Full opinion text
ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT CURTIS POWELL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 198); (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT JAMES WILBURN POWELL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 205); AND (3) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS DIANA AND JAMES BRADLEY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 208) TIMOTHY S. BLACK, District Judge. This civil action is before the Court on (1) Defendant Curtis Powell’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 198), (2) Defendant James Wilburn Powell’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 205), (3) Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 208), and the parties’ responsive memoran-da (Docs. 217, 221, 227, 242, 243, 244, and 245). I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Diana and James Bradley allege they were the victims of a real estate securities Ponzi scheme in which they lost at least $134,354.46. Plaintiff Cora Pyles alleges she lost $50,000 in a separate investment. Plaintiffs first filed this action on October 29, 2010. (Doc. 1). Twenty months later on May 17, 2012, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting a total of twelve claims against ten Defendants, including five new Defendants first named in the amended complaint. (Doc. 46). The claims against three individual Defendants have since been dismissed, and those persons are no longer parties to this litigation. Four individuals and three business entities remain as Defendants. The individual Defendants include James D. Powell (“James D.”), James Wilburn Powell (“James Wilburn”), Curtis Powell (“Curtis”), and Kevin Miller. James D. was the president of the three business entity Defendants, Capital Investments (“Cl”), Great Miami Debentures (“GMD”), and Great Miami Real Estate, LLC (“GMRE”). (Doc. 208, Ex. 9). James Wilburn is the father of James D. and the uncle of Curtis. James D. and Curtis are cousins. Count one of the amended complaint is asserted by Pyles against Miller for violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j, and Rule 10b5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. (Doc. 46 at 28-29). This is the only claim brought by Pyles, and it is not part of the summary judgment motions before the Court. (Doc. 182). The remaining counts were originally pleaded by the Bradleys against all ten Defendants. Counts two through five of the amended complaint assert violations of each of the four subsections of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962. Counts six and seven assert a violation and a conspiracy to violate the Ohio Corrupt Practices Act (“OCPA”), Ohio Rev.Code § 2923.32. Counts eight, nine, and ten assert claims for fraud, breach of contract, and negligence. Count eleven asserts a claim for fraudulent transfer under Ohio law, Ohio Rev.Code § 1336.04, and count twelve asserts a common law claim for civil conspiracy. By stipulation, Plaintiffs have narrowed the scope of the claims against James Wilburn and Curtis to OCPA, OCPA conspiracy, fraudulent transfer, and civil conspiracy. (Docs. 76, 87). Defendants Cl, GMD, and GMRE failed to answer or otherwise defend in this case and, on August 22, 2013, the Court entered default judgment as to liability and damages. (Doc. 188). The Court found that Defendants Cl, GMD, and GMRE were jointly and severally liable for $403,063.40 in damages, plus an additional amount, to be determined, of attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. at 5). Now pending before the Court are three motions for summary judgment. James Wilburn and Curtis move for judgment as' a matter of law on the four claims asserted against them. (Docs. 198, 205). Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the four remaining individual Defendants. (Doc. 208). Specifically, Plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment against James Wilburn and Curtis on the OCPA and OCPA conspiracy claims. (Doe. 208). Plaintiffs also move for summary judgment against James D. and Miller on their claims for OCPA, OCPA conspiracy, and one RICO count. (M) James D. and Miller did not respond to the summary judgment motion filed against them. Prior to moving for summary judgment, Plaintiffs filed motions for adverse inferences against James D. and Miller after both refused to answer questions at their depositions based on their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. (Docs. 187, 192). Neither filed a responsive memorandum. After dispositive motion briefing closed, the Court granted the motions and drew adverse inferences on forty-eight questions asked to James D. and seventy-three questions asked to Miller. (Doc. 250). II. UNDISPUTED FACTS A. Criminal Charges James D. and Miller pled guilty to federal criminal charges, based on their involvement in the real estate securities Pon-zi scheme that now forms the basis for this civil action. Specifically, James D. and Miller both pled guilty to a charge of conspiracy .to commit mail fraud; James D. pled guilty to an additional charge of wire fraud; and Miller pled guilty to obstruction of investigation. As part of their plea agreements, each signed a statement of facts admitting to the underlying conduct. (Doc. 192, Ex. 1; Doc. 208, Ex. 9). On November 20, 2009, Miller signed his statement of facts and admitted to his role in a Ponzi scheme that defrauded more than 80 victims out of over $7.3 million. (Doc. 192, Ex. 1 at 2, 4). On June 2, 2010, James D. also admitted to his role in the Ponzi scheme, which at that time was calculated to have defrauded over 90 victims out of a total of $9.2 million. (Doc. 208, Ex. 9 at 8). The Ponzi scheme began to form in approximately 2002 when James D. formed Cl, GMD, and GMRE. (Doc. 208, Ex. 9 at 1). James D. and his wife transferred real estate valued at over $2 million to GMRE in 2002. (Doc. 163 at 28). GMRE purchased, sold, and managed a portfolio of real estate properties. (Id. at 16). Cl held itself out as an investment company offering attractive rates of return on investments evidenced by promissory notes that were purportedly backed by the real estate portfolio of properties owned and managed by either Cl or GMRE. (Doc. 208, Ex. 9 at 1). GMD purported to issue Mortgage security promissory notes on real estate properties owned by GMRE. (Id. at 2). James D.’s statement of facts indicates that promissory notes and mortgage security notes evidencing an investment backed by a debt instrument, such as those offered by Cl and GMD throughout the course of the investment scheme, constitute securities within the meaning of federal and state securities laws. (Doc. 208, Ex. 9 at 2). Securities laws require that any firm offering the sale of securities must be registered and any person selling securities must be licensed as a securities salesperson. (Id.) Cl, GMD, and GMRE were not registered with the Ohio Division of Securities to sell securities. (Id.) James D. was never licensed as a securities salesperson. (Id.) Miller and Colwell were previously licensed as securities salespersons, but in 1999 and 2001 they were ordered by the Ohio Division of Securities to cease and desist in the sale of fraudulent unregistered securities. (Id.) Both surrendered their licenses at the time and were not registered securities salespersons when they sold the securities offered by Cl and GMD. (Id.) Around 2002, James D. and David Col-well, who was the owner of Midwest Marketing Alliance (“MMA”), agreed to a plan using their respective business entities. (Doc. 163 at 27). Colwell recruited investors, while James D. purchased and managed real estate. (Id.) Miller became involved in 2004 or 2005 when he began to work as a salesperson for Cl recruiting investors and selling securities. (Doc. 192, Ex. 1 at 5). Miller sought investors for Cl and GMD by falsely representing that the investments were safe and would be backed by income-producing properties owned by a local real estate development firm. (Id.) The Ponzi scheme primarily targeted elderly, unsophisticated, and inexperienced investors. (Doc. 192, Ex. 1 at 1; Doc. 208, Ex. 9 at 3). The victims were induced to roll over their pre-existing IRA’s into investments in promissory notes or debt investments offered by Cl and GMD. (Doc. 208, Ex. 9 at 3). James D. and Colwell arranged for Fiserv, an unaffiliated and presumably innocent entity, to serve as the IRA trustee/custodian for self-directed IRA accounts. (Id. at 2-3). On November 3, 2004, James D. executed a Declaration of Administrative Feasibility to establish retirement plan accounts with Fiserv for investments into Cl and GMD. (Id. at 3). James D. falsely agreed on behalf of Cl and GMD to provide investors “with all information and documentation regarding their investments.” (Id. at 4). Fiserv served as the trustee/custodian over the investors’ IRA accounts for tax purposes only. (Id.) Colwell was named as the Servicing Agent, which is required to be a “disinterested independent third party entity or individual,” to carry out certain responsibilities on behalf of the note holders or investors. (Id. at 3) Most importantly, the Servicing Agent was tasked with overseeing repayments to investors. (Id. at 4). In reality, Colwell personally obtained the investors’ funds and converted them to further the Ponzi scheme and for Defendants’ own personal use. (Id.) James D. and Miller admitted to participation in a conspiracy that made false representations and promises, and failed to disclose known material information, to investors in order to induce them to invest money in Cl and GMD. (Doc. 208, Ex. 9 at 46). Specifically, the conspirators falsely promised guaranteed annual interest rates that exceeded the investors’ current investment rates and falsely represented that the investments were safe and 100% guaranteed. (Id. at 4) Further, the conspirators falsely represented that the investments were backed by equity in real estate purchased or developed with investor monies and owned by Cl or GMRE. (Id. at 4-5). However, many of the properties were not even owned by Cl or GMRE. (Id.) James D. prepared at least two versions of a document titled Real Estate Portfolio, which purported to list the properties backing the investments in Cl by address, value, debt, income, and monthly payment. (Id. at 5; Doc. 246, Ex. A). The first version of the Real Estate Portfolio dated December 3, 2002 falsely stated that Cl owned thirteen properties with a total value of $4.8 million. (Doc. 246, Ex. A at 1-2). The final version dated September 15, 2007 falsely stated that Cl had increased its portfolio to forty properties with an overall equity of approximately $10.5 million. (Id. at 3-7). A number of properties listed in the Real Estate Portfolio were not owned by Cl or GMRE, and the property value and equity were falsely inflated. (Doc. 208, Ex. 9 at 5). By November 2007, the few properties actually owned by Cl or GMRE lacked substantial equity, were in a state of disrepair, were in default, or were in various stages of foreclosure. (Doc. 208, Ex. 9 at 5). By November 2007, the Ponzi scheme had squandered the investors’ money. (Doc. 208, Ex. 9 at 5). Nonetheless, Cl and GMD continued to produce monthly account statements falsely listing each investor’s principal investment and interest earned. (Id.) James D., Miller, and Col-well scrambled each month to come up money to make monthly interest payments to certain investors. (Id.) The Ponzi scheme continued to solicit new investors, using that money to make interest payments to earlier investors and keeping the remainder for their own personal living expenses. (Id. at 5-6). James D., as president of Cl, sent periodic letters to investors assuring them that their investments were doing well. (Id. at 6). On January 8, 2008, James D. sent a letter falsely stating that Cl was an active player in the investment industry and was producing yields well above the market average. (Id.) In late January 2008, the investors’ money was completely gone, leaving Cl and GMD unable to make any monthly interest payments. (Id. at 8). Colwell refused to continue to contact investors and demanded that his address be removed from the companies’ materials. (Id. at 8). On February 5, 2008, James D. wrote a letter to investors advising them of a “minor change” in the mailing address of Cl due to “some restructuring within the company,” but provided no indication that the investors’ money was completely gone. (Id.) On March 4, 2008, Colwell committed suicide by shooting himself in the head. (Doc. 108-8, Ex. 1 at ¶ 4; Doc. 162 at 18; Doc. 200 at 139). On January 10, 2010, Miller entered a guilty plea to charges of conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and obstruction of investigation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519. (Doc. 192, Ex. 1). He was sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment. On June 28, 2010, James D. pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. (Doc. 208, Ex. 9). The wire fraud conviction resulted from a series of real estate purchases and mortgage loan applications completed between 2000 and 2005. (Id. at 8-10). In 2000, James D. purchased a total of six properties for $750,000. (Id. at 8). The purchase price was financed through multiple bank mortgage loans and a promissory note and mortgage with the sellers. (Id.) On October 15, 2003, James D. defaulted on a balloon payment on the loan from the sellers, instead making on monthly interest payments. (Id. at 9). In November 2005, James D. sought to refinance one of the properties purchased in 2000. (Id.) On November 14, 2005, James D. signed a mortgage loan application that falsely inflated his income, listed a nonexistent asset, and failed to disclose a substantial outstanding loan in default. (Id. at 10). In total, the banks and the real estate sellers lost $944,848 from James D.’s wire fraud scheme. (Id.) On September 28, 2010, James D. was sentenced to 121 months imprisonment. James Wilburn made a brief, unsworn statement at his’son’s sentencing hearing in an attempt to offer mitigating factors. (Doc. 205, Ex. B at 33-37). B. Bradleys’ Involvement in the Investment Scheme Plaintiffs Diana and James Bradley first met Miller in 1996 when Miller was selling insurance. (Doc. 173-1 at ¶¶ 4 — 5). Miller sold insurance policies to the Bradleys and helped them establish a trust. (Id.) On Miller’s recommendation, James Bradley transferred approximately $66,000 into an annuity with Northwestern Insurance Company. (Id. at ¶ 7). In 2005, the Bradleys contacted Miller for assistance in making a change to James Bradley’s Northwestern annuity, which at that time had grown in value to $88,362.23. (Doc. 173-1 at ¶¶ 19, 23). Diana Bradley also had an annuity worth $45,990.77. (Id. at ¶ 28). Miller used the opportunity to pitch the Bradleys on the benefits of investing in CL (Id. at ¶ 20). Miller told the Bradleys that Cl was invested in locally-owned real estate, that Cl’s guaranteed interest rate of 6.65% exceeded their current annuities, and that Cl was a very safe investment. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-26; Doc. 192, Ex. A at 5). Based on then-discussions with Miller, the Bradleys transferred their annuities, worth a total of $134,353, to investments with Cl. (Doc. 173-1 at ¶¶ 23, 28). On June 1, 2005, the Bradleys received account statements from Cl signed by James D. (Doc. 173-1 at ¶29). Diana Bradley also received statements from Fi-serv, which stated that her money had been transferred to GMD promissory notes. (Id. at ¶ 35). The Bradleys continued to receive periodic statements from Cl and Fiserv from June 2005 to May 2008. (Id. at ¶ 37). On May 22, 2008, Diana Bradley received a letter from Fiserv stating that the GMD promissory notes where her money was invested had been administratively dissolved. (Doc. 110-18 at 20; Doc. 173-1 at ¶ 38). An account statement dated September 30, 2008 provided that Diana Bradley’s Fiserv IRA account had a balance of $55.58. (Doc. 110-18 at 21). In June 2008, the Bradleys received written questionnaires from the Ohio Department of Commerce, Division of Securities requesting information about their investments in Cl. (Doc. 173-1 at ¶ 46). The Bradleys contacted Miller for assistance in completing the questionnaires, signed the questionnaires in blank, and then permitted Miller to complete and return the questionnaires on his own. (Id. at ¶ 47; Doc. 192, Ex. 1 at 7). Miller falsely stated on the questionnaires that Colwell had recruited the Bradleys to invest in CL (Doc. 173-1 at ¶ 50; Doc. 192, Ex. 1 at 7). This conduct resulted in Miller’s criminal conviction for obstruction of investigation. (Doc. 192, Ex. 1 at 7). C. James Wilburn In December 2002, James Wilburn and his wife Betty Powell entered into a Land Contract to sell a mobile home park called Midwest to GMRE for $600,000. (Doc. 198, Ex. A). The Land Contract required James D. to make a $100,000 dowp payment and pay the remaining balance in $4,000 monthly payments at 6% interest. (Id. at ¶ 2). James Wilburn and Betty retained title to Midwest until GMRE paid the full balance of the purchase price. (Id. at ¶ 16). The Land Contract prohibited GMRE from assigning its interest without consent. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 17). James D. made timely monthly payments of $4,000 from January 2003 to April 2006, which amounted to over $160,000 in payments. (Doc. 200 at 59-60). On May 1, 2007, after James D. failed to make several monthly payments on Midwest, James Wilburn and James D. executed a Mutual Release of Land Contract, which cancelled the 2002 Land .Contract for Midwest. (Doc. 19.8, Ex. G). The Mutual Release of Land contract recited that James D. owed over $466,000 on Midwest, that James D. failed to make the required monthly installment payments since May 2006 and had failed to pay the real estate taxes since 2005, and that James Wilburn had loaned $120,000 to James D. (Id.) On June 28, 2007, James D. executed a Quit Claim Deed on behalf of GMRE to transfer any remaining interest in Midwest to his parents James Wilburn and Betty. (Doc. 208-16). Also on June 28, 2007, James Wilburn transferred Midwest to Curtis through a General Warranty Deed. (Doc. 198, Ex. O). James. Wilburn and Betty made several loans or payments to their son James D. in 2006 and 2007. On November 10, 2006; December 21, 2006; June 29, 2007; and April 4, 2008, James Wilburn wrote four checks to James D. for a total of $80,500. (Doc. 208-20; Doc. 216, Ex. 23 at 23, 26, 44). Three of the checks were made payable to James D. personally, while the $32,500 check dated June 29, 2007 was made payable to CL (Doc. 208-20). On September 14, 2006, Betty transferred $10,000 from her First Financial checking account to James D. (Doc. 216, Ex. 23 at 13). On November 1, 2006, Betty transferred another $20,000 to James D. (Id. at 22). Between September 6, 2007 and October 15, 2007, Betty purchased four cashier’s checks totaling $59,000 from her Fifth Third account made payable to James D. (Id. at 35, 37, 40, 41). Betty first opened her Fifth Third checking account in July 2007 and the account was solely in her name, James Wilburn was not authorized to make transactions. (Doc. 200 at 112). D. Curtis Curtis moved from Georgia to Ohio in 2003. (Doc. 195 at 96). Between 2003 and 2006, he saw his cousin James D. very infrequently, typically only on Christmas Eve and at the large church both attended. (Id. at 12). In the summer of 2006, Curtis worked construction for a company that purchased, refurbished, and then resold foreclosed homes. (Doc. 195 at 8). Curtis also assisted in finding and viewing foreclosed homes for the company to purchase. (Id. at 8-9). Curtis had never owned rental property, but he had a long-standing interest in doing so and kept an eye out for a property to personally purchase. (Id.) Curtis found a six-family apartment for sale by the owner and was quoted a price. (Doc. 195 at 9-10). No knowing whether this was a fair price, Curtis sought the opinion of his cousin James D., whom Curtis thought owned two nearby 12-family apartment complexes (Id.) James D. said it was not a good price, and the two did not speak again for quite some time. (Id.) Several weeks later, in late September or early October 2006, Curtis was performing construction work on a home listed for sale by his employer when James D.’s daughter and son-in-law came to view it. (Doc. 195 at 8, 10-11). About one week later, James D. called Curtis to arrange to view the home himself. (Id. at 10-11). James D. invited Curtis to lunch after-wards, which Curtis thought was to continue their conversation about the house. (Id. at 11-12). James D. used the lunch to pitch Curtis on an investment opportunity. (Doc. 163 at 122-23; Doc. 195 at 13-14). James D. told Curtis that he had entered a land contract with his father James Wilburn in 2002 to purchase Midwest for $600,000, that he made a $100,000 down payment, and that he owed another $425,000. (Doc. 163 at 122-26; Doc. 195 at 13-14). James D. told Curtis that he owned several other properties and could use Curtis’ help to manage and maintain Midwest. (Doc. 163 at 122-26; Doc. 195 at 13-15). James D. also told Curtis that he planned to refinance Midwest to help purchase another mobile home park called 8000 Hamilton. (Doc. 195 at 14-15). Then James D. told Curtis that the two could be equal partners on Midwest, which James D. said was worth $725,000, if Curtis came up with $50,000. (Doc. 163 at 122-23; Doc. 195 at 14-15). James D. said he would put Curtis’ $50,000 in an interest bearing savings or escrow account while James D. arranged the refinancing. (Doc. 195 at 15). Curtis, who expected the lunch conversation to center on whether James D.’s daughter should purchase the house, was caught completely off guard and asked for time to think over James D.’s investment offer. (Id.) James D. did not mention that he was in default on the Midwest installment payments, that he did not hold title to Midwest, or that the other properties he owned were in various stages of foreclosure. (Id.) James D. called Curtis about a week later to follow up on the investment offer. (Doc. 195 at 15-16). Curtis spoke with his father about the opportunity and then requested further information from James D. (Id.) James D. told Curtis that Midwest brought in $9,000 per month in rent, that the installment payments were $4,000 per month, and that the utility payments were such that Midwest turned a profit each month. (Id. at 15-17). Curtis returned again to his father, who agreed to loan Curtis the $50,000 because he felt that Curtis’ grandfather would be happy that the cousins were going into business together. (Id. at 17). Curtis wrote a $50,000 check to James D. on October 18, 2006. (Doc. 195 at 17Í8; Doc. 198, Ex. B). The two opened a joint checking account for their purported business and Curtis deposited $50 from his personal account. (Doc. 195 at 17-18). James D. told Curtis that he deposited the $50,000 check in a separate savings or escrow account to accrue interest before it went towards a down payment on 8000 Hamilton. (Doc. 195 at 15, 17-19, 31, 134-35). In reality, James D. spent the $50,000 almost immediately, something Curtis did not learn until late March 2007. (Id. at 31, 135-35). On November 13, 2006, Curtis met with Barbara Hoffman from Coldstream Financial Services to apply for financing in anticipation of purchasing 8000 Hamilton. (Doc. 218 at ¶ 10). On December 29, 2006, Curtis and James D. officially formed a company called C & J Property Enterprises, LLC. (Doc. 198, Ex. C). James D. worked with an attorney to draft the paperwork, which Curtis did not see or know about prior to the day of signing. (Doc. 195 at 104-07). An Operating Agreement and attached Exhibit 8.1 set forth their respective contributions and provided that each would hold a 50% interest. (Id., Exs. C and D). Curtis’ contribution was the $50,000 delivered to James D. two months earlier, which Curtis was unaware had already been spent. (Id., Ex. D). James D.’s contribution was to be $50,000 in equity gained from the future refinancing of Midwest and two other properties. (Id.) According to the agreement, James D. would refinance the properties and then transfer them to C & J, with James D. to retain any excess proceeds. (Id.) However, Curtis and James D. had a verbal agreement that the excess proceeds from the refinancing would go towards the down payment on 8000 Hamilton. (Doc. 195 at 108). Curtis had not heard about the other two properties set forth in the Operating Agreement. (Id. at 106-08). James D. told Curtis that the bank had made a mistake with a mortgage payment on those properties, but assured Curtis that he would resolve the matter soon. (Id.) Unbeknownst to Curtis, those properties were already foreclosed upon and James D. held no interest at the time. (Id. at 105-09). On January 1, 2007, James D. and Curtis signed an Assignment of Land Contract drafted by James D. (Doc. 198, Ex. E). The contracted purported to assign Midwest from GMRE to C & J. (Id.) Curtis gave James D. the assignment to file with the recorder’s office. (Doc. 195 at 27, 110, 153, 184; Doc. 198, Ex. E). Curtis thought that C & J owned Midwest on January 1, 2007 and began managing and maintaining Midwest for the next three months. (Doc. 195 at 26, 154). However, the assignment had no effect because the Land Contract required James Wilburn and Betty to consent to any assignment. (Doc. 198, Ex. A at ¶¶ 7, 17). James D. had never shown the Land Contract to Curtis, and Curtis was unaware that it contained an anti-assignment provision. (Doc. 195 at 14-15). James Wilburn had not given consent and did not learn about the purported assignment until late March 2007. (Doc. 200 at 77). To help conceal the assignment from James Wilburn, James D. delayed filing the assignment with the recorder’s office until April 3, 2007. (Doc. 198, Ex. E). In January 2007, James D. approached Howard Robinson to purchase an apartment duplex called Marlou. (Doc. 197 at 8-11). Robinson first met James D. in late 2006. (Id. at 6). Robinson described James D. as a person desperate for money but also a charismatic and persuasive salesman. (Id. at 6-7). For example, James D. successfully convinced Robinson to purchase a gun from James D. for $700 even though Robinson knew the gun was worth significantly less. (Id. at 6-7). On January 23, 2007, James D. and Robinson signed a contract to purchase Marlou for $235,000. (Id. at 9-10; Doc. 218, Ex. K). As part of the negotiations, Robinson loaned James D. $20,000, which James D. promised to repay at the closing. (Doc. 197 at 13; Doc. 224 Ex. B). On the memo line of the check, Robinson wrote that the money was for Marlou. (Doc. 224 Ex. B). Robinson repeatedly testified that James D. presented himself as the buyer of Mar-lou in January 2007 and that James D. never mentioned Curtis or C & J. (Doc. 197 at 8,10-11,15). James D. first spoke with Curtis about purchasing Marlou in late February 2007 and told Curtis that they needed $21,750 for the down payment. (Doc. 195 at 21-23). James D. convinced Curtis that they would use only $16,000 of Curtis’ $50,000 initial investment towards the down payment. {Id. at 22-23). James D. had told Curtis that his $50,000 was deposited in a savings or escrow account to which Curtis did not have access, and Curtis remained unaware that this money was gone. (Id. at 15,134-35). The closing on Marlou occurred on March 2, 2007. (Doc. 195 at 22). Only minutes before the closing began, James D. approached Robinson in the parking lot to tell Robinson that Curtis and his wife would be the real purchasers of Marlou. (Doc. 197 at 16-17, 35, 39). Robinson was caught completely off guard because James D. had discussed purchasing Mar-lou himself and Robinson had never heard of Curtis before. (Id.) Robinson testified that he received only $175,000 of the $215,000 purchase price at the Marlou closing. {Id. at 19-22). Robinson first realized this discrepancy during the closing, which also attended by at least one title agent. {Id.) James D. silently mouthed to Robinson that he would take care of the $40,000 difference, in addition to repaying the $20,000 loan James D. had promised to repay at the closing. {Id.) Robinson trusted James D. at the time so he took James D. at his word. {Id. at 65). Robinson repeatedly testified that James D., not Curtis or Wilburn, owed Robinson the outstanding $60,000. (Doc. 197 at 21, 27, 40, 50, 56). Curtis began to realize that James D. had defrauded him in late March 2007. First, James Wilburn told Curtis that C & J did not own an interest in Midwest because the Land Contract required James Wilburn’s consent for the purported assignment of Midwest to C & J. (Doc. 200 at 68-71, 77). Curtis also learned that James D. had lied about making the $4,000 monthly installment payments to James Wilburn. (Doc. 195 at 25-26, 28). James D. had been deducting money from the Midwest rent payments and told Curtis the money went to James Wilburn. {Id.) However, James D. actually spent that money on personal expenses. {Id.) Curtis believed that he had owned an interest in Midwest for three months and attempted to pay the three missed installment payments in an attempt to salvage his investment; however, James Wilburn refused to accept the money out of fear that doing so would tacitly recognize Curtis as a partial owner. {Id.)’ Still desperate to save his investment, Curtis gave $12,000 to James D. so that he could make the installment payments to James Wilburn. {Id. at 73-74). Later in March 2007, Curtis first learned that James D. had spent his initial $50,000 investment on personal expenses. {Id. at 31,134-35). On April 2, 2007, three months after forming C & J with James D., Curtis dissolved C & J and terminated the Operating Agreement. (Doc. 198, Exs. H, I). On April 17 and 26, 2007, Curtis reorganized C & J and declared himself the sole member. {Id., Exs. J, K). Additionally, Curtis removed James D. from the C & J checking account and changed the key to the post office box the two had previously shared. (Doc. 195 at 33-34,149). On April 6, 2007, James D. wrote three postdated checks to Robinson for a total of $40,000. (Doc. 197 at 27; Doc. 224, Ex. G). The three checks bounced when Robinson attempted to cash them in early May 2007. (Doc. 224, Ex. H). Robinson called Curtis soon after to tell Curtis that the checks bounced and threatened to call the sheriff on James D. (Doc. 195 at 21; Doc. 197 at 28). On June 13, 2007, James Wilburn repaid his son’s $20,000 to Robinson to prevent the situation from escalating with law enforcement. (Doc. 183-5 at 3). Between April and June 2007, Curtis and James Wilburn had extensive discussions regarding Curtis purchasing Midwest directly from James Wilburn. (Doc. 195 at 31; Doc. 200 at 68-71, 77). James Wilburn was impressed with Curtis’ management of Midwest, particularly the manner in which Curtis collected rent and maintained the property. (Doc. 195 at 111-12, 129, 136). Eventually the two reached an agreement for Curtis and his wife to purchase Midwest for $700,000. (Doc. 200 at 77-78). On May 1, 2007, Curtis signed a quitclaim deed conveying any interest C & J had in Midwest back to GMRE. (Doc. 198, Ex. L). Also on May 1, 2007, James Wilburn and James D. executed a Mutual Release of Land Contract, which cancelled the 2002 Land Contract for Midwest. (IcL, Ex. G). The Mutual Release of Land Contract recited that James D. owed over $466,000 on Midwest, that James D. failed to make the required monthly installment payments since May 2006 and had failed to pay the real estate taxes since 2005, and that James Wilburn had loaned $120,000 to James D. (Id.) James D. called Curtis in early June 2007 to request a $10,000 commission for his role in the Midwest sale. (Doc. 195 at 65-68). On June 14, 2007, Curtis agreed to the commission because James D. was the only reason that Curtis knew about Midwest and wrote a $10,000 check to James D. (Id.; Doc. 198, Ex. N). On June 28, 2007, James Wilburn and his wife sold Midwest to Curtis and his wife for $700,000 and transferred title through a General Warranty Deed. (Doc. 1945 at 52; Doc. 198, Ex. O). Also on June 28, 2007, Curtis and his wife purchased 8000 Hamilton from a couple who are not involved in this litigation. (Doc. 195 at 49, 103). Curtis and his wife signed loan applications for the financing on Midwest and 8000 Hamilton, and a HUD-1 statement for Midwest. (Doc. 221-3; Doc. 224, Exs. J, O). Curtis met with Barbara Hoffman in February 2007 to complete the loan application. (Doc. 195 at 61). Curtis and his wife received a $38,500 loan towards his purchase of 8000 Hamilton and a $682,500 loan on the refinance of Midwest. (Doc. 221-3; Doc. 224, Ex. O). Wilburn received a check for $469,500 from Silver Hill Financial as part of the purchase price for Midwest. (Doc. 200 at 97; Doc. 216-8). Curtis also executed a $215,000 promissory note to James Wilburn, which was secured by a mortgage. (Doc. 243-3). Curtis did not speak with James D. again until early September 2007, when James D. approached Curtis in a very desperate manner talking about suicide. (Doc. 195 at 6972). James D. said that he needed money to pay the mortgage on his own house and adamantly asserted that he held equity in Midwest. (Id.) Curtis was particularly sensitive to suicide because years earlier another cousin committed suicide and Curtis watched the children grow up without a father. (Id. at 70). Eventually Curtis borrowed $12,000 from another family member and wrote a check on September 12, 2007, which Curtis hoped would prevent his cousin James D. from also committing suicide. (Id.; Doc. 198, Ex. P). It was not until Colwell committed suicide in March 2008 that Curtis learned that James D.’s properties were in foreclosure and that James D. had taken money from other investors. (Doc. 195 at 174,181). III. STANDARD OF REVIEW A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to the Court demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine disputes over facts which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. All facts and inferences must be construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Where a “party fails ... to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). “[JJudges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles that might be buried in the record.” Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed.Appx. 733, 736 (6th Cir.2011). It is counsel’s responsibility and obligation “to point to the evidence with specificity and particularity in the relevant brief rather than just dropping a pile of paper on the district judge’s desk and expecting him to sort it out.” Wimbush v. Wyeth, 619 F.3d 632, 639 n. 4 (6th Cir.2010). The Court will not “sua sponte comb the record from the partisan perspective of an advocate.” Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 410 (6th Cir.1992). Rather, counsel must “identify this evidence and craft these arguments” supported by “specific citations to particular portions of the record.” Emerson, 446 Fed.Appx. at 736. “[T]he designated portions of the record must be presented with enough specificity that the district court can readily identify the facts upon which the [moving or] nonmoving party relies.” InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989). IV. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER James Wilburn and Curtis argue that Plaintiffs’ fraudulent transfer and civil conspiracy claims are barred by the statute of limitations. A claim under the Ohio Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”) requires proof that a debtor made a transfer or incurred an obligation “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.” Ohio Rev.Code § 1336.04(A)(1). The UFTA was enacted to “create a right of action for a creditor to set aside an allegedly fraudulent transfer of assets.” Esteco, Inc. v. Kimpel, No. 07-co-3, 2007 WL 4696855, *2, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 6323, at *4 (Ohio App. Dec. 20, 2007). “The tort of civil conspiracy is a malicious combination of two or more persons to injure another in person or property, in a way not competent for one alone, resulting in actual damages.” Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St.3d 464, 700 N.E.2d 859, 868 (1998). “An underlying unlawful act is required before a civil conspiracy claim can succeed.” Id. Plaintiffs’ UFTA and civil conspiracy claims relate to the Mutual Release of Land Contract and Quit Claim Deed divesting James D. of any interest in Midwest, and James Wilburn’s subsequent transfer of Midwest to Curtis. James Wilburn and Betty executed a General Warranty Deed on June 28, 2007, transferring title to Midwest to Curtis and his wife. (Doc. 198, Ex. 0). The Mutual Release of Land Contract was recorded on June 6, 2007. (Id., Ex. G). The Quit Claim Deed and General Warranty Deed were both properly recorded on July 10, 2007. (Id., Ex. 0; Doc. 208-16). Finally, Curtis’ $215,000 mortgage to James Wilburn was recorded on August 20, 2007. (Doc. 243-3). James Wilburn and Curtis contend that the UFTA and civil conspiracy claims related to the 2007 transfer of Midwest are barred by the statute of limitations. The UFTA provides that an actual fraud claim under § 1336.04(A)(1) is “extinguished unless an action is brought ... within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation was or reasonably could have been discovered by the claimant.” Ohio Rev.Code § 1336.09(A). It is undisputed that Plaintiffs’ UFTA claims, which were first asserted on May 17, 2012, were brought more than four years after the transfer of Midwest. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim is timely only if the one-year discovery rule applies. The dispositive question here is whether the Midwest transfer “was or reasonably could have been discovered by” Plaintiffs before August 20, 2011. Ohio Rev.Code § 1336.09(A). In determining whether a party should have discovered wrongful conduct, the relevant inquiry under Ohio law is whether the facts known “would lead a fair and prudent man, using ordinary care and thoughtfulness, to make further inquiry.” Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 465 N.E.2d 1298, 1300-01 (1984). If Plaintiffs “possessed knowledge sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent person to make inquiry and had such inquiry been made with reasonable care and diligence, it would have led to the discovery” of the Midwest transfer sometime before August 20, 2011, then the claim is untimely. Id. at 1301. The Court first addresses a preliminary matter. Plaintiffs insist that the Court’s two prior rulings that factual disputes precluded summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue prevents James Wil-. burn and Curtis from raising the issue in their current motions. (Docs. 147, 186). The Court’s second ruling denied Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment that the statute of limitations defense did not apply. (Doc. 186). James Wilburn filed his responsive memorandum to Plaintiffs’ motion on June 20, 2013. (Doc. 160). On June 25, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a motion to extend the discovery deadline to September 15, 2013. (Doc. 166). The Court granted the extension in part and extended the discovery deadline to August 5, 2013 and the dispositive motions deadline to September 13, 2013. (Doc. 169). Plaintiffs then moved for default judgment against the business entity Defendants on-July 8, 2013, supported by the affidavit of Diana , Bradley. (Doc. 173-1). Diana Bradley was deposed that same day. (Doc. 203). Courts have the inherent authority reconsider interlocutory orders when new evidence is available. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir.2009). Diana Bradley’s affidavit was not available to James Wilburn or Curtis in opposing Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 160). The only facts presented to the Court on its prior rulings involved whether Plaintiffs and their counsel were diligent in investigating matters after filing their original complaint. (Docs. 147, 186). However, Plaintiffs subsequently introduced new evidence that is highly relevant to the issue of whether Plaintiffs reasonably could have discovered the challenged transfer prior to filing their original complaint in October 2010. Notably, Plaintiffs filed this affidavit after requesting an extension to the discovery deadline and dis-positive motion deadline. (Doc. 166). Accordingly, the Court concludes that it is proper to examine this new evidence. The affidavit of Diana Bradley provides that on May 22, 2008 she received a letter from Fiserv, the IRA custodian, informing her that the GMD promissory notes where her money was invested been administratively dissolved. (Doc. 110-18 at 20; Doc. 173-1 at ¶ 38). An account statement indicated that Bradley’s Fiserv IRA account had a balance of $55.58 on September 30, 2008. (Doc. 110-18 at 21). Bradley asked Miller about the Fiserv letter, and Miller said he would have to look into the matter. (Id. at ¶ 40). About a week later, Miller informed Bradley that Colwell had been shot dead under mysterious circumstances. (Id. at ¶¶ 41^2). Bradley asserts she had never heard of Colwell, and Miller explained that Colwell had played an important role in managing their investment. (Id. at ¶ 41). Miller explained that Cl and GMRE could be forced to sell their real estate holdings. (Id. at ¶43). Several weeks later, in June 2008, the Bradleys received written questionnaires from the Ohio Department of Commerce, Ohio Division of Securities requesting information about their investments in Cl. (Doc. 173-1 at ¶ 46). The Bradleys signed the questionnaires in blank and permitted Miller to complete them. (Id. at ¶¶ 47-49, 51). Sometime thereafter, Mark Ballen-ger, an enforcement attorney at the Ohio Division of Securities, called Diana Bradley with follow-up questions about the questionnaires. (Id. at ¶ 50). Ballenger asked Bradley about Colwell, who was listed on the questionnaire as the person who sold her the investments. (Id.) Bradley denied that Colwell sold her the investments and told Ballenger that Miller had completed the questionnaires. (Id. at ¶¶ 41-42, 51). Fifteen minutes later, Miller called Diana Bradley in an “angry” tone to ask what she told Ballenger. (Doc. 173-1 at ¶ 52). Ballenger called Bradley again later that day, explaining that the Ohio Division of Securities was beginning an investigation into Cl and that she and her husband could be called to testify in court. (Id. at ¶ 53). Ballenger continued to speak with Diana Bradley about the investigation from approximately June to September 2008. (Id. at ¶ 55). On January 29, 2009, Diana Bradley received a letter from the Butler County Prosecutor informing her of an ongoing criminal investigation into CL (Doc. 173-1 at ¶ 65). The letter specifically advised the Bradleys that their money was gone and that they should consult with an at- tomey. (Id. at ¶¶ 70, 71). Diana Bradley spoke with Ballenger after receiving the letter from the Butler County Prosecutor about her mother’s investment with Miller. (Id. at ¶ 74). At Ballenger’s request, Diana Bradley sent Ballenger documents related to her mother’s investment. (Id. at ¶¶ 74-76). On December 30, 2008, the Ohio Department of Commerce filed a civil action against, inter alia, James D., Miller, Cl, GMD, and GMRE. (Doc. 108-8). On March 10, 2009, Diana Bradley received a letter from the court-appointed receiver for James D. advising her to submit a claim. (Doc. 203 at 93-94, 180). Diana Bradley responded to the receiver with a letter dated March 14, 2009. (Doc. 110-6 at 8-9). Bradley’s letter explained that the May 22, 2008 letter from Fiserv informed her that there was no money remaining in her IRA account. (Id. at 9). Bradley had called Fiserv shortly after she received the letter intending to close her account. (Id.) Bradley received another notice from Fiserv on January 10, 2009 charging her an account service fee. (Id.) On February 16, 2009, Bradley officially requested that Fiserv close her account and disburse any remaining funds. (Id.) Bradley received a check for $25.69 several weeks later. (Id.) Based on this new evidence introduced by Diana Bradley’s affidavit, the Court concludes as a matter of law that the Bradleys “possessed knowledge sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent person to make inquiry and had such inquiry been made with reasonable care and diligence, it would have led to the discovery of the alleged” fraudulent transfer of Midwest prior to August 20, 2011. Hambleton, 465 N.E.2d at 1301; Ohio Rev.Code § 1336.09(A). Specifically, the Bradleys received notice from four independent parties between May 22, 2008 and March 10, 2009 that there were serious issues with their investments and the persons tasked with managing their funds. Diana Bradley knew that her Fiserv account was worthless, that the Ohio Division of Securities was actively investigating the persons involved with her investment, that criminal charges were contemplated, and that a civil action was commenced. Most notably, the Butler County Prosecutor starkly warned Diana Bradley to consult with an attorney on January 29, 2009. (Doc. 173-1 at ¶ 65). During this time, Midwest was listed as a property owned by Cl in the Real Estate Portfolio. (Doc. 246, Ex. A). Under the totality of the circumstances, the Bradleys had “knowledge of such facts as would lead a fair and prudent man, using ordinary care and thoughtfulness, to make further inquiry.” Hambleton, 465 N.E.2d at 1300-01. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ fraudulent transfer and civil conspiracy claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Ohio Rev.Code § 1336.09(A). Y. OCPA and OCPA Conspiracy Plaintiffs move for summary judgment against all four Defendants on their OCPA and OCPA conspiracy claims, while James Wilburn and Curtis filed cross motions for summary judgment on these claims. James D. and Miller did not file responsive memoranda. A. Legal Standard The OCPA, which is primarily a criminal statute, is modeled after the federal RICO statute. These statutes were enacted to. “enhance the government’s ability to quell organized crime.” State v. Schlosser, 79 Ohio St.3d 329, 681 N.E.2d 911, 914 (1997). “The obvious intent of the General Assembly in enacting the RICO statutes was to reduce the' influence and power of organized crime in the state.” State v. Stevens, 139 Ohio St.3d 247, 11 N.E.3d 252, 256 (2014). In addition to providing enhanced criminal sanctions, the OCPA authorizes civil actions for treble damages to persons who suffered injuries proximately caused by the OCPA violation. 1. Substantive OCPA Violation The OCPA contains three distinct prohibitions: (A)(1) No person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or ■ indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity or the collection of an unlawful debt. (2) No person, through a pattern of corrupt activity or the collection of an unlawful debt, shall acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in, or control of, any enterprise or real property- (3) No person, who knowingly has received any proceeds derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of corrupt activity or the collection of any unlawful debt, shall use or invest, directly, or indirectly, any part of those proceeds, or any proceeds derived from the use or investment of any of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any title to, or any right, interest, or equity in, real property or in the establishment or operation of any enterprise. Ohio Rev.Code § 2923.32(A). Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges that each Defendant violated and conspired to violate § 2923.32(A) without specifying a particular subsection. (Doc. 46 at ¶¶ 220-23). However, Plaintiffs do cite each of the three subsections in their briefs and appear to argue violations of each provision. Accordingly, the Court will construe Plaintiffs’ amended complaint to assert a violations of each of the three provisions of § 2923.32(A). See Sheets v. Carmel Farms, No. 96APE09-1224, 1997 WL 303760, *5,1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2422, at *13-14 (Ohio App. June 5, 1997) (noting that the plaintiffs’ OCPA claims “are not models of clarity,” but construing them to assert violations of each subsection). To establish a violation of § 2923.32(A)(1), Plaintiffs must prove “(1) that the conduct of the defendant involves the commission of two or more specifically prohibited state or federal criminal offenses, (2) that the prohibited criminal conduct of the defendant constitutes a pattern of corrupt activity, and (3) that the defendant has participated in the affairs of an enterprise.” Hall v. CFIC Home Mtg., 175 Ohio App.3d 587, 888 N.E.2d 469, 477 (2008). A violation of § 2923.32(A)(2), sometimes referred to as an acquisition claim, requires proof: “(1) that the conduct of the defendant involves the commission of two or more specifically prohibited state or federal criminal offenses, (2) that the prohibited criminal conduct of the defendant constitutes a pattern of corrupt activity, and (3) that the defendant ... has acquired or maintained an interest in or control of an enterprise” or real property. Id. Finally, an investment claim under § 2923.32(A)(3) requires proof: (1) that the defendant knowingly received proceeds derived from a pattern of corrupt activity, (2) that the defendant used or invested those proceeds (3) to acquire an interest in real property or in the establishment of an enterprise. Sheets, 1997 WL 303760, at *5, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2422, at *13-14. There are two major differences between violations of § 2923.32(A)(1) and (A)(2) on the one hand, and § 2923.32(A)(3) on the other. First, § 2923.32(A)(1) and (A)(2) require proof that the defendant personally committed two or more predicate acts that constitute a pattern of corrupt activity. State v. Feliciano, 115 Ohio App.3d 646, 685 N.E.2d 1307, 1311 (1996). Although a violation of § 2923.32(A)(3) requires proof of the existence of a pattern of corrupt activity, it “does not require that the defendant have committed the acts that are the basis for the ‘pattern of corrupt activity.”’ Id. at 1314. Second, § 2923.32(A)(1) and (A)(2) are strict liability offenses, while § 2923.32(A)(3) requires proof that the defendant acted “knowingly.” State v. Schlosser, 79 Ohio St.3d 329, 681 N.E.2d 911, 913-14 & n. 1 (1997). Accordingly, “no culpable mental state is required” to establish that a defendant engaged in a pattern of corrupt activity for purposes of § 2923.32(A)(1) and (A)(2). Id. at 915-16. Rather, “if a defendant has engaged in two or more acts constituting a predicate offense, he or she is engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity and may be found guilty of a RICO violation” if the defendant also either participated in the affairs of an enterprise, § 2923.32(A)(1), or acquired or maintained an interest in an enterprise or real property, § 2923.32(A)(2). Id. at 915. Conversely, § 2923.32(A)(3) “refers to ‘knowingly’ receiving and investing proceeds from a pattern of corrupt activity, presumably to protect innocent investors, banks, etc.” Id. at 913 n. 1. The Supreme Court of Ohio summarized the multiple overlapping elements of a § 2923.32(A)(1) violation as follows: A RICO offense is dependent upon a defendant committing two or more predicate offenses listed in R.C. 2923.31(1). However, a RICO offense also requires a defendant to be “employed by, or associated with” an “enterprise” and to “conduct or participate in” an “enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity.” R.C. 2923.32(A)(1). Such pattern must include both a relationship and continuous activity, as well as proof of the existence of an enterprise. Thus, the conduct required to commit a RICO violation is independent of the conduct required to commit the underlying predicate offenses. The intent of RICO is to criminalize the pattern of criminal activity, not the underlying predicate acts. State v. Miranda, 138 Ohio St.3d 184, 5 N.E.3d 603, 606-07 (2014) (internal citations omitted). Many of the terms used in the OCPA are statutorily defined. “Corrupt activity” means “engaging in, attempting to engage in, conspiring to engage in, or soliciting, coercing, or intimidating another person to engage in” any of a long list of enumerated state and federal criminal statutes. § 2923.31(1). A “pattern of corrupt activity” means “two or more incidents of corrupt activity, whether or not there has been a prior conviction, that are related to the affairs of the same enterprise, are not isolated, and are not so closely related to each other and connected in time and place that they constitute a single event.” § 2923.31(E). “The com-mission of two incidents of corrupt activity-alone is insufficient to demonstrate a pattern of corrupt activity.” Morrow v. Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., 183 Ohio App.3d 40, 915 N.E.2d 696, 708 (2009). Instead, “a pattern of corrupt activity under the OCPA requires that predicate crimes be related and pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” Id. “Enterprise” is defined as including “any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, limited partnership, corporation, trust, union, government agency, or other legal entity, or' any organization, association, or group of persons associated in fact although not a legal entity. ‘Enterprise’ includes illicit as well as licit enterprises.” § 2923.31(C). The Supreme Court of Ohio has remarked that “[t]he definition of ‘enterprise’ is remarkably open-ended” and observed that the statute “does not indicate how the existence of an enterprise is to be proved.” Beverly, 2015-Ohio-219, at ¶¶ 8-9, 37 N.E.3d 116. Several recent cases have sought to clarify the definition of an enterprise and develop standards to prove its existence. To prove that a defendant was “associated” with an enterprise, the prosecution or a civil plaintiff must “prove that each defendant was voluntarily connected to that pattern [of corrupt activity] and performed at least two acts in furtherance of it.” Schlosser, 681 N.E.2d at 915. To “conduct” the affairs of the enterprise means “to direct.” State v. Beverly, 2015-Ohio-219, at ¶ 19, 37 N.E.3d 116. Alternatively, a defendant may “participate” in the affairs of the enterprise. In the context of the OCPA, “participate” means “to take part in and is not limited to those who have directed the pattern of corrupt activity. It encompasses those who have performed activities necessary or helpful to the operation of the enterprise whether directly or indirectly without an element of control.” Id. In State v. Griffin, 141 Ohio St.3d 392, 24 N.E.3d 1147 (2014), the Supreme Court of Ohio indicated that “the concepts of ‘common purpose’ and ‘acting in concert’ are included in the concepts of ‘associating with an enterprise’ and ‘conducting or participating in the affairs of that enterprise.’ ” Id. at 1151. In Beverly, the Supreme Court of Ohio formally adopted the federal RICO definition of an association-in-fact enterprise as “a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” Beverly, 2015-Ohio-219, at ¶ 9, 37 N.E.3d 116 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981)). For an OCPA conspiracy claim, “the plaintiff is not required to prove that each defendant committed two or more predicate acts.” In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enterprises, Inc., Inv. Litig., 604 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1157 (S.D.Ohio 2009). However, Plaintiffs can only meet their “burden by presenting evidence that the defendant agreed that others would commit the acts that would establish the ‘pattern of corrupt activity.’ ” Feliciano, 685 N.E.2d at 1316. This requires proof that a defendant “knowingly cooperated in a common plan” to engage in a pattern of corrupt activity. In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enterprises, 604 F.Supp.2d at 1159. 2. Civil cause of action In addition to establishing a violation or conspiracy to violate any or all of the subsections of § 2923.32(A), a plaintiff in a civil OCPA action must prove he or she was injured, directly or indirectly, by the OCPA violation and the injuries were proximately caused by that violation. First, the plaintiff must prove that he or she is a “person directly or indirectly injured by conduct in violation of section 2923.32 of the Revised Code or a conspiracy to violate that section.” Ohio Rev.Code § 2923.34(E). Ohio courts apply “traditional notions of proximate cause” to civil OCPA actions. Cleveland v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 98656, 2013 WL 1183332, at *5, *8 (Ohio App. Mar. 21, 2013). Although the OCPA is “broader than the comparable federal RICO requirement” in that it authorizes civil actions to recover for indirect injuries, it is “clear a plaintiff bringing a claim under [OCPA] must prove its damages were proximately caused by the defendant’s” conduct in violation of § 2923.32(A). CSAHA/UHHS-Canton, Inc. v. Aultman Health Found., No. 2010CA00303, 2012 WL 750972, at *9-10 (Ohio App.2012). Accordingly, “the language in § 2923.34(E) that any person directly or indirectly injured can state a private cause of action informs the analysis of whether, but does not relieve the burden to prove that, the illegal conduct proximately caused the plaintiffs injury.” W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 54 F.Supp.3d 888, 919 (S.D.Ohio 2014). Proximate cause “requires a showing of connection between the violations and the claimed injuries.” Lesick v. Manning, No. 91-C-70, 1992 WL 380284, at *3 (Ohio App. Dec. 17, 1992). The proximate cause inquiry is tied to the particular violation of § 2923.32(A). A civil action premised on a violation of § 2923.32(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant’s pattern of corrupt activity proximately caused the plaintiffs injury. Herakovic v. Catholic Diocese of Cleveland, No. 85467, 2005 WL 3007145, at *5 (Ohio App. Nov. 10, 2005). If a defendant acquired an interest in real property through a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of § 2923.32(A)(2), the plaintiff must offer proof that its injuries were proximately caused by the defendant’s acquisition of that property interest. Sheets, 1997 WL 303760, at *7,1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2422, at *18. Finally, if a violation of § 2923.32(A)(3) is demonstrated based on evidence that a defendant knowingly received proceeds derived from a pattern of corrupt activity and used or invested those proceeds to acquire an interest in real property, then the plaintiff must establish injuries proximately caused by the usage or investment of those proceeds. Id. Second, the pattern of corrupt activity that forms the basis of a civil claim “shall include at least one incident other than a violation of’ state and federal criminal statutes prohibiting mail or wire fraud, securities fraud, or interstate transportation of stolen goods. Ohio Rev.Code § 2923.34(E). Accordingly, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that each defendant engaged