Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TOWNES, District Judge. In a second superseding indictment filed on December 1, 2014, Ali Yasin Ahmed, Madhi Hashi, and Mohamed Yusuf (“Defendants”) have been charged with crimes relating to their alleged support of a foreign terrorist organization. Defendants are charged with conspiring to provide, providing, and attempting to provide “material support or resources to” and “receiving military-type training from” al-Shabaab, a “designated foreign terrorist organization,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B and 2339D, and using, carrying, or possessing, including brandishing and discharging, firearms, including a machine gun, in relation to and in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Trial in this case is scheduled to commence on May 18, 2015. Currently before the Court are Defendants’ omnibus motions to dismiss the indictment and for other relief. (EOF Nos. 99, 100, 101, 103, 129,130,131,147.) LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS INDICTMENT Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) provides that “[a] party may raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial on the merits.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(1). In other words, Rule 12 authorizes defendants to challenge the lawfulness of a prosecution on purely legal, as opposed to' factual, grounds. See United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 75-76 (2d Cir.2012) (“[A] federal indictment can be challenged on the ground that it fails to allege a crime within the terms of the applicable statute.”). “The sufficiency of an indictment and the interpretation of a federal statute are both matters of law” reviewable on a motion to dismiss an indictment. Id. at 76. However, “[u]nless the government has made what can fairly be described as a full proffer of the evidence it intends to present at trial[,] ... the sufficiency of the evidence is not appropriately addressed on a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment.” United States v. Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772, 777-78 (2d Cir.1998). In considering the sufficiency of an indictment, the indictment “must be read to include facts which are necessarily implied by the specific allegations made,” United States v. LaSpina, 299 F.3d 165, 177 (2d Cir.2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and the Court must accept all pertinent allegations in the indictment as true, Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 n. 16, 72 S.Ct. 329, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952). See also United States v. Heicklen, 858 F.Supp.2d 256, 261-63 (S.D.N.Y.2012). FACTUAL BACKGROUND Arrest and Indictment On August 5, 2012 Defendants were arrested by Djiboutian authorities after illegally crossing the border from Somalia into Djibouti on their way to Yemen, allegedly to join another designated foreign terrorist organization: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. (ECF No. 153 at 17). Djiboutian authorities detained Defendants and Defendants allege that they were tortured by Djiboutian officials and subsequently questioned, while still in Djibou-tian custody, by two separate FBI teams. (ECF Nos. 99-2,100-1,101-1.) On October 18, 2012, a grand jury empaneled in the Eastern District of New York returned an indictment charging the defendants with crimes related to their provision of material assistance to al-Shabaab. (ECF No. 153 at 19.) In November 2012, Djiboutian officials turned Defendants over to the United States government, at which point they were brought to the United States for prosecution. (Id. at 17). On November 15, 2012, a grand jury returned a first superseding indictment. (ECF No. 15.) On December 1, 2014, a grand jury returned a five-count second superseding indictment against Defendants. (ECF No. 138.) Count One charges Defendants with conspiring to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, to wit: al-Shabaab, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(a)(l) and 2339B(d). Count Two charges that Defendants, together with others, provided material support to al-Shabaab, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(a)(l) and 2339B(d). Count Three charges that Defendants, together with others, attempted to provide material support to al-Shabaab, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(a)(1) and 2339B(d). Count Four charges that Defendants Ahmed and Yusuf, together with others, received military-type training from al-Shabaab, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339D(a) and 2339D(b). Finally, Count Five charges that Defendants, together with others, unlawfully used, carried, and possessed one or more firearms, including a machinegun, in relation to and in furtherance of the crimes of violence charged in Counts One through Four, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) and 924(c)(l)(B)(ii). The Government alleges that Defendants brandished and discharged one or more of these firearms. Current Motions Defendants filed the instant motions to dismiss the indictment, raising various constitutional challenges and challenging the sufficiency and timeliness of the operative indictment. Defendants also (1) move for a bill of particulars, (2) move in limine for an order directing the government not to use the terms: “terrorist,” “terrorist activity,” or “terrorism,” and (3) move for notice pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)(2) of uncharged crimes about which the Government intends to offer evidence at trial. (ECF Nos. 129, 130, 131.) Defendants also renew their motions to suppress, for all purposes, statements made to FBI agents while in Djiboutian custody and related relief. (ECF Nos. 99, 100, 101, 103.) While Defendants’ motions were pending, the Government filed a superseding indictment. In response, Defendant Yusuf filed a supplemental motion to dismiss, addressing the counts added in the superseding indictment, moving: (1) to dismiss Count Three, which charges Defendants with attempting to provide material support to al-Shabaab on multiplicity grounds, or in the alternative, for an order requiring the Government to “elect between” Count Two, the substantive count, and Count Three, the attempt count, and (2) to strike aliases recited in the indictment. (ECF No. 147.) DISCUSSION Statutory Framework On April 24, 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) was signed into law. On December 17, 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (“IRTPA”) which amended AEDPA. Three sections of these anti-terrorism statutes are at issue in Defendants’ motions. Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by AEDPA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1189, empowers the Secretary of State to designate an organization as a “foreign terrorist organization” (“FTO”). 8 U.S.C. § 1189; P.L. 104-132, Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, Sec. 302. Section 2339B of Title 18, enacted by AEDPA, makes it a crime to provide “material support” and resources to an FTO. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; P.L. 104-132, Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, Sec. 303. Section 2339D of Title 18, which was enacted by the IRTPA, makes it a crime to knowingly receive “military-type training” from or on behalf of an FTO. 18 U.S.C. § 2339D; PL 108-458, Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3761, Sec. 6602. Under § 1189, the Secretary of State may designate an organization as an FTO if the Secretary finds: (1) that the organization is a foreign organization; (2) that the organization engages in terrorist activity; and (3) that the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(l)(A)-(C). As amended, § 2339B imposes criminal liability, up to life in prison, upon “[w]ho-ever knowingly provides material support or resources to [an FTO], or attempts or conspires to do so.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l). The term “material support or resources” includes, inter alia, “personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself).” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(l). As amended, § 2339D imposes criminal liability, up to 10 years imprisonment, upon “[w]hoever knowingly receives military-type training from or on behalf of any organization designated at the time of the training [as an FTO].” Both statutes include an identical mens rea requirement, which requires that a person who “knowingly provides material support or resources” to an FTO or “knowingly receives military-type training from or on behalf of’ an FTO must also know that (1) “the organization is a designated [FTO] terrorist organization,” (2) “the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity” as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), or (3) “the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism” as defined in § 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2389B(a)(l), D(a). Both statutes also include an identical “extraterritorial jurisdiction” element, which provides a disjunctive list of circumstances under which the statute has extraterritorial reach, specifically, if: (A) an offender is a national [or lawful permanent resident] of the United States ...; (B) an offender is a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the United States; (C) after the conduct required for the offense occurs an offender is brought into or found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United States; (D) the offense occurs in whole or in part within the United States; (E) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce; or (F) an offender aids or abets any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph in committing an offense under subsection (a) or conspires with any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph to commit an offense under subsection (a). 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(d)(l) and D(b). A defendant in a criminal action under §§ 2339B and 2339D is precluded from challenging the validity of the organization’s designation as an FTO during his or her criminal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8). Defendants are also charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which is entitled “Penalties,” and provides, in relevant part: (c)(1)(A) ... [A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime— (i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years; (ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and (iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years. (B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation of this subsection— (ii) is a machinegun ..., the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(A)-(B). I. Motion to Dismiss the Indictment A. Defendants’ Constitutional Challenges Defendants raise numerous as-applied and facial challenges to their prosecution. They argue their prosecution in the United States offends due process. They also argue that the material support and receipt of military-type training statutes, as written, are unconstitutional because they: (1) are not tied to an enumerated power of Congress, (2) are vague and standardless, in that they leave to the executive’s “whim” the decision of who to bring into the United States for prosecution, and (3) violate Defendants’ right to have every element of each offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt because Defendants are not permitted to challenge the Secretary of State’s designation of al-Shabaab as an FTO. However, the statute is clear, and there is no constitutional infirmity with its clear meaning. 1. Defendants Do Not Challenge the Jurisdiction of this Court As a threshold matter, to the extent that the Defendants have framed their arguments regarding the extraterritorial reach of the statutes at issue as questions of “jurisdiction,” such.a reading has been definitively rejected by the United States Supreme Court. In Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., the United States Supreme Court explained that the extraterritorial reach of a statute does not “raise a question of subject-matter jurisdiction,” which “refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a case,” but rather, “is a merits question.” 561 U.S. 247, 253-54, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Yousef, 750 F.3d 254, 262 (2d Cir.2014) (“Jamal Yousef’) (clarifying that “whether [a statute] is intended to reach overseas conduct ... is a merits question that does not implicate the power of the district court to hear and decide the case.”). Indeed, “[i]n the criminal context, 18 U.S.C. § 3231 is all that is necessary to establish a court’s power to hear a case involving a federal offense,” regardless of “whether or not the conduct charged proves beyond the scope of Congress’ concern or authority in enacting the statute at issue.” Jamal Yousef, 750 F.3d at 262. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 provides that “[t]he district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 2. Due Process Limits on Extraterritorial Application of United States Criminal Laws Defendants argue that it is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution to prosecute them in the United States under any United States statute for conduct they allegedly committed entirely outside of the United States, as Somalis by birth and non-United States nationals. Defendants assert that any United States prosecution of them is unconstitutional because “nothing that the government has provided to date shows that the defendants] had any notice or reason to believe that [they were] subjecting [themselves] to U.S. law and could be hauled into a U.S. court for [their] conduct.” (ECF No. 129-1, Yusuf Br. at 4.) However, Defendants overstate the extent of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause’s protections. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes limits on the United States’ authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir.2003) (“Ramzi Yousef’). It requires “that a territorial nexus underlie the extraterritorial application of a criminal statute,” in order to “protect[] criminal defendants from prosecutions that are arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.” Jamal Yousef, 750 F.3d at 262 (citation and internal quotation marks and omitted). “The absence of the required nexus ... [is] grounds for dismissing [an] indictment before the district court[.]” Id. However, all that is required by the Due Process Clause is “a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States, so that such application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 258 (quoting United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir.2011) (quoting Ramzi Yousef, 327 F.3d at 111)). In cases involving “non-citizens acting entirely abroad, [such a] nexus exists when the aim of that activity is to cause harm inside the United States or to U.S. citizens or interests.” Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 118; see also Jamal Yousef, 750 F.3d at 262 (disavowing the term “jurisdictional nexus,” but explaining that due process requires a “territorial nexus”). In Al Kassar, the Second Circuit expressly rejected the argument that due process requires that a defendant understand that his conduct exposes him to criminal prosecution in the United States, explaining that: “The idea of fair warning is that ‘no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’ Fair warning does not require that the defendants understand that they could be subject to criminal prosecution in the United States so long as they would reasonably understand that their conduct was criminal and would subject them to prosecution somewhere. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 119 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted in Al Kassar)). Here, Due Process is not violated by prosecution on United States soil because the Defendants allegedly engaged in clearly unlawful conduct that was intended to “cause harm inside the United States or to U.S. citizens or interests.” Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 118. The Government has represented to the Court that it intends to prove the following at trial: (1) Defendants allegedly traveled from Europe to Somalia in order to materially assist and receive military-type training from al-Shabaab. (2) At the time when Defendants allegedly traveled to join and assist al-Shabaab, al-Shabaab had made public threats directed towards the United States and United States interests, for example, publicly declaring: [W]e say to the patron and protector of the cross, America: the wager that you made on the Ethiopians, Ugandans, and Burundians in Somalia was a failure, and history has proven it. Allah willing, we will attack them, roam [through their ranks], cut off every path they will take, chase away those who follow them, and fight them as insects and wolves. [We] will give them a taste of the heat of flame, and throw them into hell. (ECF No. 153 at 3.) (3) Defendants allegedly knew that al-Shabaab was engaged in terrorism. The statute requires the Government to prove that Defendants knew “that [al-Shabaab] is a designated terrorist organization ..., that [al-Shabaab] has engaged or engages in terrorist activity ..., or that [al-Sha-baab] has engaged or engages in terrorism....” 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(a)(l) & 2339D(a). The Government intends to prove, inter alia, that Defendants Yusuf and Ahmed served under Saleh Nahban, ■an al-Qaeda-linked Kenyan mujahid and leader of al-Shabaab’s foreign mujahideen fighters, who allegedly sent a mujahid who had trained alongside Ahmed and Yu-suf to assess the viability of a suicide bomb attack on, among other locations, the U.S. Embassy located in Kampala, Uganda. (EOF No. 153 at 9.) Thus, the Government intends to proffer evidence, which it contends will show that Defendants had “fair warning” that they might be held criminally liable somewhere for their alleged conduct because their conduct was “self-evidently criminal,” and they should have “reasonably underst[oo]d that their conduct ... would subject them to prosecution somewhere.” Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 119. Additionally, Defendants allegedly joined and assisted al-Shabaab, “a known terrorist organization,” in order to engage in violent jihad “with the understanding that [al-Shabaab intends] to kill U.S. citizens and destroy U.S. property.” Id.; see also United States v. Ahmed, No. 10 CR 131 PKC, 2011 WL 5041456, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2011) (finding prosecution of a defendant under the same statutes as are at issue in this case was “neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair” because “[t]aken together, the designation and knowledge requirements ensure that there is a nexus to American interests”). Thus, because “the [alleged] aim of [their] activity[, in materially assisting al-Shabaab carry out its mission, wa]s to cause harm inside the United States or to U.S. citizens or interests,” there is a sufficient “territorial nexus” with the United States. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 119. Accordingly, it does not offend due process to prosecute Defendants in the United States for their conduct abroad. If at the close of the Government’s case, the Government has failed to prove the required jurisdictional nexus, Defendants may renew their as-applied due process challenge at that time. 3. Is the Material Assistance Statute Unconstitutionally “Boundless ”? Defendants also raise what appears to be a facial due process challenge, without citations or clarification, asserting that § 2339B violates due process because it purportedly has limitless extraterritorial reach and leaves to the executive’s “whim” the decision of who to bring into the United States for prosecution. As a threshold matter, that a criminal statute could potentially be invoked to reach a large number of offenders and leaves the decision about who to investigate and prosecute to law enforcement and prosecutors does not render the statute unconstitutional, particularly where the statute concerns national security. As the Supreme Court stated in Bond v. United States, “prosecutorial discretion [i]s a valuable feature of our.constitutional system” which “involves carefully weighing the benefits of a prosecution against the evidence needed to convict, the resources of the public fisc, and the public policy of the [prosecuting sovereign].” — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2077, 2092-93, 189 L.Ed.2d 1 (2014). This is the norm in our constitutional system and is not grounds for striking down a statute. See also Doherty v. Meese, 808 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir.1986) (where petitioner challenged discretionary determinations of the Attorney General, the Court explained that “[t]he requisite judgment requires an essentially political determination [as it] ... inevitably affects United States relations with other nations ... [as well as] the complicated multilateral negotiations concerning efforts to halt international terrorism”) (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952) (“[M]atters [relating to foreign relations] are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.”)). Moreover, Defendants are mistaken that the statute has “boundless” extraterritorial reach for two reasons. First, the statute includes an “extraterritorial jurisdiction” element, which provides a disjunctive list of circumstances under which the statute has extraterritorial reach, specifically, if: (A) an offender is a national [or lawful permanent resident] of the United States ...; (B) an offender is a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the United States; (C) after the conduct required for the offense occurs an offender is brought into or found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United States; (D) the offense occurs in whole or in part within the United States; (E) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce; or (F)an offender aids or abets any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph in committing an offense under subsection (a) or conspires with any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this paragraph to commit an offense under subsection (a). 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(l). Thus, any extraterritorial application of the statute is limited by this list. Defendants assert that the list provides no limiting principle because subsection (d)(1)(C) is “all encompassing” and would cover anyone brought from abroad for the purposes of prosecution. However, as the Government explains, “extraterritorial jurisdiction must exist at the time of charging. In a case like this, w[h]ere the defendants were abroad when they were first indicted, Section 2339B(d)(l)(C) would not apply.” (ECF No. 153, Gov’t Br. at 35 n. 29.) Second, as discussed above, the statute’s extraterritorial application is limited by the requirements of due process. Due process requires, at a minimum, “that a territorial nexus underlie the extraterritorial application of a criminal statute.... ” Jamal Yousef, 750 F.3d at 262. Thus, there is no merit to Defendants’ contention that § 2339B could be invoked to reach conduct entirely unrelated to the United States. 4. Does the Firearms Statute Have Extraterritorial Application? Defendants argue that Count Five, the firearms count, must be dismissed because Congress did not intend 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to have extraterritorial reach. This argument was considered and rejected by the Second Circuit in United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700-01 (2d Cir.2012). Defendants argue that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010), and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1659, 185 L.Ed.2d 671 (2013), radically changed the way courts think about the presumption against extraterritoriality, and reversed the doctrine that the Siddiqui court relied on in reaching its holding — that the presumption has no application in criminal cases. In Morrison, the Supreme Court stated that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies “in all cases, preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.” Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261, 130 S.Ct. 2869. Nevertheless, in Siddiqui, which the Circuit decided after Morrison, the Circuit stated that “[t]he ordinary presumption that laws do not apply extraterritorially has no application to criminal statutes,” before holding that the jurisdiction of § 924(c) is coextensive with the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking offense to which it refers. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d at 700. As Defendants point out, after the Supreme Court decided Kiobel the following year, reiterating the broad scope of the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Circuit followed suit and held, in United States v. Vilar, that the presumption applies with equal force to civil and criminal statutes, “except in situations where the law at issue is aimed at protecting ‘the right of the government to defend itself.’ ” United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98-100, 43 S.Ct. 39, 67 L.Ed. 149 (1922)). Although Defendants are correct that one line in Siddiqui, if taken out of context, is no longer good law, there is no reason to believe that the Circuit would reach a different conclusion if asked to interpret § 924(c) after Kiobel and Vilar, This is because the Circuit’s holding in Siddiqui, that § 924(c) could have extraterritorial application depending on the predicate underlying criminal offense, was not premised on a mistaken non-application of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather, the Circuit’s analysis was based on the structure of § 924(c), a statute that, in essence, provides sentencing enhancements for certain categories of predicate crimes if firearms are involved. See Siddiqui, 699 F.3d at 701; see also United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 247 (4th Cir.2013) (“[A]s an ancillary crime to underlying [piracy] crimes that apply ex-traterritorially, § 924(c) applies coexten-sively with the underlying crimes.”); United States v. Viglakis, No. 12 CR 585 KBF, 2013 WL 4477023, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2013) (citing Siddiqui, finding § 924(c) applies extraterritorially because, inter alia, § 2339B applies extraterritorially); United States v. Naseer, 38 F.Supp.3d 269, 271-72 (E.D.N.Y.2014) (same). The Siddiqui court’s reasoning is entirely consistent with Morrison and Kiobel. Neither Morrison nor Kiobel requires Congress to employ some talismanic language to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather, the Court may look to the structure of the statute and with it, its incorporated predicate statutes, to determine whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted. See Ofori-Tenkorang v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d 296, 301 (2d Cir.2006) (“If necessary to ascertain Congress’s intent [about the extraterritorial application of a statute], we may also consider ‘all available evidence about the meaning of the statute, including its ... structure[ ] and legislative history.’ ”) (citation omitted). In reaching this conclusion, this Court finds the Circuit’s post-Kiobel decision in European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129 (2d Cir.2014), instructive. In RJR, the Circuit reversed a district court which applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to hold that the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., which is silent as to its extraterritorial application, could not have extraterritorial effect. Id. at 135. The Circuit explained that Congress “incorporate[d] by reference numerous specifically identified federal criminal statutes, as well as a number of generically described state criminal offenses (known in RICO jurisprudence as ‘predicates[J ” without limiting the predicates to the domestic realm. Id. Indeed, several of the predicates “unambiguously and necessarily involve extraterritorial conduct.” Id. at 136. In light of the structure of the RICO statute, which bases liability on the nature of predicate offenses, the Circuit looked to the predicate offenses to determine Congress’s intent. Id. (holding that “when a RICO claim depends on violations of a predicate statute that manifests an unmistakable congressional intent to apply extraterritorially, RICO will apply to extraterritorial conduct, too, but only to the extent that the predicate would.”). Here, like the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is silent as to its extraterritorial application and, like the RICO statute, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) are based on predicate offenses. The predicate offenses are defined as “any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Thus, guided by Siddiqui and RJR, this Court looks to the predicate offenses to determine the extraterritorial reach of § 924(c). Here, the predicate crimes of violence relate to international terrorism, and, as already explained, Congress clearly and explicitly gave those statutes extraterritorial effect. Accordingly, contrary to Defendants’ contentions, Morrison and Kiobel do not require this Court to decline to follow the Circuit’s clear holding in Sid-diqui. 5. Is the Material Support Statute Untethered to Congressional Authority? It is well established that “[e]very law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000) (emphasis added). Defendants argue that unless subdivisions (D) and (E) of § 2339B(d)(l) — which provide, respectively, that “the offense occurs in whole or in part within the United States” and “the offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce” — are construed as elements of an offense under § 2339B, the material support statute is unconstitutional because it is not tethered to any of Congress’s enumerated powers. This argument fails because the material support statute is tethered to several of Congress’s enumerated powers. Section 2389B criminalizes the provision of material assistance to FTOs — defined as organizations that, inter alia, “threaten[ ] the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(C). Congress may regulate conduct affecting the United States’ national security by invoking, inter alia, its power to provide for national security. See United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 137 (2d Cir.2011) (observing that § 2339B was passed pursuant to, inter alia, “the power of Congress to make laws necessary and proper to the nation’s defense”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964) (“That Congress under the Constitution has power to safeguard our Nation’s security is obvious and unarguable.”). Further, the United States is party or signatory to numerous international conventions and treaties relating to terrorism, and Congress may draw authority from its power to pass laws “necessary and proper” to carry out the nation’s treaty obligations. U.S. Const, art. I, cl. 18; U.S. Const, art. II, § 2; United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir.1998) (“Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause extends beyond those powers specifically enumerated in Article I, section 8,” thus “Congress may enact laws necessary to effectuate the treaty power, enumerated in Article II of the Constitution.”). Additionally, where an offense involves violations of customary international law, Congress may draw on its authority to “punish [offenses] ... against the law of nations.” Const, art. I § 8, cl. 10. Thus, Congress may criminalize providing material assistance to designated FTOs without drawing on its commerce or territorial authority because there are several other sources of authority pursuant to which Congress may regulate conduct that threatens U.S. interests, violates treaties, and is against the law of nations. Defendants next argue that § 2339B is unconstitutional because it does not include, as an element of an offense, a “jurisdictional element” expressly tethering each prosecution under the statute to one of Congress’s enumerated powers. In support of this proposition, they cite to a portion of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, in which the Court explained that the criminal statute at issue, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, was unconstitutional because, inter alia, it “contained] no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.” 514 U.S. 549, 561-62, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). Defendants are mistaken for several reasons. Lopez merely holds that where a statute is promulgated solely pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and the statute does not target “some sort of economic endeavor,” the presence of a “jurisdictional element may establish that the enactment is[, nevertheless,] in pursuance of Congress’ regulation of interstate commerce.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612, 120 S.Ct. 1740. There is no reason to believe that this language has any application to a statute not promulgated under Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. In Lopez, Congress’s only constitutional hook for passing the Gun-Free School Zone Act was the Commerce Clause, and thus, because the statute did not regulate economic activity, without a requirement that the firearm affected interstate commerce, the statute criminalized behavior beyond the purview of Congress. 514 U.S. at 567-68, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (holding that a statute which criminalized possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school was unconstitutional because “there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce”). Defendants wrongly assert that Congress only has the power to criminalize the material support of terrorism if Congress invokes the Commerce Clause. However, as explained above, Congress’s authority to enact § 2339B is not solely dependent on the Commerce Clause. Moreover, the “jurisdictional element” discussion in Lopez did not impose an additional requirement on lawmakers that each statute include an express jurisdictional element. The Supreme Court merely explained that Congress could reach conduct not traditionally thought of as affecting national commerce if, as an element of the offense, the Government proved that a defendant’s specific acts affected interstate commerce. United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir.1995) (“In discussing the lack of a jurisdictional element in Lopez, the [Supreme] Court simply did not state or imply that all criminal statutes must have such an element, or that all statutes with such an element would be constitutional, or that any statute without such an element is per se unconstitutional,” but rather, “[r]ead in context, the Court simply stated that the Gun-Free School Zones Act ... lacks a jurisdictional element to ‘ensure’ constitutionality, not to fulfill a prerequisite of constitutionality.”); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“[A]ll of the circuits that have addressed the question since Lopez (as well as those that have considered the matter since Morrison) have concluded that the absence of an express jurisdictional element is not fatal to a statute’s constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. Rather, ... ‘[t]he absence of such a jurisdictional element simply means that courts must determine independently whether the statute ... substantially affect[s] interstate commerce.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir.1999) (collecting cases)); United States v. Morales-de Jesus, 372 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir.2004) (“[E]ven a complete absence of a jurisdictional element in the text of a statute is not fatal to a statute challenged on Commerce Clause grounds.”). Thus, there is simply no reason to require that the Government identify, as an element in the indictment, precisely which of Congress’s enumerated powers supports any particular prosecution under the statute, let alone require that all prosecutions be supported by the same enumerated power. State of Nev. v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 449 n. 8 (9th Cir.1989) (“Congress is not required to identify the precise source of its authority when it enacts legislation. It is the duty of Congress to promulgate legislation, and it is the function of the courts to determine whether Congress has acted within the bounds of federal power.”). 6. Is the Material Support Statute Void for Vagueness? Defendants argue that the material support statute is void for vagueness because it includes an overly broad definition of terrorist activity and imprecisely incorporates definitions from the Immigration and Nationality Act. These arguments are meritless. “A criminal statute must clearly define the conduct it proscribes.” Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 415, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)). Vague statutes violate due process because they (1) fail “to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited,” or (2) are “so standardless that [they] authoriz[e] or encourag[e] seriously discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008); see also United States v. Rosen, 716 F.3d 691, 699 (2d Cir.2013) (“The [void for vagueness] doctrine ‘addresses concerns about (1) fair notice and (2) arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions.’ ”) (quoting Skilling, 561 U.S. at 416, 130 S.Ct. 2896). “The ‘touchstone’ of the notice prong ‘is whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant’s conduct was criminal.’ ” Mannix v. Phillips, 619 F.3d 187, 197 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997)). “The arbitrary enforcement prong requires that a statute give ‘minimal guidelines’ to law enforcement authorities, so as not to ‘permit a standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.’ ” Mannix, 619 F.3d at 197 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted in Mannix)). However, while “a law must provide ‘explicit standards,’ it ‘need not achieve meticulous specificity, which would come at the cost of flexibility and reasonable breadth.’ ” Mannix, 619 F.3d at 197 (quoting Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 747 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted in Mannix)). “A statute that is unconstitutionally vague cannot be saved by a more precise indictment, nor by judicial construction that writes in specific criteria that its text does not contain.” Skilling, 561 U.S. at 415-16, 130 S.Ct. 2896 (internal citations omitted). “Vagueness challenges to statutes not threatening First Amendment interests are examined in light of the facts of the case at hand; the statute is judged on an as-applied basis.” Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); see also Mannix, 619 F.3d at 197; Farhane, 634 F.3d at 138 (in vagueness challenge to § 2339B, explaining that “[i]n the absence of First Amendment concerns, courts generally view vagueness challenges to a statute as applied to the defendant’s case.”) (citing, inter alia, Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (“First Amendment freedoms are not infringed by [the statute at issue], so the vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied.”)); United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2d Cir.2003) (collecting cases). This is because “[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.” Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). In Farhane, the Second Circuit explained that: To the extent the Supreme Court has suggested that a facial challenge may be maintained against a statute that does not reach conduct protected by the First Amendment, the identified test is, in fact, only a variation on as-applied analysis, requiring the defendant to show “that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” [quoting Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497, 102 S.Ct. 1186 and citing] United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (observing that defendant mounting facial challenge bears heavy burden because he “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid”). Farhane, 634 F.3d at 138-39; Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 150 (Raggi, J., concurring) (“Where, as in this ease, defendants have already been prosecuted for specific conduct under the challenged law ... [the court] should ‘examine the complainant’s conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications.’ ”). (quoting Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497, 102 S.Ct. 1186). Thus, when considering a void-for-vagueness challenge to a penal statute outside of the First Amendment context, courts will uphold the statute if “the particular enforcement at issue [is] consistent with the core concerns underlying the [statute].” Dickerson, 604 F.3d at 748 (alterations in original) (quoting Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 493 (2d Cir.2006)). Put another way, “[o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.” Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974); Thibodeau v. Portuondo, 486 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir.2007) (“Even assuming, arguendo, that the statute did not provide ■ sufficient objective, explicit criteria to prevent arbitrary enforcement, the statute as applied to [defendant] would not be unconstitutionally vague because the conduct to which the statute was applied falls within the ‘core meaning’ of the statute.”). First, Defendants argue that the definition of “terrorist activity” in § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) renders § 2339B unconstitutional because § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) includes, in its definition of “terrorist activity,” “the use of any ... explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary gain) with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.” Defendants contend that incorporating such a broad definition of terrorist activity renders the statute unconstitutional because it “encompasses traditionally local activities — just as an example, gang violence in Amsterdam.” (ECF No. 129-1, Yusuf Br. at 36.) However, Defendants are not accused of engaging in purely local activities. Knowingly participating in a jihadi training program for the benefit al-Shabaab, planning and carrying out attacks on behalf of al-Shabaab, and featuring in online videos to recruit Westerners to join al-Shabaab all implicate the “core concerns” of the statute — international terrorism. Dickerson, 604 F.3d at 748; see also United States v. Kassir, No. 04 CR. 356(JFK), 2009 WL 2913651, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2009), aff'd sub. nom., United States v. Mustafa, 406 Fed.Appx. 526, 530 (2d Cir.2011) (summary order) (rejecting vagueness challenge to 18 U.S.C § 2339B, finding that “training young men and disseminating training manuals online for the benefit of al-Qaeda implicates the ‘core meaning’ ” of the statute); United States v. Warsame, 537 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1018 (D.Minn.2008) (rejecting vagueness challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, finding that “the alleged participation in an A1 Qaeda training camp is unambiguously encompassed within the plain meaning” of the statute). Given that Defendants do not contend that the statute is impermissi-bly vague “in all applications,” nor could they, as the statute is not impermissibly vague as applied to them, their non-First Amendment facial challenge to the statute fails because only as-applied void-for-vagueness challenges are cognizable. Farhane, 634 F.3d at 138-39. Therefore, this Court “address[es] Defendants’ vagueness challenge on an as applied basis.” United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 550 (2d Cir.1993). Second, Defendants argue that § 2339B is void for vagueness because the statute purports to incorporate a definition set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act contains two possible definitions which may be incorporated “[djepending on where one puts the quotes.” (ECF No. 129-1, Yusuf Br. at 34.) Section 2339B provides, in relevant part, that: To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that: (1) the organization is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in subsection (g)(6)), (2) that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or (3) that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989). 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l) (numbering added). Defendants take issue with the second of the three alternative knowledge requirements, which provides that “the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity,” because the statute attempts to incorporate a definition from the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act has definitions for both the term “Terrorist Activity” and the term “Engages in Terrorist Activity.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) and (iv). Thus, Defendants argue that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, in that it fails to fairly apprise defendants of what conduct is prohibited. However, there is no ambiguity because the definition of “engage in terrorist activity” merely incorporates the definition of “terrorist activity.” Section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which defines “engage in terrorist activity” provides: (iv) “Engage in terrorist activity” defined As used in this chapter, the term “engage in terrorist activity” means, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization— (I) to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity; (II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity; (III) to gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity; (IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for— (aa) a terrorist activity; (bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or (cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization; (V) to solicit any individual— (aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this subsection; (bb) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or (cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III) unless the solicitor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization; or (VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training— (aa) for' the commission of a terrorist activity; (bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity; (cc) to a terrorist organization described in subclause (I) or (II) of clause (vi) or to any member of such an organization; or (dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi)(III), or to any member of such an organization, unless the . actor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the actor did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv). Meanwhile, Section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which defines “terrorist activity,” provides: (iii) “Terrorist activity” defined As used in this chapter, the term' “terrorist activity” means any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if it had been committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and which involves any of the following: (I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle). (II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained. (III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of Title 18) or upon the liberty of such a person. (IV) An assassination. (V) The use of any— (a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or (b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property. (VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). As the Second Circuit has held, § 2339B incorporates the definition of “engages in terrorist activity” which is set forth in § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv), which, in turn, repeatedly uses the term “terrorist activity” and incorporates the definition of that term from § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). See Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 768 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir.2014) (“Section 2339B(a)(l) explicitly incorporates the meaning of ‘engage[ ] in terrorist activity’ from § 212(a)(3)( [B]) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)( [B] )(iv)(IV).”). Because the use of the phrase “engages in terrorist activity” is not vague, it defines the offense with sufficient clarity to allow ordinary people to understand what conduct is prohibited and is sufficiently definite that it does not permit arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 402-03, 130 S.Ct. 2896. 7. Is Defendants’ Inability To Challenge The FTO Designation Unconstitutional? Defendants assert, in a footnote without adequate explanation, that their inability to challenge al-Shabaab’s designation as an FTO under 8 U.S.C. § 1189 is unconstitutional because, as an element of the offense, “the organization’s threat to the security of the United States ... should be subject to proof beyond a reasonable doubt” and Defendants “have the due process right to be heard on this issue.” While Defendants are correct that they are not permitted to challenge whether al-Shabaab was properly designated as an FTO, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8), they are mistaken that proper designation is an element of the offense. Whether designation is proper or not “ha[s] no effect on the defendants,” because the relevant element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt is that defendants provided material support to al-Shabaab, which “was, in fact, designated as an FTO.” United States v. Sattar, 272 F.Supp.2d 348, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (it is not an element of the offense “whether the • Secretary of State correctly designated [the organization] as an FTO”); United States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F.Supp.2d 157, 166 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (rejecting First, Fifth and Sixth Amendment and nondelegation challenges to 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8), and collecting cases rejecting “[e]ach of these constitutional challenges ... in various appellate and district courts.”). The Government must merely prove, beyond a reasonable doubt that, as of February 26, 2008, al-Shabaab was designated as “foreign terrorist organization,” pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1), meaning that former-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (in consultation with the Secretary of Treasury and the Attorney General, after review by members of Congress), found that al-Shabaab “engages in terrorist activity” which “threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1), (d)(4); Department of State Designation of al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, 73 Fed.Reg. 14550-02 (March 18, 2008). Defendants are free to argue that al-Shabaab was not, in fact, a designated FTO. That they are barred from arguing that al-Shabaab’s designation was improper is of no event, because proper designation is not an element of the offense. B. Defendants’ Challenges to the Indictment Defendants assert that, for various reasons, the operative superseding indictment is deficient. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant’s right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” against him. U.S. Const, amend. VI. This guarantee is given effect, in part, by Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires that an indictment need only consist of “a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1); United States v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86, 98 (2d Cir.2000) (“The Sixth Amendment’s notice protection is implemented by the requirement of Rule 7(c)(1).”). In general, “[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, ... if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.” Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956). An indictment is facially valid if it, first, “contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend” and, second, “enables [a defendant] to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108, 127 S.Ct. 782, 166 L.Ed.2d 591 (2007) (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974)). Thus, “an indictment need only allege that a defendant committed a federal criminal offense at a stated time and place in terms plainly tracking the language of the relevant statute.” United States v. Rubin, 743 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir.2014). The material support statute provides that: (1) Unlawful conduct. — Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989). 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l). Thus, the elements of the crimes of providing material support, or attempting or conspiring to do so, are: First, that the defendant “provide[d] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization ... or attempted] or conspire[d] to do so”; Second, that the foreign terrorist organization was a designated FTO; Third, that the defendant acted “knowingly,” that is (1) the defendant acted “knowingly and intentionally” and (2) the defendant had “knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization ..., that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989)”; and Fourth, the offense occurred in the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States. See Farhane, 634 F.3d at 138 (finding that 2239B “does not prohibit simple membership in a terrorist organization. Rather, the statute prohibits the knowing provision of material support to a known terrorist organization. Proof of such provision (whether actual, attempted, or conspiratorial) together with the dual knowledge elements of the statute is sufficient to satisfy the personal guilt requirement of due process.”). The receipt of military-type training statute provides that: (a) Offense. — Whoever knowingly receives military-type training from or on behalf of any organization designated at the time of the training by the Secretary of State under section 219(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a foreign terrorist organization shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for ten years, or both. To violate this subsection, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in subsection (c)(4)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989). 18 U.S.C. § 2339D(a). Thus, the elements of the crime of receiving military type training are: First, that the defendant “receive[d] military-type training from or on behalf of an[ ] organization”; Second, that the organization was a designated FTO “at the time of the training”; Third, that the defendant acted “knowingly,” that is (1) the defendant acted “knowingly and intentionally” and (2) the defendant had “knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization ..., that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989)”; and Fourth, the offense occurred in the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States. The substantially identical extraterritoriality subsections of these statutes