Full opinion text
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER , DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF TRIAL JUDGE HAUK, District Judge. This matter came on for hearing Monday, November 17, 1975, at 1:30 p. m., before the Honorable A. Andrew Hauk, United States District Judge, to whom the case, cause and proceedings herein were heretofore assigned by lot under the rules, regulations and orders of this United States District Court for the Central District of California, and particularly, General Order No. 104 thereof, upon the following papers and pleadings: 1. A letter addressed to said Judge Hauk, dated October 28, 1975, by Walter H. Young, attorney for plaintiff, with copies sent to defendant’s counsel and to Chief Judge Stephens of this Court enclosing a copy of “REQUEST TO HON. A. ANDREW HAUK, JUDGE, TO EXCUSE HIMSELF FROM THE TRIAL OF THIS ACTION AND RETURN THE CAUSE FOR REASSIGNMENT.” The letter further stated: “I have not actually scheduled a Motion on this Request as it is my understanding that it is proper to call the facts to the attention of the Court in this matter, rather than in the form of a formal Motion. If your Honor feels that this Request should be made in the form of a formal Motion, I will schedule the same accordingly.” This letter was received on 'October 2'8, 1975, and at that time the Court made its Order to the Clerk to file the letter and its enclosure and put it on the calendar as a “motion” under the Court’s “17-day” Rule, Local Rule 3(e). Whereupon the Clerk, by Minute Order of October 30, 1975, set the matter for hearing on November 17, 1975, at 10:00 a. m., when it was continued to 1:30 p. m., because of the crowded motion calendar for that morning. See Appendix A attached. 2. Thereafter plaintiff’s counsel filed. Points and Authorities in Support of the “Request” for Disqualification, and a Supplemental Declaration of Plaintiff’s Counsel, Walter H. Young (Appendix B attached). 3. In reply thereto, defendant filed a Response with Points and Authorities, and Affidavits of R. G. Furse and Edward T. Bowers, Executives of Texas Gas Transmission Corporation, the parent company of a corporation, American Commercial Lines which owns all of the stock of defendant Commercial Carriers, Inc. (Appendix C attached). After full consideration of each and all of said pleadings and points and authorities therein contained, and the oral arguments made before the Court on Monday, November 17, 1975, and good cause appearing, the Court orally discussed the various contentions and made its oral order refusing to disqualify, recuse or excuse itself from further proceedings in this case, and noted that it would make and enter written Findings, Conclusions and Order, which it now does, as follows: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS (1) The Letter and Request of Plaintiff’s Attorney For Disqualification of the Court Are, and Each of Them Is, Legally Insufficient Under Local Rule 1.8, as well as 28 United States Code Mi. The letter of plaintiff’s said counsel, Walter H. Young, with its enclosure was submitted in violation of Local Rule 1.8' of the Central District of California, which provides as follows: “1.8 Correspondence and Communications with the Judge: Attorneys or parties to any action or proceeding should refrain from writing letters to the Judge or otherwise communicating with the Judge unless opposing counsel is present. All matters to be called to a Judge’s attention should be formally submitted as hereinafter provided.” For this reason it is legally insufficient, but rather than waste time and paper, the Court ordered the Clerk, as stated above, to put it and its enclosure on the motion calendar under Local Rule 3(e) and it was so held on Monday, November 17, 1975. Counsel’s failure to abide by Local Rule 1.8 was, therefore, permitted in this instance, and while it is legally insufficient, we are treating the letter as a motion. However, since 28 U.S.C. § 144 requires that any party seeking to disqualify a Federal Judge must file a “timely and sufficient affidavit” of “the party” (not the attorney) and further that the affidavit of the party (not the attorney) must be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith, it is clear beyond any doubt that the letter and request (or declaration, or affidavit whichever it may be) are both legally insufficient to meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 144. The same legal insufficiency is found in the Supplemental Declaration of Attorney Walter H. Young. (Appendix B) All three are signed by the. attorney (Walter H. Young) for the party and not by the party, and the affidavit, if it be such, as well as the supplemental declaration were not accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that they were made in good faith. See Appendices A and B. The Court is obliged to determine their legal sufficiency under 28 U.S.C. § 144. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 33, 41 S.Ct. 203, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921); Batts v. United States, 413 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969); Lyons v. United States, 325 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. den., 377 U.S. 969, 84 S.Ct. 1650, 12 L.Ed.2d 738 (1964). Since they are not legally sufficient, being signed and filed solely and only by the attorney, Walter H. Young, and not by the party, Paul A. Mavis, they are obviously legally insufficient. (2) Assuming the Papers in Appendix A Had Been Signed and Filed, By The Party, Paul A. Mavis, They Are Still Legally Insufficient Under 28 United States Code 1UU and 28 United States Code 155. While we believe that the points already made would be sufficient in and of themselves to require this Court to deny a request by plaintiff’s counsel that the Court disqualify itself in this case, we will, for the purpose of the following discussion, assume that the “Request” (Appendix A) is the affidavit of the party, and further that the failure to accompany it with a certificate of good faith by counsel of record for the party is not fatal. Nevertheless, even assuming these to be the facts, which they obviously are not, it is just as certain that neither the letter, nor the request (see Appendix A) nor the Supplemental Declaration of the attorney, Walter H. Young, (Appendix B) nor any of them, is or are legally sufficient under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. We note that in the “Request” (Appendix A) plaintiff’s counsel sets forth two contentions for disqualification of the Court: (i) That since the Court admittedly owns substantial common stock in Union Oil Company of California, and since defendant Commercial Carriers, Inc., is wholly owned by American Commercial Lines, which is, in turn, wholly owned by Texas Gas Transmission Corporation, which has engaged in joint ventures in offshore oil and gas exploration in the Gulf of Mexico with Union Oil Company of California, and has purchased gas from said Union Oil Company of California, the Judge has some sort of interest in defendant Commercial Carriers, Inc., which would serve to disqualify him under 28 U.S.C. § 455. (ii) That certain statements of defendant’s counsel made to plaintiff’s counsel outside the presence, hearing and knowledge of the Judge, apparently at depositions and in other meetings of counsel out of Court, somehow constitute a circumstance which should disqualify the Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 455. Let us analyze these two contentions by taking the second one up first. It is absolutely clear from all of the papers filed, as listed hereinabove and set forth in Appendices A, B and C, that the Court was not present, did not hear and had absolutely no knowledge whatsoever of any statements made out of court by any counsel to any other counsel. It is perfectly plain that any such statements could not constitute grounds for disqualification of the Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 455. 'burning now to the first contention of plaintiff’s counsel, namely, that the Judge should have disqualified himself, because he owns stock in Union Oil Company of California which has engaged in joint ventures with and sold gas to Texas Gas Transmission Corporation, which wholly owns American Commercial Lines which, in turn, wholly owns defendant Commercial Carriers, Inc. Somehow, what plaintiff’s counsel seems to say is that because the Judge owns stock in Union Oil Company, he cannot preside over, but must disqualify himself from, any and all proceedings which may involve a subsidiary, twice removed, of a corporation which has done business-with Union. To state the contention is to refute it as legally insufficient on any sound or reasonable basis. But let us be more specific and analyze each subsection of 28 U.S.C. § 455, assuming, once again, contrary to the facts, that a proper affidavit and certificate of probable cause were filed in this matter. With that assumption, there is no doubt that it is the duty of the Judge sitting in the case to make the decision as to whether or not the affidavits are sufficient. In doing so, the Judge cannot pass upon or dispute the truth of the factual allegations set forth in the affidavits. Berger, 255 U.S. 22, 33, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921); Botts, 413 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1963); Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969); Lyons, 325 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. den., 377 U.S. 969, 84 S.Ct. 1650, 12 L.Ed.2d 738 (1964), supra. For the record, we feel constrained to affirm that the Judge does not now have nor did he ever have any personal bias or prejudice in the slightest degree for or against any of the parties to this case, cause and proceeding herein, and more particularly, does not have now, nor did he ever have any such personal bias or prejudice in the slightest degree against the plaintiff, Paul A. Mavis. The question we must turn to then, is whether or not the allegations set forth in the Request and Supplemental Declaration (assuming for the moment that they are appropriate affidavits of a party, and that the appropriate certificate by counsel of good faith has been filed as required by 28 U.S.C. § 144, which allegations the Court must accept as true, and in the absence of any contradictory evidence which as has been noted is absolutely impermissible under 28 U.S.C. § 144), are legally sufficient to show any one of the disqualifying grounds set forth in the new Federal statute on disqualification of Judges, 28 U.S.C. § 455, and in the new “Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges” which was promulgated and enacted by the United States Judicial Conference at its semi-annual session, March 7 and 8, 1974, and amended at its March 6 and 7, 1975 session. Now today, 28 U.S.C. § 455 and the Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon S C are virtually identical, with only one difference, and that is that the Judicial Conference has ruled in eliminating former Canon 3 D that there cannot be a waiver of any of the grounds for disqualification, whereas 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) provides that waiver can be accepted as to the ground for disqualification, under subsection (a). Let us take up the first ground for disqualification in 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). It provides that: “Any . . . judge ... of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Canon 3 C (1) states the same ground, but then adds additional grounds which are set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of 28 U.S.C. § 455. Thus it is incumbent upon us first to determine whether this is a proceeding in which the Judge’s impartiality might reasonably be' questioned. Disqualification or recusal certainly is not automatically required merely upon the filing of the letter request, declarations or affidavits. If there were support for this line of reasoning, the floodgates would be opened to “judge-shopping” and the impressive body of precedents which we have heretofore cited in Berger and its progeny would be wiped out. In any event, while the new and revised statute on judicial disqualification, 28 U.S.C. § 455, broadens the grounds for recusal or disqualification and is intended to eliminate the “duty to sit” concept of the old statute, it has not changed the law to the extent plaintiff’s counsel attempts to suggest. The standard of the general disqualification provision, Section 455(a) of 28 U.S.C., is still one of reasonableness and should not be interpreted to include a spurious or loosely based charge of partiality. The legislative history of the new Section 455 makes this abundantly clear in House Report No. 93-1453, adopting Senate Report No. 93-419, 3 U.S.Cong. & Admin.News, 93rd Cong., 2d Ses. 1974, pp. 6351-6363. In particular, this Report concludes at Page 6355: “While the proposed legislation would remove the ‘duty to sit’ concept of present law, a cautionary note is in order. No judge, of course, has a duty to sit where his impartiality might be reasonably questioned. However, the new test should not be used by judges to avoid sitting on difficult or controversial cases. At the same time, in assessing the reasonableness of a challenge to his impartiality, each judge must be alert to avoid the possibility that those who would question his impartiality are in fact seeking to avoid the consequences of his expected adverse decision. Disqualification for lack of impartiality must have a reasonable basis. Nothing in this proposed legislation should be read to warrant the transformation of a litigant’s fear that a judge may decide a question against him into a ‘reasonable fear’ that the judge will not be impartial. Litigants ought not have to face a judge where there is a reasonable question of impartiality, but they are not entitled to judges of their own choice. Finally, while the proposed legislation would adopt an objective test, it is not designed to alter the standard of appellate review on disqualification issues. The issue of disqualification is a sensitive question of assessing all the facts and circumstances in order to determine whether the failure to disqualify was an abuse of sound judicial discretion.” Having these thoughts in mind, we have approached each and all of the allegations of plaintiff’s counsel sensitively and utilizing sound judicial discretion, having in mind at all times that judge shopping is “out.” We have measured the allegations by all of the grounds set forth in the new 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 C and find that the allegations are not legally sufficient. First of all, there are no allegations of fact showing that the Court’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. If the contentions of the plaintiff’s attorney are given any credence in this regard it would mean that this Court would be forced to disqualify itself in any case in which a party has had any kind of business transactions with Union Oil Company of California, which would include banks and investment companies, stock transfer agents, lenders, borrowers, service stations, employees and anyone and anybody else who had any kind of business dealings with Union Oil Company. Here, Union Oil Company of California is not a party to the proceedings, nor is there any allegation of any kind that the defendant Com,mercial Carriers, Inc. itself ever had any business dealings of any kind with Union Oil Company of California. There is simply no basis at all on which the Court’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Having the same thoughts in mind, and with the same sensitivity that we have disposed of the ground stated in Section 455(a), let us examine the other grounds in Section 455 of 28 United States Code: “(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) [Canon 3 C (l)(a)] Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” —There is absolutely no allegation of any kind stating facts to show this ground. “(2) [Canon 3 C (1)(b)] Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it.” —There are no allegations concerning this ground whatsoever. “(3) [Canon 3 C (1) (e)] Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case, in controversy.” —This is, obviously, not involved. “(4) [Canon 3 C (1) (c) ] He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.” • — It is true, as alleged, that the Court holds stock in Union Oil Company of California, but that does not constitute any financial interest in the subject piatter in controversy, or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. This proceeding could not possibly affect the Court’s stocks in Union Oil or its value. “(5) [Canon 3 C (l)(d)] He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; (ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.” —There is no allegation as to this. “(c) [Canon 3 C (2)] A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.” —The Court has informed itself and knows that the only stock held in Union Oil Company of California is held by the Judge and his spouse in joint tenancy. We will not go into the other subsections, (d) [Canon 3 C (3)] which are merely definitions, or (e), which provides for partial waiver which is not permitted under the Code of Judicial Conduct, except to point out that the term “financial interest,” which is a ground for disqualification under Section 455(b)(4), is defined as follows in Section 455(d) (4) : “ ‘[Financial interest’ means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party Obviously the business relationships in which Union Oil sells gas to Texas Gas Transmission Corporation, and in which they engage in a joint venture for off-shore oil and gas drilling and exploration in the Gulf of Mexico cannot, and will not be permitted to, transmogrify or pervert a stock ownership in Union Oil into a “financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party [defendant] to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4). Moreover, it is beyond doubt that here the only claim by plaintiff’s attorney and the only fact of the matter is that the parent corporation of defendant, once removed, that is Texas Gas Transmission Corporation, the parent of American Commercial Lines, the parent of defendant Commercial Carriers, Inc., has some contracts with Union Oil involving commercial ventures in gas sales, drilling and exploration all of which are completely and entirely unrelated in any way, either to the proceedings herein or to any party, including the defendant herein, or any issue of any kind involved herein. There is no such claim, and there can be no such claim, if we deal in fact and not fantasy or fancy of plaintiff’s counsel. (3) The Authorities Cited- by Plaintiff’s Counsel Do Not Demonstrate that Plaintiff’s Alleged Grounds for Disqualification are Legally Sufficient. Plaintiff’s counsel relies entirely on three cases to support his claim of the alleged and imaginary “financial interest” or other interest, precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 455. As we shall now demonstrate, none of these three cases has any applicability whatsoever. (i) Adams v. Minor, 121 Cal. 372, 53 P. 815 (1898) This was an action involving the question of the validity of certain bonds issued by an irrigation district, a portion of which bonds were held by a bank in which the Superior Court Judge owned stock. The Supreme Court of California naturally held that the Judge should be disqualified as “interested” within the meaning of CCP 170. But here in our case, there is no showing that the Judge has any interest in any company holding anything belonging to the defendant party. (ii) Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965) In this case, under the old 28 U.S.C. § 455, the Tenth Circuit properly held that a District Judge should not sit in a case in which the attorney for the plaintiff was a lawyer who represented the Judge in another case, and accordingly, properly granted mandamus to disqualify the Judge. In our case here, the Judge has never had any kind of relations with counsel for plaintiff or counsel for defendant, nor has he ever utilized or employed either set of counsel in any way, shape or form. (iii) In Re Honolulu Consolidated Oil Co., 243 F. 348 (9th Cir. 1917) In this case, it appeared that District Court Judge Bledsoe had stock in an oil company that was involved in another case as part of a scheme or plan of unitary litigation brought by the United - States in numerous suits against various oil companies concerning oil lands ownership. In this Honolulu suit also brought by the United States against Honolulu Consolidated Oil, but in Judge Bledsoe’s Court and as part of the same unitary scheme or plan of litigation, Judge Bledsoe refused to disqualify himself, because he did not hold any interest in Honolulu Consolidated. However, it was obvious that any decision he would render in the Honolulu case would (because it was part of the same unitary scheme or plan of litigation brought by the United States in numerous cases against various oil companies, including the other case involving the oil company in which Judge Bledsoe did hold stock ownership), affect his interest as a shareholder in the company in which he did hold stock, even though the case involving it was not before him. Accordingly the Ninth Circuit properly held that Judge Bledsoe “is sufficiently related to the litigation to impel the conclusion that he is concerned in interest, and therefore should not sit.” 243 F. 348, 353. And so a Writ of Mandamus was issued requiring him to disqualify himself. But here again this case has no possible application to the proceeding herein, since there is no unitary scheme or plan of litigation at all. Here, as far as we know or are informed, there is no Union Oil litigation of any kind related in the slightest degree to the litigation herein. Certainly plaintiff’s counsel has made no showing whatsoever of any such scheme or plan of unitary litigation. ORDER Upon the Findings and Conclusions set forth above, and the Court being convinced that the allegations of plaintiff’s attorney' (Appendices A arid B) are not legally sufficient to raise any ground or issue of disqualification or recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144, 28 U.S.C. § 455, the Code of Judicial Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3 C, or the long-standing case law of Berger and its progeny, and this Judge knowing of the heavy burdens already borne by the other Judges on this Court which would be greatly exacerbated by the reassignment of this proceeding to another Judge of this Court, It is hereby ordered: 1. That the letter, request and supplemental declaration of plaintiff’s counsel that this Judge be disqualified and recuse himself from the case, cause and proceedings herein, be, and the same hereby are, denied. 2. The Clerk is directed to file and enter these Findings, Conclusions and Order forthwith and serve copies thereof upon counsel for all parties herein. APPENDIX A REQUEST TO HON. A. ANDREW HAUK, JUDGE, TO EXCUSE HIMSELF FROM THE TRIAL OF THIS ACTION AND RETURN THE CAUSE FOR REASSIGNMENT STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES WALTER H. YOUNG does hereby and herewith certify and declare that the following facts are true: (1) That he is the attorney for the plaintiff. (2) That declarant calls to the attention of HON. A. ANDREW HAUK certain facts concerning the relationship of COMMERCIAL CARRIERS, INC. to TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION, and the relationship of TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION to UNION OIL CORPORATION, with which HON. A. ANDREW HAUK may not be familiar. (3) That declarant also calls attention of the Judge to certain comments and statements that are constantly being made by defendant’s counsel concerning predictions as to how this Judge will rule, and that by virtue of the combination of said events declarant requests this Court to excuse himself from the trial of this action and return the cause to the HON. ALBERT LEE STEPHENS, Senior Judge, for reassignment. (4) This affidavit is made pursuant to Public Law 93-512, 88 Statutes 1609, amending Section 455, title 28 U.S.Code, approved and in force and effect December 5, 1974. That section applies to1 any case the trial of which will be after that date, and this case has not yet been tried. That section uses the mandatory word “shall” and requires the Judge to excuse himself from the trial of an action under the circumstances set forth in said section. Declarant relies on Subdivisions (a) and (b) of said section and all portions of said Section 455, as amended, and requests HON. A. ANDREW HAUK to excuse himself in these proceedings and return the case to the Senior Presiding Judge, HON. ALBERT LEE STEPHENS, for reassignment. (5) There are two major bases for this motion, one being the relationship between HON. A. ANDREW HAUK, JUDGE, and UNION OIL CORPORATION, and the relationship of the UNION OIL CORPORATION to TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION, which owns COMMERCIAL CARRIERS, INC. as a wholly-owned subsidiary, the defendant in this action; and the second basis is that the declarations and statements of defendant’s counsel, predicting what this Judge will do in this action make a combination of circumstances, whereby in the interest of justice and the judicial system, it would be best if this matter were assigned to some other court. APPENDIX A — Continued (6) HON. A. ANDREW HAUK did on December 2, 1974, fully and fairly acknowledge publicly that he had a substantial interest in UNION OIL OF CALIFORNIA (hereinafter referred to as “Union”), by voluntarily excusing himself from the trial of Case No. CV 74-2374-AAH, entitled People of the State of California v. Roger C. B. Morton, Secretary of Interior, and a certified photostatic copy of minute order in that case is attached. In addition to JUDGE HAUK’S substantial financial interest in Union, it is a matter of public knowledge by printed information in books and pamphlets relating to judges, that HON. A. ANDREW HAUK, JUDGE was prior to his elevation to the bench, counsel for Union. (7) However, there is nothing in the record in this case to date that indicates Union’s financial connection with Texas Gas Transmission, a publicly-owned corporation, or that COMMERCIAL CARRIERS, INC. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Texas Gas Transmission, such facts at this point not having been disclosed to the court by anything in the record in this case. The fact that Texas Gas Transmission owns COMMERCIAL CARRIERS, INC. appears as public information in the Standard & Poors Corporation information sheet, issued September 24, 1975. (8) Furthermore, at depositions taken at the office of Texas Gas Transmission on October 13 and 14, 1975, in Owensboro, Kentucky, of its attorney, E. Phillips Mallone, and the former President of COMMERCIAL CARRIERS, INC., Charles Herrick, and a Richard Young, a Vice President of Texas Gas Transmission, it was admitted and acknowledged that Texas Gas Transmission owns COMMERCIAL CARRIERS, INC. as a wholly-owned subsidiary. At said depositions, it was established in the course of the depositions that Texas Gas Transmission operates a pipe line, emanating from Louisiana, and that Unión is one of its two principal suppliers of gas, which it purchases from Union. Following that deposition in the discussion with E. Phillips Mallone, attorney for Texas Gas Transmission, Mr. Mallone in response to questions from declarant, informed declarant that Texas Gas Transmission purchases a great part of its gas from Union and, furthermore, is engaged in joint partnership exploration and development with Union in Louisiana and Gulf of Mexico area. Attached hereto are photostatic copies of 1972, ’73 and ’74 annual reports of Union, which show that Union has a huge natural gas production, that it operates in Louisiana, that it has partners in Louisiana, and that Union Oil’s efforts to increase domestic production are centered in that area in the Gulf of Mexico. While the Union annual reports do not name any of the partners, Texas Gas Transmission is, in fact, a partner with Union according to the information supplied to declarant by E. Phillips Mallone, attorney for Texas Gas Transmission. Attached hereto is a letter by declarant to defendant’s counsel, requesting them to make a full, fair, complete and honest disclosure of the sales of gas by Union to Texas Gas, and the joint and partnership ventures in which the two companies are engaged in Louisiana and the Gulf of Mexico. That it is clearly apparent therefore that the real party in interest in this lawsuit is Texas Gas Transmission as the owner of Commercial Carriers, and that there is a direct financial relationship between Union Oil and Texas Gas Transmission by virtue of the large amounts of monies which must pass between the two corporations for the purchase and sale of millions of cubic feet of gas and by virtue of the partnership and joint ventures between said two corporations in the Louisiana and Gulf of Mexico area. The fortunes of Texas Gas Transmission affect the financial position of Union Oil Corporation, in which Hon. A. Andrew Hauk has a substantial interest pursuant to his previous public declaration, and, therefore, it is inappropriate in this action that he should be called upon to rule whether Texas Gas Transmission, through Commercial Carriers, Inc., should be permitted to acquire Mr. Mavis’ business and/or recover damages from Mr. Mavis, and/or whether Mr. Mavis should be permitted to keep his business and/or recover damages from Commercial Carriers, Inc., the wholly-owned subsidiary of Texas Gas Transmission. The second aspect of this situation relates to declarations and statements by defendant’s counsel, Mr. Lynn H. Pasahow and Mr.1 James L. Hunt. That since the commencement of this action, defendant’s counsel have on innumerable occasions, in the course of depositions, and before and after hearings before this Court, have stated to declarant in very positive terms that they were certain the Court would rule in their favor on the particular matter at issue and have made predictions that the Court would rule in their favor on other matters, such as, “If we have to go before the judge, I am sure he will rule in our favor.” “I have no objection to your going before the judge on this record — and I have no doubt that we will be awarded sanctions if you do.” “If you inhibit my deposition, I will terminate the deposition and see the judge.” When the defendant’s counsel failed to comply with the rules and file a pretrial statement after three prior pretrial continuances and I complained, counsel said, “We will ask for a continuance — and there is no doubt that Judge Hauk will grant our motion to continue the pretrial.” At that hearing, the Court granted the pretrial and made other rulings. Following that hearing, Mr. James L. Hunt stated to declarant in the hall: “You have lost every motion before Judge Hauk, and you will continue to do so — and furthermore he will strike your cause of action on economic frustration when the proper time comes.” Defendant’s counsel have made similar predictions as to what this Court will do, and this has been an important factor in persuading declarant into making this request. Defendant’s counsel, however, have never made such statements in the presence of the court, nor have such statements heretofore been called to the attention of the Court. To aid the Court in deciding this motion and request, declarant submits the following: In Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 Fed.2d, 655, certiorari denied, 383 U.S. 936, the court held that proper administration of justice requires of a judge not only actual impartiality but also the appearance of detached impartiality. In the case of In re Honolulu Consolidated Oil Co., 9th Circuit, 243 Fed. 348, a judge was disqualified from hearing a case if he owned stock in an oil company which was a party to the case. Where an irrigation district issued bonds and some of the bonds were held by a bank and a judge held stock in the bank, the judge thereby became interested in the bonds of the irrigation district by virtue of his ownership of stock in the bank (see Adams v. William O. Miner, 121 Cal. 372). The judge was therefore disqualified from acting on the case irrespective of the pecuniary value or interest, and the fact that the judge disposed of his stock before decision does not remove his disqualification. The analogy between that case and the present situation is that whereas the bank had an interest in the irrigation district that was the subject of the action, we have the situation that Union has an interest in Texas Gas Transmission by virtue of its partnership connection and the sale of gas. Therefore, the ownership of stock in Union is in the same category as the ownership of stock by the bank in the irrigation district. The court further said, “We can see no substantial difference in the case of a judge who was a stockholder in a corporation sitting in a case brought by or against such corporation, and a case where the matter in controversy involves the property of such corporation, although it is not a party to the action.” That declarant is transmitting a copy of this declaration together with a letter of transmittal (copy of which is attached), to HON. ALBERT LEE STEPHENS, JR., Senior Judge, U. S. District Court, for the Central District of California, U. S. Courthouse, Los Angeles, California 90012. WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that this Judge excuse himself from the trial of this action and return this cause to the Senior Judge for reassignment. Dated: October 28, 1975. Respectfully, (s) Walter H. Young_ WALTER H. YOUNG Susbcribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of October, 1975. (s) Adeline M. Young Adeline M. Young Notary Public DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL (U. S. District Court, Central District, Local Rule 5[b] [3].) Edith C. Lee, the undersigned, hereby declares: That declarant is a citizen of the United States and is employed by YOUNG & YOUNG, Attorneys at Law, 606 S. Olive St., Suite 2104, Los Angeles, California 90014. Declarant is over the age of twenty-one years, and not a party to the within action. On October 28, 1975, at the direction of WALTER H. YOUNG, a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, I served the within REQUEST TO HON. A. ANDREW HAUK, JUDGE, TO EXCUSE HIMSELF FROM THE TRIAL OF THIS ACTION AND RETURN THE CAUSE FOR REASSIGNMENT on the attorneys of record for the defendant and counterclaimant in this matter by mailing an envelope, with postage thereon, containing a true copy of the said document, addressed as follows: McCUTCHEN, DOYLE, BROWN & ENERSEN Attorneys at Law 601 California St., Suite 2000 San Francisco, California 94108 Attention: Lynn H. Pasahow, Esq. and James L. Hunt, Esq. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Los Angeles, California, this 28th day of October, 1975. (s) Edith C. Lee Edith C. Lee Union Oil and Gas Dívísíon Union’s domestic crude oil production averaged 263,100 barrels a day in 1972, down two percent from 1971 production. Domestic natural gas production rose one percent to a record 1.57 billion cubic feet per day. Plant production of natural gas liquids declined slightly to 36,200 barrels a day. The company's U.S. crude oil reserves at the end of 1972 totaled 717 million barrels compared with 766 million barrels a year earlier. Net natural gas reserves at year end were 7.05 and 7.16 trillion cubic feet in 1972 and 1971, respectively. In 1972, we participated In drilling 298 wells, of which our share was the equivalent of 184 wells. This Included the equivalent of 97 successful oil wells, 34 successful gas wells and 53 that were unsuccessful and abandoned. Louisiana In September, the company and two . partners acquired nine tracts at a Federal government lease sale offshore eastern Louisiana. The nine tracts totaled over 43,000 acres, and Union’s net outlay was $11.4 million for a 38 percent interest. An evaluation well currently Is being drilled, and several more are scheduled this year. Offshore drilling In 1972 Included continuing evaluation of 11 tracts acquired with the same partners in December 1970. Four of these tracts have been proven productive to date. Platforms have been installed on three of them with a fourth to be Installed this year. Two additional tracts may be productive but will require further drilling to evaluate. Development drilling activity offshore Louisiana Included 17 wells drilled Drilling proceeds from platform D in the Altaka field, East Kalimantan, Indonesia. The ship on the right provides power and service for drilling, and accommodations for the crew. The workboat in the foreground flies the Indonesian national flag and the Union Oil house flag from new platforms on Ship Shoal Block 208, Ship Shoal Block 274 and South Marsh Island Block 48. Ten more wells will be drilled In 1973 and production from these platforms of about 4,000 barrels per day of oil and 75 million cubic feet of gas will begin late In the year. Texas A gas discovery was made some 60 miles southeast of Pecos on 11,500 acres In which Union has a 50 percent Interest. Called Elsinore Cattle Co. No. 1, ‘he well tested at over 8 million cubic feet of natural gas (jer day from below 12,600 feet. A ' follow-up well now Is drilling. Oklahoma- In April 1972, Union completed Its Bruner No. 1 gas well in the Anadarko Basin. The discovery was completed below 24,000 feet to become the world’s deepest producing well. Development drilling to determine the extent of the field Is now In progress. California In the Santa Barbara Channel, drilling from two platforms on Block 402 is complete, Current production Is approximately 34,600 barrels per day (7,200 net to Union) from 84 producing wells. Government approval for a third platform was granted and then suspended. The Federal District Court recently upheld the government’s refusal to lift Its suspension order and an appeal Is planned. The suspension order continues to delay our development program. No exploratory drilling was done by Union or others in the Santa Barbara Channel during 1972 due to continuing Federal government restrictions. The Union Island gas field, approximately nine miles southwest of Stockton, was extended with completion of a new discovery well early in 1972. The well, Sonol Securities #1A, and a confirmation well were completed flowing 4,5 and 7.0 million cubic feet of natural gas per day, respectively.' A well completed early In 1973 found a new deep gas zone, extending the producing area of the field. Further development of this field, located on an 8,000 net acre lease block, continues In 1973. Alaska Our holdings in the Cook Inlet aiea make Union the largest producer of crude oil and natural gas in Alaska. Furthermore, production Is being maintained at high levels by successful secondary recovery procedures. Construction was completed during the year of a gas transmission system to carry gas from production platforms on the west side of the Cook InleJ to the Kenal Peninsula. This eliminates flaring of gas produced with crude oil and delivers It to Collier Carbon and Chemical Corporation's ammonia-urea plant for use as fuel gas, and to the Swanson River oil field for pressure maintenance Injection. Gas deliveries through the system after completion late in 1972 averaged 28 million cubic feet per day. In the future' It will allow us to use, or market, ouryet-undeveloped natural gas reserves on the west side of the Cook Inlet. Activity on Alaska’s North Slope, where Union holds 228,000 net acres, continues to be curtailed due to the lack of a permit from the Federal government for construction of an 800-mlle pipeline to the warm wafer port of Valdez, Alaska. Evaluation of our leases, some of v/hich are near discoveries by other companies, can begin shortly after such permission is granted. Union International Oil Division Operating through subsidiaries, the company's net crude oil production from areas outside the United States averaged 63,700 barrels per day, a new record and up 14 percent from 1971, Natural gas production averaged 61 million cubic feet per day, up 21 percent from 1971 and also a new record level. We also participated in drilling 150 wells, equivalent to 68 net wells, in Extract 1972 Union Annual Report of production practices for specific reservoirs. New reservoir flooding processes are in Various stages of development and testing, and Improved techniques for maximizing productivity of Individual wells were tested in the field. For example, a new fluid was developed for use In drilling and well repair. Results of several field applications have demonstrated that It causes less permanent plugging of the well face than do conventional fluids. Therefore, higher oil production rates are realized. To maximize flexibility and minimize costs, the Marine Department is using ■ the same ship's tanks for crude oil and refined products. The success of this venture depends upon adequately and economically cleaning the tanks before loading refined products and at the same time meeting environmental restrictions. Research helped develop and monitor a successful cleaning technique which Is now in use. Shareowners and Employees Union Oil Company common and preferred shares are held by over 140,000 individuals, business firms, labor unions, mutual funds, pension funds, educational, religious and charitable institutions and others. Shareowners reside in each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia and in many foreign countries. At year end 16,263 people were employed by Union Oil Company and its subsidiaries, compared to 16,473 at the end of 1971. The company's 1972 salary, wage and benefit expense amounted to $242 million compared with $222 million In 1971. These costs will Increase comparably during 1973 as a result of new inflationary labor contracts forced upon us by guideline standards established by the Federal government. The company has a stated policy of equal opportunity for all with respect to hiring, promotion and all other personnel practices and policies. We are comnilted to a program of affirmative action in hiring and advancement of minorities and women to permit their promotion to positions of greater responsibility and higher skill commensurate with their qualifications. In 1972, the Union Oil Company of California Foundation continued its program of assisting educational, welfare and civic organizations. Emphasis centered on scholarships and fellowships in fields of vital Interest to the future of the company, as well as continued aid programs to assist disadvantaged students to obtain higher education. Union’s float depicting the “Keystone Cops” won the Judges Special Award in the 1973 Pasadena Tournament of Roses This award is for the float displaying the best humor m the parade. Extract 1972 Union Annual Report ENERGY RESOURCES “A major effort was made to increase worldwide production of crude oil, natural gas and geothermal steam while, at the same time, increasing exploration for more and new energy resources.” Natural gas production fell six percent to 1.53 billion cubic feet per day in 1973. However, 1974 gas production is expected to increase reflecting new production brought on stream in late 1973 and expected to be placed on production in early 1974. Plant production of natural gas liquids also declined slightly to 35,600 barrels per day. Worldwide crude oil reserves at the end of 1973 declined to 1,020 million barrels compared with 1-.085 million a year earlier. Natural gas reserves rose to 7.7 trillion cubic feet from 7.6 trillion cubic feet at the end of 1972. Capital investments to acquire, explore and develop oil, gas and geothermal properties totaled $276 million in 1973. We now have developed significant geothermal steam reserves which are contributing to revenues. During the year, we participated in drilling 429 wells, of which our share was the equivalent of 256 net wells. This included the equivalent of 120 successful oil weiis, 49 successful gas wells and 87 that were unsuccessful and abandoned. Union OH and Gas Division Our efforts to increase domestic production and reserves are centered primarily in the Gulf of Mexico where Union has been a major producer since we drilled the world’s first offshore well there in 1937. During<1973 we were successful in gaining good competitive land positions in two major Federal offshore lease sales and are making intensive preparations for anticipated further sales in 1974. In June we acquired varying interests in six tracts off western Louisiana and Texas for a net company expenditure of $32.6 million. Early drilling on these properties has resulted in two tracts being proved gas productive. Drilling on these and other tracts will continue throughout 1974. The second major sale, late in December, covered leases in the eastern part of the Gulf of Mexico off Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida, in this sale Union with two partners acquired interests in 14 tracts for a net company expenditure of $50.4 million. Exploratory work on these tracts is planned for 1974. We also carried on an active exploratory and development drilling program in other parts of the Gulf area during the year. In total, we participated in drilling 21 onshore and offshore exploratory wells in the Gulf area. Development drilling on proved properties in the Gulf has continued throughout the year. Production from new platforms at Ship Shoal Block 208 and Ship Shoal Block 274 is averaging 4,500 barrels of oil and 50 million cubic feet of gas daily. A third platform, at South Marsh Island Block 48, is scheduled to begin production in early 1974. ■; *''"*• l‘i • • *4 r‘¡n! r*r:ii. Ship Shoal fi«r •: ¡ ' O'jlf of I'Aevico. After rcr.sliucllon was cl ' . í. j " ’i 'íU .nilüou cubic fc 4 (4 m.4u!í<¡ gas r Uay n. n ll.'v*- !<,*' Ikw £> mvJ iiKtuslncs in the Norlhaast Extract 1973 Union Annual Report Energy Resources Union responded to the growing shortage of reliable long-term sources of energy through acceleration of an already active exploratory and development program in 1974 Measuied in dollars, Union's capital expenditures for energy resources were nearly double the previous high year of 1968 Our drilling activity was 20 percent above the previous year Worldwide production of crude oil declined slightly from record 1973 levels reflecting a continuation of steadily increasing foreign production and decreasing domestic production as shown in the chart on page 5. Natural gas production showed a slight increase over 1973 after being down the previous year. The seeming inconsistency between our increased effort to find new oil and the decline* in our production is the result of the long lead time between the acquisition of land — the purchase of offshore leases, for example — and actual production. Although Instances where we are able to achieve sustained production within a year or two after beginning exploration seem to be more highly publicized, these are exceptions to our general experiences. During 1974 Union was active in 28 states of the United Stales and in 17 other countries Worldwide crude oil production averaged 328,500 barrels a day and natural gas production averaged 1.5 billion cubic feet per day. Union Oi! and Gas Division In our effort to secure promising exploratory prospects, Union spent $184 million at four Federal land sales in the Gulf of Mexico in 1974. These included various interests in over 280,000 acres in 36 tracts offshore from Texas and Louisiana. normally takes three to five years from the time we acquire a property until it becomes a producing oil or gas field, if at all. Thus increased activity in 1974 hopefully will bear fruit in 1976 or beyond and then only as the result of a cumulative long-term effort. Exploratory work on these and other tracts in this area acquired in recent years has been the major thrust of our domestic exploration effort during the year. Results to date of this drilling have been encouraging with seven of the tracts drilled in 1974 making new discoveries which indicate commercial potential. An aggressive exploration program in the Gulf of Mexico will continue to be emphasized dur1975. At the same time there are significant exploration opportunities remaining onshore as evidenced by a number of successful 1974 developments. Most notable among these has been follow-up drilling to our December 1973 gas-condensate discovery in Mobile County, Alabama, our first discovery in that state. Following a second well, which was unsuccessful, three additional productive wells have been drilled in what is now designated as the Chunchula field. These wells have been drilled on a 10,000 acre exploratory unit in which Union has a 77 percent interest and each has produced on test at rates up to 3 million cubic feet per day and over 1,100 barrels per day of condensate from a depth below 18,000 feet. In addition to the exploratory unit, Union has a 100 percent interest in approximately 52,000 acres in this area. Drilling to further evaluate the extent of this field will continue throughout 1975. Another area of major interest is the .North Slope of Alaska whpre drilling has been deferred because of repeated delays in approval of the trans-Alaska pipeline. With this approval finally obtained in 1974 preparations were underway at year end for the drilling of our first well in several years on the Slope and our first well near the Prudhoe Bay field. Our objective will be to extend the Lisburne formation production at Prudhoe Bay field eastward onto a large block of land we hold jointly with another company. Opportunities continue to be developed in proximity to some of our older producing areas in the United States. Typical of-these is Union's 1974 discovery and development of the Quest field in Wyoming, where we have drilled six wells to date with a production capability of about 750 barrels of oil per day. Another example is a recently announced new fault block discovery on a state lease in the Caillou Island area of Louisiana. This discovery well, in which Union has k 60 percent interest, flowed at-a fate of 10.7 million cubic feet per day of gas and 435 barrels per day of condensate in an area which has ATTORNEYS ANO COUNSELORS WALTER H, YOUNG W. HERBERT YOUNG JANE YOUNG LAW OFFICES YOUNG S, YOUNG CITY NATIONAL BANK BU.LOING 606 SOUTH OLIVE STREET, SUITE 2104 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90014 TELEPHONES 623-5200 626-S209 625 * 6370 October 28, 1975 Hon. Albert Lee Stephens, Jr. Senior Judge United States District Court Courthouse Los Angeles, California 90012 Re: MAVIS vs. COMMERCIAL CARRIERS, INC. USDC Number: CV 74-2708 AAH Request to Return Cause for Reassignment Dear Sir: Enclosed is copy of a Request to Hon. A. Andrew Hauk, Judge, to excuse himself from the trial of this action and return the cause to you for reassignment. This Request has been filed and a copy delivered to Judge Hauk and service has been made on defendant* 1s counsel. I submit this copy to you so you will have the papers available before you in the event Judge Hauk should contact you concerning same and further, as I understand that this is the proper practice so to do. Respectfully, SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF WALTER H. YOUNG RE MOTION UNDER SECTION 28 U. S. CODE SECTION 455 STATE OF CALIFORNIA "1 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES J SS' WALTER H. YOUNG does hereby and herewith certify and declare under penalties of perjury that the following facts are true: (1) Following receipt of the Order of October 30th, 1975 of the Order setting for hearing as a Motion plaintiff’s request to HON. A. ANDREW HAUK to excuse himself from the trial of this action, declarant made or caused the following' things to be done: (a) Caused inquiry to be made at the Federal Energy Office, the Federal Power Commission, the Security and Exchange Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission as to where, could be located, a record of partnership or joint ventures between Texas Gas Transmission and Union Oil Company of California in connection with the exploration, production and transmission of natural gas and received information from all of said agencies, that generally such transactions were handled by private agreements and specific identity not disclosed. That declarant ascertained that in the field of oil and natural gas, Texas Gas Transmission filed its reports with the Federal Power Commission and declarant has obtained a copy of the report, approximately two inches thick of Texas Gas Transmission for the year ending December 31st, 1974 and said report does not identify its transactions with Union Oil Comnanv of California as such. (b) That on October 28th, 1975, declarant wrote a letter to defendant’s counsel, copy of which is attached, requesting information as set forth in said letter and although declarant has been informed by Mr. Hunt, that Mr. Malone of Texas Gas Transmission had mailed said information to them, declarant has not yet received the same. (c) That declarant assembled authorizations from four shareholders of Union Oil requesting that Union Oil disclose to declarant information on the joint ventures between Texas Gas Transmission and Union Oil of California, but declarant finally ascertained that such records were in the Houston, Texas office, under the jurisdiction of Bob Marquez, phone: 1-713-623-8000 and declarant talked to Mr. Marquez who informed declarant that such records could not be released except by authority of the main office and declarant finally talked to Sam A. Snyder of the legal department of the Union Oil Company who informed declarant that there was a policy of Union Oil Company not to aid either party to litigation, but that if a joint request was filed that Union Oil Company of California would supply said information. That in connection with said inquiries, at no time did declarant disclose the name of HON. A. ANDREW HAUK, but merely informed the parties involved that said information was requested in connection with litigation concerning Texas Gas Transmission. That declarant on November 5th, 1975 informed Mr. Hunt of what had occurred and requested him to join in a request with declarant for said information and Mr. Hunt informed declarant that he wanted to talk to'Mr. Snyder first. At the deposition in Washington on November 10th of Mr. Charles Ephraim, Mr. Hunt informed declarant that he had not been able to make contact with attorney Sam A. Snyder of Union Oil, but that he did have under consideration my request for a joint request and also informed declarant that he understood that Mr. Malone had already mailed out information on this subject to him. That declarant has made due and diligent search to ascertain from public records and public sources the nature, scope and extent of the partnership in joint transactions between Texas Gas Transmission and Union Oil Company of California and that none of said information is available from public sources, but can only be obtained from Texas Gas Transmission and Union Oil Company of California and for which, apparently, the cooperation of Texas Gas Transmission is required and declarant has made due and timely and appropriate request for said information from defendant’s counsel, none of which has been supplied as of November 12, 1975. . (2) That extracts from the Federal Power Commission report 1974 of Texas Gas Transmission do reveal the following: (a) That gas operating revenues of Texas Gas Transmission in 1974 amounted to $346,108,382.00. (b) That its oil and gas producing activities are handled through Texas Gas Exploration in Louisiana, Delaware, Netherlands, United Kingdom and in the Artie region and that said Texas Gas Exploration Companies are 100% owned by Texas Gas Transmission. Said report also indicates that there are three commercial carriers wholly owned subsidiaries, one in Michigan, one in Delaware and one in Illinois. (c) That Texas Gas Transmission is guaranteed a $35,000,000.00 Note of Texas Gas Exploration Corporation, its wholly subsidiary. (3) That declarant was informed at the Owensburg deposition by Mr. Herrick that Texas Gas Transmission obtains a great deal of its gas from Union Oil of California. Since revenues produced in the gas amount to $346 million, it is obvious that the gas obtained from Union Oil runs into many, many millions of dollars. (4) That attached hereto is Standard & Poors circulated brochure on Texas Gas Transmission which reflects that it owns Commercial Carriers and that it conducts its well drilling activities through Texas Gas Exploration operating in the North Sea, United Kingdom, Wyoming and another report attached hereto indicates that Texas Gas Transmission is operating in Louisiana and Texas. ■ (5) Extracts from the Union Oil Company Annual Reports reflects that Union Oil Company produces 1.5 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day, that its efforts to increase domestic production are centered in the Gulf of Mexico, that they have varying interest in tracts in Louisiana and Texas and that Union Oil was doing exploratory work through partners in the Gulf of Mexico, Louisiana and are producing millions of cubic feet of gas in that area. (6) That it is apparent from the foregoing that the oil exploration and gas producing activities of Union Oil Company of California and Texas Gas Exploration (a subsidiary wholly owned) are taking place in the Gulf of Mexico and Louisiana, that the investments run into hundreds of millions of dollars, that there are great amounts of gas being produced and that Texas Gas Transmission is obviously buying millions of dollars of gas from Union Oil and the statements made to declarant as heretofore set forth by Mr. Herrick and Mr. Malone that Texas Gas Transmission and Union Oil Company of California were joint venturers in the Gulf of Mexico and Louisiana establishes partnership interests between these companies involving great amounts of money. Attached hereto are extracts from the Financial Report of Texas Gas Transmission from 1974 indicating risk of well damage in the Gulf of Mexico with Hurricane Carmen. It also reflects that the companies sold 696 billion cubic feet of gas and 77% was obtained from independent producers. The pipeline map indicates that gas for its pipelines is supplied from sources in Louisiana and the Gulf of Mexico. The'report further establishes that Texas Gas Exploration, through its own efforts, produces only 5% of the system requirements of gas. The 1974 report also indicates an economic problem in that the free market price for gas is $2.