Full opinion text
RULING ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BLUMENFELD, Chief Judge. Plaintiff is an unincorporated association of persons aggrieved by present plans for the construction of the southwest quadrant of 1-291, a multilane, controlled access, divided highway which would run for about 7.6 miles through Rocky Hill, Wethersfield, Newington, New Britain, and Farmington, Connecticut, linking 1-91 south of Hartford, Connecticut, with 1-84 west of Hartford. This quadrant was originally planned as only part of an entire circumferential beltway around metropolitan Hartford. The southwest quadrant (Rocky Hill to Farmington) of this beltway is the only portion thereof which is nearing construction, and is the only portion thereof which is directly in issue in this action. For convenience I will refer hereinafter to this southwest quadrant by its family name, “1-291.” Plaintiff, whose standing to bring this action has not been challenged, has filed a complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiff asserts that this Court has jurisdiction over the action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, 1361, 1391, 2201 and 2202. Alleged as separate causes of action are defendants’ breach of four federal statutes. In moving for a preliminary injunction to halt construction of 1-291, plaintiff has by agreement with defendants restricted its attack to its first cause of action: defendants’ alleged breach of the duties imposed on them by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 et seq. Plaintiff enumerates in five counts defendants’ alleged failure to comply with NEPA, four of the five counts touching directly or indirectly on the adequacy of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on 1-291 prepared by defendants. The first count alleges that the air pollution and noise generated by 1-291, as indicated by defendants’ own studies made after completion of the EIS, will be so great as to violate the substantive mandate of section 101(b)(3) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3), directing federal agencies to act so as to “attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences.” The second count accuses defendants of failing to act in accordance with the “continuing responsibility” for environmental problems required of federal agencies-Niy section 101(b) of NEPA, insofar as they failed to incorporate air and noise pollution data obtained by them after completion and approval of the original EIS, into a supplemental EIS duly circulated among and approved by responsible public agencies. The third count alleges that the original EIS was not prepared in accordance with pertinent Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) guidelines, and count four alleges that the EIS lacked the adequacy and good faith preparation required by NEPA, and that the EIS was not prepared “by the responsible official” as directed by NEPA. The fifth count asserts that defendants violated their duty of “continuing responsibility” under NEPA by failing to file a supplemental EIS once it became apparent that the southwest quadrant of 1-291 would be the only portion of the entire Hartford metropolitan beltway to be constructed in the foreseeable future. Issue was joined on these five counts at a hearing of several days’ duration on plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. I. BACKGROUND The general location for an expressway such as 1-291 has been under consideration for some twenty years. Public hearings on possible routes to be used were held in 1959 and 1961. Public hearings on the design of the highway were held in 1969, 1970, and 1971. The proposed highway was divided into two projects of roughly equal length, designated Conn. Projects Nos. 93-74 and 51-130. Design study reports on these projects were submitted to the FHWA, together with a request for design approval, in August, 1970, and were resubmitted in revised form in December, 1970. At this time the cost of constructing 1-291 was estimated to be $31,500,000. If 1-291 is constructed as part of the federal interstate highway system, 90 per cent of the cost will be borne by the federal government, and 10 per cent by Connecticut. See 23 U.S.C. § 120(c). It has not been disputed that FHWA supervision and funding of the planning and construction of 1-291 by the FHWA constitutes “a proposal for major federal action” within the purview of section 102(C) of NEPA, which became effective January 1, 1970. Thus on February I, 1971, the FHWA Division Engineer for Connecticut advised the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Transportation (CONNDOT) that an EIS would be required for I-291. Personnel of CONNDOT’s Bureau of Highways accordingly prepared a rough draft of an EIS. This rough draft was reviewed in February, 1971, by David Densmore, a field employee of the Connecticut division of the FHWA. Defendant George Koch, then Chief of Design for the CONNDOT Bureau of Highways (until March, 1971), supervised preparation of a preliminary draft EIS based on the earlier rough draft and Densmore’s comments thereon. During the preparation of the preliminary draft, Densmore and two other FHWA engineers spoke almost daily, in person or by telephone, with CONNDOT personnel concerning the draft EIS. Defendant Koch testified that the resulting preliminary draft was based more on his experience and knowledge of the project than on empirical data. This preliminary draft was filed with the FHWA in June, 1971, and circulated among other federal agencies, including the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), but not including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). After comments from these agencies on the preliminary EIS were received by the FHWA and CONNDOT, and after a multi-disciplinary team of experts in environmental problems had reviewed the draft EIS at the regional office of the FHWA, see Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. Secretary of Transportation, 362 F.Supp. 627, 630 (D.Vt.1973) (Circuit Judge Oakes), the final EIS was written by CONNDOT personnel in cooperation with Densmore and other FHWA employees. Also contributing to the final EIS was defendant A. J. Siccardi, who upon transfer from another state became the FHWA Division Engineer for Connecticut on June 26, 1971. The final EIS was submitted to the FHWA’s divisional office on February 24, 1972. This office forwarded the final EIS to the FHWA’s regional office on February 28, 1972, with a cover letter noting that the EIS had been prepared in conformance with FHWA guidelines and recommending the EIS’s acceptance. After acceptance by the regional and Washington offices of the FHWA and the office of the Secretary of Transportation, the final EIS was filed with the CEQ on September 18, 1972. On or about October 4, 1972, public notice was given by newspaper publication that the EIS would be available for inspection for thirty days thereafter. Shortly after the expiration of this thirty-day period, defendant Siccardi granted formal design approval for 1-291 on November 6, 1972. On that same day, however, defendant Siccardi requested CONNDOT to give “further consideration” to the noise and air quality impacts of 1-291, to reflect advances in noise and air quality evaluation techniques since preparation of the 1-291 EIS and design study reports. CONNDOT personnel completed a noise impact evaluation for 1-291 in February, 1973. When it sent this report to defendant Siccardi on March 6, 1973, CONNDOT noted that the report showed one area of open space to be noise sensitive, and recommended construction of a mound ten feet in height to attenuate this noise. Defendant Siccardi’s office concurred in this recommendation on April 4,1973. CONNDOT commissioned an air quality study by The Research Corporation of New England (TRC), which was forwarded to defendant Siccardi on June 8, 1973. This report showed that projected 1990 traffic along 1-291 would, under “worst-case” meteorological and traffic conditions, cause the level of hydrocarbons in the air to exceed EPA standards at three points near the expressway. On June 14, 1973, defendant Siccardi approved CONNDOT’s “plans, specifications, and estimates” (P.S.&E.) for the first two miles of I-291 from 1-91 to the Newington-Wethersfield town line. This P.S.&E. approval committed the United States to paying its 90 per cent share of the cost of the construction outlined in the P.S.&E. See 23 U.S.C. § 106(a). See generally Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1328 (4th Cir. 1972), cert denied sub nom. Fugate v. Arlington Coalition on Transportation, 409 U.S. 1000, 93 S.Ct. 312, 34 L.Ed.2d 261. In the same letter in which he approved the P.S.&E. for this project, defendant Siccardi also authorized CONN-DOT to solicit bids for the construction of the first two miles of I-291. On September 6, 1973, a $10,996,216.92 contract for this construction was awarded to Arute Brothers, Inc. (Arute). Arute began work under the contract on September 19, 1973. Its operations to the date of the hearing consisted of grading, clearing, and drainage work, and the construction of temporary approaches. On October 12, 1973, defendant Siccardi notified CONNDOT that his office was accepting “without reservation the Air Quality Study as submitted.” A memorandum of the same date from FHWA field engineer Densmore to Siecardi noted that reevaluation of the study had been prompted by the circulation on August 31, 1973, of an FHWA “Notice of Air Quality,” a document not part of the record in this case but apparently concerned with air quality standards for federally funded highways. The Densmore memorandum accepted the conclusion of the TRC study that 1-291 would not cause significant air quality problems, and recommended no further delay in “future P.S. &E. approvals for the remaining projects on this section [of 1-291] due to air quality considerations.” II. LACHES The defendant state and federal officials as well as the Connecticut Construction Industries Association (as amicus curiae) have asserted laches as an affirmative defense to plaintiff’s action. Comprehensive consideration of this defense is necessary because of the differing significance regarding laches, individually or in various combinations, of the alleged failures of defendants to comply with NEPA and the hardships threatened by plaintiff’s claims for relief as to each such failure. The essence of defendants’ laches claim is that plaintiff was on notice of the contents of the final EIS for 1-291 once the EIS was made available for public inspection on or about October 4, 1972, and for thirty days thereafter. Thus defendants contend that it was unreasonable for plaintiff to wait until November 12, 1973, to file its complaint challenging the adequacy of the EIS. Defendants claim prejudice because in the intervening thirteen months the design of 1-291 was given final FHWA approval (November 6, 1972), the P.S.&E. for the initial segment was approved (June 14, 1973), bids were solicited and a contract for the initial segment awarded (September 6, 1973), and construction had begun (September 19, 1973). Defendants rely primarily on Clark v. Volpe, 342 F.Supp. 1324 (E.D.La.1972), aff’d 461 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1972), in which laches was held to bar a suit to stop an interstate highway for, among other reasons, the failure of federal officials to file an EIS. Federal P.S.&E. approval of the highway was granted in May, 1971; construction began in July, 1971; plaintiffs filed suit in February, 1972. Assuming, arguendo, that the May, 1971, P.S.&E. approval date was the crucial date for determining the applicability of laches, the Clark court concluded that plaintiffs had delayed unreasonably in waiting to bring their action, since at the time of the hearing on laches, one month later, the contested construction was 25-30 per cent complete. “It is inconceivable that plaintiffs, charged with knowledge of approximately fifteen years of publicity concerning the highway, were not on notice as of May 25, 1971 that actual construction would soon proceed unless legal action was promptly initiated. Nevertheless, plaintiffs stood idly by during the remaining months as bulldozers and chain saws stripped and leveled the land and as vast sums of public money were expended on highway construction. Finally, after the area had been laid barren of trees or grass, and after several million dollars had been spent for highway development, plaintiffs, on February 24, 1972, belatedly filed suit to halt construction. The Court holds that, under the circumstances of this particular case, plaintiffs’ delay in filing suit, during which delay the very acts of which they complain were being performed, was unreasonable, and defendants and intervenors would be substantially prejudiced if plaintiffs were allowed injunctive relief.” Clark v. Volpe, supra, 342 F.Supp. at 1329. Plaintiff does not dispute the validity of Clark’s statement of the law of laches, and is content to distinguish Clark on its facts. Plaintiff invokes the equitable nature of the doctrine of laches, and from this perspective stresses what it considers to have been inequitable aspects of defendants’ conduct. Thus plaintiff emphasizes that the best evi-' dence of the possible inadequacy of the 1-291 EIS — the air and noise pollution studies requested by the FHWA on the same day as design approval for the project was granted — was not made known to the public. Plaintiff also notes that the two mile segment on which construction was started was not separated from the rest of the 1-291 project and slated for early construction until after design approval. See p. 236, infra. Plaintiff contends that once it became apparent that this first segment would be constructed in advance of the rest of the project, it advised Arute and state and federal officials in September, prior to the start of construction, of its continuing objection to construction of 1-291. Plaintiff retained counsel on October 25, 1973, and it was apparently not until counsel’s inspection of CONNDOT’s files on October 31, 1973, that the supplemental air and noise pollution studies were made known to plaintiff. On these facts plaintiff contends it was duly diligent, and that Arute and state and federal officials were put on notice that their failure to agree to a moratorium on construction might expose them to the risk of an injunction after commencement of construction. Defendants’ view of the facts stresses the prejudice which would be suffered by their agents should construction of 1-291 be enjoined. Defendant Koch has estimated Arute’s per diem expenses while construction is in progress to be $27,200. Some of this expense would continue, and new expenses of storage and protection of materials would be incurred, should an injunction issue. Koch also estimates the cost of restoring destroyed vegetation to be in excess of $100,000. Land acquisition and design of the expressway have been largely completed by the state; Koch estimates Connecticut’s expenses in these regards to be $15,000,000. It must be noted preliminarily that this lattermost figure for Connecticut’s general expenses in connection with I-291 cannot fairly be weighed against plaintiff in considering the applicability of laches. Connecticut has been planning and preparing for a highway such as 1-291 since the 1950’s. Only a fraction of the expenses thus incurred by Connecticut could have been avoided or postponed had plaintiff brought suit as soon as its cause of action under NEPA accrued,- and defendants have made no showing as to what this fraction might be. In this regard, it is important to remember that what is in issue here is not the state’s decision to build an expressway but rather the federal government’s decision to participate in the construction of that expressway by approving its design, incorporating it within the interstate highway system, and accordingly underwriting 90 per cent of its cost. Plaintiff had no right, let alone obligation, to bring suit until the FHWA’s sponsorship of 1-291 reached the point of a “proposal for major Federal action” within the ambit of section 102(2) (C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C), and whatever the consideration to which the state’s prior expenditures might be entitled in this Court’s weighing of the equities of granting injunctive relief, these prior expenditures are not material to the issue of laches. Because of the many stages at which FHWA approval is required if a state highway project is to be funded as an interstate highway, see generally Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, supra, 458 F.2d at 1328, neither the record of this case nor prior law conclusively establishes any single FHWA decision as the crucial one which transformed 1-291 from a tentative project into a proposal for major federal action which plaintiff could attack through NEPA. Apportionments among the states of available federal highway funds are made each fiscal year, under 23 U.S.C. § 104. After receiving notice of their apportionments, the states are to submit programs of proposed projects to be funded by the apportioned moneys. 23 U.S.C. § 105. Approval of a state’s program under 23 U.S.C. § 105 is a prerequisite to submission of P.S.&E. for approval under 23 U.S.C. § 106. But 23 U.S.C. § 128, requiring public hearings on proposed interstate highways’ locations, and reports of consideration given to objections to proposed interstate highways’ locations and designs expressed at such hearings, has been interpreted by the FHWA as requiring the additional steps of “location approval” and “design approval” before P.S.&E. approval. Thus FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum (PPM) 20-8, “Public Hearings and Location Approval,” promulgated January 14, 1969, sets up a “two-hearing procedure” for compliance with 23 U.S.C. § 128. A “corridor public hearing” must be held to consider the location of a proposed highway project, and a transcript of this hearing transmitted to the FHWA, before the FHWA division engineer may approve the route location and authorize design engineering. After “location approval,” a “highway design public hearing” must be held to provide “a full opportunity for presenting views on major highway design features, including the social, economic, environmental, and other effects of alternate designs,” before the FHWA division engineer can grant “design approval.” P.S.&E. approval cannot precede design approval. The FHWA has established location approval as the stage at which a state highway project proposed in contemplation of federal funding must be the subject of an EIS. Thus PPM 90-1, which evolved from the FHWA’s November 24, 1970, interim guidelines on compliance with NEPA, requires that a draft EIS be circulated among appropriate agencies and be made available to the public in advance of the location (i. e., corridor) public hearing prescribed by PPM 20-8. The FHWA may not grant location approval until at least thirty days after the final EIS has been filed with the CEQ and made available to the public. However, the FHWA has also designated design approval as the crucial stage, at least where location approval but not design approval had been granted prior to February 1, 1971. “In such instances the environmental statement ... or negative declaration shall be prepared and processed during the design studies. The final environmental statement or negative declaration for such highway sections shall be furnished to FHWA before or with the request for design approval.” The overall thrust of the FHWA’s procedures seems to be that while location approval is a preferable stage for preparation of an EIS, allowing more time for accommodation of problems raised in an EIS, design approval is the stage at which NEPA affirmatively requires preparation of an EIS. While recogni2;ing the significance of design approval, courts have nevertheless been reluctant to assign design approval talismanic value, so as to exempt absolutely from NEPA highway projects which had received design approval prior to the January 1, 1970 effective date of NEPA. Thus the Fourth Circuit, having held “that Section 102(C) [NEPA’s EIS requirement] is applicable to a project until it has reached the state of completion where the costs of abandoning or altering the proposed route would clearly outweigh the benefits therefrom,” concluded that “ [m] anifestly the date of design approval alone does not measure whether [an interstate highway project] has reached the crucial stage, and determining the applicability of Section 102(C) by this' standard alone would be arbitrary and capricious agency action and an abuse of administrative discretion.” Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, supra, 458 F.2d at 1332. However, it appears that while a balancing-of-the-factors approach is required to determine if an EIS is required of a highway project which had received FHWA design approval before 1970, such an approach cannot work in reverse to exempt from the EIS requirement a highway project which received design approval. after January 1, 1970. Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761, 766-767 (D.Vt.1972) (Circuit Judge Oakes); Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F.Supp. 731 (D.Conn. 1972). Of course, equitable consideration of the extent of completion of a highway project which did receive design approval after January 1, 1970, might still influence the decision whether or not an injunction should issue because of the failure to comply with NEPA. Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, supra, 346 F.Supp. at 738. I conclude that plaintiff herein could have challenged defendants’ compliance with NEPA once defendant Siccardi granted design approval to 1-291 on November 6, 1972, at which point 1-291 became a proposal for major federal action. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the entire year "from that date until plaintiff’s complaint was filed on November 12, 1973, must be counted against plaintiff in considering for the purpose of laches if plaintiff delayed unreasonably. As was stated in the very case on which defendants principally rely for their argument in favor of invoking laches: “Laches is not merely a question of time; it is a question of diligence as well. [Citation omitted.] There is no certain period of time within which a plaintiff may reasonably delay before filing suit; that ‘reasonable’ period varies upon the circumstances of each case. . . . [j[] Laches is an equitable doctrine and will be applied where it would be inequitable to permit plaintiffs to proceed.” Clark v. Volpe, supra, 342 F.Supp. at 1328. It is true that prior to the November 6, 1972, design approval of 1-291, the final EIS on 1-291 had been available for public inspection, and hence plaintiff had had an opportunity to assess the adequacy of the EIS and so determine if defendants’ compliance with NEPA should be tested by litigation. But this fact alone will not support the conclusion that plaintiff had to attack the EIS forthwith or forever hold its peace. Plaintiff has emphasized that it did not regard the 1-291 EIS as inadequate enough to warrant litigation until it became aware of the air and noise studies requested by defendant Siccardi contemporaneously with his grant of design approval. Moreover, although this design approval established 1-291 as a proposal for major federal action within the purview of NEPA, it did not leave the FHWA irrevocably committed to funding 1-291. This commitment is not made until the stage of P.S.&E. approval. is reached. 23 U.S.C. § 106(a). At the time of design approval, P.S.&E. approval was still some distance away. Indeed, it was not until June 14, 1973, that P.S.&E. approval was granted, and even then only for the initial two-mile segment of 1-291, Project No. 159-121, which segment did not even exist until November 9, 1972, when it was broken out of Project No. 93-74, one of the two original projects forming 1-291, given a separate project number and scheduled for completion “at least one (1) year before the second section, and possibly much longer.” Had plaintiff filed suit during the seven months between the granting of design approval and the P.S. & E. approval of the initial two-mile segment of 1-291, the prejudice attributable to a suspension of work by Arute could indeed have been avoided. But this Court is chary of forcing on those in plaintiff’s position at the time of design approval the choice between filing a suit without a good faith belief in its merits or losing the opportunity to sue later should new facts come to light raising substantial questions as to the adequacy of the EIS upon which design approval was originally granted. The better position, as suggested in Clark v. Volpe, supra, 342 F.Supp. at 1328-1329, is to allow one opposed to a proposed federally-funded highway to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that public officials will properly fulfill their statutory obligations until such time as P.S.&E. approval makes the commencement of actual construction imminent. Once P.S.&E. approval issues, a potential plaintiff must decide if there is sufficient reason to warrant suspicion of non-compliance. If such suspicion is justified, the plaintiff must then act diligently to develop its case and, if this results in a good faith belief in non-compliance with pertinent statutes, file its complaint. Applying these principles to the instant case, it must be noted that the seven month period from November, 1972, to June, 1973, was the very time in which defendant Siccardi was awaiting CONNDOT’s compliance with his request for air and noise pollution studies. Had Siccardi’s concern over the adequacy, under current standards, of the air and noise pollution studies underlying the EIS been made a matter of public record at the time of his grant of design approval, plaintiff might now be held accountable in equity for not having promptly challenged the grant of design approval. Lacking any such evidence to overcome the presumption that defendants had complied fully with NEPA before deciding to go forward with 1-291, plaintiff was not so obliged to commence litigation in November, 1972. Not until the P.S.&E. approval of June 14, 1973, was plaintiff affirmatively on notice that, barring litigation, 1-291 would be constructed as planned. It was then no longer reasonable for plaintiff to presume that any necessary modifications in the 1-291 EIS and consequent reconsideration of 1-291 would be undertaken by defendants, on their own initiative and in advance of commencement of construction of 1-291, in recognition of their “continuing responsibility” under section 101(b)(3) of NEPA “to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs and resources to the end that the Nation may . . . attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences.” 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3). By moving promptly after the P.S.& E. approval of June 14, 1973, plaintiff might still have minimized the prejudice to defendants, and it is for the five months’ delay between June 14, 1973, and November 12, 1973, that plaintiff stands in real risk of laches. It is, at this point that plaintiff’s special status as essentially a public interest litigant seeking to vindicate public rights under NEPA must be considered. Environmental litigation is complex and costly; even the decision when to seek counsel with a view toward litigation is difficult, since the posture of a public works project is inevitably obscured by the mists of bureaucracy. With few exceptions environmental action groups — especially those such as plaintiff organized in ad hoc response to a particular project — lack the resources affording access to legal advice in advance of a decision to litigate. The interests of the members of such groups are generally inchoate and decentralized until action is galvanized and funds are mobilized by some startling disclosure which awakens the public to the possibly dire consequences of an imminent intrusion on the environment. Yet dozens of cases have demonstrated that absent the advocacy of such groups, the procedural rights and protections enshrined in NEPA stand in jeopardy of being ignored with impunity. See, e. g., Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972); Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, supra; Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Comm., 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109 (1971); Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, supra; Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. Volpe, supra. This Circuit has joined others which have recognized in NEPA a Congressional mandate for scrupulous official conduct when environmental impacts are in the offing, and have seen the forcefulness of this mandate as authorizing special judicial solicitude of those who seek pro bono publico to ensure that the Government and its agents live up to NEPA. The call for vigorous judicial enforcement of NEPA was first sounded by the District of Columbia Circuit. Courts dealing with NEPA litigation were said to have the duty “to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.” Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, supra, 449 F.2d at 1111. The Calvert Cliffs' court emphasized that the procedural provisions of NEPA “establish a strict standard of compliance,” 449 F.2d at 1112, and that “ [c] onsiderationa of administrative difficulty, delay or economic cost will not suffice” to excuse non-compliance with NEPA. 449 F.2d at 1115. The Second Circuit has since accorded explicit approval to Calvert Cliffs’ construction of NEPA. Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commission, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 849, 93 S.Ct. 56, 34 L.Ed.2d 90. “[W]e can only add our voice to that of the District of Columbia Circuit in Calvert Cliffs’: Delay is a concomitant of the implementation of the procedures prescribed by NEPA . . .-. ‘It is far more consistent with the purposes of the Act to delay operation at a stage where real environmental protection may come about than at a stage where corrective action may be so costly as to be impossible.’ [Calvert Cliffs’, 449 F.2d] at 1128.” Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commission, supra, 455 F.2d at 422-423. Subsequent to both Calvert Cliffs’ and Greene County, the Fourth Circuit declined to invoke the doctrine of laches to bar a suit to halt an interstate highway, even though the. plaintiffs-appellants therein had caused considerable prejudice to the defendants-appellees by failing to institute litigation promptly once NEPA had granted them- a cause of action. From the very first words of its opinion, the court emphasized the special status of environmental litigation, and then proceeded to justify its refusal to honor the claim of laches by express reference to that status. “This is an ecology case. It is the declared public policy of the United States to protect and preserve the national environment ‘to the fullest extent possible.’ National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (NEPA). The NEPA is a value judgment by the Congress that in order to ‘foster and promote the general welfare’ each generation of Americans must, beginning now, act ‘as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations.’ 42 U.S.C.A. § 4331. We hold that even essential highway construction must yield to the eongressionally structured priority. * * * * * * We conclude that the federal statutes invoked by appellants are applicable to Arlington 1-66 and must be complied with before further steps may be taken towards construction of this highway. Compliance means not only reconsideration of the proposed location of Arlington 1-66 in the light of environmental, social, and economic policies set forth in the statutes; it means also suspension of work on Arlington 1-66 pending this reconsideration. Further investment of resources by appellees in the proposed route would render alteration or abandonment of the proposed route increasingly costly and, therefore, increasingly unwise. If appellees were thus allowed to limit their options during their reconsideration of the location of Arlington 1-66, reconsideration would be a hollow gesture. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (1971). ****** [Ajppellees claim that appellants’ suit should be barred by laches. Appellees as representatives of the general public and specific interest groups will be prejudiced by appellants’ delay in bringing suit if the proposed route for Arlington 1-66 is altered or abandoned. Most of the right-of-way for the proposed route has been acquired; Arlington County’s planning with respect to zoning, traffic, and location of utilities has been based upon the route; and the location of numerous businesses has been chosen in reliance upon the route. Appellants could have brought suit earlier to minimize or avoid this harm; all of the relevant statutes were in effect by January 1, 1970, but appellants did not file suit until February 19, 1971. Nevertheless, we decline to invoke laches against appellants because of the public interest status accorded ecology preservation by the Congress. [Footnote omitted.] We believe that Arlington 1-66 has not progressed to the point where the costs of altering or abandoning the proposed route would certainly outweigh the benefits that might accrue therefrom to the general public. In their reconsideration of the proposed route, the Secretary of Transportation and the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Highways may decide, of course, that the costs do outweigh the benefits. If the opposite conclusion is a reasonable possibility, however, as it is here, the congressional declaration of policy in the relevant statutes of the importance of the benefits that might accrue demands that the merits of the question be considered by the appropriate agencies.” Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe, supra, 458 F.2d at 1326, 1327, 1329-1330 (emphasis in original). Accord, Environmental Defense Fund v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 468 F.2d 1164, 1182-1183 (6th Cir. 1972). Besides the special status of plaintiff, the conduct of defendants must also be considered in assessing whether plaintiff was properly diligent after June 14, 1973. Defendants did not make public the post-EIS air and noise pollution studies, even though these studies revealed that more substantial air and noise pollution impacts than were discussed in the EIS might result from I-291. While the studies offered no conclusive evidence of the advisability vel non of building 1-291, they at least made the advisability of proceeding with 1-291 a question upon which, in the light of the two studies, reasonable men could disagree. These reports were sure fuel for any environmentalists opposed to 1-291; had they been made public plaintiff might now reasonably be held accountable for failing to bring its action shortly after defendant Siccardi’s grant of P.S.&E. approval. In the absence of disclosure of the reports, only the actual commencement of construction prodded plaintiff into actively.condering litigation. Counsel were retained in late October, 1973; once plaintiff gained through counsel access to the documentary record of defendants’ decision making, plaintiff’s suit was promptly filed. The “unconscionable delay” requisite for successful assertion of the defense of laches “can occur only after a party discovers or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could have discovered the wrong of which he complains.” Ward v. Ackroyd, 344 F.Supp. 1202, 1212 (D.Md.1972). In the instant case, as in Ward v. Ackroyd (where FHWA compliance with 23 U.S.C. § 128 and PPM 20-8 was in issue), “there is no evidence that plaintiffs knowingly sat on their rights and delayed bringing suit.” Id. (Emphasis in original.) While I certainly find no evidence whatsoever of bad faith on the part of defendants in keeping the post-EIS air and noise pollution reports off the public record, and do not doubt that the reports would have been disclosed much earlier had plaintiff been aware of the proper inquiries to make, the fact remains that environmental litigants generally do not have legal counsel at their fingertips, and depend on public disclosure of the details of proposals for major federal actions in order to determine if the threat to their interests is sufficiently grave to warrant organized political and legal opposition. Also pertinent to the significance in equity of plaintiff’s delay is the extent of the construction of 1-291 which has already taken place. Unlike Clark v. Volpe, supra, the interstate highway project here in issue is nowhere near 25 to 30 per cent complete, even as to the initial two-mile segment. In view of all the circumstances of the case, and especially the special status accorded litigants such as plaintiff, I rule that plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit was not so unreasonable, nor its consequences so unconscionable, as to constitute laches as a bar to temporary relief. As Judge Friendly has written: “The tardiness of the parties in raising the issue cannot excuse compliance with NEPA; primary responsibility under the Act rests with the agency.” City of New York v. United States, 337 F.Supp. 150, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (three-judge court). III. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL REVIEW UNDER NEPA Before commenting and ruling on plaintiff’s broad-ranging attack on defendants’ compliance with NEPA, the role of this Court in NEPA litigation should be considered. NEPA confers no jurisdiction on this Court to review the wisdom of federal financing of a proposed expressway. See, e. g., Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, supra, 346 F.Supp. at 739. Of course, arbitrary decisions concerning federal highway monies may be set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act, which permits judicial invalidation of administrative decisions which are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Under this standard, “the court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. [Citations omitted.] Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 824, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). The passage of NEPA has yet to be shown by authoritative construction to have broadened this limited grant of power to the judiciary to review the substantive merits of agency action. See City of New York v. United States, 344 F.Supp. 929, 939-940 (E.D.N.Y.1972) (opinion of Circuit Judge Friendly) (three-judge court). However, the Administrative Procedure Act’s narrow standard of substantive review does not preclude judicial “inquiry . . . whether the action followed the necessary procedural requirements.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, 401 U.S. at 417, 91 S.Ct. at 824 (emphasis added). It is in the area of procedural review that NEPA has indisputably opened wide judicial vistas, which were explored in detail in Calvert Cliffs’. “[T]he general substantive policy of the Act is a flexible one. It leaves room for a responsible exercise of discretion and may not require particular substantive results in particular problematic instances. However, the Act also contains very important “procedural” provisions — provisions which are designed to see that all federal agencies do in fact exercise the substantive discretion given them. These provisions are not highly flexible. Indeed, they establish a strict standard of compliance. Perhaps the greatest importance of NEPA is to require the Atomic Energy Commission and other agencies to consider environmental issues just as they consider other matters within their mandates. This compulsion is most plainly stated in Section 102. There, ‘Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act * * * .’ Congress also ‘authorizes and directs’ that ‘(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall’ follow certain rigorous procedures in considering environmental values. [Footnote omitted.] * * * * * * Of course, all of these Section 102 duties are qualified by the phrase ‘to the fullest extent possible.’ We must stress as forcefully as possible that this language does not provide an escape hatch for footdragging agencies; it does not make NEPA’s procedural requirements somehow ‘discretionary.’ Congress did not intend the Act to be such a paper tiger. Indeed, the requirement of environmental consideration ‘to the fullest extent possible’ sets a high standard for the agencies, a standard which must be rigorously enforced by the reviewing courts. Unlike the substantive duties of Section 101(b), which require agencies to ‘use all practicable means consistent with other essential considerations,’ the procedural duties of Section 102 must be fulfilled to the ‘fullest extent possible.’ [Footnote omitted.] * * * * * -X- We conclude, then, that Section 102 of NEPA mandates a particular sort of careful and informed decisionmaking process and creates judicially enforceable duties. The reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision on its merits, under Section 101, unless it be shown that the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values. But if the decision was reached procedurally without individualized consideration and balancing of environmental factors — conducted fully and in good faith — it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse.” 449 F.2d at 1112, 1114, 1115 (emphasis in original). Calvert Cliffs’ thus contemplated the use of two different standards of review of agency actions subject to NEPA: a “strict” standard for reviewing compliance with NEPA’s “rigorous” procedural duties, a lenient standard for reviewing compliance with NEPA’s “flexible” substantive duties. The reviewing court can properly demand strict compliance with NEPA’s procedural requirements for gathering and discussing information on the environmental consequences of a proposed project in advance of a decision by the agency to proceed with the project. The agency’s preparation of an EIS cannot be a cursory exercise of filling in blanks. “NEPA requires that an agency must — to the fullest extent possible under its other statutory obligations — consider alternatives to its actions which would reduce environmental damages. That principle establishes that consideration of environmental matters must be more than a pro forma ritual.” Calvert Cliffs’, supra, 449 F.2d at 1128 (emphasis in original). Cf. Nat’l Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1001-1002 (10th Cir. 1973); Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. Secretary of Transportation, supra, 362 F.Supp. at 632-636. Although the Second Circuit has yet to pas's on this exact issue, it appears that if the EIS survives this strict scrutiny, the reviewing court cannot extend its strict scrutiny to the agency’s substantive decision to proceed with the project despite the impacts considered in the proeedurally adequate EIS. Under both the Administrative Procedure Act, as explicated in Overton Park, and section 101 of NEPA, as explicated in Calvert Cliffs’, an agency’s decision to proceed with a project may be set aside upon review of its merits only when the decision is arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion, as when the decision displays such callous disregard of the environmental considerations expressed in the EIS as to support an inference of bad faith on the part of the agency in deciding nonetheless to proceed with the project. See, e. g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 951-953 (7th Cir. 1973); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1283 (1st Cir. 1973); Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973); Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1281 (9th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 298-300 (8th Cir. 1972), injunction denied, 409 U.S. 1072, 93 S.Ct. 1072, 34 L.Ed.2d 661; Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F.Supp. 1289, 1332-1334 (S.D.Tex. 1973); City of New York v. United States, supra, 344 F.Supp. at 939-940. Cf. Scenic Hudson Preserv. Conf. v. Federal Power Commission, 453 F.2d 463, 468, 481 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926, 92 S.Ct. 2453, 32 L.Ed.2d 813 (1971). IV. DEFENDANTS’ COMPLIANCE WITH NEPA Plaintiff has attacked defendants’ compliance with NEPA on many fronts. Besides challenging on its merits defendants’ substantive decision to proceed with 1-291, plaintiff contends that many procedural aspects of defendants’ preparation for that decision failed to comport with NEPA. The Court finds merit in three of plaintiff’s contentions of defendants’ noncompliance with NEPA’s procedural mandates. Each of these contentions relates to the adequacy of the 1-291 EIS: the authorship of the EIS, its discussion of alternatives, and its discussion of the impact of 1-291 on the air quality and sound levels of land adjacent to the expressway. Authorship of the EIS The title page of the final 1-291 EIS states “PREPARED BY THE CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION — BUREAU OF HIGHWAYS — OFFICE OF DESIGN.” This accurate representation of the actual authorship of the EIS reflects adherence to the FHWA’s November 24, 1970, interim guidelines on compliance with NEPA, see note 56, supra. These guidelines directed state highway departments to prepare both draft and final EIS’s where such were required by NEPA as a condition to FHWA funding of a highway. PPM 90-1, which superseded the interim guidelines, also leaves preparation of EIS’s to state highway departments. Plaintiff contends that the FHWA, by leaving the writing of the EIS to CONNDOT, failed to comply with the explicit statutory command of NEPA’s section 102(2) (C) directing “all agencies of the Federal Government” to include in reports on proposals subject to NEPA “a detailed statement by the responsible official,” whom section 102(2) (C) also refers to as “the responsible Federal official.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (emphasis added). Were plaintiff’s contention to present a question of first impression, the Court might be free to view the previously catalogued, extensive cooperation of FHWA personnel with CONNDOT personnel in the preparation of the draft and final 1-291 EIS’s as constituting sufficient compliance with the statutory mandate that the EIS be prepared by personnel of the federal agency charged with compliance with NEPA. But previous case law in this Circuit compels this Court to demand strict compliance with the letter as well as the spirit of NEPA as regards authorship of an EIS. In Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commission, supra, the Second Circuit ruled that the Commission had “abdicated a significant part of its responsibility by substituting the statement of [a state agency] for its own. The Commission appears to be content to collate the comments of other federal agencies, its own staff and the intervenors and ... to act as an umpire. The danger of this procedure, and one obvious shortcoming, is the potential, if not the likelihood, that the [state agency’s] statement will be based upon self-serving assumptions.” 455 F.2d at 420 (footnotes omitted). The court noted that NEPA made consideration of environmental values the “primary and nondelegable responsibility” of the Commission; thus, the court concluded, NEPA required of the Commission “the preparation by its staff of its own impact statement . . . .’’Id. at 420, 422 (footnote omitted, emphasis in original). In Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, supra, Judge Newman of this Court held that Greene County squarely controlled the precise issue here considered. PPM 90-1’s provision for state preparation of the final as well as the draft EIS for a federally funded highway was held to be in irreconcilable conflict with NEPA. Judge Newman noted that Greene County did allow state preparation of the draft EIS. “But as to the final version of the detailed statement required by § 102(2) (C), the Court of Appeals ruled unequivocally that this must be prepared by the F.P.C. itself, with the actual work to be done by the agency’s own staff.” Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, supra, 346 F.Supp. at 741. The FHWA’s regulations thus had to give way to “the plain wording of NEPA,” id., and federal officials were directed to prepare the final version of the EIS there required. Another analogous case, Conservation Society of Southern Vermont v. Secretary of Transportation, supra, also considered “the very fundamental question whether FHWA procedures requiring preparation of an EIS by the local state highway agency, with communication from and [the] cooperation of the regional FHWA [office], followed by review by an FHWA ‘task force’ at the regional level complies with NEPA and more particularly NEPA as construed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in [Greene County].” 362 F.Supp. at 630. Judge Oakes found that the state highway department there concerned was under a legislative mandate to build the highway in issue, and therefore was prone to “self-serving assumptions” in preparing an EIS, as contemplated by Greene County. 362 F.Supp. at 631. Judge Oakes termed the FHWA’s review of the final EIS “merely perfunctory, the equivalent of an agency rubber stamp,” id., and found the FHWA’s role in the preparation of the EIS to have consisted of only “informal chats touching upon the subject, together with [a] field trip and subsequent ‘review.’ ” 362 F.Supp. at 632. Judge Oakes accordingly ruled that the EIS there in issue had not genuinely been “prepared by the responsible federal agency, to wit, the FHWA.” 362 F.Supp. at 639. The facts of the instant case are arguably distinguishable in two respects from the situation confronted by Judge Oakes. Here, the extent of the communication and consultation between CONNDOT and the FHWA seems to have gone beyond the level of informal chats. See pp. 229-230, supra. Subordinates of the FHWA Division Engineer were in fairly constant contact with CONNDOT, did do ^pme editing of the preliminary draft, and this draft was reviewed in detail by the regional office of the FHWA. FHWA personnel continued to monitor CONNDOT’s preparation of the final EIS. Nevertheless, the actual writing of the final EIS was clearly done by CONNDOT personnel, not FHWA personnel, see p. 230, supra. Moreover, there was no apparent final “draft” stage which would allow substantive review or editing of CONNDOT’s draft of a final EIS by other than the divisional office of the FHWA. The final EIS submitted to the FHWA Division Engineer on February 24, 1972, and forwarded to the regional office four days later, was indeed in final form — already printed and bound. While the divisional office of the FHWA had apparently reviewed a draft of the final EIS before it was printed up, the regional office of the FHWA first saw the final EIS in printed form, and thus found itself in a “take it or leave it” posture, with no options other than approval in toto or rejection in toto. This atmosphere is hardly conducive to the detailed review which would be required to transform the CONNDOT final “draft” into the FHWA’s own final EIS, and in fact the FHWA regional office’s review of the final EIS in the instant case was limited to approval without any alteration. It must be remembered in this regard that it is the regional, not the divisional level, at which the FHWA has the capability to undertake multi-disciplinary review of an EIS, see p. 230, supra. Moreover, PPM 90-1, in effect for over six months before the printed final I-291 EIS was sent to the regional FHWA office, explicitly provides: “FHWA review and acceptance of the final environmental statement shall be the responsibility of the Regional Federal Highway Administrator.” Yet the regional office received the final 1-291 EIS in so final a form as to allow only complete rejection or “rubber stamp” approval. Thus, in no real sense can the final EIS be said to have undergone such searching review by the FHWA as to make the EIS the FHWA’s own product. Rather than resulting from a synthesis of CONNDOT’s draft and the FHWA’s rigorous review, the final 1-291 EIS was written by CONNDOT and merely ratified by the FHWA. A second arguable distinction between the instant case and Southern Vermont is the apparent lack of any legislative requirement that CONNDOT proceed with 1-291. But this does not mean that CONNDOT is necessarily disinterested in whether the FHWA agrees to fund 1-291. Federal funding for 1-291 would serve to reimburse CONNDOT for 90 per cent of the cost of CONNDOT’s acquisition of rights of way and other preliminary expenses, see, e. g., 23 U.S.C. §§ 106-108, 120, 124, amounting to several million dollars, see pp. 233-234 supra. Moreover, CONNDOT’s preparation of the 1-291 EIS was primarily the work of highway design engineers, who might well have personal interests in promoting the FHWA’s approval of a highway they had already designed, and which they were understandably anxious to see constructed. Thus CONNDOT’s perspective may well be far different from that demanded of an EIS by Congress, which in passing NEPA was “intent upon requiring the agencies of the United States government, such as the defendants here, to objectively evaluate all of their projects, regardless of how much money has already been spent thereon and regardless of the degree of completion of the work.” Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F.Supp. 728, 746 (E.D.Ark.1971). In sum, CONNDOT is just as likely to lard an EIS with “self-serving assumptions” as were the state highway department in Southern Vermont and the state power authority in Greene County. I conclude, in accord with Route 7 and Southern Vermont, that PPM 90-1’s delegation to state highway departments of primary responsibility for the preparation and writing of EIS’s for highway projects proposed for FHWA funding, cannot be squared with Greene County’s construction of NEPA as requiring that the federal agency charged with compliance with NEPA itself prepare the final EIS. Since the final 1-291 EIS was prepared. in accordance with the PPM 90-1 policy of state authorship, there appears to be a strong probability that defendants would be found in non-compliance with NEPA on this point at a trial on the merits of plaintiff’s complaint. Alternatives In assessing whether the 1-291 EIS adequately complies with the procedural mandates of NEPA, the Court has the benefit of the Second Circuit’s own capsulization of the relevant inquiry, framed in the identical context of an FHWA highway funding decision: “The primary purpose of the impact statement is to compel federal agencies to give serious weight to environmental factors in making discretionary choices . It is, at the very least, ‘an environmental full disclosure law’ for agency decision makers and the general public. In light of this, the Secretary of Transportation was bound fully to comply with the requirements of the statute, and mere token efforts in that direction do not suffice.” Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, supra, 472 F.2d at 697 (citations omitted). There are many aspects to the adequacy of an EIS, of course, but the “requirement for a thorough study and a detailed description of alternatives,” see §§ 102(2) (C)(iii), 102(2) (D) ed NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4832(2)(C)(iii), 4332(2)(D), “is the linchpin of the entire impact statement.” Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, supra, 472 F.2d at 697-698 (footnote omitted). Of the 28 pages of the 1-291 EIS, one quarter fall under the section headed “Alternatives.” Even these seven pages represent a seven-fold increase over the discussion of alternatives in the preliminary draft of the EIS, which in a single page asserted that since 1-291 “is an entirely new project” its traffic service could not be provided by modernization of existing streets and highways, hence “our alternates [sic] are either to build the facility or not to build it at all.” The preliminary draft went on to dismiss not building 1-291 as “not a reasonable and prudent alternate” because it would result in increasing traffic congestion in the area and lead to economic loss. The preliminary draft concluded that even after the construction of 1-291 traffic growth would exceed its capacity; however, 1-291 would then be useful as a medium for mass transit by motorized buses through establishment of exclusive bus lanes. The preliminary draft’s one-rpage section on alternatives was criticized by both the division office of the FHWA and the Connecticut Office of State Planning. Yet the seven-page section on alternatives in the final EIS retains many of the flaws of its predecessor. The final EIS does follow the FHWA’s suggestion that material from the “4(f)” statements required under section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f), relating to alternatives to the taking of publicly-owned open space, be incorporated in the 1-291 EIS. Thus four of the seven pages discuss various alternative routes within the same general corridor, justifying the rejection of these alternatives on the basis of economic cost, displacement of housing or businesses, other important existing land uses, and safety factors.' Another page notes that the location of the general corridor for 1-291 has been a matter of “general public knowledge” since “the late 1950’s,” and hence “existing development patterns precluded anything but minor adjustments to the original concept.” It is apparently on this premise that, aside from the four-page discussion of “minor adjustments,” the EIS considers only three alternatives to 1-291 as currently proposed. Like the preliminary draft, the final EIS dismisses in a conclusory paragraph the alternative of improving existing streets: “It is unrealistic to believe that modernizing the existing network could greatly improve traffic flow. The high development of lands adjacent to these roads, the numerous side road intersections, the devious routes followed and the extremely high cost make this alternative impractical.” No data whatsoever is produced to support these conclusions. The alternative of abandoning plans for construction of 1-291, termed the “do-nothing” alternative by the EIS, is given even shorter shrift, again echoing the criticized preliminary draft: “This could only lead to increased congestion on the highways through Newington in particular and to some degree in the other affected Towns. Since this congestion would cause increased economic loss to the Towns and to all potential users of the facility this does not appear to be a reasonable and prudent alternate.” No data is offered as to existing or projected traffic congestion, or as to economic loss. The final alternative considered is mass transit. The need for mass transit facilities is admitted, but from two statistics on projected travel patterns along 1-29 1 the EIS concludes that it “can readily be seen” that the origins and destinations of traffic along 1-291 will