Full opinion text
Memorandum Opinion. And Order Manish S. Shah, United States District Judge Melissa Callahan is a taxicab driver in Chicago. She obtained her license to drive a taxicab in 2007, and drove fall time between January 2009 and August 2011. Callahan asserts that, during that period, she was unable to earn the minimum wage as defined by the Fair Labor Standards Act ($7.25 per hour) or by the Illinois Minimum Wage Law ($8.25 per hour). In 2012, Callahan sued the City of Chicago, claiming: (1) that the City was her employer under these statutes; and (2) that it violated those laws by failing to pay her the required minimum wages. The City moves for summary judgment on Counts IV and V of Callahan’s amended complaint. Callahan cross-moves for summary judgment on the same counts. The City of Chicago closely regulates the taxicab industry. It licenses both the owners and drivers of cabs, sets maximum rates charged to consumers, and sets standards for drivers’ conduct and appearance, among other things. The City also benefits from taxis working within its borders. The City requires much from those who would operate taxicabs, but the City has not gone so far as to employ the individual lessees who drive them — the City regulates, but it does not provide the business to which cabdrivers render service. As a result, the City was not Callahan’s employer under the FLSA or IMWL, and is not liable to her for any wages. To prevail on a minimum-wage claim under the FLSA or IMWL, a plaintiff must prove not only that the defendant was her employer, but that she was not in fact paid the minimum wage. On this latter front, Callahan has not produced admissible evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer much, if anything, about her hourly income and whether it fell below the applicable minimum. Her own calculations are premised on inadmissible evidence and speculation. Consequently, Callahan cannot defeat the City’s motion for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, the City’s motion is granted, and Callahan’s motion is denied. I. Legal Standard Summary judgment may be granted where “there is no genuine issue of material fact and ... the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hussey v. Milwaukee Cnty., 740 F.3d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir.2014) (quoting Jackson v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. 204, 653 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir.2011)). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 547 (7th Cir.2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). In reviewing a summary-judgment motion or a cross-motion for summary judgment, a court construes all facts, and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts, in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 768 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir.2014) (quoting Laskin v. Siegel, 728 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir.2013)). II. Facts A. Licensing and Regulation of Taxicabs The Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection is an executive department of the City of Chicago. See Municipal .Code of Chicago § 2-25-020. Among the powers and responsibilities of the department is to review and process applications for city business licenses. See id. § 2-25-050(b). Pursuant to this power, the department issues on behalf of the City approximately 49 types of business licenses, including licenses concerning pub-lie-passenger vehicles such as taxicabs. See [122] at 2 ¶ 5. Before a taxicab may be operated in Chicago, the taxicab generally must be licensed by the City through the department. See MCC § 9-112-020. A taxicab medallion is a metal plate, provided by the City, to be affixed to the outside of a cab as a physical representation of a license to operate that vehicle as a taxicab. See [122] at 8-9. ¶ 24; see also MCC § 9-112-010. Medallion licensees, or medallion holders, often form medallion-holder associations, or “taxicab affiliations.” See [122] at 8-9. ¶ 24. Yellow Cab and American United, for example, are well-known taxicab affiliations. See id. “Affiliates” are the members of a taxicab affiliation. See id. Licensed taxicabs must have certain features and equipment. See, e.g., MCC § 9-112-140 (required safety features); id. § 9-112-510 (required taximeter equipment). They are also subject to inspection at the direction of the department commissioner. See id. § 9-112-050. Failure to follow the rules and regulations governing medallion holders may subject those owners to fines, or to suspension or revocation of their taxicab license(s). See id. § 9-112-370(b); see also Taxicab Medallion License Holder Rules and Regulations (July 1, 2012) (“2012 Medallion Holder Rules”), [121-29] at 27-28 (Rule TX17.02); Rules and Regulations for Taxicab Medallion License Holders (May 1, 2008) (“2008 Medallion Holder Rules”), [121-22] at 51 (Rule 15.02). From time to time, the City of Chicago holds auctions for taxicab medallions. See [142] at 7 ¶ 22; see also MCC § 9-112-480. The average price of a medallion in 2007 was $63,781. See [142] at 7 ¶ 21. As of 2013, the minimum bid at auction was $360,000. See id. 122. Medallion holders may transfer their medallions to others. See MCC § 9-112430(d). In 2013, the average market value for a medallion transfer was more than $348,000. See [142] at 7 ¶ 20. When a medallion is transferred, the transferee must pay to the City a transfer fee, which ranges from 5 to 25 percent of the transfer price depending on certain factors (such as when the transferor acquired the medallion). See MCC § 9-112-430(g). Medallion owners who instead choose to keep their medallions and renew those taxicab licenses must pay a renewal fee. See id. § 9-112-150; see also 2012 Medallion Holder Rules, [121-28] at 7-8 (Rule TX2.04(d)); 2008 Medallion Holder Rules, [121-22] at 38 (Rule 9.04(3)). Newly-issued medallions are subject to a licensing fee, as well. See MCC § 9-112-150. B. Licensing and Regulation of Public Chauffeurs Chicago taxicabs may be operated only by licensed chauffeurs. See MCC §§ 9104-020, 9-112-260. To obtain a public chauffeur’s license in Chicago, the applicant must satisfy certain criteria, including: (1) they must have a valid Illinois State driver’s license; (2) they must be at least 21 years old; (3) they must be able to speak, read, and write English; (4) they cannot have certain medical conditions, such as epilepsy; and (5) they must have successfully completed a mandatory training course. See id. § 9-104-030(2). The commissioner is tasked with providing (or “eausfing] to be offered”) such training courses, which may be done in “contract with the city colleges.” Id. § 9-104-030(7). A licensed public chauffeur is not obligated to use her license, and so may take extended absences from driving if she wishes. See [148] at 2 ¶ 4; id. at 8 ¶ 15. However, to the extent a chauffeur does elect to use her license, she is subject to various rules and regulations governing her conduct. Regulations concerning a public chauffeur’s conduct are set forth in the City’s Municipal Code, see MCC § 9104-060 et seq., and in a series of rules promulgated by the department, see Public Chauffeurs Rules and Regulations (as amended December 3, 2012), [121-14], For example, public chauffeurs must operate their vehicles safely and be “courteous to passengers ... and other drivers,” id. at 20 (Rules CH5.08(a), (d)). They must also remain “clean and neat in their appearance at all times,” id. at 22 (Rule CH5.09). Appearing clean and neat includes wearing the proper attire — a shirt or blouse with sleeves, see id. If a passenger has left personal belongings in the taxicab, the driver must bring the items within 24 hours to the lost-and-found office of her taxicab affiliation, or to the nearest police department if the driver is operating an unaffiliated cab. See id. (Rule CH5.10). Chauffeurs’ driving hours are also regulated to a certain extent. For example, current regulations prevent drivers from operating a taxicab for more than 12 consecutive hours in a 24-hour period. See [148] at 7 ¶ 13 (citing MCC § 9-112-250). While in service, chauffeurs cannot leave their cabs unattended. See [121-14] at 20 (Rule CH5. 06). The rules and regulations also address how a chauffeur may accept passengers, drive passengers to their destinations, and collect fares. For example, if the driver’s taxicab is “for hire,” she must agree to transport “any person ... to any destination” unless certain exceptions apply (e.g., the driver is on her way to pick up a passenger who phoned in a taxicab request). Id. at 18 (Rule CH5.02(a)). If the request for cab service came directly to the driver through a radio-dispatch call made by her taxicab affiliation, she must respond to that call. See id. at 19 (Rule CH5.03). Drivers who have leased their cabs from an affiliation also have an affirmative duty to respond to dispatch calls requesting cab service for passengers in “underserved areas” at least once during a lease of 24 hours or fewer (or at least 7 times during a weekly lease). See id. at 25 (Rule CH6.01(a)). If the chauffeur would like to attempt to find passengers using a cab stand (or in the vicinity of one), she must follow certain rules — e.g., she must go to the back end of the line if using the stand. See id. at 17 (Rule CH5.01). Once the driver has accepted a passenger, she must take the passenger to their destination “by the most direct route.” Id. at 19-20 (Rule CH5.04(c)); see also id. at 33 (Rule CH11.02). Accordingly, drivers must know — or must have reference materials “immediately available” in order to determine — what that route is. Id. at 19 (Rule CH5.04(b)). Maximum fare rates are prescribed by the City, and are set forth in the Municipal Code. See MCC § 9-112-600(a). Drivers cannot charge more than the maximum permitted fare rate. See id. § 9-112-600(b);. see also [121-14] at 34 (Rule CH11.05). Passengers may pay their fares using any form of legal tender, including credit cards. See [121-14] at 34 (Rule CH11.06(a)). Members of the public may alert the City to potential violations of these rules and regulations by dialing “311.” See [142] at 4-5 ¶ 15. Rule violations can subject public chauffeurs to various penalties, including fines, or suspension or revocation of their chauffeur’s license. See, e.g., MCC §§ 9-104-040(a), 9-104-140; see also [12114] at 46 (Rule CH16.02) (“first offenses” may subject a driver to fines between $75 and $750, while “repeated” or “aggravated” offenses may subject a driver to fines between $200 and $750). Before any such penalty may be imposed, however, the driver must be notified, and an administrative hearing provided upon written request. See MCC § 9-104-040(c). Licensed taxicab drivers are also subject to special transportation-related taxes. The Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority Airport Departure Tax is imposed on cab drivers and other drivers licensed by the City to provide ground transportation for hire. See [142] at 13 ¶ 35; [121-7] at 4. Taxicab drivers who pick up passengers from either of Chicago’s major airports (O’Hare and Midway) must buy corresponding MPEA “tax stamps.” [122] at 10 ¶ 31. C. Administrative Fees, Lease Rates, and Income To obtain a public chauffeur’s license, an applicant must pay a licensing fee. See [121-14] at 10 (RuleCH1.15); MCC § 9-104-070 ($15.00 for an “original” chauffeur’s license). First-time applicants must also complete a mandatory training course, as described above, and may be required to pay tuition for that course, see [122] at 1 ¶ 2. Licenses may be renewed for an additional fee ($8.00 per renewal application). See MCC § 9-104-070. The City does not own any taxicabs. See [122] at 9 ¶26. If a licensed public chauffeur wants to drive a taxicab but does not herself own a licensed cab (i.e., she is not a medallion holder), she may lease the cab from a taxicab affiliate; plaintiff here is such a lessee. See id. ¶ 25. The City has established a schedule of maximum lease rates based on the taxicab’s fuel efficiency. See MCC § 9-112-230. Taxicab drivers, including lessee-drivers such as plaintiff, earn money from passengers who pay the drivers for their taxicab services. See [122] at 9-10 ¶ 28. To the extent that this income derives from metered fares, the maximum fare rates are set by the City, see MCC § 9-112-600, as described above. A portion of a cab driver’s income may also come from tips. See [122] at 10 ¶ 30. The City does not control how much a given passenger may tip, see id. and indeed some drivers receive larger tips as a result of specific actions that they take. Some drivers, for example, receive larger tips because they: (1) advertise their taxicab services using business cards or online social media; (2) market themselves in a “unique” way, such as by singing to their passengers or by decorating their cabs; (3) provide entertainment or other amenities to their passengers, such as movies or television programming, reading materials, or internet access; or (4) connect with their passengers more quickly using mobile-phone technologies. See [148] at 8-9 ¶¶ 16-17. Some taxicab drivers may also try to improve their income by avoiding areas where it is more difficult to connect with passengers, or by avoiding areas where the passengers, as the driver has learned, generally provide smaller tips, see id. at 12 ¶ 25. ‘(Conversely, some drivers, including plaintiff, will keep track of large events such as sports games or theatre productions, and will try to be at those locations when the events are letting out. See [122] at 12 ¶ 87.) And some drivers will not pick up passengers from airports, because they do not find airport trips to be a good investment of their time. See [148] at 7 ¶ 13. Drivers may also attempt to improve their earnings not by increasing their income, but by decreasing their expenses or other losses. For example, taxicab drivers may comparison-shop for gas prices and attempt to minimize the amount of gas they use by decreasing their use of air conditioning, or by accelerating more smoothly. Plaintiff takes this approach. See [122] at 16 ¶48. Driving carefully may also lower a driver’s expenses through avoiding accidents. See id. ¶ 49. D. Melissa Callahan’s Taxicab Driving 1. Callahan’s Licensure and Driving History Melissa Callahan first became a Chicago taxicab driver in 2007, when she obtained her public chauffeur’s license. See [122] at 1 ¶ 1; [142] at 1-2 ¶ 1. Before she obtained her public chauffeur’s license, Callahan completed a two-week training course at Harold Washington College; the course addressed geography and the rules and regulations for driving a taxicab in Chicago, among other things. See [122] at 1 ¶ 2. She paid approximately $275 in tuition for this course. See id. Callahan did not interview with the City to become a taxicab driver. See id. at 2 ¶ 3. She was never told by the City that she had been hired to perform work for the City. See id. The City did not ask Callahan to complete any tax-related forms, such as a W-4, as a condition for receiving her chauffeur’s license. See id. ¶ 4. Callahan used her chauffeur’s license to drive taxicabs beginning in 2007, and she was a full-time cab driver between January 2009 and August 2011. See [142] at 1-2 ¶¶ 1, 5. During that period, she would lease a taxicab from a cab owner of her choice. See id. at 2-3 ¶ 6; [122] at 14 ¶ 41; [141] at 2 ¶ 2. The leases that Callahan entered with the cab owner were typically daily leases of 12 or 24 hours each. See [141] at 2 ¶ 3. The City of Chicago did not provide Callahan with any taxicabs to drive. See [122] at 9 ¶ 27. While leasing taxicabs, Callahan purchased gasoline to use in the cabs. See id. at 10 ¶ 31. She also bought a guidebook that had a list of streets, spent money on car washes for the cabs, and purchased MPEA tax stamps. See id. The City of Chicago did not provide Callahan with gas for the taxis she leased, or with any other materials necessary to drive a taxicab. See id. at 8-9, ¶¶ 23, 27. Nor did the City provide Callahan with any passengers for her cab. See id. at 9 ¶ 27. 2. Control Over Callahan’s Taxicab Leases and Driving Callahan selected the taxicab affiliations from which she leased her cabs; the City did not dictate her choice. See id. at 14 ¶ 41. When driving a leased taxicab, Callahan would decide where to go to look for passengers in need of taxicab services— unless, that is, she received a radio-dispatch call from the affiliate from whom she had leased her cab. See id. at 4 ¶ 10. Similarly, Callahan would decide whether to drive to a city airport in search of potential fares. See id. ¶ 11. It was also Callahan’s choice whether to use (or not) a particular taxicab stand. See id. ¶ 12. The City generally required Callahan to take the most direct route to a given destination, but did not otherwise dictate the specific routes that she took. See id. at 6 ¶ 18. Callahan set her own driving hours and decided when she would take breaks, though the City now limits (to twelve) the number of consecutive hours that a taxicab driver may drive. See id. at 4-5 ¶¶ 9, 17; see also MCC § 9-112-250(a). Callahan also decided if and when to take vacations from driving a taxicab, and did not inform the City (or seek its approval) when taking such vacations. See [122] at 5 ¶ 15. Nor did she inform the City of any sick days she took from driving. See id. ¶ 16. She wore her own clothing while driving a cab (typically a pair of pants and a shirt); the City did not inspect her chosen attire or personal appearance. See id. ¶¶ 13-14. 3. Callahan’s Earnings, January 2009 to August 2011 Callahan did not keep complete records of her income and expenses from taxicab driving between January 2009 and August 2011 — indeed, her recordkeeping was quite poor. She did recall that she had earned only enough money to cover her total expenses. See id. at 17 ¶ 53; [141] at 4 ¶ 7. For the purposes of this litigation, Callahan therefore estimated her earnings from driving a taxicab in 2009, 2010, and 2011, by estimating: (1) her household expenses (rent, utilities, and the like); and (2) taxi-related expenses (money spent on gas and cab leases). See id. In estimating her personal or household expenses, Callahan relied on some (unidentified) bills and receipts that she had kept; she had not retained all of those records, however, so she used rough estimates to fill in the gaps. See [122] at 17-18, ¶¶ 53-57. She estimated her taxi-related expenses based on her personal knowledge and experience as a taxicab driver. See Declaration of Melissa Callahan, [121-26] at 4 ¶ 20. Using this approach, Callahan estimated that she earned the following from driving a taxicab full time: $2,210 in 2009; $12,777 in 2010; and $9,414 in 2011 (January through August). See [122] at 17-18 ¶¶ 54, 56-57. In 2013, Callahan filed amended tax returns for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011. See [95] at 14 ¶ 59; [122] at 18 ¶59. Callahan did not provide her return-preparer with any documents concerning her income and expenses during those years; she calculated these figures herself. See [95] at 14-16, ¶¶ 60, 62, 64; [122] at 18-19, ¶¶ 60, 62, 64. She calculated those figures by looking at her household expenses (rent, utilities, etc.) and estimating her tax-related expenses (gas, cab leases), and then assuming that her income was approximately the same as her total expenses. See [141] at 5 ¶ 9. In her amended tax returns, Callahan reported having earned the following profits from taxicab driving: $2,158 in 2009; $12,832 in 2010; and $9,414 in 2011. See [96-3] at 7; [96-4] at 7; [96-5] at 6. Callahan also made some handwritten notes of what she spent on taxicab expenses (leases, gas), and what she earned from taxi driving, for seven months in 2009 (February, May, June, July, August, November, and December) and two months in 2010 (January and February). See [141] at 2 ¶ 4. In addition, Callahan obtained some credit-card payment reports from 2012, which purported to show some earnings that Callahan had made as a taxicab driver in that year. See id. at 5 ¶ 8. Between January 2009 and August 2011, Callahan did not keep any records of the number of hours she drove a taxicab for hire. See [122] at 21 ¶ 73. Nor did she keep a calendar or schedule of her driving. See id. Callahan did retain copies of nearly all of the taxicab lease agreements she entered in 2010 and 2011, however, and asserts that she worked all, or nearly all, of the hours of each lease. See [141] at 3 ¶ 5. E. Procedural History In January 2012, Callahan sued the City of Chicago under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See [1]. Callahan subsequently amended her suit to be a putative class action, alleging that the City was her employer within the meaning of the FLSA, and that the City is liable under the Act because she did not earn the required minimum wage ($7.25 per hour), see [33] at 13-14 (Count V). Callahan also asserted a similar claim against the City under the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (Count IV), which requires that employees be paid a minimum of $8.25 per hour. See id. at 12-13. Three other counts were dismissed from the case and are not at issue here. See [39]. The City and Callahan both move for summary judgment on Counts IV and V of the amended complaint. [90]; [119]. III. Analysis A. Fair Labor Standards Act (Count V) The FLSA was enacted in 1938 “to protect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours.” Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). The goal was to ensure “a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work.” Id. (quoting Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 578, 62 S.Ct. 1216, 86 L.Ed. 1682 (1942)) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted); cf. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir.1992). Not all workers benefit from the Act’s protections, however. These protections are afforded only to “employees.” See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (“Every employer shall pay to each of his employees ... wages at the [specified] rates_”). The threshold question, then, is whether Melissa Callahan is an “employee” of the City of Chicago within the meaning of the FLSA. The statute itself provides little guidance, defining “employee” in a circular fashion. See id. § 203(e)(1) (“[T]he term ‘employee’ means any individual employed by an employer.”). The Act defines “employ” as “to suffer or permit to work.” Id. § 203(g). Callahan did not interview to become a formal employee of the City of Chicago; she was never told by the City that she had been made, or would be made, an employee; and the City never provided her with an employee handbook, manual, or other personnel policy. See [122] at 2 ¶¶ 3-4. She was not, in other words, what one typically considers to be an “employee” in the traditional (or common-law) sense. See Bluestein v. Cent. Wis. Anesthesiology, S.C., 769 F.3d 944, 952 (7th Cir.2014) (quoting Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449-50, 123 S.Ct. 1673, 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003)). But, as Callahan correctly points out, the FLSA uses a much broader definition of “employee” than is found at common law. See Estate of Suskovich v. An them Health Plans of Va., Inc., 553 F.3d 559, 565 (7th Cir.2009); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326, 112 S.Ct. 1344, 117 L.Ed.2d 581 (1992) (“[The FLSA] stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles.”). Indeed, the Act’s definition of “employ” is “the broadest definition ... ever included in any one act,” Reyes v. Remington Hybrid Seed Co., Inc., 495 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n. 3, 65 S.Ct. 295, 89 L.Ed. 301 (1945)). The City sets many aspects of a cab driver’s job performance. Callahan must possess a public chauffeur’s license and must drive a properly licensed cab. See MCC §§ 9-112-020, 9-104-020. The City quite literally “permits” Callahan to work as a taxicab driver. But the statute, though broad, is not limitless. See Tony and Susan Alamo Found, v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 295, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152, 67 S.Ct. 639, 91 L.Ed. 809 (1947). Once the appropriate boundaries have been drawn, the City — Callahan relationship falls outside of the Act. 1. The City’s Involvement in Taxicab Operation The statute provides that Callahan is the City’s employee if the City “suffer[s] or permit[s her] to work.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). Not just any work qualifies, however. Individuals are “working” within the meaning of the Act — and so are entitled to be paid for any time spent so “working” — when they are performing activities “controlled or required by the employer ■ and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.7 (quoting Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 64 S.Ct. 698, 88 L.Ed. 949 (1944), overruled on other grounds and superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 25-28, 126 S.Ct. 514, 163 L.Ed.2d 288 (2005)) (emphasis added); see also Musch v. Domtar Industries, Inc., 587 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir.2009) (citing Jonites v. Exelon Corp., 522 F.3d 721, 726 (7th Cir.2008)); Sehie v. City of Aurora, 432 F.3d 749, 751 (7th Cir.2005) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 785.7). Put another way, “employees [under the FLSA] are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render service.” Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (1987) (quoting Mednick v. Albert Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir.1975)). Thus, the critical question here is whether the “business” to which Callahan renders service is, in fact, the City’s business. Callahan is a taxicab driver; the service she provides is therefore the transportation of passengers by taxicab, and the City controls to quite a significant extent the operation of taxicabs in Chicago. Licen-sure, equipment, and other requirements for taxicabs are set by the City and determine the physical environment in which cab drivers work. The City also regulates taxi drivers directly through licensure, eligibility, and conduct requirements that are specific to them. In addition, taxicab drivers must follow certain rules regarding how they obtain and transport passengers. But controlling or regulating how taxicabs are operated is not the same as providing, or undertaking to provide, transportation by taxicab. The City does not perform the latter role. The City does not provide the taxicabs themselves — and so does not provide transportation by taxicab directly — because it does not own any, see [122] at 9 ¶ 26. The City provides only the licenses (ie., medallions) that allow private vehicle owners to operate their vehicles as taxicabs. See MCC § 9-112-010; [122] at 8-9 ¶ 24. Nor is there any evidence that the City provides taxicab transportation indirectly — ie., by requiring or mandating that licensed taxicabs actually be used. Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary: taxicabs in Chicago may be driven lawfully only by licensed public chauffeurs, see MCC §§ 9-104-020, 9-112-260, and there is no requirement that public chauffeurs actually use their licenses, see [148] at 2 ¶ 4. This is a critical point. The City can, as Callahan asserts, effectively limit the maximum number of in-service taxicabs available to passengers by capping or otherwise controlling the number of medallions in circulation at any given time. But the City does not go so far as to set a minimum number of cabs that must be driven for hire. The City makes no guarantee to would-be passengers that taxicab services will be available. The City therefore does not provide transportation by taxicab, even indirectly. Callahan offers several reasons why, in her estimation, the City is “in the taxi business.” Callahan posits that the City is in the taxicab business because: (1) the City profits from the sale of taxi medallions, medallion-transfer fees, and the collection of related taxes; (2) taxicab service is an essential part of transportation in the City; (3) the City owes medallion holders a reasonable return on their investment in medallions; and (4) the City acts in the interest of medallion owners, who used to supervise and control taxicab drivers. None of these arguments is persuasive. a. Taxi-Related Revenues The City allegedly “profits” from taxi services in several ways. To begin, says Callahan, the City collects millions of dollars from medallion auctions — such as in 2013, for example, when the opening bid (for each of 50 available medallions) was $360,000. See id. at 30. The City also collects money when one medallion owner transfers his medallion to another, since the transferee must pay the City a fee; this fee ranges from 5 to 25 percent of the sale or transfer price. See id.-, see also MCC § 9-112-430(g). Finally, notes Callahan, the City collects taxes related to the provision of taxicab services: a monthly ground-transportation tax, see [120] at 31; see also MCC § 3-46-030(B)(l)(a)(i) (requiring the payment of $78.00 per month); and airport-related (MPEA) taxes, imposed on taxicab drivers when they pick up passengers from Chicago-area airports, see [120] at 31; [122] at 10 ¶ 31. What Callahan describes, however, are not “profits” from a business of providing transportation by taxicab, but revenues derived from regulating the taxicab industry. Taxicab medallions, in effect, are permits that allow the permittee to use taxicabs for hire on city property. The City charges a fee for this privilege, and thus collects revenue from those who provide transportation by taxicab. But this does not suggest that the City itself provides (or guarantees provision of) those services. The power to tax may be the power to destroy, but the collection of taxes, 'fees, or revenue by a governmental entity does not make the regulated industry the business of that government. Nor does it cause the regulated person to render their services to the government. b. Importance to Transportation in Chicago Callahan also argues that the City is in the business of providing taxicab services because these services are essential to transportation in the City as a whole. See [120] at 32-33. In support of this argument, Callahan offers as expert testimony the opinion of Dr. Robert Ginsburg. See id. at 32. Dr. Ginsburg earned his undergraduate and doctoral degrees in Chemistry, and from June 2011 to October 2013 served as Administrative Director of the Department of Transportation and Highways for Cook County, Illinois. See [121-13] at 4, 7. Dr. Ginsburg also served as an economic research advisor for Amalgamated Transit Union (from 1997 to 2007), during which time he worked on public-transit funding and transit legislation in Illinois. See id. at 5. In Dr. Ginsburg’s opinion, “the [t]axi system is an essential part of the transportation system maintained and regulated by' the City [of] Chicago, the counties in Northeast Illinois and the State of Illinois.” [121-13] at 10. This ultimate conclusion rests on three supporting conclusions: first, that taxi service is an essential component of providing transportation services to individuals eligible for assistance under the Americans with Disabilities Act; second, that taxi service is an important component of the City’s efforts to promote tourism; and finally, that taxi service is needed to fill gaps in the public-transit system by providing “what is referred to as ‘last mile’ transportation and transportation in unusual circumstances.” Id. The parties dispute whether these opinions are admissible. Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), “the district court is tasked with determining whether a given expert is qualified to testify in the case in question and whether his testimony is scientifically rehable.” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 616 (7th Cir.2010) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786). The City argues that Dr. Ginsburg meets neither requirement, and that his opinions therefore should be excluded from the summary-judgment record. See [144] at 26. The City maintains that Dr. Ginsburg is unqualified to render the above-cited opinions because he holds degrees only in chemistry — irrelevant to the issues on which he claims to be an expert — and because he worked for only two years in transportation for Cook County, where he performed mostly budget-related and “HR” functions. See id. Whether a witness is qualified to give expert testimony must be determined by “comparing the area in which the witness has superior knowledge, skill, experience, or education with the subject matter of the witness’s testimony.” Gayton, 593 F.3d at 616 (quoting Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir.1990)); see also Lees v. Carthage Coll, 714 F.3d 516, 521 (7th Cir.2013) (discussing the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence). Each of Dr. Ginsburg’s conclusions must be examined individually to determine if he has adequate education, skill, and training to reach that conclusion. See Gayton, 593 F.3d at 617. Dr. Ginsburg first concludes that “[t]axi service is an essential component of the provision of transportation ... services to individuals eligible for assistance under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).” [121-13] at 10. According to Dr. Ginsburg, the Taxi Access Program (TAP) — a city program that requires Chicago taxicab drivers to offer reduced rates to disabled customers — is “necessary to ... provide sufficient service to meet the needs” of such persons. Id. Dr. Ginsburg may not offer an opinion on what is required under the ADA or, consequently, on what constitutes services “sufficient ... to meet the needs of’ individuals qualified for protection under the Act. What is required by the ADA is an issue of law, not of fact, and thus is-not an appropriate topic for expert-witness testimony. On the other hand, whether taxicab service is “an essential component” of transportation services that are otherwise provided to ADA-qualified individuals is an issue of fact on which an expert may conceivably opine. Dr. Ginsburg, in other words, may (in theory) be qualified to offer an opinion on whether taxicab services are important or significant to persons deemed disabled under the ADA. The City contends that Dr. Ginsburg is not qualified to give such an opinion (or, for that matter, to reach any other conclusion in his report) because Dr. Ginsburg focused primarily on budget management and human-resources issues while working in the Department of Transportation and Highways for Cook County. See [144] at 26. Dr. Ginsburg did, as defendant says, have “fiscal management” responsibilities within the County’s Department of Transportation, and he did also manage “Personnel/HR functions” there. See C.V. of Robert E. Ginsburg, [121-13] at 4. But he did not do only those things. He also designed and managed the implementation of a Long Range Transportation Plan, see id. and his experience includes analyzing and developing “regulations and legislation regarding transportation and public transit in the Chicago region,” [121-13] at 10. These aspects of Dr. Ginsburg’s background must also be taken into account. See Gayton, 593 F.3d at 616 (“The court should ... consider the proposed expert’s full range of experience ....”) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, Dr. Ginsburg has not provided enough detail about his background and experience to reasonably conclude that he is qualified to render an opinion on the extent to which taxicab services are important to travelers deemed disabled under the ADA. Dr. Ginsburg offers only vague descriptions of his prior responsibilities while working for the County’s Department of Transportation and the Amalgamated Transit Union, and none of these descriptions suggests that he gained from his work any special insight into the needs and activities of disabled travelers in Chicago. For example, Dr. Ginsburg claims to have worked for the County on a “Long Range Transportation Plan.” See [121-13] at 4. But he provides no information about what this plan actually entailed. Similarly, Dr. Ginsburg states that while working as an advisor for the Union, he “[djeveloped legislative proposals” regarding public-transit funding, prepared (presumably related) reports, and “execut[ed] several sections of [the Illinois] transit legislation” in 2008, including Performance Management. See id. He does not explain whether, if at all, this work touched on transportation for disabled individuals. Dr. Ginsburg’s second conclusion is that taxi service is an “important component” of the City’s efforts to promote tourism in Chicago. See id. at 10. However, the lack of detail concerning his background again prevents a finding that Dr. Ginsburg is qualified to form the opinion he now offers. It is not apparent that, from the experiences discussed above, Dr. Ginsburg acquired any specialized knowledge about tourism in Chicago, or about how the provision of taxicab services intersects (or to what extent) with that industry. General references to prior work on transportation plans and transit-related legislation are insufficient. Dr. Ginsburg’s third conclusion is that taxicabs are necessary to fill gaps in the City’s public-transit system, such as by providing “last mile” transportation, see id. Whether Dr. Ginsburg is qualified to reach this last conclusion is a closer question. He states in his report that this conclusion is based on: Dr. Ginsburg’s ten years of experience analyzing and making recommendations on Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) budgets and state legislation for the Amalgamated Transit Union; two years working as a consultant to the Regional Transportation Authority concerning performance-management requirements for the CTA (and other regional transportation entities); and his two years of experience with the County’s Department of Transportation and Highways. See id. It is certainly conceivable that, while performing such work, Dr. Ginsburg obtained particular insight into the intricacies of the transit system in Chicago — and, more critically for present purposes, that he acquired some specialized knowledge concerning whether, and to what extent, taxicabs may fill any gaps in such a system. Once again, however, his C.V. and report make clear only that he worked generally on transportation-related projects in Chicago. These materials do not provide specific details about those projects, and so do not provide enough facts to reasonably conclude that Dr. Ginsburg is qualified to offer an opinion on the gap-filling potential of taxicab services in the larger transit system of Chicago. Dr. Ginsburg is not qualified, on this record, to reach any of the three conclusions appearing in his report. He therefore is not qualified to offer the more general opinion — that taxicabs are “an essential part of the transportation system maintained and regulated by the City,” id. since that opinion is based on the three supporting conclusions just discussed, see id. Because Dr. Ginsburg’s opinions are not admissible due to his lack of qualification, I do not reach defendant’s argument that Dr. Ginsburg’s opinions are also unreliable (and thus inadmissible under Dau-bert on separate grounds), see [144] at 26. Moreover, the undisputed benefits that taxicabs provide to the City (as identified by Dr. Ginsburg) do not support Callahan’s conclusion that her work renders service to the business of the City. First, it is undisputed that the City requires taxicab affiliations and medallion holders to charge reduced rates to disabled riders. See Exhibit B to Ginsburg Report, Taxi Access Program (TAP): Customer Guide (2011), [121-13] at 19; Exhibit C to Ginsburg Report, Rules and Regulations for Affiliations (2001), [121-13] at 33; 2008 Medallion Holder Rules, [121-22] at 43 (Rule 12.01). Regulations require taxicab affiliations to ensure that only TAP-qualified taxicab drivers are dispatched to answer requests from TAP-eligible passengers for taxicab services, and that discounts are provided to TAP-eligible patrons who hail cabs on the street. See [121-13] at 34 (Rule No. 2.3(f)); TAP Customer Guide, id. at 22. But there is an important difference between requiring taxicab affiliates to offer reduced rates (for transportation that the taxicab affiliates have already chosen to provide), and requiring affiliates to provide taxicab rides in the first instance. The latter is the business to which Callahan renders service— providing transportation by taxicab. TAP is a service offered by the City to ADA eligible customers, but the “service” offered is a reduction of prices for preexisting taxicab services, not a provision of those services in the first place. If a taxicab affiliate has not decided to use its medallions, then participation in TAP effectively requires no action at all. Rate-setting regulates — and the City may stand to benefit in some way from that regulation — but it does not cause the City to take on the regulated business as its own. Similarly, the City stands to benefit from setting a simplified rate structure and standardized procedures for taxi transportation to and from airports — and the City announces the existence of these services. In addition, says Dr. Ginsburg, taxicabs “provide options for people with lots of luggage,” and for those who work late or who are unfamiliar with the area (tourists). See [121-13] at 11. The “City of Chicago and the transit agencies,” he says, “need to provide a variety of options and additional convenience to such travelers,” since the bus-and-train system is not always sufficient to meet their needs. Id. But Dr. Ginsburg points to no evidence that the City must provide transportation of any kind; and his opinion that the City should provide transportation by taxicab misses the point. The crucial question is not whether the City ought to provide transportation by taxicab, or whether it benefits from the provision of such services by others. The relevant question is whether the business to which Callahan renders service is the City’s. Dr. Ginsburg merely identifies a positive consequence of having taxicabs in Chicago: flexibility for travelers. But the City does not provide the service, does not mandate the service, and does not require medallion holders to use their medallions for tourists or anyone else. c. Return on Medallion Investments Citing Yellow Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 919 F.Supp. 1133 (N.D.Ill.1996), Callahan argues that the City must be “in the taxi business” because medallion owners spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to acquire taxicab medallions, and the City has a constitutional obligation to ensure a reasonable return on those investments. See [120] at 33 (citing Yellow Cab Co., 919 F.Supp. at 1140). Callahan’s reliance on Yellow Cab Co. is misplaced. In Yellow Cab Co., a taxicab affiliation sued the City of Chicago alleging, among other things, that the City had effected an unconstitutional taking of the affiliation’s property by setting maximum taxicab lease rates. See 919 F.Supp. at 1140. The affiliation contended that the lease rates set by the City did not permit the affiliation to charge enough for its leases in order to pay its own expenses and earn a reasonable rate of return on the medallions it had acquired. See id. The question in Yellow Cab Co. was whether the maximum lease rates as set by the City were so low as to be confiscatory of the affiliation’s property (ie., its medallions). See id. Whether the City directly or in effect provided transportation by taxicab was not at issue in that case, and the theoretical possibility that a government could confiscate or take a business does not mean that that business is the government’s for purposes of the FLSA. d. The City’s Role in Relation to Medallion Owners Finally, Callahan argues that the City is “in the taxi business” because the City: (1) has effectively usurped the role of taxicab affiliates, who used to control taxicab drivers through an employer-employee-type relationship; and (2) acts in those affiliates’ interests. See [120] at 23-25, 31. Callahan first relies on Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm., Seafarers Int'l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862 (D.C.Cir.1978), for the proposition that the City has stepped into the shoes of the medallion owners. Democratic Union is unhelpful to Callahan. In that case, the D.C. Circuit examined two taxicab affiliations in Chicago— Yellow Cab and Checker — which had recently switched from the traditional “commission system” to a newer lease-based system. See id. at 866. Under the commission system, the taxicab affiliations would earn money by taking a certain percentage of the fares paid to the individual drivers who used those companies’ cabs. See id. In 1975, however, the companies retired the old system and replaced it with a new one — a leasing system — in which drivers would keep their fares and instead pay the cab companies a flat rate for use of the licensed taxicabs. See id. When the National Labor Relations Board concluded that the companies were still the employers of the drivers under the National Labor Relations Act (and were thus obligated to bargain with the drivers’ union representative), the companies filed suit under the NLRA to challenge that order. See id. at 866, 868. The Court of Appeals determined that the drivers were not the companies’ employees under the Act, because the companies imposed “virtually no control ... over the lessee-drivers, independent of municipal regulations.” Id. at 875. “Government regulations,” the court observed, “constitute supervision not by the employer but by the state.” Id. Callahan would read Democratic Union to stand for the proposition that, if the taxicab affiliates who lease the use of their medallions are not the employers of the lessees, then the government must be (since it now “supervises” the drivers through regulation). But this is not what Democratic Union says. The court in that case stated only that a putative employer is not “controlling the driver” when it obligates him or her to comply with the law. See id. The court did not opine that, by eliminating through regulation the need for supervision or control by a direct employer, the City itself had become that employer. To the contrary, the court concluded that the lessee-drivers “essentially work[ed] for themselves.” Id. at 877. Callahan asserts that even if the City is not her direct employer, it is nonetheless her employer under the FLSA because it acts “in the interest of’ the medallion owners who, according to Callahan, are “unquestionably in the taxi business.” [120] at 24-25. Here Callahan relies on Section 203(d) of the FLSA, See id. at 24, which states that the term “employer” as used in the Act includes “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer!,] and includes a public agency,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). But Callahan’s analysis is not quite correct. Even assuming that, in regulating taxicabs, the City of Chicago is acting in the interest of the medallion owners (addressed further below), Callahan has not provided any evidence suggesting that the medallion owners, under the current lease-based system, are indeed the employers of the lessee-drivers who drive their cabs. In fact, Callahan argues just the opposite: she contends, as just discussed, that the City has replaced the taxicab affiliate as the employer. See [120] at 24 (discussing Democratic Union); see also id. (arguing that the medallion owner “used to be the employer”) (emphasis added). If the taxicab affiliates are no longer the drivers’ employers, then the City is not acting “in the interest of an employer” even if it has somehow acted in the interests of the medallion owners. Nor am I persuaded that the City has indeed acted in the medallion owners’ interests. Callahan maintains that the City must have done so, since it now “supervises” drivers’ conduct such that the medallion owners no longer have to. See [120] at 24. But Callahan casts too wide a net. In essence, she argues that the City acted in the medallion owners’ interests because the owners derived a benefit from the City’s regulation — that is, relief from having to supervise or otherwise monitor taxicab drivers’ behavior. Such a reading of Section 203(d), however, would render the reach of that provision virtually boundless. Under Callahan’s interpretation, a government or regulatory agency would by statute “employ” any person whose direct employer relied on ordinances, rules, or regulations to set the parameters of an employee’s job performance. There is no reason to assume this was Congress’s intent in drafting the FLSA. The FLSA is a broad statute, and those who reap the benefits of another’s labor (ie., those who suffer or permit others to work) can be employers under the Act — even if they are not the direct source of the worker’s remuneration, or the sole entity with control over wages or income earned. See, e.g., Reyes, 495 F.3d at 406-09 (discussing the concept of joint employment); Reich v. Circle C. Invs., Inc., 998 F.2d 324, 326-29 (5th Cir.1993) (concluding that the defendant nightclub owners “employed” several dancers who used the club’s stages, even though the dancers were paid only in tips from the club’s customers and not by the owners themselves). But FLSA liability requires that the work at issue be primarily and necessarily for the benefit of the defendant-employer’s business. This was true in Circle C., for example, where the workers were required to comply with weekly work schedules set by the defendants. See 998 F.2d at 327 (noting' that the nightclub owners would fine the dancers for any non-compliance with the schedule). By mandating that certain hours be worked, the defendants in that case not only bene-fitted from the dancers’ work, but made the dancers’ business their own. The defendants, in other words, made dancing a part of their nightclub business. Here, however — while the City of Chicago created and now regulates the market for transportation by taxicab (and benefits from the existence of taxieabs)-the City does not provide to its residents or visitors transportation by taxicab, either directly or indirectly. Callahan therefore did not work for the City within the meaning of the FLSA, since her activities were not necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the City’s business. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.7. Thus, as a matter of law, the City did not suffer or permit Callahan to work within the meaning of the FLSA, and so did not “employ” her under that Act. 2. The “Economic Reality” of Callahan’s Relationship with the City The parties focus a great deal on the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, in which the court articulated a series of six criteria to be considered when determining whether a given worker is an employee under the FLSA. See 835 F.2d at 1534-35. The criteria, explained the court, are meant to assist in assessing the “economic reality of the ... working relationship.” Id. at 1534. Those six criteria are: 1) the nature and degree of the alleged employer’s control as to the manner in which the work is to be performed; 2) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending upon [her] managerial skill; 3) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for [her] task, or [her] employment of workers; 4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill; 5) the degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship; 6) the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business. Id. at 1535. No single factor or criterion is controlling, however, as it is the totality of the circumstances surrounding the work activity that must be evaluated. See id. at 1534. As the City points out, the Lauritzen test is an awkward fit for this case. See [93] at 11-15. The factors described in Lauritzen are most logically applied to situations where it is clear that the defendant hired the plaintiff to perform a certain kind of work (specifically, agricultural work). In such cases, the issue to be resolved is whether the plaintiff was hired as an “employee” or merely as an “independent contractor.” See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1535. Here, however, the facts suggest that Callahan was never really hired by the City at all. She did not interview with the City; she was never told that she had been hired to work for the City; she did not receive any tax- or employment-related forms from the City; and once she obtained her public chauffeur’s license, she never informed the City of any absences that she took from driving a taxicab (such as vacation or sick days). See [122] at 2, 5 ¶¶ 3-4, 15-16. Thus, the question here is not really whether Callahan was hired as an employee rather than as an independent contractor, but whether she became a sort of de facto-employee of the City when she obtained her public chauffeur’s license (and thus became subject to certain municipal regulations if and when she decided to use her license). Despite the awkwardness of applying Lauritzen’s six-factor test to the scenario at hand, Lauritzen is a decision of the Seventh Circuit on the meaning of “employ” under the FLSA, and it is not my place to disregard it. Even under the Lauritzen analysis, however, Callahan is not an employee of the City of Chicago within the meaning of the FLSA: although a few of the six factors weigh in her favor, Callahan is not economically dependent on a business of the City. a. Factors Favoring Employee Status A few of the Lauritzen factors support Callahan’s claim. The first is the nature and degree of control over how Callahan performs her work. See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1535. The City contends that it does not control the day-to-day details of how Callahan performs her job, such as: when to start or stop driving for the day (or to take breaks); where to look for potential passengers; how to interact with passengers; what- to wear while driving; or which exact route to take to a given destination. See [93] at 17-21. But the City’s focus is too narrow. A defendant’s right to control is relevant under Lauritzen even where that right “applies to the entire ... operation, not just the details” of that operation. 835 F.2d at 1536. Even if the City does not dictate the nuances of how Callahan drives a taxicab for pay, she is nonetheless subject to a plethora of rules and regulations, set by the City, that govern the operation of taxicabs as a whole. Moreover, the City can and does enforce those regulations. In each of the years from 2009 to 2012, for example, the City issued more than 1,600 citations to taxicab drivers for “discourtesy.” See [142] at 4 ¶ 12. And in 2012, the City fined 39 drivers for failing to take the “most direct route” to their passenger’s chosen destination, See id. at 4 ¶ 14. Although the City may not control every aspect of how taxicab drivers perform their work, it nonetheless maintains significant control over the operation of taxicabs. The first Lauritzen factor therefore weighs in plaintiffs favor. Also in plaintiffs favor is the fourth Lauritzen factor: whether the service rendered requires a special skill, 835 F.2d at 1535. Although at least some skill is required to drive a taxicab in Chicago — e.g., familiarity with the City’s geography, knowledge of where one-way streets are located, see [93] at 26 — such skills are not sufficiently specialized. These are not skills, in other words, that require a substantial amount of particular training. (Indeed, the training course that Callahan took to get her public chauffeur’s license lasted for only two weeks. See [122] at 1 ¶ 2.) Because an unskilled job suggests the worker is poor in human capital, it “augurs for a conclusion of employment.” Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1541 (concurring opinion), b. Factors Favoring Non- ■ Employee Status The remaining Lauritzen factors tend to show that Callahan is not an employee of the City of Chicago within the meaning of the FLSA. The third criterion focuses on the parties’ respective investments in equipment or materials required to complete the work at hand. See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1535, 1537. To the extent the putative employee made a disproportionately small investment in the venture as compared to the putative employer, she is more likely to be economically dependent on that entity or individual. See id. at 1537. Taxicab drivers like Callahan invest in their driving. For example, drivers must spend money to acquire and maintain their public chauffeurs’ licenses — first by completing a mandatory training course (for which Callahan paid $275) and by paying a licensing fee ($15), then by paying any applicable renewal fees ($8 per application), see MCC §§ 9-104-030(2), 9-104-070. Taxicab drivers must also lease a cab if they do not own one themselves. Lessee-drivers like Callahan may have to pay for gas, too, or for MPEA tax stamps. See [122] at 10 ¶ 31. Callahan also purchased a guidebook containing a list of Chicago streets, and occasionally spent money on car washes to keep the taxicabs clean. See id. On the other hand, lessee-drivers such as Callahan do not have to pay for the major capital investments — the taxicab medallions or the taxicabs themselves. But who makes those? It is not the City, as the City does not even own any taxicabs. See id. at 9 ¶ 26. It is the medallion owner who pays for — and thus invests in— the taxicab, and the medallion owner who pays for and invests in the license to use it (i.e., the medallion). That the City collects revenue from and thus benefits from medallion sales is inconsequéntial, since the City retains that money even if the medallion owners do not use those licenses by putting taxicabs into service. The City has made no major investment in Callahan’s driving that it stands to lose. Relative to the City, Callahan made a disproportionately large investment in driving a taxicab, and this Lauritzen factor therefore weighs in the City’s favor. The fifth criterion is the “degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship.” 835 F.2d at 1535. Permanency suggests that the worker is economically dependent on the putative employer. In assessing the permanency of a working relationship, it does not matter that a given relationship is temporary. Temporary work relationships — e.g., seasonal work relationships — may be permanent and exclusive for their duration, and thus “permanent” under Lauritzen. See id. at 1537 (citing Donovan v. Gillmor, 535 F.Supp. 154, 162-63 (N.D.Ohio 1982))). Callahan argues that any full-time work as a licensed taxicab driver is “permanent work” for FLSA purposes, and that she therefore qualifies as a permanent worker because she drove a taxicab full time for two years. See [120] at 29. The problem with this argument is that it conflates li-censure (¿a, permission) to perform a given task with an affirmative request to perform that task. The latter is what occurred in Lauritzen, where the defendants (pickle/cucumber farmers) hired the plaintiffs (migrant families) to do something particular to benefit the defendants’ business (pick pickles/cucumbers during harvest season). See 835 F.2d at 1532. There was, in other words, at least an implicit expectation on the defendants’ part that the plaintiffs would — for several months — do what had been asked of them: pick pickles. See id. (noting that harvest season typically lasted from July through September). Here, by contrast, the