Full opinion text
DECISION AND ORDER (GRANTING DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST “RACE QUOTA” SYSTEM FOR FEDERAL GRANTS TO LOCAL LOS ANGELES AGENCIES) HAUK, District Judge. This matter arises upon plaintiffs’ complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief based upon the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 103(f)(2) of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub.L.No.95-28, 91 Stat. 116-121, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2), which requires that 10 percent of the amount of each federal grant applied for under the Act be expended for “minority business enterprises.” The Act has been implemented by rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Commerce under the authority given to him in the original Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6735, which was amended by the Public Works Employment Act of 1977. Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgments that the Department of Commerce and Secretary of Commerce’s (Federal Defendants) enforcement of the minority business enterprises provisions of Pub.L.No.95-28 and the regulations promulgated thereunder, as well as the policies of the City and County of Los Angeles and their agencies named defendants (Local Defendants) of devising, approving, advertising, and awarding bids in accordance with the provision of the statute and regulations, violated and violate plaintiffs’ rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief, by way of a temporary restraining order, order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted, and a permanent injunction, restraining all defendants from enforcing and complying with the said minority business enterprises provisions. After the October 6, 1977, initial hearing, this Court issued its temporary restraining order, extended it for an additional ten days, and set the hearing on the preliminary injunction for October 31, 1977. On October 21, 1977, the Federal Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, for which motion an application shortening time to notice the motion to October 31, 1977, was properly made and approved. See Local Rules 3(e) and 3(f), Central District of California. The Local Defendants and the plaintiffs have orally made and joined in the motion for summary judgment by their own motions and counter motions for summary judgment, whereupon the Court proceeded to hear and rule by consolidating the hearing on the preliminary injunction with the hearing on the merits on the permanent injunction, by way of hearing the motions and counter motions for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P., Rule 65(a)(2). I STATUTORY BACKGROUND The Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976, Pub.L.No.94-369 (July 22, 1976), 90 Stat. 999-1012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6735, with its authorization of $2 billion (42 U.S.C. § 6710) (hereinafter “LPW Act”), for the implementation of which Congress appropriated $2 billion in Pub.L.No.94-447 (Oct. 1,1976), was enacted for the purposes of alleviating the problem of nationwide unemployment and stimulating the national economy by assisting state and local governments to build badly needed public facilities. See H.R.Rep.No.94-1077 re Pub.L.No.94-369, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). The program was to be administered by the Secretary of Commerce acting through the Economic Development Administration (hereinafter “EDA”), which distributed program funds for construction of public works projects to state and local government applicants. In order to expedite the initiation of construction projects contemplated by the LPW Act, Congress provided that the Secretary shall make a final determination upon each application within 60 days of receipt, with failure to take action within the prescribed period deemed to be approval [42 U.S.C. § 6706]; that the Secretary shall prescribe any rules and regulations deemed necessary to carry out the provisions of the LPW Act within 30 days of its enactment [42 U.S.C. § 6706]; and that on-site labor must begin within 90 days of project approval if funds are available [42 U.S.C. § 6705(d)]. Between October 26, 1976, and February 9, 1977 (“Round I”), approximately 2000 projects were approved and the appropriate Federal grants made, exhausting the $2 billion originally authorized and appropriated. On May 13, 1977, Congress enacted the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 116-121, Pub.L.No.95-28 (hereinafter the “PWE Act”), amending the LPW Act. The PWE Act (denoted “Round II”) was designed to correct certain inadequacies of Round I and to increase funding for public works projects. By the PWE Act of 1977, a total of $6 billion was authorized to be expended in carrying out Round I and Round II under the provisions of the PWE Act, Pub.L.No.95-28, § 109 (May 13, 1977), of which an additional $4 billion was appropriated by Congress, Pub.L.No.95-29, Chap. III (May 13, 1977). Congress remained aware of the importance of the infusion of Federal funds into the depressed construction industry, H.R.Rep.No.95-20, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1977), and, seeking to avoid any unnecessary delay in the implementation of the PWE Act, added the provision in the PWE Act that the Secretary shall not consider any application submitted subsequent to December 23,1976, Pub.L.No. 95-28, § 107(h)(1) (May 13, 1977), in addition to retaining those deadlines originally set forth in 42 U.S.C. §§ 6705(d), 6706. Included in the PWE Act was the following provision: “(2) Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any local public works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises. For purposes of this paragraph, the term ‘minority business enterprise’ means a business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned by minority group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.” Pub.L.No.95-28, 91 Stat. 117, Sec. 103(f)(2). This Minority Business Enterprises (“MBE”) provision was introduced on the House floor during debate and was intended ostensibly to remedy the situation in which “The average percentage of minority contracts, of all Government contracts, in any given fiscal year is 1 percent — 1 percent.” 123 Cong.Rec. p. H-1437-8 (daily ed. February 24, 1977). Economic Development Administration Guidelines for implementation of the MBE provision indicate that “[w]hen prime contractors are selected through competitive bidding, the Grantee [state or local government] must require that each bid include a commitment to use at least 10 percent of the contract funds for MBEs . . . . In the case of projects involving more than one contract . some of the contractors may themselves be MBEs . . .” MBE Guidelines, pp. 8, 9. Among the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to his authority to prescribe necessary regulations [42 U.S.C. § 6706] is the provision that the MBE requirement may be waived as to any grant for which the Assistant Secretary determines that the ten percent set-aside cannot be filled by minority businesses located within a reasonable trade area. Reg. 317.19(b)(2), 42 Fed.Reg. 27432, 27434-5 (May 27, 1977. And the EDA Guidelines elaborate to some extent: “The Grantee must demonstrate that there are not sufficient, relevant, qualified minority business enterprises whose market areas include the project location to justify a waiver. The Grantee must detail in its waiver request the efforts the Grantee and potential contractors have exerted to locate and enlist MBEs. The request must indicate the specific MBEs which were contacted and the reason each MBE was not used. EDA will consider the degree to which the Grantee and potential contractors have used available referral sources and related assistance in evaluating waiver requests.” MBE Guidelines, pp. 13, 14. II STATEMENT OF FACTS Under Round II, and by September 30, 1977, the Secretary of Commerce had granted and obligated the entire $4 billion PWE Act authorization and the appropriation by Public Law 95-29 including $29,782,108 for Los Angeles City projects, and $28,109,-085 for Los Angeles County projects. Bid openings for these projects were to commence on October 7, 1977; however, because of the issuance of the temporary restraining order, no contracts have been awarded under Round II. Plaintiffs are four nonprofit incorporated contractors’ associations and five businesses engaged in general contracting work. The associations allege that a substantial number of their members desire to bid on contracts to be funded under the PWE Act, and on behalf of these members, allege that the MBE provision in Pub.L.No.95-28 and the rules and regulations thereunder issued constitute discrimination on the bases of race in the awarding of public funds in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The individual contractors allege that sufficient qualified minority contractors do not exist to enable compliance with the MBE provision, and that the MBE provision increases the bid price which such contractors must submit. There is no allegation that any plaintiff has requested the Local Defendants to seek a “waiver” of the MBE provisions of Sec. 317.19(b)(1) of the rules and regulations pursuant to § 317.19(b)(2) thereof. 42 Fed.Reg. 27432 at 27435 (May 27, 1977.) III ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY Defendants’ initial contention is that the waiver procedure authorized in § 317.-19(b)(2) of the rules and regulations, and set forth in the MBE Guidelines, affords an , administrative remedy which renders unmeritorious plaintiffs’ allegation that there is an insufficient number of qualified MBEs in the Los Angeles area. While the Court recognizes the conflict in authorities dealing with the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies when a constitutional claim is at issue [K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies (1976), § 20.04], it is apparent that the seeking of a waiver of the applicability of the MBE provision would result simply in circumvention of the issue which plaintiffs seek to have resolved. Plaintiffs complain of injury under an allegedly unconstitutional statute, and “[adjudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.” Oestereich v. Selective Service Board, 393 U.S. 233, 242, 89 S.Ct. 414, 419, 21 L.Ed.2d 402 (1968) (citations omitted). The purposes of the exhaustion doctrine, avoidance of interruption of the agency’s duty to apply a statute in the first instance, development of the factual background upon which decisions should be based, and deference to the agency’s discretion and expertise, McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969), are not served by requiring constitutional issues to be argued before an administrative agency. No further development of the facts is necessary in this case; no administrative discretion is involved; no determination of the applicability of the MBE provisions to plaintiffs is needed. Unlike the claim in Montana Chapter of Association of Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. Young, 514 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1975), plaintiffs’ primary claim before this Court is the infringement upon their Constitutional rights. In Young, su pra, the claim was for a declaration that certain issues upon which defendant refused to negotiate were in fact the proper subject for negotiation pursuant to an Executive Order. Thus, “[t]he necessity of deciding the constitutional issues may well . [have been] avoided by the grant of alternative administrative relief,” because the Constitutional issue would never arise if the agency determined that the issues were negotiable. In the case here before us, the Constitutional issue has arisen, but it may never be decided if it is insisted that plaintiffs go before an administrator and ask him to rule upon something which he has no authority to decide. See also Public Utilities Commission v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40, 78 S.Ct. 446, 451, 2 L.Ed.2d 470 (1958) (United States not required to exhaust state administrative remedy; “an administrative proceeding might leave no remnant of the constitutional question .... [b]ut where the only question is whether it is constitutional to fasten the administrative procedure onto the litigant, the administrative agency may be defied and judicial relief sought as the only effective way of protecting the asserted constitutional right.”) Further, the administrative remedy to be pursued here belongs to the Local Defendants, not to plaintiffs: the MBE Guidelines state that “[o]nly the Grantee can request a waiver.” MBE Guidelines, p. 14. Thus, while plaintiffs may ask the Local Defendants to request a waiver, this possibility obviously allows plaintiffs no control over either the decision to seek a waiver or its presentation to the Secretary. Such a procedure hardly affords any administrative remedy which could preclude judicial determination of plaintiffs’ claim. In addition to arguing that the exhaustion doctrine precludes standing, defendants contend that plaintiffs have suffered no injury at this point in the administration of Round II. With respect to associational standing, the Supreme Court said in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2211, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), “[e]ven in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its members. E. g., National Motor Freight Assn. v. United States, 372 U.S. 246, [83 S.Ct. 688, 9 L.Ed.2d 709] (1963). . . . The association must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit, [citation omitted] So long as this can be established, and so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the cause, the association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Plaintiff contractors, and contractors represented by associations, which are before this Court are clearly suffering the immediate, threatened injury of bidding on construction contracts on terms with which they are unfamiliar, of distinguishing between subcontractors on grounds allegedly unrelated to the characteristics upon which contractors normally employ subcontractors, and submitting bids higher than they otherwise might expect to submit. Plaintiff subcontractor, and subcontractors represented by associations, are threatened with being denied a prescribed percentage of the construction dollar in Los Angeles County due to the application of the MBE provisions. In Warth v. Seldin, supra, the Supreme Court held that an association of firms engaged in residential construction lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of a city ordinance which allegedly precluded persons of low and moderate income from residing in the city. The Court ruled that, because the association sought damages rather than declaratory or injunctive relief, any injury was peculiar to the individual member, and would necessitate individual proof. The Court also held that there had been no averment that the ordinance had been responsible for the denial of a building permit for any specific project contemplated by the association. In the case before this Court, however, plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief from a provision which allegedly removes them from consideration for an identified percentage of construction funds targeted for specific, planned projects. Thus, injury to plaintiffs is clear, and they have standing to bring this action. Moreover, this case presents “a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937). This Court rejects Federal Defendants’ argument that facial constitutional invalidity can never be asserted where there is a waiver provision. Accordingly, there is a justiciable controversy between plaintiffs and defendants which is appropriate for. judicial determination. The Court also notes that laches is inapplicable to this case. Plaintiffs brought this action five days after the. September 30, 1977, deadline for obligating the entire $4 billion in PWE Act funds appropriated by Congress. Any earlier action by plaintiffs would not have defined a concrete controversy, since additional projects might have been approved by the Secretary until September 30. The test of laches is prejudice to the opposing party. Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 215, 83 S.Ct. 1185, 10 L.Ed.2d 297 (1963). Federal Defendants are not prejudiced in this case because they have fully performed their function of granting and obligating the funds appropriated and approving the necessary projects. Local Defendants offer no indication of prejudice flowing from the timing of the filing of this action, as opposed to prejudice flowing simply from the filing of the action. IV CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION The gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint is that the MBE provisions infringe upon their rights to due process of law, by creating a classification which denies the granting of Federal construction funds solely on the basis of race. Although the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not contain an equal protection clause, discrimination which contravenes the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 364, n.4, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954). The initial question confronting this Court is whether the MBE provisions in fact create a “classification” or whether they constitute a “remedy” for past discrimination. Programs which eliminate discrimination are clearly necessary, and have been judicially decreed or approved to dismantle dual school systems which impermissibly perpetuate separation of the races in public schools. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). Further, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been held to mandate the award of retroactive seniority to victims of discrimination in hiring on the basis of race, Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976), and a state redistricting plan, which was drawn with racial considerations aimed at correcting past discrimination, has been upheld under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and found not to contravene the Fourteenth Amendment. United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977). Thus, it is clear that, “[j]ust as . race . . . must be considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in formulating a remedy.” North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46, 91 S.Ct. 1284, 1286, 28 L.Ed.2d 586 (1971). However, it is also clear that a generalized assertion of “remedy” cannot exempt a racial classification from careful judicial examination, lest such an assertion be invoked as justification for obviously invidious discrimination. In fashioning a remedy for racial discrimination, there must be no discrimination against innocent non-minorities. In United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165, 97 S.Ct. 996, 1009, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977), Justice White, with Justices Stevens and Rehnquist concurring, stated: “There is no doubt that in preparing the 1974 legislation, the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner. But its plan represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race, and we discern no discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment In the case before this Court, there is no doubt that nonminority contractors and subcontractors are denied a specified percentage of Federal funds solely on the basis of their race. In addition to depriving these plaintiffs of equal treatment under the PWE Act, the MBE provisions, as a result of their asserted role in remedying “past discrimination,” indicate that plaintiffs are members of an industry guilty of a history of discrimination against minorities, a contention which has not been substantiated in this case. Moreover, at least in the area of desegregation, the Supreme Court has suggested that the school desegregation remedies there discussed may be limited to the specific context of achieving unitary public school systems: “It would not serve the important objective of Brown I [Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 [74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873] (1954)] to seek to use school desegregation cases for purposes beyond their scope, although desegregation of schools ultimately will have impact on other forms of discrimination.” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra, 402 U.S. at 22-23, 91 S.Ct. at 1279. The remedies discussed in the above-mentioned cases also appear to be directed only at eliminating the racial injustice practiced, rather than at attempting to establish an arbitrary level of compensation which will counterbalance prior wrongs. In this respect, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 94 S.Ct. 1734, 40 L.Ed.2d 189 (1974), and Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 97 S.Ct. 1192, 51 L.Ed.2d 360 (1977), are inapposite, since they deal with classification on the basis of gender, rather than race. Hence, this Court concludes that the MBE provisions constitute a purely racial classification and must be examined as such. It should also be noted at this point that, while the Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment was precipitated by discrimination against Blacks [Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1879); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873)], its protection extends to all races, including whites. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873). See also United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, supra, 430 U.S. at 165, 97 S.Ct. 996; Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal.3d 34, 51, 132 Cal.Rptr. 680, 553 P.2d 1152 (1976), outlawing a race quota in medical school, and McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976), holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits private employment discrimination against whites as well as nonwhites. Classifications based solely upon race must be subjected to the most rigid judicial scrutiny. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); Bolling v. Sharpe, supra, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100, 63 S.Ct. 1375, 87 L.Ed. 1774 (1943). In related circumstances, this scrutiny has been held to require that the government must establish a compelling governmental interest for the classification, which interest is unrelated to race, and show that there are no alternative means to advance that interest which would impose a lesser burden on the group disadvantaged. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Constructors Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 441 F.Supp. 936 (W.D.Pa., 1977); Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, supra, 18 Cal.3d at 49, 132 Cal.Rptr. 680, 553 P.2d 1152. The legislative history of the PWE Act indicates that it was intended “to help revitalize the Nation’s financially-pressed communities and reactivate the distressed construction industry with its hundreds of thousands of jobless workers . . . .” H.R.Rep.No.95-20, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977). While the legislative history includes no mention of the MBE provisions, Federal Defendants cite the Court to the remarks of Representative Mitchell, sponsor of the MBE amendment on the floor of the House of Representatives, which indicate a desire to correct the situation in which minority businesses are given only 1 percent of all government contracts in any fiscal year. 123 Cong.Rec.H. 1436-1437. Congress apparently became concerned with unemployment in minority communities and the rate of dissolution of minority businesses, mainly by the persuasive rhetoric of Congressman Mitchell, but no study was made and there is no legislative history of this Mitchell Amendment. The Court recognizes the laudable goal of directing aid to that portion of the community which is suffering from severe unemployment. However, the MBE provision does not advance a governmental purpose unrelated to race. In fact, it is based on race alone — an invidious race quota. It is not contended here that minority business enterprises are more capable than nonminority businesses. No .racially neutral justification is offered for the MBE provisions. Indeed, the specific objective asserted for this classification is the preference of one group of races over another. It is not a permissible governmental objective to direct financial assistance to segments of the community which are classified solely on the basis of race to the exclusion of other segments. Moreover, the “remedy” versus “classification” distinction is inapplicable in this situation, where no discrimination against the minority business enterprises sought to be assisted by this legislation has been alleged. Federal Defendants have contended that a Congressional desire to remedy prior discrimination is “implicit” in Congressman Mitchell’s remarks, but no specific evidence of such discrimination was shown by him, nor has any such evidence been offered by Federal Defendants, or any parties to this lawsuit. Further, the MBE provisions fail the second part of the compelling governmental interest test, since underemployed minorities in the construction industry could be aided by racially neutral legislation having less of a detrimental impact upon nonminority contractors. For example, the 10 percent set-aside could be directed at those businesses which have experienced a low prescribed level of unemployment or income within the preceding year, and the Department of Commerce could take affirmative steps to ensure that businesses in geographical areas of high unemployment become particularly aware of Federally funded projects which were being planned and to familiarize such businesses with the larger general contractors which customarily bid on Federally funded projects. Prior to and at the hearing on Summary Judgment, Federal Defendants supplied the Court with an Opinion and Order of the Honorable Daniel J. Snyder, Jr., United States District Judge, 441 F.Supp. 936 (W.D.Pa. No. 77-1035, 1977), in the case of Constructors Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, a case with issues identical to ours. In that Opinion and Order, Judge Snyder denied a preliminary injunction on the grounds that while the same 10% racial quota for subcontractors deserved the strictest scrutiny of the Court since it is inherently constitutionally suspect, id. at 950, nevertheless, and while viewing the lack of legislative history as “troublesome,” he concluded that the 10% quota based on race alone “is the only effective way to crack the competitive barriers and end the cycle which continually excludes minority businesses from proportionate participation.” Id. at 953, 945, 942-944. To this conclusion, I take exception and therefore, with his Opinion and Order I disagree, with all due respect and humility. Perhaps the Bakke case now before the Supreme Court on certiorari will settle the matter for both Judge Snyder and this Court. Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 18 Cal.3d 34, 132 Cal.Rptr. 680, 553 P.2d 1152 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1090, 97 S.Ct. 1098, 51 L.Ed.2d 535 (1977), argued before the United States Supreme Court, 1977. - U.S. -, 98 S.Ct. 46, 54 L.Ed.2d 67. Quotas are absolutely invidious and unconstitutional. Whether used to exclude minorities as in the old collegiate 10% quota system, or used to include minorities under this new public works subcontractors 10% quota system, as here, every quota based on race or national origin alone is constitutionally invalid and impermissible. In this situation the “10% quota-ed” persons are the stigmatized, and the remaining “non quota-ed” persons are the illegitimatized, whether hurt or helped. All discrimination solely on the basis of race or national origin, direct or reverse, converse or inverse, is invidious and unconstitutional. Affirmative action and goals are permissible; race quotas are not. It is simple as that, but even worse and inevitably, race quotas do not achieve or even approach the goals desired — personal, familial, economic, educational, recreational and all kinds of human equality, regardless of race or national origin. Equal protection and non-discrimination in every phase and activity of human life is mandated by equal protection to all persons guaranteed in the Federal Constitution. Race quotas necessarily run counter to this Constitutional mandate and must be struck down if this Court, and indeed all of us, are to live under and abide by the United States Constitution. V THE APPLICABILITY OF TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, SECTIONS 601 AND 602, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d and 2000d-l Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Sec. 601,42 U.S.C. § 2000d provides that no person in the United States shall on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. This unequivocal statutory statement by Congress of the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection and non-discrimination solely on the basis of race, color, or national origin is specifically directed to be enforced by every Federal department or agency rendering Federal assistance to any program or activity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. A plain uncomplicated reading of these two statutes would clearly invalidate the 10% “race quota” system set forth in the “race quota” law here in question, Public Law No. 95-28, Sec. 103(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2), and the rules and regulations issued by the Commerce Department thereunder especially Sec. 317.17(b), 42 Fed.Reg. 27432 at 274S4-5. But let us consider these statutes in the light of appropriate statutory construction. The Court is aware of the general rules of statutory construction, which are hornbook law, and which are ordinarily controlling in a problem involving conflicting statutes: (1) Where there is no clear intention to the contrary, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, irrespective of the priority of enactment. (2) In resolving irreconcilable conflicts between successive statutory enactments, the later enactment should be given “primary consideration” over the prior. But the Court is compelled to go beyond the hornbook and must ascertain the purposes underlying any such conflicting enactments, and may not dispose of the problem solely by using such mechanical judicial slide-rules. Fanning v. United Fruit Co., 355 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1966). The two hornbook principles are not to be applied when the results are “extraordinary,” or when the results do not reflect the true “presumed intention of the law making body.” It follows that when an overriding public interest is demonstrably clear, in that the prior general statute sets forth the true Constitutional mandate, and the later specific statute is less conducive to the public welfare, then the public good controls and the general statute will invalidate the specific statute. So also will the prior invalidate the subsequent. In our case here, where the prior statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and § 2000d-1, set forth in clear and unmistakable terms the overriding mandate of the Federal Constitution for equal protection and non-discrimination, they obviously express the true policy of the United States, the true intent of Congress, and the true Constitutional mandate. Any attempt to invalidate them by the “race quota” statute and rules and regulations thereunder would give us, indeed, extraordinary results. Thus, even though they are general and not specific and even though they are prior in time, the Court must necessarily uphold these general and prior statutes and decree the invalidity of the “race quota” system contained in the specific and subsequent 10% “race quota” law and regulations. The legislative history of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and more particularly Sections 601 and 602, thereof, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d and 2000d-l, unmistakably and in the plainest of language, sets forth the Congressional mandate in enacting these two statutes. They codify into statutory formula the equal protection and nondiscrimination guarantees of the Federal Constitution. For instance, House Report No. 914, 88th Congress, 2d Session, in reporting H.R. 7152, later amended and then enacted as 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Sec. 601 of Title VI of the Civil'Rights Act of 1964) to the floor, printed out as “Purpose and Content,” that Title VI “prohibits discrimination in any Federal financial assistance program.” And in the Sectional Analysis portion, the House Report emphatically proclaims as to Title Vi: “This title declares it to be the policy of the United States that discrimination on the ground of race, color, or national origin shall not occur in connection with programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance and authorizes and directs the appropriate Federal departments and agencies to carry out this policy.” In stark contrast, the “race quota” provisions in Pub.L.No.95-28, Sec. 103(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) have absolutely no legislative history. The most that the defendants can dredge up are the remarks of the Hon. Parren J. Mitchell (D.Md.), United States Congressman from Maryland, who for the first time on the floor of the House at the time of the debate upon Pub.L.No. 95-28, introduced the 10% “race quota” amendment which, after slight modification, has become Section 103(f)(2) of Pub.L.No. 95-28, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2). But, of course, this is not legislative history. It is only the debate rhetoric of a partisan who sponsored the amendment. This is not astounding, because, as defendants admit, and as the legislative history of Pub.L.No.95-28 demonstrates, the amendment sponsored by Congressman Mitchell was never considered by the House or by the Judiciary Committee, and is not mentioned anywhere in House Report No. 914, which reported the Bill to the House Floor without Mitchell’s amendment. The “race quota” provisions in Pub.L.No. 95-28, Sec. 103(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2), the specific and subsequent law, and in the regulations issued pursuant to it cannot be held to invalidate by any kind of theory or implication the overriding Congressional, National, and Constitutional policy in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and d-1, mandating the Federal Constitutional guarantees of equal protection and non-discrimination, even though the “race quota” ostensibly is claimed to benefit minorities, which of course, it does not in reality do. On the contrary) it is a glaring and flagrant violation of both the Congressional intent and National policy, as well as the Constitutional mandate. It follows that this Court is obliged to declare the “race quota” provision of Pub.L. No.95-28, Sec. 103(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f) (2), and the rules and regulations issued thereunder, especially Section 317.19,42 Fed. Reg. 27432 at 27434-5, invalid and illegal under and by virtue of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Sections 601 and 602, 42 U.S.C. §2000d and d-1. VI PROPRIETY OF THE REMEDIES SOUGHT (a) Declaratory Judgment The Federal Judicial Code has since 1948, as amended in 1976, provided that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any Court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201. This statutory determination of the availability of declaratory relief “in a case of actual controversy” is, under Rule 57, Fed.R.Civ.P., available in accordance with all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the Rule governing the entry of Summary Judgments, Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. And the remedy of Declaratory Judgment is available “whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201. As we have demonstrated heretofore, the case before us is a “justiciable controversy.” See in this connection, 6A Moore’s Federal Practice, Paragraph 57.-18[2] (2d ed. 1974, as kept up to date by the 1976-77 Cumulative Supplement) “Constitutionality of Public Acts,” and cases there cited. The case before us concerns “the rights and other legal relations” of the plaintiffs under the unconstitutional provisions of Pub.L.No.95-28, Sec. 103(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2). Not only have these unconstitutional 10% “race quota” provisions been applied, but they are clearly threatened to be applied in the future, and since the plaintiffs have standing, declaratory relief is properly, factually, and legally invoked here and should be issued, not only with regard to the unconstitutionality of Pub.L.No.95-28, Sec. 103(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2), but also with respect to the relevant rules and regulations issued thereunder by the Federal Defendants, especially Section 317.19(b), 42 Fed.Reg. 27432, 27434-5. Based on race alone they are unconstitutional on their face and as applied; and we might add, since they are threatened to be applied in this situation, a declaratory judgment is obligatory. Since we have also found that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d and d-1 are applicable to invalidate Pub.L.No. 95-28, Sec. 103(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2), declaratory relief should also be granted to plaintiffs upon this ground. (b) Injunctive Relief While the basic elements of injunctive relief are present here where we have an unconstitutional and illegal “10% race quota” system, the Affidavit of Arthur J. Sulvetta, Attachment N to Federal Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, makes it clear that any restraint retroactively or retrospectively applied would work a serious and irreparable injury upon the Local Defendants and upon the people and economy of Los Angeles County and Los Angeles City. As Sulvetta, who is Chief, Program Analysis Division, Economic Development Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce and an apparently extremely well qualified economist, under oath declares, a nationwide total of $4 billion out of the $6 billion appropriated to date have been granted, including more than $57 million for the Local Defendants: $29,782,108 for the City of Los Angeles and its departments, offices and projects; and $28,109,085 for the County of Los Angeles, and its departments, offices and projects. Moreover, Sulvetta estimates that those projects will generate approximately 5,613 to 6,068 person-years of jobs, involving 1,910,901 hours of employment, the equivalent of a full year of employment for 1,517 construction workers, translated into 12,265 workers to be employed on these local projects. He further estimates 489 person-years in indirect jobs associated with the construction industry here on these projects in Los Angeles City and County. Finally, Sulvetta estimates that a one-year delay in project construction activities would increase costs an additional $7.6 million over and above the $59 million for the Local Defendants; and a two-year delay would result in $16.1 million increase in costs. Founded as they are on reliable studies by the Rand Corporation and other equally reliable studies and statistics, Sulvetta’s Affidavit convinces the Court that retroactive or retrospective application of injunctive relief would be in essence a financial, economic, and fiscal disaster for the Local Defendants, their residents, and their economies. And, of course, Sulvetta’s estimates are substantiated in every material respect by the affidavits submitted by the Local Defendants, specifying in some detail the public injury that would result if projects were held up for any length of time, consisting as they do of police facilities, schools, recreation centers, senior citizen facilities, storm drains, sewerage facilities, flood control projects, hospital additions, medical and surgical augmentations, fuel storage facilities, landscaping, and numerous other public works. We are thus fully aware of the tremendous detriment and harm that necessarily would befall the defendants if any injunctive relief were to be made retroactive, as so clearly demonstrated by the most recent affidavits of the defendants and the acts of the plaintiffs themselves by their undue delay and even fault in filing their action and in failing and refusing to bid, even though they were under the clear threat of the defendants to deny awards to any such bids. This awareness obliges this Court to apply any injunctive relief solely and only in the future and prospectively. This is not to say that the statute is not unconstitutional for we have already held that it is. But the Court does have equitable discretion to consider all of the circumstances in determining how far reaching and in what time frame restraint should be ordered. The Court finds and concludes that it should operate only in the future, balancing as it must the needs of and detriment that might be suffered on both sides, depending on the prospective or retroactive thrust of injunctive relief. It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the injunctive relief in the Judgment should be fashioned so as to apply only prospectively in accordance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 627-29, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), and Chicot County District v. Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940). In fashioning this prospective injunctive application we should keep in mind two dates today, October 31, 1977, with respect to the Federal Defendants, and December 31, 1977, with respect to the Local Defendants. And just as absolutely clear from the Sulvetta Affidavit it is that no injunctive relief should be issued, applied, or even contemplated with respect to Federal grants made to local agencies throughout the United States, other than the Local Defendants. To do so would be to pass judgment on some $4-billion worth of projects and controversies throughout the nation with totally unacceptable and undoubtedly baleful consequences. It is wholly repugnant to this Court, and, of course, will not be ordered. VII ORDER By reason of the foregoing Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is hereby ordered that judgment be entered for plaintiffs and against defendants for declaratory relief and permanent injunction in accordance herewith. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. Appendices to follow. APPENDIX A PUBLIC LAW 95-28 [H.R. 11]; May 13, 1977 LOCAL PUBLIC WORKS CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT ACT OF 1976 For Legislative History of Act, see p. 716 An Act to increase the authorization for the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976. Be it enacted by the. Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976, authorization increase. Public Works Employment Act of 1977. 42 USC 6701 note. 42 USC 6701. Public works project. TITLE I Section 101. This title may be cited as the “Public Works Employment Act of 1977”. Sec. 102. (a) Paragraph (2) of section 102 of the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976 is amended by striking out “and American Samoa.” and inserting in lieu thereof the following: “American Samoa, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.”. (b) Section 102 of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: “(4) 'public works project’ includes a project for the transportation and provision of water to a drought-stricken area.”. Grants and contracts, requirements. 42 USC 6705. Competitive bidding. Sec. 103. Section 106 of the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections: “(e) (1) No part of the construction (including demolition and other site preparation activities), renovation, repair, or other improvement of any public works project for which a grant is made under this Act alter the date of enactment, of this subsection shall be performed directly by any department, agency, or instrumentality of any State or local government. Construction of each such project shall be performed by contract awarded by competitive bidding, unless the Secretary shall affirmatively find that, under the circumstances relating to such project, some other method is in the public interest. Contracts for the construction of each project shall be awarded only on the basis of the lowest responsive bid submitted by a bidder meeting established criteria of responsibility. No requirement or obligation shall be imposed as a condition precedent to the award of a contract to such bidder for a project, or to the Secretary’s concurrence in the award of a contract to such bidder, unless such requirement or obligation is otherwise lawful and is specifically set forth in the advertised specifications. Illegal aliens. “(2) No grant shall be made under this Act for any local public works project unless the State or local government applying for such grant submits with its application a certification acceptable to the Secretary that no contract will be awarded in connection with such project to any bidder who will employ on such project any alien in the United States in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act or any other law, convention, or treaty of the United States relating to the immigration, exclusion, deportation, or explusion of aliens. 8 USC 1101 note. U.S.-made products. “(f) (1) (A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no grant shall be made under this Act for any local public works project unless only such unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have been mined or produced in the United States, and only such manufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have been manufactured in the United States substantially all from articles, materials, and supplies mined, produced, or manufactured, as the case may be, in the United States, will be used in such project. “(B) Subparagraph (A) of this paragraph shall not apply in any case where the Secretary determines it to be inconsistent with the public interest, or the cost to be unreasonable, or if articles, materials, or supplies of the class or kind to be used or the articles, materials, or supplies from which they are manufactured are not mined, produced, or manufactured, as the case may be, in the United States in sufficient and reasonably available commercial quantities and of a satisfactory quality. “(2) Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any local public works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10 per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises. For purposes of this paragraph, the term ‘minority business enterprise’ means a business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned by minority group members. For the purposes of the preceding sentence, minority group members are citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. Grant allocation requirements. “Minority business enterprise.” Minority group members. “(g) No grant shall be made under this Act for any project for which the applicant does not give assurances satisfactory to the Secretary that the project will be designed and constructed in accordance with the standards for accessibility for public buildings and facilities to the handicapped and elderly under the Act entitled ‘An Act to insure that certain buildings financed with Federal funds are so designed and constructed as to be accessible to the physically handicapped’, approved August 12, 1968 (42 U.S.C. 4151 et seq.). The Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board established by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-112) is authorized to insure that any construction and renovation done pursuant to any grant made under this Act complies with the accessibility standards for public bunldings and facilities issued under the Act of August 12, 1968.”. Accessibility standards for handicapped and elderly. 29 USC 701 note. Sec. 104. Section 107 of the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976 is amended by inserting after the third sentence thereof the following new sentence.^ “The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Labor, and consistent with existing applicable collective bargaining agreements and practices, shall promulgate regulations to assure special consideration to the employment in projects under this Act of qualified disabled veterans (as defined in section 2011(1) of title 38, United States Code) and qualified Vietnam-era veterans (as defined in section 2011 (2) (A) of such title 38).”. Employment of disabled veterans, regulations. 42 USC 6706. Sec. 105. Subsection (a) of section 108 of the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976 is amended to read as follows: . Funds, allocation. 42 USC 6707. “(a) The Secretary shall allocate funds appropriated after the date of enactment of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 under section 111 of this Act as follows: Post, p. 119. “(1) 21/2 per centum of such funds shall be set aside and shall be expended only for grants for public works projects under this Act to Indian tribes and Alaska Native villages. None of the remainder of such funds shall be expended for such grants to such tribes and villages. “(2) After the set aside required by paragraph (1) of this subsection, $70,000,000 shall be set aside and expended oxdy for grants for any public works project the application for a grant for which was made under this Act after the date of enactment of this Act and before December 24,1976, and which application was not received, was not considered, or was rejected solely because of an error by an officer or employee of the United States. Any allocation made to an applicant pursuant to regulation shall be reduced by the amount of any grant made to such applicant under this paragraph. “(3) After the set asides required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, 65 per centum of such funds shall be allocated among the States on the basis of the ratio that the number of unemployed persons in each State bears to the total number of unemployed persons in all the States and 35 per centum of such funds shall be allocated among those States with an average unemployment rate for the preceding twelve-month period in excess of 6.5 per centum on the basis of the relative severity of unemployment in each such State, except that (A) no State shall be allocated less than three-quarters of one per centum or more than 121/2 per centum of such funds for local public works projects within such State, except that in the case of Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, not less than one-half of one per centum in the aggregate shall be granted for such projects in all four of these jurisdictions, and (B) no State whose unemployment data was converted for the first time in 1976 to the benchmark data of the current population survey annual average compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics shall receive a percentage of such funds less than the percentage of funds allocated to such State under this Act from funds appropriated to carry out this Act prior to the date of enactment of the Public Works Employment Ant of 1977.”. 42 USC 6707. Sec. 106. Subsection (b) of section 108 of the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976 is amended by— (1) inserting “(1)” immediately after “(b)”; and (2) adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs: “(2) In making grants for projects for construction, renovation, repair, or other improvement of buildings, the Secretary shall also give consideration as between such building projects to those projects which will result in conserving energy, including, but not limited to, projects to redesign 'and retrofit existing public facilities for energy conservation purposes, and projects using alternative energy systems. “ (3) In making grants under this Act, the Secretary shall also give priority and preference to any public works project requested by a State or by a special purpose unit of local government which is endorsed by a general purpose local government within such State. “ (4) A project requested by a school district shall be accorded the full priority and preference to public works projects of local governments provided in section 108(b) of this Act.”. Sec. 107. (a) The first sentence of subsection (c) of section 108 of the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976 is amended by striking out “three most recent consecutive months” each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof at each such place “twelve most recent consecutive months”. Waiver. (b) Subsection (c) of section 108 of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: “The Secretary may waive the application of the first sentence of this subsection to any State which receives a minimum allocation pursuant to paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of this section.” 42 USC 6707. (c) Subsection (d) of section 108 of such Act is amended to read as follows: “(d) Whenever a State or local government submits applications for grants under this Act for two or more projects, such State or local government shall submit as part of such applications its priority for each such project.”. (d) Subsection (e) of section 108 of such Act is amended by striking out “of direct benefit to,” and all that follows down through and including the period at the end of the sentence and inserting in lieu thereof: “to be constructed in Such community or neighborhood.”. Repeal. (e) Subsection (f) of section 108 of such Act is hereby repealed. (f) Section 108 of such Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections: “(h) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the Secretary shall not consider or approve or make a grant for any project for which any application was not submitted for a grant under this Act on or before December 23,1976. “ (2) The Secretary may receive applications for grants for projects under this Act— “(A) from the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; “(B) from Indian tribes and Alaska Native villages; “(C) from any applicant to use any allocation which may be made pursuant to regulation, to the extent necessary to expend such allocation, if a sufficient number of applications were not submitted on or before December 23,1976, to use such allocation. “(i) The Secretary may allow any applicant which has received a grant for a project under this Act to substitute one or more projects for such project if in the judgment of the Secretary (1) the Federal cost in the aggregate of such substituted project or projects does not exceed such grant, (2) such substituted project or projects comply with section 106(d) of this Act, and (3) such substituted project or projects will in fact aid in alleviating drought or other emergency or disaster-related conditions or damage. Section 106(a) of this Act shall not apply to projects substituted under this subsection. Ante, p. 118. “(j) Notwithstanding subsection (h)(1) of this section, grants may be made from appropriations made under section 111 of this Act after September 30,1977, to States or local governments for projects for the construction, renovation, repair, or other improvements of health care or rehabilitation facilities owned and operated by private nonprofit entities.”. Post, p. 120. Sec. 108. The first sentence of section 109 of the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976 is amended by striking out “by contractors or subcontractors”. 42 USC 6708. Sec, 109. Section 111 of the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976 is amended by striking out “$2,000,000,000 for the period ending September 30,1977,” and inserting in lieu thereof “$6,000,000,000 for the period ending December 81, 1978.”. 42 USC 6710. Sec. 110. (a) The Secretary of Commerce is authorized and directed to study public works investment in the United States and the implications for the future of recent trends in such investment. Public works investment, °'U1 note- (b) The study authorized by this section shall include, but not be limited to, the following: (1) The historical scope and nature of public works investment, including— (A) shifts in the types of public facilities constructed over the last thirty years and the implications of such shifts; (B) the patterns of regional distribution of investment; (C) the role of the Federal Government, States, and local communities in funding public facilities; (D) the impact upon unemployment in minority groups. (2) The proportion of the gross national product devoted to public works investment over the last thirty years. (3) Methods by which the aggregate need for public works can be determined. (4) How public works are financed and how financing arrangements affect the pattern and type of investment. (5) The level of maintenance or renovation of existing public facilities needed, compared to that provided. Report to Congress. (c) The Secretary of Commerce shall submit to Congress a report with respect to its findings and recommendations no later than eighteen months after the date of enactment of this section. A preliminary report putting forth the study design shall be submitted to Congress within four months after the date of enactment of this section. 42 USC 6710 note. Sec. 111. The Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior shall immediately initiate the construction of those Federal public works projects (A) which are the responsibility of their respective departments, (B) which have been authorized, and (C) which can be commenced within 60 days of the date of enactmen