Full opinion text
Re Document Nos.: 118, 131 MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AND TO STRIKE EXHIBITS RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge I. INTRODUCTION Felicia Martin, an employee of the District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Regulation Administration, brought this action against the District and her current and former superiors, asserting statutory and common-law claims arising out of alleged gender, disability, and age discrimination and retaliation. Before the Court are the defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary judgment (ECF No. 118), and Martin’s motion for sanctions and to strike exhibits in support of the defendants’ motion (ECF No. 131). Having reviewed the parties’ filings, the Court grants in part and denies in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, and denies Martin’s motion for sanctions and to strike exhibits. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Martin is a female aged forty-five at all times relevant to this case. See Am. Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 38; Defs.’ Statement of Facts ¶ 2, ECF No. 118-2. Since 2007, she has served as an Investigator in the Enforcement Division of the Alcoholic Beverage Regulation Administration (“AJBRA”). See Pl.’s Am. Statement of Facts ¶1, ECF No. 129; Martin Aff. ¶2, Pl.’s Ex. 74, ECF No. 128-74. ABRA is ^•an independent agency of the District of Columbia (“District” or “D.C.”) that assists the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (“ABC Board”) in the administration and enforcement of the District’s alcohol regulations. See D.C. Code §§ 25-201(c), 25-202. In furtherance of this mission, ABRA Investigators inspect, train, and advise establishments licensed to provide alcoholic beverages and prepare reports on potential regulatory violations for submission to the ABC Board. See Investigator job description, PL’s Ex. 62, ECF 128-62. A. Special Evaluation of ABRA by the D.C. Office of the Inspector General In 2007 and 2008, several complaints surfaced alleging that ABRA management improperly interfered with or altered investigative reports. See, e.g., Webb complaint, PL’s Ex. 6, ECF No. 128-6; Anonymous complaint, PL’s Ex. 9, ECF No. 128-9. In response, then-Director of ABRA Maria Delaney (“Delaney”) requested that the D.C. Office of the Inspector General (“DCOIG”) conduct a special evaluation of ABRA. See DCOIG Report Executive Summary 2, Defs.’ Ex. A, ECF No. 118-4. This evaluation commenced in June 2008 and concluded in April 2009. Id. Shortly after Delaney announced the forthcoming evaluation, she received an email from Martin asking for “ABRA’s contact person responsible for scheduling interviews with OIG.” Martin-Delaney emails of June 20, 2008, Pl.’s Ex. 18, ECF No. 128-18. Delaney replied, explaining that DCOIG would initiate any necessary interview scheduling. Delaney then forwarded her email exchange with Martin to ABRA Chief of Enforcement Johnnie E. Jackson (“Jackson”) with the note “Fyi.” Id. In late June 2008, a DCOIG Special Agent interviewed Martin to gather information regarding allegations that Delaney and Jackson had instructed ABRA staff to destroy evidence relevant to the DCOIG evaluation. Martin denied having been instructed to destroy documents. However, she reported that on several occasions in the past, Delaney had asked her to change reports citing certain licensees for infractions, and as proof, provided a draft report with Delaney’s comments. Martin alleged that Delaney was motivated by a personal association with the licensees that she sought to protect. See DCOIG Memorandum of Interview, Pl.’s Ex. 20, ECF No. 128-20. Additionally, Martin claimed that Delaney’s favoritism affected not only her reports, but those of all Investigators, who were expected to follow an “unwritten rule in ABRA” that certain licensees should be treated more leniently. Id. B. Denial of Promotion to Supervisory Investigator In July 2008, Martin sought a promotion to Supervisory Investigator, applying for one of two vacant positions. See Martin Aff. ¶ 7, PL’s Ex. 74; PL’s Am. Statement of Facts ¶ 34. In late October 2008, several Supervisory Investigator candidates were interviewed, but Martin was not among them. See Interview notes, PL’s Ex. 39, ECF No. 128-39. Days later, having heard about the interviews, Martin approached Jackson and asked why she had not been chosen. See Jackson email of Oct. 27, 2008, PL’s Ex. 40, ECF No. 128-40. He explained that because Martin had been promoted in May 2008 to a permanent Investigator position at the G-12 pay grade, Martin Aff. ¶ 3, PL’s Ex. 74, she did not have one year’s “time in grade” and was thus ineligible for the promotion, id. ¶ 16; Jackson Aff. ¶ 3, Defs.’ Ex. I, ECF No. 118-12. Jackson claims that in finding Martin to be ineligible, he relied on advice from the D.C. Department of Human Resources (“DCHR”). See Jackson Aff. ¶3, Defs.’ Ex. I. In late October 2008, the DCHR generated a Selection Certificate listing three individuals deemed eligible, and Martin’s name does not appear on that Certificate. See Selection Certificate, Defs.’ Ex. J, ECF No. 118-13. However, on at least one past occasion, ABRA management had attempted to fill a vacancy by first identifying the candidate it wished to hire, and then asking DCHR to place that candidate’s name on a Selection Certificate. See Farouk email of Feb. 15, 2008, PL’s Ex. 30, ECF No. 128-30. Among the candidates interviewed for the promotion in October 2008 were male Investigators Jermaine Matthews (“Matthews”) and Gregory Price (“Price”), whose names appeared on the Selection Certificate. See Interview notes, PL’s Ex. 39; Selection Certificate, Defs.’ Ex. J. Both Matthews and Price had less than one year’s time in grade: Matthews had been promoted in May 2008 to a full-time, DS-11 position, see Jackson email of May 21, 2008, PL’s Ex. 32, ECF No. 128-32, whereas Price had been employed with ABRA since February 2008, at the DS-11 pay grade, see Price appointment form, PL’s Ex. 31, ECF No. 128-31. In November 2008, Jackson announced that Price had been selected for the promotion to Supervisory Investigator, leaving only one position vacant. See Jackson email of Nov. 7, 2008, PL’s Ex. 41, ECF No. 128-41. Martin did not apply for the second position because Jackson had led her to believe that her first application would be considered for the other vacancy. See PL’s Am. Statement of Facts ¶ 46; Jackson email of Dec. 12, 2008, Pl.’s Ex. 43, ECF No. 128-43; Jackson Aff. ¶ 4, Defs.’ Ex. I. In late December 2008, Martin spoke with male Investigator Craig Selby Stewart (“Stewart”) at a celebration to mark his departure from ABRA. During their conversation, Martin learned that despite the fact that Stewart had also been ineligible under the time-in-grade rule for the Supervisory Investigator promotion, he had been offered the promotion, though he declined for personal reasons. See Martin Aff. ¶ 27, Pl.’s Ex. 74. Ultimately, in November 2009, two additional male Supervisory Investigators were selected — Matthews and Stewart, who by that time had re-joined ABRA. See Moosally email of Nov. 10, 2009, Pl.’s Ex. 53, ECF No. 128-53 (announcing promotions); Moosally email of Apr. 10, 2009, Pl.’s Ex. 47, ECF No. 12847 (announcing Stewart’s return to ABRA); Martin Aff. ¶52, PL’s Ex. 74. C. Denial of Volunteer Assignment as Relief Supervisory Investigator On several occasions, Martin was not selected for the volunteer position of Relief Supervisory Investigator, despite expressing interest. In July 2008, Martin volunteered to serve as Relief Supervisory Investigator upon the resignation of a former Supervisory Investigator. Jackson instead appointed Matthews. See Martin Aff. ¶ 5, PL’s Ex. 74. In September 2008, Jackson solicited volunteers to serve as Relief Supervisory Investigator, and Martin expressed her interest. See id. ¶ 9. Jackson instead selected Stewart. See Jackson email of Oct. 8, 2008, PL’s Ex. 37, ECF No. 128-37. In June 2009, Jackson again asked for volunteers, and Martin again responded affirmatively. See Martin-Jackson emails of June 10, 2009, PL’s Ex. 48, ECF No. 128-48. The next day, Jackson again selected Stewart. See Jackson email of June 11, 2009, PL’s Ex. 49, ECF No. 128-49. At the time, Stewart was either thirty-eight or thirty-nine years old. See DCOHR letter 3, Defs.’ Ex. E, ECF No. 118-8 (explaining that at time of the November 2009 promotion, Stewart was thirty-nine years old). In August 2009, Jackson asked Martin to serve as Relief Supervisory Investigator, but Martin declined on grounds that she did not wish to answer service calls after hours, as required by the position. See Jackson Aff. ¶ 5, Defs.’ Ex. I; Hollis Aff. ¶ 10, Defs.’ Ex. L, ECF No. 118-15. D. Denial of Other Volunteer Assignments Martin was also denied various other volunteer positions. In June 2008, Martin was selected to serve on a committee detailed to the 2009 Presidential Inauguration. See Jackson email of June 21, 2008, PL’s Ex. 54, ECF No. 128-54. However, Martin was removed from the committee after failing to have her photograph taken on a designated day in November 2008,as required for participation per certain security measures. See Martin-Jackson emails of Nov. 19-20, 2008, Defs.’ Ex. N, ECF No. 118-17; Jackson Aff. ¶6, Defs.’ Ex. I. Although there was a makeup appointment for taking the required photographs, Martin was unaware of anyone who had their photo taken on the make-up day. See Martin Dep. 89: 17-21, Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 118-5. In September 2008, Jackson asked for volunteers to serve as Training Coordinator, Fleet Coordinator, and Special Events Coordinator. See Martin-Jackson emails of Sept. 19-24, 2008, Pl.’s Ex. 56, ECF No. 128-56. These volunteers would take on additional duties to improve the Enforcement Division’s operations and would in turn gain management and leadership experience. See Martin Aff. ¶ 11, Pl.’s Ex. 74; Jackson Aff. ¶ 10, Defs.’ Ex. I. Jackson did not specify any selection criteria. See Martin-Jackson emails of Sept. 19-24, 2008, Pl.’s Ex. 56. Despite expressing interest in all three positions, Martin was not selected for any. See id.; Martin Aff. ¶ 11, Pl.’s Ex. 74. The two females selected as Training and Special Events Coordinators were under age forty, while the male selected as Fleet Coordinator was sixty-two years old. See PL’s Am. Statement of Facts ¶ 53. Also in September 2008, Jackson asked for volunteers to serve as Inaugural Liaison to help coordinate activities and submission of documents on behalf of ABRA’s detail for the 2009 Presidential Inauguration. Martin volunteered. See Martin-Jackson emails of Sept. 11, 2008, PL’s Ex. 55, ECF No. 128-55. Minutes later, however, Jackson announced that male Investigators Dwyne Shoemaker and Price would serve as the Liaisons. See id. E. Carpal Tunnel Syndrome In December 2008, Martin was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome, a condition that limits her ability to type. See Dr. Mody Letter, PL’s Ex. 59, ECF No. 128-59; Jackson memo, PL’s Ex. 60, ECF No. 128-60. Typing is a significant part of an Investigator’s job: Investigators must resolve virtually all complaints of regulatory violations by means of a written report, and Martin handled 96 to 162 cases per year. See Martin letter of Jan. 2, 2012, PL’s Ex. 62, ECF No. 128-62; Investigator job description, id. In December 2008, when Martin reported her condition to Jackson, he accused her of having a preexisting condition and of “dropping [her] injury in ABRA’s lap.” Martin Aff. ¶ 22, PL’s Ex. 74. ABRA then provided Martin with a cassette recorder “to be utilized to dictate her investigative reports,” though Martin had requested voice recognition software. Jackson memo, PL’s Ex. 60; Jackson memo, PL’s Ex. 59, ECF No. 12859; see also Defs.’ Statement of Facts ¶ 41. That same month, Jackson decided to divert cases away from Martin on the basis that she could no longer type. See Nickens Aff. ¶ 6, PL’s Ex. 58, ECF No. 58. By January 2009, Martin had no cases assigned to her, see Martin email of Jan. 8, 2009, PL’s Ex. 57, ECF No. 128-57, and this workload reduction persisted into August 2010, see Martin Aff. ¶ 90, PL’s Ex. 74 (“I did not have enough work to sustain me thru [sic] the 8 hour tour.”). Also in January 2009, Jackson instructed another Investigator to type Martin’s cases for her, though such duties would be additional to his normal work assignments. See Nick-ens Aff. ¶ 7, PL’s Ex. 58. Martin’s symptoms did not abate. In 2010, Martin inquired on several occasions about the availability of voice recognition software, explaining that the cassette recorder was of no help in sending emails on á daily basis. See Martin correspondence, PL’s Ex. 64, ECF No. 128-64. In July 2010, Supervisory Investigator Stewart confirmed to Martin that Jackson had declined to purchase the requested software and that she cohsequently had to use the cassette recorder. See Martin Aff. ¶ 84, Pl.’s Ex. 74. In early 2011, Martin underwent surgery for her condition and .attended occupational therapy sessions. See Medical records, Pl.’s Ex. 76, ECF No. 128-76. In September 2011, her doctor instructed her to limit working hours, computer usage, and other physical tasks such as lifting, standing, walking, sitting, and driving. See Dr. Mosely recommendations, Pl.’s Ex. 65, ECF No. 128-65. ABRA eventually provided Martin with voice recognition software in December 2011. Martin Dep. 33:17-18, Defs.’ Ex. Q, ECF No. 118-20; Defs.’ Statement of Facts ¶ 44. F. Denial of Overtime Pay In July 2009, Martin signed up to work an overtime shift. During the shift, she and other colleagues met Matthews, who was riding in a separate vehicle and at the time was serving as Relief Supervisory Investigator. Upon seeing the number of people on the shift, Matthews stated that he “was not paying overtime for ... five people” and that “one of [them] had to leave.” Martin Aff. ¶ 37, Pl.’s Ex. 74. However, no one departed, given that each ■believed that they had been properly approved to work. Id. Martin later learned that her name was not on the “overtime list” and that she would not be paid for the overtime hours. Id. According to Jackson, Martin had failed to obtain written advance approval by a Supervisory Investigator for her work on the overtime shift, per ABRA policy. See Jackson Aff. ¶ 8, Defs.’ Ex. I. G. Procedural History In November 2009, Martin met with ABRA’s internal Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) Officer to discuss the possibility of filing a discrimination complaint. Martin Aff. ¶ 54, PL’s Ex. 74. She subsequently filed an internal EEO complaint. See id. ¶ 57. In February 2010, Martin filed a formal charge alleging gender, disability, and age discrimination under the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code §§ 2-1401.01 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., with the D.C. Office of Human Rights (“DCOHR”) and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See Charges, PL’s Ex. 68, ECF No. 128-68. In July 2010, Martin filed with both agencies a separate retaliation complaint under the DCHRA and Title VII, alleging that she had suffered retaliation for her discrimination complaints. See id. In August 2010, the DCOHR issued a no-cause finding on Martin’s discrimination claims. See DCOHR letter, Defs.’ Ex. E; Martin Aff. ¶ 110, PL’s Ex. 74. In December 2010, Martin withdrew her retaliation complaint from the DCOHR administrative process. See Request for Withdrawal, Defs.’ Ex. F, ECF No. 118-9. In March 2011, Martin received a notice from the EEOC of the dismissal of her discrimination claims and of her right to file a lawsuit, explaining that the EEOC had adopted the findings of the DCOHR. See Compl. Ex. A, ECF No. 1-1. On June 9, 2011, Martin filed the instant action. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Her amended complaint asserts claims under Title VII; the DCHRA; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.) the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.) the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.) the D.C. Whistle-blower Protection Act (“DCWPA”), D.C.Code §§ 1-615.51 et seq.) and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1988”); along with other statutory and common law claims. See generally Am. Compl. In addition to the District, the amended complaint names as defendants various ABRA personnel in their individual capacities, including Jackson, Delaney, and Stewart, who by then was Martin’s direct supervisor. The other two individual defendants are Frederick Peter Moosally, III (“Moosally”), who had become ABRA Director in July 2009 after Delaney resigned, and former Chairman of the ABC Board Charles Brodsky (“Brodsky”). See generally Am. Compl. This Court subsequently dismissed or granted summary judgment on all claims against Brodsky. See Martin v. District of Columbia, 968 F.Supp.2d 159, 161 (D.D.C.2013) (ECF No. 99). Accordingly, the remaining defendants are the District, Moosally, Jackson, Stewart, and Delaney (collectively “Defendants”). During the pendency of this litigation, in March 2012, Martin filed a second retaliation complaint with the DCOHR and EEOC, alleging retaliation for both this lawsuit and her earlier discrimination complaints. See Charge, Defs.’ Ex. G, ECF No. 118-10. In May 2014, the DCOHR issued a no-cause finding on this retaliation claim. See DCOHR letter, Defs.’ Ex. H, ECF No. 118-11. Subsequently, Defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment on Martin’s outstanding claims. See ECF No. 118. After Martin filed her opposition and Defendants replied, Martin moved for sanctions and to strike certain exhibits in support of Defendants’ motion, alleging that Defendants had failed to disclose those exhibits during discovery, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1). See ECF No. 131. Both motions are now ripe for adjudication. III. LEGAL STANDARDS Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) provides that a party who “fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e) ... is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion ..., unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A court need not accept as true a plaintiffs legal conclusions or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party moving for summary judgment bears the “initial responsibility” of demonstrating “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 328, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In response, the non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324,106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a genuine issue exists, a court must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence; rather, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). IV. ANALYSIS Martin’s remaining claims are those brought against the District (All Counts); against Moosally (Counts Four, Five, Seven, Eight, Nine, Eleven, and Twelve); and against Jackson, Stewart, and Delaney (Counts Four, Five, Eight, Nine, Eleven, and Twelve). Defendants have moved to dismiss or for summary judgment on all of these counts. Martin has moved for sanctions and to strike exhibits in support of Defendants’ motion. Because the disposition of Martin’s motion could potentially affect the Court’s assessment of Defendants’ motion, the Court addresses Martin’s motion first. A. Martin’s Motion for Sanctions and to Strike Exhibits Martin moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) to strike certain ex-Mbits in support of Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, and for other sanctions as this Court deems appropriate. See Pl.’s Mot. Sanctions & Strike Exs., ECF No. 131. Martin contends that the exhibits at issue were not disclosed by Defendants as required by Rule 26(a)(1), and that Rule 37(c) sanctions are warranted because the failure to disclose was not harmless. See id. at 7-8; Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c). Defendants concede that they failed to file their Rule '26(a)(1) initial disclosure but argue that Martin’s motion is untimely and, alternatively, that the lack of disclosure was harmless. See Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Sanctions 1-3, ECF No. 132. The Court declines to strike exhibits or impose any sanctions. First, Martin’s motion was not timely. “The timeliness of a [Rule 37(c) ] motion for sanctions depends on such factors as when the movant learned of the discovery violation, how long he waited before bringing it to the court’s attention, and whether discovery has been completed.” Long v. Howard Univ., 561 F.Supp.2d 85, 91 (D.D.C.2008). Here, Martin learned of the discovery violation in April 2012 and waited over two years — until after discovery had closed (and after summary judgment briefing had concluded) — to move for sanctions. See Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Sanctions 2. Moreover, Martin has failed to establish that Defendants’ discovery violation prejudiced her. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (authorizing exclusion of undisclosed evidence “unless the failure [to disclose] ... is harmless”). As Defendants explain, most of the exhibits that Martin seeks to strike were produced during discovery by Martin herself. Of the three exhibits that were not, only one was not produced during discovery by Defendants — the no-cause finding determination sent to Martin from the DCOHR. See DCOHR letter, Defs.’ Ex. H. This omission is understandable: The letter, dated May 14, 2014, did not exist when discovery closed in February 2014. See id.; Minute Order of Jan. 28, 2014 (extending discovery deadline to February 28, 2014). Furthermore, the letter was addressed to Martin, who presumably was fully aware of its content before Defendants filed it as a supporting exhibit. See DCOHR letter, Defs.’ Ex. H. Martin’s only concrete assertion of prejudice is that she was unable to examine Jackson about his affidavit because she allegedly did not receive the affidavit prior to his deposition. See Pl.’s Mot. Sanctions & Strike Exs. 8 (citing Wannall v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 26, 36 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that party was prejudiced “by being unable to cross-examine [expert witness] about his new opinions” disclosed only after discovery)). Martin’s contention is unfounded: She possessed a copy of the Jackson affidavit prior to discovery, as she subsequently produced it to Defendants. Moreover, in their discovery responses, Defendants also provided Martin with a copy of the same affidavit. See Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Sanctions 3. Accordingly, the Court denies Martin’s motion for sanctions and to strike exhibits in support of Defendants’ motion. B. Disparate Treatment on the Basis of Gender in Violation of Title VII, of Disability in Violation of the ADA, and of Age in Violation of the ADEA (Counts One, Five, and Ten) Martin alleges that the District discriminated against her on the basis of her gender, disability, and age, in violation of Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, respectively. Because her claims of gender, disability, and age discrimination are premised on many of the same factual allegations related to promotion, training, work assignments, volunteer opportunities, overtime pay, and other work benefits, the Court proceeds by analyzing each set of factual allegations under the relevant legal theories. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 119-23, 139 — 41, 197-200. 1. Legal Framework for Disparate-Treatment Discrimination under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual “because of such individual’s ... sex....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), (2). Such discrimination includes “failing] or refus[ing] to hire ... any individual, or otherwise ... discriminating] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” or “limiting] ... his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee....” Id. Where a Title VII plaintiff proffers “only indirect evidence” of discrimination, courts apply the three-part burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286, 1292 (D.C.Cir.2003). Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination; the employer then must articulate a legitimate, nondiseriminatory reason for its action; and finally, the plaintiff must show that the employer’s reason was a pretextual cover for discrimination. 411 U.S. 792, 802-805, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). A plaintiff “makes out a prima facie case of disparate-treatment discrimination by establishing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C.Cir.2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of a failure to hire or promote, an inference of discrimination can be established by a plaintiff’s elimination of “the two most common legitimate reasons ... to reject a job applicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought.” Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n. 44, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)). Where a plaintiff has suffered an “adverse employment action” and her employer asserts a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for the alleged discrimination, the district court must forgo the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C.Cir.2008). Instead, at summary judgment, “the district court must resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of ... sex ... ?” Id. A plaintiff can demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason was “not the actual reason” by “produc[ing] evidence suggesting that the employer treated other employees of a different ... sex ... more favorably in the same factual circumstances” or by showing that the employer “is making up or lying about the underlying facts.... ” Id. at 495. “If the employer’s stated belief about the underlying facts is reasonable in light of the evidence, however, there ordinarily is no basis for permitting a jury to conclude that the employer is lying about the underlying facts.” Id. (citing George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 415 (D.C.Cir.2005) (“[A]n employer’s action may be justified by a reasonable belief in the validity of the reason given even though that reason may turn out to be false.”)). Under Brady, the prima facie case still plays a role under certain circumstances. Where an employer offers no nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, a plaintiff must still make out a prima facie case. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 494 n. 2 (explaining that prima facie case still “matters” where “defendant does not assert any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision”). Additionally, when a plaintiff successfully demonstrates that an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason is “not the actual reason,” the plaintiff must still show that “the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of ... sex ... [.]” Id. at 494. In deciding this latter -issue, “courts since Brady have used evidence from the prima facie case (without deciding whether there is one or not) as well as evidence of pretext....” Pederson v. Mills, 686 F.Supp.2d 78, 82 n. 2 (D.D.C.2009) (explaining that Brady “broaden[ed]” the summary judgment inquiry); see also Evans v. District of Columbia, 754 F.Supp.2d 30, 44 (D.D.C.2010) (“The evidence to consider [in resolving Brady’s, central inquiry] includes (1) the plaintiffs prima facie case, (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation, and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff.”). Under Section 102 of the ADA, “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability ih regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The EEOC regulations elaborate on the scope of such discrimination, prohibiting discrimination “in regard to ... promotion, ... [j]ob assignments, ... training, ... [and] [a]ny other term, condition, or privilege of employment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(a)(l)(ii), (iv), (vii), (ix). To make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must show that “he had a disability within the meaning of the ADA, that he was ‘qualified’ for the position with or without a reasonable accommodation, and that he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability.” Swanks v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C.Cir.1999). The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual “because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (2). As with Title VII, such discrimination includes “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire ... any individual, or otherwise discriminating] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” or “limiting] ... his employees ... in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.... ” Id. To establish a failure-to-hire prima facie case under the ADEA, the plaintiff must show that “(1) she is a member of the protected class (i.e., over 40 years of age); (2) she was qualified for the position for which she applied; (3) she was not hired; and (4) she was disadvantaged in favor of a younger person.” Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1155 (D.C.Cir.2004); see also 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (providing that ADEA protects individuals “who are at least 40 years of age”). “The fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of Ms age.” O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). However, an inference of discrimination cannot be drawn from the fact that a plaintiff lost out to an “insignificantly younger” individual. Id. at 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307. The Brady framework governs ADEA and ADA disparate-treatment discrimination claims. See Barnett v. PA Consulting Grp., Inc., 715 F.3d 354, 358 (D.C.Cir.2013) (ADEA); Adeyemi v. District of Columbia, 525 F.3d 1222, 1226 (D.C.Cir.2008) (ADA). That is, “[o]nce an employer has offered a legitimate reason for an [adverse employment action], the question at the summary judgment stage is whether the employee has produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of ... age” or disability. Barnett, 715 F.3d at 358 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 2. Reduction in Work Assignments In Count Five, Martin alleges that her work assignments were reduced on account of her carpal tunnel syndrome, in violation of the ADA. See Am. Compl. ¶ 141. In Count One, Martin asserts that her gender was also a basis for discrimination as to her “work assignments,” in violation of Title VII. See Am. Compl. ¶ 120. At the outset, the Court dismisses the ADA claim — Count Five — as to defendants Moosally, Jackson, Stewart, and Delaney. As the Court explained in dismissing the same count against Brodsky, “[t]here is no liability under the ADA for a person in his individual capacity.” Martin, 968 F.Supp.2d at 166 (citing CookeSeals v. District of Columbia, 973 F.Supp. 184, 186-87 (D.D.C.1997)). As with Brodsky, the amended complaint names Moosally, Jackson, Stewart, and Delaney as defendants only in their “individual capacities].” See Am. Compl. 1-2. Thus, the District is the only remaining defendant in Count Five. a. Disability Discrimination under the ADA In its motion, the District neither asserts a nondiscriminatory reason for Martin’s workload reduction, nor contests record evidence that the reduction was motivated by Martin’s carpal tunnel syndrome and that it lasted at least through August 2010. See Nickens Aff. ¶ 6, PL’s Ex. 58 (“[Jackson] stated that if [Martin] could not type she could not get any cases.”); Martin Aff. ¶¶ 29, 90, Pl.’s Ex. 74; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(a)(l)(iv) (prohibiting discrimination as to “job assignments”). Rather, the District attacks Martin’s prima facie case, contending that Martin’s carpal tunnel syndrome did not constitute a “disability” under the ADA. See Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss & Summ. J. 17. The ADA provides that no covered entity shall “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability....” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A “qualified individual” means “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position-” Id. § 12111(8). The term “disability” refers to, among other things, “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” id. § 12102(1)(A), and “major life activities” include tasks such as “performing manual tasks, ... lifting, ... communicating, and working,” id. § 12102(2)(A). In contending that Martin’s carpal tunnel syndrome cannot constitute a disability, the District invokes a Ninth Circuit opinion for the proposition that typing does not qualify as a “major life activity.” Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss & Summ. J. 17 (citing Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 292 F.3d 1045, 1046 (9th Cir.2002)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). That Ninth Circuit decision in turn relied on Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002), in which the Supreme Court explained that “to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks” — one category of “major life activity” provided in the statute — “an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance in most people’s daily lives.” Thornton, 292 F.3d at 1046 (quoting Williams, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681). Subsequently, however, Congress expressly rejected the Williams Court’s narrow interpretation of “disability” under the ADA, as explained in the “Findings and Purposes” section of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAA”). See ADAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(4), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008). As amended, the ADA expressly provides that the term “disability” “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals.... ” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). Similarly, “substantially limits” must be “interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of the [ADAA],” and an impairment need substantially limit only one major life activity to qualify as a disability. Id. § 12102(4)(B), (C). The amended regulations provide that “substantially limits” is “not meant to be a demanding standard,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i), and shall be construed “to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard” that predated the ADAA, id. § 1630.2(j)(l)(iv). Similarly, “major life activity” must neither be read to “create a demanding standard” nor be defined “by reference to whether it is of ‘central importance to daily life.’ ” Id. § 1630.2(i)(2). In light of the ADAA’s broad definition of “disability,” the Court concludes that the District has failed to demonstrate that Martin lacked a “disability” as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Martin has produced a December 2008 letter from her doctor advising her against typing for three months. See Dr. Mody letter, Pl.’s Ex. 59. Her problems did not subside after three months; in 2010, Martin inquired on several occasions about the availability of voice recognition software. Martin correspondence, Pl.’s Ex. 64. In September 2011, after Martin had undergone surgery and occupational therapy, her doctor instructed her to limit working hours to four hours per day and computer usage to one hour per day; to avoid grasping, pushing, and pulling; and to observe weight limits for lifting and time limits for standing, walking, sitting, and driving. See Dr. Mosely recommendations, PL’s Ex. 65. On this record, a jury could find that when Jackson decided to reduce her workload, Martin had a “physical ... impairment that substantially limit[ed]” the major life activity of “working” insofar as her job required typing. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), (2)(A). A jury could also find that in 2011, her condition limited several other major life activities, including “manual tasks, ... walking, standing, lifting, ..., [and] communicating.” Id. Based on these findings, a jury could conclude that Martin was an individual with a “disability,” especially in light of the statutory instruction that “disability” should be interpreted “in favor of broad coverage of individuals.” Id. § 12102(4)(A). The Court takes additional guidance from Congress’s intent that “the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis,” and that courts should instead focus on determining whether defendants “have complied with their obligations” under the ADA. ADAA, Pub. L. No. 110325, § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008). Because there remains a dispute of material fact as to whether carpal tunnel syndrome is a “disability,” the District is not entitled to summary judgment on Martin’s disability-based discrimination claim in Count Five. b. Gender Discrimination under Title VII Martin asserts in Count One that her gender was also a basis for discrimination as to her “work assignments,” in violation of Title VII. See Am. Compl. ¶ 120. Although the District moves generally for summary judgment on all disparate-treatment claims in Count One, see Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss & Summ. J. 9, it does not address the “work assignments” claim in its motion — neither offering a nondiscriminatory reason nor attacking Martin’s pri-ma facie case. Nonetheless, to proceed, Martin still must establish the elements of a prima facie case. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 494 n. 2. A plaintiff asserting a Title VII gender-discrimination claim “makes out a prima facie case of disparate-treatment discrimination by establishing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (8) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Czekalski, 475 F.3d at 364 (internal quotation marks omitted). The first prong is satisfied, as Martin is a female protected by Title VII. The second prong would not bar Martin’s claim either: Her evidence establishes that the reduction in her workload was substantial and lasted into 2010. See Martin Aff. ¶ 90, Pl.’s Ex. 74; cf. Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 903 (D.C.Cir.2006) (holding that “precipitous reduction in the complexity of [plaintiffs] work and the substantial amount of time it took to correct these deficiencies” constituted adverse employment action as to Title VII retaliation claim). The third prong of the Title VII disparate-treatment prima facie case is that “the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination,” Czekalski, 475 F.3d at 364, which inference a plaintiff can establish by eliminating “the two most common legitimate reasons ... to reject a job applicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought,” Stella, 284 F.3d at 145. Here, Martin’s evidence could support a finding that she was still qualified to handle her normal workload, despite her inability to type for three months. See Dr. Mody letter, Pl.’s Ex. 59 (advising against keyboard use for three months); Jackson memo, id. (“[W]here [Martin] is working with another ABRA investigator and they observe a violation, the other investigator is to take the lead and prepare the report.”). Furthermore, there was no absence of a job “vacancy,” since Martin’s cases were simply reassigned to her colleague. See Nickens Aff. ¶ 6, PL’s Ex. 58. Because Martin’s evidence rules out “the two most common legitimate reasons” for reducing her workload, she has made out a prima facie case for her claim that the reduction was based on her gender. Accordingly, the Court dismisses all claims in Count Five as to defendants Moosally, Jackson, Stewart, and Delaney. The Court denies summary judgment on Counts One and Five as to Martin’s claim against the District that, on account of her gender and disability, respectively, she suffered the disparate treatment of a reduced workload. 3. Denial of Promotion to Supervisory Investigator Martin alleges that she was denied a promotion to Supervisory Investigator on the basis of her gender, disability, and age. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-28, 119-23, 139-45, 197-200. In response, the District proffers a nondiscriminatory reason for the denial: ABRA was advised by the DCHR that Martin was ineligible for the promotion under the “time-in-grade” rule because she had occupied her current position for less than one year. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss & Summ. J. 10 (citing Jackson Aff. ¶ 3, Defs.’ Ex. I). As evidence of the DCHR’s guidance, the District cites a Selection Certifícate listing three individuals deemed eligible for the promotion — not including Martin. See id. at 10-11 (citing Selection Certificate, Defs.’ Ex. J). In arguing that the District’s reason was pretextual, Martin does not contend that she was eligible for promotion under the time-in-grade rule. Indeed, she effectively concedes that she did not have one year’s time in grade. See Pl.’s Am. Statement of Facts ¶ 38 (stating that interviewee “also” had less than one year’s time in grade). Nor does she challenge the facial validity of the time-in-grade rule or its applicability to her. Rather, Martin submits that a jury could find the District’s reason to be pretextual on the basis of evidence that ABRA management interviewed, extended offers to, and ultimately promoted Investigators who also failed to satisfy the time-in-grade rule. The Court agrees with Martin: Based on this record, a jury could conclude that ABRA did not “honestly and reasonably believ[e]” that its time-in-grade rule was a valid basis for refusing to consider Martin. Brady, 520 F.3d at 496 (emphasis omitted); id. at 495 n. 3 (explaining that finding that proffered reason was “not the actual reason” can be established by showing “inconsistencies in the stated reasons for the adverse action”). When an employer cites a facially nondiscriminatory policy as a reason for an adverse employment action, the plaintiff can undermine that reason by showing that the policy is waived or applied more leniently to a similarly situated employee. In Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, Mungin, an attorney hired laterally by the Katten law firm, alleged that because of his race, his starting salary was lower than that of other sixth-year associates. 116 F.3d 1549, 1554 (D.C.Cir.1997). Katten’s nondiscriminatory reason was that under the firm’s policy, all lateral hires were paid less — in an amount between the associate’s former salary and the salary of current Katten associates. Id. On appeal, Mungin contended that the firm’s reason was pre-textual because it “never demonstrated that such a policy was ever consistently and systematically enforced,” citing the higher salaries of white sixth-year associates. Id. But the D.C. Circuit disagreed, explaining that Mungin had compared his pay only to that of “homegrown” associates and had failed to identify any “nearly identical” lateral hires “to whom this policy was not enforced.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike Mungin, Martin has identified “nearly identical” colleagues who were treated more favorably in spite of the time-in-grade rule. Id. at 1554. Martin’s evidence suggests that three colleagues— Price, Matthews, and Stewart — were, like her, ineligible under the time-in-grade rule at the time they sought promotions to Supervisory Investigator. Yet unlike her, they were interviewed and, in the case of Stewart and Price, actually promoted. This inconsistency suggests that even if the time-in-grade rule was formally in effect, it was not “consistently and systematically enforced.” Id. The inquiry cannot end here, however, because as the District correctly notes, a plaintiff must do more than show the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason to be “false”: She must demonstrate that the employer’s action is not “justified by a reasonable belief in the validity of the reason given....” George, 407 F.3d at 415 (emphasis added). Indeed, “it is the perception of the decision maker which is relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.” Vatel v. Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., 627 F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C.Cir.2011) (citation omitted). The District claims that ABRA management reasonably relied on the DCHR’s Selection Certificate, even if the Certificate was inaccurate. See Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss & Summ. J. ■ 10-11 (“DCHR, not ABRA, selected the candidates who were qualified for the position and should be interviewed.”). The Certificate purports to identify three individuals eligible for the promotion, and Martin was not among them. See Selection Certificate, Defs.’ Ex. J. However, the Court concludes that the Selection Certificate is unavailing and, in fact, bolsters Martin’s argument that the time-in-grade rule was “not the actual reason” for ABRA’s action. Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. In short, Martin has introduced evidence sufficient for a jury to conclude that the Selection Certificate is not the binding guidance the District makes it out to be. First, Martin’s evidence suggests that on at least one past occasion, ABRA management attempted to fill a vacancy by first identifying the candidate it wished to hire, and then asking the DCHR to place that candidate’s name on a Selection Certificate. See Farouk email of Feb. 15, 2008, PL’s Ex. 30. This procedure suggests that the Selection Certificate is a mere formality, that ABRA management— not DCHR — decides which employees to promote, and that the notion of “eligibility” is subject to manipulation. Second, although the Selection Certificate here appears to bear a list of eligible employees, the Certificate was dated October 31, 2008, and Martin has produced interview notes dating from October 24, 2008. See Selection Certificate, Defs.’ Ex. J; Interview notes, Pl.’s Ex. 39. The fact that interviews took place before the Selection Certificate’s issuance further supports an inference that ABRA management was not bound by names listed therein. Moreover, the Certificate, viewed in the light most favorable to Martin, appears to contravene the District’s own policies for waiver of the time-in-grade rule, further suggesting that the rule was not consistently enforced. Under District Personnel Manual Instruction No. 859, each job candidate appearing on a Selection Certificate who is ineligible under the time-in-grade rule must be marked with an asterisk, accompanied by an explanation of time-in-grade waiver procedures. See DPM Instruction No. 8-59 § 6(c), D.C. Department of Human Resources, http://dchr.dc. gov/publication/issuance-i-8-59 (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). Both Matthews and Price are listed on the Certificate, and if both men were ineligible under the time-in-grade rule (as Martin’s evidence suggests), then asterisks should have appeared by their names with the relevant explanation. See Selection Certificate, Defs.’ Ex. J. There are no such asterisks or explanations, and the Court concludes that this absence could further suggest that the time-in-grade rule was not rigorously or consistently enforced. Thus, Martin has proffered sufficient evidence that could support a jury finding that ABRA’s action was not “justified by a reasonable belief in the validity of the reason given.” George, 407 F.3d at 415. Having concluded that Martin’s evidence could show that the District’s nondiscriminatory reason was “not the actual reason” for its action, the Court must now ask whether the evidence could also show that “the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee” on the unlawful basis. Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. Accordingly, the Court reviews holistically Martin’s evidence of discrimination supporting her claims of disparate treatment based on gender, disability, and age. See Evans, 754 F.Supp.2d at 44 (examining evidence for pretext, prima facie case, and any “further evidence of discrimination”). a. Gender Discrimination under Title VII Martin’s evidence could support a jury finding that ABRA “intentionally discriminated” against her on the basis of her gender. Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. In addition to Martin’s evidence supporting a prima facie case, she has introduced “further evidence of discrimination.” See Evans, 754 F.Supp.2d at 44. As to the evidence of a prima facie case, the District does not dispute that Martin is a member of a protected class and that the denial of the promotion was an adverse employment action. Likewise, a jury could draw an inference of discrimination because Martin’s evidence does not establish either her “absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought.” See Stella, 284 F.3d at 145. The Supervisory Investigator position was vacant when Martin applied in 2008, and the District’s only claim that Martin lacked “qualifications” — that she was ineligible under the time-in-grade rule — has not stood up to Martin’s evidence that this explanation was not the “actual reason” for ABRA’s decision. Brady, 520 F.3d at 494; id. at 496 n. 4 (“[Discrediting an employer’s asserted reason is often quite probative of discrimination.” (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000))). There is also indirect evidence of discriminatory animus in the form of later statements made by Jackson. In August 2009, Jackson told Martin’s colleague that he should be “ashamed ... for being codependent on a ‘[wjoman’ ” — Martin. Nickens Aff. ¶ 8, Pl.’s Ex. 58. Moreover, in October 2009, Jackson stated that he was hiring “four ... new male [Investigators” to “ ‘balance’ out the ‘mess’ in the office.” Id. ¶ 10; see also Martin Aff. ¶ 46, Pl.’s Ex. 74 (“Chief Jackson added that they were older males, so that they could balance out the office.”). Considering the “totality of the circumstances of the case,” the Court concludes that the District is not entitled to summary judgment on Martin’s gender discrimination claim as to her denial of the promotion to Supervisory Investigator. Evans, 754 F.Supp.2d at 44 (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097). b. Disability Discrimination under the ADA Martin has not shown that ABRA “intentionally discriminated against [her] on the basis of [her disability]” by denying her the promotion, Brady, 520 F.3d at 494, because she has not proffered evidence that she had a “disability” at the time of the denial, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Swanks, 179 F.3d at 934. Martin was allegedly denied the promotion in October 2008, when ABRA officials allegedly declined to invite her to interview. See Jackson email of Oct. 27, 2008, Pl.’s Ex. 40; Martin Aff. ¶ 16, PL’s Ex. 74 (explaining that on October 1, 2008, Martin learned from Jackson and Delaney that she was ineligible for the promotion). But not until November 7, 2008, did she experience the initial numbness in her hand that prompted her later doctor’s visit and carpal tunnel syndrome diagnosis in December 2008. See Martin Aff. ¶ 20, Pl.’s Ex. 74; Mody letter, Pl.’s Ex. 59. Thus, the District is entitled to summary judgment on Martin’s claim of disability discrimination as to the denied promotion. c. Age Discrimination under the ADEA An ADEA plaintiff must establish as part of her prima facie case that she was “disadvantaged in favor of a younger person.” Teneyck, 365 F.3d at 1155. An inference of discrimination cannot be drawn from the fact that a plaintiff lost out to another individual who was “insignificantly younger.” O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307. Martin has neither alleged that Price is younger than she is nor proffered any evidence of his age. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the District is entitled to summary judgment on Martin’s claim of age discrimination as to the denied promotion. The Court grants the motion for summary judgment on Counts Five and Ten as to Martin’s claims that she was denied the promotion to Supervisory Investigator on the basis of her disability and age, respectively. The Court denies the motion for summary judgment on Count One as to the claim that this denial was based on gender. 4. Denial of Relief Supervisory Investigator Assignment Martin alleges that she was denied the opportunity in June 2009 to serve as a Relief Supervisory Investigator on the basis of her gender, disability, and age. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24-25, 119-23, 139-45, 197-200. The District fails to assert any nondiscriminatory reason for Martin’s loss of this opportunity. Because the District offers no nondiscriminatory reason, the Court must determine whether Martin has made out a prima facie case. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 494 n. 2. a. Gender Discrimination under Title VII As explained above, a Title VII plaintiff “makes out a prima facie case of disparate-treatment discrimination by establishing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Czekalski 475 F.3d at 364 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The first prong is easily satisfied, as Martin is a female protected under Title VII. Likewise, the third prong is no obstacle: A jury could draw an “inference of discrimination” because the record rules out “the two most common legitimate reasons” for denying an opportunity — “absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy....” Stella, 284 F.3d at 145 (citation omitted). The District’s own evidence establishes that all Investigators were qualified to serve as Relief Supervisory Investigator, and the District does not deny that Martin was presented with such an opportunity in June 2009. Jackson Aff. ¶ 5, Defs.’ Ex. I. The remaining question for Martin’s prima facie case is whether the June 2009 denial of an opportunity to serve as Relief Supervisory Investigator constitutes an “adverse employment action.” Such an action must result in “materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm.” Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C.Cir.2009); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Certain decisions are “conclusively presumed to be adverse employment actions” because they directly impact employment status — hiring, firing, failing to promote, and reassignment with significantly different responsibilities. Id. at 552-53. By contrast, when a plaintiff challenges an employment action “that do[es] not obviously result in a significant change in employment status ... [she] must go the further step of demonstrating how the decision nonetheless caused ... an objectively tangible harm.” Id. at 553. To inflict objectively tangible harm, the “denial of a training opportunity” must cause a “material change in [one’s] employment conditions, status or benefits.” Casey v. Mains, 878 F.Supp.2d 175, 184 (D.D.C.2012) (quoting Lester v. Natsios, 290 F.Supp.2d 11, 29 (D.D.C.2003)). Actionable harm resulting from lost training can consist of “a failure to promote or a loss of career advancement opportunities.” Trachtenberg v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of New York, 937 F.Supp.2d 460, 468 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (citations omitted). Put differently, denial of training that is a “stepping-stone” for advancement is an adverse employment action. Cruz v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 13-cv-1335, 2014 WL 2547541, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2014). The Court concludes that Martin’s evidence is sufficient to support a finding of “objectively tangible harm” because it suggests that the volunteer Relief Supervisory Investigator position was a “steppingstone” for promotion to Supervisory Investigator, see Cruz, 2014 WL 2547541, at *5, and that she had thus been denied tangible “career advancement opportunities,” Trachtenberg, 937 F.Supp.2d at 468. The crux of this inquiry is the materiality of the management training afforded by service as Relief Supervisory Investigator. Martin asserts that Matthews and Stewart, who were promoted to Supervisory Investigator, both “served in volunteer positions with similar duties.... ” Am. Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n 9. Martin contends that a jury could find that the loss of these volunteer opportunities “harmed her future employment opportunities and competitive promotional opportunities within [ABRA].” Id. Martin’s inferences find support in her proffered evidence. First, the career paths of the three individuals promoted to Supervisory Investigator all included a period of service as Relief Supervisory Investigator. Stewart and Matthews, both promoted in November 2009, had both previously served as Relief Supervisory Investigator, as did Price, who was promoted in November 2008. Cf. Casey, 878 F.Supp.2d at 184 (dismissing denial-of-training claim on basis that plaintiffs contention that training would have “increased her potential for career advancement” was “pure speculation”). Second, record evidence suggests that the position of Relief Supervisory Investigator was seen as a form of career advancement itself. An individual who was removed in 2007 from his service as Acting Supervisory Investigator protested the action as a “demotion.” See Coward email of Dec. 7, 2007, PL’s Ex. 29, ECF No. 128-29. Jackson himself, in a 2008 email soliciting volunteers for the position, asked Investigators to respond “if [they] would like to be considered to participate in the management program as a Relief Supervisor or Acting Supervisory Investigator.” Jackson email of Sept. 10, 2008, Defs.’ Ex. K, EOF No. 118-14 (emphasis added). In short, the evidence could lead a jury to conclude that the Relief S