Full opinion text
ORDER MOYE, District Judge. This case presents a challenge by Dr. Joseph W. Gilbert, Jr., a physician formerly employed at the Veterans Administration Hospital [V.A.H.] in Atlanta, Georgia, until September 1,1971, to his subsequent removal from the position of Associate Chief of Staff [ACOS] and transfer from the V.A.H., Atlanta, Georgia. At the pretrial conference held in chambers on November 13, 1975, this Court indicated that the Court would review the administrative record of the 38 U.S.C. § 4110 Disciplinary Board hearing held October-December 1973 in connection with Doctor Gilbert’s removal and transfer [i. e., item # 4 (page 12) of defendants’ response filed July 3, 1975, to plaintiff’s May 16, 1975, pretrial order]. This Order constitutes the Court’s review of the administrative record. The facts of this protracted litigation are as follows: Facts The plaintiff, Dr. Joseph W. Gilbert, a trained cardio-thoracic surgeon with 17 years experience in his specialty, was recruited by the Veterans Administration to be Associate Chief of Staff for Education and Research [ACOS] at the Atlanta Hospital in late 1965. He joined the V.A. in that capacity in 1966 allegedly with the understanding that he would have patient care duties in his highly specialized field, cardiothoracic surgery, besides administering the research program at the Atlanta V.A. Hospital. The position of Associate Chief of Staff for Research and Education did not necessarily require a cardio-thoracic surgeon since the duties of the job were the conducting of research and administering the research program of the hospital. Doctor Gilbert was excluded from patient care responsibilities during his tenure at the Atlanta V.A. Hospital, 1966-1970, despite the fact that thoracic surgeons were needed by the hospital and Doctor Gilbert was receiving additional compensation from the V.A. due to his Board certification and classification as a thoracic surgeon. Doctor Gilbert apparently experienced disappointment and frustration with his lack of patient care responsibility and ascribed this state of affairs to “institutional jealousy” by Drs. Julian A. Jarman, Hospital Director, and J. D. Martin, Chief of Surgery at Emory. Doctor Gilbert requested Doctor Jarman to convene the Dean’s Committee to review the controversy surrounding Doctor Gilbert’s desire to have patient care duties during this period, but this was not done. Some friction, ill feeling and lack of cordiality arose between Doctor Gilbert and other V. A. staff members. By March 1970, it became apparent to Dr. Lewis Jones, Chief of Staff at that time, that Doctor Gilbert’s alleged “poor interpersonal relationships” with the V. A. staff had interfered with his administration of the Research Program at the hospital. In the narrative portion of his annual proficiency report on Doctor Gilbert for 1970, Doctor Jones wrote: “The Research Program at this hospital does not approach the quality that is possible. It is my impression that there are few persons, if any, who would disagree with this estimate, including Dr. Gilbert himself. In my opinion, by far the most important reason for this failure has been Dr. Gilbert’s inability to instill enthusiasm and his failure to encourage participation in research on the part of our staff. In fact, because of very poor interpersonal relationships, Dr. Gilbert has discouraged persons from even visiting the research areas of this hospital. Dr. Gilbert’s unsatisfactory relations extend outside this hospital to involve persons in the Medical School including the Chairman of Departments.” Doctor Jones’s proficiency report continued: “For the most part, information about research activities has been limited to the research areas because Dr. Gilbert has secluded himself within his office and laboratory. Everyone agrees that Dr. Gilbert has a brilliant mind and an extraordinary ability to express his thoughts both verbally and in writing; however, his extreme egocentricity makes it almost impossible for him to sensibly perceive and interpret what others are thinking or saying. It seems to me that this is the real basis for his extremely poor administrative ability. He would probably function better as an independent investigator, relieved of administrative responsibilities. In my opinion, it is not possible at this point for Dr. Gilbert to reconstitute any worthwhile relationships at this station which he may have had in the past or to generate new ones. I see no way that the research program at this hospital can profit from his continued presence. Doctor Gilbert rebutted vigorously these allegations at his subsequent hearing, and attributed these bad reports to jealousy and petty motives on the part of his superiors. The Court notes that the Disciplinary Board found in its “Report of Findings” that the breakdown in communications with the staff might not have been caused entirely by Doctor Gilbert: “ . . . Dr. Smith in testifying on Specification # Xlll, brought out Dr. Gilbert’s disappointment and frustration over his failure to gain a significant appointment at the V. A. Hospital, due in major part to resistance from chairman and members of the EUSM Department of Surgery. The Board was never able to determine the basis for this attitude, which became a source of increasing frustration for Dr. Gilbert and no doubt contributed to many of the interpersonal difficulties he experienced.” In contrast to Doctor Jones’s view of Doctor Gilbert, a “site visit report” or “peer review” report on May 15, 1969, concerning Doctor Gilbert’s management of the research program at the V. A. H. described Doctor Gilbert as “a very creative, dynamic and aggressive individual, but, functioning alone, he has brought about piecemeal and slow progress . . . Dr. Gilbert, apparently almost single-handedly, has performed the real selection of programs, enticement of investigators (which have been few) to the program, and monitoring of the varied projects. His efforts have seemingly provided the communications between investigators after the initial approach of cross-fertilization of ideas failed because of lack of attendance at research conferences.” The site visit report appeared to lift some of the onus for the sluggishness of the V. A. Hospital’s Research Program from Doctor Gilbert’s shoulders when it noted: “Institutional scientific direction [for the Research Program] is lacking. Local facilities in Atlanta . . . have been virtually neglected as possible sources of research collaboration or advice. A negative attitude toward research, prevailing in the past at the VAH and to some degree within some Emory clinical departments, has contributed to the small interest in research in the past of the faculty, staff or house staff of the VAH Nevertheless, the remarks of Dr. Lewis Jones represented the hospital management’s view of Doctor Gilbert’s problems at that time and thereafter. This viewpoint, that Doctor Gilbert’s “personality problems” were the major cause for the Research Program’s failure to get off the ground, became the basis for Doctor Jar-man’s decision in April 1970 to relieve Doctor Gilbert of his duties as Associate Chief of Staff, although retaining Doctor Gilbert on the Veterans Administration payroll for the purpose of continuing his own research. This action was followed up by a May 6, 1970 letter by Doctor Jarman to the Veterans Administration wherein he requested Doctor Gilbert’s reassignment to another station due to the progressive breakdown of Doctor Gilbert’s relationships with “almost everyone in this hospital and Emory.” On September 22, 1970, Doctor Jarman assigned Doctor Gilbert to the examination of veterans in connection with pension and compensation claims, an inferior position which allegedly was within the capability of a senior medical school student or intern, and which has been characterized by Doctor Gilbert and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as “menial” and “totally unrelated to his highly-specialized field of cardio-thoracic surgery.” Gilbert v. Johnson, 490 F.2d 827, 829-30 (5 Cir. 1974). Although Doctor Gilbert was willing to do pension and compensation examinations as a part-time activity, his belief that accepting the job as a full-time position, when he was a skilled cardio-thoracic surgeon with 17 years’ experience in that specialty, would have been extremely damaging to his career, led him to refuse the position and take a leave of absence without pay commencing November 30, 1970, in order to protect his reputation from the injury that he alleges it would receive from accepting the assignment. Moreover, at this time he was attempting to get a review of his situation and a hearing that he felt was required by the tenure rules of Emory University. Doctor Gilbert spent his four-month leave of absence without pay — November 1970 to March 1971 — in Leeds, England, where he took refresher training in eardio-vascular surgery. Upon his return from Leeds in March 1971, Doctor Gilbert was ordered transferred to the Des Moines, Iowa, V. A. Hospital for training in general surgery. Doctor Gilbert regarded this as a further attempt to strip him of his cardio-thoracic surgery specialty. [It was undisputed on the record that cardio-thoracic surgery is a separate and distinct specialty from general surgery.] Doctor Gilbert protested this transfer by letters dated June, July, and August 1971. He claimed that he was entitled to a hearing under the Veterans Administration statutes and regulations. See 38 U.S.C. § 4108(c), providing for a hearing before a “Board of Specialists.” The V. A. Central Office replied that if Doctor Gilbert did not accept the reassignment he would be discharged. Doctor Gilbert was discharged on July 30, 1971, without a hearing. This lawsuit was filed April 4, 1972. On June 16, 1972, this Court held that Doctor Gilbert was entitled to a hearing pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 4110 prior to discharge and ordered that Doctor Gilbert receive back pay and compensation from the V. A. until the effective date of the decision of the § 4110 Disciplinary Board. The Court, however, did not order Doctor Gilbert reinstated as Associate Chief of Staff. The Court found that Doctor Gilbert’s suspension as Associate Chief of Staff in April 1970, his detail to examination of compensation and pension patients in September 1970, and his transfer to Des Moines in March 1971 and subsequent termination on July 30, 1971 “originated in personality problems or personality misunderstandings between the plaintiff and others of the Veterans Administration set-up. Apparently, it became apparent to all concerned that Dr. Gilbert would best serve the Veterans Administration somewhere other than at the Atlanta Veterans Administration Hospital.” The Court further found: “A major part of the job of Associate Chief of Staff of the Veterans Administration Hospital in Atlanta involved coordination of the research program including the recruitment and stimulation of other investigators who would work with or under the Associate Chief of Staff.” Title 38 U.S.C. § 4110(a) provides that a career Veterans Administration Department of Medicine & Surgery [DM&S] employee may be removed on three grounds: “inaptitude, inefficiency or misconduct.” This Court ruled on June 16, 1972, that “A personality deficiency or personality defect that would interfere with the effective performance of that job [ACOS] is, in effect, a species of inaptitude or inefficiency with respect to the job in question. . . . ” The Court continued: “Therefore, the removal from the job of Associate Chief of Staff, the detail to compensation claims examinations, and the transfer were in effect actions based upon charges of inaptitude or inefficiency and a hearing was required to be held with respect thereto under Title 38 U.S.C. § 4110.” On August 28, 1972, following this Court’s Order, the V.A. advised Doctor Gilbert that he had been assigned once again to conduct pension and compensation examinations at the Atlanta V.A. Hospital. Doctor Gilbert refused this assignment, arguing that it was contemptuous of the Court’s Order, a damaging and punitive disciplinary action taken without a hearing, and a continued attempt by the V.A. arbitrarily to destroy his reputation by undercutting his specialized surgical qualifications by placing him in a demeaning position. In September 1972 Doctor Lewis Jones, Chief of Staff of the Atlanta V.A.H., began a preliminary investigation of Doctor Gilbert before the Disciplinary Board hearing was to be held, as is required by V.A. Regulations. V.A. Manual, MP-5, Part II, Chapter 8, Section A, 5(c)(1). In December 1972, in an effort to reach a negotiated settlement of this litigation, the V-A. offered Doctor Gilbert an assignment in his specialty, thoracic surgery, at the Little Rock, Arkansas, V.A. Hospital. Although this proposed assignment was within his specialty, Doctor Gilbert rejected it because the V.A. still had not complied with the Court’s June 16,1972 order and because, in the words of Doctor Gilbert’s counsel, “In the posture in which he found himself, the acceptance of this type of negotiated settlement would be tantamount to an admission on his part that his removal as Associate Chief of Staff, and his ultimate discharge were justified. The refusal to accept the Little Rock negotiated settlement was not unreasonable in light of Dr. Gilbert’s knowledge that Drs. Jones and Jarman had endeavored to smear his professional reputation with negative references, including the allegation that he was ‘mentally ill’ and ‘homicidal.’ Dr. Gilbert believed, and would so testify, that the only way to repair his reputation and reclaim his professional prestige was by . reinstatement . ” Letter Brief filed February 9, 1976, p. 16. In February 1973, the V.A. assigned Doctor Gilbert to the out-patient surgical clinic of the Atlanta V.A. Hospital. Doctor Gilbert rejected this assignment for the same reasons he had turned down the pension and compensation examination position. After Doctor Gilbert rejected this last offer, a second preliminary investigation of Doctor Gilbert was started by Mr. John R. Pollard of the V.A.’s Central Office in Washington. By April 1973, the V.A. had neither sent a letter of charges to Doctor Gilbert nor held the statutory hearing ordered by the Court on June 16, 1972, nor paid the money judgment to Doctor Gilbert ordered by the Court. The plaintiff filed a motion to enforce judgment which this Court denied, May 10, 1973. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this Court on March 6, 1974, and ordered enforcement of the June 16, 1972 judgment. In the meantime, on July 25, 1973, thirteen months after this Court ordered a hearing, Doctor Gilbert was served with a letter of charges accusing him of failure “to effectively conduct and administer the research program of Veterans Administration Hospital, because of personality problems and personality misunderstandings . . ” Twenty-two specific charges followed, purporting to support the main charge and evidencing Doctor Gilbert’s “frequently unsuitable [conduct] for a Veterans Administration employee.” These charges primarily consisted of incidents in which Doctor Gilbert was accused of inter alia : “angrily yelling” (XVII); making “derogatory comments” (XVIII); assuming “a superior air” (XIX); starting to scream, shout and furiously wave [his] arms (XI); being “rude, discourteous and unprofessional” (IV); exhibiting “anger and hostile behavior”; launching “into a long tirade” (XXII) and (VI) or launching a “diatribe” (XXI). On October 15,1973, sixteen months after being so ordered, the V.A. commenced Doctor Gilbert’s Disciplinary Board hearing. The hearing extended through December 12, 1973, and produced a transcript record of 4,021 pages plus exhibits and other documents. On July 17, 1974, the Disciplinary Board issued its findings. The Board sustained the main charge that Doctor Gilbert’s failure “to effectively conduct and administer the research program . . . because of personality problems . . . ” was a species of “inaptitude” under 38 U.S.C. 4110(a). With reference to the other two grounds for removal under Section 4110(a), the Board stated, “We do not find specific evidence of inefficiency or of misconduct.” However, the Board failed to find for or against Doctor Gilbert on any of the 22 specific charges. While noting that during the hearing “Doctor Gilbert effectively rebutted the specifications of the chargefs] involving these witnesses,” the Board found that “the impression remains that his manner and attitude evoked negative responses in these witnesses which appeared to hamper his interpersonal relationships and effectiveness in the organization.” The Board’s findings continue: “The Board notes that in the four years of Doctor Gilbert’s active tenure as Associate Chief of Staff, he developed many protocols, proposals and reports. However, there was no evidence presented of the initiation of any research career development program, of any traineeship application actually funded, or of foreign research fellowships developed and funded. There was not a single instance in which outside research collaboration involving program development, i. e., with the Center for Disease Control, NASA or Georgia Tech, was finalized, approved and funded. This lack of accomplishment could in no way be attributed to Doctor Gilbert’s lack of ability, diligence or energy. These frustrations we believe can be attributed in great part to the formidable opposition to him within the VAH and EUMS. He must, we believe, bear some responsibility for the apparent antagonism evoked by his personality. “The Board recognizes that Doctor Gilbert did accomplish some things and proposed many more admirable programs in the face of obstruction. It is also quite apparent to the Board through testimony and direct observation that Dr. Gilbert is a man of high principle and laudable ambition. He will not accept second best and will fight vigorously for his beliefs. That he should return to his native state and his alma mater to meet such eventually overwhelming opposition is ironic. However, we must conclude that based on the opposition apparently evoked by Dr. Gilbert’s personality, that his efforts to develop a significant research program at VAH, Atlanta, were eventually and significantly frustrated.” After sustaining the charge that Doctor Gilbert failed to administer the V.A.H. program effectively, the Board concluded with respect to disciplinary action: “We find many extenuating and mitigating circumstances which move us to recommend only minimal disciplinary action which we believe will be in the best interests of Dr. Gilbert and the Veterans Administration.” On August 8, 1974, John D. Chase, M.D., Chief Medical Director of the Atlanta V.A. Hospital, informed Doctor Gilbert that he agreed with the findings and recommendations of the Disciplinary Board. Doctor Chase in that letter announced his decision to reassign and transfer Doctor Gilbert to another V.A. facility which would be disclosed later. On October 30, 1974, Chief Medical Director Doctor Chase informed Doctor Gilbert that he would be transferred to the V.A. Hospital in Birmingham, Alabama. [The plaintiff claims to have inadvertently-seen a teletype message between the Birmingham V.A.H. and the V.A. Central Office in Washington indicating that Doctor Gilbert would not be engaging in his speciality of cardio-thoracic surgery in Birmingham, but would be limited to conducting cardio-vascular research, and working as a staff physician in the out-patient clinic.] On August 17, 1974, Doctor Gilbert appealed the decision of Chief Medical Director, Doctor Chase, to Richard L. Roudebush, the Administrator of the V.A. On March 17,1975, the administrator sustained Doctor Chase’s decision and his order of transfer. On March 26, 1975, Doctor Gilbert requested Administrator Roudebush to reconsider his decision. The Administrator reaffirmed his decision by letter of May 2,1975. Jurisdiction of the Court and Scope of Review of the Administrative Record The Court’s jurisdiction in reviewing the Disciplinary Board’s decision and the other proceedings in the administrative record is delineated by the Administrative Procedure Act [APA]. The APA provides: “A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. However, this right to review does not apply to agency action “to the extent that . [the] action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). In the Fifth Circuit, judicial review of federal employee personnel decisions, as in the case sub judice, is limited to a determination of (1) whether the employee has been afforded administrative procedural due process as provided by statute, regulation and the United States Constitution; and (2) whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious, Davis v. Vandiver, 494 F.2d 830 (5 Cir. 1974); Mann v. Klassen, 480 F.2d 159, 161 (5 Cir. 1973); Dozier v. United States, 473 F.2d 866 (5 Cir. 1973); Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5 Cir. 1968); Chiriaco v. United States, 339 F.2d 588 (5 Cir. 1964). See also Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2 Cir. 1969); Sexton v. Kennedy, 523 F.2d 1311 (6 Cir. 1975); McGhee v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 445 (10 Cir. 1969); and Pauley v. United States, 419 F.2d 1061 (7 Cir. 1969). The Ninth and Third Circuits have expanded the scope of judicial review of these adverse personnel decisions to encompass a determination of whether there is “substantial evidence” to support the decision below on the merits. Toohey v. Nitze, 429 F.2d 1332 (9 Cir. 1970), Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390 (3 Cir. 1969). However, this is the minority view of the Circuit Courts of Appeal. The rationale behind the majority view is that agency personnel decisions are relegated to the discretion of the agency, Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 20 S.Ct. 574, 44 L.Ed. 774 (1899); Meehan v. Macy, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 217, 392 F.2d 822, 830 (1968), and the district court has neither the power nor responsibility to act as a super Civil Service Commission in reviewing the propriety and wisdom of those decisions on their merits, Sexton v. Kennedy, supra at 1314. As the Court of Appeals stated in Hargett v. Summerfield, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 85, 243 F.2d 29, 32 (1957), cert. den., 353 U.S. 970, 77 S.Ct. 1060, 1 L.Ed.2d 1137 (1957): “The function of a reviewing court in cases involving the discharge of civil service employees is a limited one [citation omitted]. The judicial function is to determine whether there has been substantial compliance with applicable procedures and statutes, and not to review the administrative determination as to the wisdom or good judgment of the agency in exercising discretion.” The Fifth Circuit embraced the reasoning of Hargett v. Summerfield in Chiriaco v. United States, 339 F.2d 588 (5 Cir. 1964): “No departure from the required standard of procedural due process appears, and the scope of judicial review in a matter of this kind is limited to the determination of that question.” Chiriaco v. United States, 339 F.2d at 590. Subsequent cases have limited this review to the issue of administrative due process only: “. . . Confining itself to consideration of the record made in the Civil Service hearing and proceedings, the Court properly limited its review of the Commission’s decision to whether there had been a departure from the required standard of procedural due process. ,The merits of the determination by the Commission under the Veterans Preference Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 7512, that the termination of Dozier’s employment was for such good cause as will promote the efficiency of the Service was not subject to review.” Dozier v. United States, 473 F.2d at 868 (5 Cir. 1973). “It is clear that the district court does not have the authority to review the facts of the plaintiff’s dismissal, except to inquire whether the administrative proceedings, which resulted in his discharge, conformed to the requirements of administrative due process. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 79 S.Ct. 968, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012 [other citations omitted].” Mann v. Klassen, 480 F.2d at 161 (5 Cir. 1973). Although the Second Circuit in Kletschka v. Driver, supra, and the Fifth Circuit in Mann v. Klassen, supra, and Anonymous v. Macy, supra, foreclosed completely a review of the underlying merits of the administrative proceeding, it is apparent from the Fifth Circuit opinions in Chiriaco v. United States, supra; Dozier v. United States, supra; Davis v. Vandiver, supra, and the opinions cited supra from the other circuits, that the Court should look to the underlying merits solely for the limited purpose of determining whether the agency action was arbitrary or capricious. The Courts, however, define the term “arbitrary or capricious” very narrowly. “Administrative action may be regarded as arbitrary and capricious only where .it is not supportable on any rational basis. ‘[Something more than error is necessary to spell out arbitrary or capricious action.’ * * * The fact that on the same evidence a reviewing court could have reached a decision contrary to that reached by the agency will not support a determination that the administrative action was arbitrary and capricious.” N.L.R.B. v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 3 Cir., 342 F.2d 129, 131 (1965); see also United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243-244, 67 S.Ct. 252, 91 L.Ed. 209 (1946) and United States ex rel. Rongetti v. Neelly, 7 Cir., 207 F.2d 281, 284 (1953). (emphasis added). This Court rejects the minority view expressed by the Ninth and Third Circuits and in reviewing Doctor Gilbert’s administrative record limits the Court’s inquiry to an analysis of the following two issues: (I) Was Doctor Gilbert denied procedural due process as secured for him by statute, regulation or the United States Constitution? (II) Was the agency action on its merits arbitrary or capricious in that it was not supportable on any rational basis? I. Procedural Due Process The plaintiff before, during, and after the Disciplinary Board hearing raised numerous issues concerning the V.A.’s alleged denial of his procedural due process rights. They are treated hereinafter: (1) The Letter of Charges alleges charges which are vague, general and unspecific and which fail to allege actions by Doctor Gilbert warranting a disciplinary proceeding. On July 25,1973, the V.A. Regional Medical Director, Dr. R. M. Whittington, wrote Doctor Gilbert a “Letter of Charges” which apprised him of the charge of failing to effectively conduct and administer the V.A.’s research program because of personality problems, and which supported that charge with the particulars of 22 incidents. A typical charge from the letter reads as follows: “XV. In or about February, 1970, Dr. William C. Butz, Assistant Chief, Laboratory Service, Veterans Administration, came to you seeking assistance with respect to a research project he had in mind. As soon as Dr. Butz informed you of the reason for the visit, you went into a long diatribe about management and research at the Veterans Administration Hospital. You talked to Dr. Butz in this vein for approximately 45 minutes without permitting Dr. Butz to get any more comments in about his research project. Your comments were highly unfavorable to Hospital management, the Dean’s Committee and Dean Richardson.” Doctor Gilbert’s position is that none of the 22 charges, like the above, constitutes the basis for a disciplinary proceeding and that by failing to designate a specific time, date, place, person involved, detail, and other reasons, each charge fails to comport with the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause and the applicable V.A. Regulations. See V.A. Manual MP-5, Part I, Chapter 12, Section A, and G-1; and DM&S Supplement, MP-5, Part I, 7.02, p. 10. The Court overrules plaintiff’s contention that the incidents portrayed in these charges fail to constitute a proper basis for a 38 U.S.C. § 4110 disciplinary proceeding. The Court ruled in its June 16, 1972 Order that a personality defect could be a species of “inaptitude” under § 4110. Clearly, the V.A. cannot be foreclosed from proving those incidents whereby Doctor Gilbert’s “personality problems” manifested themselves in his relationships with his colleagues at the Veterans Administration Hospital. The Court therefore believes the V.A. was acting within the scope of its authority to inquire into these incidents in connection with a disciplinary proceeding under 38 U.S.C. § 4110. Moreover, disciplinary action is authorized in a situation such as this by V.A. Regulation, DM&S Supplement, Part II, Chapter 8, Section A(3) which provides: “Whenever an employee’s performance of duty or his personal conduct is unsatisfactory because of inaptitude, inefficiency, neglect, or unwillingness to comply with instructions, established policies, procedures, rules and regulations, and with commonly accepted standards of personal conduct, appropriate disciplinary action will be taken in accordance with the provisions of this section.” (emphasis added) Plaintiff’s second contention concerning the Letter of Charges is that the charges are vague, general and unspecific and failed to adequately apprise Doctor Gilbert of the charges against him. The Court has examined the Letter of Charges and found the charges to be stated in a sufficiently clear way as to enable Doctor Gilbert to defend himself. The motion of Doctor Gilbert at the hearing to quash the letter for these reasons was unfounded in law and if granted would have exacted of the Disciplinary Board a higher degree of specificity in drafting the Letter than would be required in a Grand Jury’s bill of indictment in a criminal matter. The Fifth Circuit addressed itself to this type of claim in Davis v. Vandiver, 494 F.2d 830-31 (1974), wherein the Court stated: “Davis [the discharged employee] impliedly demands a highly detailed catalog of offenses clearly setting forth each imaginable species of malfeasance which could result in substantial discipline. The short answer to this contention was well expressed by the District of Columbia Circuit: ‘[I]t is not feasible or necessary for the Government to spell out in detail all that conduct which will result in retaliation. The most conscientious of codes that define prohibited conduct of employees includes “catchall” clauses . . .’ Meehan v. Macy, 1968, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 217, 392 F.2d 822, 835 modified 138 U.S.App.D.C. 38, 425 F.2d 469, quoted in Arnett v. Kennedy, supra [416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633], at 1648, 40 L.Ed.2d 15.” Accordingly, the Letter of Charges comports with the specificity standard as set out by Davis v. Vandiver, supra, and plaintiff’s objections in this regard are not well-taken. (2) The Disciplinary Board was improperly convened inasmuch as Doctor Gilbert’s reassignment and separation on September 1, 1971, was an administrative and not a disciplinary decision. The Court ruled on this contention, raised by Doctor Gilbert at the Disciplinary Board Hearing, in the Court’s June 16,1972, Order wherein the Court ruled that Doctor Gilbert’s removal and transfer was not purely administrative, but was a disciplinary action for which a § 4110 hearing was required. See similar ruling in Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 444-45 (2 Cir. 1969). Plaintiff’s objection in this regard is overruled. (3) The Disciplinary Board was not a neutral and detached tribunal. The Disciplinary Board which convened on October 16, 1973, consisted of three physicians, Doctors Christianson (Chairman), Fiege (Secretary), and Bell. They were selected by the Chief Medical Director, Doctor Musser, in accordance with 38 U.S.C. § 4110(a) and V.A. Regulation MP-5, Part II, Chapter 8, Section C, Paragraph 3(a). Doctor Gilbert argues that Chief Medical Director Musser should have been precluded from appointing the Disciplinary Board members because Doctor Musser himself approved the removal of Doctor Gilbert as Associate Chief of Staff and originally denied Doctor Gilbert’s request for a hearing. In addition, Doctor Gilbert alleges that Doctor Musser solicited recommendations for Disciplinary Board members from V.A. personnel antagonistic to Doctor Gilbert. Moreover, he argues, the appointed Disciplinary Board members are all physicians, subject to the V.A.’s regulations, “under the lawful direction of the V.A.,” dependent on their relationship with the Chief Medical Director. Thus, their positions at the V.A.H., Atlanta, preclude their being a “neutral and detached tribunal” as plaintiff alleges is required by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). The defendant asserts that the composition of the board is set by V.A. regulations with a view to giving an accused physician a hearing by his peers who could be expected to be more sympathetic and understanding of his problems than a group of laymen would be. Plaintiff has not shown or even alleged exertion of pressure or influence on the board members. The Court finds plaintiff’s objections in this regard to be unpersuasive. Absent any specific allegations of misconduct, bias or prejudice by the Board members in this case (there is none alleged), the Court rules that the appointment of these Board members by Chief Medical Director Musser complied with the V.A.’s regulations and statute and in no way contravened the United States Constitution. Plaintiff’s reliance on Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, and Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, is misplaced. These cases may be distinguished on their factual circumstances and are not the closest Supreme Court precedent on the question of the procedural due process rights of a government employee in challenging adverse action to him. Rather, the parties’ attention is directed to Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (plurality opinion), and Bishop v. Wood,-U.S.-, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976). The Ar-nett case, supra, held that, in the context of the discharge of a non-probationary federal employee pursuant to the provisions of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7501, the Fifth Amendment does not require that Congress, in granting by statute a federal employee a termination hearing, must bestow therewith “the full panoply of rights which attend a trial-type adversary hearing.” In Arnett, supra, 416 U.S. at 151, 94 S.Ct. at 1643, the Court held that a post-termination hearing was sufficient to comply with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The recent case of Bishop v. Wood, supra, casts further doubt on the scope of procedural due process guarantees in the area of government employment. In Bishop, supra, the Supreme Court held that a city ordinance permitting the discharge of permanent city employees for cause as a matter of state law did not give a city policeman a “property” interest in his continued employment, which was protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution because the position was held at the “pleasure and will” of the city. Accordingly, the Court found no constitutional right to a pretermination hearing, even if the charges brought against the employee were false. Taken in tandem with Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), these cases establish the proposition that in the absence of a “property right” in a government job, the employee may be removed from his position by the government without constitutionally required procedural due process protections. Where Congress has provided an employee with a right to administrative due process in the removal procedure, this provision does not engage the full panoply of rights that would adhere to “a trial-type adversary hearing.” Arnett, supra, 416 U.S. at 151, 94 S.Ct. 1633. In Davis v. Vandiver, supra at 833, citing Arnett, the Fifth Circuit rejected a claim like the instant one that the tribunal which recommended a government employee’s discharge was not undetached and impartial: “Davis’s argument regarding biased decisionmakers is equally without force. Five Justices in Arnett perceived no constitutional infirmity in the employee’s being dismissed by the very person who initially brought the charges of misconduct. In the case sub judice, Davis was dismissed not by the charging party, the detachment commander, but by the detachment personnel officer who acted with the approval of the State Adjutant General. We can only conclude that in this respect the Air National Guard provided more than the Constitution required.” Notwithstanding that Doctor Gilbert’s Board was chosen by Doctor Musser, who, it is alleged, may have been eager to transfer Doctor Gilbert, and, despite the fact that the Board members were subject to Doctor Musser’s authority, it is clear from Arnett and Davis that the Board’s impartiality passes constitutional muster and was also in compliance with the provisions of § 4110(a). (4) The Veterans Administration failed to give Doctor Gilbert prior notice that the events for which he was charged had occurred and to counsel with him to give Doctor Gilbert an opportunity to know the charges and change his behavior. This contention by Doctor Gilbert appears to be predicated in large part on two V.A. Regulations which either provide for or imply that informal counseling or conciliation procedures should be employed before an employee is brought before a Proficiency Board or a Disciplinary Board. Doctor Gilbert argued at the Disciplinary Board hearing that he had a right to be made aware that charges against him were being brought to the attention of higher authority, before the Letter of Charges was issued, in order to give him a chance to conciliate the charges. The defendants contend that, not only did plaintiff receive considerable counselling concerning his conduct and job performance and was well aware of what V.A. management considered his shortcomings prior to receipt of formal charges, but he had ample time after receiving the Letter of Charges to formulate a response thereto. The V.A. Regulation concerning Disciplinary Action to which Doctor Gilbert refers is found in DM&S Supplement, MP-5, Part II, Chapter 8, Section A(5)(c)(l) and (2). It provides: “c. Initiation of Proposed Action (1) The Medical Officer, highest in authority at the station, will assure that a thorough preliminary inquiry is conducted to obtain all of the facts prior to the official initiation of a request for proposed action, including those facts relating to the employee’s view in the matter. When initiating proposed disciplinary action more severe than admonishment or reprimand, the station [head] will forward the preliminary inquiry and any pertinent comments of station officials to the Chief Medical Director for review. If the review shows that the appropriate disciplinary action should be reprimand or less, the Chief Medical Director may take the action or he may refer the matter, through the Area Medical Director, to the station [head] for action. (2) When station heads request the removal, demotion, or suspension of an employee through preferment of charges, the request will be evaluated for the Chief Medical Director by a Central Office Screening Committee. The organizational structure of this committee will be similar in nature to that outlined for Disciplinary Boards in paragraph 3 of section C. The Chief Medical Director will appoint all members of the Screening Committee. No person may serve on both a Disciplinary Board and a Screening Committee in handling the same case.” (emphasis supplied) It is apparent to Doctor Gilbert that (c)(1), supra, implies that in conducting the “thorough preliminary inquiry” and in obtaining “those facts relating to the employee’s view in the matter,” the Medical Officer must consult and counsel with the subject of the inquiry in an effort to clear up a matter prior to initiating a request for proposed action. While such an effort would be laudable and possibly advantageous to both the employee and the agency, it is not apparent from the face of the regulation that the Medical Officer had a duty to counsel or conciliate with plaintiff. Certainly the Constitution does not mandate such a pre-preliminary investigation attempt at counseling or conciliation. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra. The Court does not believe such a duty must be read into the regulation. Therefore, plaintiff’s objection in this regard is overruled. The plaintiff alleges, however, that the applicable V.A. Regulations require that the rating officials counsel and advise their subordinates concerning the annual Proficiency Report made for each employee. See DM&S Supplement, MP-5, Part II, Chapter 6, Paragraph 6.11(c)(d). This regulation provides that a conference be held with the employee, whether his rating is satisfactory or unsatisfactory. Doctor Gilbert alleges that these regulations were ignored by Doctors Jarman and Jones, who inserted unsatisfactory comments into Doctor Gilbert’s personnel file without the counseling or notice required by the regulation, supra. These actions are offered by the plaintiff as evidence of the pattern of due process violations to which Doctor Gilbert has been subjected during these proceedings by the V.A. While the Court cannot condone any purported violations of Doctor Gilbert’s right under the regulations to have been counseled in connection with his Proficiency Report, the Court fails to see how this purported violation is significantly related to the Disciplinary Board hearing and plaintiff’s procedural due process rights therein and this Court’s review of same. Accordingly, the objection is overruled as insubstantial. (5) The Veterans Administration failed to conduct a truly “thorough preliminary inquiry.” In this contention, related to the previous one, Doctor Gilbert argues that the V.A. failed to conduct a truly “thorough preliminary investigation,” under the regulation MP-5, Part II, Section A(5)(c)(l) cited supra. Alternatively, Doctor Gilbert appears to argue that the preliminary investigations were too thorough in that the investigators interviewed over 100 V.A. employees in a “witch hunt” to “get” Doctor Gilbert. It is undisputed that the two “preliminary investigations” which took place [(1) September-October, 1972, by Doctor Lewis Jones; (2) February-April, 1973, by William Pollard] occurred after (not before) Doctor Gilbert was initially removed and transferred (September 30, 1971), because the investigations were conducted pursuant to this Court’s June 16, 1972 order which directed the V.A. to hold a § 4110 Disciplinary Board hearing. Plaintiff claims that neither Doctor Jones’s investigation nor Mr. Pollard’s investigation was impartial because both were ex post facto attempts to conduct a “witch hunt” against Doctor Gilbert by exceeding the permissible basis for the Letter of Charges of July 25, 1973, which should have related back only to Doctor Gilbert’s original separation and transfer. Doctor Gilbert alleges that Mr. Pollard’s investigation sought to explore additional avenues to attack Doctor Gilbert and was not designed to elicit facts supportive of Doctor Gilbert’s side of the story. This is allegedly shown by the fact that Mr. Pollard’s examination of Doctor Gilbert by deposition on April 10, 1973, never gave Doctor Gilbert the opportunity to state his side of the story. Moreover, Doctor Gilbert was physically absent from the hospital for a period of three years prior to receipt of the July 25, 1973, Letter of Charges, and had neither the access to the records and documents, associates and staff, nor the advantage of the incumbency of his position, as did the V.A. investigators. Consequently, it is alleged that the more than 100 interviewed employees simply told their “bosses” what the “bosses” wanted to hear about an already-discharged employee. In response, the V.A. states that the two investigations carried out by the V.A. were complete and thorough. The affidavit of Robert E. Coy, Veterans Administration Assistant General Counsel, filed May 14, 1973, shows that the “case” of Doctor Gilbert was active from the time the V.A. received this Court’s June 16, 1972 order until the close of the Disciplinary Board hearing in December 1973. Plaintiff was interviewed by Mr. Pollard and was given the opportunity to present his views to the agency prior to the preparation of charges. ' Even if plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, the Court does not believe that his administrative due process rights were jeopardized thereby. Doctor Gilbert had the full opportunity at the Disciplinary Board hearing to tell his side of the story and to cross-examine the V.A.’s witnesses, besides presenting his own. Moreover, the Disciplinary Board never saw the reports of the preliminary investigation. Neither the regulations nor the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause warrants that the preliminary investigation preceding the serving of the Letter of Charges be an “equal time” proposition guaranteeing to the subject of the inquiry and his witnesses the same investigative time and effort by the investigators as for the “prosecution-oriented” witnesses. See Davis v. Vandiver, supra, and Arnett v. Kennedy, supra. The scope of the preliminary investigation is vested in the sound discretion of the V.A. and this Court does not find that any due process right of the plaintiff was substantially prejudiced by that investigation. (6) The V.A. failed to disclose to Doctor Gilbert copies of all documents, transcripts, memoranda and tapes gathered by the two V.A. investigations, or alternatively evidence which the V.A. proposed to use against him. At the Disciplinary Board hearing, counsel for Doctor Gilbert made a motion in the nature of a discovery motion for the V.A. to turn over to him copies of every document, transcript, memoranda and tape relating to the two V.A. investigations, including written statements of employees who were interviewed. Doctor Gilbert asserts that he was denied his right effectively to cross-examine and confront adverse witnesses by .the failure of the V.A. to disclose to him its investigative file of him and the list of witnesses to be examined. Alternatively, Doctor Gilbert claims that he was entitled to have disclosed to him before the hearing the oral and documentary evidence which the V.A. proposed to use against him. If not that, Doctor Gilbert claims that he had the right to examine a witness’s statement following the witness’s direct examination, but before cross-examination at the hearing. Lastly, Doctor Gilbert asserts that at least the exculpatory evidence in the possession of the V.A. should have been disclosed to Doctor Gilbert before the trial, citing the criminal cases of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); United States v. Ladd, 48 F.R.D. 266 (D.Alaska, 1969), and United States v. Graves, 428 F.2d 196 (5 Cir. 1970). On August 9, 1973, Doctor Gilbert requested by letter that the V.A. furnish him with copies of all documents, statements, transcripts and tapes obtained as a result of the two V.A. investigations of Doctor Gilbert. The V.A. responded by letter dated August 28, 1973, from Robert E. Coy, Assistant General Counsel, refusing Doctor Gilbert’s request. The V.A. position was that no information or evidence would be considered by the Disciplinary Board except that which was presented at the hearing. Copies of any documentary evidence presented at the hearing would be made available to Doctor Gilbert at the hearing. The V.A., by letter of Mr. Coy (September 12, 1973), and Doctor Christianson (September 11, 1973) informed the plaintiff that it was the position of the V.A. that the rules of evidence, discovery and subpoena power, which were available to a litigant in a federal civil trial, were inapplicable to a § 4110 Disciplinary Board Hearing. Doctor Gilbert claims that by failing to allow him pre-hearing discovery and disclosure of the evidence and witnesses to be used against him, he was denied his due process rights of confrontation and cross-examination under Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959). Doctor Gilbert also cites this Court’s decision in Parker v. Letson, 380 F.Supp. 280 (N.D.Ga.1974), which relied on Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5 Cir. 1970), for the proposition that minimum due process requires that the subject of a discharge hearing “. . .be advised of the names and the nature of the testimony of witnesses against him.” Moreover, Doctor Gilbert argues that it was the V.A.’s position at the hearing that the Disciplinary Board proceeding was administrative and not adversarial in nature. In light of this, Doctor Gilbert’s counsel argues: “If the ‘non-adversary’ remarks had been made in good faith, it should have been incumbent upon V.A. legal counsel to make available to Doctor Gilbert the full reports of investigation, and, at the very minimum, any exculpatory statements or documentation contained therein. How the agency could be prejudiced by rendering such exculpatory materials in a non-adversary administrative hearing defies the imagination.” Doctor Gilbert argues that it was error for the Board to refuse to review the two investigative reports at least for material exculpatory to Doctor Gilbert. As evidence for his position that exculpatory material and witness statements exist in the file, Doctor Gilbert cites the instances of two witnesses, Dr. Shirley Rivers and Mrs. Virginia Watkins. Both these witnesses were interviewed by the V.A.’s investigators and gave statements favorable to Doctor Gilbert. The V.A. called neither at the Disciplinary Board hearing. Doctor Gilbert called both as witnesses on his behalf. However, it was only because Doctor Rivers and Mrs. Watkins individually and independently contacted Doctor Gilbert and offered to testify in his behalf, that Doctor Gilbert became aware of their proffered exculpatory testimony. The defendants’ response to these allegations is threefold. The defendants contend that Doctor Gilbert had ample opportunity at the hearing to cross-examine all witnesses produced by the V.A. Given the extensive length of the hearing and the fact that it recessed for an extended period and then resumed, the defendants argue that no prejudice can be shown since the plaintiff had ample time and opportunity to obtain witnesses to refute anything said by a government witness. The defendants state that Doctor Gilbert had no legal right to see the contents of the material in the investigative files, or the pre-hearing statements of witnesses who testified. Heffron v. United States, 405 F.2d 1307, 186 Ct.Cl. 474 (Court of Claims, 1969). The defendants argue that in Heffron, supra, the court held that the fact that plaintiff was shown only part of an investigation report on him was not prejudicial since the Hearing Officer and the Civil Service Commission in Heffron had access to only the same parts as the employee. The defendants show that in Doctor Gilbert’s case, “. . . the board did not see any of the investigative reports. The board heard and considered only what plaintiff heard and saw at the hearing; there is no injury to plaintiff when he did not see something which the disciplinary board also also did not see.” Concerning plaintiff’s claim that he was denied an opportunity to depose and interview witnesses and otherwise gather information for use in the disciplinary board hearing, the defendants argue that no one prevented Doctor Gilbert or his counsel from talking to any employee of the V.A. and obtaining any statement they desired. A review of the hearing transcript shows that the plaintiff and his counsel spoke with “a number of people, in and out of the Veterans Administration, concerning this matter.” The Court does not find that any procedural due process right of plaintiff was violated by the V.A.'s failure to provide plaintiff with a list of witnesses, statements, memoranda, transcripts, tapes or exculpatory evidence prior to the hearing. The Veterans Administration Regulations provide for the following principal due process procedures before a V.A. disciplinary board: a. Letter of charges b. The right of the employee to request a hearing c. The right to respond to a Letter of Charges d. Notice of the hearing e. The right of the employee to appear personally and to be represented by legal counsel or V.A. counsel at the hearing f. The Chairman to rule on all questions arising during the proceedings such as admissibility of evidence, calling of witnesses, order of their introduction, etc. g. V.A. attorneys may serve as advisors to the board. h. The employee will have the right to call upon witnesses, who, if willing to testify, will be heard. The Chairman, Disciplinary Board, will, on his own initiative or at the request of the employee, call such witnesses as may be necessary to develop the evidence. It will be considered the duty of all VA employees who appear as witnesses to furnish information fully and honestly whether it be favorable or derogatory to the employee charged i. The Chairman, Disciplinary Board, will permit the parties to the case to ask questions of witnesses and will use reasonable discretion to exclude irrelevant testimony in order to uncover, develop and consider all pertinent facts. Both sides will have opportunity to properly present and support their respective positions upon any question or matter presented to the board for decision. j. A stenographic or mechanical verbatim is to be made of the board’s proceedings. k. Witnesses will be sworn under oath. l. The Secretary of the board will read the charges and specifications contained in the Letter of Charges to the employee. Additional charges, which the accused employee has had no notice to defend, may not be introduced. m. In the Opening statement, the Chairman will give a brief summary of the charges set forth in the Letter of Charges. He will introduce evidence and call witnesses to testify in such order as he sees fit. The Chairman will direct the questioning of the accused employee and witnesses. n. The board is not obliged to content itself with the evidence presented for consideration. Where such evidence appears to be insufficient for a proper determination of any issue or matter, the board will take appropriate action to obtain such additional evidence as is necessary or advisable. The board may recall a witness, summon new witnesses, request that an inquiry along certain lines be made with a view to discovering and producing additional evidence, etc. The request, suggestion or motion that additional evidence be called for may be made by any of the members of the board. o. The board may refer the accused employee to an appropriate “reviewing authority” where the employee’s mental condition is in issue. p. The findings and recommendations of a Disciplinary Board will be based solely on the evidence presented and will not be influenced by any knowledge of other factors in the case. To sustain a charge, the board must find on all the evidence that the employee has committed the offense(s) with which he is charged. [All the above is set out in DM&S Supplement, MP-5, Part II, Chapter 8, Section A.] The Court rules that the Y.A. procedures listed above, though failing to provide for the pre-hearing discovery and disclosure requested by the plaintiff, comply easily with the minima of due process procedures set out by the Supreme Court in Arnett v. Kennedy, supra. The V.A. need not afford the plaintiff the full panoply of rights that he would have in a trial-type adversary hearing. Arnett, supra. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Davis v. Vandiver, 494 F.2d at 832-33 (1974), in ruling that Mr. Davis’s termination hearing was valid under Arnett: “Davis was provided with notice of the charge and granted a reasonable opportunity to respond prior to his discharge. Subsequent to his dismissal he was afforded a full-scale evidentiary hearing presided over by a hearing examiner. Arnett demands no more.” See also Charles v. Blount, 430 F.2d 665, 666 (7 Cir. 1970), where the Court, in reviewing the employee’s discharge for its conformance with the requirements of administrative due process, defined the minimal requisites of due process as: “. . . i. e., whether the employee was accorded a fair and open hearing on articulated charges with the right of confrontation and cross-examination. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 82 L.Ed. 1129 . . .; Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 79 S.Ct. 968, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012 . . .; Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 . . .” Nowhere is there stated a constitutional requirement, which the plaintiff urges, that the pre-hearing discovery and disclosure procedures be available to a government employee challenging an adverse personnel decision in an administrative hearing. The cases cited by plaintiff are not persuasive. Brady v. Maryland, supra; United States v. Ladd, supra, and United States v. Graves, supra, are all criminal cases wherein the full panoply of due process rights has long been assured and guarded by the Fifth Amendment and the courts. It is axiomatic that the procedural due process perquisites in a criminal trial are not applicable in full to an administrative hearing. Arnett, supra. The plaintiff misreads Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, a case involving due process guarantees for parolees facing revocation of parole, for the proposition that proposed evidence, and the contents of statements, transcripts and tapes and witness lists must be turned over to the accused before the hearing. Morrissey simply requires that the accused parole violator, after fair notice of the charges, be confronted with the evidence, statements and witnesses against him at the hearing. Similarly, plaintiff’s reliance on Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959), is misplaced. Greene held that a government employee, in challenging the revocation of his security clearance on grounds of communistic associations, could not be questioned by the Board from secret reports and confidential statements which the Board refused to show the employee for security reasons. The Supreme Court held that this type of proceeding (absent any executive authorization therefor) denied the employee his right effectively to cross-examine and confront the evidence and witnesses against him. The instant factual situation is readily distinguishable from that in Greene v. McElroy. Neither the Board nor Doctor Gilbert had access to the preliminary investigation reports. All the evidence, documents and witness statements presented against Doctor Gilbert were available to him and his counsel to inspect, confront and cross-examine. The Greene case is inapposite to the case sub judice. ' Lastly, Doctor Gilbert relies on Parker v. Letson, supra, a decision of this Court based on Ferguson v. Thomas, supra. Both cases involved discharged school faculty members suing to enforce their rights to procedural due process. In Ferguson, the Fifth Circuit set out four due process requirements that should be adhered to “within the matrix of the particular circumstances present when a teacher who is to be terminated for cause opposes his termination . . .: “(a) he be advised of the cause or causes for his termination in sufficient detail to fairly enable him to show any error that may exist, “(b) he be advised of the names and the nature of the testimony of witnesses against him, “(c) at a reasonable time after such advice he must be accorded a