Full opinion text
Re Document Nos.: 14, 18, 21 MEMORANDUM OPINION Granting Defendants’ Motion to Strike or Dismiss the Amended • Complaint, Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion to File Supplemental Complaint, and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff BEG Investments, LLC, operated Twelve Restaurant and Lounge, a nightclub in the District of Columbia. As a consequence, Plaintiffs business was regulated by the D.C. Alcohol Beverage Control Board (“the Board”), an administrative body tasked with approving, changing, suspending, and revoking liquor licenses for establishments serving alcoholic beverages in the District. In June 2011, after reports of multiple violent incidents at Plaintiffs establishment, the Board granted Plaintiffs application to renew its liquor license, but did so on the condition that Plaintiff hire a police detail to patrol the area surrounding its establishment when Plaintiff provided certain types of live entertainment. Plaintiff filed suit against six members of the Board in February 2013, arguing that the condition on its liquor license was discriminatory and extortionate. This Court dismissed Plaintiffs six-count complaint on March 31, 2014, on qualified immunity grounds and for failure to state a claim, but gave Plaintiff leave to amend its First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause claims. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 30, 2014. On June 6, 2014, after an assault occurred at Plaintiffs establishment, the Board summarily suspended Plaintiffs liquor license. Plaintiff views the suspension and other actions taken by the Board after Plaintiff filed its first complaint as retaliatory, and Plaintiff filed a motion to supplement its complaint with these allegations on July 16, 2014. The supplemental complaint named two additional Board members as Defendants, as well as a Sergeant with MPD and an attorney for the District of Columbia’s Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”). Now before the Court are Defendants’ motion to strike the amended complaint or, in the alternative, to dismiss all claims, Plaintiffs motion to supplement its complaint, and Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions. Upon consideration of the parties’ motions and the memoranda in support thereof and opposition thereto, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to strike or dismiss the amended complaint, grant in part and deny in part Plaintiffs motion to supplement its complaint, and grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Plaintiffs First Complaint Plaintiff is a company that formerly operated Twelve Restaurant and Lounge in the District of Columbia. Defendants Nicholas Alberti, Donald Brooks, Herman Jones, Calvin Nophlin, Mike Silverstein, and Ruthanne Miller are members of the Board who have issued a series of orders pertaining to Plaintiffs liquor license. As detailed in this Court’s Memorandum Opinion of March 31, 2014, the Board was established by D.C.Code § 25-201, and it is authorized to “issue licenses to persons who meet the requirements” set forth in the Alcoholic' Beverage Statute and to impose “certain conditions” on those licenses if the Board “determines that the inclusion of the conditions will be in the best interest of the locality ... where the licensed establishment is to be located.” D.C.Code § 25104(a), (e). The Board also oversees the Alcoholic Beverage Regulation Administration (“ABRA”), which provides “professional, technical, and administrative staff assistance to the Board in the performance of its functions.” D.C.Code § 25-202. On June 22, 2011, the Board issued an order on Plaintiffs application for renewal of its liquor license. Board Order 2011-289 at 7, Defs.’ Ex. -A, ECF No. 19-2; Compl. ¶26, ECF No. I. After finding that there had been three assaults and fifteen calls to the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) at the establishment’s address, and that MPD had increased patrols in the area due to intoxicated individuals leaving Plaintiffs establishment, the Board granted Plaintiffs application for renewal of its license on the condition that Plaintiff hire an MPD reimbursable detail “whenever the establishment provides any entertainment permitted by the establishment’s entertainment endorsement.” Board Order 2011-289 at 4, 7, Defs.’ Ex. A. A reimbursable detail is comprised of “MPD officers [who] patrol the surrounding area of an establishment for the purpose of maintaining public safety.” See D.C.Code § 25-798(a)(3); Emergency Suspension of Liquor Licenses Act of 2005, D.C. Act 16-20. Upon Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration, the Board modified its June 22 order on August 10, 2011, ordering that Plaintiff hire an MPD reimbursable detail “whenever the establishment provides any DJs or live music as entertainment at the establishment.” Board Order 2011-368 at 12, Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 19-2. Additionally, the modified order required that the MPD detail “be hired for a minimum of four hours and shall end no sooner than one hour after closing.” Id. On July 11, 2012, the Board fined Plaintiff $1500 for failing to hire an MPD reimbursable detail when a DJ performed at Plaintiffs establishment on October 9, 2011. Board Order 2012-301 at 22, Defs.’ Ex. C., ECF No. 19-2. Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a six-count complaint against Defendants in their individual capacities on February 11, 2013. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff claimed that the Board’s orders requiring Plaintiff to hire an MPD detail at a rate of over $55 per hour — more than double the basic wage of police officers— was unlawful and extortionate. Plaintiff alleged: (1) racketeering in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); (2) conspiracy to commit racketeering in violation of RICO § 1962(d); (3) deprivation of equal protection of the law; (4) deprivation of property in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (5) deprivation of freedom of speech in violation the First Amendment; and (6) conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court granted Defendants’ motion. See Order, ECF No. 8. In its Memorandum Opinion, this Court explained that Plaintiffs RICO claims, which were predicated on violations of the Hobbs Act, failed because the unlawfulness of Defendants’ imposition of a reimbursable detail was not clearly established. BEG Investments, 34 F.Supp.3d at 80-84. As a result, Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the RICO and Hobbs Act claims. Id. Additionally, the Court found that Plaintiffs allegations were inadequate to state an Equal Protection Clause, Fifth Amendment, or First Amendment claim. Id. at 84-88. Although the Court dismissed Plaintiffs complaint in its entirety, it did grant Plaintiff leave to amend its claims brought pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment because Plaintiff had alleged additional facts pertaining to those claims in its opposition brief. Order, ECF No. 8. B. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint On April 30, 2014, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against the same six Defendants, this time in both their individual and official capacities. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3-4, ECF No. 12. Notably, the amended complaint was not limited to Plaintiffs Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment claims, which the Court had given Plaintiff leave to amend. Instead, the amended complaint reasserted all six of Plaintiffs previously dismissed claims and added a seventh claim that Defendants violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by targeting establishments like Plaintiffs “for the purpose of inhibiting the free association of young black African Americans and to inhibit the playing of ‘urban’ styles of music such as R & B, Hip-Hop and Go-Go music.” Am. Compl. ¶ 119. Defendants, pointing out that Plaintiff had not obtained either their consent or the Court’s leave to amend as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), have moved to strike the amended complaint, with the exception of Plaintiffs Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment claims. Defs.’ Mot. Strike at 6, ECF No. 14-1. Alternatively, Defendants move to dismiss all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Id. at 1. . C. Plaintiffs Supplemental Complaint On July 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed a two-page motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint to include events that occurred after Plaintiff filed its first complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d). Pl.’s Mot. Leave to Suppl. Compl. at 1-2., ECF No. 18. The supplemental complaint named four new Defendants: Amy Sehmidt-Banker, an OAG attorney who prosecuted a noise violation complaint against Plaintiff; Alexander Pope, III, a Sergeant with MPD who responded to an assault at Plaintiffs establishment and reported to an ABRA investigator regarding Plaintiffs handling of the incident; and Board members Victor Rodriguez and James Short, Jr. The supplemental complaint also included six new claims: three claims of First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defamation per se claim, a defamation per quod claim, and an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. According to Plaintiff, Ms. Schmidt violated Plaintiffs First Amendment rights by fabricating a noise complaint against Plaintiff in retaliation for the filing of this lawsuit. . Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 58-63, ECF No. 18-1. Plaintiff alleges that it received a Notice of Status Hearing and Show Cause hearing on March 13, 2013 — approximately one month after Plaintiff filed its first complaint-detailing a noise complaint that allegedly occurred more than seven months prior, on July 26, 2012. Id. ¶¶ 6-9. Citing inconsistent allegations regarding the time the noise violation occurred, the inability of the ABRA investigator to provide details about the complainant, and the Board’s decision to dismiss the charge for lack of sufficient evidence, Plaintiff alleges that the investigative report and other documents related to the noise complaint “were wholly fabricated by Schmidt and other unknown persons” after Plaintiff filed its first complaint in this case. Id. ¶¶ 10-24. Next, Plaintiff alleges that the Board cancelled Plaintiffs liquor license and closed its establishment on May 14, 2014, for the improper purpose of interfering with this suit and in violation of Plaintiffs First Amendment rights. Id. ¶¶ 72-79. By way of background, Plaintiff explains that it properly submitted its license renewal application on September 6, 2013, but that Plaintiffs representative became ill and failed to appear or to request a continuance of Plaintiffs December 11, 2013, status hearing. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. As a consequence of Plaintiffs failure to appear, the Board dismissed the September 2013 renewal application. Id. ¶27. Plaintiff subsequently requested that its application be reinstated, but the Board refused, so Plaintiff reapplied for renewal on February 7, 2014. Id. ¶¶ 28-30.. The Board held a hearing on the second renewal application on April 21, 2014, but Plaintiff contends it did not receive notice of the scheduling of the hearing. Id. ¶¶ 31-33. When Plaintiff again failed to appear, the Board dismissed the second renewal application and instructed Plaintiff that it could request reinstatement of its application within ten days. Id. ¶¶32, 34. Plaintiff did not request reinstatement of the second renewal application and instead submitted a third renewal application to ABRA on April 28, 2014. Id. ¶¶ 33, 35. On May 12, 2014, the Board ordered Plaintiff to cease selling alcoholic beverages, citing Plaintiffs failure to apply for reinstatement of its second renewal application. Id. ¶¶ 36-37. The Board’s order, however, failed to acknowledge the fact that Plaintiff had already filed a third renewal application with ABRA. Id. Plaintiff alleges that its third application was readily evident, that its license was not yet expired, and that the Board’s decision to order Plaintiff to cease operations was predicated on “information they knew or should have known by reasonable inquiry to be false.” Id. ¶¶ 36-37, 74-76. The Board subsequently vacated the May 12 order on May 21, 2014, and it permitted Plaintiff to resume operations while its third renewal application was being processed. Board Order 2014-228 at 67, Defs.’ Ex. J, ECF No. 19-2. On May 24, 2014, three days after the Board allowed Plaintiff to resume operations, an assault occurred in Plaintiffs establishment. See Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 38-39. The Chief of MPD temporarily suspended the operation of Plaintiffs establishment, finding that the violent crime was directly connected to Plaintiffs establishment and that it severely endangered the public. Id. Plaintiff alleges that MPD’s Sergeant Pope, who responded to the assault, falsely reported to an ABRA investigator that the establishment did not immediately comply with police instructions after the assault, that emergency respondents had difficulty reaching and transporting the victim due to the establishment’s lack of assistance, that Plaintiffs staff were not cooperative, and that the scene was chaotic. Id. ¶¶ 40-46. Plaintiff contends that Sergeant Pope denied making those allegations when he took the stand at a subsequent evidentiary hearing before the Board, that video evidence contradicted a number of the allegations, and that the Board’s June 6, 2014, order suspending Plaintiffs liquor license contained a number of factual assertions that lacked evidentiary support. Id. ¶¶ 46-56. Accordingly, Plaintiff claims that the Board’s June 2014 order was based on information known by the Board to be false and intended to interfere with Plaintiffs prosecution of this case in violation of Plaintiffs First Amendment rights. Plaintiff also alleges that Sergeant Pope’s false statements to the ABRA investigator constitute defamation per se and defamation per quod, id. ¶¶ 80-94, and that Defendants have conspired to deprive Plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Id. ¶¶ 95-98. Defendants oppose Plaintiffs motion to file a supplemental complaint on the grounds that to allow it would be futile. Defs.’ Opp’n Mot. Leave to Suppl. Compl., ECF No. 19. III. LEGAL STANDARDS A. Legal Standards for Amending and Supplementing a Complaint Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, if a plaintiff wants to amend his complaint more than 21 days after a responsive pleading has been filed, he must seek consent from the defendants or leave from the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Virtue v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Ret. & Family Prat. Plan, 893 F.Supp.2d 46, 47-48 (D.D.C.2012). Pursuant to Rule 15, a court should grant leave to amend a complaint when “justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999, 1003 (D.C.Cir.1996). However, a court may deny a motion to amend if the amendment would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); see James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1996). “An amendment would be futile if it merely restates the same facts as the original complaint in different terms, reasserts a claim on which the court previously ruled, fails to state a legal theory or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Robinson v. Detroit News, Inc., 211 F.Supp.2d 101, 114 (D.D.C.2002); see also Oladokun v. Corr. Treatment Facility, 5 F.Supp.3d 7, 13 (D.D.C.2013) (“[I]n assessing an argument that an amendment would be futile, the court must assess the proposed amendments under the same standard as would be applied to a motion to dismiss.”). Unlike an amended complaint, which “typically rest on matters in place prior to the filing of the original pleading,” United States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 385 (D.C.Cir.2002), a supplemental complaint sets forth “transaction[s], oecurrence[s], or event[s] that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). A supplemental complaint is used “to set forth new facts that update the original pleading or provide the basis for additional relief; to put forward new claims or defenses based on events that took place after the original complaint or answer was filed; [and] to include new parties where subsequent events have made it necessary to do so.” Hicks, 283 F.3d at 386 (citing 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1504 (3d ed.2010)). Before filing a supplemental complaint, a plaintiff must first seek the Court’s permission. Hall v. C.I.A., 437 F.3d 94, 100 (D.C.Cir.2006) (“Such supplements always require leave of the court.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (providing that a court “may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading”). A motion to supplement a pleading is “to be freely granted when doing so will promote the economic and speedy disposition of the entire controversy between the parties, will not cause undue delay or trial inconvenience, and will not prejudice the rights of any of the other parties to the action.” Hall, 437 F.3d at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted). As is the case when a plaintiff seeks leave to amend a complaint, however, a court may deny a motion to file a supplemental complaint as futile “if the proposed claim[s] would not survive a motion to dismiss.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 480 (D.C.Cir.2012) (affirming denial of leave to file a supplemental complaint); Oladokun, 5 F.Supp.3d at 13 (explaining that when a party argues that a claim is futile because it would not survive a motion to dismiss, the claim is analyzed “under the same standard as would be applied to a motion to dismiss” pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)). B. Legal Standard for Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim” in order to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) does not test a plaintiffs ultimate likelihood of success on the merits; rather, it tests whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). A court considering such a motion presumes that the complaint’s factual allegations are true and construes them liberally in the plaintiffs favor. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.D.C.2000). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elements of its prima facie case in the complaint. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-14, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Bryant v. Pepco, 730 F.Supp.2d 25, 28-29 (D.D.C.2010). Nevertheless, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). This means that a plaintiffs factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclu-sory statements,” are therefore insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A court need not accept a plaintiffs legal conclusions as true, see id., nor must a court presume the veracity of the legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 5.Ct. 1955. IV. ANALYSIS A. Failure to Seek Leave to Amend: RICO & Takings Clause Claims Defendants first argue that this Court should strike Plaintiffs amended complaint — with the exception of those claims for which Plaintiff received the Court’s leave to amend — because Plaintiff failed to abide by the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Rule 15(a) provides that a plaintiff “may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (emphasis added), and Plaintiff obtained neither. By way of response, Plaintiff argues that it had already received the Court’s leave to amend its First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause claims, and it is aware of “no authority for the proposition that once leave is granted to a Plaintiff to amend a Complaint, such amendments are somehow confined to the exceptions specifically noted by the Court in granting the amendment.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. Strike at 1-2, ECF No. 16. To find such authority, Plaintiff need only have consulted the plain language of this Court’s March 31, 2014, Order. In that Order, the Court clearly stated that “Plaintiff is granted leave to amend its claims brought pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amend-. ment.” Order at 1 (emphasis added). The Order did not contain a general grant of leave to amend. Neither did it provide Plaintiff with leave to amend its two RICO claims, which the Court dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. Similarly absent was a grant of leave to amend Plaintiffs Takings' Clause claim, which the Court dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the claim was premised on the payment of funds to MPD and an obligation to pay money does not’constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. See BEG Investments, 34 F.Supp.3d at 87-88. And yet, Plaintiff has reasserted both its Takings Clause claim and its RICO claims without seeking leave to do so. This is not the first time that Plaintiff has attempted to amend its complaint in an improper manner. Indeed, the Court’s limited grant of leave to amend was intended to allow Plaintiff to correct precisely that problem. As the Court’s Memorandum Opinion explained, Plaintiffs brief in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss contained new facts pertinent to its First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause claims that did not appear in Plaintiffs complaint. BEG Investments, 34 F.Supp.3d. at 85-86. Because “a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss,” Coleman v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 94 F.Supp.2d 18, 24 n. 8 (D.D.C.2000), the Court was unable to consider those new facts when ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. In the interests of justice, however, the Court elected to grant Plaintiff leave to amend its Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment claims sua sponte so that Plaintiff might include all facts pertinent to those claims in its complaint. BEG Investments, 34 F.Supp.3d. at 85-86, 88. Once more, however, Plaintiff has attempted to amend its complaint in an impermissible manner, this time by ignoring the limitations of this Court’s Order and failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Plaintiff is correct that “this Court has denied motions to strike amended pleadings when a party intended to comply with, and did not cavalierly disregard, a scheduling order,” Greggs v. Autism Speaks, Inc., 987 F.Supp.2d 51, 54 (D.D.C.2014), but Plaintiff has, given no indication that this is such a case. Plaintiff is represented by counsel, and in the event that Plaintiffs attorney was unfamiliar with the requirements of Rule 15(a), Defendants’ motion to strike the amended complaint clearly set forth those requirements. To this day, however, Plaintiff has not sought leave to amend its complaint. Neither has Plaintiff suggested a plausible reading of the Court’s Order that would authorize Plaintiff to amend all claims, and the Court is at a loss to supply one. Plaintiffs final effort to defend its course of action is to assert that “Defendants’ hypertechnieal and baseless claim that the Plaintiff violated Rule 15(a) will matter little to anyone” when Plaintiff files its supplemental complaint, which “will make these amendments pale in comparison.” See Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Strike at 3. Though Plaintiffs clear violation of the Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Order may “matter little” to Plaintiff, the Court does not share this view. If Plaintiff viewed the Court’s sua sponte grant of leave to amend as too narrow, Plaintiff was free to seek the Court’s leave to make additional amendments. Plaintiff was not, however, free to simply ignore the limitations of the Court’s Order and the requirements of the Federal Rules. The Court therefore grants Defendants’ motion to strike Counts I, II, and V— Plaintiffs RICO and Fifth Amendment claims — from the amended complaint. See Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 22 F.Supp.3d 1305, 1320-21 (N.D.Ga.2014) (dismissing two counts of an amended complaint where the plaintiff did not seek the Court’s leave to amend as required by Rule 15(a)(2), and the claims were not among those that the Court’s order previously gave plaintiff leave to amend); Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 975 F.Supp.2d 20, 28 (D.D.C.2013) (striking second amended complaint filed without first seeking court’s leave); see also United States ex rel. Mathews v. Health-South Corp., 332 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir.2003) (“[Flailing to request leave from the court when leave is required makes a pleading more than technically deficient. The failure to obtain leave results in an amended complaint having no legal effect.”); Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 612 (10th Cir.1998) (“Because Murray’s amended complaint was not properly filed pursuant to Rule 15 [because he failed to seek leave of court or consent of defendants before filing], it had no legal effect....”). B. Futility of Amendment: RICO & Takings Clause Claims Alternatively, even if Plaintiff had sought leave to amend Counts I, II, and V as required by Rule 15, the Court would not have granted it on grounds of futility. An amendment is futile “if it merely restates the same facts as the original complaint in different terms, reasserts a claim on which the court previously ruled, fails to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Robinson, 211 F.Supp.2d at 114. “Courts may deny a motion to amend a complaint as futile .:. if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to dismiss.” James Madison Ltd., 82 F.3d at 1099. 1. Individual Capacity RICO Claims As Defendants correctly point out, the RICO and RICO conspiracy claims in Plaintiffs amended complaint are virtually identical to those previously considered and dismissed by this Court, reflecting only two changes. First, in the “relevant facts” section of Plaintiffs amended complaint, Plaintiff adds that “[i]n some instances, an establishment will schedule and pay for the Reimbursable Detail, but no officers will show up for the detail.” Am. Compl. ¶ 26. Second, Plaintiff has added to Count I the assertion of an interstate commerce nexus. See id. ¶ 107(e) (“By demanding payment to Reimbursable Detail program for the purpose of extorting money from the Plaintiff, the Defendants have obstructed, delayed, and affected commerce within the District of Columbia in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951”). Count II, alleging a RICO conspiracy, is entirely unchanged from Plaintiffs first complaint. Compare Compl. ¶¶ 87-90 with Am. Compl. ¶¶ 108-11. Plaintiff asserts generally that it “has endeavored to address and rehabilitate [its claims] to the Court’s satisfaction.” See PL’s Opp’n Mot. Strike at 2. But Plaintiff offers no argument or explanation as to how either of Plaintiffs proposed amendments could be considered responsive to the basis of this Court’s earlier dismissal of Plaintiffs RICO claims against Defendants in their individual capacities. The Court did not dismiss the claims due to Plaintiffs failure to allege either the existence of an interstate commerce nexus or the occasional unreliability of reimbursable details. Rather, the Court found that Defendants were “entitled to qualified immunity on the RICO and Hobbs Act claims because Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants’ imposition of a Reimbursable Detail violated clearly established law.” BEG Investments, 34 F.Supp.3d at 80. Plaintiffs proposed amendments do not change this conclusion. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs RICO claims are unable to survive a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, see id. at 80-84, and that Plaintiffs proposed RICO and RICO conspiracy claims against Defendants in their individual capacities would be futile. See Robinson, 211 F.Supp.2d at 114 (“An amendment would be futile if it merely ... reasserts a claim on which the court previously ruled.... ”). 2. Official Capacity RICO Claims Plaintiffs RICO claims against Defendants in their official capacities, presented for the first time in the amended complaint, are just as infirm as Plaintiffs individual capacity claims. “Because the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official,” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991), Plaintiffs RICO claims against the Board members in their official capacities are effectively RICO claims against the District of Columbia. Defendants maintain that this is a fatal defect, because a civil RICO claim “cannot be maintained against a municipal corporation.” Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 914 (3d Cir.1991). RICO provides a right of action against any “person,” defined as “any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property,” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3), and dictates that a successful plaintiff “shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee,” § 1964(c). There is no question that the District of Columbia is a “person” within the meaning of RICO, but that fact alone does not end the Court’s inquiry. Two additional matters bear on the ability of this Court to find the District liable under RICO: (1) the punitive nature of RICO’s treble damages provision, and (2) the inability of a governmental entity to form the malicious intent necessary'to commit the underlying Hobbs Act violation that gives rise to RICO liability. In Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), the Supreme Court described the well-established common law proposition that municipal corporations are immune from punitive damages. Id. at 259-63, 101 S.Ct. 2748. The Court explained that “officials’ malice should not be attributed to the taxpaying citizens of the community” via an award of punitive damages. See id. at 261, 101 S.Ct. 2748. The Court also cited with approval a state supreme court opinion finding that “a municipality could not be found liable for treble damages under a trespass statute, notwithstanding the statute’s authorization of such damages against ‘any person,’ ” because municipal corporations, unlike their officers, cannot commit willful and malicious acts. See id. (citing Hunt v. City of Boonville, 65 Mo. 620, 625 (1877)). The Court went on to observe that “[¡Judicial disinclination to award punitive damages against a municipality has persisted to the present day in the vast majority of jurisdictions,” id. at 260, 101 S.Ct. 2748, and that “[t]he general rule today is that no punitive damages are allowed unless expressly authorized by statute.” Id. at 260 n. 21; 101 S.Ct. 2748; see also Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831, 832 (D.C.1975) (per curiam) (holding that the “District of Columbia is not liable for punitive damages”). Applying the Supreme Court’s municipal immunity analysis to RICO, the Third Circuit observed in Genty that RICO requires an award of treble damages, “a civil remedy far in excess of the amount necessary to compensate an injured RICO victim.” Genty, 937 F.2d at 912. “[Blear-ing in mind the strong weight of authority which supports the characterization of treble damages as punitive,” as well as the absence of any express statutory language providing for municipal liability, the Genty court held “that RICO’s overall purpose to thwart the generalized harm wrought by racketeering activity, its dependence on statutory crimes, and the mandatory provision for treble damages are sufficient evidence of Congress’ intention that the treble damages provision serve a predominantly punitive purpose.” Id. at 914. As a consequence, the court concluded that a civil RICO claim could not be maintained against a municipal corporation. Id. at 914; see also Tengood v. City of Philadelphia, 529 Fed.Appx. 204, 209 (3d Cir.2013) (applying Genty and affirming dismissal of civil RICO claims against a city); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F.Supp.2d 269, 272 (D.D.C.2002) (describing the Court’s earlier grant of a motion to dismiss RICO claims against a municipal corporation that could not be liable under RICO for punitive damages). The Third Circuit is not alone in finding municipal corporations immune from civil RICO liability. In Lancaster Community Hospital v. Antelope Valley Hospital District, 940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.1991), the Ninth Circuit held that RICO claims brought against government entities must fail. Id. at 404. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[s]ince civil RICO damages are not merely compensatory, but are trebled, Newport is compelling,” and “public policy is offended if all the citizens of a state are made liable for extraordinary damages as a result of the actiong of a few dishonest officials.” Id. at 404-05. Moreover, the court explained, “government entities are incapable of forming a malicious intent.” Id. at 404; see also Newport, 453 U.S. at 263 n. 23, 101 S.Ct. 2748 (citing “respectable authority” that municipal corporations “cannot, as such, be supposed capable of doing a criminal act, or a willful and malicious wrong”). Because the plaintiffs RICO claim was based on a predicate criminal act with an intent requirement, the court concluded that municipal liability was not available. Id. at 261, 101 S.Ct. 2748; see also Pedrina v. Chun, 97 F.3d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir.1996) (applying Lancaster and summarily rejecting RICO claims against a city because “government entities are incapable of forming the malicious intent necessary to support a RICO action”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Second Circuit has also rejected claims that a municipality can be liable under RICO. See Rogers v. City of New York, 359 Fed.Appx. 201, 204 (2d Cir.2009) (citing Pedrina and holding that “there is no municipal liability under RICO”); Frooks v. Town of Cortlandt, 997 F.Supp. 438, 457 (S.D.N.Y.1998) aff'd, 182 F.3d 899 (2d Cir.1999) (noting that “every court in this Circuit that has considered the issue has held that a municipality cannot form the requisite criminal intent to establish a predicate act, and has therefore dismissed the claim against the municipality”). Against the weight of opinions from the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits, Plaintiff has failed to point this Court to a single case holding that a civil RICO action may be maintained against a municipal defendant. Plaintiff nevertheless characterizes Defendants’ reliance on Genty as improper and argues that this Court should rely instead on First American Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 948 F.Supp. 1107 (D.D.C.1996), which held that “[although the treble damages provisions of a civil RICO suit may suggest a punitive element, the overriding purpose of RICO is to provide a remedy to persons injured as a result of racketeering activity.” Id. at 1122. Plaintiffs reliance on First American, a case that did not address the subject of municipal liability under RICO, is unavailing. The Court in First American considered the question of whether RICO is primarily punitive or remedial only for the purpose of determining whether a civil RICO suit could survive the death of the defendant. Id. at 1122. Additionally, First American expressly distinguished the facts in Genty, where the treble damages provision was punitive because the case involved “potential municipal liability where actual damages were easily calculated,” from the facts in First American, where “the actual damages arising from a specific defendant’s actions may be difficult to assess.” Id. Plaintiff, however, has not suggested that the actual damages caused by the District in this case may be difficult to assess, and the Court has no reason to doubt that damages could be easily calculated based on the payments Plaintiff made to the Reimbursable Detail. Even if this Court were inclined to extend First American’s holding that RICO’s treble damages provision is .not primarily punitive to the facts at hand, Plaintiff has entirely failed to respond to Defendants’ argument that a municipal corporation cannot, as a matter of law, form the intent necessary to commit the predicate criminal offense that gives rise to civil RICO liability. See Defs.’ Mot. Strike at 11 (citing Pedrina, 97 F.3d at 1300; Brewer v. Vill. of Old Field, 311 F.Supp.2d 390, 398 (E.D.N.Y.2004)); see also Nu-Life Constr. Corp. v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 779 F.Supp. 248, 252 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (holding that governmental entities “are not capable of forming the criminal intent necessary for the commission of the predicate violations of the Hobbs Act, and therefore cannot be held liable under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(e)”). In the absence of any opposition to Defendants’ assertion that the District is incapable as a matter of law of forming the necessary criminal intent to violate the Hobbs Act and thus subject itself it RICO liability, the Court deems the matter conceded. See Local Civil Rule 7(b); Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 284 F.Supp.2d 15, 25 (D.D.C.2003) (“[W]hen a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that to permit amendment of Plaintiffs complaint to include RICO claims against the Board members in their official capacities would be futile. 3. Takings Clause Claim Similarly, even if Plaintiff had sought leave to amend its Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim, the Court would have denied the amendment as futile. Plaintiffs Takings Clause claim, Count V, is premised on the Board’s order requiring Plaintiff to hire reimbursable details, thereby requiring Plaintiff to pay MPD thousands of dollars for policing services. Am. Compl. §§ 125-130. This Court previously dismissed Count V for failure to state a claim, explaining that “a mere payment of money, without more, is not a taking within the meaning of the Takings Clause.” BEG Investments, 34 F.Supp.3d at 87. Plaintiffs amended complaint adds a single assertion to those allegations previously found inadequate by the Court: “Defendants have forced the Plaintiff to pay extortionate monetary payments to receive business permits without any legitimate governmental purpose.” Am. Compl. ¶ 129. Defendants, in response, have argued that res judicata bars the claim, and they have incorporated by reference their prior arguments for dismissing Count V for failure to state a claim under the Fifth Amendment. See Defs.’ Mot. Strike at 8-9, 9 n.5. Plaintiffs opposition, however, offers no counter-argument on the subject; indeed, Plaintiffs opposition is devoid of any reference whatsoever to the Fifth Amendment generally or Plaintiffs Takings Clause claim specifically. In light of Plaintiffs failure to respond to Defendants’ arguments in favor of striking or dismissing the Takings Clause claim as futile, the Court shall treat the matter as conceded. See Local Civil Rule 7(b); Jordan v. District of Columbia, 949 F.Supp.2d 83, 91 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing two claims because “[b]y failing to respond in their opposition, the plaintiffs have conceded [the defendant’s] argument”); Hopkins, 284 F.Supp.2d 15, 25 (D.D.C.2003) (“[W]hen a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”). C. Failure to Seek Leave to Amend: Title VI Claim New to Plaintiffs amended complaint is Count IV, a claim that alleges a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Although Plaintiff did not seek leave to amend its complaint to include a claim of race discrimination under Title VI, like the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI prohibits only intentional discrimination. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280-81, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 n. 23, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 156 L.Ed.2d 257 (2003) (holding that “discrimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment committed by an institution that accepts federal funds also constitutes a violation of Title VI”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (“Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment”). And Plaintiffs allegations in support of its Equal Protection Clause claims, which the Court did grant Plaintiff leave to amend, are virtually identical to the allegations offered in support of Plaintiffs Title VI claim. Compare Am. Compl. ¶ 114 (alleging Equal Protection Clause violation on the basis of the imposition of reimbursable details “to unlawfully inhibit the free assembly of minorities ... and to unlawfully inhibit the performance of certain kinds of music”) with id. ¶ 119 (alleging Title VI violation on the basis of the imposition of reimbursable details “for the purpose of inhibiting the free association of young black African Americans and to inhibit the playing of ‘urban’ styles of music”). Accordingly, in the interests of justice and in the absence of any demonstrated prejudice to Defendants, the Court will treat the addition of Plaintiffs Title IV claim as an amendment of Plaintiffs Equal Protection Clause claims permitted by this Court’s Order. The Court will not strike Count IV, Plaintiffs Title VI claim, for failure to comply with Rule 15, and will proceed to consider Defendants’ alternative argument that even those claims in Plaintiffs amended complaint that are properly before the Court must be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). D. Failure to State a Claim: Equal Protection Clause & Title VI Claims Defendants next assert that Counts III, IV, and VII, which assert violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, respectively, must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Count III alleges that Defendants’ imposition of the reimbursable detail condition on Plaintiffs establishment, “but not all other similarly situated businesses,” deprived Plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants imposed the condition “for a discriminatory purpose,” “to unlawfully inhibit the free assembly of minorities and certain economic or social classes, and to unlawfully inhibit the performance of certain kinds of music.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 114, 116. Count IV similarly alleges that Defendants’ imposition of the reimbursable detail condition “targeted establishments such as the Plaintiffs ... for the purpose of inhibiting the free association of young black African Americans and to inhibit the playing of ‘urban’ styles of music such as R & B, Hip-Hop and Go-Go music,” in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. ¶¶ 9, 119. And Count VII, which is unchanged from Plaintiffs first complaint, alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff “of the equal protection of the laws.” Id. ¶ 138. Pertinent to all three claims are Plaintiffs new factual allegations that BEG’s establishment is patronized “almost entirely” by “black African Americans between the ages of 25-40,” id. ¶ 29, and that the music it plays “consists mostly of R & B, Hip-Hop and Go-Go music” id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff also alleges that four other establishments that played similar music and had primarily African-American patrons were also subject to reimbursable detail conditions, see id. ¶¶ 40-95, and that a fifth, although not required to hire a reimbursable detail, was required to provide the names of two. Go-Go bands’ members to the Board before its indefinite suspension could be lifted, id. ¶¶ 96-103. Defendants contend that these allegations are not enough to make out a plausible claim for relief under the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, or § 1985. Specifically, Defendants point out that aside from a conclusory assertion that “not all other similarly situated businesses” were subject to a reimbursable detail condition, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to suggest that any establishment similarly situated to Plaintiffs, but for some protected category, was treated differently by the Board. Defs.’ Mot. Strike at 13-16. Without such allegations, Defendants contend, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible discrimination claim. Plaintiff counters that it has adequately alleged facts showing “palpable discriminatory animus,” citing four paragraphs of its complaint that describe the Board’s regulation of an establishment owned by a non-party. Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Strike at 14-15. In those paragraphs, Plaintiff alleges that the Board voted to continue the suspension of an establishment’s license until the establishment “provided to them the names of band members of two Go-Go bands,” that the Board required the establishment “to submit a list of its entertainment events ... on a monthly basis,” that the establishment “submitted a proffer letter” to the Board stating that it would not employ the two Go-Go bands at issue, and that the Board accepted the proffer and permitted the reestablishment to reopen on that basis. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 101-04. Accepting these allegations as true, one could infer that the Board harbors animus towards certain Go-Go bands, and that when restricting the abilities of those bands to perform at a particular establishment, it may have violated the rights of individuals who are not parties to this litigation. But such inferences are insufficient to support Plaintiffs claims that the Board violated the rights of Plaintiff and Plaintiffs patrons by imposing reimbursable details in a discriminatory manner on the basis of race and musical genre. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d .868 (2009), the Supreme Court explained that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must offer “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that allegation that the FBI arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men after September 11 did not plausibly establish discrimination on account of race, religion, or national origin where it was just as likely that the men were detained for non-discriminatory, national security purposes). In accordance with Iqbal, this Court warned Plaintiff in its prior Memorandum Opinion that although Plaintiff had leave to amend its Equal Protection Clause claims, Plaintiff was advised that “generalized claims of discrimination cannot survive a motion to dismiss if not supported by alleged facts.” BEG Investments, 34 F.Supp.3d at 85 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). This warning is no less applicable to Plaintiffs Title VI claims, which also requires factual allegations showing intentional discrimination. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 281, 121 S.Ct. 1511 (“Title VI itself directly reaches only instances of intentional discrimination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A careful review of Plaintiffs amended complaint shows that it lacks adequate factual allegations to make its conclusory assertions of discrimination plausible rather than merely possible. The Court accepts as true Plaintiffs non-conclusory assertions that five establishments in the District of Columbia, including Plaintiffs, that play primarily R & B, Hip-Hop, and Go-Go Music and that are patronized primarily by African-Americans, have been required to hire reimbursable details. Missing from Plaintiffs complaint, however, are any factual allegations supporting its conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent and differential treatment. For example, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants have placed any genre- or band-related restrictions on Plaintiff, or even that the Board was aware that Plaintiff played R & B, Go-Go, and Hip-Hop music. And the only mention of musical genres in the Board’s Order imposing the reimbursable detail condition on Plaintiff is a factual summary of the testimony of the establishment’s manager, who said that “[ojcassionally, the establishment ... has jazz groups perform on Sundays.” See Board Order 2011-289 at 4, Defs.’ Ex. A. Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to allege that the Board members who imposed the reimbursable condition, professedly in the interest of public safety following reports of multiple violent incidents at Plaintiffs establishment, were aware that the majority of Plaintiffs patrons were African American. The amended complaint is also devoid of any factual allegations suggesting that similar establishments that were patronized primarily by other races or that played primarily other genres of music were not subject to reimbursable detail conditions, Plaintiffs conclusory assertion that the Board imposed reimbursable detail conditions on “Plaintiff but not all similarly situated businesses,” Am. Compl. ¶ 115, is no substitute for factual allegations. See Mpras v. District of Columbia, NO.2014-CV-00220, 74 F.Supp.3d 265, 271, 2014 WL 6603303, at *5 (D.D.C.2014) (rejecting as conclusory the complaint’s allegation that the plaintiff was treated differently from those “similarly situated” where complaint did not allege any supporting facts “about who these other persons are or how they were similarly situated”); Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray, 27 F.Supp.3d 142, 159 (D.D.C.2014) (holding that plaintiffs failure “to identify any neighborhood, much less one that is a similarly situated ... that has been treated more favorably ... is insufficient to demonstrate a racially discriminatory purpose behind Defendant’s actions and, therefore, insufficient to ‘plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief under the Equal Protection Clause”). Plaintiff does allege that its “attorney’s research has indicated no kind of imposition of police details upon establishments not catering to young black African Americans,” but it does so only in its opposition brief. Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Strike at 14. As this Court previously informed Plaintiff, however, “the Court cannot consider facts alleged in the briefing when ruling on a Motion to Dismiss. ‘It is axiomatic that a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.’ ” BEG Investments, 34 F.Supp.3d at 85 (quoting Coleman v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 94 F.Supp.2d 18, 24 n. 8 (D.D.C.2000)). Plaintiff also protests that it is not its burden at any point in this litigation to “prove a negative,” and that it should be the Defendants’ burden to come forward with evidence that establishments patronized by other races were treated similarly. See Pl.’s Opp’n. Mot. Strike at 14. Plaintiff then cites a series of cases suggesting that a party ought not be required to prove a negative, and that the preferred approach is to put “the burden of coming forward with evidence on the party with superior access to the affirmative information.” Sissoko v. Rocha, 440 F.3d 1145, 1162 (9th Cir.2006) opinion withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh’g, 509 F.3d 947 (9th Cir.2007). As Defendants point out, however, Board orders — including those imposing reimbursable detail conditions on other establishment — are publically available, and indeed, Plaintiff cites a number of them in its amended complaint. More to the point, burdens of proof and production are irrelevant to the issue at hand: Plaintiffs pleading obligations. Plaintiff need not come forward with any evidence at this stage of the proceedings, but its failure to allege any facts supporting its assertion of discriminatory intent or demonstrating that any similarly situated establishments were treated differently makes the claim of discriminatory treatment less than plausible. See Jones v. Nat’l Council on Disability, No. CV 13-1691, 66 F.Supp.3d 94, 103, 2014 WL 4359167, at *6 (D.D.C.2014) (“To advance an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must assert facts that support the allegation that the government intentionally treated him differently from others who were similarly situated .... ” (emphasis added)), aff'd, No. 14-5244, 2015 WL 653308 (D.C.Cir. Feb. 5, 2015). As a consequence, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI, and the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts III, IV, and VII. E. Failure to State a Claim: First Amendment Free Speech Claim The last remaining claim in Plaintiffs amended complaint is Count VI, which alleges that Defendants’ imposition of the reimbursable detail condition unconstitutionally burdened Plaintiffs First Amendment right to play certain kinds of music at its establishment. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 131— 36. After noting that “[rjegulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of content presumptively violate the First Amendment,” Plaintiff alleges that Defendants exercised their “unlimited discretion to impose reimbursable details upon the Plaintiff’ in a manner that “imposes burdens upon its establishment for playing certain types of music.” Id. ¶¶ 132, 136; see also Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Strike at 20 (arguing that the “Board is impermissibly driving certain ideas or viewpoints from nightclubs in the District”). Plaintiff adds that its “establishment plays music specifically for the enjoyment of young black African Americans,” Am. Compl. ¶ 135, and that its music consists “mostly of R & B, Hip-Hop and Go-Go music,” id. ¶ 30. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs First Amendment claim is, in fact, a selective enforcement claim cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause and not the First Amendment. Defs.’ Mot. Strike at 12-13. Defendants note that although Plaintiffs complaint recites legal provisions applicable to the First amendment and “content-based regulations,” Plaintiff does not actually allege that the Board’s order imposing the reimbursable detail was itself content-based. See id. at 12. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that the Board has exercised its regulatory power unconstitutionally by imposing reimbursable detail conditions on certain establishments in an effort to discourage them from playing certain kinds of music. Because Plaintiffs claim is a selective enforcement claim, Defendants contend, it must be analyzed pursuant to Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, and because Plaintiff has failed to allege that it was singled out from similarly situated establishments, the “First Amendment” claim must be dismissed. Id. at 12-16. Alternatively, Defendants argue that to the extent Plaintiff truly did intend to state a First Amendment claim, it has failed to do so because neither the statute that authorized the Board to act nor the condition that the Board imposed regulates or references content, and the stated purpose for asserting the condition was the content-neutral governmental interest in curbing violence and noise. Defs.’ Mot. Strike at 12 n.8. The precise nature of Plaintiffs First Amendment claim is not immediately obvious from the amended complaint, which first cites legal principles applicable to content-based regulations that must be analyzed with strict scrutiny, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 132-33, and then complains of the Board’s exercise of its “unlimited discretion” to burden Plaintiffs establishment “for playing certain types of music,” Am. Compl. ¶ 136. Plaintiffs opposition brief, which contains multiple pages of case citations, summaries, and quotations — the applicability of which Plaintiff does not discuss — offers only three sentences of argument that shed little light on the nature of Plaintiffs claim. See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n at 17 (acknowledging Defendants’ argument about its “intermingled constitutional claim,” but responding only that such claims “are not without precedent,” without addressing whether analysis of the claim as one for selective enforcement under the Equal Protection Clause is appropriate). In an abundance of caution, the Court will consider first whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged the imposition of a content-based restriction that violates the First Amendment, and then whether Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to make out a plausible claim of selective enforcement. To the extent that Plaintiffs amended complaint could be read as suggesting that the reimbursable detail condition on Plaintiffs liquor license is an unconstitutional “content-based regulation,” Plaintiffs claim fails. “Content-based laws are ... ‘presumptively invalid, and the government bears the burden to rebut that presumption.’ ” Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia, 798 F.Supp.2d 134, 145-46 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp. Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000)). But Plaintiff does not allege — and the condition itself does not reflect — that the Board imposed any restrictions whatsoever on the content or genre of music that Plaintiff may play while maintaining its liquor license. According to the Board’s order, Plaintiff was required to hire a reimbursable detail only if it elected to provide certain forms of live entertainment — a DJ or live music — regardless of whether the music played was go-go or gospel. See Board Order 2011-289 at 5-7, Defs.’ Ex. A. Furthermore, the Board’s explanation for its imposition of the condition was content-neutral. See id. (expressly stating that the Board was imposing the reimbursable detail condition to alleviate “negative impacts on the neighborhood” and in response to “concerns regarding the establishment’s effect on peace, order, and quiet” after “a number of violent incidents ... occurred at the establishment”). There is thus no question that the reimbursable detail condition is facially content-neutral, impacting indirectly only the “time, place or manner of expression,” purportedly for the purpose of ameliorating the establishment’s negative effects on the surrounding neighborhood. Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (holding that where a sound-amplification guideline was justified by “the city’s desire to control noise levels[,] ... to retain the character of the [area], and to avoid undue intrusion into residential areas,” the justification had “nothing to do with content and ... satisfie[d] the requirement that time, place, or manner regulations be content neutral” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The Board order imposing the condition proffers substantial, content-neutral justifications for imposing the reimbursable detail con