Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM GRANT, District Judge. I — INTRODUCTION On 28 November 1972, twenty-six named plaintiffs brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, [the “Act”], individually and on behalf of other female employees, against the Uniroyal Corporation and their collective bargaining representative, Local Union No. 65, alleging various discriminatory employment practices on the basis of sex. Jurisdiction is founded upon 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). On 4 September 1974, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on all issues of class liability and a motion for a preliminary injunction. Approximately two years later, Uniroyal filed a cross-motion seeking summary judgment with respect to four specific matters at issue. All motions and supporting briefs have been timely filed with the court. 1. Motions for Summary Judgment Summary judgment should only be entered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions filed in the case “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”. Rule 56 F.R.C.P. Under this rule the movant bears the heavy burden of demonstrating the absence of all material factual issues; furthermore, all factual uncertainties shall be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 1973); Albert Dickinson Co. v. Mellos Peanut Co., 179 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1950). As for cross-motions for summary judgment, see 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2720 p. 459 (1973). This court, however, does not begin with a clean slate. On 5 July 1973, the late Judge Beamer entered partial summary judgment against Uniroyal on the following matters: (1) The company has conducted layoffs in the Mishawaka plant on a segregated basis according to sex; (2) At all times up to and including 1970, defendant company paid new employees at the plant according to discriminatory starting pay rates on the basis of sex, and (3) Defendant company refuses to consider female employees for assignment, transfer, or promotion to jobs which were restricted to male employees only, regardless of the seniority or qualifications of the female employees. Those jobs are listed in plaintiffs’ requests to admit facts filed 2 March 1973. This order was based upon the Company’s failure to respond to plaintiffs’ requests for admissions in accordance with Rule 36, F.R.C.P. There has been much discussion by the parties concerning the significance of this order. Having considered the respective arguments, the court concludes that Judge Beamer’s findings merely establish in plaintiffs’ favor a prima facie case of sex discrimination which defendant may seek to now justify. The 5 July 1973 order, therefore, will not be considered dis-positive of the above issues unless no viable defense is presented by the Company. See, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). This being a motion for summary judgment with respect to the issue of class liability, the court’s inquiry must be limited to a comparison between the disparate effects, if any, that a particular employment practice has upon two groups or classes of individuals. The focus during the first stage of this bifurcated class action is “inter-class” as opposed to “intra-class” which, of course, is the proper inquiry during the second, or individual relief stage. The distinction must be clearly drawn at the outset since Uniroyal has, in many instances, raised arguments that would have the court examine the merits of individual claims. See, Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 443-44 (5th Cir. 1974). Before examining plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the court shall first examine several preliminary issues raised by Defendant Uniroyal and Defendant Local No. 65. II — UNIROYAL’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1. Alleged Discriminatory Layoffs The Company first seeks a ruling that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction with respect to claims of discriminatory layoffs occurring more than ninety days prior to the filing of charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Beginning in November 1968, the Company began laying off several hundred employees over a two-year period as the plant’s footwear divisions (which employed approximately 42% of the work force at the Mishawaka facility) were being closed and transferred to locations in the East. On 13 January 1970 plaintiffs filed charges with the EEOC specifically complaining that the layoffs were conducted in a discriminatory fashion to the detriment of female employees; therefore, the applicable cut-off date is 15 October 1969 (ninety days prior to the filing of charges with the EEOC). Generally, Title VII provides that to present a cognizable claim in federal court, an aggrieved party must first file a complaint with the EEOC within ninety days after the alleged unlawful employment practice has occurred. This basic limitation, however, may be extended (or tolled) in those instances where the alleged discriminatory conduct is considered to be a “continuing violation” of the Act. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971); Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969). Here, Uniroyal contends that individual claims which allege discriminatory layoffs prior to 15 October 1969 should now be dismissed. It is defendant’s contention that such layoffs are not “continuing violations” of Title VII. This is the second time Uniroyal has advanced this argument before the court. On 23 March 1973 Judge Beamer, in an order denying Uniroyal’s motion to dismiss and/or strike portions of plaintiffs’ complaint, rejected the Company’s position: Finally, defendant contends that the claims of discriminatory layoffs . . are not continuing violations and, therefore, only eleven of the plaintiffs have made a timely presentation of this claim to the EEOC. As noted above . the court must assume that this is a proper class action and, accordingly, all of the plaintiffs need not have made a’ timely presentation of this charge. Oatis v. Crown Fellerback Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). Therefore, we need not reach the question of whether such charges constitute continuing violations. The court refuses to set aside Judge Beamer’s earlier determination. However, the court is unable to agree with plaintiffs that the issue raised by the Company is wholly immaterial to this case. Whether or not the tardy claims are barred by the statutory limitation is a question which the March 23rd order, and cases cited therein, did not reach. Consequently, the court must reserve judgment on this matter until the individual relief stage of this case when it shall be appropriate for the court to conduct an “intra-class” examination of individual claims. 2. Duty of Affirmative Action Uniroyal next asks for a ruling that it did not violate Title VII with respect to plaintiffs’ allegations that subsequent to November 1971 the Company failed to adopt a credible policy of equal employment opportunity. The Company maintains that an employer has no obligation under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to fashion and implement an affirmative action program unless so ordered by a judicial decree. Defendant’s claim has no merit. See, Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers, A.F.L.-C.I.O., C.L.C. v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 987-91 (5th Cir. 1969); Myers v. Gilmore Paper Co., 392 F.Supp. 413, 420 (S.D.Ga.1975); Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 352 F.Supp. 230 (S.D.Ala.1972); United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F.Supp. 532 (W.D.N.C.1971); United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 327 F.Supp. 1034 (E.D.Va.1971); and Irvin v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 308 F.Supp. 152 (E.D.Ark.1970). The more difficult question now facing the court is whether Uniroyal breached its duty of affirmative action. As a practical matter, that issue cannot be determined until the full extent of Uniroyal’s discriminatory practices before November 1971, if any, is established. The matter shall be examined with respect to plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. Ill — UNION’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Apart from alleging the existence of factual issues requiring trial, the Union has set forth various reasons why plaintiffs, as a matter of law, cannot succeed in their effort. Plaintiffs’ motion states that: Contrary to its duty the defendant Local No. 65, United Rubber Workers, in its agreements with Uniroyal has discriminated against the female members of its collective bargaining unit, including all of the dues-paying female members of the Local, by negotiating pay rates for the Mishawaka plant which discriminate against female workers as a class arid by agreeing to discriminatory bidding, bumping, and disqualification rules that perpetuate segregation and discrimination against the female employees it has the duty to represent. The defendant union has acquiesced while Uniroyal has maintained a segregated system of employment that has discriminated against the female members of its collective bargaining unit as a class with respect to job assignments, promotions, transfers, layoffs, recalls, and terminations. The Union’s first defense is that any and all discriminatory employment practices were solely the result of Uniroyal’s policies and procedures. Without citing any authority, the Union submits that acquiescence by a union to an employer’s unlawful employment practices is a valid defense in a Title VII action. However, all authorities located by the court have reached the opposite conclusion. For example, in Myers v. Gilman Paper Co., supra, the court’s memorandum reads as follows: In general, the defendant Unions argue that they took no part in any discriminatory practices prior to or after 1965, and that Gilman Paper Corporation was solely responsible for all racial discrimination in employment, assignments, promotions, and transfers . Assuming, without finding, that Gil-man was solely responsible for all racial discrimination in employment, assignments, promotions, and transfers prior to and after 1965, that fact raises no defense for the Unions. The essence of the plaintiffs’ claim against the Unions is that the collective bargaining agreements tended to perpetuate and, in fact, perpetuated past discrimination, thus constituting present discrimination. Recent decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit leave this Court with the clear understanding that Title VII, as construed in this circuit, places an affirmative duty on labor unions, as well as employers, to take corrective steps to prevent present discriminatory practices, to remove impediments that perpetuate past discrimination, and to place discriminatees into their “rightful place”. (Citations omitted.) Id. at 419-420; see also, Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Synthetic Rubber Plant, 491 F.2d 1364, 1381-82 (5th Cir. 1974); and Machlin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 156 U.S.App.D.C. 69 at 79, 478 F.2d 979 at 989 (1973). Furthermore, the Union’s implication that it acted at all times in good faith is inconsequential under the Act. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, 401 U.S. at 432, 91 S.Ct. 849. The Union next challenges on three grounds the plaintiffs’ allegation that the Local failed to represent its membership in a fair manner as mandated by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970). See Steele v. Louisville & N. L. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944). Relying upon Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R. B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962) and Local Union No. 12 United Rubber Workers v. N.L.R.B., 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), the Local first argues that plaintiffs’ claim should be presented before the National Labor Relations Board rather than this court. In other words, the Union maintains that the Board’s jurisdiction pre-empts this court of the authority needed to entertain the instant matter. However, after Miranda Fuel and Local Union No. 12 were decided, the Supreme Court, in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S. Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), had this to say about the pre-emption doctrine: A primary justification for the preemption doctrine — the need to avoid conflicting rules of substantive law in the labor relations area and the desirability of leaving the development of such rules to the administrative agency created by Congress for that purpose — is not applicable to cases involving alleged breaches of the union’s duty of fair representation. The doctrine was judicially developed in Steele and its progeny, and suits alleging breach of duty remained judicially cognizable long after the NLRB was given unfair labor practice jurisdiction over union activities by the L.M.R.A. Moreover, when the Board declared in Miranda Fuel that a union’s breach of its duty of fair representation would henceforth be treated as an unfair labor practice, the Board adopted and applied the doctrine as it had been developed by the federal courts. Thus, the court has the power to adjudicate the § 158 claim. The Union further argues, without supporting authority, that the representational duty is in some way limited to unions which have historically refused membership to black individuals. The court is unable to discern any such limitation. While many of the reported cases have involved racially segregated unions, the Steele decision makes clear that the statutory duty extends to all labor organizations defined by N.L. R.A., and is designed to eliminate all irrelevant and invidious classification schemes, including discrimination on the basis of sex. Cf. Adkinson v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., Inc., 10 FEP Cas. 710 (N.D.Ga.1975); and Glus v. Murphy Co., 329 F.Supp. 563 (W.D. Pa.1971). Lastly, the Union contends that plaintiffs’ claim must fail since plaintiffs did not exhaust their intra-union remedies before commencing this suit. As a general rule, an aggrieved party must first resort to such remedies before his claim may be adjudicated in federal court. The purpose of this rule is well stated in Ruficka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 1975): The reason for this requirement is that intra-union remedies are part and parcel of the industrial in-house procedure for settling labor disputes. The primary benefit of requiring initial submission of employee complaints against a union . . . is that the internal machinery can settle difficulties short of court action. It is quite apparent in this case that to find in defendant’s favor would not effectuate the purpose of the exhaustion requirement. The conciliatory mechanisms of Title VII have failed to produce amiable results. To now separate the N.L.R.A. claim and return the plaintiffs to their union remedies in hope of reaching an accord would certainly be a fruitless endeavor. Therefore, the court shall now consider the instant claim, together with those arising under Title VII. See, Jones v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1974). IV — PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1. Pre-Act Employment Practices Plaintiffs begin their motion and brief arguing that prior to the effective date of Title VII, 2 July 1965, Uniroyal openly segregated job opportunities according to an individual’s sex. Specifically, plaintiffs maintain that Uniroyal (1) classified each job within the plant as a “male” or “female” job; (2) operated a segregated personnel office on the basis of sex; (3) paid male employees a higher wage rate than female employees, and (4) kept seniority lists for each department within the plant on a segregated basis according to sex. It is today well settled that the provisions of Title VII are not retroactive in effect; discriminatory employment practices happening prior to 2 July 1965 and ending thereafter will not, when standing alone, give rise to a cause of action. See, e. g., James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 394 F.Supp. 434, 493 (D.Ala.1975). However, Title VII places an affirmative duty upon an employer to rectify the current effects of wrongful discrimination which existed before passage of the Act. See, e. g., Myers v. Gilmore Paper Co., supra, at 420. Subsequent to 2 July 1965, then, failure on the part of an employer to voluntarily remove the discriminatory effects of its pre-Act employment practices will constitute an encroachment of Title VII, provided the aggrieved party can establish a causal nexus between past discrimination and present conditions of employment. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., supra, at 493. For this reason, the Company’s employment practices and policies in effect before 1965 are relevant to this case. When discrimination in employment practices and conditions is alleged, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing disparate treatment between two classes of individuals. Generally, statistical evidence is used to accomplish this task. Ibid, at 492. Assuming the plaintiff meets this challenge, the burden then shifts to the defendant to justify its actions. Unintentional discriminatory practices as well as discrimination founded upon a compelling “business purpose” are viable defenses under the Act. See, Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, 401 U.S. at 432, 91 S.Ct. 849, respectively. In the present case, Uniroyal does not dispute plaintiffs’ allegations of discriminatory conduct described above; it does, however, seek to justify the “male”-“female” job classification scheme. According to the Company, the scheme resulted from the personal preferences of female employees to perform the less physically demanding “female” jobs as opposed to the more strenuous tasks of a “male” job. Defendant has submitted several affidavits of employees which state, in essence, that no female worker ever expressed a willingness to hold a traditionally designated male position. The Company, therefore, concludes that the “concentration” of female workers in certain departments within the plant was the result of factors other than Uniroyal’s employment practices and policies. The question which immediately arises is whether an employer, whose female employees prefer to hold the lower paying and less strenuous positions, is in violation of federal law. The obvious answer to this question is no, provided all qualified employees possess the unfettered right to seek any job available within the plant. That situation did not exist at Uniroyal prior to 1965. The record clearly shows that defendant deliberately constructed a system of classifying jobs in which the determinative factor was an individual’s sex and not his or her abilities. Although ostensibly based upon good faith, Uniroyal’s presumption that all female workers could perform none of the male jobs because of their supposed physical limitations is precisely the evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII. See, e. g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 91 S.Ct. 496, 27 L.Ed.2d 613 (1972); Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975); and Sporgis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971). Uniroyal’s conduct is clearly outside the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) which provides an exception to the general prohibitions of Title VII when “sex . is a bona fide occupational qualification” [BFOQ]. Recently, the same defense came before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971). In that case the court rejected defendant’s BFOQ argument, stating at pages 1224-25: . on the basis of a general assumption regarding the physical capabilities of female employees, the company attempts to raise a commonly accepted characterization of women as the “weaker sex” to the level of a BFOQ . Based on the legislative intent and on the Commission’s interpretation, sexual characteristics, rather than characteristics that might, to one degree or another, correlate with a particular sex, must be the basis for the application of the BFOQ exception. See Developments in the Law — Title VII, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1109, 1178-1179 (1971). Southern Pacific has not, and could not allege such a basis here, and section 703(e) thus could not exempt its policy from the impact of Title VII. There was no error in the granting of summary judgment on this issue. There being no indication in the present case that the sexual characteristics of an employee are crucial to the successful performance of a “male” job (as would be the case, for example, with the need for an actor or actress) the court must similarly reject defendant’s contention. See, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a). The Company’s position is strengthened neither by the allegation that it did not intentionally discriminate on the basis of sex, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, 401 U.S. at 432, 91 S.Ct. 849, nor the fact that no female employee ever challenged the system by trying to obtain a male job. See Sagers v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 388 F.Supp. 507, 515 (N.D.Ga.1973); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 4 FEP Cas. 325, 329 (Pa.Cmwlth.1972). Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight Co., 505 F.2d 40, 58 (5th Cir. 1974); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 369 F.Supp. 522 (W.D.Pa.1973). Defendant has not challenged the remaining allegations of discriminatory conduct. Consequently, the court finds that prior to 2 July 1965, Uniroyal segregated jobs at the Mishawaka facility on the basis of sex; maintained a segregated personnel office on the basis of sex; kept segregated seniority lists according to sex; and paid male employees a higher wage rate than female employees. As stated above, however, such findings do not constitute violations of Title VII unless plaintiffs establish a nexus between the discriminatory practices just described and post July 1965 employment conditions. To that matter the court now turns. 2. 1965-1970 Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became effective July 2nd of that year, the provisions of Title VII did not take effect until 2 July 1965. The enforcement delay was permitted so that employers would have sufficient time in which to familiarize themselves with the new legislation as well as to remove from their employment systems all unjustified forms of segregation. In this case, plaintiffs claim that from the effective date of Title VII until the end of 1970, Uniroyal maintained the same segregated employment system which existed before passage of the Act. In their brief, plaintiffs have enumerated eight specific instances in which Uniroyal allegedly continued to discriminate against the class of female employees throughout the first five years of Title VII. Each allegation will be examined seriatim. A — The Alleged Segregated “A-B” System The first issue before the court is whether the Company abolished the segregated “male-female” job classification system following the enactment of Title VII. Having considered the evidence, the court finds that Uniroyal’s action had the effect of merely disguising the former discriminatory system. The only change discernable to the court is one of form; the traditionally designated “male” jobs were reclassified as “Class A” jobs, and the traditional “female” positions were reclassified' as “Class B” jobs. Of significance is the fact that Uniroyal also began categorizing all employees on the basis of sex. All male workers were known as “A” workers and assigned to Class A jobs, and all female workers were known as “B” workers and assigned to Class B jobs. Unsurprisingly, the statistical evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the new “AB” system operated to restrict an employee’s job opportunities to the same extent as before the enactment of Title VII. Such evidence establishes for plaintiffs a prima facie case which defendant has not attempted to justify other than to say that the system was not intentionally designed with discriminatory consequences in mind, and that no female employee outwardly expressed a desire to hold a Class A job. However, as we have indicated before, such arguments do not present tenable defenses in a Title VII suit. See p. 11, infra. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a decree that Uniroyal’s dual system of designating both employees and jobs within the plant was discriminatory on the basis of sex. B — Alleged Discriminatory Practices Regarding Job Bidding, Bumping and Promotion Plaintiffs next seek a judgment that Uniroyal maintained unlawful bidding, bumping and promotion rules from 1965 through 1970. It appears that very little actually changed at the Mishawaka facility after Title VII went into effect. Under the Company’s “A-B” system, no female employee ever held a traditionally designated “male” job during this period of time. Bidding Rules The terms of the labor agreement then in force (1965-1970), provided that qualified employees were permitted to bid on jobs located anywhere in the plant; the agreement contained no reference to an individual’s sex. Although seemingly innocuous, in operation this proviso presented an obstacle to female employees wishing to enter the Class A job market. When a particular job became available in his department, a plant foreman was required to categorize each vacancy as a Class A or Class B job. Employees desiring to bid on the job would have to act according to those designations since “A” jobs were filled by Mr. Edgar Kavanaugh, Supervisor of Male Employment, and the “B” jobs were filled by Mrs. Elizabeth Hoffer, Supervisor of Female Employment. See Part IV, 2-E. Thus, if a female worker wanted to bid on ah “A” job, she would have to obtain that job through an office which has traditionally placed male workers in the plant and which, by its very name, gave the appearance of continued preferential treatment. Female workers, therefore, would have to challenge Uniroyal’s employment system in order to successfully bid on jobs historically held by men. The rules posed an uncertain risk to females, which members of the opposite sex — solely because of their sex — did not have to encounter. The graph below shows the discriminatory impact that the bidding rules had in the plant. JOB BIDDING 1968-1970 Bids by Bids by Jobs Total Male Female Posted Bids Emolovees Emolovees ‘Class A” 1,869 1,868 i ‘Class B” 1,197 2 1,195 Bumping Rules From 1965 through 1968, the labor agreements at Uniroyal also provided that each employee affected by the shutdown of a product line or division had the option, regardless of sex, of (1) bumping a less senior employee on a job which the affected worker could perform within a reasonably short training period; (2) bumping a less senior employee on a job in which the former employee had previous experience; or (3) by accepting an “open” job located anywhere in the plant. When considered in isolation, the contractual bumping rules appear to be consonant with the demands of Title VII. However, when set against the discriminatory “A-B” system, the provisions also had the effect of restricting job opportunities on the basis of sex. Before 1971, an incumbent employee seeking to bump into a Class A job did so by going through Mr. Kavanaugh’s office. If, on the other hand, a worker wanted to bump into a Class B job, the request was channeled through Mrs. Hoffer’s office. By its very nature, this system of filling different jobs and job opportunities through different offices labeled “male” and “female” is presumptively invalid. Cypress v. Newport News, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967). Once again, in order to move into a higher paying Class A job, a female worker would have to break precedent and challenge the traditional employment practices of Uniroyal. Male employees, on the other hand, did not have to undertake such a task (at least with respect to the “A” jobs). It is not surprising then, that no female employee successfully bumped into a Class A job until Frances Klaer did so in 1971. For these reasons, the same result must also obtain in connection with Uniroyal’s practice of promoting employees within the plant. Consequently, the court finds as a matter of law, that Uniroyal maintained discriminatory bidding and promotion rules from 1965 until and including. 1970, and discriminatory bumping rules from 1965 to 1968, in violation of the Act’s prohibition against sex discrimination. C — Alleged Exclusion of Female Employees from Most of the Departments and Jobs in the Plant It is plaintiffs’ contention that following the enactment of Title VII, Uniroyal continued to exclude female employees from most of the departments in the plant. In June 1970, for example, defendant operated 89 departments of which 61 were restricted to male employees. Four departments were restricted to females; the remaining 24 departments contained both Class A and Class B jobs. The graph below portrays a prima facie case of discrimination. JUNE 1970 Department Employment Statistics bv Sex 24 Male Departments— 61 Male 4 Female & Female Male Employees— 782 - 0 - 268 Female Employees— - 0 - 25 370 Total Employees— 782 25 638 Plaintiffs further maintain that defendant excluded female employees from most of the jobs in the plant. In 1969, for instance, the Company designated 1,251 jobs as “A” jobs and only 460 jobs as “B” jobs. Thus, female workers were restricted to one-fourth of the available jobs. Having advanced no justification for this statistical disparity (other than those resolved earlier in plaintiffs’ favor), the court finds that due to discriminatory employment practices described above, Uniroyal wrongfully restricted female employees to particular departments and jobs solely on the basis of sex. D — Allegations that Uniroyal Paid Female Employees Less than Male Employees Plaintiffs next seek a determination that Uniroyal paid female workers with Class B jobs a lower wage rate than male workers with Class A jobs, and that the reason for this differentiation was based solely upon sex. Evidence submitted by the plaintiffs for the year 1969, for example, clearly shows that in eight of Uniroyal’s 14 plant divisions, the lowest paid male workers holding an “A” job received a higher wage rate than the highest paid female worker with a “B” job. Thus, in many instances, male employees, including new male employees, were paid a higher wage rate than their female counterparts. Section 2000e-2(h) of the Act provides in pertinent part: It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29. Section 206(d), or the Equal Pay Act, forbids wage discrimination “between employees on the basis of sex” when employees perform “equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.” Under this section, the court’s initial inquiry is always: Are the jobs held by a male and a female substantially equal? Walker v. Columbia University, 407 F.Supp. 1370, 1374 (S.D.N.Y.1976); Shultz v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 315 F.Supp. 1323, 1326 (W.D.Tenn.1970). The statute requires an aggrieved party to demonstrate to the court that all factors other than sex are constant, such that the only variable which can possibly explain the wage differential is sex. In this case, plaintiffs have failed to meet this threshold burden since there is no allegation that females performed tasks substantially similar to those of males. Because “. . . Congress did not intend to put . . . the courts in the business of evaluating jobs and determining what constitute^] a proper differential for unequal work,” movants’ request for a decree in their favor must be denied at this time. Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 1973). This conclusion, however, does not preclude plaintiffs from showing that Uniroyal unlawfully prevented women from obtaining the higher paying positions. Hodgson v. Golden Isles Convalescent Home, Inc., 468 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). E — Alleged Segregated Personnel Office The court further finds that during the years 1965 through 1970, the Company continued to maintain a segregated employment office in the plant. Mr. Kavanaugh continued to serve as Supervisor of Male Employment and Mrs. Hoffer continued to serve as Supervisor of Female Employment. The Supervisor of Male Employment had personnel office responsibility for “A” workers and Class A jobs; Kavanaugh continued to conduct recruiting, hiring, job assignment, job bidding, promotions, transfers, layoffs, and recalls of all male employees with respect to the Class A jobs. On the other hand, the Supervisor of Female Employment was responsible for “B” workers and Class B jobs; Hoffer continued to conduct recruiting, hiring, job assignment, job bidding, promotions, transfers, layoffs and recalls of all female workers with respect to the Class B jobs. F — The Segregated Seniority System Under the “A-B” System existent in the plant from 1965 through 1970, Uniroyal continued to maintain seniority lists for each department on a segregated basis according to sex. Such a practice, when used to the detriment of a particular class of employees, will be violative of federal law unless sufficiently justified. It has often been repeated that: [ejmployers which lay off female employees while retaining male employees with less seniority than the females commit unlawful employment practices if the discrimination against such females is on the basis of their sex. See, Trivett v. Tri-State Container Corp., 368 F.Supp. 137, 141 (E.D.Tenn.1973) and cases cited therein. Allegations respecting illegal use of this seniority system will be examined in more detail below. G — The 1968-1970 Close-Down of the Footwear Divisions; Alleged Discriminatory Layoffs and Recalls on the Basis of Sex (i) Layoffs On 22 March 1968, Uniroyal publicly announced plans to transfer the production of waterproof and canvas footwear from Mish-awaka to the Company’s plants in Nauga-tuck, Connecticut, and Woonsocket, Rhode Island. The decision, calling for a phaseout of footwear production over a two-year period, was expected to have a direct and substantive impact upon Uniroyal’s operations and employees. The employment picture at Uniroyal before the shutdown was as follows: EMPLOYMENT BEFORE SHUTDOWN Male Female Total Employees in Footwear Div.— 562 802 1,364 Employees in Non-Footwear Div.— 1.152 529 1.681 TOTALS— 1.714 1.331 3.045 The move, therefore, came at a time when 42% of Uniroyal’s work force was employed in the footwear divisions and was expected to have a disproportionate impact on female employees since approximately 59% of all females working in the plant were assigned to footwear jobs, compared to only 30% of all male workers. Plaintiffs maintain that female employees were discriminatorily laid off by the Company as the footwear divisions were in the process of being closed down. They claim that female employees having more seniority than males were laid off while junior male employees were retained in active employment; and at the same time new male employees were hired to fill Class A jobs. The crux of plaintiffs’ claim is that female employees who were affected by the shutdown could not avail themselves of the many Class A job opportunities that were available to the junior men. Plaintiffs conclude that with fewer opportunities of active employment available to them, the plaintiff class was exposed to a greater risk of being laid off than were male employees. A determination as to the validity of this claim requires examination of the labor agreement then in effect, particularly the provisions respecting the discontinuation of a product line or division. Under the 1968 agreement, an employee who was affected by such events had several alternative courses of action available to him or her. Each employee, depending upon individual circumstances, could elect to (1) retire under the provisions of the Pension, Insurance, and Severance Pay Agreement; (2) terminate employment with the Company; (3) go on layoff and, if eligible, collect supplemental unemployment benefits, (4) bid on a “posted” job; (5) accept an “open” job; or (6) bump a less senior employee in accordance with Articles VII and VIII of the Wage Employee Agreement. However, considering the significant number of employees to be affected by the footwear shutdown — and the fact that many workers would undoubtedly try to bump in order to remain actively employed — there was great concern among Company officials that the bumping rules of Articles VII and VIII would seriously impair the overall operations of the plant. Based upon these fears, the Company and the Union mutually agreed upon a new set of bumping rules designed to minimize bumping by encouraging affected employees to go on layoff, quit, or retire; the determinative factor was “previous experience”. The modified rules permitted employees having two or more years of seniority, to bump less senior employees located anywhere in the plant, provided the affected worker had “previous experience” in the job then held by the junior employee. Thus, upon learning that his job would be affected by the footwear shutdown, a male employee met with Mr. Kavanaugh and a Union representative to discuss the various options available to him. It will be recalled that Kavanaugh’s duties at this time included the selection and placement of all male employees for the Class A jobs. Thus, an affected male employee could elect to retire, quit, go on layoff, or try to stay actively employed by bidding, bumping into, or accepting another Class A job. On the other hand, a female worker affected by the shutdown met with Mrs. Hof-fer and a Union representative. Hoffer’s duties under the “A-B” system complemented those of Kavanaugh; her responsibilities included the selection and placement of female employees for the Class B jobs. Thus, like her male co-workers, a female could choose to retire, quit, or go on layoff. But unlike the male worker, a female wishing to stay actively employed in the plant was restricted to seeking the “B” designated jobs. In short, Uniroyal’s “A-B” employment system — without regard to the bumping requirement of previous experience— discouraged female employees from moving into 1,252 Class A jobs then present in the non-footwear divisions, thereby exposing the plaintiff class to a greater risk of layoff, termination, or retirement. As a result, female workers were being laid off by the Company while it retained junior male workers in the plant and hired 92 new male employees to fill openings in various Class A jobs. Additionally, the court finds that the modified bumping requirement of “previous experience” also had a discriminatory impact. Because of the fact that Class A jobs were held by male workers, only males could possibly have had experience needed to transfer into the remaining “A” jobs. The clause therefore had the effect of increasing a female’s chance of layoff, etc., for now, in order to bump into an “A” job, she had to overcome not only the “A-B” designations, but also the requirement of previous experience. (a) Business Necessity Uniroyal maintains that during the phaseout of the footwear divisions, continuation of its discriminatory transfer rules was required as a matter of “business necessity”. If that be true, then plaintiffs’ claims with respect to such discriminatory practices from 1968 to 1970 cannot stand. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra 401 U.S. at 431, 91 S.Ct. 849. Our first task is to define the proper standard by which to measure the Company’s contentions. Defendant urges the court to adopt the rationale espoused in Trivett v. Tri-State Container Corp., 368 F.Supp. 137 (E.D.Tenn.1973). In that sex discrimination case, demand for defendant’s products was reduced to the extent that layoffs were required. Although Tri-State maintained a plant-wide system of seniority, Class B female folders, who were senior to some of the male general floor helpers, were laid off while the men remained in the plant. Also, at this time, the Company hired new male workers as general floor helpers. The court rejected the women’s claim that'Tri-State’s practices infringed upon their Title VII rights: It appears to the Court that Tri-State had a valid judgmental decision to make concerning which employees should be laid-off during such slack periods. The lack of work occurred in the A&P department. General floor helpers could do whatever work of the class B folders as might be required, although management would be required to pay the general floor helpers 15$ an hour more for services therein than would have been paid class B folders for the same work. On the other hand, class B folders were not qualified to do some of the heavier and higher classification work required of general floor helpers, if the latter were laid off. The Court finds, therefore, that the decision of Tri-State’s management to lay off class B folders rather than general floor helpers with less seniority was for reasons other than the sex of the class B folders, and hence that there was no violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, in the instance described. Id. at 141. The Trivett analysis is entirely too broad a standard for purposes of justifying discriminatory actions. Its holding would ostensibly exempt from the Act all employment decisions having a business purpose; but necessity, not purpose, is the proper test. United States v. N. L. Industries, 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973). The sweeping definition suggested in Trivett would seriously undermine the policy of Title VII, which today represents the principal means of ensuring that an individual’s ability will be the determinative factor in employment opportunities. If the Act is to remain a potent force against discriminatory employment practices, the defense must be narrowly construed and confined to those unusual instances where a segregative policy is absolutely essential to the achievement of a legitimate business need. This is the rationale which underlies the test announced by the Fourth Circuit in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). There the court stated that: The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial impact. Id. at 798 (emphasis added); see also, United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971); and United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2nd Cir. 1971). There can be no doubt that Robinson’s three-pronged test represents the better view; however, a problem arises with respect to the burden of establishing the final portion of the defense (no acceptable alternative policy). The difficulty was explained and resolved fairly in Crockett v. Green, 388 F.Supp. 912 (E.D.Wisc.1975). Literally applied, the “no alternative” approach to “business necessity” in the case law and the E.E.O.C. Guidelines; 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3, places upon an employer the practically impossible burden of proving an absolute negative, i. e., the nonexistence of any alternative procedures. A fair and preferable allocation of the burden of proof on the existence of alternatives would place upon the plaintiff the burden of initially proposing or suggesting reasonable alternative practices while leaving to the employer the ultimate burden of demonstrating that any suggested alternatives are not adequate substitutes for its present practices. Id. at 920. Since the court is now considering plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, however, the ultimate burden of demonstrating the adequacy of a suggested alternative must also be shouldered by plaintiffs. Rule 56, F.R.C.P. It is with these factors in mind that we turn to the allegations presented in this case. The Company maintains that if employees affected by the footwear close-down had bumped in accordance with the pre-1968 transfer rules as written, the effect would have been the loss of business, severe economic losses, and consequently the loss of more jobs. (b) Training Costs Defendant’s initial contention is that the implementation of nondiscriminatory transfer rules during the footwear shutdown would have been prohibitively expensive. The following graph is taken from the affidavit of Uniroyal’s Manager of Industrial Engineering, William T. Bailey. GRAPH NO. 1 1968 1969 1970 Adhesives NS* NS NS Automats 5.3% 4.2% 2.8 Coated Fabrics (Inch Knitting) 4.5 3.2 .4 Custom Processing No Sales No Sales NS Auto Foam & Foam Specialties 20.9 19.1 2.3** Engineered Systems (Inch Filatex) 17.2 752.6 ** 2.4** ENSOLITE 6.0 2.4 Weighted Average Loss (NIAT)— 9.2% 8.2% 2J5% * — Not Significant ** — Increased Losses These projections are based upon the anticipated cost of having to train affected employees for their new positions; training costs for each commodity are set forth on the following page. Defendant’s first “business necessity” argument fails to raise a cognizable defense. Uniroyal’s expectation of an additional $1,885,658.00 in expenses is premised upon the assumption that each affected worker would bump on the average of 2.8 times. Graph No. 2, Column III. As plaintiffs suggest, however, these expenses could have been significantly reduced without discriminating on the basis of sex by permitting all employees only one opportunity to bump. Such a plan would have reduced costs by an estimated $1,212,209.00. Training costs could have been further minimized by requiring employees to bump into those jobs where the average costs were low, and prohibiting employees from bumping into jobs where costs were high. Graph No. 2, Column V. GRAPH NO. 2 TRAINING COST BY COMMODITY I II III ¡V V YI Net Training Cost Displaced Bumps Disquali-(Including %of Footwear Per fication Scrap) Per Cost to Commodity PoDulation x Personnel x Occur, x Rate x Occur. = Commodity Knit Fabrics 9.0% 468 2.8 1.15 $ 367.78 $ 49,880 Coated Fabrics 6.6 468 2.8 1.15 2,083.24 207,193 Automats 10.5 468 2.8 1.15 453.34 71,733 ENSOLITE 7.3 468 2.8 1.15 430.86 47,398 KOYLON 23.8 468 2.8 1.15 1,272.60 456,426 Fuel Cells 38.4 468 2.8 1.27 477.04 304,855 Filatex 4.4 468 2.8 1.15 448.45 29.734 TOTAL 1968— 100.0% $1,167,224 Knit Fabrics 9.0% 288 2.8 1.15 $ 367.78 $ 30,696 Coated Fabrics 6.6 288 2.8 ’ 1.15 2,083.24 127,506 Automats 10.5 288 2.8 1.15 453.34 44,144 ENSOLITE 7.3 288 2.8 1.15 430.86 29,168 KOYLON 23.8 288 2.8 1.15 1,272.60 280,877 Fuel Cells 38.4 288 2.8 1.27 477.40 187,745 Filatex 4.4 288 2.8 1.15 488.45 18.298 TOTAL 1969 ' 100.0% $ 718,434 COMBINED 1968 & 1969 TOTAL— $1,885,658 Using defendant’s data, it appears that the adoption of a nondiseriminating bumping policy would have cost the Company less than $600,000, thereby reducing NIAT by roughly 3% in 1968, 2.8% in 1969, and .8% in 1970. The question, therefore, is whether Title VII may require an employer to withstand a 2.2% [(.03 + .028 + .008)/3] average reduction in NIAT over a three-year period in order that both male and female workers have the same employment opportunity available to them. The court has examined many cases wherein defendants have similarly raised the cost factor as a defense. What evolves from these cases is the notion that dollar cost alone is an immaterial consideration under the business necessity doctrine, except when expenditures of monies may curtail operations to the extent that incumbent employees may lose their jobs. The principle that employers who wrongfully discriminate must bear the cost of remedying that discrimination is exemplified in Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F.Supp. 490 (C.D.Cal.1971). There the court noted that: The sole permissible reason for discriminating against actual or prospective employees involves the individual’s capability to perform the job effectively. This approach leaves no room for arguments regarding inconvenience, annoyance or even expense to the employer. Id. at 495. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the Robinson court held “that avoidance of the expense of changing employment practices is not a business purpose that will validate the [discriminatory] effects of an otherwise unlawful employment practice”. 444 F.2d at 800. See also, United States v. N. L. Industries, supra, at 366; and United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 310, 311 (8th Cir. 1972), Cf. 84 Harv.L.Rev., supra, at 1149-50. In the case at bar there is no claim that incumbent employees would lose their jobs as a consequence of the additional expenses; hence, the court must reject the Company’s initial contention. (c) Decreasing Sales and the Possible Loss of Jobs The record does show that in 1968 Company officials feared the consequences that mass bumping might have upon the sales of non-footwear products as hundreds of inexperienced laborers transferred into those divisions. Donald Frey, the Company’s Manager of Industrial Relations, testified that: . In the business we’re in today it’s a highly competitive business. And we deal a great deal with the motor industry. And the motor industry is notorious for not having a single source for parts for their cars. And you either supply them what they want at the time they want it or they’ll go to another source. It can mean loss of business to you. * sk * * !}: Well, at the time we started the Footwear phaseout, approximately fifty per cent of the membership in Local 65 were in Footwear Operations, which would have meant that we would have affected every commodity in the plant adversely. * # Hi * sfc * Better than fifty per cent of our business was automotive at the time of the Footwear phaseout. . . . discounting the Footwear. (Deposition of Donald Frey, pp. 18, 137-139.) Frey also testified that more jobs may have been lost as a result of the pre-1968 bumping rules. Although additional expenses and a decline in sales may, at least for accounting purposes, reduce NIAT by the same amount, a court must be sensitive to the differing impacts the two transactions may have. Depending upon the nature of a particular employer and his customers, plummeting sales may have weightier affects than extraordinary expenses. For example, if, because of a sudden drop in the efficiency of his workers, an employer is unable to supply the demands of his buyers, product sales will immediately fall and customers may be permanently lost. If the reduction in sales is substantial, it may mean a similar reduction in the size of the existing work force. Unlike extraordinary expenses, the impact of which is generally limited to the year in which it is paid or incurred, a decrease in sales volume may likely have more severe short-term and long-term affects and should, therefore, be accorded more significance under the business necessity defense. The above scenario closely describes Uniroyal’s predicament in 1968. With approximately 600 persons expected to transfer into jobs which they never before held, inefficiency was expected to seriously hamper production and sales. The need for maximum efficiency at Uniroyal appears to be especially acute in view of the fact that greater than 50% of the company’s business was then derived from the “highly competitive” auto industry. Frey’s affidavit states that if Uniroyal was unable to meet a buyer’s immediate demands, another manufacturer would be most willing to do so. It will be recalled that the first part of Robinson’s test, requiring the challenged practice to effectively carry out the purpose it is alleged to serve, is undoubtedly satisfied in this case. Certainly, maintenance of the discriminatory transfer rules kept inefficiency in the non-footwear divisions to an absolute minimum. However, as for the second part of the test, that the alleged business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override its discriminatory impact, a material issue of fact exists. Here, the court must judicially balance the competing interests of the litigants; in other words, the adverse impact that less discriminatory transfer rules would have had from 1968 through 1970 upon production, sales, and workers in the plant, must be measured against the degree of sex discrimination experienced in the plant. Although the latter factor has been presented to the court, plaintiffs have failed to show, as they must on a motion for summary judgment, the full extent that nondiscriminatory rules would have had on the enterprise. Defendant has shown that such a program could have meant the loss of business and possibly jobs. The evidence, which plaintiffs do not challenge, presents an argument which may at some point constitute a compelling reason for not implementing a nondiscriminatory employment system. To now conclude as a matter of law that defendant’s argument cannot prevail would contravene the narrow purpose of Rule 56, F.R.C.P. Therefore, without adequate information to place on both sides of the scale, the court is unable to properly evaluate the business necessity defense. Since there is not sufficient information before the court to resolve the matter, each party shall submit such evidence as it deems necessary to support its respective position. Plaintiffs shall file their information within 60 days of this Order, and defendant shall have 30 days from the filing of such data to respond. Likewise, an issue requiring additional evidence also exists in connection with the final portion of the business necessity test, i. e., that no acceptable policy or practice would accomplish the business purpose equally well with a lesser discriminatory impact. Plaintiffs have suggested that Uniroyal could have limited each employee to one opportunity to bump into any job in the plant; also, efficiency may have been preserved by prohibiting employees from moving into jobs requiring long training periods. Perhaps the affects of the proposed slow-down could have been further mitigated by having experienced employees work overtime or by building inventories prior to the footwear shut-down. Whether such steps were either practical or feasible in 1968 is a matter not ascertainable from the record now before the court. Alternative policies must be framed in more precise terms in order to satisfy movants’ burden of proof. See, Crockett v. Green, supra, at 320. The parties shall provide the court with the necessary information in the manner prescribed in the preceding paragraph. (ii) Recalls The Company’s admissions to plaintiffs’ requests to admit facts show that from June to December 1969, and again from June to August 1970, the Company recalled some of its laid-off employees to active employment. In making these recalls, Uniroyal unlawfully segregated job opportunities on the basis of sex in at least two respects. First, the Supervisor of Male Employment recalled male employees to fill vacancies in traditionally “male” or “A” jobs; the Supervisor of Female Employment recalled female employees to fill vacancies in “female” or “B” jobs. Once again, females did not have equal access to the many Class A jobs. Irrespective of an individual’s present wishes and abilities, employees were considered for certain jobs and not others based upon his or her sex. Secondly, recalls were made using different seniority dates for male and female workers. Because the female seniority date was always earlier than the male seniority date, the Company recalled junior male employees in active employment while senior female employees remained laid off. See Part IV, 2, F. Defendant does not and, indeed, cannot rely upon the business necessity defense discussed above. H — Allegations that Uniroyal Discriminato-rily Caused Its Female Workers to Quit (i) Terminations Due to Alleged Discriminatory Cutoff of Supplemental Unemployment Benefits The Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Agreement of 1967 provided that employees who are laid off as the result of an operation or plant shut-down and who have more than one but less than five years seniority are eligible to receive 80% of his or her weekly straight-time rate. In March 1968 the Company decided to extend this privilege to employees with five or more years of service who had been laid off out of line of seniority as the footwear phaseout began. These workers were “gratuitously” deemed by the Company to be on “temporary layoff” within the meaning of § 4(a) of the S.U.B. agreement. The affidavit of Donald L. Frey states: [t]he reason for this decision was that (1) the Company was anticipating new business which might entail recalling the laid-off employees, and (2) the S.U.B. would soften the economic impact of the layoff in regard to the seven employees. By November 1969, however, product sales indicated that it would be “highly unlikely” that persons laid off would be recalled. Uniroyal therefore decided to change its previous position by revoking the economic largess it had bestowed upon employees with five or more years of experience. A letter was drafted by Company officials and mailed to affected workers, advising each employee that S.U.B. had been terminated and that he or she could elect to take a termination allowance and lose all service and seniority with the Company, or elect to stay on layoff and hope to some day be recalled to active employment. Plaintiffs maintain that these notices were delivered to a disproportionate number of female employees and that the letters caused a greater proportion of females to terminate their employment relationship with Uniroyal. The Company also seeks a decree in its favor with respect to this claim. The S.U.B. termination letters were mailed on three different occasions; the first was 12 November 1969. The record shows that these letters were first sent to employees on layoff having seniority dates ranging from 1959 to 1963 inclusive (“Group I”). Despite the fact that on November 12th the Company had 92 male and 171 female workers in active employment or on layoff status with such seniority dates, all 157 letters sent that day by the Company were delivered to female employees. On 26 December 1969, a second wave of notices were mailed to a group of laid-off workers with seniority dates ranging from 7 September 1955 to 29 August 1959 (“Group II”). Once again, only female workers had their benefits discontinued even though the Company had 140 males and 236 females in active employment or on layoff status with the appropriate time of company service. On 13 January 1970, plaintiffs filed a complaint with the E.E.O.C., charging Uniroyal with various discriminatory practices on the basis of sex, including complaints concerning the Company’s cutoff of S.U.B. payments. Shortly thereafter, on 6 February 1970, Uniroyal released a final wave of letters. These notices were sent not only to the oldest seniority group of employees (1952-1955, “Group III”), but also to workers with dates ranging from 1955 to 1963. For the first time Uniroyal terminated the benefits of male workers. In February the Company delivered the last letters to 159 men and 192 women at a time when it had 534 males and 216 females in active employment or on layoff with seniorit