the OMAR account.” First Affidavit ¶ 27, at 9-10. 31. The First Affidavit alleges that the IP address used to access the JASONLO-ERA and OMAR accounts is associated with Loera’s residence. See First Affidavit ¶ 27, at 10. 32. Consequently, on- November 19, 2012, FBI Special Agent Michael Boady secured a warrant to search Loera’s residence. See First Warrant at 1. 33. The First Warrant incorporated by reference Attachment B to the First Application (“Attachment B”). See First Warrant at 1. 34. Under ’“identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location,” the First Warrant states: “See Attachment B to affidavit in support of application, incorporated herein by reference.” First Warrant at 1. 35. Under “[t]he person or property to be searched, described above, is believed to conceal,” the First Warrant states: “See Attachment B to affidavit in support of application, incorporated herein by reference.” First Warrant at 1. 36. Attachment B details the scope of the First Warrant as follows: 1.All records, in any form, relating to violations of Title 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohibited) and Title 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Fraud and related activity in connection with Computers), involving Jason Loera or others including: a. .Usernames, passwords, and other account information for email accounts, Google Apps accounts, domain accounts, accounts for credit, debit, or gift cards, and online storage accounts; b. Records which are related to the use of computer programs to redirect email from one domain to . another; c. All records and/or communications related to the susana2010.com and susanapac.com domains or the intrusion thereof; d. All bank records, checks, credit or debit card bills, account information, and other financial records from June 2011 to the present. e. Records relating to the provision of internet and phone service; f. Records showing the technical or computer knowledge. 2. Any. computers, cell phones, and/or electronic media that could have been used as a means to commit the offenses described on the warrant. 3. For any computers, cell phones, tablets, computer hard drives, or other physical objects upon which computer data can be recorded/stored (hereinafter, “COMPUTER”) that is called for by this warrant, or that might contain things otherwise called for by this warrant: a. evidence of who used, owned’, or controlled the COMPUTER at the time the things described in the warrant were created, edited, or deleted, such as logs, registry entries, configuration files, saved usernames and passwords, documents, browsing history, user profiles, email, email contacts, “chat,” instant messaging logs, photographs, and correspondence; b. evidence of the attachment to the COMPUTER of other storage devices or similar containers for electronic evidence; c. evidence of the counter-forensic programs (and associated data) that are designed to eliminate data from the COMPUTER; d. evidence of the times the COMPUTER was used; e. passwords, encryption keys, and other access devices that may be necessary to access the COMPUTER or to conduct a forensic examination of the COMPUTER; f. documentation and manuals that may be necessary to access the COMPUTER or to conduct a forensic examination of the COMPUTER; g. contextual information necessary to understand the evidence described in this attachment. 4.Records and things evidencing the use of computers and/or the internet to commit the fraud activity described in the Search Warrant Affidavit, including: a. Routers, modems, and network equipment used to connect computers to the Internet; b. Records of Internet Protocol addresses used; c. Records of wireless internet connections d. Records of Internet activity, including firewall logs, caches, browser ■ history and cookies, “book-' marked” or “favorite” web pages, search terms that the user entered into any Internet search engine, and records of user-typed web addresses. As used above, the terms “records” and “information” include all of the foregoing items of evidence in whatever forms and by whatever means they may have been created or stored, including any form of computer or electronic storage (such as hard disks or other media that can store data); any handmade form (such as writing, drawing, painting); any mechanical form (such as printing or typing); and any photographic form (such as microfilm, microfiche, prints, slides, negatives, videotapes, motion pictures, or photocopies). 5. Any and all statements for bank accounts, which include transactions from June 1, 2011 to the present. 6. Any and all documents, printouts, hand written statements, electronic communications, and in whatever form related to the following: a. The Susaria2010.com domain b. Communications with GoDad-dy.com and DomainsByProxy.com c. The SusanaPAC.com domain d. The interception of emails related to the Susana2010.com Domain. 7. Any and all records in whatever form related to email accounts maintained, controlled or used in any manner by Jason Loera. Attachment B ¶¶ 1-7, at 2-5. 37. On November 20, 2012, FBI agents — including Cravens and Nishida— executed the First Warrant at Loera’s residence. See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 52:9-17 (taken May 20, 2014) (“May 20, 2014 Tr.”) (Cravens, Tuckman). 38. Cravens and Nishida understood that the purpose of the search was to find and seize evidence of electronic mail hijacking and computer fraud. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 53:7-11 (Cravens, Tuckman); id. at 152:6-8 (Nishida, Tuckman); id. at 160:5-11 (Nishida, Tuckman). 39. The FBI agents discovered a large volume of electronic media in Loera’s residence — including CDs, DVDs, laptop computers, external hard drives, a USB flash drive, an iPhone, and an iPad. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 154:22-155:1 (Nishida, Tuckman). • 40. Cravens and Nishida were responsible for “previewing” the CDs at Loera’s residence to determine if they contained evidence of electronic mail hijacking or computer fraud. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 57:23-58:6 (Cravens, Tuckman); id. at 153:14-154:6 (Nishida, Tuckman). 41. The purpose of previewing the CDs was to ensure that the FBI seized only CDs that contained information relevant to the investigation. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 57:24-58:6 (Cravens, Tuckman); id. at 68:23-69:11 (Cravens, Tuckman); id. at 155:8-24 (Nishida, Tuckman). 42. Cravens and Nishida split up the CDs between themselves and searched them separately. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 119:2-14 (Cravens, Serna). 43. Cravens initially tried to view the files on the CDs using a program called FTK Imager. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 58:18-22 (Cravens). 44. FTK Imager can be used to limit a CD or hard drive search to a particular type of file — i.e., to search for only image, text, or audio files. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 101:5-11 (Cravens, Serna). 45. When Cravens attempted to use the FTK Imager software on the first CD that he -found, however, it showed that the CD was empty. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 103:1-3 (Cravens, Serna). 46. Assuming that the FTK Imager software was malfunctioning, Cravens closed the software and opened the CD on his Windows desktop, which showed that the CD was not empty, but instead contained a number of files. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 58:18-25 (Cravens, Tuckman). 47. Cravens used the “thumbnail view” to preview the files — meaning that he saw small images of the files, the file names, and the file types. May 20, 2014 Tr. at 59:1-8 (Cravens, Tuckman). 48. Cravens “tr[ied] to use the thumbnails” to determine if the files contained relevant evidence, and he “clicked on anything that didn’t appear correct, or any documents.” May 20, 2014 Tr. at 92:6-11 (Cravens). 49. Although he tried to use the thumbnails to identify which CDs contained relevant evidence, Cravens believed that the First Warrant authorized him and Nishida “to go through the entire contents of the CDs.” May 20, 2014 Tr. at 92:9-11 (Cravens). 50. Cravens seized only CDs that contained “documents related to the Domain” and anything “that might have been'evidence of domain e-mail hijacking.” May 20, 2014 Tr. at 68:18-22 (Cravens). 51. While Cravens was “scrolling down through the images or files ... on the CDs, [he] found what looked like a nude child, and opened” up the file. May 20, 2014 Tr. at 60:5-7 (Cravens). 52. Cravens stated that, based on the thumbnail view, “it appeared to be a child pornography image,” but he “enlarge[d] it to confirm” that it was. May 20, 2014 Tr. at 139:12-17 (Cravens, Court). 53. Cravens viewed the first child pornography image for “under 30 seconds.” May 20, 2014 Tr. at 61:6-12 (Cravens, Tuckman). 54. After Cravens found the first child pornography image, he ejected the CD containing the image from his computer and set it aside. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 61:12-13 (Cravens). 55. Cravens did not write down a filen-ame or description of the first image. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 61:24-25 (Cravens, Tuckman). 56. After finding the first child pornography image, Cravens did not seek advice from an Assistant United States Attorney, a colleague, or a supervisor, whether he should obtain a search warrant for child pornography. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 115:16-25 (Cravens, Serna). 57. Instead, Cravens told Boady — the FBI special agent in charge of Loera’s ease — and Nishida that he had found child pornography, and continued to search for evidence of electronic mail hijacking and computer fraud. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 65:15-17 (Cravens, Tuckman); id. at 116:3-12 (Cravens, Serna); id. at 158:25-159:1 (Nishida, Tuckman). 58. Although he was not searching for more child pornography images after finding the first one, Cravens thought he might find more child pornography on Lo-era’s CDs. See May 20, 2014 Tr- at 65:10-17 (Cravens, Tuckman); id. at 66:1-4 (Cravens, Tuckman). 59. Cravens later found a child pornography image on a second CD. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 67:18-68:4 (Cravens, Tuck-man). 60. As he had done with the first CD, Cravens immediately set the,CD aside and did not open any other files on that CD. -See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 67:21-23 (Cravens, Tuckman). 61. Although he was searching for evidence of electronic mail hijacking or computer fraud, Cravens opened files that appeared to be images, because they “could have been a picture of a person or personal information, identifying information, or ... a screen shot of e-mail or domain hijacking, or it could have been a renamed file.... [T]he extension could have been different than what it actually was.” May 20, 2014 Tr. at 62:19-25 (Cravens). 62. Cravens explained that a text file can be changed to look like an image file by double-clicking the name of the file, and “changing] the name and the file extension.” May 20, 2014 Tr. at 63:6-8 (Cravens). 63. Cravens did not find, however, any electronic mail transmissions that were labeled to look like other files during his previewing of the CDs. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 130:17-21 (Cravens, Serna). 64. Although the subscriber account that was used to re-register the Domain was created in July, 2009, Cravens did not limit his search to files created after that date, because he believed that the file dates could have been changed or inaccurate. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 64:4-24 (Cravens, Tuekman). 65. As an example, Cravens explained that, if you change the date on your computer, “it would change all files created or modified after that, the dates would be different, and incorrect.” May 20, 2014 Tr. at 64:19-21 (Cravens). 66. Cravens was not aware, however, whether any of the dates of the files in the electronic media seized from Loera were modified. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 128:22-129:1 (Cravens, Serna). 67. Aside from the images on those two CDs, Cravens did not find any other child pornography images during the November 20, 2012, search. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 87:15 (Cravens); id. at 119:21-120:2 (Cravens, Serna). 68. When Nishida' began previewing the files on the CDs, he chose not to use a program called “Encase” to limit his search of the CDs to electronic mail transmissions, web pages, or internet history. See Transcript of Hearing at 242:3-25 (Ni-shida, Serna) (taken May 21, 2014) (“May 21, 2014 Tr.”). 69. Nishida also made a “conscious decision” to not use the FTK Imager software to preview the files, because he thought using Windows Explorer would be faster. May 20, 2014 Tr. at 209:19-22 (Nishida, Serna). See id. at 210:22-211:1 (Nishida, Serna). 70. The FBI also has software that that can determine whether a file’s contents do not match its listed extension— like a text file with an image extension— without opening the file itself; Nishida also did not use this program when he previewed the files on the CDs. See May 21, 2014 Tr. at 250:22-251:4 (Nishida, Ser-na); id. at •251:22-252:7 (Nishida, Serna). 71. Nishida previewed the files using the “details view” — meaning that he saw a list of files, file names, and last-modified dates of those files, but there were no pictures associated with the files. May 20, 2014 Tr. at 157:13-19 (Nishida, Tuekman). 72. Nishida described his procedure for previewing the files on the CDs as follows: I would put [CDs] in a laptop. I would open up Windows Explorer, and I would see what was on the CD. I would sample a few files. If it were, say, music files, I would verify that they were what they were labeled. And then I would set it aside. Same if I found the movie “The Wizard of Oz,” I would play it a little bit, see if it was “The Wizard of Oz,” and I would stop it and put it aside. May 20, 2014 Tr. at 156:19-157:2 (Nishida). 73. Nishida seized only CDs that contained files that appeared to be documents or that he could not immediately identify. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 158:13-19 (Nishi-da, Tuckman). 74. Nishida also discovered images of child pornography while previewing the files on the CDs. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 158:20-22 (Nishida, Tuckman). 75. After finding a child pornography image, Nishida opened two or three other files on that CD to determine if they contained evidence of computer fraud or electronic mail hijacking. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 161:17-162:18 (Nishida, Tuckman). 76. After finding the first child pornography image, Nishida continued to search for evidence of electronic mail hijacking and computer fraud. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 165:4-17 (Nishida, Tuckman). 77. Nishida did not limit his search to files that appeared to contain text, because image files could also contain evidence of electronic mail hijacking or computer fraud. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 163:2-22 (Nishida, Tuckman); id. at 249:11-20 (Ni-shida, Serna). 78. Nishida also did not limit his search to files created after July, 2009, because the First Warrant did not contain a date restriction, and because he believed that “there could easily be evidence of the crime that doesn’t fit in that data range.” May 20, 2014 Tr. at 164:8-11 (Nishida). 79. There are a number of ways in which individuals can change the dates of files on CDs: “[S]ome software will allow you to burn the date, use the dates that were on th.e hard drives for the files, or use a date that the CD was burned, or you could pick an arbitrary date and just type it in while you’re burning ... the CD.” May 20, 2014 Tr. at 219:19-24 (Nishida). 80. Nishida also found a second CD that contained child pornography images. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 87:15 (Cravens); id. at 119:21-120:2 (Cravens, Serna). 81. Nishida believes that neither he nor Cravens exceeded the scope of the First Warrant during their November 20, 2012, searches of Loera’s CDs. See May 21, 2014 Tr. at 253:19-21 (Nishida). 82. In total, the FBI found four CDs containing child pornography images during the November 20, 2012, search — two from Cravens and two from Nishida. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 70:20-22 (Cravens, Tuckman). 83. The FBI agents seized nine CDs containing evidence of electronic mail hijacking and computer fraud from Loera’s residence. See May 20, 2014 Tr.' at 70:23-71:7 (Cravens, Tuckman). 84. In addition to the thirteen CDs, FBI agents also seized several other items from Loera’s residence, including computers, external hard drives, an iPhone, and an iPad. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 39:24-40:8 (Tuckman). 2. The November 27, 2012 Searches. 85. On November 27, 2012, Cravens decided to obtain a search warrant to search the items seized from Loera’s residence for child pornography. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 72:5-12 (Cravens, Tuckman); id. at 140:13-16 (Cravens, Court). 86. Cravens thought that the affidavit in support of the search warrant should include a detailed description of one child pornography image from each of the four CDs on which he and Nishida had found child pornography during their initial preview of the CDs at Loera’s residence on November 20, 2012. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 72:1-4 (Cravens); id. at 72:21-22 (Cravens). 87. Consequently, Cravens obtained the four CDs on which he and Nishida had discovered child pornography from Boady, the Special Agent in charge of Loera’s case. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 71:19-25 (Cravens, Tuckman). 88. Cravens initially tried to preview the images on the first CD using the same FTK Imager software that he had unsuccessfully attempted to use at Loera’s residence on November 20, 2012. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 72:16-17 (Cravens). 89. The FTK software again showed that the CD did not contain any files. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 72:17-18 (Cravens). 90. Cravens, accordingly, stopped using the FTK software and opened the files on the CDs without it. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 72:17-22 (Cravens). 91. To find child pornography images that he could accurately describe in the affidavit, Cravens looked at several images — “more than just a couple” of images, but “[m]ost likely less than a dozen” — on each of the four CDs seized from Loera’s residence. May 20, 2014 Tr. at 143:6-16 (Cravens, Court). 92. That day, Cravens had the four CDs for a total of two-and-a-half hours, during which time he also drafted the Second Affidavit. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 74:10-21 (Cravens, Tuckman). 93. In the Second Affidavit, Cravens explained that: (i) he had been an FBI agent for eight years; (ii) his experience included investigations of “crimes against children on the Internet”; (iii) computers and electronic media — including CDs — are used in the child pornography industry; (iv) child pornography images were found on the four CDs seized from Loera’s residence; and (v) when he used the term “child pornography,” he meant “a visual depiction involving the use of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.” See Second Affidavit ¶¶ 2, 6, 8, 23-27, at 1-10. 94. Cravens stated, in the Second Affidavit, that he reviewed the four CDs seized from Loera’s residence on November 27, 2012. See Second Affidavit ¶ 22, at 9. 95. Based on his review of Loera’s CDs on November 27, 2012, Cravens provided a detailed description in the Second Affidavit of three still images and one video of child pornography that he found on Loera’s CDs. See Second Affidavit ¶¶ 23-27, at 8-9. 96. Before submitting his search warrant application to a United States Magistrate Judge, Cravens had John Anderson, the Assistant United States Attorney assigned to Loera’s case, review and approve the application, including the Second Affidavit. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 75:6-18 (Cravens, Tuckman). 97. On November 29, 2012, the Honorable W. Daniel Schneider, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of New Mexico, approved a search warrant to search the items seized from Loera’s residence for child pornography. See Second Warrant at 1; May 20, 2014 Tr. at 75:22-76:2 (Cravens, Tuckman). 3. The Laptop Searches. 98. On November 28, 2012, Nishida checked out the laptop seized from Loera’s residence from FBI evidence to conduct a search pursuant to the First Warrant. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 168:1-13 (Nishida, Tuckman). 99. Before a hard drive can be searched for evidence, it must first be “imaged” and “preprocessed.” See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 148:4-5 (Nishida); id. at 168:12-16 (Nishida, Tuckman). 100. The imaging process creates an exact copy of a hard drive. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 148:4-5 (Nishida). 101. Preprocessing then translates the hard drive data produced by the. imaging process from “a group of ones and zeros” into “a form that humans can actually understand.” May 20, 2014 Tr. at 168:12-16 (Nishida, Tuckman). 102. When Nishida conducts a computer search pursuant to a child pornography search warrant, he uses “child pornography hash sets” in the preprocessing procedure. May 20, 2014 Tr. at 169:3-11 (Ni-shida, Tuckman). 103. Child pornography hash sets filter the hard drive data to determine whether any of the child pornography images on the computer are of a known child pornography victim. See May 20, 2014 at 169:12-170:11 (Nishida, Tuckman). 104. Because Nishida was preprocess-ing the hard drive only for evidence of electronic mail hijacking and computer fraud pursuant to the First Warrant, however, he did not use the child pornography hash sets on November 28, 2012. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 169:10-11 (Nishida); id. at 170:12-23 (Nishida, Tuckman). 105. After conducting the initial pre-processing and imaging of the hard drive on Loera’s laptop on November 28, 2012, Nishida received the Second Warrant and the Second Affidavit. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 171:19-25 (Nishida, Tuckman). 106. Nishida did not think there was anything wrong with the Second Warrant. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 172:1-3 (Nishida, Tuckman). 107. Nishida did not review any of the data that the imaging and preprocessing procedures produced until after he received the Second Warrant. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 171:9-12 (Nishida, Tuckman). 108. Beginning in December, 2012, Nishida conducted a full examination of the hard drive data from Loera’s laptop for the evidence that the First Warrant and the Second Warrant sought. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 172:4-7 (Nishida, Tuekman); id. at 176:18-185:22 (Nishida, Tuekman). 109. During his search of the laptop seized from Loera’s residence, Nishida found: (i) numerous child pornography images 'in the “My Documents” folder; (ii) websites under the “Bookmarks” tab with titles such as “Jailbait Cam,” “Lot of preteens,” and “Lolita Danny"; (ni) a file on the desktop entitled “Allmyfiles.txt” that contained multiple references to child pornography, including — “llyo Maria Antonio,” “lOyo Kopia,” “14 yo-Lil-And-Girl-friend,” and “Spyeam 9yr Undress”; and (iv) another file on the desktop entitled “v.txt” that referenced a file named “Vicky lOyo Anal Pumped (33m52s).” May 20, 2014 Tr. at 181:12-185:24 (Nishida, -Tuck-man). See Jason Loera Dell User Movie CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, submitted to the Court at the May 20, 2014, evidentiary hearing as Government’s Hearing Exhibit 11 (“Loera Dell Movie”). 110. In total, Nishida found over 730 images and forty movies of child pornography on Loera’s laptop. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 186:22-25 (Nishida, Tuekman). 111. There were so many child'pornography images and movies on the laptop that, at some certain point, Nishida stopped counting them. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 186:25-187:5 (Nishida, Tuekman). 112. If Cravens had not obtained the Second Warrant, Nishida would not have searched the laptop for evidence of child pornography, but he would still have searched it for evidence of electronic mail hijacking and computer fraud pursuant to the First Warrant. See May 20, 2014 Tr. at 187:6-17 (Nishida, Tuekman). 113. While searching for evidence of electronic mail hijacking or computer fraud, Nishida would have clicked on electronic mail transmissions, internet history, internet cache, “Bookmarks,” and text files — including “My Documents,” “Allmy-files.txt” and “v.txt” — all of which either contained or referenced child pornography. May 20, 2014 Tr. at 187:18-188:21 (Nishi-da, Tuekman); Loera Dell Movie. 114. Nishida stated that, had he found child pornography images on the laptop during a search conducted solely .pursuant to First Warrant, he would have “alerted the case agent so that [he] could get a search warrant for child pornography.” May 20, 2014 Tr. at 189:8-11 (Nishida). 4. Nishida’s April, 2013, Searches of Loera’SuCDs. 115. On or about April 4, 2013, Boady asked Nishida to examine the four CDs seized from Loera’s residence for child pornography. See New Mexico Computer Forensics Laboratory Report of Examination at 1 (dated April 19, 2013), submitted to the Court at the May 20, 2014 evidentia-ry hearing as Government Exhibit 14 (“Apr. 19, 2013, Examination Report”). 116. At some point between April 4, 2013, and April 19, 2013, Nishida attempted to conduct, pursuant to the Second Warrant, a forensic examination for child pornography of the four CDs seized from Loera’s residence. See Apr. 19, 2013, Examination Report at 1. 117. As he had done with the hard drive from Loera’s laptop, Nishida first attempted to image — or create an exact copy of the data from — Loera’s CDs. See Apr. 19, 2013, Examination Report at 2; May 20, 2014 Tr. at 215:21-216:11 (Nishi-da, Serna). 118. Nishida was able to image only two of the four CDs seized from Loera’s residence, however, because two of the CDs “were scratched.” Apr. 19, 2013, Examination Report at 2; May 20, 2014 Tr. at 215:21-216:11 (Nishida, Serna). 119. Consequently, Nishida examined only those two CDs for child pornography. See Apr. 19, 2013, Examination Report at 2. 120. Nishida discovered approximately 330 images and two movies of suspected child pornography on the two CDs that he examined. See Apr. 19, 2013, Examination Report at 2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A federal grand jury indicted Loera on two counts of receipt of visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, allegedly occurring on September 6, 2009, and one count of possession of a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, allegedly occurring on February 20, 2010. See Indictment at 1-2, filed May 29, 2013 (Doc. 2). Early in 2014, a federal grand jury filed a superseding indictment that charged Lo-era with three counts of possession of material containing any visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, each allegedly occurring in November 20, 2012. See Superseding Indictment at 1-2, filed January 9, 2014 (Doc. 25) (“Superseding Indictment”). , Count I of the Superseding Indictment concerns the hard drive on Loera’s laptop, and counts 2 and 3 each concern a CD seized from Loera’s residence. See Superseding Indictment at 1-2. 1. Loera’s Motion. Loera filed the Motion on March 7, 2014. See Motion at 1; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress Evidence and Statements, filed March 7, 2014 (Doc. 36) - (“Memorandum”). Loera moves the Court, pursuant to rules 12(b)(3) and 41(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and pursuant to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, for an order suppressing the following evidence at trial: (i) all evidence seized from Loera’s effects pursuant to the United States’ illegal search at Loera’s residence on November 20, 2012; (ii) all evidence seized from Lo-era’s effects pursuant to the United States’ illegal search of Loera’s effects on November 27, 2012; (iii) all evidence seized as a result of the search warrant issued on November 29, 2012; and (iv) all other evidence, tangible or intangible resulting from any illegal searches of Loera’s effects on November 20, 2012, November 27, 2012, and December 7, 2012, and thereafter. See Motion at 1-2. Loera first argues that the First Warrant lacked particularity, because it failed to specify “ ‘as nearly as possible the distinguishing characteristics of the goods to be seized.’ ” Memorandum at 4 (quoting Cassady v. Goering, 567 F.3d 628, 635 (10th Cir.2009)). Loera next argues that the November 20, 2012, search of the CDs at his residence went beyond the scope of the First Warrant in three ways. See Memorandum at 2-6. First, Loera contends that the First Warrant did not authorize Nishida and Cravens to open images or videos. See Memorandum at 4. Loera says that the First Warrant limited the scope of the November 20, 2012, search to “evidence pertaining to ... unlawful interception of wire communications and fraud in relation to computers.” Memorandum at 4. In Loera’s view, the First Affidavit “contained no basis for probable cause to believe that evidence of wire fraud or unlawful interception of wire communications would be found in graphic image or video files.” Memorandum at 5 (citing United States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1157 (10th Cir.2006)). Second, Loera asserts that, because the First Affidavit alleged that the wire fraud and interception of wire communications began on July 29, 2011, the First Warrant authorized Cravens and Nishida to only open files created after that date. See Memorandum at 6. Third, Loera contends that the First Warrant did not authorize Cravens and Nishida to continue previewing the CDs after Cravens discovered child pornography. See Memorandum at 8-9 (citing United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir.1999)). By doing so, Loera argues, Nishida and Cravens “transformed the search warrant for evidence of ... wire fraud pertaining to Governor Martinez’s e-mails into a ‘general warrant’ and resulted in a general and illegal search of the four CDs.” Memorandum at 7. Loera next argues that the November 27, 2012, searches — Cravens’ search of the four CDs and Nishida’s search of Loera’s laptop — exceeded the scope of the First Warrant. See Memorandum at 10-11. Loera argues that “[t]hese ... searches for child pornography were not within the scope of the November 19 warrant for evidence of wire fraud and unlawful interception of electronic communications.” Memorandum at 11. Finally, Loera asserts that, because the November 20, 2012, and November 27, 2012, searches were unconstitutional, and Cravens relied on those searches to obtain the Second Warrant, the Court should suppress any evidence obtained through the execution of the Second Warrant as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Memorandum at 11. 2. The United States’Response. The United States filed a Response to the Motion on April 7, 2014. See United States’ Response to Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. 35), filed April 7, 2014 (Doc. 41) (“Response”). In its Response, the United States asks the Court to deny the Motion. See Response at 1. The United States first argues that Loera fails to establish the requisite standing to seek suppression of the child pornography, because he has not asserted a possessory interest in the evidence that he seeks to suppress. See Response at 6-7. The United States next asserts that, to the extent that Loera argues that the First Warrant was not sufficiently particularized, “it is worth noting that the Tenth Circuit has ‘adopted a somewhat forgiving stance’” when faced with particularity challenges to warrants authorizing computer searches. Response at 6 n.4 (quoting United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir.2006)). The United States argues that, a warrant authorizing a computer search is sufficiently particular if it is “limited to a search for evidence of a violation of a particular federal statute.” Response at 6 n. 4 (citing United States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1165 (10th Cir.2013)). The United States next contends that the November 20, 2012, search of the CDs at Loera’s residence was within the First Warrant’s scope. See Response at 6-10. The United States points out that the First Warrant “authorized agents to search and seize, among othér things, pictures that could be found on ‘physical objects upon which computer data can be recorded/stored,’ such as the CDs at issue here.” Response at 7 (quoting Attachment B ¶¶ 3, 3a., at 3). The United States also argues that the First Warrant authorized Nishida and Cravens to open files that appeared to be images and videos, because file names and extensions can be changed to conceal evidence. See Response at 7 n. 5. To support this contention, the United States quotes from United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir.2009), in which the United States Court of Appeals for, the Tenth Circuit stated: It is unrealistic to expect a warrant to prospectively restrict the scope of a search by directory, filename, or extension or to attempt to structure search methods — that process must remain dy-naixiic.... [I]llegal activity may not be advertised even in the privacy of one’s personal computer — it could be well coded or otherwise disguised. Response at 7 n. 5 (quoting United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1093-94) (internal quotation marks omitted). The United States next addresses Lo-era’s argument that Nishida and Cravens went beyond the scope of the First Warrant by continuing to search the CDs after finding child pornography. See Response at 8-9. The United States contends that Loera’s reliance on United States v. Carey for this argument is “misplaced.” Response at 8. The United States explains that, in United States v. Carey, after discovering child pornography, an officer abandoned his warrant-authorized search for drug-related evidence “to look for more child pornography,” and did not resume his original search for five hours. Response at 9 (quoting United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273) (internal quotation marks omitted). The United States argues that, unlike the officer in United States v. Carey, Nishida and Cravens did not abandon their warrant-authorized searches' after finding evidence of child pornography, but instead continued to search for evidence of electronic mail hijacking and computer fraud. See Response at 9 (citations omitted). The United States contends that this difference is significant, because the Honorable Bobby R. Baldock, Senior Judge on the Tenth Circuit, stated in his United States v. Carey concurrence that, “ ‘f the record showed that Detective Lewis had merely continued his [warrant-authorized] search for drug-related evidence, and, in doing so, continued to come across evidence of child pornography, I think a different result would be required.’ ” Response at 9 (alterations in Response but not source) (quoting United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1277) (Baldock, J., concurring). The United States argues that Cravens’ search of Loera’s CDs on November 27, 2012, was permissible. See Response at 10-11. .The United States concedes that, “[generally, law enforcement engaged in a lawful search who wish to abandon that search and begin a focused search for child pornography, need to obtain a search warrant before beginning a child pornography search.” See Response at 11 (citing, e.g., United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1094-95). The United States asserts, however, that Cravens’ “limited review of some files so that he could include a brief description in his affidavit did not rise to the .level of an unlawful search outside the scope of the First Warrant.” Response at 11. The United States argues that, even without Cravens’ description of the images and video that he saw on Loera’s CDs on November 27, 2012, the Second Affidavit included sufficient probable cause to obtain the Second Warrant. See Response at 14. The United States explains that Cravens stated in the Second Affidavit that: (i) he had been an FBI agent for eight years; (ii) his experience included investigations of “crimes against children on the Internet”; (iii) computers and electronic media — including CDs — are used in the child pornography industry; (iv) child pornography images were found on the four CDs seized from Loera’s residence; and (v) when he used the term “child pornography,” he meant “a visual depiction involving the use of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.” Response at 12-13 (citations omitted). The United States further asserts that the Tenth Circuit has recognized that the phrase “child pornography” has a generally understood meaning and referring to images of child pornography provides sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant. Response at 13 (citing, e.g., United States v. Haymond, 672 F.3d 948, 959 (10th Cir.2012); United States v. Cervini, 16 Fed.Appx. 865, 868 (10th Cir.2001)). The United States argues that, accordingly, the information in the Second Affidavit — even without descriptions of the images or videos on the CDs — established sufficient probable cause for Judge Schneider to issue the Second Warrant. See Response at 14. The United States argues that, even if the Court excises Cravens’ descriptions of the three images and one video from the Second Affidavit and finds that the Second Affidavit did not contain sufficient probable cause to obtain the Second Warrant, the Court should find that Nishida relied on the Second Warrant in good faith when he searched Loera’s laptop and CDs pursuant to the Second Warrant. See Response at 14-16. The United States explains that, under the good-faith exception, “evidence seized pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate later found invalid may still be admissible if the executing officer acted in objective good faith and with reasonable rebanee on the warrant.” Response at 14 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The United States as-' serts that Nishida searched Loera’s laptop and CDs for child pornography only after Judge Schneider issued the Second Warrant. See Response at 16. In the United States’ view, Nishida relied on Judge Schneider’s determination that probable cause existed to search those items “reasonably and in good faith.” Response at 16. The United States argues that, consequently, the Court should not suppress any evidence obtained through the execution of the Second Warrant. See Response at 16. ■ The United States contends that Cravens also acted in good faith in obtaining the Second Warrant. See Response at 15-16. The United States explains that, in the Second Affidavit, Cravens stated that he opened files on Loera’s CDs on November 27, 2012, to provide a description of the files in his search warrant affidavit. See Response at 16. The United States points out that Cravens had Mr. Anderson, an Assistant United States Attorney review his application for the Second Warrant, including the Second Affidavit. See Response at 4, 15. The United States argues that the Tenth Circuit has identified asking a lawyer to approve a search warrant application as one factor that indicates an officer acted in good faith in obtaining a warrant. See Response at 16 (citing United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (10th Cir.2009)). The United States contends that Cravens’ actions demonstrate that he “was trying to comply with the law,” and that his actions are “not enough to justify exclusion.” Response at 16. The United States further argues that none of the exceptions to the good-faith exception apply in this case. See Response at 16. The United States explains that the Supreme Court has recognized four situations in which the good-faith exception does not apply: (1) the issuing judge was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial role and failed to perform his neutral and detached role; (3) the affidavit issued to support the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) the warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Response at 15 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The United States argues that Judge Schneider was not misled by any falsehoods, and that he remained neutral and detached. See Response at 15. The United States further contends that the Second Affidavit “overwhelmingly” established probable cause and that there was nothing on the face of the Second Warrant which would lead Ni-shida to presume it was invalid. Response at 15. The United States asserts that, even if Cravens had not obtained the Second Warrant, Nishida would have inevitably discovered child pornography while searching the items seized from Loera’s residence pursuant to the First Warrant. See Response at 17. The United States contends that, “evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment should not be suppressed if agents inevitably would have discovered that evidence through lawful means.” Response at 17 (citing United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534, 540 (10th Cir.2014)). The United States argues that the inevitable discovery inquiry turns on the likelihood “that a warrant would have been issued and that the evidence would have been found pursuant to the warrant.” Response at 17 (quoting United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d at 541) (internal quotation marks omitted). The United States contends that Loera “had so much readily accessible child pornography on his electronic media that not only would agents have inevitably discovered the contraband while searching under the authority of the First Warrant, they would have done so ... in a matter of minutes.” Response at 17. The United States explained that, when Nishida searched Loera’s laptop, he quickly found several child pornography sites under the “Bookmarks” tab, a text file on the desktop that contained child pornography terms, and images of child pornography on the laptop itself. Response at 17. Once Nishida found that evidence, the United States contends, he would have obtained a search warrant authorizing a search for child pornography, because “that is exactly what [Cravens and Nishida] did.” Response at 18. The United States also argues that the four factors from United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir.2000), weigh in favor of finding inevitable discovery. See Response at 18. The United States explains that the United States v. Souza factors are: 1) the extent to which the warrant process has been completed at the time those seeking the warrant learn of the search; 2) the strength of the showing of probable cause at the time the search occurred; 3) whether a warrant ultimately was obtained, albeit after the illegal entry; and 4) evidence that the law enforcement agents “jumped the gun” because they lacked confidence in their showing of probable cause and wanted to force the issue by creating a fait ac-compli. Response at 18 (quoting United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d at 541). Addressing the first factor, the United States argues that the First Warrant and the Second Warrant were obtained before Nishida began searching for child pornography. See Response at 18. Turning to the second factor, the United States contends that the strength of the probable cause showing was “undeniably high” when Nishida searched Loera’s CDs and laptop, because Cravens and Nishida had personally viewed child pornography on the CDs on November 20, 2012. See Response at 18. Regarding the third factor, the United States says that Cravens obtained the Second Warrant and, had there been no Second Warrant, “there is no question that the FBI would have obtained a warrant authorizing a search for child pornography evidence once ... Nishida found such evidence” during his search under the First Warrant. Response at 19. As to the fourth factor, the United States contends that Nishida and Cravens did not “jump the gun,” but instead had “complete confidence that probable cause existed to support the issuance of a search warrant,” because Nishida waited until he obtained the Second Warrant to conduct the search. Response at 19. The United States concludes its inevitable discovery argument by stating that, “if the Court finds the Second Warrant to have been invalid, the evidence obtained from the search authorized by the warrant should not be suppressed as it inevitably would have been lawfully discovered.” Response at 19. 3. Loera’s Reply. Loera filed his Reply to the Response on April 12, 2014. See Defendant’s Reply to United States’ Response to Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed on April 12, 2014 (Doc. 45) (“Reply”). Loera addresses the United States’ standing argument by admitting that the CDs and laptop on which the agents discovered child pornography were in Loera’s control and possession when the agents seized them. See Reply at 1. Loera then reiterates the arguments that he made in his Motion and Memorandum. See Reply at 1-5. Moreover, Loera argues that Attachment B mentioned photographs, not as evidence of wire fraud or unlawful interception of electronic communications, but as “ ‘evidence of who used, owned, or controlled the COMPUTER at the time the things described in this warrant were created, edited, or deleted.’ ” Reply at 3 (quoting Attachment B ¶ 3.a., at 3). Loera next turns to the United States’ argument that the Second Warrant would be valid even without Cravens’ description of the three images and one movie that he found on Loera’s CDs. See Reply at 5-6. Loera contends that the resulting search warrant affidavit would read, “four writable CDs ... appeared to contain images of child pornography.” Reply at 5. In Lo-era’s view, “child pornography” is a “mere conclusory statement ]” that “cannot support probable cause.” Reply at 6. Loera contends that, accordingly, without the detailed description of the images and video that Cravens obtained from his Nove