Full opinion text
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MARGARET M. MORROW, District Judge. On December 12, 2014, Mori Rubin, regional director of Region 31 of the National Labor Relations Board, acting for and on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board (the “Board”), filed a petition seeking a temporary injunction under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), against Vista Del Sol Health Services, Inc. (“Vista”). The petition seeks injunctive relief based on Vista’s purported violations of § 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the NLRA, which prohibit unfair labor practices. Vista opposes the petition. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Vista Del Sol Healthcare Vista operates a nursing facility located in Los Angeles, California. The facility is divided into a skilled nursing division that goes by the Vista name, and an assisted living division known as Casa Del Mar. Vista employed approximately 62 employees in October 2013, including Rosa Valdi-via, the facility’s top management official; Jeri Warner, director of nursing; Ester Cuellar, assistant director of staff development; Vida Zelaya, director of staff development; and Areadio De Borja and Ingrid Castillo. Valdivia, Warner, and Cuellar are high ranking supervisors with authority to terminate employees. B. The Beginning of Union Organizing In early August 2013, the Service Employees International Union-Long Term Care Workers (“SEIU-ULTCW” or the “union”) began organizing employees at Vista. Several organizers made house visits and conducted meetings with the employees. . Valdivia admitted that by August 8, 2013, she had “learned that there was some kind of union activity going on.” Marcos Salvador reports that, at approximately the same time, Id., “Valdivia called a meeting of employees. It took place in the hallway to the right of the nurse’s station. There was Reyna Artola, Kiran [Singh], Remedios Lopez, Jeanette Aguill-era, and myself. Ester [Cuellar] was there also. Valdivia did the speaking.... She said that we needed to be careful because there were some thieves visiting houses because they had stolen some documentation from her including all the employee information. She said that they would identify themselves as from the [u]nion. She said this was not true and they were actually thieves.... She said that we should not open our doors because they would look at everything we had so that they could steal it.” Rosa Lopez states that Valdivia called her cellular telephone sometime after the union visited her and told her that she “should not let them in because they might be thieves.” On October 11, 2013, union representatives Jose Manzano and Edward Gutierrez held two meetings at a McDonalds. The first took place at approximately 1:00 pm. Two Vista employees were present: Silvia Figueroa and Lerma Davis; both signed union authorization forms. A second meeting was held later in the day. Elisa Mayorga, Marcos Salvador, Rosa Lopez, Remedios Lopez, Reyna Artola, Ivania Ruedas, and Genaro Meza were present, and each signed a union authorization form. By October 14, 2013, Vista employees had obtained signatures from a majority of employees; at 3:30 or 4:00 pm that day, the union gave Valdivia a signed union petition. Figueroa, Salvador, Davis, Mayorga, Ruedas, Rosa Lopez, Remedios Lopez, Xenon Perez, Jeanette Aguillera, Aurora Maria Rodriguez, Reyna Artola, Maria Ramirez, Martha Aparicio, Rosalva Salazar were present, wearing purple Service Employees International Union scrubs. Salvador spearheaded presentation of the petition to Valdivia; speaking in Spanish, he allegedly demanded union recognition and requested that Valdivia sign the petition. Valdivia allegedly responded, also in Spanish, that she would not sign the petition and said she would contact her attorney. C. Vista’s Response to its Employees’ Attempt to Unionize 1. Policy Changes On October 14, 2013, at approximately 3:00 pm, just prior to presentation of the union petition, Valdivia stopped Maria Ramirez and asked her about the union authorization cards that were being circulated and why she had signed the union “list.” After the petition was presented, Valdivia — who appeared “very upset and angry,” told all off-duty employees to leave the facility. Petitioner contends that this was a departure from ordinary practice, as “[t]here was no problem” with employees coming to the facility on days they were not working. Valdivia and Warner, the director of nursing, held meetings with several employees after the union petition was presented, and announced that the company would no longer tolerate employees arriving after the seven minute grace period at the start of their shift, and that employees who arrived late would be subject to discipline, including termination. The meetings apparently took place during the week of October 14, 2013; the record does not reflect the precise date. On October 15, 2013, Valdivia met with housekeeping department employees. She informed them that Vista was going to enforce a more strict dress code policy, and would prohibit the wearing of any logos. Petitioner contends this effectively prevented employees from wearing union insignia. 2. Polling and Interrogation Petitioner contends that from October 17 to 21, 2013, Valdivia polled and interrogated employees. Specifically, petitioner asserts that Valdivia gave employees a form to sign asking them to indicate whether they had voluntarily or involuntarily signed the union petition. On October 18, 2013, Valdivia purportedly asked Meza if he knew what he had signed, if he knew what he was doing, and what the union had promised him in return. After he explained that employees wanted someone to represent them, Valdivia said that “the trust had ended” and that he had “betrayed her.” On October 20, De Bor-ja, a charge nurse, questioned Ramirez concerning her union involvement. When Ramirez declined to comment, De Borja ordered her to answer. The next day, Valdivia asked Rosa Lopez if she had been forced to sign the union petition; she promised that Lopez would keep her job as long as she wanted it if she signed a document stating that she had been forced to sign the petition. Petitioner alleges that on October 23, 2013, Cuellar impliedly threatened Meza by telling him that Valdivia was “well prepared” to respond to the union organizing and that the employees “should all be careful;” indeed, Cuellar purportedly went so far as to say that she “felt sorry for [the employees] because Valdivia was so well-prepared against [them].” In an October 9, 2014 letter to the NLRB, Vista’s lawyer stated that the entire facility might be forced to close if the employees were unwilling to accept the company’s settlement offers. Petitioner assert this is a threat that if Vista employees do not stop attempting to organize a union, the company will close the facility. 3. Discharge of Employees i. Martha Aparicio and Delfina Sanchez Petitioner contends that Martha Apari-cio and Delfina Sanchez were discharged in order to discourage employees from engaging in union activities. On October 6, 2013, these certified nursing assistants (“CNAs”) were scheduled to work their usual 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift at Vista, together with charge nurse Jennifer Abaunza and CNA Maria Lopez. At approximately 3:50 a.m. on October 7, 2013, Abaunza told Aparicio that she could take her break. Aparicio fell asleep in the nurse’s station near Sanchez and Lopez. Roughly an hour later, Abaunza said that Thomas Adelman, the son of a Vista patient, had just taken photographs of Apari-cio, Sanchez, and Lopez sleeping, and told them all to wake up. Adelman, who was upset the nurses were sleeping, showed the photographs to Valdivia. The next day, Warner called Ingrid Castillo, a charge nurse, into her office to discuss the incident because she believed that Castillo had been involved. After the meeting, Castillo told the CNAs that they needed to take turns taking naps in the future. The Vista employee handbook states that sleeping on the job is a violation that can lead to termination following the first offense. Vista contends it had never before had an issue with employees sleeping on the job. Several CNAs assert, however, that CNAs and charge nurses regularly slept during the night shift, that charge nurses knew this, and that CNAs were not disciplined for doing so. Indeed, Sanchez states that even after the October 7, 2013 incident, CNAs continued to sleep during the night shift. After the incident and after Castillo’s meeting with Warner, Sanchez and Aparicio worked their regularly scheduled shifts on October 7, 8, and 11-14, 2013 without issue. Aparicio participated in the presentation of the union petition on August 14, 2013, which included both her and Sanchez’s names, but not Maria Lopez’s name. On October 15, 2013, Sanchez met with Warner, who said she was obligated to terminate her because Sanchez had slept on the job. Warner stated that four people had been sleeping and that all were being fired. Aparicio met with Warner and Cuellar on October 18, 2013, and was told that she too was being terminated for sleeping. When she explained that Castillo had given her permission, as she had done for years, Warner said the orders came- from Valdivia and that she had to terminate Aparicio. Lopez was not terminated. Vista contends this is because Adelman’s photographs did not show that she had been sleeping and did not otherwise implicate her in the incident; it also asserts that on the day of the incident, Lopez was scheduled to work at Casa Del Mar — “located in another building.” ii. The Housekeeping Department From October 25 to 28, 2013, Vista laid off seven of the eight employees in its housekeeping department, replacing them with five individuals provided by an independent contractor, Pro-Clean. The employees had received no information that Vista was going to subcontract their work prior to their discharge. Six of the employees — Meza, Cobar, Mayorga, Romana Lopez, Rosa Lopez, and Maria Isabel Val-ladares nee Menjivar — signed the union petition; two — Rosa Lopez and Mayorga— were present when the union petition was served on Valdivia on October 14, 2013. The only housekeeping employee Vista retained was Ramon Lopez, who expressed anti-union sentiments. Vista asserts that it retained Lopez because Pro-Clean was providing only housekeeping services, and/or because it could not provide afternoon or weekend maintenance. 4. Wage Increases to Bargaining Unit Employees On approximately October 10, 2013, Vista gave two employees a 50 cent an hour raise. Petitioner asserts this was done in an effort to discourage them from supporting the union. In December 2013, Vista gave all CNAs a wage increase of 50 cents an hour. This was discretionary and unscheduled; most employees had not received a raise in at least six years, which was one of the reasons they supported the union. 5. Overt Hostility Towards Union In January 2014, Warner, who was still director of nursing at the time, sent a series of text messages to Remedios Lopez. The messages stated: • “[Valdivia] did get rid of house keeping & laundry because she said the CNA will need 50% vote I didn’t agree with her practices so she has to fire me too.” • “I am writing corporate to let them now that [Valdivia] was retaliating against the CNA.” • “[Valdivia] was so mad about this union business [she] did [not] even want [to] do the employee of the month which I said should b[e][yo]u [ (Remedios Lopez) ] and Marcos [Salvador]! Nope she w[a]s [too] mad.” D. Vista’s Response to Union Formation Caused Some Employees to Fear Losing Their Jobs As a Result of Supporting the Union Several Vista employees testified that they were scared they would lose their jobs because they supported the union. On October 29, 2013, Maria Ramirez stated that “[a]s a result[ ] of [her] coworkers’ termination, [she] ... fear[ed] ... losing [her] job because [she] supported the [u]n-ion.” She also stated that “[e]very day that [she] clock[s] in at the start time or time[s] out, [she] feel[s] that [] Valdivia will call [her] into her office and ... fire [her].” Ivania Rueda stated that she was “afraid to lose [her] job for ... supporting the [u]nion.” She also reported that she overheard Maria Ramirez and Romana Lopez say they were “afraid to participate in the [u]nion after [their] coworkers were discharged and laid off.” Elisa Mayorga testified she heard “Reyna [Artola] say that she [was] afraid she was going to lose her job just like [Mayor-ga and the others] did”; she also reported hearing Remedios Lopez, Reyna [Artola], and Maria Ramirez state that they were “afraid to wear the [u]nion shirts now.” On October 30, 2013, Maria Rodriguez indicated that she had the same fears as these employees; she stated that she was “aware that employees ha[d] been fired,” said she thought they had been fired “because they supported the [u]nion,” and admitted that she feared she “could be next because [she] signed the [u]nion petition.” Likewise, Maria Menjivar stated that “[a]s a result of [the termination of the CNAs], [she] felt that [she] could lose her job for supporting the [u]nion and signing the petition.... [0]ther employees, including Rosa Lopez, [Dafny] Cobar, and Elisa Mayorga commented to [Menji-var] that they felt the same way.” Marcos Salvador and Reyna Artola testified that they both felt they could be fired for supporting the union. In November 2013, Salvador stated: “Now that so many employees have been fired or laid-off,' I feel that I could be next. I believe that they were let go because they supported the [u]nion.” He also said that after the layoffs in October 2013, “employees stopped attending [u]nion meetings.” More recently, on October 3, 2014, Artola stated that “[r]ight after [Vista] fired the housekeepers, [she] was afraid that [she] would get fired too.... After the housekeepers were fired, employees were scared to support the [u]nion because they said they had families to support and they did not want to get fired. [She] heard the following employees say they were afraid to get fired: Marcos Salvador, Kiran [Singh], Diana Hernandez, Yolanda Hernandez, and Maria Ramirez.” She commented that CNA Ornela Cuesta signed a union authorization card, “but after the housekeepers were fired, she stopped supporting the [u]nion as well.” E. Procedural Background As noted, the union filed a petition for an election to represent certain of Vista’s employees on October 17, 2013. Between October 18 and December 9, 2013, the union filed fifteen charges against Vista, alleging violations of § 8(a)(1) and (3). Since November 15, 2013, the Union’s petition to be appointed as representative for certain of Vista’s employees has been blocked pending the Board’s investigation of the charges. On March 21, 2014, Vista filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the NLRB from enforcing certain investigatory subpoenas. The action was assigned to this court. On April 30, 2014, the NLRB filed an application for an order requiring compliance with two administrative subpoenas duces tecum. The case was initially assigned to Judge Stephen Wilson, but was subsequently transferred to this court. On May 12, 2014, the Board filed a motion to dismiss Vista’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court granted the NLRB’s motion to dismiss on July 7, 2014. The same day, it granted the NLRB’s application to enforce the subpoenas, except to the extent the first subpoena sought information concerning the identity ofVista’s shareholders. On September 26 and October 2, 2014, the union filed two new charges against Vista, alleging § 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) violations. On October 30, 2014, the NLRB issued an order consolidating the cases, filed a consolidated complaint, and noticed a hearing on the consolidated complaint. The union filed an additional charge against Vista on November 3, 2014, alleging another § 8(a)(1) violation. Vista answered the consolidated complaint on November 12, 2014. On December 5, 2014, the NLRB issued a second consolidated complaint, There is presently a hearing before an administrative law judge scheduled for January 20, 2015. F. Vista’s Evidentiary Objections Vista has asserted several objections to the evidence petitioner adduced in support of the petition. The objections generally concern authentication and hearsay, although other grounds are asserted with respect to certain items of evidence. Petitioner contends that the court can consider its evidence, although possibly inadmissible, in deciding a motion for preliminary injunction. Petitioner is correct. It is well established that trial courts can consider otherwise inadmissible evidence in deciding whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction. See Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981) (“[A] preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits”); Flynt Distributing Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir.1984) (“The Harveys argue that Flynt’s evidence is hearsay. The urgency of obtaining a preliminary injunction necessitates a prompt determination and makes it difficult to obtain affidavits from persons who would be competent to testify at trial. The trial court may give even inadmissible evidence some weight, when to do so serves the purpose of preventing irreparable harm before trial”). “Indeed, district courts have considerable discretion to consider otherwise inadmissible evidence when ruling' on the merits of an application for a preliminary injunction.” See Garcia v. Green Fleet Sys., LLC, No. CV 14-6220 PSG (JEMx), 2014 WL 5343814, *5 (C.D.Cal. Oct. 10, 2014) (citing Flynt, 734 F.2d at 1394; Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir.1988) (observing that the rules of evidence do not strictly apply to preliminary injunction proceedings)). This does not mean, however, that issues concerning authentication and hearsay have no relevance at this stage of the proceedings. Such “issues properly go to weight, rather than admissibility.” Id. See also Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1530 n. 10 (9th Cir.1992) (“In the absence of any evidence that Nagashima was lying, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district judge to admit his declaration and the altered Accolade cartridges as evidence. The fact that neither Accolade nor the district court was able to verify Nagashima’s statements affects the weight to be given the statements and the proffered cartridges, not their admissibility”). Accordingly, the court considers Vista’s objections to evidence the court relies upon infra. II. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard Governing Motions for Preliminary Injunctions “Section 10(j) permits a district court to grant relief ‘it deems just and proper.’ ” 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). Frankl v. HTH Corp., 650 F.3d 1334, 1355 (9th Cir.2011). “To decide whether granting, a request for interim relief under Section 10(j) is ‘just and proper,’ district courts consider the traditional equitable criteria used in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction.” McDermott v. Ampersand Publ’g, LLC, 593 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir.2010). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008). Thus, a district court should enter a preliminary injunction only “upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). Such a showing requires that the plaintiff establish he “is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365; see Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir.2009) (“Under Winter, plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor; and (4) a preliminary injunction is in the public interest”); see also Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1081 (9th Cir.2009) (“[P]reliminary injunctive relief is available only if plaintiffs [also] ‘demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction,’ ” quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 129 S.Ct. 365); American Trucking Associations, 559 F.3d at 1052 (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits,” citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365); Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. Kennedy, 687 F.Supp.2d 1171, 1182 (E.D.Cal.2009) (“Pursuant to Winter, [plaintiffs must make a ‘clear showing’ that they are ‘likely to succeed on the merits,’ ” quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, 129 S.Ct. 365). Following Winter, the Ninth Circuit articulated an alternate formulation of the sliding scale test. Pos t-Winter, serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships that tips sharply in favor of the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction if plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and the injunction is in the public interest. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir.2011) (“To the extent prior cases applying the ‘serious questions’ test have held that a preliminary injunction may issue where the plaintiff shows only that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiffs favor, without satisfying the other two prongs, they are superseded by Winter, which requires the plaintiff to make a showing on all four prongs...'. But the ‘serious questions’ approach survives Winter when applied as part of the four-element Winter test. That is, ‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest”). If the harm to plaintiff is merely monetary, it “will not usually support injunctive relief.” American Trucking Associations, 559 F.3d at 1057. See also California Pharmacists Association v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d 847, 851-52 (9th Cir.2009) (“Typically, monetary harm does not constitute irreparable harm.... Economic damages are not traditionally considered irreparable because the injury can later be remedied by a damage award” (emphasis original)). In addition, harm that is “merely speculative” will not support injunctive relief, “although a loss of goodwill and reputation can do so.” American Trucking Associations, 559 F.3d at 1057. As the Winter Court noted, “[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 55, 129 S.Ct. 365. “In each case, a court must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 542, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987). “In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barce- lo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982). “The plaintiff[ ] bear[s] the initial burden of showing that [issuance of an] injunction is in the public interest.” Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1139 (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 27, 129 S.Ct. 365). The district court “need not consider public consequences that are ‘highly speculative.’ ” Id. (quoting Golden Gate Restaurant Association v. City & County of San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1126 (9th Cir.2008)). “In other words, the court should weigh the public interest in light of the likely consequences of the injunction. Such consequences must not be too remote, insubstantial, or speculative and must be supported by evidence.” Id. “When the reach of an injunction is narrow, limited only to the parties, and has no impact on non-parties, the public interest will be ‘at most a neutral factor in the analysis rather than one that favor[s] [granting or] denying the preliminary injunction.’ ” Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1138-39 (quoting Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir.2003)). See also Sierra Forest Legacy, 577 F.3d at 1022 (‘When deciding whether to issue a narrowly tailored injunction, district courts must assess the harms pertaining to injunctive relief in the context of that narrow injunction”). “If, however, the impact of an injunction reaches beyond the parties, carrying with it a potential for public consequences, the public interest will be relevant to whether the district court grants the preliminary injunction.” Id. at 1139 (citing Sammartano v. First Judicial District Court, 303 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir.2002)). “[When] an injunction is asked which will adversely affect a public interest ... the court may in the public interest withhold relief until a final determination of the rights of the parties, though the postponement may be burdensome to the plaintiff.” Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312-13, 102 S.Ct. 1798. As a threshold matter under Winter, the moving party must establish a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims before a court can grant a preliminary injunction. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365. As noted, in the Ninth Circuit, this threshold showing can be made by demonstrating that there are serious questions going to the merits of the claims. If the moving party is unable to establish this element, the request for a preliminary injunction must be denied and the court need not review whether the remaining requirements for issuance of a preliminary injunction are satisfied. See Dudum v. City and County of San Francisco, Case No. 10-00504-RS, 2010 WL 1532365, *11 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 16, 2010); Jones v. Felker, Case No. 08-0096-FCD-EFB, 2010 WL 582131, *2 (E.D.Cal. Feb. 12, 2010). B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 1. Legal Standard Governing Likelihood of Success on the Merits When considering “a § 10(j) petition, likelihood of success is a function of the probability that the Board will issue an order determining that the unfair labor practices alleged by the Regional Director occurred and that this Court would grant a petition enforcing that order, if such enforcement were sought.” Frankl, 650 F.3d at 1355. “[I]n evaluating the likelihood of success, ‘it is necessary to factor in the district court’s lack of jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, and the deference accorded to NLRB determinations by the courts of appeals.’ ” Id. (quoting Miller v. California Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 460 (9th Cir.1994)). “It is, after all, the Board and not the courts, which ‘has primary responsibility for declaring federal labor policy.’ ” Id. In light of this deference, “it remains the case — whether or not the Board itself approved the filing of the § 10(j) petition — that the regional director in a § 10(j) proceeding ‘can make a threshold showing of likelihood of success by producing some evidence to support the unfair labor practice charge, together with an arguable legal theory.’” Id. (quoting Miller, 19 F.3d at 460 (emphasis added)); Scott v. Stephen Dunn & Associates, 241 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir.2001) (“[T]o satisfy the ‘likelihood of success’ prong of the traditional equitable test, [the Director] need only show a better than a negligible chance of success.”). Conflicting evidence, moreover, “does not preclude the Regional Director from making the requisite showing for a section 10(j) injunction.” Frankl v. HTH Corp., 693 F.3d 1051, 1063 (9th Cir.2012); Garcia ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. S & F Mkt. St. Healthcare, LLC, No. CV 12-1773 PA (VBKx) 2012 WL 1322888, *6 (C.D.Cal. Apr. 17, 2012) (same); Baudler v. American Baptist Homes of the West, 798 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1107-08 (N.D.Cal.2011) (finding that respondent employer’s evidence disputing the union’s assertion that respondent had replaced strikers to teach them a lesson did not preclude the Regional Director from showing a likelihood of success because “if credited by a fact-finder, [the union’s] account would demonstrate an improper purpose in hiring permanent replacements.”). 2. Whether Petitioner has Shown a Likelihood of Success on the Merits Petitioner contends that overwhelming evidence and well-settled Board law support the unfair labor practices charges. As a result he asserts that it is likely Vista will be found to have violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the NLRA, and that he has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits. The court addresses success on the merits under each section of the NLRA in turn, i. Section 8(a)(1) Section (8)(a)(l) prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or coercing “employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in 29 U.S.C. § 157 (“§ 7”)”. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Section 157 rights include the right of self-organization, the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations, and the right to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid protection. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Petitioner cites a litany of alleged acts, all of which the Board has found violate § 8(a)(1). There is thus little doubt that petitioner has an arguable legal theory that supports a § 8(a)(1) violation. The court therefore examines whether the evidence the parties have adduced supports a finding that such violations actually took place. See Garcia, 2014 WL 5343814 at *7 (conducting such an analysis). (1) Instructing Employees Not to Talk to the Union Petitioner first argues that Vista violated § 8(a)(1) by instructing employees not to talk to union organizers. As evidence of this, he cites Valdivia’s admission under oath that she “learned that there was some kind of union activity going on” by August 8, 2013, and thereafter told at least six employees not to open their homes to union representatives because they might be “thieves.” Vista contends it had no notice of union activity until October 14, 2013, when the union petition was presented to Valdivia. As petitioner notes, however, Valdivia has admitted that she knew “some kind of union activity” was going on as early as August 8, 2013, Vista also contends that Valdivia was acting in good faith when she advised employees that people visiting their homes could be thieves, because the unsolicited house calls began just months after employees’ personal information had been stolen from Vista. The court does not find this argument credible. Valdivia’s self-serving declaration, moreover, is entitled to little weight. See N.L.R.B. v. Pac. Grinding Wheel Co., 572 F.2d 1343, 1347 (9th Cir.1978) (“It is also well established that the Board need not treat self-serving declarations of an employer as conclusive, even if not contradicted by any direct testimony in the record”). Marcos Salvador reported that Valdivia told five Vista employees “thieves” would visit them and “would identify themselves as from the [u]nion.” Vista has proffered no evidence indicating or inferring that union organizers stole employees’ personal information from Vista, nor has it suggested any reasonable basis on which such an inference could be drawn. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the evidence strongly suggests that Valdivia attempted to dissuade Vista employees from talking to union organizers; this constitutes interference with their § 7 right to engage in self-organization, to join a labor organization, and to take part in other concerted activities. Indeed, several circuit courts have found that comparable conduct violates § 8(a)(1). See Bally’s Park Place, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 646 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C.Cir.2011) (observing that there was no dispute that § 8(a)(1) had been violated where an employer told an employee “not to talk about the union and [solicited] grievances and promised] to remedy them in order to dissuade employees from supporting the union”); Dorsey Trailers, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 233 F.3d 831, 838 (4th Cir.2000) (holding that an employer violated § 8(a)(1) when it “told workers not to talk to the union during working hours without a supervisor’s approval”). The court therefore finds that petitioners have adduced some evidence that supports a finding Vista violated § 8(a)(1) by telling its employees that people who came to their homes and introduced themselves as union organizers were thieves and that the employees should not open their doors to them. (2) Interrogation and Polling Petitioner next asserts that Vista violated § 8(a)(1) by polling and interrogating employees about their union activities and sympathies. As respects polling, petitioner contends that Vista polled employees by preparing a form that it gave to employees and asked that they state whether they had voluntarily signed the union petition. Vista disputes this finding; it contends that the letter was not a poll because employees were not forced to return it. This argument is unavailing. Determining the “kind of employer actions [that] constitute a ‘poll’ does not depend on their formal nomenclature; the key is their practical effect of tending to instill in employees a reasonable belief that the employer is trying to find out whether they support or oppose the union.” Allegheny Ludlum, Corp. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 1354, 1360 (D.C.Cir.1997). This happens whenever “the employees are forced to make an observable choice that demonstrates their support for or rejection of the union.” Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 301 F.3d 167, 175-76 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting Barton Nelson, Inc., 318 NLRB 712, 712 (1995)). Here, there is no' question that the questionnaire forced employees to make an observable choice that demonstrated their support for or rejection of the union. Vista contends that employees were not required to return the form; no evidence supports this assertion, and it is belied by employee testimony. Romana Lopez testified that “[b]ased on what [Valdivia] told [her] [she] felt that [she] had to sign the letter or [she] would get in trouble.” The court therefore concludes that petitioner has adduced some evidence supporting a plausible legal argument that the letter was a poll, and employs the NLRB’s polling framework to analyze whether a violation occurred. “[A]ny attempt by an employer to ascertain employee views and sympathies regarding unionism generally tends to cause fear of reprisal in the mind of the employee if he replies in favor of unionism and, therefore, tends to impinge on his Section 7 rights.” Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 NLRB 1062 (1967). See also Mingtree Rest., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 736 F.2d 1295, 1297 (9th Cir.1984) (observing that “[i]n Struksnes Construction Co., Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967), the Board adopted guidelines for employer polling of employee union sentiment during a union’s initial demand for recognition” and applying Stmksnes), disapproved on other grounds in Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 522 U.S. 359, 364, 118 S.Ct. 818, 139 L.Ed.2d 797 (1998). In Stmksnes, the Board concluded that “a poll taken while a petition for a Board election is pending does not ... serve any legitimate interest of the employer that would not be better served by the forthcoming Board election. In accord with long-established Board policy, therefore, such polls [ ] continue to be found violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the [NLRA].” Struksnes, 165 NLRB at 1063. Petitioner contends that Vista’s polling was per se unlawful under Stmksnes, because it took place between October 17 and 21, 2013, after the union had presented its petition to Valdivia on October 14, 2013, and while a petition for a Board election— filed October 17, 2013 — was pending. The court agrees. Romana Lopez stated that Valdivia gave her an envelope on which her name was printed, which contained a document asking whether she had voluntarily signed the union petition. This took place on October 20, 2013, six days after the petition was presented to Valdivia, and three days after the petition for a Board election was filed. Vista, in fact, admitted in its response to charges filed with the Board that it circulated the polling form to all employees to determine whether they had voluntarily signed the union petition. It contends the form was circulated in response to “complaints of coercion and harassment to sign some documents by [u]nion organizers.” Vista cites no evidence of harassment or coercion, however, nor any evidence that any employee who signed the union petition or an authorization card did not do so voluntarily. Vista’s unsupported assertion, therefore, is entitled to no weight. Even were the court to credit Vista’s description of the “motive” for the polling, moreover, it does not change the fact that the form sought information as to whether employees supported or opposed the union while a petition for a Board election was pending. That is precisely what Stmksnes prohibits. See 165 NLRB at 1063 (“a poll taken while a petition for a Board election is pending does not ... serve any legitimate interest of the employer that would not be better served by the forthcoming Board election. In accord with long-established Board policy, therefore, such polls [ ] continue to be found violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the [NLRA]”). The court therefore finds that petitioner has provided some evidence that employees were polled, and that the poll took place while a petition for Board election was pending; accordingly, Struksnes dictates that the poll “be found violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the [NLRA].” Id. “An employer can also violate Section 8(a)(1) by improperly interrogating employees about their union activities.” Garcia, 2014 WL 5343814 at *13 (Southwire Co., 282 NLRB 916, 917 (1987)). The test for evaluating if an interrogation violates § 7 is “whether under all the circumstances the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain, coerce, or interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act.” Id. (citations omitted). Petitioner has adduced evidence that on October 18, 2013, Valdivia asked Genaro Meza if he knew what he had signed when he signed the petition, if he knew what he was doing, and what the union had promised him in return. After he explained that he and others wanted someone to represent them, Valdivia said that “the trust had ended” and that he had “betrayed her.” This is strong evidence that Valdivia interrogated Meza. Vista counters that, as reflected in her declaration, Valdivia never met with Meza. The court, however, finds Meza’s statements more credible, particularly because other employees, such as Romana Lopez, have testified that Valdivia approached them and asked questions about their union sympathies. The court therefore finds that petitioner has adduced some evidence that Valdivia interrogated Meza in violation of § 8(a)(1). See L’Eggs Products, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 619 F.2d 1337, 1346 (9th Cir.1980) (“Although it is not an unfair labor practice for an employer to inform employees that they have a right to revoke their union support, it is an unfair labor practice actively to solicit revocations in an otherwise coercive atmosphere”). This evidence also supports a finding that Vista violated § 8(a)(1) because Valdivia equated support of the union with betrayal. See Hialeah Hosp., 343 NLRB 391, 391 (2004) (“Thus, as the judge found, Linares violated Section 8(a)(1) by telling the employees that he felt ‘betrayed’ and ‘stabbed in the back’ because they had contacted the Union. Those statements conveyed to the employees the message that engaging in union activity, a protected statutory right, was tantamount to employee disloyalty, and implicitly threatened them with unspecified reprisals”). There is additional evidence that interrogations occurred as well. Rosa Lopez testified that on October 21, Valdivia asked whether she had been forced to sign the union petition, and promised her that she could keep her job as long as she wanted if she signed a document stating that she had signed the petition involuntarily. Lopez also stated that Valdivia remarked in a separate conversation on October 18, 2013, that Lopez was “trusting] people who [she] d[id] not know,” and asked her about what “the[ union organizers] [were] offering you all.” Petitioner contends this is further evidence of interrogation, especially because it took place without anyone else present and without any assurances that the information would not be used against Lopez. Vista counters that Valdivia denies she told Lopez she could keep her job if she signed a document stating that she had been forced to sign the petition. There is no evidence of Valdivia’s purported denial, however. Accordingly, petitioner adduced some evidence suggesting that Lopez was interrogated and/or coerced by Valdivia, and hence that Vista violated § 8(a)(1). See N.L.R.B. v. Sky Wolf Sales, 470 F.2d 827, 829 (9th Cir.1972) (“Section 8(a)(1) of the Act makes it unlawful for an employer to instigate and promote a decertification proceeding or induce employees to sign any other form of union-repudiating document, particularly where the solicitation is strengthened by express or implied threats of reprisal or promises of economic benefit,” quoting N.L.R.B. v. Birmingham Publishing Co., 262 F.2d 2, 7 (5th Cir.1958)); see also L’Eggs Products, Inc., 619 F.2d at 1346 (“Although it is not an unfair labor practice for an employer to inform employees that they have a right to revoke their union support, it is an unfair labor practice actively to solicit revocations in an otherwise coercive atmosphere”). In sum, the court finds that petitioner has adduced credible evidence that Vista violated § 8(a)(1) by polling and interrogating its employees about their union involvement and support, and by otherwise attempting to solicit revocations of union support in a coercive atmosphere. (3) Impression of Surveillance “The Board has also found that an employer violates the NLRB by maintaining ‘surveillance of the meetings and meeting places of [the union] and of the activities of ... employees in connection with [the union].’” Garcia, 2014 WL 5343814 at *12 (quoting Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 NLRB 1, 48 (1935)). “In determining whether an employer’s statement has created an unlawful impression of surveillance, the test is ‘whether the employees would reasonably assume from the statement that their union activities had been placed under surveillance.’ ” Id. (citing Bridgestone Firestone, 350 NLRB 526, 529 (2007)). Petitioner argues that Valdivia created an impression of surveillance when she questioned Ramirez prior to the presentation of the petition on October 14, 2013. Ramirez testified that she was called into Valdivia’s office and asked if “they had looked for [her] again.” Ramirez understood “they” “referr[ed] to the [u]n-ion.” Valdivia said that “she kn[ew] who they were,” and that Ramirez “had to tell her what was going on and what [ ] the cards that [were] being circulated [were about].” Ramirez stated that Valdivia never “explained what she was referring to when she said that they had already told her or [to] whom she was referring.” The court agrees that Ramirez’s comments constitute “some evidence” that Vista created an impression of surveillance. The standard used to determine whether conduct constitutes surveillance is an objective one, based on the rationale that “employees should be free to participate in union organizing campaigns without the fear that members of management are peering over their shoulders, taking note of who is involved in union activities, and in what particular ways.” Flexsteel Industries, 311 NLRB 257, 257 (1993). Here, Valdivia communicated to Ramirez on October 14, 2013, that she knew union organizing taking place and that authorization cards were being circulated; this was before the petition was presented. Valdivia did not reveal the source of this information. “When an employer tells employees that it is aware of their union activities, but fails to tell them the source of that information, the employer violates Section 8(a)(1). This is because employees are left to speculate as to how the employer obtained its information, causing them reasonably to conclude that the information was obtained through employer monitoring.” In re Stevens Creek Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc., 353 NLRB 1294, 1296 (2009) (citing North Hills Office Services, 346 NLRB 1099, 1103 (2006); Conley Trucking, 349 NLRB 308, 315 (2007); Dallas & Mavis Specialized Carrier Co., 346 NLRB 253, 254 (2006)). Accordingly, the court finds that petitioner has proffered some evidence that Vista created an impression of surveillance in violation of § 8(a)(1). Vista disputes this, arguing that employees presented the petition to Valdivia a mere half hour after this conversation took place, and that Valdivia had received calls from employees before the conversation regarding the union. This argument is unpersuasive. An employer violates the § 8(a)(1) by creating the impression of surveillance. How Valdivia in fact learned of employees’ efforts to unionize is not relevant. What matters is the impression her statements to Ramirez objectively conveyed. During the conversation with Ramirez, Valdivia did not say that she learned of the union activity from other employees, or from any particular source; rather, Valdivia left Ramirez “to speculate as to how [Vista] obtained its information, causing [her] reasonably to conclude that the information was obtained through employer monitoring.” Stevens Creek Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc., 353 NLRB at 1296. The court therefore finds that petitioner has adduced some evidence that Vista engaged in conduct that created an impression of surveillance in violation of § 8(a)(1). (4) Promise of Greater Job Security to Rosa Lopez “An employer’s promise of'benefits during a preelection campaign violates Section 8(a)(1).” Dyncorp & Grant Turner, 343 NLRB 1197, 1198 (2004) (citing Bakersfield Memorial Hospital, 315 NLRB 596, 600 (1994)). This is because “[s]uch promises made in the course of urging employees to reject unionization are unlawful because they link improved conditions to defeat of the union.” Id. (citing Reliance Electric Co., 191 NLRB 44, 46 (1971), enfd. 457 F.2d 503 (6th Cir.1972)). The use of “cautious language or even a refusal to commit ... to specific corrective action, does not cancel the employees’ anticipation of improved conditions if the employees oppose or vote against the unions.” Id. See also Superior Emerald Park Landfill, LLC, 340 NLRB 449, 460 (2003) (“[T]he fact that an employer couches the promises of benefits in language that does not guarantee anything specific does not remove the taint of illegality”). Petitioner has adduced evidence that Valdivia told Rosa Lopez that if she signed a document stating that she was forced to sign the union petition she “would have [her] job as long as [she] wanted it.” Petitioner argues, and the court agrees, that this statement is much more than a promise to maintain the status quo; indeed, it constitutes an absolute promise of ongoing future employment in exchange for rejecting unionization. Accordingly, petitioner has adduced some evidence that supports a finding that Vista violated § 8(a)(1) by promising benefits in exchange for rejecting the union. See Fabric Warehouse, 294 NLRB 189, 191 (1989) (finding a § 8(a)(1) violation where “Respondent told the employees they would receive a certain package of benefits that combined some of the best elements of both the union and the nonunion benefits it currently provided its employees, thus offering them a better set of benefits than either their own or the nonunion employees’ current benefits” (emphasis original)), enfd. Hancock Fabrics v. N.L.R.B., 902 F.2d 28 (4th Cir.1990); see also N.L.R.B. v. Exch. Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409, 84 S.Ct. 457, 11 L.Ed.2d 435 (1964) (“We have no doubt that [Section 8(a)(1) ] prohibits not only intrusive threats and promises but also conduct immediately favorable to employees which is undertaken with the express purpose of impinging upon their freedom of choice for or against unionization and is reasonably calculated to have that effect”). (5) Limiting Employee Access to Yista Premises In Tri-County Medical Center, the Board found that “except where justified by business reasons, a rule which denies off-duty employees entry to parking lots, gates, and other outside nonworking areas will be found invalid.” 222 NLRB 1089, 1090 (1976); see also Meijer, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 463 F.3d 534, 544 (6th Cir.2006) (holding that an employer could not prohibit union solicitation and distribution in a driver check-in area because the area was a mixed-use area as employees were “free to talk, read newspapers and magazines, or stand around until their assigned driving time”); Garcia, 2014 WL 5343814 at *15 (citing and applying Tri-County). Petitioner cites evidence that after the petition was presented to her, Valdivia— who appeared “very upset and angry”— told all off-duty employees to “leave the premises.” Petitioner contends that this was a departure from ordinary practice, as previously “[t]here [had been] no problem” with employees coming to the facility on their days off. Vista counters that it has always allowed off-duty employees to be present at the facility during working hours, and that it continues to do so. It contends Valdivia asked the employees to leave only because they were being loud and repeatedly shouted “we are in” in a nursing home that cares for ill and elderly patients. It also argues that “some aggressive comments were made,” but does not identify what these comments were or to whom they were directed. Although Valdivia states in her declaration that some aggressive comments were made, she indicates — both in the declaration and in an earlier November 13, 2013 response — that she “told [them] to leave the building,” and that “[ajs they were leaving the building, the guy who was with them was yelling “we’re in, we’re in!’ ” Valdivia’s November 2013 statement does not mention aggressive comments in any way. It merely reports that charge nurse Trisha Flora stated the “she felt scared because the people came in very aggressively.” Taken together, the evidence cited by Vista does not credibly suggest that Valdivia had knowledge of any threats made by the off-duty employees and union organizers at the time she ordered them to leave the premises; rather, it makes clear that the loud chants occurred after Valdi-via asked them to leave. More fundamentally, “because the [c]ourt need not decide whether [Vista], in fact, [ordered the employees to leave] in response to a [u]nion campaign, but [rather] whether [petitioner has provided some evidence that it did, the [c]ourt finds that [p]etitioner has met [his] burden.” Garcia, 2014 WL 5343814, at *16. (6) Stricter Enforcement of Dress Code Effectively Prohibiting Union Insignia Petitioner next argues that Vista violated § 8(a)(1) by more strictly enforcing its dress code after union activity began. It is well established that an employee’s right to wear union insignia while at work is protected by the NLRA. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 795-804, 65 S.Ct. 982, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945). “The Board has held that, in the absence of ‘special circumstances,’ an employer’s prohibition of or limitation on the display of union insignia violates Section 8(a)(1).” See Albis Plastics & United Steelworkers of Am., 385 NLRB 923, 924 (2001) (quoting Ohio Masonic Home, 205 NLRB 357, 357 (1973), enfd. 511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir.1975)). Thus, “a rule which curtails that employee right is presumptively invalid unless special circumstances exist which make the rule necessary to maintain production or discipline, or to ensure safety.” Kendall Co., 267 NLRB 963, 965 (1983). “In cases where the employer argues that special circumstances justify a ban on union insignia, the Board and courts balance the employee’s right to engage in union activities against the employer’s right to maintain discipline or to achieve other legitimate business objectives, under the existing circumstances.” Albis Plastics & United Steelworkers of Am., 335 NLRB at 924 (citing Standard Oil Co. of California, 168 NLRB 153, 161 (1967)). Sometime during the week of October 14, 2013, following presentation of the union petition, Valdivia held a meeting with housekeeping department employees. At the meeting, she said that Vista intended to enforce its dress code more strictly, prohibiting “uniforms with any type of logos on them.” Dafny Cobar testified that she did not “remember any type of rule regarding uniforms” previously, as did Eliza Mayorga. Vista asserts that it changed the dress code because employees were wearing “any t-shirt” and “this was not promoting a professional atmosphere”; it also underscores that “at no time was the [ujnion or its insignia mentioned during the meeting.” The fact that the union was not explicitly mentioned during the meeting is irrelevant; what matters is whether the rule has the effect of curtailing employees’ ability to wear union insignia. See Kendall Co., 267 NLRB at 965 (“a rule which curtails [the] right is presumptively invalid unless special circumstances exist which make the rule necessary to maintain production or discipline, or to ensure safety”). The court need not decide whether the dress code change was motived by a desire to promote a professional atmosphere or by a desire to ban union insignia, because it need only determine whether petitioner has adduced some evidence to support his allegation that a violation occurred. Petitioner has, in fact, adduced some evidence that Vista banned logos in order to prohibit union insignia in violation of § 8(a)(1), and thus has satisfied its burden respecting this purported violation. (7) Threats of Unspecified Reprisals Employer statements that “reasonably convey[ ]to [an employee] that he would be jeopardizing his job security and current wage rate by supporting [a] [u]n-ion” violate § 8(a)(1). See Metro One Loss Prevention Servs. Grp. (Guard Div. NY), Inc. & Allied Int’l Union, 356 NLRB No. 20, 2010 WL 4762307, *1 (Nov. 8, 2010) (citing Liberty House Nursing Homes, 245 NLRB 1194, 1198-1199 (1979) (employer unlawfully threatened employees with more onerous working conditions by, among other things, stating that “if the Union came in, times would be even worse”)). Petitioner cites evidence that assistant director Ester Cuellar told Meza that Val-divia was “well prepared” for a union campaign and that the employees “should all be careful.” This evidence supports a finding that Vista impliedly threatened an unspecified reprisal, given that the statement was apparently made approximately a week after the union petition was presented. See Gaetano & Associates Inc., 344 NLRB 531, 534 (2005) (“Supervisor Sammy Superville cautioned Logan to ‘be careful talking to him,’ referring to Union Agent Anthony Williamson.... The Board has held that such ‘be careful’ warnings convey the threatening message that union activities would place an employee in jeopardy. We accordingly find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening Scan Logan”), enfd. 183 Fed.Appx. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (Unpub.Disp.); St. Francis Medical Center, 340 NLRB 1370, 1383-1384 (2003) (holding a “be careful” statement by a supervisor in context of union activity unlawful); Jordan Marsh Stores Corp., 317 NLRB 460, 462 (1995) (supervisor’s statements such as “watch out” are unlawful implied threats). Vista reiterates its contention that Val-divia never spoke to Meza. As noted, however, the court does not find Valdivia’s blanket denial that she had a conversation with Meza credible. As a result, it finds that petitioner has adduced some evidence that Cuellar made threats of unspecified reprisals in violation of § 8(a)(1). (8) Threats of Closure of Facility for Engaging in Union Activity Section 8(a)(1) is violated when an employer “threaten[s] a plant closure in response to its employees’ union activity.” Garcia, 2014 WL 5343814, at *8 (citing Hertzka and Knowles v. N.L.R.B., 503 F.2d 625, 627 (9th Cir.1974)). Thus, “[i]f there is ‘any implication that an employer may or may not take action solely on its own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities and known only’ to the company, the statement is considered a threat and is a violation of Section 8(a)(1).” Id. at *8 (quoting Hertzka and Knowles, 503 F.2d at 627). Petitioner asserts that Vista threatened a plant closure when, in an October 9, 2014 letter to the NLRB, Vista’s lawyer stated that the entire facility might be forced to close if the employees were unwilling to accept the company’s settlement offers. Petitioner contends the lawyer’s comments constituted a threat that if Vista employees did not cease efforts to organize a union, the company would close the facility. The court cannot agree. As the Supreme Court explained in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969), an employer is “free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his specific views about a particular union’ so long as the communications do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.’” 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918 absent a threat. Id. at 618, 89 S.Ct. 1918. The employer “may even make a prediction as to the precise effects he believes unionization will have on his company.” Id. The prediction, however, “must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey [the] employer’s belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control or to convey a management decision already arrived at to close the plant in case of unionization.” Id. Communicating a belief “ ‘that unionization will or may result in the closing of the plant is not a statement of fact unless, which is most improbable, the eventuality of closing is capable of proof.’” Id. at 618-19, 89 S.Ct. 1918. The October 2014 letter is an offer of compromise, which states: “We strongly suggest that the Board ensure that the employees are aware of these offers and that they have a say in the decision. They may not like the alternative. Along the same lines, during out meeting you made comments that in case of a sale of the facility, the potential buyers will have to be notified of the potential liabilities. My Client is aware of the need of said Notification and as such, the sale of the company to anyone under the circumstances which the Board has caused, is rather limited. Therefore, the only alternative [Vista] will have is to close down its facility. In such a situation, at least 65 patients will lose the services and the remaining of the 60 employees will lose their employment.” The court agrees that Vista’s October 2014 letter explicitly threatens closure of the facility. The court also agrees that the threat must be understood as being made in response to union activity. The letter was sent to the NLRB after the union had presented a petition for appointment as the employees’ representative, and after it had charged violations of § 8(a). It concerned settlement of claims alleging unfair business practices in violation of the NLRA. The Board was prompted to file the claims that led to the settlement proposal due to union activity and complaints. Thus, Vista’s threat must be understood in context as threatening facility closure in