Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S [81] MOTION TO DISMISS AND / OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ [39] AMENDED MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS, AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ [49] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT JUDITH E. LEVY, District Judge. Plaintiffs bring this suit as a class action against defendant Maura Corrigan, in her official capacity as Director of the Michigan Department of Human Services (hereinafter “DHS”), challenging Michigan’s law and policy governing disqualification of “fugitive felons” from various forms of public assistance, including federal food assistance. Under that law and policy, defendant disqualifies applicants and recipients of federally-funded public assistance benefits based on a match between the applicant’s / recipient’s name and a record of an outstanding felony warrant in the Michigan Law Enforcement Information Network (hereinafter “LEIN”). Defendant informs persons of their disqualification by means of a written notice. Plaintiffs challenge that notice as failing to provide the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and as failing to meet the notice requirements of the Food and Nutrition Act, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. Plaintiffs also contend the Michigan law and DHS policy themselves violate and are preempted by the Act. Before the Court are defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 81), plaintiffs’ Amended Motion to Certify Class (Dkt. 39), and plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 49). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant defendant’s. Motion to Dismiss with respect to plaintiff Woodward only, and deny defendant’s motion with respect to the remainder of the relief sought; grant plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class; and grant plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. I. Factual background Congress first established a permanent Food Stamp Program in 1964. Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub.L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 (1964). The purpose of the program was “to promote the general welfare” and “to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation’s population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households.” Id. § 2. Congress made significant revisions to the program in 1977. Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub.L. No. 95-113, 91 Stat. 913 (1977). In 2008, the Food Stamp Program was renamed the “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program” (hereinafter “SNAP”) and the Food Stamp Act was renamed the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 (hereinafter “SNAP Act”). Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-234,122 Stat. 1092 (2008). SNAP .is administered through state programs, although the benefits are funded by the federal government. 7 U.S.C. ■ §§ 2013, 2020(a), (d), (e). The state programs are governed by criteria set forth in the SNAP Act. Those criteria include the standards for qualification for and disqualification from SNAP benefits. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014-2015. The eligibility standards in state plans must be “in accordance with sections 2014 and 2015 of [the SNAP Act] and “include no additional requirements imposed by the State agency.” ” Id. § 2020(e)(5). States are expressly prohibited from imposing “any other standards of eligibility as a condition for participating in the program,” Id. § 2014(b). Of relevance here, section 2015(k) provides that: No member of a household who is otherwise eligible to participate in the supplemental nutrition assistance program shall be eligible to participate in the program as a member of that or any other household during any period during which the individual is— (A) fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction, under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing, for a crime, or attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing or that, in the case of New Jersey, is a high misdemeanor under the law of New Jersey; or (B) violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under a Federal or State law. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(k)(l). Michigan’s SNAP program, titled Food Assistance Program (hereinafter “FAP”), is administered by DHS. DHS also administers other public assistance programs, including the Family Independence Program, State Disability Assistance Program, Child Day Care Program, and Refugee Assistance Program. Since October 8, 2011, Michigan’s Social Welfare Act prohibits DHS from granting public assistance benefits to any person who is “subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge against that individual in this or any other jurisdiction.” 2011 P.A. 198, codified at Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b. The Act also requires DHS and Michigan State Police (hereinafter “MSP”) to develop an automated program that compares DHS’ list of public assistance recipients with MSP’s information regarding outstanding felony warrants or extradition warrants. Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10c. That program, dubbed the “fugitive felon interface,” has been operational since January 2018. (Dkt.- 49-2 & 49-3, Ex. A & B to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J.) DHS’ computer eligibility system is known as “Bridges.” Pursuant to the policies set forth in its Bridges Eligibility and Bridges Administrative Manuals [hereinafter “BEM” and “BAM”], DHS disqualifies persons from food assistance benefits who are (1) subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge, (2) subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant for extradition arising from a criminal charge, or (3) admitted fugitive felons. (Dkt. 49-5 & 49-6, Exs. D & E to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. (BEM 204); Dkt. 49-7 & 49-8, Ex. F & G to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. (BEM 203).) Bridges automatically identifies matches between the DHS benefit list and the MSP warrant information. Bridges then sets the benefit applicant’s / recipient’s file to close, generates a criminal justice disqualification notice that is sent to the applicant / recipient, and automatically schedules the reduction or termination of benefits. (Dkt. 49-14, Ex. M to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. (BAM 811, eff. 2/1/13); Dkt. 49-15, Ex. N to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. (BAM 811, eff. 5/1/13); Dkt. 49- ' 16, Ex. O to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. (BAM 811, eff. 7/1/13); Dkt. 49-17, Ex. P to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. 2-3.) The individual plaintiffs in this case are Walter Barry, Heather Woodward, Doni-tha Copeland, Kenneth Anderson, and Westside Mothers, a non-profit organization with 450-500 dues-paying members that advocates on behalf of public assistance' applicants and recipients. Barry, Woodward, Copeland, and Anderson have all received at least one criminal justice disqualification notice and have been threatened with reduction or termination of food assistance benefits, or have experienced actual reduction or termination of benefits, based on the criminal justice disqualification. Plaintiffs bring four counts in their Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 70). Counts I, II, and III are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: • Count I: Denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs allege defendant’s criminal justice disqualification notices violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, before denial / reduction / termination of public assistance benefits, as a matter of constitutional law. • Count II: Denial of due process under the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program Act (“SNAP Act”), 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10). Plaintiffs allege the criminal justice disqualification notices violate plaintiffs’ rights to adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before denial / reduction / termination of public assistance benefits, as a matter of statutory law. • Count III: Violation of rights to receive food assistance under the SNAP Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(a) and (b) and 2020(e)(5). Plaintiffs allege Mich. Comp. Laws 400.10b, as well as defendant’s policies enacted pursuant to that law, violate plaintiffs’ federal statutory right to food assistance benefits. • Count IV: Preemption of Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.10b and defendant’s fugitive felon policy by the SNAP Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(b), 2015(k), and 2020(e)(5). Plaintiffs allege the SNAP Act expressly preempts Mich. Comp. Laws 400.10b and defendant’s fugitive felon policy and practices. The Court will begin its analysis with the issues of whether plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit and whether their claims are moot. The Court will then address plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and the remaining issues in the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. II. Standing / mootness Defendant argues for dismissal of all plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing. Defendant further maintains that the claims of plaintiffs Barry, Woodward, and Copeland (and therefore, Westside Mothers) are moot, and should therefore be dismissed. (Dkt. 75, Def.’s Resp. to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. xi.) A. Standing It is an “essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III” that a plaintiff must have standing to bring a case in federal court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Constitutional standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to show (1) a “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent” injury, that is (2) “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct, and is (3) “likely” to be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130. An association has standing “when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing these elements. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The relevant time for determining standing is the outset of the litigation. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189, 120 S.Ct. 693 (defining standing as “the requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). But the elements of standing must be supported throughout the litigation. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Thus, “[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from defendant’s • conduct may suffice.” Id. But at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff must “set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts” supporting the existence of an injury in fact. Id. Defendant argues that the individual plaintiffs cannot show the first element of standing—injury in fact. Westside Mothers thus cannot show the first element of associational standing, as its only member among the individual plaintiffs, Copeland, lacks standing herself. When, as here, “the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction” and the plaintiff is the “object of the action,” then “there is ordinarily little question that the action ... has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing ... the action will redress it.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Indeed, the individual plaintiffs here were the objects of the two actions they challenge: notice of disqualification from public assistance benefits, and disqualification from food assistance benefits. All four individual plaintiffs assert the same two injuries: (1) procedural injury, from defendant’s allegedly inadequate notices, and (2) economic injury, in the form of actual or threatened loss of food assistance benefits, from defendant’s automatic felon disqualification policy. (Dkt. 85, Pis.’ Resp. 1.) Plaintiff Westside Mothers asserts standing based on economic injury: namely, that its members’ ability to pay dues is directly affected by their loss of food assistance under defendant’s challenged policies. (Dkt. 70, Second Amended Compl. ¶¶ 200-201.) Westside Mothers also claims associational standing through plaintiff Copeland. 1. Barry Plaintiff Barry filed the initial class action complaint in this matter on July 25, 2013. (Dkt. 1.) At that time, he had an outstanding felony warrant in his name, and a disqualification from food assistance that went into effect on June 1, 2013. (Dkt. 50-2, Ex. S to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J.) Barry did not receive his July food assistance until July 26, 2013—two days after he filed the complaint, and one day after he moved for class certification. (Dkt. 70-10, Ex. I to Second Amended Compl.) At the time he brought his claim, Barry suffered several injuries in fact: a procedural injury, from the allegedly inadequate notice, and economic injuries, consisting of defendant’s withholding of his July 2013 food assistance, the threat of having to repay those benefits, once received, if he lost at the hearing on his disqualification, and the threatened termination of all future benefits. Barry thus had standing to bring the claims in this suit. Defendant maintains Barry lacks standing because he has suffered no injury in fact. (Dkt. 81, Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 1.) Defendant apparently means that because Barry has received food assistance “every month since June 1, 2013,” he has suffered no injury. {See Dkt. 75, Def.’s Resp. to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. 1.) But defendant fails to counter evidence that (1) Barry’s food assistance had been withheld at the time he filed the complaint, (2) Barry’s disqualification had not been resolved at the time he filed the complaint, leaving him exposed to the possibility of having to repay benefits and to termination of future benefits, and (3) Barry suffered a procedural injury from defendant’s notice. 2. Woodward Woodward applied for food assistance in July 2013 and received a denial notice, based on a criminal justice disqualification, on August 1, 2013. (Dkt. 50-8, Ex. Y to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J.) Woodward joined this action in the Amended Complaint filed on August 13, 2013. (Dkt. 7.) At that time, Woodward remained disqualified from receiving food assistance. She therefore has established an injury in fact (both the procedural injury from the notice and the economic injury from the disqualification) and has standing to bring this suit. Defendant argues that Woodward lacks standing because (l)she was denied food assistance as an applicant, not a recipient, of benefits, and (2) she currently receives, food assistance benefits. (Dkt. 75, Def.’s Resp. to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. 3.) But neither argument bears on standing: the first goes to Woodward’s adequacy as a class representative, while the second goes to mootness (see below). 3.Copeland Copeland applied and was approved for food assistance in September 2012. (Dkt. 70, Second Amended Compl. ¶¶ 137-38.) She received a criminal justice disqualification notice dated December 31, 2012, terminating her food assistance effective February 1, 2013. (Dkt. 70-21, Ex. T to Second Amended Compl.) Copeland reapplied and received a notice dated February 12, 2013, denying benefits based on a criminal justice disqualification. (Dkt. 70-22, Ex. U to Second Amended Compl.) Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint and motion for class certification on October 28, 2013, adding Copeland to both. (Dkt. 38.) At that time, Copeland still had an outstanding felony warrant and remained disqualified from receiving food assistance benefits. She therefore has established procedural and economic injuries, and has standing to bring her claims. Defendant argues that Copeland lacks standing because she (1) failed to request an administrative hearing, and (2) has moved out of state. (Dkt. 75, Defi’s Resp. to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. 3.) The only authority defendant provides for the proposition that Copeland had to exhaust her state administrative remedies in order to have standing to bring this suit is an unpublished order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (See Dkt. 75-4, Ex. 3 to Def.’s Resp. to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J.) Defendant does not explain, nor can the Court discern, why this case is relevant. In fact, as explained below, there is a strong presumption against requiring a plaintiff to exhaust state remedies before bringing a suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). Copeland’s failure to request a state administrative hearing on her disqualification does not preclude her from bringing this suit. As for Copeland’s relocation to Alaska, that argument goes to mootness, not standing. 4.Anderson It is undisputed that Anderson still has an outstanding felony warrant in his name and is not receiving food assistance benefits. Defendant only argues that Anderson lacks standing based on Anderson’s failure to exhaust state administrative remedies. (Dkt. 75, Def.’s Resp. to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. 3.) As with Copeland, Anderson’s failure to request a state administrative hearing does not affect his standing to bring this action. 5.Westside Mothers Because Copeland had standing at the time Westside Mothers joined the case, Westside Mothers has associational standing. The case for Westside Mothers’ independent standing, however, is more difficult, and turns on an element of standing not addressed by the parties: redressability. Westside Mothers has met the injury element by asserting economic injury in the form of lost dues payments from members. .However, when “a plaintiffs asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else ... causation and redress-ability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130. In such circumstances, standing “is ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish.” Id. Here, a decision in favor of plaintiffs would plausibly lead to some members of Westside Mothers receiving food assistance benefits. As a result, those members could reasonably be expected to have more money to spend on other, non-food expenses. But the alleged economic injury to Westside Mothers can only be remedied if those members decide to spend a portion of that money as dues. That is, the re-dressability of Westside Mothers’ economic injury depends on decisions beyond the Court’s control. While the scenario here is not precisely analogous to that in Defenders of Wildlife — where redressability hinged on the decisions of third parties not before the Court — it is close enough to require more from Westside Mothers to show it meets the redressability element of standing. The Court therefore finds that Westside Mothers has associational, but not independent, standing to bring this action. B. Mootness Courts have often described mootness as “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame.” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189, 120 S.Ct. 693. On this view, the relationship between standing and mootness is as follows: “The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Id. If the plaintiffs personal interest, or “stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,” is eliminated during the litigation, “the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as' moot.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 1528, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013). There are recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine, including the exception, invoked here by plaintiffs, for claims that are “capable of repetition yet evading review.” See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 191, 120 S.Ct. 693. This exception applies “when (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated pri- or to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subject to the same action again.” Lawrence v. Blackwell, 430 F.3d 368, 371 (6th Cir.2005). The party asserting that this exception applies has the burden of establishing both elements. Id. But it is not necessary to show that “recurrence of the dispute [is] more probable than not,” only that “the controversy [is] capable of repetition.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 319 n. 6, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988). 1. Barry Defendant argues Barry’s claims are moot because “there is no Department action against his food assistance, he no longer has a felony warrant in his name and he is receiving benefits.” (Dkt. 81, Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss 6.) While it is undisputed that Barry is receiving benefits, it also appears , undisputed that he has a second outstanding felony warrant in his name. (Dkt. 79-8, Ex. G to Pis.’ Reply in Support of Mot. Summ. J.; Dkt. 86, Def.’s Sur-reply to Amended Mot. Cert. Class 4, 6.) At the hearing on these motions, defendant’s counsel stated that defendant had been advised by email that all of Barry’s warrants had been resolved. Defendant has not, however, proffered the email or any other evidence that Barry’s second warrant has, in fact, been resolved. Barry’s claims are therefore not moot— there is a reasonable expectation that he will be again subject to defendant’s criminal disqualification policy and notice. 2. Woodward Defendant maintains that Woodward’s claims have become moot, because she “no longer appears as a fugitive felon” and receives food assistance benefits. (Dkt. 81, Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 6.) In support, defendant points to the affidavit of Dale Shaw, a Cash Assistance Senior Policy Analyst at DHS. (Dkt. 74-2, Ex. 1 to Def.’s Resp. to Pis.’ Amended Mot. Cert. Class [hereinafter “Shaw Aff.]”) Shaw states that Woodward “is not currently listed as a fugitive felon.” (Id.) He further states that Woodward applied for food assistance on August 11, 2014. (Id.) On that same day, “[i]t appears the caseworker changed her FF [sc. fugitive felon] status from yes to no,” but “there are no notes ... as to whether the caseworker verified that she had resolved her FF status.” Woodward was approved for food assistance benefits on September 4, 2014. (Id.) Woodward’s outstanding felony warrant was apparently related to her alleged theft of exercise equipment from her father’s house. While her father has submitted a declaration stating that he does not wish to pursue charges against Woodward, and has advised police accordingly (Dkt. 52, Ex. YY to Pis.’ Mot. Sum. J.), it is not clear from the record whether the warrant has, in fact, been resolved. Plaintiffs do not, however, assert that Woodward still has an outstanding warrant. Rather, they maintain Woodward’s claims are not moot based on her ongoing interest in receiving declaratory and notice relief that would allow her to recover food assistance benefits she lost while disqualified. (Dkt. 79, Pis.’ Reply in Support of Mot. Class. Cert. 9). Because Woodward is currently receiving food assistance benefits and is not at risk of disqualification based on an outstanding felony warrant, she no longer has a personal stake in the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs. Under Green v. Mansour, declaratory relief against a state runs afoul of the Eleventh Amendment in the absence of a continuing or threatened violation of federal law. 474 U.S. 64, 73, 106 S.Ct. 423, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985). And the notice relief sought by plaintiffs cannot stand on its own, but only “escape[s] the Eleventh Amendment bar” if it is ancillary to another type of relief. Green, 474 U.S. at 71, 106 S.Ct. 423. Given, then, that neither declaratory nor notice relief would be available to Woodward, her alleged interest in such relief cannot keep her claims alive in this case. Woodward’s claims are therefore moot. 3. Copeland and Westside Mothers Defendant maintains Copeland’s claims are moot because she no longer has an outstanding felony warrant and has moved to Alaska. (Dkt. 81, Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 6.) Plaintiffs counter there is a reasonable expectation that Copeland will be again subject to disqualification (and notice thereof), because (1) her warrant was dismissed without prejudice, (2) that warrant was the result of someone stealing Copeland’s identity, and that person could commit further crimes using Copeland’s identity, and (3) Copeland will return to Michigan in November 2014. Whether Copeland’s claims are moot is a close question. Copeland has submitted a declaration in which she states that she moved to Alaska for seasonal employment and intends to return to Michigan thereafter. (Dkt. 83, Ex. E to Pis.’ Reply in Support of Mot. Summ. J., Second Copeland Dec. ¶ 2 [hereinafter “Second Copeland Dec.”].) Copeland notified DHS of her move to Alaska and expects to reapply for food assistance benefits upon her return to Michigan, as she does not have employment arranged in Michigan. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) On the basis of Copeland’s declaration, the Court finds a reasonable expectation that she will not be disqualified from receiving food assistance benefits on the basis of her residency. Still, Copeland must show there is a reasonable expectation she will again be subject to defendant’s fugitive felon disqualification policy. Again, she need not show it is more likely than not she will be subject to the disqualification policy. Honig, 484 U.S. at 319 n. 6, 108 S.Ct. 592. Copeland raises the possibility that her felony warrant could be reinstated, and that her identity could again be used in the commission of a felony. The facts in Barry’s case are certainly suggestive of the latter possibility: at least two felony warrants have issued in his name for acts he did not commit. Although it seems less likely that Copeland’s warrant will be reinstated, the two possibilities together — of reinstatement of Copeland’s felony warrant, and of a new warrant issuing in Copeland’s name — are enough to create a reasonable expectation that Copeland “faces some likelihood of becoming involved in the same controversy in the future.” United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). Copeland’s claims are therefore not moot. Because Copeland’s claims are not moot, Westside Mothers’ claims are similarly not moot. 4. Anderson Defendant does not challenge Anderson’s claims as moot, and with good reason, as Anderson still has an outstanding felony warrant in his name and is not receiving food assistance benefits. In sum, of the five named plaintiffs, only Woodward’s claims are moot. Defendant’s motion to dismiss thus cannot succeed on mootness grounds. Even if the claims of all named plaintiffs were moot, this case would nonetheless survive defendant’s motion under the “special mootness rules [that] exist for class actions.” Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 399 (6th Cir.1993). It is well-established in this Circuit that mooting the named plaintiffs’ claims while a motion for class certification is pending does not moot the case. See Carroll v. United Compucred Collections, Inc., 399 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir.2005); Dozier v. Haveman, No. 14-12455, 2014 WL 5483008, at *8-13, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153395, at *25-36 (E.D.Mich. Oct. 29, 2014) (thoroughly surveying relevant cases). Here, plaintiffs Barry, Woodward, and Copeland joined in the motion for class certification before being approved for food assistance — the act that defendant maintains mooted their claims. Barry’s food assistance benefits were reinstated the day after he filed his motion for class certification. (Dkt. 70-10, Ex. I to Second Amended Compl.) Woodward joined the First Amended Class Action Complaint on August 13, 2013, and the proposed Amended Motion to Certify Class on October 28, 2013. (Dkt. 7, 39.) Her fugitive felon status was changed in DHS’ records on August 11, 2014, and she was approved for food assistance benefits on September 4, 2014. (Shaw Aff. ¶ 5.) Copeland joined the proposed Second Amended Class Action Complaint and the Amended Motion to Certify Class on October 28, 2013. (Dkt. 39, 40.) Her felony warrant was dismissed without prejudice on November 19, 2013. (Dkt. 79-9, Ex. H to Pis.’ Reply Br. in Support of Mot. Cert. Class.) Copeland’s food assistance benefits were approved thereafter. (Dkt. 79, Pis.’ Reply Br. in Support of Mot. Cert. Class 10.) In short, defendant’s attempts to moot the individual plaintiffs’ claims, if they had been successful, would still not have prevented this case from going forward as a class action. III. Motion to Certify Class Having found that the individual plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims and that the claims of four individual plaintiffs are not moot, the Court must now determine whether ' class certification is warranted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. A. Standard of Review Plaintiffs bear the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that their proposed class meets all four requirements of Rule 23(a) and satisfies at least one provision of Rule 23(b). Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, - U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1432, 185 L.Ed.2d 515 (2013); Senter v. Gen’l Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 522 (6th Cir.1976). Rule 23(a) provides for class certification only if: (1) the class is so numerous that join- ■ der of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;' (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). Plaintiffs maintain their proposed class falls within Rule 23(b)(2), which comprises actions in which “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2). Rule 23 further includes an “implicit requirement” that “an ascertainable class of persons to be represented” exists. Dozier, 2014 WL 5483008, at *14, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153395, at *37 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Failure to satisfy any of these requirements precludes certification. Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 484 (6th Cir.2013). “Meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a) requires something more than mere repetition of the rule’s language; there must be an adequate statement of the basic facts to indicate that each requirement of the rule is fulfilled.” Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 537 (6th Cir.2012) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). To that end, the Court must perform a “rigorous analysis,” including, if necessary, “prob[ing] behind the pleadings before coming to rest 'on the certification question.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551-52, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011). B. Analysis 1. Ascertainability A threshold question in determining a motion for class certification is whether the defined class is “sufficiently definite so that it is administratively feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the proposed class.” Young, 693 F.3d at 537-38. The Court must be able to make this determination by reference to objective criteria. Id. Plaintiffs propose the following class, termed a “Due Process Class”: [A]ll past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of, benefits administered by the Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS) under the • Food Assistance Program (FAP) • Family Independence Program (FIP). • State Disability Assistance Program (SDA) • Child Day Care (CDC), and • Refugee Assistance Programs (RAP) public assistance programs, who have suffered or will suffer actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of public assistance benefits based on DHS’ determination that the applicant / recipient or a member of the applicant / recipient’s household is ineligible based on a criminal justice disqualification, and who do not' receive a written notice, at the time of denial and at least 10 days prior to an actual or threatened termination or reduction, that details: (i) the nature and duration of the intended agency action, (ii) the specific actions they can take to lift the disqualification and fully access benefits, and (iii) the factual and legal reasons for the negative action, including a. which of the given types of criminal justice disqualifications is at issue, b. the name of the person whose alleged conduct has resulted in the disqualification, c. the date, place, and nature of the alleged crime and the resulting conviction or warrant, d. the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred or the warrant was issued, e. the name of a specific person or entity with knowledge of the basis for the disqualification whom the individual can contact for additional information, f. -where applicable, the basis for concluding that the disqualified individual is aware that he or she is being sought by law enforcement and is fleeing to avoid prosecution, arrest, or custody or confinement for a felony, and g.where applicable, the basis for concluding that law enforcement is actively seeking the individual. (Dkt. 39, Amended Mot. Class Cert. 2-3.) Plaintiffs also propose the following subclass, termed “Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass”: All past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of, Michigan’s Food Assistance Program benefits, who have suffered or will suffer actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of Food Assistance Program benefits based on DHS’s policy of disqualifying individuals as “fugitive felons,” without a finding that the individual is intentionally fleeing from justice to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after convic-' tion, and/or without finding that the individual is actively sought by law enforcement, for a crime that is a felony. (Id. at 3-4.) On plaintiffs’ view, the proposed Due Process Class is ascertainable by reference to membership in a specific group (those having suffered denial, reduction, or termination of benefits based on a criminal justice disqualification), and to a specific harm . (receipt of the allegedly inadequate criminal justice disqualification notice). (Dkt. 39, Pis.’ Br. in Support of Mot. Class Cert. 3-4.) Likewise, the Automatic FAP Disqualification Subclass is ascertainable by reference to membership in a specific group (applicants for or recipients of food assistance benefits, who are alleged to have an outstanding felony warrant), and to a specific harm (denial, reduction, or termination of food assistance benefits without a determination that the person is fleeing or actively sought by law enforcement). (Id. at 13-14.) Defendants respond that the proposed classes are not well-defined, because they include (1) people who have not been harmed, and (2) both felons and non-felons. (Dkt. 74, Def.’s Resp. to Mot. Class Cert. 5, 10.) As with all of defendant’s counterarguments, this depends on defendant’s redefinition of plaintiffs’ harm as “them erroneous disqualifications based on LEIN records of outstanding felony warrants.” (Id. at 5.) The Court can find no reason why it should accept defendant’s definition of plaintiffs’ harm over plaintiffs’ own definition. The injuries plaintiffs allege — inadequate notice and disqualification without a determination that they are fleeing to avoid prosecution and are actively sought by law enforcement — are legally cognizable injuries. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (holding “the denial of procedural due process should be actionable ... without proof of actual injury”); Dozier, 2014 WL 5483008, at *25-26, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153395, at *66 (certifying class on basis of claims that (1) notice was inadequate under both Medicaid statute and Fourteenth Amendment and (2) defendant unlawfully terminated plaintiffs’ Medicaid coverage without evaluating plaintiffs’ eligibility for other Medicaid categories). Furthermore, as plaintiffs note, what defendant terms the “real” harm — erroneous LEIN records — caused no harm to plaintiffs until defendant used the LEIN records to disqualify plaintiffs from food assistance benefits. (Dkt. 79, Pis.’ Reply in Support of Amended Mot. Class Cert. 4 n. 6.) In other words, the question of whether the disqualification is lawful is different from the question of whether the LEIN records are accurate. (See id.) Accordingly, the Court rejects defendant’s attempted redefinition of plaintiffs’ harm and, along with it, defendant’s primary argument against class certification. While plaintiffs’ proposed subclass satisfies the ascertainability requirement, their proposed class definition is problematic, in that it arguably implicates the merits on a central issue: the adequacy of defendant’s disqualification notice. See Dozier, 2014 WL 5483008, at *15-16, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153395, at *41. By defining the class in terms of what was lacking from the notice, plaintiffs assume what a constitutionally and statutorily adequate notice should contain. The Court will therefore exercise its authority to sua sponte modify plaintiffs’ proposed class definition. See id. at *14-15, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153395 at *39 (citing Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 619 (6th Cir.2007) (“[District courts have broad discretion to modify class definitions ... ”)). Accordingly, the Court will evaluate the following class definition under Rule 23: [A]ll past, present, and future applicants for, or recipients of, benefits administered by the Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS) under the • Food Assistance Program (FAP) • Family Independence Program (FIP) • State Disability Assistance Program (SDA) • Child Development and Care Program (CDC), and • Refugee Assistance Program (RAP) public assistance programs, who have suffered or will suffer actual or threatened denial, termination, or reduction of public assistance benefits based on DHS’ determination that the applicant / recipient or a member of the applicant / recipient’s household is ineligible based on a criminal justice disqualification, ai^d who receive or have received a written notice at the time of denial issued by DHS informing the applicant / recipient of the criminal justice disqualification. 2. Numerosity Rule 23(a)(1) requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the proposed class and subclass are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the number of potential class members is not dispositive, “the sheer number of potential litigants in a class, especially if it is more than several hundred, can be the only factor needed to satisfy [numerosity].” Other factors to consider include “judicial economy, geographical dispersion of class members, ease of identifying putative class members, and practicality with which individual class members could sue on their own.” Crawley v. Ahmed, 2009 WL 1384147, at *10, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40794, at *28-29 (E.D.Mich. May 14, 2009). Plaintiffs point to a Michigan State Police press release reporting 4,562 matches when MSP cross-checked names of persons with outstanding felony warrants against a list of DHS public assistance recipients. (Dkt. 39-2, Ex. A to Pis.’ Mot. Class Cert.) These matches were only those made in January and February 2013. On this basis, plaintiffs claim the class and subclass are so numerous that joinder will be impracticable. Plaintiffs also note the likely geographical dispersion of class and subclass members (across Michigan), the difficulty they face in bringing suit on their own (given their likely low-income status), and the ease of identifying them through DHS databases. Defendant counters by again redefining the harm as erroneous disqualification based on an outstanding felony warrant. Based on that definition, defendant cites evidence that, between February 2013 and August 2014, administrative hearings on criminal justice disqualifications resulted in only 13 reversals. (Dkt. 74, Def.’s Resp. 11-12). On that basis, defendant contends plaintiffs have failed to meet the numerosity requirement. Having rejected defendant’s redefinition of the harm, the Court finds this argument meritless. Plaintiffs have adduced sufficient evidence to satisfy the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1). 3. Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.” “[T]here need be only a single issue common to all members of the class.” In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1080 (6th Cir.1996). Resolution of that issue should “affect all or a significant number of the putative class members,” Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 424 (6th Cir.1998), and should “advance the litigation.” Sprague v. Gen’l Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir.1998). According to plaintiffs, the legal issue common to the Due Process Class is whether the 'disqualification notices were inadequate as a matter of constitutional and statutory law. The legal issue common to the subclass is whether disqualification based on Michigan’s fugitive felon law and policy violated the SNAP Act. Again, defendant counters that the real injury plaintiffs allege is disqualification based on an erroneous LEIN match. Separate adjudications will thus be necessary to determine whether each proposed class member did or did not have a valid outstanding felony warrant. Again, the Court rejects defendant’s redefinition of plaintiffs’ injury. Plaintiffs have identified a single legal issue common to all members of the Due Process Class, and one common to all members of the Disqualification Subclass. The alleged inadequacy of the disqualification notices is “central to the validity of each one of the claims” — specifically, Counts I and II — of both the named plaintiffs and the class members. Likewise, whether Michigan’s fugitive felon law and policy violates the SNAP Act is central to the validity of the claims of both the named plaintiffs and the class members in Counts III and IV. Resolution of these two issues will not only “advance the litigation,” Sprague, 133 F.3d at 397, it will be dispositive of the claims of all class members. Plaintiffs have therefore met the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). 4. Typicality Rule 23(a)(3) requires the claims of the class representatives to be- typical of the claims of the class. The Sixth Circuit has concluded a proposed class representative’s claim is typical if “it arises from the same event or practice - or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the same legal theory.” In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d at 1082. The result is that “the representative’s interests will be aligned with those of the represented group, and in pursuing his own claims, the named plaintiff will also advance the interest of the class members.” Id. The typicality requirement thus “ensures that the representative party adequately protects the interests of the proposed class.” Crawley, 2009 WL 1384147, at *12, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40794, at *35. Plaintiffs maintain the class representatives’ claims arise from the same conduct of defendant, involve the same harm, and rest on the same legal theories. Yet again, defendant maintains plaintiffs’ injuries “derive from the supposed mismatches” between plaintiffs and outstanding felony warrants in the LEIN. (Dkt. 74, Def.’s Resp. to Mot. Class Cert. 18.) The named plaintiffs’ claims, like those of the class, arise from the same conduct: (1) the allegedly inadequate disqualifica,tion notices, and (2) the application of the allegedly invalid fugitive felon law and policy. Furthermore, the named plaintiffs’ claims are based on the same legal theory as the class and subclass claims: that defendant’s inadequate notice violated plaintiffs’ rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the SNAP Act, and that defendant’s denial, reduction, or termination of food assistance benefits based solely on a felony warrant match, without a determination that the applicant or recipient was fleeing to avoid prosecution or was actively sought by law enforcement, violated plaintiffs’ substantive rights under the SNAP Act. See Crawley, 2009 WL 1384147, at *13-14, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40794, at *38-39. 5. Adequacy Rule 23(a)(4) requires the named plaintiffs to show that they have common interests with the unnamed class members, and will vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel. Young, 693 F.3d at 543. “The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent. A class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.” Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 562 (6th Cir.2007). Because, as discussed above, the legal claims and injuries of the named plaintiffs are the same as those of the proposed class and subclass members, their interests in the litigation are common. As for the qualifications of proposed class counsel, their resumes demonstrate significant experience in class action suits related to public benefits programs such as Medicaid and SNAP. Defendant insists that named plaintiffs are inadequate to represent the class, because they lack standing or their claims are moot. Defendant further claims proposed class counsel is inadequate because two of them have retired. (Dkt. 74, Def.’s Resp. to Mot. Class Cert. 19-20.) As discussed above, all named plaintiffs have standing, and the claims of only one plaintiff are moot. As for counsel, Jacqueline Doig, proposed lead class counsel, indicated at oral argument that she would continue to work until this case concludes, and defense counsel indicated defendant had no objection to Doig’s qualifications as class counsel. The qualifications of the other proposed class counsel are apparent from their experience handling similar matters. The Court accordingly finds that plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4). 6. Whether defendant acted on grounds generally applicable to the class Rule 23(b)(2) requires plaintiffs to' show that defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class. It applies “only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class, certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.” Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 2557. Thus, “[ljawsuits alleging class-wide discrimination are particularly well suited for 23(b)(2) treatment since the common claim is susceptible to a single proof and subject to a single injunctive remedy.” Senter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 (6th Cir.1976). Such is the case here: defendant has allegedly provided the same inadequate notice of disqualification to all proposed class members, and has denied, reduced, or terminated food assistance of all proposed subclass members based on the same allegedly invalid law and policy. Defendant again counters that proposed class members have not suffered the same injuries. She adds that classwide injunc-tive relief is inappropriate, apparently on the grounds that defendant’s arguments about the adequacy of the notices and the validity of the fugitive felon policy are correct. (Dkt. 74, Def.’s Resp. to Pis.’ Mot. Summ. J. 22.) But this latter argument concerns the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, which are not properly considered in determining a motion for class certification. The Court has already rejected the former argument. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of 23(b)(2). C. Conclusion Plaintiffs have met their burden to show this action satisfies the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b). Accordingly, the Court will grant plaintiffs’ Amended Motion to Certify Class (Dkt. 39). IY. Cross-motions for Summary Judgment Plaintiffs’ summary judgment arguments overlap with two of defendant’s arguments in favor of dismissal. Those arguments will accordingly be treated together below, as cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendant’s mootness argument has been dispensed with above. The absence of a private right of action under the SNAP Act would preclude Counts II, III, and IV. The Court will therefore treat that issue before reaching the parties’ arguments on the substantive claims. A. Standard of Review Summary judgment is required where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of. law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court “views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 95 Fed.Appx. 132, 135 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir.2002)). B. Private right of action The SNAP Act does not explicitly confer a private right of action to enforce its provisions. The test for determining whether a federal statute confers an implied right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was articulated by the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997), and clarified in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002). Under Blessing, a plaintiff seeking to enforce a statutory provision by private suit must show that (1) Congress “intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff’; (2) “the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence”; and (3) “the statute ... unambiguously impose[s] a binding obligation on the States.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41, 117 S.Ct. 1353. The Gonzaga Court clarified the first element of the test: only an “unambiguously conferred right ... not the broader or vaguer benefits or interests” can support an action brought under § 1983. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (emphasis added). The Court’s analysis should focus not. on the SNAP Act as a whole, but on “individual provisions of the statute to determine whether a private right of action exists under each portion.” John B. v. Goetz, 626 F.3d 356, 362 (6th Cir.2010) (finding individual provisions in Medicaid Act enforceable under § 1983); accord Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 538-44 (6th Cir.2006) (holding some provisions of Medicaid Act supported private right of action, while others did not). 1. The provisions at issue Two SNAP Act provisions are at issue. Section 2014(a) underpins plaintiffs’ claim in Count III. It provides that “[assistance under this program shall be furnished to all eligible households who make application for such participation.” Section 2020(e)(10) applies to plaintiffs’ claim in Count II. It requires a state plan of operation to provide notice, fair hearing, and a “prompt determination” to “any household aggrieved by the action of the State agency under any provision” of the state plan. 2. Whether the provision creates an “unambiguously conferred right” This element is the focus of defendant’s challenge. The goal of the court’s inquiry regarding this element is to determine congressional intent. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285, 122 S.Ct. 2268. To that end, the Court’s analysis should focus on the text of the statutory provision at issue, and on' the structure of the overall statute. See id. at 286, 122 S.Ct. 2268 (“where the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied right of action.”). For the provision to create a private right, the text must be “phrased in terms of the persons benefited,” id. at 284, 122 S.Ct. 2268, and must have an individual, rather than an “aggregate,” focus. See id. at 288, 122 S.Ct. 2268. Defendant makes three arguments for finding no private right of action in the SNAP statute: (1) the statute contains no rights-creating language; (2) the statute’s focus is aggregate rather than individual; and (3) courts have found the statute creates no private right of action. a. Section 2020(a) (8) (B)(ii) As an initial matter, plaintiffs point out that section 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) contains the following language: “Records described in subparagraph A [namely, records necessary to determine the state program’s compliance with federal law] shall ... be available for review in any action filed by a household to enforce any provision of this chapter (including regulations issued under this chapter) ...” (emphasis added). As plaintiffs maintain, this provision would ■make little sense if Congress did not intend for the SNAP Act to be enforceable by private action. The language here contemplates private actions to enforce any provision of Chapter 51 (the SNAP program), as well as any related regulations. At the hearing on these motions, defendant argued for the first time that section 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) refers not to private actions to enforce the SNAP Act, but to state administrative review of benefits determinations. This argument is unpersuasive. Section 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) concerns an “action” that is “filed” to “enforce any provision” of the SNAP Act. Section 2020(e)(10), which obliges states to provide for review of agency actions, requires a “hearing” and a “determination,” not an “action.” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10). It is a “normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995). A corollary rule is that “when the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, the court assumes different meanings were intended.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004) (citation omitted). Here, the Court presumes Congress used the term “action” in section 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) to mean something different from “hearing” in section 2020(e)(10). If Congress meant otherwise, it could easily have said so — by using the same word in both sections. Defendant’s argument is also at odds with the common usage of the terms “action” and “hearing.” “Action” and “filed” are terms associated with bringing a lawsuit in court, not with seeking administrative review of an agency decision. Plus, a “hearing” is more restricted in scope than an “action,” which may comprise multiple hearings and, ultimately results in a judgment rather than a “determination.” Section 2020(a)(3)(B)(ii) alone is arguably enough to show that Congress intended for a private right of action to be available under the SNAP Act. Application of the Blessing/Gonzaga test to the provisions at issue here leads to the same conclusion. b. Language of the provisions Defendant points to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (both cited by the Gonzaga Court) as examples of “rights-creating” language. Those statutes provide that “No person ... shall ... be subjected to discrimination ...” By contrast, in defendant’s view, section 2020 of the SNAP Act speaks in terms of state responsibility — e.g., “The State agency shall provide for the granting of a fair hearing ...” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10). Defendant does not address the language of section 2014(a). Section 2014(a) is “phrased in terms of' the persons benefited.” The focus throughout this provision is on which households are eligible to participate in SNAP. The final sentence of the section states, “Assistance under this program shall be furnished to all eligible households who make application for such participation.” Section 2020(e)(10) is also “phrased in terms of the persons benefited.” Although the section begins with the phrase “The' State agency shall provide,” the substance of what the agency must provide is focused on the individual households receiving benefits. First, the agency must provide “for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of the State agency under any provision of its plan of operation as it affects the participation of such household in the supplemental nutrition assistance program or by a claim against the household for an over-issuance.” (emphasis added). Second, “any household which timely requests such a fair hearing after receiving individual notice of agency action reducing or terminating its benefits ... shall continue to participate and receive benefits ... until such time as the fair hearing is completed ...” (emphasis added). In the first sentence above, the focus is entirely on the right of an individual household to have a fair hearing and a prompt determination. In the second sentence, “any household” is the grammatical subject of the sentence, which concerns the household’s right to continuation of benefits pending adjudication of its complaint. As plaintiffs note, courts in this Circuit have found similar language in the Medicaid Act to create private rights. {See Dkt. 80-11, Ex. J to Pis.’ Reply in Support of Mot. for Summ. J.) Section 1396a(a) of the Medicaid Act is parallel to section 2020(e) of the SNAP Act. Section 1396a(a) is titled “State plans for medical assistance: Contents.” The Sixth Circuit, has held that language directing that “[a] State plan for medical assistance must ... provide that [ ] any individual eligible for medical assistance (including drugs) may obtain such assistance” establishes a private right of action. Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 461 (6th Cir.2006) (analyzing Medicaid provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)) (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that “in giving ‘any individual eligible for medical assistance’ a free choice over the provider of that assistance, the statute uses the kind of individually focused terminology that unambiguously confers an individual entitlement under the law.” Id. And rather than interpret the clause beginning “A State plan” as showing the provision lacked an individual focus, the Court reasoned that “by saying ‘[a] State plan ... must ... provide’ this choice, the statute uses the kind of rights-creating, mandatory language that the Supreme Court and our court have held establishes a private right of action.” Id. at 461-62 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Section 1396a(a)(3) states that “A State plan for medical assistance must provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any ■individual whose claim for medical assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness ...” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (emphasis added). That provision was held enforceable under § 1983 in Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 772-73 (6th Cir.2003). Substituting “household” for “individual,” the language of § 2020(e)(10) is closely parallel: “The State agency shall provide for the granting of a fair hearing and a prompt determination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of the State agency under any provision of its plan of operation ...” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) (emphasis added). Similarly, section 1396a(a)(8) of the Medicaid Act states that “A State plan for medical assistance must provide that ... such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals ...”