Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION JUDGMENT ORDER MANOS, District Judge. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On March 7,1977, the plaintiff, Sovereign News Company, filed this action seeking compensatory and punitive damages, a declaratory judgment, and preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining both the Cuyahoga County, Ohio and Montgomery County, Ohio prosecutors, and all the defendant Cleveland and Dayton police officers from using evidence seized during a search of Sovereign’s premises to prosecute Sovereign. The search in question was conducted on February 16,1977 pursuant to a search warrant. Sovereign’s complaint alleges that the search of its premises, and the Ohio statutory provisions employed to authorize that search, violate the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. On March 28, 1977, Sovereign moved for a preliminary injunction, and on March 29, 1977, the court convened a hearing on that motion. The Cleveland policemen urged the court to dismiss Sovereign’s complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) on the theory that the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975) compelled the court to abstain from hearing Sovereign’s constitutional claims. Prior to the commencement of the March 29, 1977 hearing, counsel for defendant Falke, the Prosecuting Attorney for Montgomery County, filed a written motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (3), (6), “for the reasons that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, the venue is improper and the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ” Falke’s motion was orally argued before the commencement of the March 29, 1977 hearing. Falke’s counsel, First Assistant Montgomery County Prosecutor James Brogan, admitted that this court sustained “jurisdiction to hear the case,” but urged that venue should be transferred to the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and that the court should not hear Sovereign’s claims because of the doctrine of “equitable restraint” enunciated in Louisville Area Inter-Faith Committee for United Farm Workers et al. v. Nottingham Liquors et al., 542 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1976), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Assistant Montgomery County Prosecutor Brogan also argued that United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) prohibits this court from issuing any injunctive order restraining state law enforcement authorities from introducing illegally obtained evidence to a state grand jury that sustains jurisdiction of investigate an alleged offense to which the illegally obtained evidence is relevant. At the conclusion of the arguments of counsel, the court overruled defendant Falke’s motion to change venue, and withheld ruling on the motions to dismiss until it heard the evidence elicited during the preliminary injunction hearing. On March 30, 1977, the second day of the hearing on the preliminary injunction, counsel for the defendant Cleveland police officers, moved the court in limine to limit the testimony of several of the Cleveland police officer defendants. The court denied the motion, and permitted Mr. Berkman, counsel for Sovereign, to continue his examination of the police officers called as witnesses during the preliminary injunction hearing. On March 31, 1977, the hearing on the preliminary injunction was concluded and each of the defendants renewed their motions to dismiss Sovereign’s declaratory and injunctive claims. On April 1, 1977, after the close of the hearing, the court, pursuant to motions made by the defendants, stated that it would treat the hearing as one dealing with the preliminary injunction, and that it would consider the request for a declaratory judgment “only with respect to the [purely legal] issue of the constitutional validity of [Ohio Revised Code] Sections 2907.-32, 2907.01, and 2923.04. The court will not now entertain consideration of the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claims other than the claim that Sections 2907.32, 2907.-01 and 2923.04 violated the United States Constitution.” At the same time the court reiterated its earlier ruling that the question of money damages would be considered only after further proceedings, and not based on the hearing conducted between March 29 and 31, 1977. At the conclusion of the April 1, 1977 proceeding, the defendants’ respective motions to dismiss Sovereign’s declaratory judgment and injunction claims were pending before the court. Sovereign’s motion for a declaratory judgment on the constitutional validity of Ohio Revised Code §§ 2907.32, 2907.01, and 2923.04, and its motion for a preliminary injunction were also pending. All defendants filed answers to Sovereign’s complaint by April 13, 1977, and all defendants except the Dayton policemen filed their briefs by April 25,1977. By April 14, 1977, defendant Falke, pursuant to an agreement among the parties, supplemented the record of the earlier hearing by filing Exhibits 100-141. These exhibits consist of photographs which were not located in Cleveland at the time of the hearing. On May 14, 1977, the court served copies of the plaintiff’s complaint, a copy of the transcript of the hearing on the preliminary injunction, and copies of other portions of the record upon the Ohio Attorney General with an invitation that he file an amicus curiae brief in this case regarding the issues currently pending before the court. On May 19, 1977, the Ohio Attorney General accepted the court’s invitation and filed an amicus curiae brief, followed by a supplemental brief filed on June 16, 1977. On June 21,1977, defendant Falke filed a motion to supplement the record of the March 29-31,1977 evidentiary hearing with a certified copy of a Montgomery County Grand Jury indictment, filed in the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court on May 3, 1977. The court denies Prosecutor Falke’s motion to reopen the record of the March evidentiary hearing to include the May indictment, because the document was not in existence at the time of the March hearing. However, the court will take judicial notice that the Montgomery County grand jury returned such an indictment on May 3, 1977. See, Federal Rules of Evidence 201, 902(4). On July 29, 1977 Sovereign filed its post-hearing reply brief in opposition to the answer briefs previously filed by the defendants, and in opposition to the Ohio Attorney General’s amicus curiae briefs. II. THIS COURT’S FACTUAL FINDINGS A. THE CLEVELAND AND DAYTON POLICE OBTAIN ACCESS TO SOVEREIGN’S PREMISES. During the April, 1976 term, the Hamilton County Ohio Grand Jury indicted Sovereign for pandering obscenity within the jurisdiction of Hamilton County, Ohio, in violation of Ohio Revised Code §§ 2923.04 and 2907.32. On November 1, 1976, the Montgomery County Ohio law enforcement authorities commenced an investigation of Sovereign for pandering obscenity within the jurisdiction of Montgomery County in violation of Ohio Revised Code §§ 2907.32, 2907.01 and 2923.04. The record shows that the Montgomery County investigation was sparked “as a result of complaints” received by authorities in that jurisdiction. Nothing in the record suggests that the Montgomery County inquiry was related to the Hamilton County prosecution. The Montgomery County investigation focused on the interrelation between twelve book stores in the City of Dayton, Ohio, and the stores’ supposed supplier, Sovereign, located in Cleveland, Ohio. The Dayton police placed the twelve Dayton stores under surveillance, and observed deliveries of boxes of magazines by vans which they determined were rented by Sovereign. Dayton Police Officer E. R. Robinson visited each of the twelve bookstores, examined various magazines, and purchased twelve which he submitted to a Dayton Municipal Judge. According to Officer Robinson’s affidavit, the purchased magazines: “dealt almost exclusively with pictures and portraits of nude males and females engaging in various acts of sexual intercourse, bestiality, sodomy, cunnilingus, and acts of sexual perversion. The printed matter was negligible and not relevant.” On December 19, 1976, the Municipal Judge to whom the twelve magazines were submitted issued search warrants authorizing the Dayton police to conduct a search of the twelve Dayton bookstores. A search was conducted and materials were confiscated from each location. Officer Robinson also learned from several of the bookstore owners that they were supplied from Sovereign’s Cleveland installation, that they personally knew Sovereign’s chief executive officer, Reuben Sturman, and that they dealt with him. One bookstore operator advised Robinson that other bookstore operations were subsidized by Sovereign, and that “these others may be on Sovereign News Company’s payroll and/or Reuben Sturman’s payroll.” Based on the information unearthed during this investigation, the Dayton police contacted the Cleveland Police Department, which itself had been conducting its own continuing, intensive investigation of pornography in Cleveland, including Sovereign’s Cleveland operation. Captain Delau, one of the two officers in charge of the February 16, 1977 search of Sovereign’s Cleveland premises, testified that the Cleveland police had Sovereign’s Cleveland building under surveillance and would “love to” dedicate more time to that surveillance program. Delau also testified that the Cleveland police have followed Sovereign employees. On February 14,1977, Dayton Police Sergeant Reynolds telephoned Cleveland Police Lieutenant Vanyo, the supervisory officer for the Cleveland Police Department’s Intelligence Unit, and requested Vanyo’s assistance in obtaining a warrant to search Sovereign’s Cleveland installation. Van-yo, who, along with another Cleveland police officer, had entered Sovereign’s Cleveland building pursuant to a search warrant on March 19, 1975, furnished the Dayton authorities with a description of the interior and exterior of Sovereign’s Cleveland premises. On February 15, 1977 Cleveland Police Lieutenant Vanyo and Cleveland Police Captain Delau met in Cleveland with Dayton Police Officers Robinson and Dalrympie. Officer Vanyo took the two Dayton policemen to the office of John T. Corrigan, the Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, in order to obtain a search warrant for Sovereign’s Cleveland building. The two Dayton police officers, Robinson and Dalrymple, armed with unexecuted copies of the affidavit prepared under the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s supervision, along with Prosecutor Corrigan personally, and at least one Cleveland police officer, appeared before Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Judge Leo M. Spellacy in the afternoon of February 15, 1977. After the law enforcement authorities explained the purpose of the search warrant, Officer Robinson executed the affidavit in Judge Spellacy’s presence, and the judge then issued the search warrant based solely on the information in the affidavit. The search warrant, which authorized both the Cleveland Police Department and Dayton Police Officer Robinson to search Sovereign’s Cleveland offices and warehouse, stated: “TO: CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE CLEVELAND POLICE DEPARTMENT and/or members of said Department E. R. ROBINSON, a member of the DAYTON, OHIO POLICE DEPARTMENT “Whereas there has been filed with me an affidavit consisting of four pages, a copy of which is attached hereto, designated as Exhibits A, A-l, A-2 and A-3, and incorporated herein as though fully rewritten, wherein the affiant avers that he believes and has good cause to believe that on the premises located at 2075 East 65th Street, Cleveland, Ohio, the same being a two story red brick building, located in a commercial area, which is a warehouse and general office building containing the Sovereign News Company and/or offices of Reuben Sturman, of which the second floor is devoted to general offices and the ground level and basement level are devoted to warehousing, there is now being unlawfully kept concealed and possessed evidence of pandering of obscenity and the violations of the Ohio organized crime statute, particularly any copies of the following magazines: [a list of thirteen magazines with sexually explicit titles was contained in this portion of the search warrant], invoices and bills of lading dealing with the shipment of magazines to the following stores located in Dayton, Ohio: Gaiety Book Store, Adult Book Store, Eros Book Store, Cinema X Book Store, Today’s Book Store, Adult Books, Art Movies, Adult Book Store, Exotic Book Store, Discount Book Store, Rexic Book Store and Bonnett’s Book Store from November 1st, 1976 and thereafter, payroll records as well as orders and other communications and other evidence of relationship between Reuben Sturman, the Sovereign News Company and the aforementioned book stores. “I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that the property described is being concealed on the premises above described and that probable cause for issuance of this search warrant exists. “You are hereby commanded, in the name of the State of Ohio, with the necessary and proper assistance, to serve this warrant and search forthwith the premises named for the property specified, making search in the day season, and if the property or any part thereof be found there, you are commanded to seize it, leaving a copy of this warrant and a receipt for the proper [sic ] taken, prepare a written inventory of the property seized and return this warrant and bring the property taken on such search forthwith before me, or some other judge or magistrate of the county having cognizance thereof, to be disposed of and dealt with according to law. Said search is to be made within three days of the date hereof. “Given under my hand this 15th day of February, 1977.” On the morning of February 16, 1977, at 9:00 a. m., the Cleveland Police, along with the two Dayton police, met to discuss strategy for the execution of the search warrant signed by Judge Spellacy. Cleveland Police Lieutenant Vanyo and Cleveland Police Captain Delau were in charge if the search and briefed approximately thirty Cleveland policemen before the raid. Captain Delau described the materials which were to be seized and stated the officers must avoid seizing materials not described in the warrant. Copies of the search warrant and copies of the covers of the magazines named in the search warrant, were distributed to the thirty Cleveland policemen selected to conduct the search. Despite the lack of authorization in the search warrant for the employment of photographic recording devices or video and audio tape recordings, officers from Lieutenant Vanyo’s unit employed such equipment during the search. Sergeant Richard McIntosh of the Cleveland Police Department’s “Smut Squad” testified, “Q My question is with respect to the recording materials, Sergeant, what instructions were given as to what they were to record with those cameras and tape recorders? “A I don’t remember the specific instructions. I believe the general instructions were that any information that can be obtained and used because of the search warrant should be taken down. “Q And they were left to their own devices as to determine what should be taken by recorder and what should be taken by camera or video tape equipment, is that right? “A Within the scope of the instructions to limit themselves to material that they were searching for. “Q And there is no question but that those who were in charge of the search were aware of all of these recording devices on the persons of the officers involved in the raid before the time for the raid began? “A I’m sure that they were, yes, sir. “Q The cameras and tape recording equipment was not surreptitiously sneaked onto the premises? “A No, sir. “Q It was with the full acceptance and understanding of those in charge of the police detail, isn’t that correct? “A That’s correct.” Cleveland Police Detective Berkey carried a still shot camera and a audio tape recorder onto Sovereign’s premises. He testified that Cleveland Police Officer Millett carried a video tape recorder, which also recorded sound. Both Millett and Berkey employed their equipment to “record and preserve evidence of the scene,” and “documents” for “identification purposes.” In addition to the photographic and recording devices employed by Cleveland Police Officers Berkey and Millett, Dayton Police Officer Dalrymple carried a camera onto Sovereign’s premises, and Lieutenant Vanyo observed Dalrymple photographing items during the search. After Delau and Vanyo completed their briefing, the thirty Cleveland police officers, along with Dayton officers, traveled in ten vehicles to Sovereign’s Cleveland offices and warehouse. Upon arriving, Sergeant McIntosh spoke into the intercom on the wall adjacent to the locked exterior door of the building, and announced his presence and the presence of the Cleveland Police Department. He stated that the police were there pursuant to a search warrant. After the elapse of three or four minutes, and because the exterior door was not opened from the inside, the Cleveland police broke the door with a battering ram. The first group of police entered the building and ascended a flight of stairs to a landing on the second floor where they found a second door which was locked. The officers again announced that they were there to search the premises pursuant to a search warrant. After the elapse of sixty seconds and because the second door was not opened, the police broke down the door with the battering ram, and entered Sovereign’s main offices. Upon entering, approximately thirty Cleveland police officers and two Dayton police officers fanned throughout the premises and spent the next four hours searching the office, including “every single box” of magazines and books in Sovereign’s warehouse for evidence of pandering obscenity, Revised Code § 2907.32 and organized crime offenses, Revised Code § 2923.04. By the time the search was under way, counsel for Sovereign, Mr. Larry Gordon, arrived on the premises. Mr. Gordon carried an audio tape recorder and was accompanied by a photographer hired by Sovereign. Despite requests from the police officers, none of Sovereign’s representatives furnished keys to locked cabinets and desks on the premises, and therefore many desks and other enclosures were forced open with crowbars. B. THE MATERIALS SEIZED TO SUPPORT CLEVELAND’S INVESTIGATION OF SOVEREIGN Common Pleas Judge Spellacy’s search warrant confined the permissible scope of the search to twelve books, copies of which had been purchased and adjudicated obscene in Montgomery County, invoices and bills of lading dealing with the shipment of magazines to twelve named bookstores in Dayton, Ohio from November 1, 1976 forward, and payroll records, orders, and other communications and other evidence of a relationship between the twelve Dayton bookstores and Sovereign and Reuben Sturman. Thus the scope of the search was restricted to seeking evidence of a commercial link between Sovereign’s Cleveland operation and the sale of twelve specific items in twelve separate locations in Dayton, Ohio. However, the items actually seized under the shield of Judge Spellacy’s warrant reveal that the thirty Cleveland police officers who implemented it greatly exceeded its scope by seizing material that was unrelated to the operation of an illegal business of pandering obscenity in Dayton, Ohio. The abundance of evidence which exceeded the Montgomery County orientation of the search warrant, but was nevertheless seized, impels this court to conclude that the thirty Cleveland police officers who participated in the February 16, 1977 raid on Sovereign’s premises employed the Dayton investigation as an excuse to gather evidence in support of the Cleveland authorities’ own ongoing investigation of Sovereign’s operations including whether it was engaged in violations of the pandering obscenity and organized crime statutes in Cleveland and Cuyahoga County. The record demonstrates repeated instances in which the Cleveland police seized material that was both beyond the authorization of the search warrant and unrelated to Sovereign’s alleged Dayton operations. Exhibits 80 and 31 are photographs of a letter discovered in Sovereign’s files, addressed to the attention of Marjorie Rollins at Sovereign News, and written on the legal stationary of Sovereign’s legal counsel in this case, the law firm of Berkman, Gordon, Kancelbaum and Levy. The letter, and the file to which it was clipped at the time the photograph was taken, pertains to a written statement from the law office of John T. McCall regarding the arrest of an individual in Cincinnati and Louisville. The record contains no evidence that the information on this photographed letter from an attorney’s office to a client has any relationship to the magazines, the “invoices and bills of lading dealing with the shipment of magazines,” or the “payroll records as well as orders and other communications and other evidence of relationship between Reuben Sturman, the Sovereign News Company and the Dayton bookstores” named in Judge Spellacy’s search warrant. Furthermore, the information gleaned from this photographed attorney-client letter makes no reference to any activity in Montgomery County, Ohio. Exhibits 38 and 132 are photographs of a drawer in Reuben Sturman’s desk. These photos depict three items located in the drawer. One item is a photograph of a nude female; a second, a revolver in a holster; and a third, a box labeled “cartridges.” The revolver was seized by the Cleveland police and was not sent to Dayton with the other material taken during the February 16, 1977 raid. Sergeant McIntosh also wrote down the revolver’s serial number. The items displayed in the two photographs have no bearing either on the materials described in the search warrant or on the investigation of Sovereign’s supposed Dayton involvements. However, the seizure and notation of the serial number on the weapon are useful to the Cleveland authorities in their “continuing” investigation of Sovereign’s activities because they furnish an additional item of information by which the police could trace those persons having contacts with people in Sovereign’s Cleveland headquarters. Exhibit 79-A is a memorandum, dated March 25, 1976, from Reuben Sturman to all Sovereign employees exhorting them to actively oppose “Senate Bill 1,” which had been introduced in the United States Senate earlier that year. A four page newsletter published by the Cleveland branch of the American Civil Liberties Union, characterizing that legislation as the “most dire threat to civil liberties since McCarthy,” and “an attempted repeal of much of the Bill of Rights” is attached to Sturman’s note. The seized ACLU material attacks specific portions of S-l, but does not deal explicitly with obscenity. At worst, Exhibit 79-A consists of an innocent, written political diatribe, i. e., pure political speech, and is therefore an example of the form of expression to which the First Amendment of the United States Constitution extends the greatest measure of protection from governmental interference. Despite the highly protected character of the pure political speech material contained in Exhibit 79-A the Cleveland police officers who conducted the February 16, 1977 search seized that document as evidence that Sovereign engaged in the organized crime activity of pandering obscenity. Exhibit 79-A contains no references to Montgomery County, Ohio. The seizure of such pure political expression was beyond the scope of Common Pleas Judge Spellacy’s search warrant, and cannot be justified or tolerated on the speculative theory that Exhibit 79-A relates to any obscenity investigation in Montgomery County. The only purpose for seizing this political material is to identify the political views and affiliations of Sovereign and its chief executive officer, Sturman, for future reference in connection with the Cleveland Police Department’s continuing investigation of Sovereign’s and Sturman’s Cleveland operation. Exhibit 71 consists of a printed, eleven-page mailing list of locations throughout Ohio. It was discovered in Sturman’s office. The eleven separate pages are connected by only one staple at the top of each page. A notation on the outside of the envelope containing Exhibit 71 indicates that the eleven documents contain residential and store addresses in the Dayton area. However, only five of the eleven documents seized show addresses within the jurisdiction of Montgomery County. The first two pages of Exhibit 71 show addresses located only in the Columbus, Ohio, metropolitan area; the third and fourth sheets show addresses located only in the Cleveland, Ohio, metropolitan area; sheets five and six contain addresses primarily situated only in Cleveland, Akron and Canton, Ohio; and the rest of the documents each contain at least one reference to a Montgomery County address. The documents seized in Exhibit 71 exceed the scope of the search warrant to the extent that six readily severable records dealing with locations unrelated to Montgomery County were seized along with a few records containing addresses located within Montgomery County’s jurisdiction. The seizure of documents with addresses outside Montgomery County, and especially the seizure of the documents with Cleveland addresses, reveals the thirty Cleveland police officers focused attention on possible violations of the Ohio’s pandering obscenity and organized crime statutes in the Cleveland area, and in the areas of the state other than Montgomery County. Exhibit 86-A consists of an alphabetical accordian file containing many separate pads of typed address labels located in thirteen different Ohio cities, including Cleveland, Olmsted Falls, Lorain, Toledo and Dayton. The accordian file also contains address label pads for locations in Fort Worth, Texas and Indianapolis, Indiana. Despite the severability of each address label from the accordian file, the Cleveland policemen conducting the search seized the whole file, thus seizing addresses relating not only to Sovereign’s commercial activities in the Dayton area, but also its activities in other states, and other Ohio cities, including its commercial relations with bookstores situated in Cleveland. The seized Cleveland address labels are undoubtedly a great asset to the Cleveland Police Department’s own continuing investigation of Sovereign. However, Judge Spellacy’s search warrant did not authorize seizures of information unrelated to Sovereign’s alleged Dayton activity. The seizure of that information by Cleveland policemen, despite the lack of search warrant authorization for seizures pertaining to Sovereign’s solely Cleveland oriented transactions, indicates that the thirty Cleveland police officers who implemented the search warrant were seeking evidence to support their own investigation of Sovereign as well as evidence helpful to Robinson’s and Dalrymple’s Dayton investigation. Exhibit 89, is a three-ring, loose-leaf notebook labeled “General News Gallery” containing nine separate, enumerated documents of typed information regarding the distribution volume of the magazines Hustler, Chic, and Best of Hustler, to various drugstores, delicatessens, and cigar stores across Ohio. The first four documents among these business records seized from Sovereign contain no references to stores located in Montgomery County. The four business records delineate distribution patterns of the three magazines to thirty-two different locations in the Cleveland metropolitan area. Documents six through nine establish distribution channels for the three magazines to states outside Ohio, and other locations throughout Ohio, but outside Montgomery County, including seventeen separate stores in the greater Cleveland area. Of the nine separately numbered business documents contained in Exhibit 89, evidence of a commercial distribution channel from Sovereign to locations within the jurisdiction of Montgomery County appears only on the fifth document Several additional separate handwritten documents are clipped to the back inside cover of the notebook marked Exhibit 89. Among these seized documents are three sheets of white paper containing store names and a few commercial addresses, none of which are located in Montgomery County, a handwritten invoice indicating the February 2, 1977 sale of fifty copies of the March edition of Hustler magazine to the Zodiac Bookstore East in Columbus, Ohio, and five sheets of yellow legal size paper containing the same information as the nine typed documents found in the notebook. The seizure of the notebook, marked Exhibit 89, with all of its severable documentary contents, resulted in the Cleveland and Dayton authorities obtaining voluminous information describing Sovereign’s commercial distribution patterns for three magazines throughout the State of Ohio and into four other states. None of this was covered by the Common Pleas Judge’s search warrant. The seizure of all the documents in the notebook furnished evidence to the Cleveland authorities of commercial transactions with forty-nine separate retail outlets within the Cleveland area, despite the search warrant instructions limiting the seizure of records to those relating to commercial activity in Montgomery County. Document number five is the only record in Exhibit 89 which relates to business activities in Montgomery County, because it demonstrates connections with four bookstores in Dayton. However, the Cleveland Police Department’s seizure of eight separate documents, showing forty-nine commercial connections with stores in the Cleveland area, illustrates how the search warrant was used as a vehicle for furthering Cleveland’s own continuing investigation of Sovereign for violations of the Ohio organized crime and pandering obscenity laws within the Cleveland area. Exhibit 90 is a three-ring loose-leaf notebook labeled “A/R Invoice # Listing,” containing 105 separate documents of handwritten data depicting Sovereign’s accounts receivable (/. e., “A/R”) invoice numbers, the name of the retail customers for each invoice, the city in which the customer maintains its retail business, the amount of each invoice, and a date. Of the one-hundred-five separate loose-leaf documents contained in Exhibit 90, sixty-eight documents contain no entries involving commercial transactions between Sovereign and persons or businesses situated within the jurisdiction of Montgomery County, Ohio, the sixty-eight seized documents, which have no evidentiary value regarding pandering obscenity and organized crime violations in Montgomery County, nevertheless contain evidence of commercial transactions between Sovereign and book retailers throughout the rest of Ohio and in many states outside Ohio. For example, those sixty-eight seized documents which have no bearing on the Montgomery County investigation, record two-hundred-ninety separate sales transactions between Sovereign and book retailers within the Cleveland metropolitan area. Those sixty-eight documents, which are unrelated to Sovereign’s activities in Montgomery County and therefore beyond the scope of the search warrant, must have been seized by the Cleveland Police Department as evidence in support of its own continuing investigation of Sovereign’s possible violation of Ohio’s pandering obscenity and organized crime statutes by selling arguably obscene books within the greater Cleveland area. The characteristics of the evidence seized by thirty Cleveland and two Dayton policemen in the February 16,1977 raid on Sovereign’s building conclusively demonstrates the searching party’s orientation on the day of the search. This court finds that the Cleveland police participants in the February, 1977 raid sought evidence of possible violations of Ohio’s organized crime and pandering obscenity statutes by Sovereign in both the Dayton and Cleveland metropolitan areas, despite the restrictions in Judge Spellacy’s search warrant which authorized a search only for evidence relating to Sovereign’s Dayton connections. C. EVENTS AFTER THE RAID ON SOVEREIGN After completing the search of the premises, Cleveland Police Sergeant McIntosh and Dayton Policeman Robinson, working together, cataloged Exhibits 70 through 90, the documents and physical objects seized, and both men signed the inventory receipt form listing twenty-two items taken from Sovereign’s premises. No cataloging or inventory was made by Officers Millett, Berkey or Dalrymple regarding the photographic, video and audio recordings. The video tape made by Cleveland Policeman Millett, and the audio recording made by Cleveland Policeman Berkey never left the custody of the Cleveland Police Department. The still photographs taken by Officer Berkey were developed by the Cleveland Police Department, and reviewed by Sergeant McIntosh “two or three weeks” after the raid. At least one set of Berkey’s photographs never left the custody of the Cleveland Police until the start of the preliminary injunction hearing. Sometime after the preparation of the search inventory receipt form, the Cleveland and Dayton policemen jointly filed a return on the search warrant in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court and Judge Spellacy signed it. Exhibits 70 through 90 were transported to Dayton sometime thereafter. On March 3,1977 the Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office issued the first subpoenas compelling witnesses to appear before the Montgomery County Grand Jury in connection with that body’s investigation of Sovereign’s possible violation of the pandering obscenity and organized crime statutes. On March 7, 1977, Sovereign filed this action in the United States District Court of the Northern District of Ohio. On March 10 and 11, 1977, the Montgomery County Grand Jury heard testimony from 15 different witnesses pertaining to Sovereign’s transactions in that county, and the vast majority of Exhibits 70 through 90 were presented to that Grand Jury on March 10, 1977 Mr. Brogan, the Assistant Montgomery County Prosecutor in charge of presenting evidence of Sovereign’s behavior to the Montgomery County Grand Jury characterized the state of that body’s deliberations as of March 31,1977 when he testified: “Q Now, without divulging the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings inside the chambers where the grand jury sits in Montgomery County, is it a fact that you, as first assistant county prosecutor of Montgomery County, have been conducting an investigation or presentment to the Montgomery County grand jury in connection with matters involving Sovereign News Co. and/or its employees? “A That’s correct. “Q As a matter of fact that grand jury investigation is going on right now, is it not? “A That’s correct. “Q As a matter of fact there have been subpoenas issued for certain employees, five or six of them, of the Sovereign News Co. for an appearance at the grand jury tomorrow morning, April 1, 1977, isn’t that right? “A That’s correct. “Q And I suppose tomorrow afternoon as well? “A That’s correct. “Q All right. Is it fair to say, again without revealing evidence taken inside the grand jury chambers, is it fair to say that that grand jury investigation is investigating the question of whether or not Sovereign News Co. and/or a number of its employees are to be charged with crimes for violation of the Ohio pandering obscenity statute and the Ohio organized crime statute? “A That’s correct.” “Q And as I understand it, there are no pending state prosecutions against Sovereign News Co. or its employees that you are aware of under these statutes at the present time? “A Well, again I guess if you mean whether there is an actual indictment returned against Sovereign News or any of the employees, there is not an indictment as of yet. “Q All right. And I take it that when you say there is no indictment, you mean that there are no outstanding complaints or informations, either, at the present time? “A Yes, that’s correct. “Q All right, So that with respect to what we normally consider a criminal prosecution beginning with either an indictment or a complaint or an information, there are no such cases pending at the present time, is that a fact? “A That’s correct. “Q And when you say “yet,” it sounds to me as though you’re suggesting that there might soon come a time when such prosecutions will occur? “A It’s possible that an indictment might be returned. “Q All right. And there is no doubt in your mind that even though the pandering obscenity statute itself is a misdemeanor statute for a first offense, that the grand jury has the power to return an indictment under those circumstances? “A Yes, under the organized crime section it indicates five or more persons who do anything illegal for gain. So if the misdemeanor is illegal, I take it it would fall within that concept. “Q And you can independently prosecute for a misdemeanor under Rule 7? “A We could. It would probably be transferred to Municipal Court for prosecution in the event of only a misdemeanor indictment. “Q But it is clear that both statutes are under consideration now in terms of possible prosecution of Sovereign News Co. and its employees? “A Yes. “Q And can you tell me whether or not that company is a distributor of sexually oriented magazines, books and films? “A Our investigation reveals that, yes.” As noted above, this court concluded the hearing on the preliminary injunction on April 1,1977; all the defendants filed their answers to the plaintiff’s complaint by April 13, 1977; and the court received the initial briefs from all the defendants and the plaintiff by April 25, 1977. On June 21, 1977 defendant Falke, the Montgomery County Prosecutor for the first time furnished this court with a copy of the Montgomery County Grand Jury’s May 3, 1977 indictment of Sovereign which pertinently reads: “THE GRAND JURORS of the County of Montgomery, in the name, and by authority of the State of Ohio, on their oaths do present and find that Sovereign News . . ., “Between the 1st day of November, 1976 and the 21st day of December, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six in the County of Montgomery, aforesaid, and State of Ohio, did, with purpose to establish or maintain a criminal syndicate or to facilitate any of its activities, commit or act as accomplices in the commission of any offense of a type in which a criminal syndicate engages on a continuing basis, to-wit: Pandering Obscenity, a violation of Section 2907.32 of the Revised Code; contrary to the form of the statute (in violation of Section 2923.04(A)(5) of the Ohio Revised Code) in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio. “SECOND COUNT: “AND the grand jurors of this County, in the name and by the authority of the State of Ohio, upon their oaths, do find and present that: SOVEREIGN NEWS, Incorporated, . . . between the 1st day of November, 1976 and the 21st day of December, 1976 in the County of Montgomery, aforesaid, and State of Ohio, with knowledge of the character of the material involved, did exhibit or advertise for sale or dissemination or sell or publicly disseminate or display obscene material contrary to the form of the statute (in violation of Section 2907.32(a)(2) of the Ohio Revised Code) in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Ohio.” Based on these facts, this court must decide under either the Younger or Pullman doctrines whether it should abstain from considering the issuance of an injunction or a declaratory judgment against both the Montgomery County and the Cuyahoga County law enforcement officers, or against either separately. The court first directs its attention to the abstention issue, as that issue pertains to the Montgomery County authorities. III. THIS COURT ABSTAINS, UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF YOUNGER v. HARRIS, FROM CONSIDERING THE ISSUANCE OF EITHER AN INJUNCTION OR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AFFECTING THE PROCEEDINGS IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY. The watershed decision of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), defined the basis for federal judicial abstention in cases involving issues which are pending in parallel state proceedings. In Younger, plaintiff Harris filed a federal complaint seeking an injunction restraining the Los Angeles County District Attorney from prosecuting him on a California indictment in which he was charged with criminal syndicalism. Harris contended that the state prosecution “inhibited him in the exercise of his rights of free speech and press . . . guaranteed . by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Two individuals intervened in Harris’ federal action, claiming that his prosecution “would inhibit them as members of the Progressive Labor Party from peacefully advocating the program of their party.” A college instructor also intervened, claiming that Harris’ prosecution “made him uncertain as to whether he could teach about the doctrines of Karl Marx or read from the Communist Manifesto as part of his classwork.” The three-judge district court issued the injunction restraining Harris’ prosecution. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the three-judge court’s grant of the injunction, and held that the lower federal court should have abstained from deciding Harris’ federal claims. In Part I of its opinion, the Younger court held that the three plaintiffs, who had neither been indicted in state court, nor threatened with prosecution, but who nevertheless felt “inhibited” in exercising their First Amendment rights because of Harris’ indictment, failed to plead a sufficiently “live controversy” to sustain standing to challenge the California Criminal syndicalism statute. With respect to plaintiff Harris, the Younger court conceded that he sustained standing to challenge the criminal syndicalism statute by virtue of his state court indictment. However, the court concluded in Part II of its opinion that district courts, in deference to the role of state courts in our federal system, should normally abstain from litigating issues involving the constitutionality of a state statute when the federal plaintiff who asserts those issues in a federal district court has the opportunity to assert the same issues in defense of a single pending criminal proceeding in state court. The Younger court carefully limited the scope of this abstention doctrine to situations in which the federal plaintiff could establish no “extraordinary circumstances,” such as a bad faith state prosecution, which would cause the federal plaintiff to sustain an uniquely severe burden if he were denied access to the federal forum. The Younger decision, and the complex web of subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions which formulate the “Younger doctrine,” must be considered by this court before it can decide the merits of Sovereign’s claim that Ohio’s pandering obscenity and organized crime statutes violate the First Amendment. A. STANDING Any federal district court charged with the duty to determine whether the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-55, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) applies to a plaintiff’s claim must first decide whether the plaintiff sustains standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to personally assert its claims against the defendant. In this case, the record demonstrates that as of April 25, 1977, Sovereign was the target of an advanced investigation conducted by the Dayton Police Department, the Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, and the Montgomery County Grand Jury. The Montgomery County authorities’ investigation focused solely on Sovereign’s alleged violation, in Montgomery County, of Ohio Revised Code §§ 2907.32, 2907.01, and 2923.04 which comprise the Ohio pandering obscenity and organized crime statutes. The record indicates that the Dayton police conducted interviews with Dayton bookstore operators, as well as searches and seizures of publications and other merchandise in certain enumerated Dayton book establishments. Based on the information obtained in Dayton, the Montgomery County authorities enlisted the assistance of law enforcement authorities in Cuyahoga County who were conducting a parallel “continuing” investigation of Sovereign’s possible violations of the same pandering obscenity and organized crime statutes in Cuyahoga County. The result of this alliance was the February 16, 1977 search of Sovereign’s Cleveland office and warehouse, ostensibly for evidence of Sovereign’s alleged organized crime and pandering obscenity violations in Montgomery County. Much of the evidence from that search was presented to the Montgomery County Grand Jury by March 11, 1977, and that body had subpoenaed several Sovereign employees as of March 31, 1977. James Brogan, the Montgomery County Assistant Prosecutor in charge of presenting evidence to the grand jury, testified that as of March 31, 1977 the grand jury’s investigation of Sovereign focused on violations of Ohio organized crime statutes and the Ohio pandering obscenity statute in Montgomery County. This evidence persuades the court, beyond a reasonable doubt, that as of April 25, .1977, at the latest, Sovereign was threatened with prosecution by the authorities in Dayton and Montgomery County for violations of Ohio Revised Code §§ 2907.32, 2907.01, and 2923.04, and therefore had standing under Article III of the United States Constitution, to challenge the constitutional validity of these provisions. See, Younger, 401 U.S. supra, at 41-42, 91 S.Ct. 746; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458-460, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1215, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (“At the threshold we must consider whether petitioner presents an ‘actual controversy,’ a requirement imposed by Art. Ill of the Constitution. . . Unlike three of the appellees in Younger v. Harris . . . 401 U.S. at 41, 91 S.Ct. [746,] at 749, petitioner has alleged threats of prosecution that cannot be characterized as ‘imaginary or speculative,’ id., at 42, 91 S.Ct. [746] at 749”); Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 928, 930-931, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1433, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); Contrast, Steffel, supra, 415 U.S. at 476, 94 S.Ct. 1209 (Stewart, J., concurring); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 80-81, 91 S.Ct. 758, 27 L.Ed.2d 696 (1971); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-499, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 827-830, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (Burger, C. J., joined by JJ., White and Rehnquist, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (1974). Montgomery County’s May 3, 1977 indictment of Sovereign for violating' Ohio’s organized crime and pandering obscenity statutes solely in Montgomery County, reinforces this court’s conclusion that as of April 25, 1977 Sovereign sustained a concrete threat that its operation of a book distribution network in Montgomery County would result in a criminal prosecution for alleged violations of Ohio Revised Code §§ 2907.32, 2907.01, and 2923.04 arising solely within the Montgomery County’s jurisdiction. See, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483-484, 486-489, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965); Younger, 401 U.S. supra, at 41-42, 91 S.Ct. 746 (placing a limiting gloss on Dombrowski’s standing rule); Steffel, 415 U.S. supra, at 458-460, 94 S.Ct. 1209. B. THE DOCTRINE OF YOUNGER v. HARRIS APPLIES TO THE CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION WHICH MONTGOMERY COUNTY INITIATED AGAINST SOVEREIGN Having decided that a plaintiff has standing to seek an injunction restraining state officers from enforcing state criminal statutes against the plaintiff, and declaratory relief, the court must next determine whether the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. supra, at 53-55, 91 S.Ct. 746 (1971) applies. Younger does not require this court to abstain in every case where state proceedings have been initiated. If the court concludes that the procedural posture of the state criminal enforcement proceedings which the plaintiff attacks has not advanced to the point that the Younger doctrine applies, then this court must immediately decide the merits of the federal plaintiff’s challenge to the actions of the defendants. See, Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460, 474-475, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974); Doran v. Salem, Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975); Wooley v. Maynard, 403 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1433-1434, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). However, if the procedural posture of the criminal enforcement activity conducted by the defendants did advance to a point where Younger applies to the plaintiff’s injunctive and declaratory complaint, then the federal court must not deal with merits of the plaintiff’s constitutional claims, unless the plaintiff first establishes that its case involves “extraordinary circumstances” justifying federal judicial incursion into an advanced stage of a state criminal enforcement action. See, Younger, 401 U.S. supra, at 53-54, 91 S.Ct. 746; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 75-76, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 203, 91 S.Ct. 769, 27 L.Ed.2d 781 (1971); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230-231, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 123-126, fn. 4, 95 S.Ct. 1524, 44 L.Ed.2d 15 (1975); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 819 fn. 14, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (1974); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350-352, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611-612, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 1218-1219, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 442-448 fn. 7, 97 S.Ct. 1911, 1917-1920 fn. 7, 52 L.Ed.2d 486 (1977); Sendak v. Nihiser, 431 U.S. 961, 97 S.Ct. 2914, 53 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1977); Compare, Cline v. Frink Dairy, 274 U.S. 445, 451-453, 47 S.Ct. 681, 71 L.Ed. 1146 (1927). Thus, the introduction of the Younger abstention issue into federal litigation between state criminal enforcement officials and plaintiffs who are targets for the enforcement of state criminal statutes, which they contend are unconstitutional, demands that the federal court carefully assess the procedural posture of the state criminal enforcement action. However, assessment of the procedural posture of the defendants’ state-oriented criminal enforcement action is complicated because those state enforcement activities may frequently progress during the course of the federal litigation so that the state activities which the plaintiff challenges may move through successively more advanced stages as the federal litigation itself goes forward. This problem arose in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 337-342, 349-350, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975) in which police, acting pursuant to search warrants, seized four copies of the movie “Deep Throat” from a theatre in Orange County, California and three days later, on November 27, 1974, a California state court held the seized film obscene. On November 29, 1974, the plaintiffs, owners of the theatre, who were not then parties to any litigation in state court, filed a suit against four of the police officers who participated in the seizure and the Orange County, California District Attorney. The Hicks plaintiffs sought a federal court order declaring the California obscenity statute, pursuant to which the seizure occurred, unconstitutional and mandating the return of the four seized copies of the film. The federal court heard the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and denied it. A three-judge court was convened on January 8, 1974, and service of the federal plaintiffs’ complaint was made on January 14, 1974. On January 15, 1974, prior to the federal defendants filing their answers to the complaint, and prior to “any proceedings whatsoever before the three-judge court,” but long after the filing of the federal complaint and the federal court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order, the California officials formally charged the federal plaintiffs as defendants in a state prosecution, arising from the original seizure, under the statutes which the federal plaintiffs challenged in the federal litigation. The United States Supreme Court held that the Younger doctrine applied to the federal plaintiffs’ complaint in federal court, notwithstanding that the state activities which the federal plaintiffs challenged had advanced to the stage of a pending criminal action in state court several weeks after the plaintiffs filed their federal complaint and the federal court denied the request for a temporary restraining order. The Hicks court reasoned: “[W]e now hold that where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court, the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force.” See, Hicks, 422 U.S. supra, at 349, 95 S.Ct. at 2292 (emphasis added). Thus Hicks, supra, suggests that a federal district court, charged with the duty to determine whether the Younger doctrine applies to federal injunctive and declaratory litigation between state law enforcement officials and plaintiffs who are the targets of state criminal enforcement activities, must first decide on what date “proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court.” After fixing such a date, the federal court must determine the procedural posture of the state’s enforcement actions, as of the date on which substantive proceedings occurred in the federal litigation. If the state’s act, which is the subject of the federal plaintiffs’ complaint, did not attain a sufficiently advanced procedural stage within the state’s criminal justice system, by the date “proceedings of substance” transpired in the federal litigation, then the federal court may decide the merits of the plaintiffs’ complaint without analyzing the impact of the Younger doctrine. Compare, Town of Lockport v. Citizens For Community Action, 430 U.S. 259, 1051 fn. 8, 97 S.Ct. 1047, 1051 fn. 8, 51 L.Ed.2d 313 (1977). However, if the defendants’ conduct, which is the subject of the plaintiff’s complaint, attained a sufficiently advanced stage within the state’s criminal justice enforcement system by the date “proceedings of substance” transpired in the federal litigation, then Younger descends over that federal litigation, and the federal court must determine if it has jurisdiction in terms of Younger’s comity principles. The court concludes that “proceedings of substance on the merits” occurred in Sovereign’s federal litigation against the Montgomery County and Cuyahoga County law enforcement authorities on April 25, 1977. As of that date: (1) Sovereign’s federal complaint was filed, and served on all the defendants; (2) a motion for a preliminary injunction was filed; (3) this federal court conducted a three-day hearing at which it denied a motion to transfer venue, heard testimony and extensive legal arguments on the merits of both Sovereign’s preliminary injunction and declaratory judgment claims; (4) all the defendants answered Sovereign’s complaint; (5) the Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office filed supplementary evidence to complete the record of the preliminary injunction and declaratory judgment hearing; (6) and all defendants had filed their briefs in opposition to Sovereign’s assertion of entitlement, on the merits of its First Amendment claim to a declaratory judgment, and on its claim, for a preliminary injunction. Having fixed April 25, 1977 as the date on which Sovereign’s federal litigation ripened into “proceedings of substance on the merits,” the court concludes that the issue of whether Younger applies must depend upon the procedural posture of the Montgomery County and Cuyahoga County enforcement activities as of April 25, 1977. Procedural stages which occur within the jurisdiction of a state’s criminal justice system, after the date on which “proceedings of substance on the merits” transpired in the related federal declaratory and injunctive litigation cannot terminate the more1 advanced federal action. This court cannot permit officials of a state to manipulate the comity principles of Younger in order to oust the court’s jurisdiction over a case raising significant constitutional questions. That intolerable result would materialize if the state could obtain Younger’s protection by continuing their enforcement activities after all parties, and the court itself, invested substantial resources in the determination of the federal litigation, at a point in time before the federal defendants’ state enforcement activities advanced to a posture entitling them to Younger’s cloak. Thus, this court will not permit state officials, who are usually the defendants in cases like Sovereign’s, to strip a federal court of jurisdiction by advancing the state enforcement activities, which a plaintiff claims are unconstitutional, to a stage protected by Younger, after that federal court conducted substantial proceedings. Such an expansion of Younger’s scope, beyond the carefully delineated limitations expressed in Hicks, would eviscerate the right of citizens to protect themselves from irreparable injury by resort to immediate federal litigation, when they sustain Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 standing to challenge a threatened state criminal enforcement action, predicated on an unconstitutional state statute, pri- or to the actual initiation of the threatened state proceeding. C. EXAMINATION OF THE STATUS, AS OF APRIL 25, 1977, OF THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY LAW EN- cided before April 25, 1977. For example, this court denied the contested motion to change venue before April 25, 1977. FORCEMENT OFFICERS’ ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE OHIO CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM REVEALS THAT THOSE ACTIONS WERE SUFFICIENTLY ADVANCED TO TRIGGER THE PROTECTIVE CLOAK OF THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE The record demonstrates that before April 25, 1977, the date on which proceedings of substance on the merits of Sovereign’s federal complaint took place in this federal court, the Montgomery County authorities took the following steps toward prosecuting Sovereign within the Ohio state system: (1) on November 1, 1976, responding to complaints, the Dayton police commenced an investigation of Sovereign’s activities in that city; (2) twelve Dayton bookstores were placed under surveillance; a Dayton Municipal Judge determined the twelve seized magazines obscene; (3) on December 19,1976 the Municipal Judge issued a search warrant authorizing the search of the twelve Dayton bookstores; (4) the Dayton search warrant was executed and the Dayton police were told of the close connection between at least some of the Dayton stores and Sturman and Sovereign; (5) on February 15, 1977 the Montgomery County authorities, acting in conjunction with the Cuyahoga County authorities, obtained a search warrant for Sovereign’s Cleveland premises from a Cuyahoga County Common Pleas judge; (6) on February 16; 1977 the Dayton police, furnished with assistance by the Cleveland police, searched every office, and every box of magazines inside Sovereign’s Cleveland building, and located some evidence of Sovereign’s book dealings in Montgomery County. By March 11,1977, most of the documentary evidence seized in the February raid was presented to the Montgomery County grand jury, which had subpoenaed several Sovereign employees as witnesses, and heard testimony