Full opinion text
JAMES ALGER FEE, Chief Judge. At a trial before a single jury, three cases were presented which actually involved the trial of four major issues. Before trial a pretrial conference had been held and a pretrial order adopted, which developed these issues and covered the whole field. On the cause of action by Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Ltd. (hereinafter designated as “Pineapple”) against International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union (hereinafter called “International”) and International Longshoremen’s & Ware-housemen’s Union, Local 8 (hereinafter called “Local”), there was a recovery of approximately two hundred thousand dollars. Upon the issues set up by Pineapple against International, Local and various individual longshoremen upon the ground of illegal interference with commerce between the mainland and Hawaii and with interstate transportation of the same cargo, brought about by a conspiracy to prevent the handling and movement of goods of Pineapple, there was a verdict for the defendants. In each of the actions by two truckers employed by Pineapple against various longshoremen for assault and battery, there was a verdict in damages and in punitive damages. A number of special policemen were hired for the purpose of maintaining order and protecting the property of the port. The city of The Dalles, to the limits of which the port adjoins, employed these police. As a result of these and other activities of the members of Local, Pineapple was unable to have the cargo unloaded or transported to its subsidiary in California, although arrangements had been made with the Port of The Dalles, the Union Pacific Railroad, various trucking concerns and Goodat Crane Company for the unloading and transportation thereof. The evidence tended to show the situation which will be hereinafter set out. Owing to a tie-up of transportation from Hawaii caused by the activity of Intemational and affiliated local unions in the Territory, Pineapple, in order to convey a cargo worth approximately half a million dollars, which was intended ultimately for a processing plant owned by a subsidiary in California, had chartered the navy barge YFN624, which was loaded with facilities and by employees of Isleways, Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary. This barge was towed across to the mainland by the ocean going tug “Ona,” owned 'by Isleways. Upon arrival of the barge in the harbor of Tacoma, Washington, it was impossible to unload the cargo there, owing to resistance among labor groups in that port, engendered directly or indirectly by International, Thereafter the barge was turned over to a river tow boat by the Ona and was brought up the Columbia River ninety miles past Portland to The Dalles, Oregon, on September 24, 1949. Before its arrival there, Matt Meehan, who was a representative of International in the area, engaged in a series of conferences with officials of the Port of The Dalles, wherein he insisted that the cargo be not unloaded and that the facilities be not 'furnished to the barge. His address was truculent and aggressive. An Hawaiian, claimed to be a member of a local union there affiliated with International, was flown from the islands and arrived áf The Dalles. There were meetings of the members of Local in its hall at Portland, Oregon, at which Meehan was present and took part in the discussion. The next morning members of Local, to the number of from two hundred fifty to four hundred, proceeded in small groups by private cars to The Dalles, a distance of ninety miles. There members of Local and the Hawaiian formed a picket line outside of the dock of the Port of The Dalles, a municipal corporation. After the picket line had been maintained for some days, certain of the longshoremen, hearing of the approach from outside the state, of teamsters belonging to a local teamsters union in California but who were engaged by Pineapple, met these employees at a point several miles from the dock, gave them an outline of conditions there and attempted to prevent their going further. However, -two trucks went upon the 'dock in the, morning and, when one of these had been loaded, the supervisor drove out and led two other trucks with drivers and helpers through the picket line and into the dock enclosure. Thereupon, in a riotous, threatening and violent manner, the longshoremen broke'through the cordon of local police and rushed onto the dock. Some of them assaulted each of -these employees of Pineapple. Two, in particular, were set upon by the longshoremen, who kicked them, beat them, and threatened them with death. The truck drivers were thus coerced into submission and, under threat of dea-th or great bodily harm, promised not to interfere further. The four trucks returned to California empty. The longshoremen, who rushed upon the dock at the time, proceeded to the dock’s edge, having armed themselves with various weapons which -they were able to pick up, attempted to damage a crane and threw some four hundred cases of pineapple into the Columbia River and attempted ineffectually to set the barge adrift. Thereafter, the longshoremen were recalled from the dock and gathered in a group outside -the boundaries of the Port, where they were addressed by Meehan, who is said to have complimented them upon the measures' which they had just taken, but instructed them to remain outside the property. Thereupon, the picket line dispersed. But the streets of The Dalles were patrolled by gangs of men with a threatening attitude and belligerent manner, and the small' community was thereby dominated. For something like a month, similar conditions prevailed as those above described, while attempts were being made to obtain a solution. On October 19, the picket line was restored when employees of the Union Pacific Railroad spotted cars on the dock in an . attempt to move part of the cargo by rail. As a result of such measures, Pineapple was not able to -transport any of this cargo until after October 26. Eventually, when some concessions were made by the Port so that the unions could claim they were not entirely defeated,'the picket line was withdrawn and the remaining pineapple was shipped to California. A number of the individuals who had gone on the dock were' arrested, indicted and- convicted of' the crime of riot in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon by pleading guilty to an indictment (here introduced in evidence) which charged, in part, that each of them “did then and there unlawfully, wilfully, routously and riotously trespass upon inclosed premises not their own, or either of them, namely, the premises of the Port of The Dalles; and did' then and there unlawfully, routously, riotously and’feloniously make an assault upon Don Higham, Eugene Hoard, Elvy Davis, Clarence Rosales and Raymond Curto, by then and'there unlawfully and feloniously striking and beating them with said cargo hooks, iron bars, clubs and sticks.” Both Pineapple and defendants have filed motions for new trial affecting one or more of thése cases. The grounds are so broad that complete review must be had to determine to < the satisfaction; of the Court the fairness of the judgments. At pretrial conferences the Court directed the presence of all individual defendants as well as official representatives of Local and International, in accordance with normal custom of this Court. The rule of the District of Oregon is that, except when excused by the Court, the litigants themselves must attend pretrial conferences, conducted in open court, with the court reporters present. The purpose is two-fold: first, to speed and make more accurate the issues thus simplified; second, to require litigants to participate in the proceedings and convince them of the fairness and objectivity thereof. These aims have been given little prominence in the literature on pretrial conferences. The “conversation” or “shirtsleeves” proceedings in the chambers of the judge would be of no value in realization of these aims.- All phases of the litigation are conducted in open court. This, vvas the method of the common law judges and lawyers. Return,to the methods of oral pleading at common law is thus attained. Proceedings out of court bind no one. No distinction is made in this Court between proceedings before triai and the trial. Here there is a record. The advantages are many. The first purpose of these orders is to do away with the delays of common law and code pleading, to define the is,sues, both ultimate and evidentiary, to eliminate false issues and to guarantee that the cpntroverted questions are in good faith contested. The second purpose is to have the individual litigant actually in open court before the judge and his adversaries, where he hears the discussion of his conduct and claims and is in a position to correct factual errors. Instead of the delays which were formerly necessary, legal and factual positions can be taken on the spot. The clients are in court and advice can be immediately obtained from them as to the facts. Admissions made in open court-are judicial in nature and binding unless the Court permits modification where there is clear error. The greatest advantage is in public relations. Often modernly, litigation is handled by organizations and lawyers which they select, while the individual whose interests are at stake is given no opportunity to observe the alignment or disposition of the cause. The tendency to use the individual as a pawn of some organization demigod has been heretofore noted. Important objectives are accomplished, therefore, by the rules: first, the litigant is made a part of the procedure; second, the proceeding not only appears fairer, it is fairer. A striking exemplification of such factors appeared in the instant case. As above noted, criminal proceedings had been brought against various individual defendants in the state courts, and there had been pictures taken at the time of the invasion of the dock. The attorneys for the individuals naturally felt hesitant about making such important admissions on their own authority. But fifty-two defendants in open court admitted presence on the dock during that time. Pineapple accepted these statements and did not introduce proof that other defendants were on the dock. The issues were clarified.by these admissions, and the individual defendants recognized their re sponsibility as individuals and not as mere units of an aggregate, the union. The pretrial order was drawn by the respective attorneys, based upon the admissions and the issues developed at the conference. This order, signed by the Court, states that it defines all issues and that the pleadings pass out of the case. No question can now be raised, therefore, as to the sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action, although a motion to dismiss was directed against it. However, in order that the position may be perfectly clear, the Court holds that the complaint states a cause of action against the unions under the Federal Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. It also states a cause of action against the unions and the individuals under the common law. Another question arose on-the motion to quash service. This is also moot. The unions were properly served under the statute and the rule. The individuals were likewise properly served. The pretrial orders in the three cases at bar were separately entered and contain certain agreed facts, contentions of the respective parties, issues of fact, issues of law, tabulation of exhibits and agreement that the cause be tried on the issues presented by each pretrial order alone. The causes were tried upon all issues involved at one time, since the states of fact were inextricably bound together. But separate verdicts and judgments were entered in each. In all of the proceedings, the attorneys for the defense cooperated as did the attorneys for plaintiffs. Indeed, with issues hotly contested and in an explosive emotional atmosphere, the lawyers carried on the trial in accordance with the highest ethical concepts of the profession. The trial was fair to all concerned, and the rights of the defendants, collectively and individually, were fully protected. The motions for new trial present these problems against this background of a fair trial. Defendant unions contend that the verdict against them was inconsistent with a verdict in favor of individual members of the union, who were named also as defendants. On the other hand, plaintiff Pineapple asked for a new trial on the ground that the Court failed to instruct the jury that the liability of the individuals stood on the same basic principles as that of the unions. In answer to the contention of the unions, it may be said that there is no requirement that verdicts be logically consistent. It is only necessary that the particular verdict be upheld by the evidence under the rules of law. The pretrial order holds the question of whether the unions, either alone or in combination, were liable under the applicable statute upon the facts. The Court charged the jury that plaintiff Pineapple, in order to show liability of a defendant union, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the activity affected commerce, (2) that a labor organization was involved, (3) that one or both unions (a) induced or encouraged (b) the employees of an employer (c) to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their employment (d) to use, transport or otherwise handle any goods or, to perform any services in connection with the cargo of plaintiff Pineapple (4) that one of the objects of the inducement or encouragement was to force an employer or other person to cease doing business with any other person, and (5) that plaintiff Pineapple was injured as a direct and proximate result of such act. There was sufficient evidence upon each phase to sustain a verdict in favor of Pineapple and against either or both unions. (1) It was clear and was agreed in the pretrial order that the situation here involved “an industry or activity affecting commerce.” (2) It was apparent and agreed in the pretrial order that labor organizations were involved in the .controversy. (3) (a) The record tended to show that the failure of various concerns in Tacoma to unload the barge was accomplished, by pressure brought upon the officials and members of various unions by International. This feature was not included in the charge to. the jury and was not important except that the incident threw light upon the method of operation and the objectives sought. As noted above, when information 'was received of the prospective. docking at The Dalles, Mee-han attempted to persuade the officials of the municipality not to permit the use of the facilities by the barge. Again, the incident is not important except for the light it throws upon subsequent events because, as the Court charged, persuasion of an employer does not fall within the act. It is shown without cavil that communications and brotherly compulsion were had with members and officials of the local teamsters union, members of which were employed by trucking firms operating in interstate commerce to and from The Dalles, with members and officers of the mechanics union whose members were employed by Goodat Crane Company, which owned a crane leased by Pineapple, to work at unloading the cargo with members and representatives of the Brotherhood, members of which were employed by the Union Pacific Railroad, an interstate rail carrier whose switching facilities ran into the Port and which could have been used in moving the pineapple. Finally, strong argument, appeals to class loyalty and implied threats were used by .representatives of Local to persuade and induce the two teamster employees of Pineapple before they had arrived at .the dock not to go there for the purpose of transporting the cargo. It is true that a great deal of the persuasion and inducement was accompanied by threat, a tremendous. show of potential force, and finally by actual violence. It is contended that violence is fact without juristic importance in an industrial dispute, since it must be dealt with by local authorities' and has no relation to the problems of law. No form of 'inducement could be more effective than threats of death, enforced by brandishment of a cargo hook and kicking and beating, the picket line, ominous and threatening, the violent break-through of the cordon of police and the surge onto private property, the smashing of cameras of newspaper men and the patrolling of the streets in numbers with threatening demeanor. The instant statute gives legal significance to any method of persuasion or inducement. The Court prevented any undue emphasis upon this feature. But facts are facts and were here undeniable and for the more part undenied. Considering union tradition and feeling, the picket line itself was an inducement or persuasion to all employees of employers not to attempt to go on the dock to transport or handle the cargo. (3) (b and c) The attempt was to have the employees of the various concerns which might have assisted in moving the cargo “to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their employment” to handle the pineapple. Of course, as the Court pointed out to the jury, it was sufficient if the persuasion or inducement were made. It was not necessary that it be successful. There was evidence that the members of the Brotherhood, employed by the Union Pacific Railroad, concertedly did not attempt to switch cars for the pineapple. There was evidence that the teamsters, employed by truck lines, including the Port-land-Pendleton Motor Transport Company, Consolidated Freightways and Oregon-California-Nevada Fast Freight, concertedly in each instance refused in the course of their employment to move the pineapple from the dock. Only one employee of Goodat Crane Company was engaged as an operator of the crane on the dock. He quit the job and refused to handle the cargo as a result. No other operator could be obtained from among the employees of the crane company to handle the crane or the cargo. This was evidence of a concerted refusal upon the part of the employees of Goodat Crane Company in the .course of their employment. Several truck drivers, who were employees of Pineapple, left the dock and never returned after some of them had expressly agreed not to transport any of the cargo because of duress, of assaults, and of the threats above mentioned. The circumstance that the number of these truck drivers was not great was not significant if they took concerted action in the course of their employment. In these many instances, the inducement or persuasion was highly successful, but the statute penalizes the inducement or persuasion whether the end is attained or the attempt to induce and persuade is futile. (3) (d) The evidence was conclusive that the inducement or persuasion was directed toward the concerted refusal “to transport or otherwise handle” a specific cargo of pineapple. The record is replete with evidence that this was a direct boycott for the sole reason that the cargo originated in Hawaii. There was constant reiteration by the unions, their representatives and members, of the phrase “hot cargo” or “hot pineapple.” The handling or unloading and the transportation of this cargo were the point of the attack. So far as the record shows, there never was an attempt to interfere with the Port of The Dalles or the employees thereof while engaged in loading or unloading other products or freight except this. Every incident of this controversy hinged upon the handling and transporting of this cargo alone. (4) The record also showed that it was one of the objects of the inducement and encouragement to force or require an employer to cease doing business with “any other person.” The object of the longshoremen was to isolate the cargo and prevent it from being handled by anyone and particularly transported. Therefore, it was one of the objects of the action to force or require the other persons and corporations to cease dealing with Pineapple and to force Pineapple to cease dealing with others. Not only was this the object of the compulsion, but it was effective. But the statute only requires that this be one of the objects. The evidence shows clearly the longshoremen aimed directly at this object. They did compel Pineapple to cease dealing with the railroad, the Port of The Dalles, the trucking lines, and the crane company. These measures also prevented the railroad and the trucking lines from dealing further with Pineapple after orders to move the cargo had been sent to them. Likewise, the Goodat Crane Company was required to cease renting its crane to Pineapple. It is true Pineapple bought the crane, but this circumstance did not prevent the cessation of dealing as an object of the unions; it also caused the cutting off of the leasing operations. Actually, complete stoppage of all business relations between all these groups for a long period of time was accomplished. (5) The- jury found Pineapple was injured as a direct and proximate result of these-' acts, and the evidence gave complete support to the finding. ' - • Thus it is patent that a cause of action under the Labor Management Act was stated as to each union, and the record shows that, as to each, there was substantial evidence to support a verdict. There is no inconsistency in the verdicts as to the unions and the individuals, who were freed from liability thereby. It is true, there is a well established principle that a defendant cannot be held on the theory of respondeat superior for an act of an agent, if it be found as a fact that the agent did not do the act upon which it is attempted to impose liability. But this doctrine has no application here. Here the charge involving the individuals is a conspiracy to effect unlawful acts. The individuals may have done or .assisted in doing the acts, the unions may 'have been found to have done the acts and thereby have incurred responsibility; but the mere fact that certain individuals who may have done certain acts were not found to have entered into a conspiracy with the union to do them is of no consequence. The liability would have been on entirely different grounds. Besides, as hereinafter noted, the acts of individuals for which a union might be responsible by either express authorization or express ratification would not bind other individuals. The unions could be held under the terms of the Federal Labor Management Act. A cause of action ■ could not be stated or maintained against the individual defendants under that act, which applied only to organizations. Therefore, as to them, the Court instructed the jury under the common law which the Court felt was applicable. In so doing, the Court placed a somewhat greater burden upon Pineapple as to these individuals. Since there was a greater degree of proof required as to the individuals than as to the unions, there can be no inconsistency-in the diverse findings. Before dealing with defenses, it is well at this point to dispose of plaintiff Pineapple’s motion for new trial upon the ground that the individual defendants could have been held upon the same ground and the same evidence as were the unions. Pineapple here repeats the same error as was made by the unions in contending that the verdicts were inconsistent. It is true that the Court may not have accurately stated the elements of liability at common law as to the individuals. But no exceptions were taken to the instructions upon this ground. The subject is highly complicated and the question of whether the state law or a common law adopted by the federal enactments applies is extremely nebulous. Certainly, the ground chosen by Pineapple for objection and exception cannot be maintained. The jury found against Pineapple on a fair statement of the common law. This motion for new trial is therefore denied. Since we have now an exact outline of the cause of action which the Court found in the complaint and the issues set up in the pretrial order as against the unions, certain of the defensive issues should now be considered to determine whether or not a new trial should be granted. Certain of these were not specified as grounds for new trial, but the record as a whole should be considered in disposition of these motions. The Court did give further instructions upon the only point upon which there could be any requirement of proof by Pineapple. The Court positively required the jury to find affirmatively that the persons were acting within the scope of their authority before the unions or either of them could be held responsible for the acts of these “agents” and “representatives.” This, of course, is the test used in the instructions on the second trial of the United Brotherhood case. Although the instruction thus conforms to the test of the Brotherhood case, there was no technical necessity that it do so. There was a fair treatment of the situation in the instructions. If anything, these were more favorable to defendants,- both individual and union, than the law required. It must again be noted this was a civil and not a criminal case, and the statute sets up standards foreign to those used in the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq. The next point made by the unions is that the jury returned a verdict in the amount which Pineapple indicated was the exact amount of its monetary damage, and thus, as the unions claim, gave no consideration to minimizing damages. But the Court would have upheld a verdict in a much greater sum within the limits of the prayer of the complaint, if it had not been for an express disclaimer by Pineapple during the trial. The jury returned a lesser sum probably because they believed Pineapple would be satisfied to accept that amount. In, view of the actions for which the unions were found liable, the jury unquestionably felt that Pineapple was not required to accept damages scaled down for the -benefit of the rtnions, the aggressors. The Court agrees. .The point .as to inconsistency is highlighted by another of the grounds for new trial. It is said that the Court fixed responsibility upon defendant unions by stating that certain individuals were agents, officers or representatives of one or the other of these defendants. But the judge is not an automaton. The evidence showed without cavil that Louis Gold-blatt was an officer and Matt Meehan, William Gettings,- Henry Schmidt and Howard Bodine were agents and representatives of International and that Robert Baker and Wilfred Mackey were officers and .Toby Christiansen and Matt Mee-han were agents and representatives of Local.’ There was no evidence to the contrary. There was no attempt to prove the opposite. In support of this claim of the unions, there is cited United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775, 91 L.Ed. 973. The writer tried that case upon the return thereof to the District Court and gave instructions therein in accordance with the opinion cited. A conviction followed, and no appeal was taken. That case was a criminal prosecution to which it was held Section 6 of the Norris-La Guardia Act applied. This is a civil suit for damages under the Taft-Hartley Act, which sets up its own tests of responsibility The Court will now consider some of the other inherent defenses so that the attitude of defendant unions may be viewed in the light of the record as a whole. There was a claim that Local was attempting to get the work of unloading for its own members. This attempt to build up a controversy with the Port of The Dalles over the hours and wages of the employees handling this cargo highlights a very significant factor in this case in appraising the verdict. The jury considered this claim under the instructions and must have decided that one of the objects was that proscribed by the statute. Under the law, the attempt to get work for its own members would avail nothing in avoiding responsibility if the other elements which the statute condemns were present. Besides, it will be noted, the very aim which the unions say now motivated them is also proscribed. The contention was specious and not in accord with the facts. It stands out with naked clarity that International moved to boycott this cargo for the sole purpose of exerting pressure upon the public in Hawaii by isolating the islands from the continent. The record not only establishes the boycott and its purpose, but negatives all other reasonable postulates. These unions had no quarrel with the tug “Ona” or the barge YFN624, which had been rented by Pineapple from the navy. By no possibility could this barge be considered as a portion of the plant of Pineapple with an ambulatory situs. Neither the Hawaiian Local nor the Port-land Local 8 had any controversy with Pineapple or Isleways. Isleways had no controversy with its own employees, either here or in Hawaii. Concededly, the Hawaiian Local had no relations with Isle-ways. Nor did Local. It was not contended that any local affiliated with International had any direct relationship with Pineapple or Isleways. The dock in Hawaii from whence the barge sailed was picketed. Pineapple is not shown to 'have ever employed a member of Local or, for that matter, a member of any local affiliated with International. There was no attempt to organize the employees of Pineapple. Pineapple had no difficulty with its own employees. Local had no quarrel with the Port of The Dalles or its employees until the officers thereof permitted the barge to be tied there and an attempt made to unload. Then it is contended in extenuation that there was picketing in the islands of a Hawaiian local against some alleged subsidiary of Castle and Cook, with which latter Pineapple is claimed to have been affiliated by interlocking directorate and financial inter-relation. No administrative board or court has held such feature constitutes a valid ground for picketing. There is shown no community of interest among the corporations on the one hand or the locals on the other. Harry Bridges, President of International, testified that, under the agreement of the latter with certain shipowners, collusive picket lines, jurisdictional picket lines, hot cargo picket lines and demonstration picket lines were, as he expressed it, “illegal.” That agreement was, of course, not binding upon either Pineapple or defendants, since there was no claim or offer to prove that Pineapple, Isleways, or even Castle and Cook were signatories or in anywise connected therewith. But this expression of opinion by one most intimately concerned is extremely persuasive since the law, common and statutory, actually does proscribe such activities. Inasmuch as there was no proof to show either that the Hawaiian local or Local 8 had any connection with either the barge or the tug or had any connection with Pineapple or Isleways or with Castle* and Cook or indeed had any connection with the cargo, the picket line was neither legitimate nor bona fide under the terms of the agreement made by International. Likewise, it was proscribed by law. There was no offer of any proof as to whether there was a strike or even picketing. Since no such proof was offered, there was no legal justification for a member of that local to attempt to boycott a cargo of Pineapple, who was not his employer and with which neither he nor his union had any dispute. The Court rejected an offer to prove the claimed relation between Castle and Cook and Pineapple, for, even if the claim be conceded, it gave neither the member of the Hawaiian local nor the unions here involved standing. International, according to its own reiterated position, had no authority over the Hawaiian local, and the Portland local, which is approximately twenty-five hundred miles away, had no ground to boycott a product with which it had no connection by employment or handling against an employer with whom none had had any relation. No decided controversy, whether by administrative board or court, holds there is any basis for protected concerted action upon the facts claimed 'here. It is axiomatic that in American society labor unions are highly favored. The statutes firmly found the right to bargain collectively for wages, hours and conditions of employment. The Congress and the Executive and the Courts recognize the strike as a legitimate device to publicize grievances and to exert pressure. The key purpose of recognition of this outstanding position accorded to labor is to prevent obstruction of interstate and foreign commerce. All of the federal labot legislation requires in positive and explicit terms that anything which has a tendency to prevent the free flow of goods between states and territories is to be eliminated. If a labor group is able to boycott goods and prevent the further transportation thereof, simply because these originated in Hawaii, important effects upon the public might be accomplished. The proscription might accomplish the results of a “general strike” so far as Hawaii is concerned. This might well be likened to the outlawry of an individual in middle-age England. Or, more appropriately, to the ban imposed upon a kingdom because of the recalcitrance of a ruler. In either the people suffer. If this attempt were successful, the foreign policy of the United States could be- seriously affected by the union, in thus isolating the islands of our sea frontier. The concern is not primarily the interest of either the unions, longshoremen or industry, the private parties who were before the Court. There is a paramount unity of interest which over-rides all other considerations. It was to the interest of the longshoremen as well as the industry and each individual citizen of the general public that commerce between Hawaii and the mainland should be uninterrupted by the selfish interests or demands of either the industry or the unions. The public interest is here paramount and not the selfish interest of the economic giants in the conflict. Freedom of ocean transportation cannot be denied to anyone. with safety to the nation. The specious plea that some laborer or group of laborers in Hawaii or Maine suffers discrimination cannot halt commerce between Oregon and California. The use of the weapons provided for economic bargaining cannot be made with impunity against the public itself. This boycott was against the public interest, as the jury obviously found. Interference with the transportation of goods between a territory and the states or from one state to another is a direct burden upon and obstruction of interstate commerce. If such an obstruction occurs, it is illegal. If it occurs in the manner proscribed by the statute, liability is created. The Court carefully laid down the law as enacted by Congress. The considerations which have just above been adverted to show that the result was morally sound and in accordance with the public interest as well as technically exact. There is one additional point in the motions of defendants for new trial in the separate cases for assault and battery. It is said that the wide'disparity between the proof of special damages and the compensatory and punitive damages allowed indicates passion and prejudice on the part of the jury in each of these cases. Suffice it to say, the damages allowed are not, in the opinion of the Court, excessive. Where the evidence shows, as here, that two truckers were set upon by approximately fifty men, jerked'out of a truck, threatened with death by means of a cargo hook, and so kicked and beaten that they were injured, this Court would, in judicial calm, sustain verdicts much higher, whether compensatory or punitive. The union card does not entitle any defendant to immunity for the results of acts of physical violence. The jury spoke for the public here. The result is reasonable and must be sustained. The motions for new trial by plaintiff Pineapple and defendants, respectively, are denied. Appropriate orders may be prepared. APPENDIX Instructions of The Court The Court: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, we have now arrived at the final act in these three cases which are submitted to you for trial. I know that you have paid very careful attention to the evidence throughout this rather long trial and that you have approached the thing in án entirely fair and impartial manner! It is with entire confidence that the Court submits to you for determination the questions of fact in this case. You have heard the arguments of counsel in the cases on both sides. As I said before, counsel are not witnesses. They are simply advocates. They have a right, and'it is their duty, to urge the cause of their clients and to suggest to you the things which they believe can be found from the evidence. You may, of course, accept such inferences and deductions as they suggest to you, but you are not bound to. You are the sole and ■exclusive judges of the facts in this case and of the credibility óf each and all of the witnesses. This is a .function with which the Judge does not attempt to interfere. The responsibility for the decision of the facts is yours. It is true that a United States Judge may comment upon the evidence and give you his viewpoint as to the credibility of the witnesses. However, in this case the Judge does not intend to exercise that function. This is a question of fact and should be decided by you as a question of fact. If any of you should have any idea as to how I should decide the facts in any of these three cases, I charge you explicitly that you need not pay any attention to what my attitude might be, becausei it is my intention to commit the facts to you solely and exclusively for decision. It is my responsibility to' lay down for you the rules of law, and if I tell you a certain thing is a rule of law then that is binding upon you, because there are other tribunals which are set up to take care of any mistakes I happen to make. I don’t think I will make any, but there are courts for correction of my mistakes on the law, so you don’t need to worry about that. Even if you don’t agree with the law that I lay doiwn it is your duty to follow it. You must, of course, reach your verdict on the Ibasis of the evidence that has been produced before you and in the light of the law as given to you ‘by the Judge. You are sworn under oath to try these cases upon the law and the evidence. This excludes any consideration of sympathy, prejudice, passion or bias that you may have against or for any litigant, either plaintiff or defendant. Therefore, you will not permit any such considerations for or against any litigant to enter your deliberations at all, nor will you deal on the basis of speculation or chance, but solely be guided by the evidence which has been produced in this courtroom under the rules of law as the Court shall give them to you. There will be presented for your consideration three different civil actions for damages. The first of these is Civil 5183, Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Plaintiff, against International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union and International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Local 8, and various individuals also named as defendants therein. This action is brought by the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Ltd., for the purpose of recovering damages alleged to have been caused to its business and property by the alleged acts of the union or .unions and of the individual defendants. Now, as a matter of timesaving throughout these instructions I shall use the single word “International” to designate the general union in which the various locals are affiliated and which has its headquarters in San Francisco. Throughout the instructions, likewise, I shall designate the Port-land local union affiliated with the International as Local 8. The second action which will be submitted to you for determination is Civil 5104, which was brought by Raymond Curto as Plaintiff against Matt Meehan and some forty other individuals named as defendants. This action is to recover damages for injuries claimed to have been sustained by Curto by reason of alleged activities of the defendants in willfully beating and injuring him at The Dalles, Oregon, and disabling him from-'carrying on his occupation. The third action is Civil No. 5105, and is brought by Clarence Rosales as plaintiff against Matt Meehan and forty other named individuals as defendants. This action is to recover damages for injuries claimed to have been sustained by Plaintiff Rosales by reason of the alleged activities of defendants in willfully beating and injuring him at The Dalles, Oregon, and disabling him from carrying on his occupation. Although all of the evidence is for your consideration in each of these three cases, the cases themselves are separate, depending for their solution upon separate legal principles. I will instruct you separately as to each of the cases, although I will join the two personal injury cases for convenience. You will be asked to return a separate verdict in each one of the three cases. Now, there are some other general ideas which I wish to give you with regard to each of the three cases. In each of the three cases the particular plaintiff has the burden of convincing you by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he has proved his case as to each material contention. If you are so convinced, you may return a verdict in favor of each plaintiff who so convinces you and against those defendants only whom you find liable according to the instructions. If, in any case, a plaintiff fails to prove any material contention, then that case must fail as against the defendant or defendants involved in the contention. A fair preponderance of the evidence is not determined by counting the number of witnesses on each side, but by weighing in your minds the strength of the evidence produced on either side in the light of the credibility you give the witnesses. In determining whether a preponderance exists, you must consider all the circumstances as the nature of the case permits, bringing to bear upon them the experiences and observations of life and weighing them with prudence and care. Now, there is one factor that runs throughout the cases, and I shall take that up because that is a question of admissions. With respect to all three cases also, the indictment and sentence, Exhibit 26, was admitted in relation to the individual defendants who pleaded therein, and is in the nature of a personal admission. It is not evidence against any other person or union in the case. However, if you find the acts were done by an individual defendant, you may consider such acts in connection with the other defendants, subject to the other instructions in the case. Now, also, there runs a question of admissions of agents throughout all these cases. Admissions of agents, made while engaged in the business of their principal and within the scope of their authority, with reference to matters in which they are properly engaged for their principal, is evidence against their principal. However, all oral admissions reported by another witness in court should be viewed with care. The person speaking may not have clearly expressed his meaning or the witness may have misunderstood him. The Court will now proceed to outline the case of Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Ltd., v. International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union and International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Local No. 8. The primary liability of either the International or Local 8 depends upon the existence of a duty owed by the International or Local 8, or either or both of them, to the plaintiff. The duty of each of these unions to the plaintiff is established by certain laws passed by the Congress of the United States. Trade unionism is favored in the United States. ■ Public opinion is in its favor, and so far as these union organizations are concerned any person has a right to join and go along with them. The question in this case arises upon the question of whether there has been a lawful endeavor on the part of the unions. The primary purpose of the laws which relate to these matters is to maintain the full flow of commerce, to proscribe practices which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce and to-prevent action by employers or employees which has -the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce 'by preventing the free flow of goods in such commerce, while at the same time fully protecting the rights of employees to self-organization to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and also to protect the right of the employee to refrain from any or all such activity. The law gives a right of recovery against a labor union, which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce, to anyone who has been injured in his business or property thereby under certain circumstances and limitations. This right is given where such a labor organization in such-an industry induces or encourages the employees of any employer to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to transport or otherwise handle any goods, articles or commodities or to perform any services in connection therewith. These acts are actionable only where one of the objects of the incitement or encouragement is -to force or 'require any person to cease doing business with any other person. The words “industry affecting commerce,” which the Court has used above, mean any industry or activity in commerce or in which a labor dispute would burden or obstruct commerce or tend to burden or ■obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce. The word “commerce” includes trade, traffic, commerce or transportation among the several states or between any territory and any state, and especially between the Territory of Hawaii and the States of Oregon, Washington and California. In this connection, the definition of “employer” for the purpose of these instructions includes neither the Port of The Dal-les nor the Union Pacific Railroad. The ■definition of “person” does not include the Port of The Dalles. The term “employee” includes any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer. The Hawaiian Pineapple 'Company, Ltd., the Portland Pendleton Motor Transport Company, Consolidated Freightways, Oregon-California-Nevada Fast Freight, and the Goodat Crane Company are each employers as the word is used in the law and in these instructions. The Flawaiian Pineapple Company, the Portland-Pendleton Motor Transport Company, Consolidated Freightways, Oregon-California-Nevada Fast Freight, Goodat Crane 'Company and the Union Pacific Railroad Company are all and each a person as that term is used in the law and in these instructions. The plaintiff Hawaiian Pineapple Company, since we are speaking of that case, in order to show liability upon the part of .any defendant labor union, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: First, that the activity then being carried on affected commerce; Second, that a labor organization was involved; Third, that one or both of -the labor organizations named as defendants here 'induced , or encouraged ■ the employees of an employer to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, transport or otherwise handle any goods, articles, materials or commodities, or to. perform any services in connection with the ■cargo herein involved; ; Fourth, that one of the objects of such •inducement or encouragement, if there was .any, was to force or'require some employer or some other person to cease doing business with any other person; Fifth, that the plaintiff was injured in business or property as a direct and proximate result of such acts. Now we shall turn to find what are the claims of plaintiff, the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, in order that we shall find what the basis of the contention is. Plaintiff in the Hawaiian Pineapple case claims that, having no labor trouble with its own employees, it loaded a barge with pineapple in Hawaii and towed it toward the United States; that the barge eventually went to The Dalles; that the plaintiff, Hawaiian Pineapple 'Company, Ltd., made arrangements for the handling and transportation of the cargo of pineapple with a crane company and with an interstate railroad company and interstate trucking companies in commerce. Plaintiff claims that the International, acting through its officers and agents and Local 8, and the Defendant Local 8, acting through its officers and agents, combined to prevent the unloading and transportation of the cargo in interstate commerce, and that the unions and each of them induced and encouraged employees of various employers to engage in a concerted refusal to transport, handle or work on or perform any services in connection with the cargo of pineapple, with an object of forcing plaintiff, Hawaiian Pineapple Company, to cease doing business with certain employers and certain other persons and of forcing and requiring certain employers to cease doing business or dealing with the Plaintiff Hawaiian Pineapple Company. That the defendant unions, the International and Local 8, accomplished said inducement with those objects by: Calling on the employers to persuade the employees not to handle or to haul the cargo of pineapple; calling on officials and representatives of labor unions, representing employees of the interstate trucking concerns and of the crane company, to engage ■ in a concerted refusal to handle' the goods; maintaining a picket line at the Port of The Dalles; by a forcible and violent overrunning of the terminal of the Port of The Dalles and staging, a riot and causing damage to employees and property of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company; after the riot patrolling the streets of The Dalles on September 29th; resuming picketing on October 20th to October 27th; and continuing inducement and encouragement of employes of plaintiff and other employees after October 27th. Plaintiff claims that as a direct and proximate result of these actions the plaintiff, Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Ltd., ■was damaged in business and property. Now that is one side of the case. That is the Hawaiian Pineapple 'Company’s side. The defendant unions and the individual ■defendants deny all these claims and allegations of the plaintiff above set out, and the defendants contend no conspiracy of .any kind was entered into or combination by or between any of the defendants here for such purposes or for any purpose. That the Hawaiian Pineapple Company .and Isleways are wholly owned subsidiaries .and alter egos of Castle & Cook,' Ltd., Theodore Davies, Alexander-Baldwin and Matson Navigation Company and, as such, any strike referred to in said cause of action was a primary strike and not violative of any section of the Taft-Hartley Act or ■of any general or common law of th'e United States. That any acts done and. performed by ■said defendants were done and performed ■for the purpose of achieving legitimate •ends of collective bargaining and the legitimate ends and purposes of trade unionism, namely, the prevention of the breaking down of wages and working conditions of the membership of Defendant Local'8. That the Defendant Matt Meehan was at no time the agent or representative of the Defendant International in and about the matters as set forth in plaintiff’s contentions. That neither the Defendant Local 8 nor any of said individually named defendants were the officers, agents or representatives of said International in relation to any of the matters set forth in the plaintiff’s contentions. • That each and all of the defendants deny that they either singly or collectively or in -concert with- each other did or performed any of the acts or things set forth in plaintiff’s contentions. That the Port of The Dalles is not “an employer” or “other person.” Defendants contend plaintiff could have purchased ample pineapple from other sources without money loss and thereby minimized damages. Defendants contend that plaintiff could have refrained and refused to buy large quantities of fresh fruit in 1949 under its contracts to purchase fresh fruit from growers thereof without money loss and thereby minimize their damages. Now, that sets up the contentions of the parties, and the ’Court will now state to you the conditions of recovery. You will remember that the Plaintiff Hawaiian Pineapple Company must prove its case by a prep.onderance of the evidence in order to recover and must prove all of the necessary contentions and allegations. If the Plaintiff Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Ltd., has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the International, by and through its officers and agents, and Local 8, and Local 8 itself, through its officers, agents and members, or either the International or Local 8, induced or encouraged the employees of Plaintiff Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Ltd., to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to transport, handle or work on the cargo of pineapple in commerce, or to perform any services in connection therewith at The Dalles, Oregon, with the object of forcing or requiring Plaintiff Hawaiian Pineapple Company to cease doing business with the Union Pacific Railroad, one of the various trucking companies whose names I gáve you a few minutes ago, the Goodat Crane Company, or any of them, or with its customers in the State of California, to whom the cargo' Was to be shipped, or- any ■ of them, and it is further established that as ■a direct and proximate result thereof plaintiff Sustained damage to its business and property, plaintiff would be entitled to recover as against the "defendant union or defendant unions doing the acts with the intent' described. ■: ; • Similarly, if plaintiff has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the International, by and through its officers and agents and Local 8, and Local 8 itself, through its officers, agents and members, or 'either the International or Local 8 ¿induced or encouraged the employees of either the Goodat Crane Company, the Port-land-Pendleton Motor Transport Company, ■Consolidated Freightways, Oregon-California-Nevada Fast Freight, or any other trucking lines doing interstate business from The Dalles, Oregon, to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to refuse to transport, handle, work on or perform any services in connection with plaintiff’s cargo or with the object of forcing or requiring either Good-at Crane Service or any of the trucking lines, or both, to cease doing business with the plaintiff, and you further find that as a direct and proximate result thereof plaintiff sustained damage to its business and property, plaintiff would be entitled to recover. Now, you must remember that in connection with the Goodat Crane Company on September 27th, 1949, — that is the day before the riot — Hawaiian Pineapple Company purchased the crane from the Goodat Crane Company, and therefore any inducement or encouragement of the employees of Goodat Crane Company must have occurred prior to -the transfer of the crane, and with the intent above described, to fall within this instruction. If you find that the employees of an employer did not by concerted action in the course of their employment refuse to transport commodities or perform services, but. by a preponderance of the evidence you find that any defendant union is proved to have induced or encouraged them to do so with the intent above outlined, you still might find against that defendant or defendants on that issue. In other words, it is not the actual taking of concerted action in the course of their employment by the employees of any employer, but it is the encouragement and inducement with the proscribed intent which the legislation of the Congress denounces. You may consider whether or not the conversations which were held by certain individuals of the longshoremen with the truck drivers employed by the Hawaiian Pineapple Company were for the purpose of inducing or encouraging said employees of the Plaintiff Hawaiian Pineapple 'Company or any employee of any other employer to take concerted action in the course of their employment to refuse to perform any services as to the pineapple. You may consider that also to determine whether it was; an object of any inducement or encouragement which you may find to force any person to cease dealing with the Hawaiian. Pineapple Company. If so, you will in connection with the other instructions-which I have given you determine whether-that action was illegal or actionable. And' that would be true whether such individuals advised the truck drivers of the fact: either that the pineapple was “hot,” as the-phrase is understood in -this proceeding, or that the Port of The Dalles was threatening the working conditions and wages of the Portland longshoremen, provided, of course, that you find the acts were done as-I have set forth in the previous instructions and that the purpose was as outlined'.. The inducement or encouragement, as; mentioned in these instructions before,, need not be by conversation or pressure upon the particular employees involved,, since it may be accomplished by any effective means, such as the persuasion of' the officers and agents of the union to which such employees belong, or by threats, of reprisal, however communicated, or -by-violence against other persons or against the employees of another employer; in other words, any means which would accomplish the inducement or encouragement. And in -that connection you may take into consideration the testimony and other evidence with regard to conversations held by-certain persons with the officers and agents,, of other unions, such as the Teamsters’" Union, or the other unions outside of -the-unions in suit, who had something to say-to the employees of a particular employer... You may consider all the evidence in that, regard to see whether or not inducement, and encouragement was extended. The inducement or encouragement must; be exercised as to the employees of a par'--ticular employer to take concerted action in the course of their employment in the manner above described, but one of the objects of such inducement or encouragement, if offered to all the members of the general union or class of employees, must be to cause the interruption of normal business relationships between two separate employers before there can be any liability on either of the defendant unions. Further pressure brought directly upon an employer alone, without the purpose of inducing the employees of the particular employer to take concerted action in the course of their employment, would not establish any basis for liability. One of the objects of the inducement or encouragement must be to force a particular person to cease dealing with another person. Therefore, if you find that the persons in question had never dealt with each other, the conditions for recovery would not be fulfilled, because the law requires that the object be to force a particular person to cease dealing with another person. If an object of inducement or encouragement to employees of an employer, as above defined, were to force one person to cease dealing with another person, -then it would 'be immaterial whether the person against whom the force was directed actually ceased then or thereafter to deal with such other person. The object or intent of the inducement by the union, if you find any, is material and must be established, as you have been heretofore instructed. If you find that neith