Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM WALTER E. HOFFMAN, District Judge (under designation). On September 26, 1961, the United States Naval Ship POTOMAC, a Navy tanker and a public vessel of the United States, was moored in the harbor of Morehead City, North Carolina, alongside a fuel pier belonging to Aviation Fuel Terminals, Inc., which had contracted with the United States for the handling and storage of Government-owned petroleum products. While the POTOMAC was discharging a Government-owned cargo of aviation gasoline and jet fuel, a fire broke out on the surface of the water near or underneath a railroad trestle crossing the Newport River, nearly half a mile away. The fire spread toward Aviation Fuel’s pier, and after it reached the pier and burned alongside the POTOMAC for awhile, there were a series of severe explosions on board, setting her afire and ultimately causing her to sink at the pier in 30 feet of water. The fire and explosions destroyed Aviation Fuel’s pier, caused the total loss of the POTOMAC and her cargo, and allegedly have resulted in the death and injuries of various members of her crew, as well as certain other damage to persons and property in the vicinity. These proceedings commenced with a petition for exoneration from or limitation of liability, brought pursuant to the Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C., sections 183-189, by the United States as owner of the USNS POTOMAC and by Marine Transport Lines, Inc., as the POTOMAC’S operating agent, with standing as such to petition under 46 U.S.C., section 186 In response to the petition, 38 claims aggregating $2,111,413.17, including a claim by Aviation Fuel, were filed against the United States, which in turn filed an impleading petition for recovery over against Aviation Fuel, and thereby tendered Aviation Fuel to the claimants as an additional defendant. The United States also filed a crossclaim against Aviation Fuel for the loss of the POTOMAC and her cargo. The proceedings went to trial on the merits, and on damages with respect to the death and personal injury claims. The case is before the Court for determination as to: (1) whether the United States is entitled to exoneration as to all claims; (2) if not, which claimants, including Aviation Fuel, are entitled to recovery against the United States; (3) whether and which claimants are entitled to recovery against Aviation Fuel; (4) as to those death and personal injury claimants entitled to recovery, the amount thereof; (5) whether the United States is entitled to limitation of liability, both as to property damage as well as death and personal injury claims; (6) whether the United States is entitled to recovery over against Aviation Fuel by way of reimbursement, contribution, indemnity or otherwise; and (7) whether the United States is entitled to recovery in whole or in part against Aviation Fuel for the loss of the POTOMAC and her cargo. THE USNS POTOMAC The United States Naval Ship POTOMAC was a Navy tanker and a public vessel of the United States, used exclusively for the carriage of Government-owned petroleum products for the military services. At all times material to this action, she was operated on behalf of the United States by Marine Transport Lines, as the Navy’s public vessel operating agent. She was a rather new tanker, of a new T-5 class. Built in 1957 in accordance with the Rules of the American Bureau of Shipping for Building and Classing Steel Vessels, she had a length of 593 feet, a breadth of 83.9 feet, and a depth of 42.6 feet. She measured 15,626 gross tons, 9,380 net tons, and had a cargo carrying capacity of 203,215 barrels. The POTOMAC had nine main cargo tanks, running across the ship, each of which was divided by fore and aft bulkheads into three sections. The sections on the port and starboard sides were known as wing tanks, and those on the center line between them were known as the center tanks. In addition, there were two sets of deep tanks forward of the No. 1 cargo tank, the after one of which, known as the No. 2 deep tank, was also used for carrying liquid cargo. It was divided into two sections, known as the port and starboard deep tanks. Immediately aft of the No. 9 cargo tank was the main pump room, where the ship’s four main cargo pumps were located. Aft of the pump room were the machinery spaces, the boiler room, and the engine room in the stern of the ship. The crew’s living quarters were in the after superstructure, aft of the cargo tanks and above the machinery spaces, one or more decks above the main deck. The officers were housed in the amidships superstructure, located above the No. 3 and No. 4 tanks, which also contained the ship’s radio room, the bridge and the pilot house. A catwalk above the main deck led aft along the center line from the amidships superstructure to the after house and led forward to the forecastle deck, which commenced immediately forward of the No. 2 deep tank, one deck above the main deck. The POTOMAC was designed so that her cargo tanks could be divided into four isolated systems for carrying four separate types of cargo. Each of these systems utilized its own set of lines and valves, and its own cargo pump, which pumped cargo up into a manifold line running across the main deck just aft of the amidships superstructure above the No. 5 tank, with four hose connections on both the port and starboard sides. The four systems ran in the following manner. The No. 1 and No. 2 tanks, and the deep tanks, were connected through the starboard outboard suction line to the starboard outboard cargo pump. The No. 3 and No. 4 tanks were connected through the starboard inboard suction line to the starboard inboard cargo pump. The No. 5 and No. 6 tanks were connected through the port inboard suction line to the port inboard cargo pump. And finally, the No. 7, No. 8, and No. 9 cargo tanks were connected to the port outboard suction line through the port outboard cargo pump. Each of the four cargo pumps had a 4,200 gallon per minute capacity, and a relief valve set at 125 pounds per square inch. In the main pump room, there were certain crossover lines which permitted transfer of cargo between the four systems. The upper crossover was on the discharge side of the pumps, and connected the discharge lines leading from the cargo pumps up to the main deck. The lower crossover was on the suction side of the pumps, and connected the suction lines leading to the pumps from the cargo tanks. There was a third crossover at the bottom of the pump room, known as the sea suction crossover line, or simply the sea line, which was isolated from the cargo piping systems and used for taking on or discharging sea water ballast, connecting through drop valves with the suction lines from the cargo tanks, and thus with the cargo pumps. At either end of the sea line were the sea suction valves, one on the port and one on the starboard side, through which sea water ballast is taken on or discharged. There was a third sea suction valve in the pump room known as the “eductor valve” or “master eductor valve” located on the starboard side of the pump room, and the sea chest or sea spool with which it was connected to the upper and lower crossover lines was also on the starboard side of the bottom of the vessel. This valve was closed and is not involved in this proceeding. It is of prime importance that the sea suction valves are closed during cargo handling operations, so as to avoid contamination of petroleum cargo with sea water, and to avoid losing cargo overboard. For this reason, the POTOMAC’s operating manual stated that the first step in discharging cargo was to “secure master sea suction valves” and to “close the pump discharge valve connected to the sea crossover line.” The Navy required a certification that the sea suctions were closed and sealed, emphasizing on the form that “sea suctions and overboard discharges should be carefully checked before commencement of loading to make sure that they are closed, and then sealed.” And Marine Transport Lines as operating agent had issued an oil pollution manual which contained strict instructions that in preparing to discharge cargo: “Sea valves and stern loading connections should be inspected to insure that they are tightly closed and that seals, if used, from the loading port remain intact.” The piping arrangement in the pump room demonstrates that the closing of these discharge valves, which were connected with the sea crossover line, would completely isolate the sea crossover line from the piping system during a cargo discharge operation. Section 36, paragraph 26(b) of the American Bureau of Shipping requirements provides: “Where sea suctions are provided for ballasting purposes, two valves are to be fitted between the sea chest and the cargo piping, one of which is to be capable of being locked in the closed position.” There is very little dispute as to the fact that an attempt to discharge cargo through the sea line is generally frowned upon and is considered an unsafe practice. Yet cargo was being discharged through the sea line just prior to the outbreak of the fire. THE LOADING AT HOUSTON, TEXAS The POTOMAC’S voyage which terminated with the disaster at Morehead City had commenced at Houston, Texas, in mid-September of 1961. She had arrived in the Houston area in ballast on September 15, 1961, having first discharged some ballast at sea, and discharging the balance into ballast pits at various loading facilities in Houston. When in port, the sea suction valves are not used in the discharge of ballast as ballast is pumped up into the deck lines and discharged into a pit ashore. However, while at sea the sea suction valves are used to discharge ballast. The quantity of ballast required to be discharged at sea controls whether one or both of the sea suction valves will be opened. If there are only one or two tanks to be deballasted, generally only one sea suction valve is opened; if there are more tanks to be deballasted, the usual procedure is to open both sea suction valves. On the voyage from Greenland to Houston in ballast, the record does not affirmatively demonstrate whether one or two valves were opened. It is true that the recommended practice is to use only the starboard sea suction but, in this case, the chief pumpman who opened whatever sea suction valves were opened did not testify. Bert Forman, the chief mate at the time of any deballasting, testified that the matter of opening either or both of the sea suction valves was left to the chief pumpman and that, in pumping out the usual amount of ballast, both sea suction valves would normally be used in order to more expeditiously accomplish the job. It is conceded that most of the POTOMAC’S sea water ballast was pumped out prior to the arrival of the vessel in Galveston Bay. There is affirmative evidence that the chief mate gave an order to the chief pumpman “To close off the sea suction and stand by and wait and see what happens.” Neither the chief mate nor any other officer checked the chief pumpman to determine whether the order was fulfilled. Deballasting was discontinued when the vessel arrived at Galveston Roads, and it was approximately 36 hours later before the POTOMAC headed for the Sinclair docks at the Houston Ship Channel. Upon arrival at the Sinclair docks the major portion of the remaining water was pumped ashore. When ballast is discharged using both the port and starboard sea suction valves it is necessary to use the sea crossover line. Unlike a T-2 tanker, the POTOMAC did not have a block valve inboard of the sea suction valves, which block valve operates as a safety factor in the event the sea suction valve becomes faulty, encumbered with debris, or through oversight or neglect is not closed. As a result of the fire and explosions the vessel sank and, on a later date, was towed to another location in the More-head City harbor where she rested undisturbed for more than a year. Apparently no one entered the pump room from the time of the fire until the POTOMAC was raised and put in dry dock, other than a diver employed by Merritt-Chapman & Scott who stated that he had instructions not to, and did not, touch any valve in the pump room. After the ship was in dry dock it was discovered that the port sea suction valve was open. The pertinent inquiry is whether this port sea suction valve was sealed in an open position. Concededly the open port sea suction valve could account for the spillage of the cargo. Petitioner argues that, assuming arguendo the open port sea suction valve at the time of the fire, all evidence points to the opening of this valve by Matamala, the pumpman on watch at the time of the fire, and, therefore, the petitioner would be entitled to limit its liability. The claimants, especially Aviation Fuel, contend that this valve was sealed in an open position, thereby rendering the POTOMAC unseaworthy prior to the commencement of the voyage, thus barring any right to limit liability. For reasons hereinafter stated, we agree with the claimants. Reverting to the activities of the POTOMAC in the Houston area, we find that she first proceeded from Galveston Bay to the Sinclair Refining Company, arriving at its dock at 7:12 p. m., on September 17, 1961, where she took on a Government-owned cargo of JP-4 jet fuel in her No. 7, No. 8 and No. 9 tanks. She departed from the Sinclair docks at 5:45 p. m. on September 18, 1961, and proceeded to the facilities of the Crown Central Petroleum Company, arriving there at 8:54 p. m. on the same day, where she took on a Government-owned cargo of JP-5 jet fuel in her No. 3 and No. 4 tanks. Departing Crown Central at 2:25 p. m. on September 19, 1961, she next proceeded to the Shell Oil Company dock, arriving there at 4:04 p. m. on the same date, where she took on her remaining cargo of aviation gasoline in her No. 1, No. 2, No. 5, No. 6 tanks and the No. 2 deep tanks. She finished loading at 1:15 a. m. on September 21, 1961, and was ready for sea at 4:00 a. m. on that same date. While the POTOMAC was in Houston, she was attended by port engineer and marine surveyor Walter Ritter, who was sent down from New York by James C. Clarke, the vice-president and marine superintendent of Marine Transport Lines, the Government’s operating agent, to determine whether the ship had any problems and to prepare a repair list for her next shipyard period, which was to be scheduled in the following two or three weeks. The port engineer was under instructions to contact Marine Transport’s marine superintendent’s office immediately if he discovered any condition that affected the ship’s seaworthiness, but Marine Transport received no report of any deficiencies affecting her fitness for her prospective voyage, since Ritter, after having gone over the vessel and made up a list of routine repairs, found nothing that would affect the seaworthiness of the ship. During the POTOMAC’s stay in Houston, several personnel changes were made. The POTOMAC’s former master had died at sea on her last voyage, and all her officers had moved up one grade. Her former chief mate, Arthur Hunter, an experienced tanker officer who had been going to sea for 25 years, with a master’s license since 1947, and who had previously sailed on a sister ship of the POTOMAC, remained on the ship as master after receiving detailed instructions as to his duties and responsibilities. Second mate Forman did not wish to continue as chief mate, in which capacity he had been acting, and it was necessary to obtain another chief mate. Marine Transport had none of their own personnel available, and their personnel department selected William P. Maholland, the most qualified officer whose application they had on file, after having first received a very favorable report from Sinclair, his former employer, and from his union. Maholland had been going to sea for about 23 years, had been a licensed officer since 1948, had been sailing on tankers since 1950, had held a master’s license since 1959, and had been on Sinclair tankers as master or chief since that time. Maholland had never served aboard a T-5 tanker and he admitted that the piping arrangement on the POTOMAC • was quite different from that to which he had become accustomed. When he reported aboard the POTOMAC to relieve Forman, the then chief mate, he made no effort to examine the pump room; nor did he request, nor was ever shown, any diagram of the piping arrangement in the pump room. He did not ever see the chief pumpman who left the vessel at Houston, and concedes that he never studied the operating manual or, in fact, knew that there was such a manual aboard ship. On one occasion Captain Hunter went into the pump room with Maholland for the purpose of explaining to Maholland the water eductor system which had nothing to do with the sea suction valves. There was also a change of pumpmen, who were obtained through the local union hiring hall. The new first pumpman was Howard Mixon, a duly certificated pumpman, who had been a seaman for 19 years and a pumpman since 1949, and whose last ship had been a tanker with nine cargo systems, as contrasted with the four cargo systems on the POTOMAC. Mixon, while familiar with T-2 tankers, had never served aboard a T-5 tanker. When Mixon went aboard he met the former chief pumpman who advised that he would complete the job of pumping the ballast. Mixon left the vessel to return to his home without entering the pump room at that time, and he never thereafter saw the former chief pumpman. In fact, during the continuous loading operations at the various terminals in the Houston area, Mixon went home for supper each night and left after breakfast each morning. The new second pumpman was Avelino Matamala, who was also a certificated pumpman, and had been going to sea as such since 1936 or 1937. He joined the vessel on September 20, 1961, just prior to her departure from Houston. Like the others, he had never previously served aboard a T-5 tanker. He asked Mixon for a pumping diagram but was told that the chief mate had said that none was available. Because the POTOMAC was carrying a military cargo of Government-owned petroleum product, she was regularly attended by a quality control representative, sometimes known as a petroleum inspector, from the Military Petroleum Supply Agency of the Department of Defense, one of whose functions included the sealing of sea suction and other valves essential to cargo isolation, to avoid the possibility of .contamination or loss of cargo during shipment. One of the Defense representatives at Houston was Marvin D. Brasfield, who attended the POTOMAC at both the Sinclair and the Shell docks. While he was at Sinclair, he testified that the sea suction valves were checked in his presence, when he had one of the mates open each valve and close it down again, but he did not seal the sea suctions at this time because other types of cargo were to be loaded at other docks. When he attended the ship at the Shell facilities, where her final cargo was to be loaded, Brasfield said that he went into the pump room with one of the mates, had the valves cheeked in his presence to determine that they were closed, and then chained and sealed both the port and starboard sea suction valves and the overboard eductor. He recorded the seal numbers on the final cargo loading documents, and also executed an MSTS valve sealing certificate that the sea suctions had been sealed. While Brasfield’s recollection was to the effect that' he was “pretty sure it was the chief mate [Maholland]” who tightened the valves. before the seals were affixed thereto, Maholland testified that he did not recall being present when the valves were sealed, although he noted that they were sealed when he went into the pump room the next morning. Maholland affirmatively stated that he did not know how or by whom the chains and seals were put on the valves. Assuming arguendo that a loading mate (or night mate) was the individual with Brasfield at the time, the record is devoid as to the identity of such person who may have accompanied Brasfield at the time in question. In fact, Brasfield was not contacted as to the events at Houston until approximately 17 months after the fire, and his testimony appears to be predicated largely on the entries contained in the log book which he was required to keep in substantiation of the performance of his duties. Maholland, the chief mate, testified that he first examined the sea suction valves while the ship was at Sinclair, and stated that they were closed but not yet sealed as the vessel was still loading cargo. At Shell, after the ship had started loading aviation gasoline, Maholland said that he checked the sea suction valves and found them closed, chained and sealed, and contends that he tested same by putting a wrench on the wheel of the valve handle. Later, after loading and making ready for sea, he again used a wheel wrench and, according to his statement, the sea suction valves were closed, chained and sealed. The seals were made of small strips of iron coated with tin, similar to the tin used in a tin can. After the vessel was placed in dry dock, following its year’s rest on the bottom of the harbor, the seals were missing. Whether this was due to rust, exposure to sea water, the weight of the chains which the seals held together, or the explosions at the time of the fire, is unknown. Manifestly, there were adequate reasons why the seals would break and fall into the debris in the bottom of the pump room. THE VOYAGE TO MOREHEAD CITY AND DOCKING AT AVIATION FUEL The POTOMAC departed from the dock at Houston at 5:25 a. m. on September 21, 1961, and proceeded for Savannah, Georgia, holding a fire and boat drill on her first day out of port, at 3:20 p. m., September 22, 1961. She arrived at the Southland Oil Corporation Terminal in Savannah at about 7:33 p. m. on September 24, 1961, where, according to Maholland, her sea suction valves were examined and the seals thereon found intact. While at Savannah, the POTOMAC discharged all her JP-4 jet fuel from the No. 7, No. 8 and No. 9 tanks, and discharged a partial cargo of aviation gasoline, emptying the deep tanks, all of the No. 1 tanks and the No. 2 center tank. Departing from the dock at Savannah at 8:10 p. m. on September 25, 1961, the vessel proceeded for Morehead City, North Carolina, arriving off the More-head City bar at 1:54 p. m. on September 26,1961. She was met at the sea buoy by pilot A. T. Piner of the Morehead City Pilots Association, who with the assistance of the Tugs MANIE and A. T. PINER brought her into Morehead City harbor, where she was tied up starboard side to the fuel dock of Aviation Fuel Terminals, Inc., at 3:10 p. m. The harbor of Morehead City consists of a dredged turning basin where the Newport River meets Bogue Sound, before emptying through Beaufort Inlet into the Atlantic Ocean. The harbor is bounded on the east by Radio Island, on which the facilities of Aviation Fuel Terminals are located, with its upstream limits defined roughly by a causeway-type highway bridge and an adjacent railroad trestle nearly one-half mile long, crossing the Newport River between Morehead City and Radio Island, about 700 yards north of and inland from Aviation Fuel’s dock. Both the highway bridge and the railroad trestle have drawspans near the Morehead City side of the river, to permit passage of traffic along the Intracoastal Waterway, which follows the Newport River and then turns at a right angle in the harbor so as to follow Bogue Sound to the west and down the coast. The Aviation Fuel dock is roughly opposite the entrance to Bogue Sound and the town of Morehead City, where the North Carolina Port Authority has wharves extending along the north side of the Sound and along the Newport River across from Radio Island. Aviation Fuel Terminals, Inc., at whose facilities the POTOMAC had moored, had contracted with the United States to provide certain services for the storage and handling of Government-owned petroleum products, promising to perform “in accordance with the best commercial practices.” Its petroleum storage facilities consisted of a tank farm of 10 large floating roof storage tanks, divided into three isolated systems to handle three grades of light fuel; grade 115/145 aviation gasoline, JP-4 jet fuel, and JP-5 jet fuel. As part of its contract, Aviation Fuel was required to unload fuel from tankers, and to provide a berth at which such tankers could “always be safely moored and afloat with the necessary access thereto,” for which the United States had paid Aviation Fuel dockage and wharfage charges. Its docking facilities consisted of a pier about 300 feet offshore, and essentially parallel to the shoreline, to which it was connected by a trestle over which ran three large pipelines terminating at valves and hose connections on the dock. There was one pipeline for each grade of fuel, the one to the south (or seaward) being the JP-5 line, the center line being used for aviation gasoline, and the line to the north (or inland) being used for JP-4. The POTOMAC’S cargo was to go through the south and center lines into shore tank No. 1, used to store aviation gasoline, and into shore tank No. 2, used for JP-5 jet fuel. These two tanks each had an 80,000 barrel storage capacity, and were the storage tanks closest to the dock, being located about 150 feet from the shoreline. The dock proper was about 80 feet in length, and was connected by catwalks to a set of two breasting dolphins on either side, so that the entire structure was about 190 feet long. At a distance of 130 feet and 230 feet to both the north and south of the outermost breasting dolphins were two mooring dolphins, sitting out in the water 60 feet behind the line of the pierhead, with no means of access except by boat, which Aviation Fuel did not provide. The original plan for the dock’s construction and the Army Corps of Engineers’ permit therefor both called for a catwalk or other means of ready access, but the dock was not built in conformity with those plans or with the permit. However, there was apparently no complaint ever registered as to the construction design. For fire protection, there was a fire main leading out to the dock, with a pump and hydrant on the trestle about 35 feet away, but the facility had failed to install an emergency diesel generator on its premises or provide for any other source of emergency power, so that their fire equipment could not be operated in the event of a power failure. On the dock were four 50-foot lengths of 2%-inch fire hose, which require two men to handle, and five 5-gallon cans of foam with a foam applicator whose range was 100 feet already attached. There were axes available to cut mooring lines, and there was sufficient hose that with the foam applicator, a blanket of foam could have been placed on the water around the bow of a ship moored to its dock. THE DISCHARGE OPERATIONS On arrival at Morehead City, the POTOMAC was carrying JP-5 jet fuel in her No. 3 and No. 4 cargo tanks, and aviation gasoline in No. 5 and No. 6 across and her No. 2 wing tanks. Her draft on arrival was about 20 feet, 9 inches forward and 20 feet, 1 inch aft. The vessel was tied up to the dock, starboard side to, with 10 mooring lines. There were two bow lines to the northernmost mooring dolphin, and a breast line leading to the mooring dolphin nearer the dock, all of which had been led by boat, since there was no other access. There were two stern lines and a breast line aft which led to the inaccesible dolphins to the south, and the remaining spring lines were made up to the breasting dolphins connected to the pier. As she was made fast, her bow was positioned opposite a point roughly midway between the mooring dolphins to the north, a distance of about 275 feet from the manifolds on the dock. The POTOMAC gave notice of readiness to discharge cargo at 3:10 p. m., and was thereupon boarded by Aviation Fuel personnel, who took cargo samples and gauged the ship’s cargo tanks. The local Department of Defense petroleum quality control representative, William M. Maull, came aboard and went into the pump room to examine the sea suctions. There is no contention that any wrench was applied to the valves at this time. As reflected in the cargo receiving documents, he found .the seals intact with numbers corresponding to those appearing on the cargo documents forwarded from Houston. In the meanwhile, preparations were being made to connect up the cargo hoses, which belonged to and were furnished by Aviation Fuel. The cargo hoses consisted of three 25-foot lengths, connected by bolt flanges into one hose, 75 feet in length. The cargo hoses were supported by two booms with straps, one on the dock and one on the ship, to keep the sag out of them where they were suspended in the air. Under Coast Guard regulations, 46 C.F.R., section 35.85-30, the terminal superintendent has the right to satisfy himself by personal inspection that “sea valves connected to the cargo system [are] closed” before commencement of cargo discharge operations. Aviation Fuel’s superintendent, G. L. Bennett, chose not to make any such inspection. The regulation is obviously not mandatory. As soon as the cargo samples had been tested, Bennett gave the signal to start discharging the cargo. Discharge of aviation gasoline started at 5:20 p. m., and 20 minutes later, at 5:40 p. m., discharge of JP-5 commenced. After the ship had docked, the customary in-port watch was maintained on board, consisting of an oiler, a fireman, and a relief engineer in the engine room, and three deckhands (two able-bodied and one ordinary seaman), a pumpman and a relief officer on deck. Those not on watch were free to go ashore or remain on board, and many of the officers and crew had gone off the vessel on shore leave. The night relief mate was Richard W. Cantwell, Jr., a graduate of the Kings Point Merchant Marine Academy, and a licensed second mate who had previously sailed on tankers and had acted as a tanker night mate on 50 or 60 occasions. He reported on board at about 5:30 p. m., just after the discharge of aviation gasoline had started and prior to discharge of the JP-5 jet fuel. After he advised both the chief mate and the master that this was the first T-5 tanker he had been aboard, the master told the chief mate to remain around and neither he nor the chief mate went ashore. When the cargo discharge operation commenced, the POTOMAC was discharging aviation gasoline from her No. 5 and No. 6 cargo tanks through the port inboard suction line with the port inboard cargo pump. The JP-5 jet fuel was being discharged from the No. 3 and No. 4 cargo tanks through the starboard inboard suction line by the starboard inboard cargo pump. This left the chief mate with the problem of how to discharge the aviation gasoline remaining in his No. 2 wing tanks. He could not use hi,s starboard outboard system, of which the No. 2 tank was a part, because there was only one hose and one dock connection for handling aviation gasoline, and that was being used on the port inboard system from the No. 5 and No. 6 tanks. Nor could he use the upper or lower crossover lines in the pump room to interconnect the starboard outboard and port inboard systems, because the JP-5 jet fuel was being discharged through the starboard inboard system between them, and such an interconnection would contaminate both cargoes. The only alternative open to him, short of waiting until No. 5 and No. 6 were empty and then shifting cargo hoses, was to use the sea suction crossover as a transfer line, and this was the method he decided to follow. Maholland was aware that this was a risk, but he apparently thought that the procedure would be reasonably safe provided the sea suction valves were closed. He testified that when he made his final check of the pumproom, he applied the wrench to the sea suction valves. About 10 minutes after commencing discharge of JP-5, or at about 5:50 p. m., Maholland testified that he sent the night mate up forward to open the valves which connect the No. 2 wing tanks with the starboard outboard suction line, and also sent chief pumpman Mixon back into the pumproom to open up the necessary valves there. Mixon then went down and opened the drop valve between the starboard outboard suction line and the sea suction crossover, and then the drop valve between the port inboard suction line and the sea suction crossover, thereby placing the suction of the port inboard cargo pump on the sea suction crossover line, and finally, the crossover valve in the sea suction line. Mixon then came up on deck, went forward to make certain that the night mate was opening the correct valves, and watched the night mate and two seamen open up the valves to the No. 2 wing tanks. It was at just about 6:00 p. m. that the No. 2 wing tanks were open and commenced discharging. Shortly thereafter, Maholland went ashore to make a telephone call from the tank farm office, and then came back to the ship. While he was gone, Mixon asked to be relieved by second pumpman Matamala, who did so between 6:16 and 6:20. Chief mate Maholland prepared to turn in, but before he did, he made one final check of the pumproom, at around 6:20 or 6:25 p. m., at which time he was alone. He testified that he again put a wrench on both sea suction valves, and again found both of them closed, chained and sealed. Aviation Fuel’s superintendent Bennett and plant manager Murphy left the tank farm at 6:20 p. m., leaving only two employees on the premises, one of whom was night watchman Sewell, whose functions were essentially janitorial. The other person was L. B. Willis, one of Aviation Fuel’s foremen, who had been on duty since 7:00 a. m., and was expected to carry out all the functions of a petroleum storage terminal unloading a tanker at its facilities. One of his duties was supposed to be that of a dock watch. Willis had other duties to perform. One of these required him to go up into the tank farm once an hour to obtain gauge readings from the terminal’s storage tanks into which product was being pumped, and to calculate the pumping rate and ascertain the quantity of fuel that had been discharged. His routine was to take cargo samples from each line, and then go take readings from his shore tanks, timing it so as to arrive at the base of the tank on the hour. He accordingly left the dock about 2 or 3 minutes before 6:20 p. m., an hour after discharge of the aviation gasoline had commenced, and took gauge readings from both the shore tanks which were receiving the product. Returning to the dock, he made his calculations, called Sewell on the plant intercom to have the figures recorded in the office, and then went up to give them to the ship. On his way, he noticed that his hoses were sagging a bit, and got a member of the ship’s crew to raise them with the ship’s boom for him. Instead of leaving the pumping figures with the deckhand on watch and returning promptly to his post, however, Willis went on up to the second deck of the amidships superstructure to the officers’ lounge, where he ran into night mate Cantwell entering to make his log entries and put on a pot of coffee. While the coffee finished perking, Willis waited and had a cigarette, leaving the dock unattended. Assuming that the port sea suction valve was open, the evidence is without contradiction that, when Mixon opened the valves in the pumproom thus permitting the aviation gasoline from the No. 2 wing tanks to flow into the sea line, some of the gasoline commenced to gravitate out into the harbor through the port sea chest which was located on the flat bottom of the ship about halfway between the turn of the bilge and the keel on the port side. The movement of the flood tide could reasonably cause this gasoline to rise to the surface of the water near the forward portion of the vessel. The elevation of the gasoline in the tank was approximately 23 feet higher than the sea water and it is logical to assume that the flow of gasoline would continue until the level of the tank product was reduced to the level of the sea water. THE FIRE AND EXPLOSIONS Up to the time that Willis boarded the POTOMAC, there was no obvious indication of anything out of the ordinary. It was a warm September evening, with the air temperature recorded at 81 degrees, the-water temperature logged at 80 degrees, and the wind from the south at about five knots. The tide was at maximum flood current, the speed of which according to Morehead City pilot A. T. Piner was from 2% to 3% knots. Under the tidal conditions then existing, according to pilot Piner, it would take about ten minutes for something to float on the flood current from the place where the POTOMAC was moored past the bridges to the north. However, what must not be overlooked is the fact that there was apparently nothing to ignite the fuel until the fishing boat containing the open flame lantern entered the danger area as hereinafter indicated. Thus, the approximation of ten minutes floating time is not of great value. Underneath those bridges, which were about 700 yards from Aviation Fuel’s dock, two groups of sport fishermen were preparing to fish from small outboard motorboats which they had rented. In one of them, carrying the Stone party, Donald Stone began smelling gas fumes of some kind as they reached the end of Bunch’s pier, while they were proceeding from Radio Island toward the draw-span. They passed out of the area, but after they had gone through the drawbridge, and headed back toward Radio Island, he happened to raise up a gas lantern, and it was suddenly surrounded by fire. It went out when he brought it back down, but he then began smelling gas fumes again and saw another ball of fire underneath and between the railroad trestle and the highway bridge. At this point everything caught fire, with flames spreading upstream about 100 yards, between him and Radio Island. A similar phenomenon was experienced by the boat carrying the Massengills and Wade Stanley, who found the fumes so unpleasant that they were heading back to shore. They had an open-flame Coleman gas lantern in the bottom of their boat, and as they were going underneath the highway bridge from the railroad trestle, they were suddenly surrounded by a flash of fire, from which they all sustained varying degrees of injury. At about this time, the POTOMAC’S chief engineer Norris Nations and second assistant engineer Craig were walking through Aviation Fuel’s tank farm going ashore. As they were roughly opposite shore tank No. 1 about 150 yards from the water’s edge, they began smelling a strong odor of gas and then observed a small blue flame under the causeway, about one-third of the way out. As they watched, the blue flame grew in size and moved rapidly toward the Radio Island shore, and then began following the general direction of the shoreline. Nations and Craig ran back to the ship, and proceeded into the engine room. The last time they observed the fire was when they were running down the trestle toward the ship, at which time it was in a bay about 400 yards away. In the meanwhile, the fire had been observed from the ship, and the alarm shouted. Night mate Cantwell first saw the fire off his starboard bow by one or two points of the compass when it was on the causeway, and when he observed it beginning to work towards him he called the chief mate and gave orders to stop the pumps and close down the deck manifolds. At about the same time, both Chief Mate Maholland and Captain Hunter looked out, and saw a blue flame off their .starboard bow about a quarter of a mile away coming right along the beach toward them. Maholland ran down to the deck to help the night mate secure the manifolds, ascertained that the cargo pumps were off, and then ran up to the bridge to sound the general alarm. Captain Hunter had meanwhile gone directly to the bridge, planning to get the ship underway, had called down to the engine room ordering them to get ready to get underway immediately and give him all available steam, and then ordered the engines full speed astern. At about this point, chief engineer Nations arrived in the engine room to find the fire pumps started and the necessary preparations being made for an emergency departure, and Nations set his throttles for 60 revolutions, full astern, in response to the Captain’s order. It was at this juncture that Maholland arrived, and Captain Hunter ordered him to get all the lines off. Maholland ran back to the manifold where the night mate was trying to disconnect the cargo hoses, and ordered him to throw off the after lines. Maholland then proceeded forward, threw off the spring lines, and then went up on the forecastle deck forward of the deep tanks. He began working on the breast line, and had it about halfway off, when he testified that flames higher than his head leaped over the starboard bow where he was working, driving him back. The approach of the fire was observed by the crew of the tugboats MANIE and A. T. PINER, who were in the turning basin of Morehead City harbor at the time. Four crew members of these tugs testified that they observed the fire when it was about halfway between the highway bridge and the POTOMAC, and watched it until it seemed to disappear behind the POTOMAC’S bow on her starboard side, between the ship and the dock. As they continued to watch, they saw the fire reappear in a matter of seconds when it flared up from her starboard side, just forward of her amidships superstructure, and begin to flame over her decks. Similar observations were made by others. Leon Clifton from the railroad trestle watched the fire go down the ship’s starboard .side near the point of the bow, as did the witness Wayne Sowers. The ship’s purser Newton saw the fire coming down the starboard side of the ship towards the midship section, and seaman Nelson saw a ball of orange flame proceeding toward the dock area underneath the pipe lines. Seaman Lee, pump-man Mixon, and Captain Hunter all observed the fire come between the ship and the dock as far aft as the gangway and the manifolds. On these facts, according to Aviátion Fuel’s expert Prussing, there would have then been a large quantity of petroleum product present on the water between the ship and the dock, although he also said that the condition of the steel on the port side showed evidence that the fire had been more intense on the port side than on the starboard side. In the event of an oil spill during discharge, it is the duty of a fuel terminal’s dock watch to warn the ship and then either to drive it away with water or blanket it with foam. The instructions given by terminal superintendent Bennett to dockman Willis were that in the event of a spill, he was supposed to shut down the ship, find out where the spill was coming from and, if possible, stop it. It is agreed that, if Willis had been on the dock, he would have been in the best position to detect a spill on the water between the ship and the dock or, if not Willis, then another dock watcher should have been on duty to the end that the dock would not be left unattended at any time. The port sea suction block valve was opened by Mixon at approximately 6:20 p. m., according to Maholland. The fire broke out at approximately 6:45 p. m. While better commercial practice would seem to require the services of two men — one of whom would have the duty of a yard gauger with the attendant duty of boarding the ship to advise the proper ship’s officer as to the rate the cargo was being pumped ashore; the other remaining on the dock at all times — there is certainly nothing that could have been done by either dock watcher which would have prevented the spill or, in fact, prevented the fire. As soon as the fire was discovered, Willis heard the order to close down the pumps on the ship. He ran to the dock, called the watchman in the office, stood by the valves on the pier with his foot on the hose until he could feel that the pumping had stopped, and then started to close the valve in his line. Before he could get this valve closed, the fire was too close and had almost reached the ship. He then ran to the next set of valves at the pump block, approximately 50 feet from the inshore end of the pier, and closed the valves in two lines. About that time the fire struck the bow of the vessel. To spray the water, dock and ship with foam at this final moment would have been a fruitless effort, to say nothing as to the risk of life involved in such a procedure. We cannot attribute negligence to what Willis did or failed to do under the existing circumstances. The foregoing does not, of course, answer the argument that Willis, or an additional dock watcher, might have detected the spill on the water in time to have taken some action which may have prevented the disaster or otherwise lessened the damage. While there is evidence that the fire headed generally in the direction of the starboard bow, we must remember that any dock watcher would have been several hundred feet from the vessel’s bow. It is far more likely that a member of the ship's crew would have first observed any spillage of gasoline. There is no evidence as to how close the product approached the pier and no testimony that there were any leaks in the hoses and lines adjacent to the pier. Since the gasoline was being discharged from an opening in the flat bottom of the vessel on the port .side, and since there was no vertical keel which would have retained the product on this side of the ship, it is logical to assume that the flood tide may have carried some of the fuel toward the starboard bow as it gradually rose to the surface, but this does not necessarily mean that it would have flowed to the immediate area of the pier. From the evidence we must conclude that there was gasoline on the surface of the water off both the port and .starboard bow of the vessel. We feel that it would be sheer speculation to find that the presence of an additional dock watcher or Willis’ presence on the dock would have in any manner prevented or lessened the disaster. We decline to accept the invitation to find Aviation Fuel negligent to the extent of determining that such negligence was a proximate cause of the fire and resulting damage. Indeed, Creed, the Supervising Inspector of Naval Material, testified that, at none of the commercial terminals with which he was familiar, did they maintain a dock watch of more than one man after the gauging had been completed and the pumping commenced. Since the pumping .started at 5:20 p. m. — at least 40 minutes before the No. 2 wing tanks were opened — the presence of an additional dock watcher, according to Creed, was not customary. After Willis closed the valves in both the aviation gasoline and JP-5 lines at the pump block, and at about the time the fire reached the ship, Willis moved his automobile towards the office, stopping at the fire side of the No. 1 storage tank and entering the tank farm. At this moment he heard a tremendous explosion, after which he ran and closed the valves at the base of the No. 1 and No. 2 storage tanks, and then removed his car to a point outside the gate and off the terminal premises. At about the same time, Captain Hunter left the POTOMAC’s bridge, after first telling the radio operator Salopek to get moving back to the stern, and went forward to get Maholland off the bow. When he got there, he ordered Maholland back, telling him they could not save the ship, but that they should try and save the crew. The master and chief mate then went aft, going down to the main deck on the port side from the midships house because flames were coming over the starboard side and licking up over the catwalk. They then went through the crew’s quarters in the after superstructure getting the crew out, and when they got to the fantail they found about 12 men assembled there. At this time, there was a large explosion forward of the amidships superstructure, probably in the deep tanks. Captain Hunter then ran to the engine room hatch and ordered his engineering watch to stop the engines and come out on deck. As soon as he saw that the screws had stopped dead in the water, Hunter gave the order to abandon ship and his crew began jumping or sliding down lines into the water, until only the chief mate and Hunter remained, and then they went over the stern. Most of the crew made their way to the mooring dolphins and some of them swam ashore to the beach. Others were picked up by a Coast Guard boat or by a small fishing boat which came in and retrieved them. As the fishing boat was about halfway across the harbor, there was a severe explosion on the POTOMAC, apparently in her No. 7, No. 8 and No. 9 tanks, which opened up the ship and caused her to settle to the bottom. The POTOMAC and her cargo burned thereafter for about ten days and became a total loss. WAS THE PORT SEA SUCTION VALVE SEALED IN AN OPEN CONDITION? By inference, at least, the United States contends that the second pump-man, Matamala, who was in the pump room after Maholland had departed, opened the port sea suction valve. Matamala testified by way of deposition and emphatically denied having opened this valve. Despite the discrepancy shown in the footnote, it is clear that Matamala had no motive or reason to tamper with the valve. Obviously, however, the valve had been opened at some time as evidenced by the discovered position of the port sea suction valve when the vessel was raised and placed in dry dock. We believe that a fair review of the evidence will demonstrate that it is just as likely that the port sea suction valve was sealed in an open position at the time the POTOMAC departed from Houston, Texas. The last known opening of the port and starboard sea suction valves was when the vessel pumped out most of the sea water ballast prior to her arrival in Galveston Bay en route to Houston. The party who allegedly closed these valves was the former chief pumpman who was not called as a witness. In any event, his work was not checked by the then chief officer, Forman. This pertinent issue, essentially controlling on the right to limit liability, is governed by the burden of proof in such matters. The parties are in agreement that the initial burden of proving negligence or unseaworthiness rests upon the claimant or claimants in a limitation proceeding. The 84-H, 296 F. 427 (2 Cir., 1923), cert. den. 264 U.S. 596, 44 S.Ct. 454, 68 L.Ed. 867 (1924); Walston v. Lambertsen, 349 F.2d 660 (9 Cir., 1965), cert. den. 382 U.S. 980, 86 S.Ct. 553, 15 L.Ed.2d 470 (1966); Coleman v. Jahncke Service, Inc., 341 F.2d 956 (5 Cir., 1965), cert. den., Jahncke Service, Inc. v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission, 382 U.S. 974, 86 S.Ct. 538, 15 L.Ed.2d 465 (1966); Petition of Cherokee Trawler Corp., 157 F.Supp. 414 (E.D.Va., 1957); The Titanic, 225 F. 747, 141 C.C.A. 19 (2 Cir., 1915). However, once negligence is established, the burden rests upon, the party seeking to limit liability to prove seaworthiness and lack of privity. The 84--H, supra. The evidence abundantly establishes negligence on the part of the shipowner. While we believe that negligence has been established by reason of a crew untrained in the operation of a rather unique piping arrangement in the pump room, we prefer to rest this finding on the open port sea suction valve. If, as the United States strongly intimates, the port sea suction valve was opened by Matamala about 10 minutes prior to the outbreak of the fire, then this was negligence on the part of Matamala which is attributable to the United States, but which would apparently not disturb the right of the shipowner to limit its liability. If, as suggested by Aviation Fuel and other claimants, the port sea suction valve was sealed in an open position by the former chief pumpman, this was likewise negligence attributable to the shipowner and, in addition, created a condition of unseaworthiness which existed at the outset of the voyage from Houston, all of which would bar any right to limit liability. There is no merit to the argument that, again assuming Matamala’s act in opening the port sea suction valve, the act was not in the furtherance of the business of the shipowner in the absence of a showing that Matamala intentionally committed a criminal act. A mere act of negligence on the part of the servant, which results in a loss or liability vested upon the master, does not exonerate the master. While it is perhaps true that the quantity of the testimony reflects that several individuals applied a wrench to the sea suction valves for the purpose of determining whether the valves were closed, the quality of such evidence must likewise be considered in ascertaining whether the shipowner has met the burden of proof required by law. We hold that this burden has not been met. In light of this holding, it is unnecessary to make a specific finding with respect to who opened the port sea suction valve and for what purpose as related to the claims of the POTOMAC’S crew. It is true, of course, that the United States is not liable under concepts of unseaworthiness to the Massengill fishing party, the owner of the damaged railroad trestle, or Aviation Fuel as the dockowner. Those who are not a member of the ship’s company, nor of that broadened class of workmen to whom the admiralty law has extended the absolute right to a seaworthy ship, are not entitled to recover on any basis of unseaworthiness but must rely upon negligence. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959). However, even if the United States is entitled to limit its liability, the injured parties on the Massengill fishing boat have a fund created for their benefit under 46 U.S.C., sec. 183(b) which is more than adequate. Since the Court has found that the shipowner has failed to meet the burden of proof required to demonstrate that Matamala was the party guilty of opening the port sea suction valve, and since it is obvious that this valve was open with the resultant spillage of product, the only other logical alternative is that the port sea suction valve was sealed in an open position. While such an act undoubtedly created an unseaworthy condition of the vessel, it was equally a negligent act attributable to the United States. For these reasons, and since the shipowner is precluded from limiting liability, the owners of the railroad trestle and Aviation Fuel may recover on the theory of negligence. We could go further and state that, even if Matamala or some other crew member opened the port sea suction valve after the vessel left Houston, this act of negligence may properly relate back to the commencement of the voyage in that the POTOMAC was equipped with a unique piping arrangement and no effort was made to acquaint the pump-men with the inherent dangers attendant to its operation. It was clearly the duty of the shipowner to not only provide a crew sufficient in numbers, but also a crew competent for the duties it may be called upon to perform, including provision for any exigency which is likely to happen. In re Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 130 F. 76, 82, 69 L.R.A. 71 (9 Cir., 1904); Admiral Towing Company v. Woolen, 290 F.2d 641 (9 Cir., 1961). Such a failure may constitute both negligence and unseaworthiness. Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724, 87 S.Ct. 1410, 18 L.Ed.2d 482 (1967). We do not hold that the pumpmen were per se incompetent, nor that they were not qualified in the performance of duties on a T-2 or other similar class tanker. However, with only four T-5 tankers in existence and with these T-5 tankers being equipped with a unique piping arrangement which did not have the customary safety block valve, appearing on other vessels, it seems logical to assume that the shipowner, or its operating agent, Marine Transport Lines, had the duty of warning otherwise experienced pumpmen with respect to the potential danger existing by reason of the use of the sea suction crossover as a transfer line. Acknowledging that shipowners and their operating agents must obtain their crews from a Union and, for this reason, their opportunity for selection is essentially limited — which, standing alone, would not bar the right to limit liability, Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 63 S.Ct. 291, 87 L.Ed. 363 (1943), Admiral Towing Co. v. Woolen, supra—this affords no answer to this case. Until such time as the T-5 tanker with its piping arrangement, had become universally accepted by pumpmen, we think that there existed some duty on the part of the shipowner or its operating agent to familiarize pumpmen, unacquainted with the operative effects of the piping arrangement, with the potential danger always existing under the circumstances. Negligence or knowledge of the operating agent is, of course, binding upon the United States for purposes of the Limitation Act. Admiral Towing Co. v. Woolen, supra. We turn, then, to the issue of damages. DEATH CLAIM — PETER SALOPEK This decedent was the radio operator aboard the POTOMAC. At the time of his death on September 26, 1961, he was 47 years of age, having been born on February 9, 1914. He had no wife or children, and his sole surviving eligible beneficiary was his mother, Agnes Salopek, who was born on July 25, 1891, and was 70 years old when the decedent met his death. Salopek’s tax returns reflect that he claimed his mother as a dependent with average annual contributions of $1,333.-75 for the four calendar years prior to his death, with the largest annual contribution being $1,400 in 1960, and the lowest being $1,290 in 1958. His average annual earnings for the same four-year period were $7,055.88, with a high of $9,800.98 in 1957, and a low of $4,976.84 in 1958. The calendar year prior to his death resulted in earnings of $6,053.49. On the voyage prior to the one in question — from July 21, 1961, to September 15, 1961 — Salopek’s gross earnings were $1,988.30, from which an allotment in the sum of $600 was deducted in favor of his mother. We are not too much concerned with Salopek’s life expectancy which, at the time of his death, was in excess of 25 years. It is certainly reasonable to assume that, under ordinary circumstances, Salopek would outlive his mother. Her life expectancy at the time of the fire was 10.12 years according to the Commissioners 1958 Standard Ordinary Mortality Tables. We may assume that the mother would be entitled to the full pecuniary loss for at least the period of her life expectancy. The mother testified that she was the recipient of $1,800 to $2,000 by way of annual contributions, plus a $500 per year vacation gift. No precise records, other than the claim for dependency in the tax returns and the allotment of $600 for.the voyage prior to the disaster, are available. It is contended that the decedent, together with his brother, provided the housing accomodations for the mother, same being valued at $660 per year for the decedent’s share of same. Claimant agrees, however, that the rental value of housing accomodations should be disregarded if the contributions by the decedent to a joint savings account in the name of the decedent and his mother are to be considered. The joint savings account reveals the following: YEAR DEPOSITS WITHDRAWALS INCREASE 1957 $1,864.06 $900.00 $ 964.06 1958 1.496.00 500.00 996.00 1959 1.031.00 1.031.00 1960 1.730.00 200.00 1.530.00 Total increase $4,521.06 Average annual increase $1,130.24 In 1961, there were no withdrawals but an additional $550 had been deposited. The closing balance in the account was $7,936.32; there having been an opening balance of $2,041.39 in 1956. The average annual increase over a five-year period (to the date of death) was $1,178.98. There i