Full opinion text
OPINION OF THE COURT ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. These cases present the question whether an injunction should issue restraining the enforcement of certain provisions of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Public Law 93-236, 45 U.S.C. §§ 743, 744, because of constitutional infirmities. Three-judge courts have been convened pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §§ 2282, 2284, and the matters are consolidated for disposition on cross-motions for summary judgment. The Connecticut General plaintiffs are owners of mortgage bonds and are corporate trustees or successor corporate trustees under indentures, mortgages and deeds of trust of the Penn Central Transportation Company and certain of its lease lines which together comprise the “Penn Central System.” Plaintiff, Richard Joyce Smith, Trustee of the property of The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, Debtor, is the registered holder of divisional mortgage bonds of Penn Central Transportation Company. These bonds are secured by a divisional mortgage comprising a first lien attaching certain real property, railroad tracks and improvements of the Penn Central Transportation Company. Plaintiff, Penn Central Company, is the owner of 100% of the stock in and is a creditor of the Penn Central Transportation Company, Debtor. The defendants are the United States Railway Association, a corporate entity established under Section 201 of the Act, 45 U.S.C. § 711; the Secretary of Transportation; the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission; the Secretary of the Treasury; and the United States of America. Penn Central" Trustees, Intervening Defendants, are presently operating the Penn Central Railroad under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205, in this court at Bankruptcy No. 70-347. While plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the 1973 Act with a galaxy of arguments, their central contentions may be summarily outlined: 1. The 1973 Act ultimately requires a permanent taking of their property for which they are entitled to be paid in cash instead of stocks and other securities ; that the conveyance procedures offend procedural due process; and that a deficiency judgment against Conrail provides no assurance that just compensation would be paid. 2. The 1973 Act violates the geographical uniformity requirement of Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the United States Constitution. 3. The 1973 Act effects an interim taking of their property by requiring continued rail operation pending implementation of the Final System Plan. I. Before consideration of these contentions, a short summary of the Act is necessary. The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation described it as “an heroic attempt” by Congress to solve a complex and deeply rooted problem. Eight major railroads in the Northeast and Midwest are undergoing reorganization pursuant to Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. Of these eight, seven are the only Class I railroads, those with $5 million or more of annual revenue, in the United States in reorganization. “Reasons cited for this [Northeast railroad] crisis were competition from 90 million automobiles and multiple schedules of competitive jet air service which directly competed with passenger transportation. The decline of railroad freight business also diminished the passenger carrying capabilities of the railroads. Traditional railroad freight business was lost to inland waterway operations, pipelines and trucks. Moreover, government policy tended ‘to favor non-rail transportation and perpetuate a regulatory climate that [was] hostile to experimentation.’ Water, air and highway transportation were successfully aided through public investment, at little or no user cost while railroads had to make such investments on their own." Congress first responded to the rail crisis with the Emergency Rail Services Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. § 661 et seq., authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to guarantee up to one hundred twenty-five million dollars in certificates issued by trustees of railroads in reorganization under Section 77. However, detailed treatment of the railroads’ particular difficulties did not emerge until the enactment of the 1973 Act. As stated in the defendants’ brief: The 1973 Act represents Congress’ comprehensive response to the long-range problems of railroads that own or operate most of the trackage in the Northeast and Midwest, and which therefore constitute a vital segment of the U.S. railroad system and an important segment of the U.S. economy. The Act requires the United States Railway Association ... to design a [Final System] [P]lan for reorganized rail services in the Region and provides, among other things, that a new private railroad, the Consolidated Rail Corporation (“Conrail”) shall acquire, own and operate rail properties pursuant to the Final System Plan. (Brief, 10-11.) Congress also provided in the 1973 Act several kinds of financial assistance, new in form and substantial in amount, each intended to assist in creating and implementing the overall plan for rail transportation service in the Region and the Conrail portion of that plan in particular. Four of these additional resources deserve special mention, (i) Substantial obligational authority is conferred on USRA. To carry out its purposes under the Act (principally to plan the new rail system and to provide part of the consideration for rail properties acquired by Conrail under the Act), USRA is authorized to issue $1.5 billion in securities to be guaranteed by the Secretary of Transportation. Section 210. Of this sum, not more than $1 billion may be issued to Conrail, of which not less than half must be used by Conrail for rail rehabilitation and modernization. Section 210(b). Additional amounts may be issued if approved by joint resolution of Congress. Ibid. (ii) The Secretary of Transportation, with USRA’s approval, is authorized to enter into agreement for the acquisition, maintenance or improvement of property that will be in the Final System Plan; for this purpose, the Act provides obligational authority of $150 million. Section 215. (iii) To meet emergency needs pending implementation of the Final System Plan, the Secretary of Transportation is further authorized to make payments not exceeding $85 million to the trustees of railroads in reorganization. Section 213. (iv) Finally, the Secretary of Transportation and the Association may provide subsidies for continuing noneconomic service and loans for the acquisition and modernization of rail properties. Sections 402 and 403. (Brief, 12-13.) Section 207(b) of the Act sets forth the procedure by which a railroad becomes subject to the transfer provisions contained in the Final System Plan. The Section 77 Penn Central reorganization court has already determined that Penn Central is not reorganizable “on an income basis within a reasonable time under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.” The next step under the Act is the “180-day” determination by that court as to whether “such railroad shall be reorganized by means of transferring some of its rail properties to the Corporation.” This hearing was held on June 10, 1974, but no findings have yet been made. Within 420 days after January 2, 1974, a Final System Plan must be prepared by the executive committee of the Association and submitted for approval by its Board of Directors. Section 207(c). Yet final review of the Plan remains with Congress. Section 208(a). A Special Court has been created to “exercise the powers of a district judge in any judicial district with respect to such proceedings and such powers shall include those of a reorganization court. The special court shall have the power to order the conveyance of rail properties of railroads leased, operated, or controlled by a railroad in reorganization in the region.” Section 209 (b). The Association is required to deliver a copy of the Final System Plan to the Special Court. Section 209(c). Thereafter, the Special Court shall order the trustees to convey to Conrail “forthwith . all right, title, and interest in the rail properties. . . .” Section 303(b). After the conveyances, the Special Court reviews the terms of the exchange as set forth iñ the Final System Plan. In remedying any inadequacy of consideration which it finds, that court is permitted to reallocate Conrail’s securities among the various bankrupt estates, to order the provision by Conrail of further securities of Conrail or obligations of the Association as designated in the Final System Plan and, ultimately, to enter a deficiency judgment against Conrail should these steps prove insufficient to pay the estates their “constitutional minimum.” II. We first dispose of plaintiffs’ threshold contention that the possible future conveyance of rail properties to Conrail in consideration for Conrail stock and securities- constitutes a Fifth Amendment taking without payment of just compensation. Plaintiffs argue that the provision for compensation for the conveyance of Penn Central assets renders the Act unconstitutional on its face because the compensation provided in the Act is not payable in money or other legal tender, because the purported safety valve in a deficiency judgment against Conrail provides no assurance that just compensation will be paid, and because these procedures offend procedural due process. We do not meet these Fifth Amendment questions because we are persuaded that these issues are premature. “Courts do not review issues, especially constitutional issues, until they have to.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154-155, 71 S.Ct. 624, 639, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It has been said that a number of jurisprudential rules underlie this general principle. The doctrines of “standing”, “ripeness”, “finality” and “mootness” all serve “the primary conception that federal judicial power is to be exercised to strike down legislation . . . only at the instance of one who is himself immediately harmed, or immediately threatened with harm, by the challenged action.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503-504, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1756, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961). We believe that the present circumstances do not present a ripe controversy because the basis of plaintiffs’ complaint depends on the “concurrence of . contingent events . too speculative to warrant anticipatory judicial determinations.” Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 432, 68 S.Ct. 641, 645, 92 L.Ed. 784 (1948). Before the plaintiffs may be harmed by the mandatory conveyances, certain contingencies must occur. First, the Penn Central reorganization court must decide “whether or not such railroad shall be reorganized by means of transferring some of its rail properties to the Corporation pursuant to the provisions of this Act.” Section 207(b). Although the court conducted a hearing on June 10, 1974, no findings have been made. Second, the board of directors of the Association must deliver the Final System Plan adopted by the Association to both Houses of Congress and to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce of the Senate for approval. Section 208(a). Third, after Congressional approval, the conveyances take place only at the direction of the Special Court within ten days after deposit of the consideration by Conrail. Section 303(b). Thus, before plaintiffs can be exposed to the alleged harm, there must be a judicial determination by a Section 77 reorganization court followed first by Congressional action, and finally judicial action by the Special Court. Faced with this triple contingency, the plaintiffs cannot be said to have been exposed to harm. Until these contingencies occur, only an abstract issue appears; and “abstract issues do not invoke the jurisdiction of the courts.” McCahill v. Borough of Fox Chapel, 438 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1971). “As is well known the federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions.” United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89, 67 S.Ct. 556, 564, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947) (footnote omitted). We are persuaded that the teachings of Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 1357, 6 L.Ed.2d 625 (1961), and Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 86 S.Ct. 194, 15 L.Ed.2d 165 (1965), control the issues dealing with the ultimate conveyance of railroad properties. In Communist Party the Court ruled that the mere possibility of Section 7(h) of the Subversive Activities Control Act and a regulation issued thereunder affecting the officers of the Party was not sufficient to present a live controversy. “The duties imposed by those provisions will not arise until and unless the Party fails to register. At this time their application is wholly contingent and conjectural.” 367 U.S. at 106, 81 S.Ct. at 1416. However, when the Party members subsequently appealed from an order directing them to register under the Act, the Court ruled in Albertson that the claims were ripe for adjudication. Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiff's contention that the conveyance of the rail properties offends the due process clause is not ripe for adjudication. III. Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 requires “uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” Plaintiffs contend that because the Act must be geographically uniform in application, Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 22 S.Ct. 857, 46 L.Ed. 1113 (1902), it is facially unconstitutional because it provides that only rail properties of railroads in reorganization in the “Region” may be designated for transfer to Conrail. Section 206(c), (d). By definition the Region is limited to seventeen northeastern and midwestern states, the District of Columbia, and certain portions of contiguous states. The defendants’ answer to these arguments is that, insofar as the Act is an exercise of the bankruptcy process, it is uniform: all Class I railroads in reorganization are in fact located within the defined Region, and there is no discriminatory treatment of creditors within or without the Region. Alternatively, defendants contend that the Region was defined for purposes of statutory provisions based on Congress’ power under the commerce clause, which is not subject to the requirement of uniformity. The court is divided on this issue. Judges Fullam and Bechtle are of the view that certain provisions of § 207(b) (see ante pages 514-515, n. 4) offend the constitutional requirement of uniformity. These provisions mandate dismissal of the Section 77 proceeding if the procedures of the Act are rejected. Their analysis and conclusions are set forth in Part II of Judge Fullam’s separate opinion. For my part, without reaching defendants’ alternate contention that the Act finds constitutional support under the commerce clause, I am persuaded that, in the context of the circumstances of this case, the Act does not offend Article I, Section 8, Clause 4. Hanover Bank instructs that “[t]he laws passed on the subject [of bankruptcies] must, however, be uniform throughout the United States, but that uniformity is geographical and not personal. . . .” 186 U.S. at 188, 22 S.Ct. at 860. We believe that the Founding Fathers’ requirement of uniformity was mandated to prevent Congressional geographical discrimination of creditors or debtors. But the 1973 Act is geographically uniform with respect to creditors’ claims. No provision of the Act restricts the right of any creditor wheresoever located to obtain relief because of regionalism. If there is a facial geographic restriction, it would apply to regional or non-regional debtor railroads only. However, that is not this case. We are not confronted with a proper case or controversy involving a constitutional challenge to the Act brought by a debtor railroad inside or outside the Region. The challenge is brought by creditors within the Region whose claims are treated alike. Accordingly, instructed by the rule of United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 80 S. Ct. 519, 522, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960) that “one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which . its application might be unconstitutional”, I do not reach the question of whether the Act may not survive a constitutional attack brought by a debtor railroad located outside the Region. Thus, I would hold that as to plaintiff-creditors, the Act does not offend the uniformity requirements of Article I, Section 8, Clause 4. IV. Finally plaintiffs contend that the Act effects a taking of their property by compelling operation of Penn Central’s rail properties at an irreversible loss during the period before adoption of the Final System Plan. They urge that “the Act is unconstitutional in that 1) it denies them their present right to terminate their investment in a hopelessly losing railroad; and 2) it provides no assurance that plaintiffs will in all events be paid just compensation on account of such forced continued operations.” That Congress expected losses during implementation of the Final System Plan is evidenced by Section 213 which provides that the Secretary of Transportation may make payments for certain specific interim losses: (a) Emergency Assistance. — The Secretary is authorized, pending the implementation of the final system plan, to pay to the trustees of railroads in reorganization such sums as are necessary for the continued provision of essential transportation services by such railroads. Such payments shall be made by the Secretary upon such reasonable terms and conditions as the Secretary establishes, except that recipients must agree to maintain and provide service at a level no less than that in effect on the date of enactment of this Act. (b) Authorization for Appropriations. — There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary for carrying out this section such sums as are necessary, not to exceed $85,000,000, to remain available until expended. It becomes quickly apparent that the limited amounts of these funds — available to railroads in reorganization in the region — have not been specially designated to meet challenges of unconstitutional erosion. Moreover, the full statutory authorization has not been appropriated nor is there total agreement between the Secretary of Transportation and the trustees and creditors as to the nature of the payments to be made under Section 213 and those to be made under Section 215. Congress has only appropriated $35 million of the $85 million authorized. By February 19, 1974, a tentative, partial solution was reached between the trustees and the Secretary as to $10.8 million, which required approval by the Section 77 reorganization court. In approving the trustees’ petition the court observed: Section 215 of the Act authorizes the advance of up to $150 million for the purpose of interim acquisition, maintenance and improvement of rail assets which would eventually be conveyed to the new operating corporation contemplated by the statute, as part of the final system plan (increases in value resulting from such expenditures are not to be reflected in the consideration to be paid for such transfers, and the obligation to repay is to be assumed by the new corporation) . The Secretary has thus far declined to approve any grants under § 213, and is not yet in a position to implement § 215. To meet the present emergency, the Secretary is apparently willing to use § 213 funds, but not on a grant basis. The proposal contemplates that, instead of providing funds to the Trustees to meet operating expenses, the Secretary will, in effect, transfer funds equal to certain current installments due on equipment, and in return acquire a pro tan-to interest in the Trustees' equity in that equipment. Meanwhile, it is contemplated that the parties will attempt to determine the extent to which § 215 funds can appropriately be made available to relieve future cash shortages. A hearing on the Trustees’ petition was held on February 26, 1974. The creditor interests all expressed, in varying degrees, their conviction that the proposed financing was contrary to the intent of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, and also would violate the constitutional rights of the creditors. The New Haven Trustee flatly opposes the transaction. Substantially all of the other creditor interests, and the Trustees, expressed their willingness to have the Court approve the transaction, so long as it was clearly understood that this would not create a precedent for similar approvals in the future, and that all parties expressly reserved their rights to press all constitutional and legal arguments at the forthcoming hearings on the issues involved in § 207 of the Reorganization Act and in all other proceedings involving their rights under, and the constitutionality of, the statute. As all parties recognize, unless these funds are provided immediately, the Trustees will be forced to default in the payments due on equipment in which they have an equity in excess of $70 million. Section 77 (j) of the Bankruptcy Act severely restricts the power of a reorganization court to preclude equipment creditors from exercising the rights granted under the financing documents. No other source.of cash to meet these installments has been suggested (and it is difficult to imagine any alternative source which would not involve repayment, and thus the same constitutional issues as in the present proceeding). A. Our first responsibility is to determine whether the interim erosion issue is presently ripe for adjudication. The predicate of this issue is that, absent permissive interim abandonment, the Act mandates continued operations of Penn Central until the Final System Plan is adopted. Plaintiffs contend that a compulsory interim operation for a virtually indefinite length of time at large operating losses continues to erode the Penn Central estate so as to constitute a condemnation of the assets without fair and just compensation. To decide whether this contention presents a ripe, and therefore justiciable, issue requires an overview of the Penn Central operations. A statement of operational losses being sustained by Penn Central, while under Section 77 reorganization, is revealed in the stipulations filed by the parties. During the period that began June 21, 1970, until December 31, 1973, Penn Central sustained ordinary net losses in an amount which approximates $851,000,000.00. It is also stipulated that for the two months ended February 28, 1974, Penn Central had a deficit in net railway operating income, a deficit in total income, a deficit in income available for fixed charges and deficit net income, as those items are determined in accordance with accounting regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission. As previously stated, the Penn Central reorganization court has ruled that the railroad is not “reorganizable on an income basis within a reasonable time under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.” The book value — and we emphasize that this is not a market value or liquidated value — of total assets is recorded as $4,419,917,759 as of December 31, 1971. The trustees report that as of December 31, 1971, 26,254 claimants filed Proofs of Claim, claiming a gross amount of $3,348,620,840. Fifty-one secured creditors filed timely proofs of claim in the amount of $1,062,734,988. Ten indenture trustees filed claims in the amount of $963,135,138. Thirty-five individual bondholders claimed $81,911,-646. Six claimants filed claims arising from conditional purchases of equipment and property in the amount of $17,688,204. An accountants’ report indicates that on June 21, 1970, the long-term debt in respect of mortgage bonds and collateral trust bonds, exclusive of railroad equipment obligations, was $687,692,000. This, of course, is only a partial listing of the claims. A single unsecured creditor in these proceedings, the Penn Central Company, claims an approximate amount of $41,800,000. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit suggests: “If, as some of the reports filed by the trustees suggest, it is already clear that such a reorganization is not feasible,11 then this reorganiza- 11. See, e. g., Trustees’ Interim Report of February 1, 1973; Memorandum accompanying July 2, 1973 Plan of Reorganization of the Penn Central Transportation Company and Other Railroad Corporations (June 29, 1973). tion is already at the point where the erosion of the estate in deficit operations must cease and a liquidation alternative must be considered if the secured creditors or other interested parties insist upon such consideration.” Over a year ago the Section 77 reorganization Court warned: “1. Erosion. While the precise calculations have not been fully developed, the record justifies the conclusion that post-reorganization deferrals and unpaid administration claims have already eroded the Debtor’s estate to the extent of about $500 million. Whether the constitutional limit has been exceeded depends primarily upon how the remaining assets are to be valued; and this in turn may well depend upon how those assets are to be used at the conclusion of this reorganization. Under any view of the matter, it seems clear that the point of unconstitutionality is fast approaching, if it has not already arrived. ... On the basis of the record to date, it appears highly doubtful that the Debtor could properly be permitted to continue to operate on its present basis beyond October 1, 1973.” In re Penn Central Transportation Company, 355 F.Supp. 1343, 1344, 1346 (E.D.Pa.1973). Cognizant of massive operational losses of $851,000,000 during the present reorganization proceedings, and cognizant also that unsecured creditor as well as secured creditor interests are squarely before this court, we are persuaded that a significant possibility exists that a point of erosion either has been or may soon be reached so that it can be said that plaintiffs’ contention of interim unconstitutional taking by continued loss operations is ripe for adjudication. Having determined that there is a controversy ripe for adjudication, we now examine the merits of plaintiffs’ contention. B. The defendants acknowledge that if a point is reached where continued loss operations during the interim amount to an unconstitutional taking, the Act does not explicitly provide for the payment of just compensation. They insist, however, that plaintiffs have an implied remedy at law — a suit in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, for just compensation from the United States. The Tucker Act confers jurisdiction on the Court of Claims: to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. The applicability of the Tucker Act is vital to the defendants’ position. At oral argument counsel conceded that if a point was reached at which continued mandatory operations created losses of such an amount as to constitute a Fifth Amendment taking, the operators would then be entitled to just compensation, and that without an implied Court of Claims remedy, the 1973 Act would be unconstitutional as to these plaintiffs. The defendants concede that the United States, as sovereign, may not be sued without its consent. “[T]he terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 770 (1941). Consent to be sued must be established in an act of Congress, and such an act, “since it is a relinquishment of a sovereign immunity, must be strictly interpreted.” Ibid., at 590, 61 S.Ct. at 771; see United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969). Specifically defendants urge that a statutory grant of consent to a suit against the United States for any unconstitutional taking by reason of interim losses is conferred on the Court of Claims by implication because the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 shows no affirmative Congressional intent to deprive that court of its Tucker Act jurisdiction in cases where claims for unconstitutional takings are made. The plaintiffs counter with a reference to the legislative history to demonstrate that there was a specific intention to limit the obligations of the United States to the express provisions and explicit limitations contained in the Act. Thus the issue is joined, and the solution turns on the vexing problem of statutory construction. We cannot demean the importance of proper statutory construction in the precise matter at hand. On proper statutory construction stands or falls the constitutionality of important provisions of the statutory schema. The defendants, joined by the intervening Penn Central trustees, mount a formidable argument, reminding us that when “the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and ... a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that . . . [courts] will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1404, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971), citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932) (emphasis supplied). See also, American Communications Assn, C. I. O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 407, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950); United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106, 120-121, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 92 L.Ed. 1849 (1948). The Penn Central trustees emphasize that “the Act contains no fewer than thirteen provisions repealing or making inapplicable the provisions of various laws or excluding the jurisdiction of federal courts on various subjects. Since none of thesé thirteen provisions excludes a Tucker Act remedy— although, as plaintiffs themselves argue, Congress was intensely aware of the possibility of such a remedy — Congress must be deemed to have deliberately rejected the readily available option of including such an exclusionary provision in the Act.” On their part the plaintiffs also turn to the text of the Act, describing it as “a preemptive system of judicial participation [with] respect to the final system plan. Section 209 mandates the empaneling of the Special Court and the consolidation before it of ‘all judicial proceedings with respect to the final system plan’. Section 303(c) endows the Special Court with the duty to review the consideration to be received for the properties conveyed and ultimately the authority under Section 303(c)(2) (C) to enter a deficiency judgment against Conrail. The exclusive appeal from the Special Court’s findings is provided in Section 303(d).” The legislative history reveals that Senator Vance Hartke, who would later be one of the Managers of the bill on the part of the Senate, observed that if Congress did not act by providing the creditors with stock in Conrail, “there is the distinct possibility . . . that a number of these people could make a claim against the Government which could be sustained in the Court of Claims.” Especially significant in the legislative history of the Act are the remarks recorded during the discussion on the conference report accompanying H. R. 9142 in a colloquy between two of the “Managers on the Part of the House”: Mr. [Dan] Kuykendall. “Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the gentleman from Washington one point, and that is the matter of the deficiency judgment. There was a lot of colloquy in the original debate which expressed fears that the Federal Court had the key to the Treasury. “Will the gentleman give us his interpretation of the guarantees we have to keep that from happening in the court proceedings ?” Mr. [Brock] Adams. “Mr. Speaker, there is a definite limitation on the total amount that can be authorized under this bill. Any amounts that go beyond that, or the shifting of the way in which it is spent, is to be approved by an Act of Congress, to be signed by the President. [I]t was the clear intent of the managers that any amount other than common stock [of Conrail] was to be at the lowest possible limit to meet the constitutional guarantees.” * * * * * * Mr. Kuykendall. “There is no way the Federal Court may assess the taxpayers or this Congress on the judgments of the creditors, is that correct ?” Mr. Adams. “The gentleman is correct.” Mr. Kuykendall. “There is no way they can assess the Congress for the money ?” Mr. Adams. “The gentleman is correct.” We are persuaded that the legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress intended that financial obligations be limited to the express terms of the Act. Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 provides that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury of the United States except in consequence of an appropriation made by law. Section 213(b), supra, and Section 214 entitled “Authorization for Appropriations” place an express ceiling on expenditures. Section 210 describes the maximum obligational authority of the Association, and the authorization for appropriation is limited to “such amounts as are necessary to discharge the obligations of the United States arising under this section.” (Emphasis supplied.) Judicial review is delineated with specificity in Sections 209(a) and 303 with no mention of the Court of Claims. We were taught by Justice Frankfurter “that the troublesome phase of [statutory] construction is the determination of the extent to which extraneous documentation and external circumstances may be allowed to infiltrate the text on the theory that they were part of it, written in ink discernible to the judicial eye.” John Chipman Gray often quoted a sermon by Bishop Hoadley that “[w]hoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them.” For this court to interpret the Act in a manner contrary to its explicit terms, contrary to the express representations of the bill’s managers at the conference committee discussions, and to construe this Act in a manner which will expose the United States Treasury to presently incalculable, but, in any event, substantially formidable claims would be a flagrant violation of the separation of powers doctrine. If we did this, the judiciary would truly have become the “lawgiver” for substantial federal appropriations; this in itself would raise serious constitutional problems. To accept the government defendants’ contention would require judicial legislation on a grand, if not arrogant, scale. Justice Holmes told us “I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.” To read a Tucker Act remedy into the Act would be a movement of the mass and not simply the particles. We simply lack such power. V. Accordingly, we hold that Section 304(f), in requiring mandatory interim operations without providing a legal remedy to furnish fair and just compensation for an erosion of property beyond constitutional limits, offends the Fifth Amendment; that Section 303, the only provision of the Act pertaining to valuation of the railroad estate, in failing to provide a remedy for any unconstitutional erosion caused by mandatory interim operations under Section 304(f), is also defective; that because the effect of Section 207(b) precludes a form of liquidation under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, it is constitutionally defective as set forth in Part II of the separate opinion of Judge Fullam; and that because of these conclusions the United States Railway Association must be enjoined from certifying a Final System Plan to the Special Court pursuant to Section 209(c). An appropriate decree will issue (1) enjoining the United States Railway Association, the Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Secretary of the Treasury from enforcing the Regional Rail Reorganizational Act of 1973 in a manner inconsistent with this holding and (2) declaring as null and void designated sections of the Act. FULLAM, District Judge. In view of the number and complexity of the issues which have been presented in this case, it should occasion little surprise that there is a lack of total agreement among judges on all issues. With respect to the issues actually decided by the majority, I am in general agreement, although to some extent for slightly different reasons. But the majority fails to reach a number of issues which I feel must be faced, not only because they are indeed ripe .for decision but because the principal conclusion expressed by the majority — that the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973 is unconstitutional because it fails to provide compensation for interim erosion during the planning period — necessarily depends upon an evaluation of the nature and validity of the Act’s provisions concerning mandatory conveyance of rail properties to Conrail. In short, I believe the majority has attempted to isolate an issue which cannot be isolated. I. Prematurity Plaintiffs challenge the facial constitutionality of the Act on a variety of grounds, not all of which are necessarily ripe for decision. In considering which issues must be faced at this time, it is important to keep in mind the distinctions between concepts of standing, ripeness, and the need for injunctive relief. Unquestionably, one or more of the parties to these lawsuits have standing to raise every issue which has been presented. That is, the statute affects these parties in particular, as distinguished from the public at large, in substantial ways. They thus meet the tests of Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). The question of whether all of the constitutional issues are ripe for decision requires us to analyze the inevitability of the alleged unconstitutional impact, whereas the immediacy of the alleged threat bears upon the propriety of injunctive relief. By July 1, 1974, each of the reorganization courts will have made, or failed to make, findings pursuant to § 207(b) of the Act. Under the statute, the effect of these findings or non-findings (as affirmed or reversed by the Special Court within 80 days thereafter) will be either that the statutory processes will inexorably apply to these estates, or that the § 77 proceedings will be dismissed. The plaintiffs assert that the § 207(b) proceedings themselves are unconstitutional on due process grounds. Surely this challenge is now ripe for decision; indeed, the defendants do not contend otherwise. As set forth in Judge Aldisert’s scholarly opinion, the existence and inevitability of staggering losses from continuing rail operations pose an immediate threat to the constitutional rights of the owners and creditors of the bankrupt estates. Plaintiffs contend that the effect of §§ 304(f) and 303 of the Act is to mandate continued loss operations for an indefinite period without hope of reimbursement, in derogation of both the taking and due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment. Since the majority has concluded that the ultimate conveyance issues are not now ripe for decision, the fact § 304(f) has been in force since January 2, 1974, and continues to require interim operations and losses, undoubtedly makes the interim erosion challenge ripe for decision. Plaintiffs challenge the entire Act as a violation of the uniformity requirement of the bankruptcy clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution. Again, this issue is undeniably ripe for decision. Finally, plaintiffs pose a series of challenges to the statutory provisions which contemplate the mandatory transfers of rail assets to Conrail or to existing solvent carriers, at prices to be determined by the Special Court after the event, and to be paid in the form of a to-be-determined mixture of Conrail securities, undefined “other benefits,” and possibly a limited amount of guaranteed obligations of USRA. Whether some or all of these “ultimate conveyance” issues are now ripe for decision is a more difficult question. Judge Aldisert views the possibility that a conveyance may never take place because of action taken by the reorganization court under § 207(b), the Congress, and the Special Court, as rendering inappropriate consideration of any of the ultimate conveyance issues. For me, the decision of this issue is not so simple. No one doubts, and in fact the parties have stipulated, that Penn Central rail properties will be included in the Final System Plan. Equally certain is the fact that USRA will deliver to Congress a Final System Plan which is to become effective 60 session-days thereafter. In order to prevent the Plan from taking effect, one House of Congress must act affirmatively by passage of a resolution expressing disapproval of the Plan, § 208(a). Section 208(b) makes it the continuing duty of USRA to present final system plans to the Congress until one becomes effective. I cannot equate Congress’ reservation of the right to veto the first Final System Plan, or even the second or third, to a situation in which Congressional action is necessary as a precondition to a Final System Plan becoming effective. I believe this Court must assume that the Act means what it says, and that the expressed intent of Congress would be carried out. Once a Final System Plan is effective, i. e., when the 60-day Congressional action period expires, the Special Court is required under § 303(b) to order conveyance of the property. There remains no discretionary role to be played by the Special Court, or any other court, at that point. Therefore, it is clear that if the reorganization court does not make § 207(b) findings that remove the railroad from the RRRA, conveyances are certain, save only amendment or repeal of the RRRA. Of course, the possibility of future legislative and executive action is always present during the judicial evaluation of the constitutionality of a statute, and does not render such adjudication premature. The last potential exit would be a finding by the reorganization court that the RRRA “does not provide a process which would be fair and equitable to the estate of the railroad in reorganization,” § 207(b). In this event, there would be no conveyance under the Act. In my view, this possibility does not raise an issue of ripeness, but rather, a question more akin to abstention. Under § 207(b), the reorganization court will have to consider at least some of the cluster of discrete issues concerning the ultimate conveyance provisions of the Act, including some of the constitutional issues raised by these cases. This is so because the reorganization court must consider the RRRA in its entirety in order to ascertain whether the process is fair and equitable to the estates. Moreover, it is highly improbable that a reorganization court could successfully reject the statute as unfair or inequitable under § 207(b) for reasons of less than constitutional magnitude. Indeed, the government’s position at the June 10 hearing in the reorganization court was that nothing short of unconstitutionality would justify rejection of the Act under § 207(b). Thus, the issue is essentially whether it is preferable for the three-judge court to rule on the constitutional issues surrounding the conveyance provisions, either directly or in conjunction with plaintiffs’ due process attack on § 207(b), before the reorganization courts act under § 207(b). The policies embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 2282 appear applicable in this case. Enforcement of major federal legislation is sought to be enjoined. As a practical matter, a decision by the reorganization court under § 207(b) that a constitutional infirmity requires the Act to be found not fair and equitable would be equivalent, for all practical purposes, to an injunction that might issue as a result of this three-judge court litigation; and a contrary decision would be equivalent to denial of an injunction. It is preferable that the deliberate and collegial judgment of this three-judge court should determine the constitutionality of the RRRA’s conveyancing provisions. It is significant that the government has not contended that the § 207(b) hearings operate to render any of the constitutional claims premature. This is not to say that with respect to many of key constitutional claims the government’s contention that there is not an adequate factual record for constitutional adjudication is not sound. Rather, the point is that the government’s contentions in this regard should be considered by the Court at this time. Another aspect of the RRRA’s impact that warrants consideration, is the relationship of the availability of the RRA’s processes to the pending petitions to terminate rail services and to dismiss the Penn Central’s § 77 proceeding. Obviously, the RRRA is an important factor to be weighed by the reorganization court in assessing validity of the petitioners’ contentions that operations can no longer be constitutionally required. This consequence in and of itself would seem to justify present consideration by this Court of the constitutional issues deferred by the majority. Irrespective of the validity of the foregoing observations, I am satisfied that, in the final analysis, many of the constitutional issues concerning the mandatory conveyance features of the Act are necessarily ripe for decision at this time because of their relationship to the issues of interim erosion. While it is not necessary to determine whether or not the contemplated transfers would amount to takings in the constitutional sense, requiring advance assurance of payment in cash or equivalent, I am persuaded that the constitutional validity of uncompensated interim erosion cannot be properly decided except in the light of the constitutionality of the ultimate result which implementation of the Act would produce. Stated otherwise, the fact that the statute does not provide compensation for interim erosion as such would not necessarily render the statute unconstitutional if there is reasonable present assurance that the end result of the statutory process would be the receipt of consideration for the assets and other benefits in amounts equaling at least liquidation value plus interim erosion. II. Uniformity The Act in its entirety is challenged as violative of the uniformity requirement of Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution. With one minor exception discussed below, I believe that the Act can (and therefore must) be construed in such a way as to render it constitutional. But I reach this result by a somewhat different route than does Judge Aldisert. Professor Warren tells us: “ . . . any National law which deals with inability to pay debts and which is uniform throughout the country is a law ‘on the subject of bankruptcy.”’ Charles Warren: Bankruptcy in United States History (Harv.U.Press 1935), at p. 8. For more than half a century, attempts to achieve national bankruptcy legislation were severely hampered by the widely held belief that the Constitution required that bankruptcy legislation must be uniform in its application to all classes (ibid, p. 61). However, the Supreme Court eventually decided that the requirement was geographical. Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 190, 22 S.Ct. 857, 46 L.Ed. 1113. It has been stated that the uniformity requirement “. . . is wholly satisfied when existing obligations of a debtor are treated alike by the bankruptcy administration throughout the country, regardless of the State in which the bankruptcy court sits.” Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green et al., 329 U.S. 156, 172, 67.S. Ct. 237, 244, 91 L.Ed. 162. (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Taken literally, that statement would seem to vindicate the statute here involved, since this Act unquestionably permits all claims against the affected bankrupt railroads to be treated alike, irrespective of the situs of particular creditors or particular courts. But bankruptcy legislation affects debtors as well as creditors, and it seems doubtful that the quoted language was intended to suggest that different treatment based upon the geographical location of the debtor would be permissible under the uniformity clause. The fact is, the Supreme Court has never had occasion to consider a statute which was not geographically uniform. The few reported decisions have all dealt with variations in state laws respecting property rights (e. g., exemption), or the application of nationwide standards to particular factual situations determined by courts. See Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U.S. 440, 57 S.Ct. 556, 81 L.Ed. 736 (1937). While Congress’ power to classify debtors is not open to question at this late date, see In re Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 29 F.Supp. 608 (D.Md.1939), cert. denied 309 U.S. 654, 60 S.Ct. 470, 84 L.Ed. 1003 (1940); In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry., 72 F.2d 443, 450 (7th Cir. 1934), aff’d 294 U.S. 648, 55 S.Ct. 595, 79 L.Ed. 1110 (1935), that power may not be exercised on the basis of geography. I cannot accept the notion that only those debtors not affected by the statute can have standing to challenge the lack of geographical uniformity. In my view, every railroad subject to the statute has standing to make that challenge, and so do creditors of such railroads. The Penn Central interests are not complaining that the Act is validly applied to others and not to Penn Central; the contention is that an invalid, non-uniform statute is being applied to Penn Central. Neither do I accept the government defendants’ argument that the statute is in fact uniform because all Class I railroads now in reorganization are located in the region defined in the statute. The statute is not limited to Class I railroads, and it is not, apparently, limited to railroads which were in reorganization on the effective date of the Act. But I do find it possible to uphold the statute as an exercise of Congress’ powers under the commerce clause. The essential features of an exercise of the bankruptcy power are that it deals with adjustment of the respective rights of embarrassed debtors and their creditors, and that impairment of the obligation of contracts is permissible. Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 55 S.Ct. 595, 79 L.Ed. 1110 (1935); Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, supra. Stated otherwise, recourse to the bankruptcy clause to justify Congressional action is necessary only if that action impairs the obligation of contracts. For the most part, the statute under discussion adds nothing, in that respect, to the powers already granted to reorganization courts under the geographically uniform and admittedly valid provisions of § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. To some extent, those powers are transferred to the Special Court, but this is surely permissible under Article III of the Constitution. The ultimate dispositions of the respective rights of debtors and creditors are to be made under § 77. Authority to order conveyances free and clear of liens, and to “cram down” a plan of reorganization, already exists under § 77, and is not newly created or added by the 1973 Act. Therefore, in my view, since the principal provisions of the 1973 Act which depend upon the bankruptcy power for their validity are merely repetitive of similar provisions in existing, valid, laws, the statute as a whole does not violate Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution. There is, however, one provision of the Act which is clearly an exercise of Congressional power derived solely from the bankruptcy clause, and which cannot be found in existing, uniform, legislation. I refer to the provisions of § 207(b) which mandate dismissal of the § 77 proceeding if the procedures of the Act are rejected. At first blush, this might seem relatively innocuous: Since the particular debtors have been found to be incapable of reorganizing “on an income basis” under § 77, dismissal of the § 77 proceeding might be thought to follow as a matter of course. But a § 77 proceeding may properly lead to results other than a “normal” income-based reorganization of a railroad as a railroad. The New Haven Inclusion case, 399 U.S. 392, 90 S.Ct. 2054, 26 L.Ed.2d 691 (1970), stands as a prime example of a type of reorganization designed to produce permanent withdrawal of the debtor from common carrier operations. There, the rail assets were disposed of, with a view toward reorganizing the enterprise as an investment holding company. The plan of reorganization was approved by the ICC, the reorganization court, and the Supreme Court. It thus appears that § 77 can be used to produce a form of liquidation, at least where the plan contemplates that the bulk of the rail properties will continue to be operated as a railroad by someone. The provisions of § 207(b) of the Act seem to preclude that kind of recourse to § 77. Since this partial repeal of § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act applies only to debtors in the geographical region specified in the statute, and since that feature of the Act is plainly a law “on the subject of bankruptcy,” I am forced to conclude that the Act is, in that one respect, violative of Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution. Indeed, it seems probable that that same portion of § 207(b) is vulnerable on due process and equal protection grounds, and perhaps on the ground of separation of powers as well. III. Underlying Principles and Background In order to evaluate the constitutional permissibility of interim erosion in light of the constitutional adequacy of the end result, it is helpful to review briefly the legal theories underlying the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, and their application to the Penn Central proceedings apart from, and in relation to, the, RRRA itself. A. Reorganization of financially embarrassed debtors pursuant to a plan that is feasible, fair and equitable is beneficial to both public and private interests. Underlying the reorganization process is the simple economic fact that the intangible values inherent in a going concern will be lost if individual creditors are completely free to exercise their rights to foreclose on the physical assets of the enterprise. “One of the purposes of § 77B was to avoid the consequences to debtors and creditors of foreclosures, liquidations, and forced sales with their drastic deflationary effects.” Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products, 308 U.S. 106, 124, 60 S.Ct. 1, 11, 84 L.Ed. 110 (1939) (Douglas, J.) See also R. F. C. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. R. Co., 328 U.S. 495, 508, 66 S.Ct. 1282, 90 L.Ed. 1400 (1945). If the reduction in values associated with forced sales can be avoided, and going concern values wholly or partially preserve many junior interests which would have been wiped out by liquidation (junior secured, unsecured and equity interests) may participate in the plan. See generally, Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 Univ. of Chicago L.R. 565 (1950). The medium of exchange is, of course, new corporate securities of the surviving entity. Allocation of the new securities poses both practical and theoretical problems. The theoretical difficulty involves the method of recognizing the respective priorities of the various claimants. Section 77(e)(1) is the pertinent statutory provision: “The judge shall approve the plan if satisfied that: (1) It complies with the provisions of subsection (b) of this section [77], is fair and equitable, affords due recognition to the rights of each class of creditors and stockholders, does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors or stockholders, and will conform to the requirements of the law of the land regarding the participation of the various classes of creditors and stockholders.” As Mr. Justice Douglas observed, in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products, supra: “The words ‘fair and equitable’ . are words of art which prior to the advent of § 77B had acquired a fixed meaning through judicial interpretations in the field of equity receivership reorganizations.” 308 U.S. at 115, 60 S.Ct. at 7. The substance of the fair and equitable test is derived from Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 33 S.Ct. 554, 57 L.Ed. 931 (1913), in which the Supreme Court established what has become known as the absolute priority rule. Simply put, the absolute priority rule requires that “once a hierarchy of interest is established, each class must receive 100% satisfaction before the next lower class may participate at all.” Friendly & Tondel, The Relative Treatment of Securities in Railroad Reorganizations under § 77, 7 Law & Contemporary Problems 420, 423 (1940). Yet, claims may be satisfied in whole or in part by securities of a character inferior to those originally owned by the claimant, so long as junior claimants are not permitted to participate unless and until the senior claimants receive under the plan the equitable equivalent to their entire panoply of rights under their original debt instruments. Consolidated Rock Products v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 61 S.Ct. 675, 85 L.Ed. 982 (1941); Ecker v. Western Pacific R. R. Corp, 318 U.S. 448, 63 S.Ct. 692, 87 L.Ed. 892 (1943); Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Minneapolis, St. Paul & Pacific R. R. Co, 318 U.S. 523, 63 S.Ct. 727, 87 L.Ed. 959 (1943). Basic to the application of the absolute priority rule is the valuation of the enterprise and the determination of value of the security underlying purportedly secured claims. Both § 77(e) and the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in the Consolidated Rock Products, Ecker, and Institutional Investors cases require that earning power or income-generating capacity of the debtor be the measure of a railroad’s value. Once the earning power has been established, the aggregate capitalization of the new capital structure is derived from the earning power. Although § 77 does not contain an explicit requirement that the reorganization plan be feasible (in the sense that the new capital structure is such that a viable entity will survive the reorganization process), the Interstate Commerce Commission’s duty under § 77(d) to formulate a plan that is in the public interest has been read to include this requirement. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Minneapolis, St. Paul & Pacific R. R. Co, 318 U.S. 523, 544-545, 63 S. Ct. 727, 87 L.Ed. 959 (1943). Congress has invested the judiciary with powerful tools for the effectuation of § 77 reorganizations. Preservation of the status quo can be insured by the prudent exercise of the stay provisions of § 77 (j). Trustees’ certificates having priority over secured debt may be issued pursuant to § 77(c)(3) to obtain interim working capital. Executory contracts may be rejected by the trustee or in the plan of reorganization § 77(b). Rail and non-rail properties may be sold free and clear of liens under § 77(o) (subject to the limitation imposed in this Circuit by In re Penn Central Transportation Co., 458 F.2d 1030 (3d Cir. 1973)). Under certain circumstances, funds held subject to the liens of mortgage indentures may be used for working capital or additions and betterments to the plant, Central R. R. of New Jersey v. Manufac