Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION RENFREW, District Judge. This case presents a difficult and troubling issue, requiring resolution of a confrontation between the state and church in the context of alleged employment discrimination on the basis of sex. Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) brought this suit against Pacific Press Publishing Association (“Press”), a nonprofit corporation affiliated with the Seventh-day Adventist Church, pursuant to § 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) and (3), charging that Press had deprived an employee, Loma Tobler (“Tobler”), of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affected her status as an employee because of her sex. Specifically, the EEOC alleges two discriminatory practices: First, a denial to Tobler of head-of-household monetary allowances paid to similarly situated male employees from November 10, 1970, until July 1,1973, in violation of § 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); and second, discrimination against Tobler for making charges, assisting and participating in investigations under Title VII with resulting discouragement of participation by other employees in Title VII proceedings an violation of § 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Initially, plaintiff sought damages for Tobler, permanent injunctive relief enjoining Press from in any way discriminating on the basis of sex or because of an employee’s participation in Title VII proceedings, and an order requiring Press to implement policies and affirmative action programs to provide equal opportunity for Tobler and other employees who participate in Title VII proceedings. By the time of trial, however, plaintiff narrowed its request for injunctive relief to only that necessary to accomplish the following results: “(1) Eradication of] the continuing effects of past retaliation against Lorna Tobler, including but not limited to future letters of reference to potential secular employers, derogatory information concerning her illegal termination in her personnel file, etc. “(2) Eradication of] the continuing effects of past retaliation on Press’ employees’ willingness to petition government agencies for redress or cooperate with government inquiries, including posting a copy of this judgment on Press’ bulletin board where EEOC and Department of Labor notices are posted, and notification] that the law requires Press’ future compliance with the terms of Section 704(a) of Title VII.” Pretrial Statement filed February 17, 1978, pp. 2-3. This action, filed on July 27, 1977, and consolidated on September 15, 1977, with two actions previously filed against Press, represents but a small part of the complex and protracted litigation which has focused upon the employment practices at Press. In the first suit that was filed, Silver v. Pacific Press Publishing Association (“Silver”), No. C-73-0168-CBR, plaintiff Merikay Silver sought relief on behalf of herself and those women similarly situated charging retaliation under § 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and alleging the payment of discriminatory gender-based living allowances (the “head-of-household issue”), and her receipt of lower pay than a male colleague doing equivalent work, the latter two both under § 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The retaliation and head-of-household claims in Silver were similar to those the EEOC has alleged in this action (“EEOC (Tobler Charges)”). On May 22, 1974, this Court conditionally ordered that the Silver action proceed as a class action. However, based on the nature of the responses received from the Court-ordered notice' procedures expressing great concern about the case proceeding as a class action because of the church/state confrontation issue, the Court on June 13, 1975, decertified the class while granting to those women who had responded affirmatively, or not at all, the right to intervene. In the interim, on September 20,1974, the EEOC, pursuant to §§ 706(f)(2), (3), and 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(2), (3), and 2000e-5(g), filed a second action, No. C-74-2025-CBR (“EEOC (Preliminary Relief) ”), this time against Press, General Conference of the Seventh-day Adventists, and two other Seventh-day Adventists institutions, seeking preliminary relief for Silver and Tobler because Press allegedly had threatened to retaliate against them both because of their filing of charges with the EEOC, against Tobler because of her intervening in Silver, and against Silver because of her filing of the Silver action. Shortly thereafter, Press announced its intention to discharge Silver and Tobler. On February 24, 1975, this Court issued an order temporarily restraining defendants from terminating the two women; renewed that order on March 5, 1975, for an additional ten-day period; and then granted a preliminary injunction on March 25, 1975, requiring Press to refrain from discharging Silver or Tobler until the Silver action was resolved or until the two women no longer held membership in the Seventh-day Adventist Church, a prerequisite for employment at Press. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the order granting the preliminary injunction, holding that the district court could not grant preliminary relief under § 706(f)(2) since that section was only applicable during the pendency of EEOC administrative proceedings. This Court then dismissed EEOC (Preliminary Relief) on July 23,1976. The instant action and Silver were set for consolidated trial in mid-February, 1978, but prior thereto, both cases were settled. However, a dispute about the terms of the settlement in this action subsequently arose, and the matter was tried to the Court on April 27,1978. Only two witnesses, Lorna Tobler and William Muir, Treasurer of Press, testified at trial, and their testimony focused almost exclusively on the issue of damages. The parties did not call any witnesses to testify on the issue of liability and relied instead upon the submitted record relevant to that phase of this case. Throughout the litigation in this and the related Press cases, defendants have asserted that the First Amendment and the cases decided thereunder exempt Press’s employment practices from regulation under Title VII. Following the filing of post-trial briefs on both the First Amendment and the damages issues and post-trial oral argument on the constitutional issue, EEOC (Tobler Charges) was taken under submission. However, the Court indicated it would not be decided until the First Amendment issues in the most recently filed case, No. C-78-1090-CBR, had been addressed by the parties. During the course of proceedings in that case, the Court indicated it desired to withhold judgment until the Supreme Court decided NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago iii which certiorari had been granted during the preceding term. See 434 U.S. 1061, 98 S.Ct. 1231, 55 L.Ed.2d 760 (1978). Following the issuance of the Supreme Court opinion in that case on March 21, 1979, 440 U.S. 490, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d 533, this Court called for further briefing on the effect of that decision on the Press cases still pending before it. Upon consideration of all the evidence, the voluminous record herein, and the extensive argument of counsel, the Court renders this Memorandum of Opinion, which shall serve as the Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE Plaintiff EEOC is an agency of the United States Government charged with the administration, interpretation, and enforcement of Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Defendant Press, a nonprofit corporation incorporated under California law, is a Seventh-day Adventist affiliated publishing house which engages in the business of publishing, printing, advertising, and selling religious and religiously oriented materials for the purpose of carrying out the church’s denomination work. These materials are sold throughout the United States and overseas. At all times pertinent hereto, Press has required its employees to be members in good standing of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. The Seventh-day Adventist Church is a recognized Christian denomination and is distinguished from other Christian denominations by the two aspects of its faith which gives the church its name. Its basic doctrines are completely consistent with the policy set forth in Title VII of equal employment opportunity and equal compensation for men and women. The governing body of the church is the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, an unincorporated association. The term “General Conference” subsumes several different organizational entities. The General Conference in Session, a meeting of all members of the General Conference which convenes quinquennially, is the highest authority in the denomination, and is the only body empowered to alter the structure of the church or to change doctrine. Between the quinquennial sessions of the General Conference, the General Conference Executive Committee, also known as the General Conference Committee, has complete administrative powers. The General Conference Committee itself operates in three ways. First, there are two annual meetings of the entire Committee, known as the Autumn Council and the Spring Meeting. Second, a majority of the entire General Conference Committee may transact denominational business of any nature at any time or place as long as the President or a General Vice President of the General Conference is present. Finally, weekly or more frequent meetings requiring only fifteen members, at least one of whom must be a General Conference officer, are held at General Conference Headquarters in Washington, D.C. It is in this third type of proceeding that the day-to-day administrative decisions of the church are made. The relationship between these various entities and the exercise of decisional authority in church disputes is described as follows in the Seventh-day Adventist Church Manual: “ * * * [I]t is therefore understood that all subordinate organizations and institutions throughout the world will recognize the General Conference in session, and the Executive Committee between sessions, as the highest authority, under God, among us. When differences arise in or between organizations and institutions, appeal to the next higher organization is proper till it reaches the General Conference in session, or the Executive Committee at the Annual Council. During the interim between these sessions the Executive Committee shall constitute the body of final authority on all questions where a difference of viewpoint may develop. The committee’s decision may be reviewed at a session of the General Conference or at an Annual Council of the Executive Committee.” General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, Seventh-day Adventist Church Manual 48 (rev.ed.1976) (“Manual"). In the Seventh-day Adventist organization structure, Press and the other organs through which the ministry of the church is carried out, e.g., schools, hospitals, and colleges, are denominated “institutions”. The Manual describes the structure or the polity of its church as “representative.” The Manual defines this term as follows at page 46: “ * * * [T]he form of church government which recognizes that authority in the church rests in the church membership, with executive responsibility delegated to representative bodies and officers for the governing of the church. This form of church government recognizes also the equality of the ordination of the entire ministry. The representative form of church government is that which prevails in the Seventh-day Adventist Church.” The Manual states that the “representative” form is but one of the “four generally recognized forms of church government,” listing “episcopal,” “papal,” and “independent” as the others. Other Seventh-day Adventist documents distinguish the “representative” polity from the other forms in much greater detail, concluding it is a hybrid form of the presbyterian and congregational polities. Although the General Conference in Session is referred to as the “highest authority,” none of the official Seventh-day Adventist documents refer to the church as “hierarchical.” In fact, Tobler, as a lifelong member who had also worked in Seventh-day Adventist institutions for twenty-five years, indicated that she had frequently heard the term “hierarchy” used among Seventh-day Adventists in reference to the Roman Catholic system of which she had always been taught that Seventh-day Adventists strongly disapproved. Floyd Rittenhouse, former President of Pacific Union College and of Andrews University, which includes the only Seventh-day Adventist seminary in the United States, also testified during the hearing on EEOC’s request for a preliminary injunction that he had never heard the Seventh-day Adventist denomination characterized as a “hierarchical” church. Membership in the Seventh-day Adventist denomination is held almost without exception through a local church congregation, which has principal, if not exclusive, jurisdiction for disciplining individual church members for religious reasons. The two types of discipline which the church may impose are (1) censure, a temporary removal from an erring member of the privileges of voting, giving religious instruction, and holding church office, but not sharing in worship activities, and (2) the more drastic disfellowshipping, an expulsion from membership. Members may be disciplined only after their local congregations have voted on the matter. On the issue of church discipline, Seventh-day Adventist bodies larger than the local congregation have but a limited appellate role. In earlier proceedings on the request for a preliminary injunction, Neal Wilson, Vice-President of the General Conference, expressed the opinion that the General Conference could transmit to a congregation through intermediate church bodies a “recommendation”' that an erring member be disfellowshipped. He did not suggest, however, that this “recommendation” would displace the authority the local congregation exercises with regard to disfellowshipping. Certainly, the Manual gives no power to Press to determine qualifications for church membership or to impose religious discipline. Throughout her employment at Press, Tobler was a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, and she maintained her membership throughout this litigation. Indeed, she received a certificate from her local congregation on January 10, 1977, recommending a transfer of church membership to the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Hamburg, Germany. According to the Manual, a church should never issue a “letter of transfer” to a member who is under discipline. At no time was she an ordained minister. Tobler began work at Press’s Mountain View, California offices in 1960 and remained until her termination as an employee on May 29, 1975. Prior thereto, she had worked for ten years as a secretary at four other Adventist-affiliated employers. For her first year at Press, Tobler served as a secretary in the accounting office; thereafter, until the time of her discharge, she was an editorial secretary to the editor of Signs of the Times, a monthly magazine published by Press. Tobler’s duties initially and for much of her time in the editorial department at Press involved not only secretarial, but also administrative and discretionary duties. On or about November 7, 1972, she filed her first charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC alleging unequal compensation for women, and shortly thereafter, she began to participate in proceedings centering on similar charges filed by her co-worker Merikay Silver. Tobler filed additional charges with the EEOC against Press on October 19, 1973, and January 17, 1974. Prior to her filing of charges and the commencement of the Silver action, Tobler had repeatedly communicated with the officers and managing agents of Press regarding its policy of paying women lower living allowances than those granted to similarly situated male employees. Tobler stated that once Press had notice of her actual involvement in the Silver case, it changed the nature of her job such that by June, 1974, it consisted primarily of clerical tasks and few of the discretionary and administrative responsibilities previously assigned to her. In November 1974, Tobler intervened in EEOC (Preliminary Relief). By the end of 1974, Tobler’s last remaining non-clerical responsibility, preparation of a regularly featured column in Signs of the Times entitled “What’s Going On” had been removed. In descriptions of Tobler’s duties in August and December, 1974 her supervisor, Lawrence Maxwell, indicated they were purely clerical. With regard to the substance of Tobler’s complaints to the EEOC, Press admits that until July 1, 1973, it paid Tobler, as a married female employee, a lesser rental allowance than if she had been a married male employee. This basis of compensation resulted from Press’s adoption of wage scales which were recommended by the General Conference and which differentiated among employees on the basis of sex and marital status. Under the scale, married men received a higher rental allowance than single men of equivalent seniority, who in turn received a higher rental allowance than female employees of equivalent tenure, regardless of their marital status. Press also admits that Tobler, because of her status as a married female employee, did not receive an automobile insurance allowance paid to married male employees and single male and female employees in 1971 and 1972. Neither did she receive annual utility allowances received by married men with equivalent seniority. On February 14, 1975, the General Conference Committee passed a resolution recommending that Tobler as well as her coworker Merikay Silver be terminated from employment at Press and that the action be reported to their local churches. The resolution was a determination by the General Conference Committee that employees of church institutions must meet the highest standards in adherence to Bible teachings and fidelity to church authority, and that Tobler and Silver did not meet these standards because they had “sued the Seventh-day Adventist Church” and were “at variance with the church and unresponsive to spiritual counsel.” Pursuant to this recommendation of the General Conference Committee, and it constituted no more than a recommendation, the Executive Committee of Press voted on February 19, 1975, to terminate the employment of Tobler and Silver effective February 21, 1975. It is manifestly clear that Press terminated Tobler’s employment as retaliation for her opposition to practices she believed unlawful under Title VII and for her filing charges, testifying, assisting, and participating in investigations and proceedings under Title VII. This decision to terminate Tobler was not rendered by an ecclesiastical tribunal on a church matter. Neither did the highest authority of the Seventh-day Adventist Church ever take action with regard to Tobler’s discharge. Press admits that although the General Conference in Session did meet in Vienna after the events in question had occurred and did discuss the “principle and policy applicable to the type of problem encountered in Mrs. Tobler’s case” (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 18 admitted at trial herein), the Tobler dismissal had not been the subject of any official or final decision by that body. The matter was also discussed at the 1975 and 1976 Annual Councils, but no action was taken. After her discharge and until the time she assumed full-time employment in January, 1978, Tobler applied for work with over twenty employers in this country. Over the course of this 2Vi year period she sought employment by going to the San Jose unemployment office, following up referrals from that office, looking at newspaper advertisements, and making inquiries among friends. She indicated she limited her search to secretarial opportunities and also sought work with an employer who would accommodate her need to observe the Sabbath. She also stated that other points which were raised in some of her interviews, and which might have affected her job-hunting success, were her interest in returning to Press if reinstated and her desire to obtain flexible hours to allow her an opportunity to continue her college studies. Between the date of her discharge and the commencement of trial, Tobler made three trips to visit her husband who had transferred to Seventh-day Adventist affiliated publishing houses in Europe. Two of the visits, those in July, 1975, and August, 1977, were approximately one month long. During the first, she made limited inquiries about the availability of work. At the time of her termination at Press, Tobler was entitled to four weeks’ vacation per year. She made one more extended visit to Europe joining her husband in September, 1975, in Germany, moving with him to his new job in Switzerland at the end of the year, and returning by herself to California in the summer of 1976. During this period, she testified that, because of knowledge of her husband’s impending transfer to Switzerland, she made little effort to secure employment in Germany. In Switzerland, not only language problems but also difficulties in obtaining a work permit or certification as an English teacher hindered Tobler’s search for employment. In the fall of 1976, Tobler began part-time secretarial work with a small law firm. In 1977, she accepted additional part-time work with a local commission studying the status of women. Her work with the law firm changed to full-time employment in January, 1978, when one of the two full-time secretaries left the firm. Tobler indicated at trial that, if at any time up until that date Press had offered to reinstate her, she would have accepted their offer. The parties stipulated prior to trial that monetary relief in the amount of $29,571 would be due to Tobler on account of her receipt of lower living allowances and her lost back pay if the Court should find that Press’s acts charged in the complaint violated Title VII. APPLICABLE LAW Since the initiation of this action, Press, in objecting to EEOC regulation of its employment practices, has relied upon a First Amendment defense which incorporated several arguments. Principally, Press has argued that Title VII, which it describes as a statute enacted primarily as a regulation of commerce, cannot be applied to an institution such as Press, which it characterizes as “pervasively religious,” for four reasons: (1) such regulation of religious institutions violates the free exercise clause since it requires the institution to subordinate its beliefs to commands of civil authority, (2) such regulation violates the establishment clause as it has a primary effect inhibitory to religious activity and fostering governmental entanglement with religion, (3) such regulation violates both clauses by interfering with the decisions of the church bodies as to the relationships between the church and its workers, and (4) the Bill of Rights was intended to be a limitation on the powers granted in the body of the Constitution, including the Commerce Clause. Furthermore, Press had argued that these constitutional defenses should be given decisional priority since the maintenance and prosecution of the suit were in themselves unconstitutional as excessive governmental intrusion in religious affairs. After the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 (1979), Press conceded that the constitutional issues did not have to be reached before determining whether the case could be disposed of on statutory grounds. Following the teaching of Catholic Bishop, this Court turns first to the applicability of Title VII to the instant suit. I. Applicability of Title VII to the Employer-Employee Relationship between Tobler and Press In holding that the National Labor Relations Act does not give the National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools offering both religious and secular subjects, the Supreme Court relied upon a canon of statutory construction requiring “ ‘ “the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed” ’ ” to grant jurisdiction, 99 S.Ct. at 1319 (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22, 83 S.Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547 (1963), quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147, 77 S.Ct. 699, 1 L.Ed.2d 709 (1957)), once a “narrow inquiry * * [indicates] the exercise of the Board’s jurisdiction presents a significant risk that the First Amendment [would] be infringed.” 99 S.Ct. at 1320. In conducting its preliminary “narrow inquiry,” the Court recognized “the critical and unique role of the teacher in fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school, id. at 1319, and observed that in part because of this role the Board’s actions would exceed the resolution of factual issues. Id. at 1319-1320. In investigating actions which religious leaders would no doubt continue to claim were mandated by their religious creeds, the Board, according to the Court, would have to assess the good faith of the clergy-administrators’ positions and its relationship to the schools’ religious missions. In addition, in determining what constituted “terms and conditions” of employment under 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), the Board could not avoid encroachment upon management in schools which “ ‘involve substantial religious activity and purpose,’ ” id. at 1320, quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). The resulting church-state entanglement would create sufficiently “serious First Amendment questions,” 99 S.Ct. at 1320, to require the “affirmative intention of Congress” to confer jurisdiction. In its examination of the legislative history of the National Labor Relations Act, the Labor Management Relations Act, and amendments thereto adopted in 1974, the Court found such intention absent. Id. at 1320-1322. Accordingly, the Court found jurisdiction wanting and avoided a ruling upon what degree of church-state entanglement would be impermissibly excessive under the circumstances. In making a similar preliminary inquiry into whether the church-state entanglement in the instant case presents a significant risk of infringing upon First Amendment freedoms, this Court notes that the facts here are somewhat distinguishable from those in Catholic Bishop. Specifically, these differences, which prompt a conclusion of a lesser risk, include the fact that Tobler’s clerical duties were not as intimately connected to the institution’s religious mission as were those of the parochial teachers in Catholic Bishop. The investigation of discriminatory pay practices does not turn on motive and consequently does not intrude upon religious belief. Finally, EEOC jurisdiction is triggered only when it has reason to believe as a result of a complaint by a person aggrieved or by a member of the EEOC that there has been a discriminatory employment practice. It does not involve the type of on-going supervision exercised by the N.L.R.B. after there has been a duly certified union election. Although these differences indicate that the threshold finding of a risk of entanglement mandated by Catholic Bishop may not be as great in the instant case, they certainly do not indicate whether or not the entanglement is excessive. Nonetheless, the Court still finds the risk sufficiently significant to require a demonstration of “the affirmative intention of Congress clearly expressed” that Title VII apply to religiously affiliated publishing houses. Section 702 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l, provides the following exemption for religious organizations: “This subchapter shall not apply * * to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.” The legislative history of § 702’s adoption in 1964 as well as the amendments added in 1972 clearly reveal that Congress intended that § 702 permits a religious institution to discriminate only in favor of co-religionists and that, therefore, the EEOC has jurisdiction over charges of racial, sexual, and ethnic discrimination brought against entities such as Press. In 1963, the original version of the exemption which emerged from the House Judiciary Committee as H.R. 7152 contained the following clause exempting all employees of a religious corporation: “Sec. 703. This title shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, or society.” H.R.Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1963), reprinted in EEOC, Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964 at 2010 (1965) (“1964 Legis. Hist.”) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1964, p. 2355. H.R. 7152, which was the subject of extensive discussion in the House Judiciary Committee’s report and which was passed by the House, was modified substantially in a substitute measure proposed by Senators Humphrey and Dirksen and adopted by the Senate. The substitute bill did not go through the usual committee procedures; rather, it was worked out in informal bipartisan conferences. Therefore, there is no committee report on the bill considered by the Senate. Since the House then adopted the Senate bill without change, there was no Senate-House conference report. The best available explanations on the intent behind the changes made by the Senate in the House bill are the comments made by Senators Humphrey and Dirksen at the beginning of the debate on the Senate floor. See “Congressional Debate on Titles VII and XI Introduction,” in 1964 Legis.Hist. at 3001. The Senate substitute amendment narrowed the broad exemption for religious organizations in § 703 of Title VII as proposed by H.R. 7152. Senator Humphrey explained this change: “Section 704 — formerly 703 — has been amended to limit the general exemption of religious groups to those practices relating to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the employer’s religious activities, and to extend the exemption to private educational institutions with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of such institutions.” Statement of Senator Humphrey, June 4, 1964, id. at 3004. Senator Dirksen made similar remarks and introduced into the record the following annotated version of the House bill in which italics indicate the limiting language added to the exemption by the Senate substitute proposal: Sec. [703] 702. This title shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, or society[.] with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, or society of its religious activities or to an educational institution with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of such institution.” Annotated copy of House-passed Civil Rights Bill in 1964 Legis.Hist. at 3050. Amendments introduced on June 6, 1964, by Senators Clark and Case offered the Senate an opportunity to revert to the blanket exemption for religious organizations contained in the House bill. The Clark-Case substitute provided in pertinent part: EXEMPTION “Sec. 703. This title shall not apply * * * to a religious corporation, association, or society.” 1964 Legis.Hist. at 3035. Senate debate on the various proposals extended until June 17,1964, when the Senate invoked cloture and adopted the HumphreyDirksen substitute. 110 Cong.Rec. 14239 (1964). H.R. 7152 as modified by the substitute was passed by the Senate on June 19, 1964. 110 Cong.Rec. 14511 (1964). Upon being returned to the House, the Humphrey-Dirksen substitute with its limited exemption for religiously affiliated institutions was passed without House amendment on July 2, 1964. 110 Cong.Rec. 15897 (1964). President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act the same day. 110 Cong.Rec. 17783 (1964). As enacted, the text of the relevant part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was as follows: EXEMPTION “Sec. 702. This title shall not apply * * * to a religious corporation, association, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, or society of its religious activities or to an educational institution with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of such institution.” Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 255 (1964). The legislative history of the 1972 amendment to § 702 further elucidates the limited scope of the religious exemption. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 effected a substantial revision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and formulation of the religious exemption received extensive attention on the Senate floor after the relevant bill, S. 2515, had been reported out of committee. Senators Ervin and Allen proposed Amendment No. 815 which would have completely exempted religious organizations from the coverage of the Act. In the following colloquy with Senator Williams, Senator Ervin described the sweeping character of his proposal: “Mr. Williams. Does the Senator’s amendment limit itself to the opportunity of a religious organization to have the right to hire people of its own faith? Is that the limitation of the amendment? “Mr. Ervin. I would allow the religious corporation to do what it pleased. That is what my amendment would allow it to do. It would allow it liberty. It would take it out from under the control of the EEOC entirely. * * * * * * “I am trying to take the political hands of Caesar off all religious corporations, off all religious associations, and off all religious societies. I am trying to take them even off the National Council of Churches. “Mr. Williams. Does the Senator deal with any activity that a religious organization might be engaged in — any activity? “Mr. Ervin. Any activity.” EEOC, Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1972 at 1229-1230 (1972) (“1972 Legis.Hist.”). A short while later, expressing opposition to Ervin’s proposed amendment, Senator Williams explained that it would expand the exemption for religious organizations in two ways: “Mr. Williams. * * * This amendment broadens' the present exemption of section 702 of Title VII in two respects. Section 702 now exempts religious organizations employing individuals of a particular religion for religious activities and provides an exemption for the educational activities of educational institutions. “This amendment would allow religious organizations and educational institutions a complete exemption from Title VII coverage. A religious organization would be exempt whether or not it is engaged in religious activities; and the present authority to hire employees of a particular religion, for religious activities would be expanded to include race, color, sex, or national origin for any activity.” 1972 Legis.Hist. at 1249-1250. By a vote of 55 to 25, the Ervin-Allen amendment was defeated in the Senate. 118 Cong.Rec. 1995 (1975). Subsequently, the Senate considered another Ervin amendment which would have broadened the scope of § 702 only slightly. The Senate adopted this amendment which permitted religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring for all — and not just religious — activities. Although the language of the amended version of § 702 is no more explicit than the earlier version in limiting a religious organization’s right to discriminate only with regard to an employee’s religion, the process and result of Senate deliberation emphasize the restrictive scope of the exemption. Presented with a proposal of a two-faceted expansion to § 702, the Senate refused to accept it. Faced with the opportunity of approving just one of the expansions, the Senate took it. Certainly, it is a permissible inference that rejection of the Ervin-Allen amendment is attributable to Senate disapproval of the proposal to allow religious organizations to discriminate on grounds other than religion. There are several final indications in the legislative history which demonstrate that § 702 is not to be read so broadly as to exempt religious organizations with regard to discrimination based on race, color, sex or national origin. The conference committee report which was adopted gave the following comment on § 702: “The Senate amendment eliminated the present exemption from Title VII for educational institutions. Also, the Senate provision expanded the exemption for religious organizations from coverage under this title with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion in all their activities instead of the present limitation to religious activities. The House bill did not change the existing exemptions. The House receded.” H.R. Rep. 92-899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 Legis.Hist. at 1836 (emphasis added). The conference report was adopted by both chambers. 1972 Legis.Hist. at 1853-1854 (Senate), 1872-1875 (House). Finally, in a section-by-section analysis submitted in the Congressional Record after adoption of all the 1972 changes, Senator Williams offered what is perhaps the most clear expression of an affirmative intention of Congress to grant jurisdiction to the EEOC over charges of discrimination brought against religious organizations on any basis other than an employee’s religion. Senator Williams stated: “The limited exemption from coverage in this section for religious corporations, associations, educational institutions or societies has been broadened to allow such entities to employ individuals of a particular religion in all their activities instead of the present limitation to religious activities. Such organizations remain subject to the provisions of Title VII with regard to race, color, sex or national origin.” Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, reprinted in 1972 Legis.Hist. at 1844-1845 (emphasis added). In summary, this Court finds the language as well as the legislative history of § 702 are unmistakably clear that under Title VII Press can exercise only a preference for coreligionists and that Title VII does grant to the EEOC jurisdiction over charges of sexually based discrimination arising from the employer-employee relationship between Tobler and Press. The merits of Press’s First Amendment defense to the exercise of this regulatory jurisdiction must now be considered. II. First Amendment Defenses A. Free Exercise Defense Defendant Press argues that, when application of Title VII collides with a “truly religious course of conduct,” one which constitutes an alleged exercise of religion, the exercise of religion must prevail over any implementation of the statute. Press invokes the free exercise clause to protect this asserted religiously based conduct and not its right to hold a specific religious belief. Press argues that all the activities carried on at its Mountain View plant constitute an exercise of religion and, more particularly, that the discharge of Tobler was the exercise of a specific belief that adherents of the Seventh-day Adventist faith are not to instigate or continue civil action against the church. Presumably, Press relies on the former for immunity from all facets of this litigation, including the claims for damages based on its former head-of-household compensation practices, and on the latter only to defeat jurisdiction over claims based on Tobler’s retaliatory discharge. Since Press admits that the doctrine of the Seventh-day Adventist Church incorporates the principle of equal pay, Press cannot rely on an alleged exercise of any specific religious belief to immunize its head-of-household compensation practices from EEOC scrutiny. Case law has long drawn a distinction between the absolute freedom to hold religious beliefs and the freedom of conduct based on religious beliefs, which latter freedom may be curtailed in some circumstances for the protection of societal interests. The distinction reflects the judgment that while the state should not pry into individuals’ minds or dispense benefits according to citizens’ religious beliefs, at the same time acts harmful to society should not be immune from prohibition merely because the actor asserts religious inspiration. This principle was stated by the Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940): “The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts, — freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.” (Footnote omitted.) See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-220, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-604, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-167, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878). This proposition has been repeatedly applied. For example, a state’s child-labor law may take precedence over the right of a child to exercise his religion by selling religious literature. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1941). The refusal to comply with the Equal Pay Act may not be justified on religious grounds, Marshall v. Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 14 EPD ¶ 7806 at 5957-5958 (C.D.Cal.1977), nor may the failure to comply with the federal minimum wage law, Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879, 884 (7 Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013, 74 S.Ct. 867, 98 L.Ed. 1136 (1954), or the refusal to pay federal income taxes, Parker v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 792, 795 (8 Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026, 87 S.Ct. 752, 17 L.Ed.2d 674 (1967). Such regulation of conduct will be countenanced if it impinges on free exercise freedoms only when the government demonstrates a compelling state interest which outweighs the inhibition of the religiously based conduct. Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at 221-229, 235-236, 92 S.Ct. 1526; Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-409, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). In the instant case, the Court has no doubt that there is a compelling public interest in applying the requirements of Title VII to the employment relationship between Tobler and Press that outweighs the assertion by Press that the pervasively religious nature of its activities or the exercise of its particular religious belief prohibiting civil suits immunizes its employment practices from EEOC regulation. In fact, as EEOC has contended, there are several different interests that cumulatively outweigh the infringement alleged by Press. First is the interest of all individual employees of religiously affiliated organizations in the protection of their statutory right to employment free from sexual, racial, or ethnic discrimination and the utilization of the relief mechanisms embodied in Title VII without fear of reprisal. The earlier discussion of legislative history has already shown the importance Congress attached to extending equal employment opportunity as mandated by Title VII even to employees in religious organizations. Congressional recognition of employees’ interests in proceeding to have the merits of a Title VII claim decided without retaliation is embodied in § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e— 3(a). Section 704(a) has two provisions. The first protects general “opposition” to unlawful employment practices.' The second, which covers Tobler’s “opposition” to Press’s allegedly discriminatory practices, protects specific forms of petitioning the government to end an unlawful practice, e. g., making a charge, testifying, assisting, or “participating] in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Courts have distinguished the degree of protection given by the two provisions. Individual conduct under the first proviso, general opposition to an unlawful employment practice, must meet a balancing test, Hochstadt v. Worchester Foundation, 545 F.2d 222, 230-231 (1 Cir. 1976), whereas those forms of conduct in which Tobler engaged and which are covered by the second proviso are absolutely protected. Additional decisions have emphasized the great importance to society of protecting use by individuals of the procedures Congress designated to vindicate equal employment rights in order to effectuate a statutory scheme which relies largely on just such individual willingness to file charges. See, e. g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5 Cir.), rehearing denied, 415 F.2d 1376 (1969); Mead v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 442 F.Supp. 114, 15 EPD ¶ 7885 at 6404 (D.Minn.1977). Cf. Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry Co., 361 U.S. 288, 292, 80 S.Ct. 332, 4 L.Ed.2d 323 (1960) (recognition of importance of proscription against retaliation in § 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)). Allowing retaliation to go unremedied in this instance would also defeat the EEOC’s interest in being able to administer its statutory mandate. To allow a free exercise defense to the retaliation and discriminatory pay practices alleged in this case would mean that no regulation of employment conditions by any governmental agency will be effective at any of the Seventh-day Adventist affiliated ..institutions nationwide which engage in printing; lumber, wood products, and furniture manufacturing; food processing; and other diverse activities which may have a secular component or which may employ individuals performing purely secular functions such as those Tobler was assigned. Particularly with regard to its formulation of a broad free exercise defense based on its assertion that all its activities constitute religiously based conduct, Press has misconceived who it is that must make the decisions regarding any conflict between government regulation and the free exercise of religion. In this nation, religious freedom is recognized by the secular adoption of a constitution without which religious freedom would have no meaning. This same document has conferred on the courts .the power and responsibility to construe its provisions and protect the violation of the individual rights it creates. Without doubt, the maintenance of an ordered society can and at times does conflict with the practice of certain religious beliefs. In such instances, the courts, and not the church involved, must weigh whether the societal right intrudes on religion in an unconstitutional rather than in a theological sense. It is with this principle in mind that the Court finds no violation of Press’s free exercise of religion. The same principle applies in the following consideration of Press’s second First Amendment defense, that EEOC regulation of its activities violates the establishment clause by impinging upon the separation of church and state. B. Establishment Clause Defendant Press further argues that since its institutional character is pervasively sectarian, any regulation of its employment practices pursuant to Title VII violates the Establishment Clause as it creates a governmental intrusion fostering impermissible church-state entanglement. EEOC responds that as long as the government action touches only the secular aspects of a religious institution, government regulation is permissible. Cases interpreting the Establishment Clause have clearly rejected arguments that the First Amendment requires absolute church-state separation and that it bars any contact with government upon a finding that an institution has a religious character. As the Supreme Court explained in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. at 614, 91 S.Ct. at 2112, such a requirement would not comport with the realities of modern society: “Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312, [72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954] (1952); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 [83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965] (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state requirements under compulsory school-attendance laws are examples of necessary and permissible contacts. Indeed, under the statutory exemption before us in Walz [v. Tax Commissioner of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, [90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697] (1970)], the State had a continuing burden to ascertain that the [tax] exempt property [owned by a religious organization] was in fact being used for religious worship. Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a ‘wall,’ is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.” See also Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U.S. 736, 745-746, 96 S.Ct. 2337, 49 L.Ed.2d 179 (1976) (plurality opinion). In this case, Press does not dispute that it is subject to some governmental regulation in the form of building, zoning, and fire safety laws. Rather, Press argues that the regulation which the EEOC is seeking to implement is more intrusive to the extent that it impermissibly entrenches on church-state separation. In Lemon, the Supreme Court reviewed the criteria for constitutional analysis of such challenges to the separation of church and state. The Supreme Court indicated that to survive constitutional attack a statute challenged on its face or in its application must meet the following three tests: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 [88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060] (1968); finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ Walz, supra, [397 U.S.] at 674 [90 S.Ct. 1409.]” 403 U.S. at 612-613, 91 S.Ct. at 2111. Here, the first part of Lemon’s three-prong test is not at issue. Defendant Press does not dispute that Title VII has a secular legislative purpose. It does argue, however, that as applied to Press or any other religiously affiliated organization, Title VII fails the second and third parts of this test. As to primary effect, the Supreme Court has offered a further enumeration of the factors which are to be considered. In a discussion of a challenged statute granting aid to parochial schools, a discussion which is equally apropos to consideration of regulations alleged to inhibit rather than foster religion, the Supreme Court stated: “While entanglement is essentially a procedural problem, the primary-effect question is the substantive one of what private educational activities, by whatever procedure, may be supported by state funds. Hunt [v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 93 S.Ct. 2868, 37 L.Ed.2d 923 (1973)] requires (1) that no state aid at all go to institutions that are so ‘pervasively sectarian’ that secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian ones, and (2) that if secular activities can be separated out, they alone may be funded.” Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, supra, 426 U.S. at 755, 96 S.Ct. at 2349 (plurality opinion). Applying these “primary effect” criteria to Press, this Court finds that Press is not so “pervasively sectarian” as to prevent separation of its secular and sectarian employment functions and that in applying Title VII to Tobler’s case, it is only the secular activities which are being regulated. First, the requirement of separability is satisfied because the aspect of Press which the non-discriminatory and anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII seek to regulate is Press’s employment relationship with a lay member of its clerical work force. Tobler’s functions, as her supervisor indicated, were chiefly secretarial, and the lesser living allowance which she received was gauged only to her sex and not to any factor related to the administration of a religious activity. For an employee such as Tobler, the employment relationship itself was secular with the exception of the interjection of one religious aspect permissible under § 702 of Title VII. Press could exert a preference for co-religionists and could condition Tobler’s continued employment on her membership in good standing in the Seventh-day Adventist church. However, no alteration in Tobler’s membership formed the reason for her discharge. Control over this aspect rested not with Press or the General Conference Executive Committee which recommended her discharge but with her local church congregation. Once this one religious aspect of the employment relationship is isolated, it is clear that the assertion of EEOC jurisdiction is directed to the secular component of Press’s activities in satisfaction of the second prong of the “primary effect” test. Despite the over-arching religious atmosphere Press ascribed to its institution, secular job responsibilities still had to be performed if a product was to be produced, and in fulfilling these functions Tobler received living allowances not based on the nature of her duties or on any contribution she made to the faith but solely on her sex. Applying the requirements of §§ 703(a) and 704(a) to the instant case would not impermissibly inhibit the sectarian components of Press’s activities. Evaluation of the final prong of the Lemon analysis, whether application of a statute fosters an excessive entanglement with religion, requires examination of the character and purpose of the institution involved, the nature of the intrusion the state is creating, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority. Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, supra, 426 U.S. at 748-749, 761-777, 96 S.Ct. 2337 (plurality opinion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. at 615, 91 S.Ct. 2105. Consideration of the character and purpose of the institution with regard to entanglement parallels the analysis applied in determining if an institution is “pervasively sectarian.” Once it has been determined, as it has here, that an institution has segregable secular components and that those are what are being regulated, concern over any excessive church-state entanglement that might result from regulating these secular functions is diminished. Roemer, supra, 426 U.S. at 762, 96 S.Ct. 2337. The nature of the intrusion and the possible resulting relationship between the state and the religious institution must in this instance be considered together. Application of Title VII to employment practices would not engage the EEOC in continuous supervision of the defendant’s activities. Rather, the EEOC only engages in investigation of institutions after charges have been filed by an employee or by a member of the Commission. § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the Commission may require that employers produce reports on their employment practices, see § 709(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c); however, orders to produce such information are also subject to challenge under § 709(c) by any religiously affiliated employer who believes the investigation impermissibly crosses into sectarian components of its organization. Once a complaint is filed in federal district court, discovery procedures would be supervised by the court which could be called upon if necessary to restrain overly zealous plaintiff’s counsel who might be exceeding the permissible limits under the secular-sectarian distinction. With regard to the possibility of perpetuating an excessively entangling relationship, it should be noted that the injunctive relief sought in this case is of a narrow scope. The relationship between Press and the EEOC created by the exercise of the latter’s jurisdiction over Tobler’s charges could appear to be less entangling than the filing requirements of the tax exemption which was approved in Walz v. Commissioner, supra, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697, and by those necessary to guarantee the compliance by the Seventh-day Adventist Church with the Fair Labor Standards Act ordered in Marshall v. Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-day Adventist, supra, 14 EPC ¶ 7806 at 5958-5959 & n.3. The relationship is also less entangling than the state supervisory procedures governing distribution of parochial aid which have already been approved by the Supreme Court. For example, in Roemer, supra, the Supreme Court upheld a Maryland statute providing for annual, noncategorical grants to private colleges, including religiously affiliated institutions, as long as the funds, according to a proviso in the statute, not be used for sectarian purposes. The statute authorized the state Board of Public Works to establish procedures for annual filing of itemized reports regarding the recipient institution’s use of the governmental aid and for maintenance of records to assist state auditors in checking on the institution’s expenditures. 426 U.S. at 741-743, 96 S.Ct. 2337. The Supreme Court rejected an entanglement challenge to the provisions requiring reports and audits, noting that the checks by the state agency were “not likely to be any more entangling than the inspections and audits incident to the normal process of the colleges’ accreditations by the State.” Id. at 764, 96 S.Ct. at 2353. Similarly, an on-going relationship had been required by the'statute which was upheld in Tilton v. Richardson, supra, where although the “one-time, single-purpose” construction grant approved there entailed “no continuing financial relationships or dependencies, no annual audits, and no government analysis of an institution’s expenditures on secular as distinguished from religious activities,” 403 U.S. at 688, 91 S.Ct. at 2100 (plurality opinion), the government retained the right to inspect subsidized buildings for sectarian use. 403 U.S. at 675, 91 S.Ct. 2091. The ongoing church-state involvement mandated by the statutory scheme approved in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 93 S.Ct. 2868, 37 L.Ed.2d 923 (1973), had been even greater. There, the state was actually the lessor of the subsidized buildings, retaining extensive powers to regulate their use. 413 U.S. at 738, 93 S.Ct. 2868. Nonetheless, the statute challenged in Hunt was upheld. Here, the accountability of an employer after an