Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER KARLTON, District Judge. I INTRODUCTION Growing public concern with the environmental effect of governmental action led Congress to enact the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4331 et seq. Principally, the Act is a device to insure that governmental agencies critically examine the environmental effect of significant federal action and proposals for legislation. To insure that the government and the public will be fully informed, NEPA requires the executive to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of its actions, and to disclose the facts, reasons, and results of its examination in an environmental statement. Essentially, NEPA forces the decision making process to the surface so it may be reviewed by Congress, government officials, the public, and the courts. ' In this suit, the State of California and other plaintiffs attack the Forest Service’s far ranging Roadless Area Review and Evaluation (RARE II), alleging that its actions with respect to some forty-seven areas in California (“disputed areas”) do not comply with the requirements of NEPA. RARE II seeks to determine the future land use of some sixty-two million acres of road-less national forest land. Although all of the RARE II areas meet the minimal statutory requirements to qualify for official designation as wilderness, the Forest Service in RARE II determined that a substantial majority of these areas should be developed. As required by NEPA, the Forest Service prepared a lengthy environmental impact statement to support its decision. Although the statement is described by defendants as “programmatic” in nature, it supports decisions that will have significant impact on each RARE II area. Accordingly, the sufficiency of the statement under NEPA must be tested by the extent it demonstrates that the Forest Service took a “hard look” at the environmental impact of its a.ctions in each area, and the extent that the Forest Service disclosed its findings as to each area. The particular deficiency alleged by California is a failure on the part of the Forest Service to critically examine the effect of its decisions upon the wilderness quality of the RARE II areas. My examination of the RARE II environmental statement has convinced me that the Forest Service either never seriously considered the impact of its decision on the wilderness qualities of the RARE II areas, or that the Forest Service has simply failed to disclose the data, assumptions, and conclusions employed by it in such a consideration. Ultimately, the RARE II environmental statement informs Congress and the public that the Forest Service has reached certain conclusions and is prepared to act upon these conclusions. The EIS states that the Forest Service has decided to surrender wilderness values in many areas but does not reveal what it is giving up. It explains that the Forest Service plans to develop the RARE II areas but does not describe how it will develop them nor what effect such development will have. In the course of developing this decision, the Forest Service examined an array of alternative courses of action, all, save one, heavily skewed towards development, without explaining why alternatives skewed towards wilderness were not considered. Although NEPA requires full disclosure and public participation, the Forest Service adopted a method of disclosure and public participation that effectively undercut the possibility of serious public participation in its decision making process. For these reasons, I hold that the RARE II environmental statement violated the National Environmental Policy Act. Accordingly, I enjoin the Forest Service from developing any of the disputed areas in this lawsuit prior to considering the wilderness values of the areas in compliance with NEPA. My decision in no way is based upon any conclusion that there is a “correct” decision as to how many of these areas should be developed and how many should be left as wilderness. The Forest Service bears the responsibility for making that determination, and no court may upset that substantive decision unless it is arbitrary. My conclusion is based solely on the ground that the Forest Service did not comply with NEPA’s procedural requirements. Although Congress selected a procedural approach to address the great challenge of environmental management, these requirements cannot be deprecated as “mere procedure” for “it is procedure that marks much of the difference between rule by law and rule by fiat.” Wisconsin v. Constantineau (1971) 400 U.S. 433, 436, 91 S.Ct. 507, 509, 27 L.Ed.2d 515. II BACKGROUND The Forest Service administers the National Forest System comprising 187.7 million acres organized into 154 National Forests. The RARE II areas, ultimately including 2,918 areas covering a little more than 62 million acres, are included in the System. A separate system, the National Wilderness Preservation System, was established in 1964, and presently includes some 187 areas including more than 19 million acres. In 1972, the Forest Service commenced RARE I, a program to identify roadless areas, and to determine what activities, if any, were appropriate for them. RARE I considered 56 million acres throughout the United States and resulted in the selection of some 21.3 million acres as wilderness study areas. The RARE I program was not supported by an environmental impact statement and its methodology was severely criticized. When the Forest Service attempted to develop certain of the RARE I lands, a federal court enjoined development pending compliance with NEPA. See Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz (10th Cir. 1973) 484 F.2d 1244. •For several years following RARE I, the Forest Service did not further attempt programmatic consideration of roadless areas. Rather, the Service chose a site by site evaluation during the local forest planning process. Finally, in June, 1977, RARE II was commenced. The asserted purpose of RARE II was to speed the process of wilderness allocation and to open remaining roadless areas to development. Like RARE I, RARE II sought to inventory roadless areas and then evaluate them. The final result of RARE II was the designation of each area into one of three categories: wilderness, non wilderness, or further planning. Wilderness designation was a recommendation to Congress for inclusion of an area in the Wilderness Preservation System. Non wilderness designation meant that the area was open to development without further consideration of wilderness. Further planning was, essentially, a decision not to decide and to leave land use issues to the ordinary forest planning process. Essentially, then, RARE II contemplated two actions: (1) recommendations to Congress for wilderness classification; and (2) an administrative decision to open areas to development and in general not to further consider wilderness issues. The RARE II process was supported by a draft and final environmental statement. The draft statement identified ten alternative allocation methods which resulted in different percentages of areas designated to wilderness, nonwilderness, and further planning. No officially endorsed proposed action was identified in the draft. The public was invited to comment on various proposed “decision criteria” to be used in selecting the proposed action. These criteria included resource planning goals developed by the Forest Service, comparisons of certain wilderness attributes of the areas including the goals of diversity and accessibility of wilderness areas, public agreement, the cost and impact of wilderness classification, and national issues such as housing needs and inflation. Comments were also invited on allocations for each specific area and approaches to developing alternatives. The draft was filed on June 15, 1978, and widely distributed. By October, 1978, the cutoff date for receipt of comments, some 264,093 comments had been received. The final statement was filed on January 4, 1979. For the first time, the FES identified a proposed action, which resulted in allocations nationwide of fifteen million acres to wilderness, thirty-six million acres to non-wilderness, and 10.8 million acres to further planning. Like the draft statement, the final statement is programmatic in form in that it evaluates the areas generically as opposed to individually. In all, eleven alternatives, including the proposed action, are considered. One alternative is “no action”, i. e. to continue to determine land use issues at the local planning level. One alternative allocated all areas to wilderness while another allocated all areas to nonwilderness. The remaining alternatives emphasize different factors involving different mixes of decisional criteria with resultant differing percentages of the acreage being allocated to wilderness, nonwilderness, and further planning. The proposed action is a complex, eleven step decisional process that starts with the partial combination of two alternatives identified in the draft statement. The next ten steps adjust specific area allocations based upon public response, accessibility and distribution targets for wilderness, scores on a Forest Service devised Wilderness Attribute Rating System (WARS), local forester judgment concerning public response and significant adverse effects on local communities, resource planning goals, compelling reasons, and national issues such as energy, inflation, and housing needs. Unlike the. draft statement, the final statement was only circulated to Congress and affected federal agencies and states. The proposed action recommendations were transmitted to President Carter on May 2, 1979, who made some minor changes in the allocations and then transmitted the wilderness recommendations to Congress where it is presently being considered. President Carter stated at that time that “I am asking Secretary Bergland to proceed immediately with the planning and management of these nonwilderness areas under existing law.” According to the final statement, areas allocated to nonwilderness were available for development activities on April 15, 1979. California brought this action against the Secretary of Agriculture and the Forest Service alleging violation of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4331 et seq., the Multiple Use and Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. 528 et seq., and the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1604. The Natural Resources Defense Council, Trinity County and the Clear Creek Legal Defense Fund, et al. were permitted to intervene on plaintiff’s side. Del Norte, Shasta and Siskiyou Counties, the National Forest Products Association, et al., and Webco Lumber Company, et al., were permitted to intervene on defendants’ side. Plaintiffs dispute the nonwilderness designations of some forty-seven areas in California comprising nearly one million acres of land. They seek summary judgment, a declaration of the invalidity of the nonwilderness designations and a permanent injunction against any development of the areas that might change their wilderness characteristics prior to the circulation of an environmental impact statement in compliance with the requirements of NEPA. Ill NEPA REQUIRES THAT THE RARE II EIS INCLUDE DETAILED ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF ITS LAND USE DESIGNATIONS The parties first join issue on whether the RARE II EIS must contain site specific analysis of the impact of its land use designations. Plaintiffs insist that detailed site specific analysis of the environmental consequences of the nonwilderness designations must be performed in the RARE II EIS. Specifically, they argue that if the RARE II EIS does not consider the impact of the loss of the wilderness option, it will never be assessed. Defendants, on the other hand, characterize RARE II as a mere “partial planning decision” with little immediate environmental impact. They assert that since site specific environmental analysis will be required when individual forest management plans are promulgated under the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1604, the environmental impact of the proposed action will be adequately assessed. Both the form and timing of environmental analysis, they argue, is left to the informed discretion of the agency. NEPA requires a “detailed statement” for every legislative proposal and “other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). In determining whether or not a proposed action requires an environmental statement, and, if so, when such statement must be prepared, the initial inquiry must examine the scope of the proposed action. If an environmental statement is required, the nature and scope of the proposed action will determine the extent of detail, analysis, and information an adequate statement must contain (Atlanta Coalition v. Atlanta Regional Comm. (5th Cir. 1979) 599 F.2d 1333, 1344), as well as the range of reasonable alternatives that must be considered. See, e. g. NRDC v. Morton (D.C.Cir.1972) 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 13, 458 F.2d 827, 835. To put it simply, the type of action proposed dictates the type of environmental analysis required. A. Scope of the Proposed Action The RARE II EIS proposes two distinct types of actions. First, it proposes legislation to add some of the RARE II areas to the National Wilderness Preservation System. Under the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq., additions to the Wilderness Preservation System may only be made by Congress. RARE II’s wilderness designations are therefore “proposals for legislation” that require an environmental statement. No party in this action challenges these designations. Non wilderness designation, however, unlike wilderness designation, is an administrative action not requiring legislative implementation. Accordingly, in order to determine whether these designations constitute major federal actions, and, if so, when and in what depth environmental analysis is required, I must first turn to an examination of these designations. Pending the outcome of the RARE II process, no major development activities were permitted on areas under consideration. By definition, the areas are undeveloped, roadless areas that have not been allocated to nonwilderness uses by a filed land management plan, and meet the minimum criteria for inclusion in the Wilderness Preservation System (see infra). In the past, these lands have been managed to preserve their wilderness qualities. Most of the public use of these areas has been of a type consistent with the lands’ wilderness character (FES 47). Present recreational use of the areas nationwide is estimated at more than 32.6 million visitor days annually, or approximately 16% of the total visitor days in the entire National Forest System (FES 14). Areas allocated to nonwilderness uses are available for the full range of nonwilderness uses including timber harvesting, mining, roadbuilding, intensive grazing, recreational site development, and motorized recreation. Nonwilderness uses will be regulated by existing laws, regulations, and management plans. As management plans are prepared in accordance with the National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1604, areas allocated to nonwilderness will not be considered for further wilderness use. Recent regulations adopted by the Forest Service to implement the new requirements of the National Forest Management Act provide that areas designated non wilder ness by RARE II “will [not] be considered for designation as wilderness until a revision of the forest plan. . . . ” 44 F.R. 53988 § 219.12(e) (September 17, 1979). The United States conceded at oral argument that RARE II and this regulation bar a consideration of the wilderness features of any given area during the preparation of the “first generation” of forest management plans. The Forest Service intends to complete the management planning process by 1983; in any event, the National Forest Management Act requires completion of the plans by 1985. 16 U.S.C. 1604(c). Forest management plans adopted under the new regulations must be revised every ten years, and may be revised more frequently if conditions change or public demand requires such changes. When a plan is revised, the Forest Service may once again consider wilderness uses of the area in question. 44 F.R. 53988, §§ 219.12(e), 219.11(f). Thus, at a minimum, areas designated nonwilderness will be managed for nonwilderness uses for period of time ranging ten to sixteen years. At no point during this period, unless conditions change, may the Forest Service consider wilderness features or uses. Defendants argue, however, that wilderness values will be considered and protected during this period notwithstanding the Forest Service regulations. First, defendants contend, any management plan adopted under the new regulations will be accompanied by an environmental statement if the new plan significantly changes current uses. 44 F.R. 53988 § 219.11(b)(2)(i). The regulations, however, expressly preclude consideration of wilderness. Thus, although a forest plan environmental statement may be required and may examine some types of environmental impact resulting from development (e. g., pollution), the central values of wilderness— opportunities for solitude, primitive recreation, and primeval character, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c), cannot be considered. Moreover, even if specific environmental effects which could implicate wilderness values are examined, the wilderness alternative, with its affirmative legislative safeguards (see infra), cannot be examined. Finally, the regulations only require environmental statements for revisions or amendments to forest management plans. Lesser planning activities that are themselves not major federal actions will not be subject to environmental analysis, restricted or otherwise. Thus there is the present danger of the accretion of small deleterious effects that could “whittle away” wilderness values. See infra. Defendants argue, however, that the wilderness alternative will still be considered sub rosa since the environmental statement accompanying each new management plan must consider a “no action” alternative — i. e. “the most likely condition expected to exist in the future if the current management direction would continue unchanged.” 44 F.R. 53988 § 219.5(f)(l)(ii). Defendants contend that the no action alternative is tantamount to the wilderness alternative since by definition the RARE II areas are in a natural condition. While it is true that the areas are presently in a natural condition, many of these areas, as I have noted, have specific management plans that contemplate development activities. For these areas, the no action alternative is quite different from the wilderness alternative, since the “current management direction” entails development. Even if the no action alternative meant leaving the area in its natural state, however, it will not adequately assess wilderness values for two reasons. First, although no action might mean leaving an area in its natural condition, it will not include the affirmative safeguards of the Wilderness Act. Secondly, however, the no action alternative will not operate as a wilderness alternative because under statutory law and regulation neither the purpose, effect or advantages of no action can involve wilderness considerations. As I have indicated, the RARE II decision forecloses wilderness uses of areas designated for nonwilderness. Under the National-Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1604, and the Multiple Use Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. § 528 et seq., the Forest Service is required to administer the National Forests to “provide for multiple use and sustained yield of the products and services obtained therefrom . . . and, in particular, include coordination of outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish, and wilderness . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1). Aside from wilderness uses, the Forest Service must “develop and administer the renewable surface resources of the national forests for multiple use and sustained yield of the several products and services obtained therefrom.” 16 U.S.C. § 529. If the Forest Service cannot consider wilderness values, then it is required, in determining the uses of the national forests, to consider only the other allowable uses of the lands. Thus, under RARE II and the new regulations, the rationale or justification for a “no action” alternative cannot rely upon wilderness uses or values. Forest Service regulations require that “the purposes of the management direction proposed” be stated for each alternative discussed. 44 F.R. 53988 § 219.5(f)(2)(iv). If the no action alternative cannot rely upon any wilderness “purpose” what purposes can it rely upon? Obviously, under the regulations and the statutes, it can only rely upon the promotion of other alternative multiple uses, many of which are development oriented and thus hostile to wilderness use. Conceivably, other factors may justify the “no action” alternative such as budgetary constraints or the economics of development. Thus the “no action” alternative will never operate as a wilderness alternative. It will not even promote wilderness oriented values unless (1) present resource management plans do not contemplate development, (2) no action is supported by reasons unrelated to wilderness considerations, and (3) management of the area includes the type of affirmative protection in the Wilderness Act. Since the sine qua non of the nonwilderness designations is development and resource exploitation, it is inherently improbable that this fortunate combination of factors will occur. Nonwilderness designation thus results in three interrelated types of impact upon wilderness values. First, management planning will not consider mitigation measures that might minimize the impact of development upon the wilderness characteristics of an area. Second, and most obviously, the areas will not enjoy the affirmative protections of wilderness classification. Third, the opportunity for wilderness classification will be permanently foreclosed on many of the areas because development activities-will change the nature of an area to the point that it will no longer meet the minimal criteria for inclusion in the wilderness system. These criteria require an area to be “untrammeled by man,” “undeveloped . retaining its primeval character without permanent improvements or human habitation . . . with the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable .” and to include “outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation . . . .” Additionally, the area must have at least five thousand acres of land or be of “sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in unimpaired condition . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). Not only is it likely that non wilder ness uses would result in the noticeable imprint of man’s works, but even if less radical development occurs, a variety of projects could “whittle away” the size of a potential wilderness area to the point that it would be impracticable to manage it as wilderness. In addition, a variety of secondary environmental effects resulting from development may further undercut the wilderness value of an area: soil erosion from roadbuilding and timber harvesting, water quality and fishery degradation, air pollution from the use of fossil fuels and slash burning, adverse consequences from the use of chemical herbicides, pesticides, and fertilizers used in timber and range management, the decline in the number and types of wildlife and plant species, increased vulnerability of species deriving from uniform timber treatment, the destruction of solitude and beauty, and the diminution of wild and natural areas available for scientific study. Despite these threats, the impact of these consequences upon wilderness values cannot be considered during the land management process and, of course, wilderness classification itself cannot be raised or recommended. Since any environmental statement prepared during the first generation of forest management plans cannot consider wilderness, the proposed management plan will never be compared with or assessed against wilderness values. In other words, although the forest plan environmental statement may consider other environmental effects, it will never raise salutary questions about the advantages of protecting wilderness values, the effect of wilderness lost, or the potentially permanent loss of the wilderness option. Although wilderness values may again be examined in ten to sixteen years, the wilderness character of an area in the meantime may be so irreparably changed that it will fail to meet the minimum criteria for wilderness classification. Finally, even if an area is presently unsuitable for formal wilderness classification, it may still contain wilderness ‘values that could be lost to development. These values or mitigation measures to preserve these values will not be assessed or otherwise examined during the forest planning process. B. Major Federal Action Notwithstanding the effects of non-wilderness designation, an environmental impact statement analyzing these effects is only required if the action is a “major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). Generally, the duty to prepare an environmental statement is triggered when there is a proposal to change the status quo. Committee for Auto Responsibility v. Solomon (D.C.Cir.1979) 195 U.S.App.D.C. 178, 188-9, 603 F.2d 992, 1002-3. RARE II designations change the status quo by foreclosing the consideration of wilderness in the planning process. In order to determine whether the RARE II process itself, as well as specific area designations require an environmental statement, then, our inquiry must be whether or not such actions constitute “major federal actions,” within the meaning of NEPA. The applicable Council of Environmental Quality regulations define “actions” to include the “making, modification, or establishment of regulations, rules, procedure and policy.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(a)(3) (1976). Thus, the RARE II designations are “actions.” The issue of whether they are “major” actions, while more complex, also seems relatively clear. The regulations define “major federal actions” to include actions where there “is a potential that the environment may be significantly affected. . . . ” 40 C.F.R. 1500.6(a) (Emphasis added). See also City of Davis v. Coleman (9th Cir. 1975) 521 F.2d 661, 673 (an environmental statement is required “whenever a project may cause a significant degradation of some . environmental factor.”). The environmental statement must be prepared even if the action merely permits or authorizes major actions by other parties, go verm mental or private, that may significantly affect the environment. See, e. g. Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm. (D.C.Cir.1973) 156 U.S.App.D.C. 395, 404, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088; NRDC v. Morton (D.D.C.1974) 388 F.Supp. 829, 834, aff’d without opinion, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 77, 527 F.2d 1386, cert. den. 427 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 3201, 49 L.Ed.2d 1204. It is clear that the RARE II process is itself a major federal action requiring an environmental statement. Indeed, we need only examine the Forest Service’s own characterization of the RARE II process to resolve the issue: “major decisions are involved in this process that may have significant effects on balance and availability of commodity outputs and the resultant social and economic environment and with potential to impact physical and biological resources.” (FES at 2). It is also clear that specific activities on individual areas may be major federal actions requiring an environmental impact statement. See, e. g. Cady v. Morton (9th Cir. 1975) 527 F.2d 786, 796 (application for approval of mining plan covering 770 acres); Minnesota Pub. Int. Res. Group v. Butz (8th Cir. 1974) 498 F.2d 1314, 1323 (modification of existing contracts for logging in Boundary Waters Canoe Area); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz (10th Cir. 1973) 484 F.2d 1244 (authorization of clearcutting on 670 acres); Kelley v. Butz (W.D.Mich.1975) 404 F.Supp. 925 (chemical spraying of 84 acres); NRDC v. Morton (D.D.C.1974) 388 F.Supp. 829, 834 aff’d without opinion 174 U.S.App.D.C. 77, 527 F.2d 1386, cert. den. 427 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 3201, 49 L.Ed.2d 1204 (single grazing permit may be major federal action). . In some ways, of course, permanently foreclosing the wilderness alternative and foreclosing consideration of wilderness values for a particular area may have longer lasting effect than an individual project, whose impact may, by itself, be limited or transitory. RARE II designations are in the nature of land use decisions that direct and channel all types of land use in the future. Individual developments that in themselves do not constitute a major federal action may, by accretion, permanently remove the possibility of wilderness classification or undermine wilderness values. In determining the significance of a non-wilderness designation for a particular area, the importance Congress has placed on wilderness preservation must not be overlooked. First, the preservation of “an enduring resource of wilderness” is a declared national policy. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a). Second, the Forest Service has been given affirmative duties to consider existing and potential wilderness areas during its forest planning process. In developing, maintaining and revising forest plans, the Forest Service is required to provide for “coordination of outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish, and wilderness . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e)(1) (Emphasis added). Moreover, in specifying guidelines for management planning, the Forest Service must “insure consideration of the economic and environmental aspects of various systems of renewable resource management ... to provide for outdoor recreation (including wilderness), range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish . . . 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(A) (Emphasis added). Contrary to defendant Webco’s assertion, these provisions are not limited to requiring coordination solely with existing official wilderness areas. Both the legislative history, and the contemporaneous construction of the statute by the Forest Service indicate that in addition to existing wilderness areas, both potential wilderness areas and wilderness values in general must be considered. See S.Rep. 94-893 (94th Cong.2d Sess.) at 10; S.Rep. 94-1335 (94th Cong.2d Sess.) at 24 — 25, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1976, p. 6662; 44 F.R. 53988, §§ 219.-6(a), 219.12(b)(3). The great importance Congress has placed on wilderness, and the affirmative duty of the Forest Service to consider it during the forest planning process, combined with the fact that individual development projects in themselves may be major federal actions, convinces me that individual nonwilderness designations constitute major federal actions that must be assessed in an environmental impact statement. RARE II designations change the forest planning process by deciding wilderness issues prior to local forest planning consideration of potential uses. RARE II forecloses consideration of wilderness values or the wilderness alternative during the future forest planning process. The designations are themselves tantamount to a decision to engage in development activities on the individual areas. In sum, it is clear that RARE II nonwilderness designations may significantly affect the environment of individual RARE II areas. Defendants argue that since future development projects are not known at this time, it is impossible to assess their environmental impact. This argument, however, does not address the question of whether or not an environmental statement is required, i. e. whether or not the decision constitutes a major federal action; it only raises the questions of how and when the environmental impact must be assessed. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus (9th Cir. 1979) 596 F.2d 848. I now turn to these questions. C. Timing and Method of Environmental Analysis Defendants argue that, notwithstanding the fact that allocation of specific areas to development may constitute major federal action requiring an environmental impact statement, the decisions concerning when the Forest Service must analyze environmental impact, as well as the method of analysis are left to the informed discretion of the Forest Service. Defendants argue that since specific development plans for particular areas were unknown during the RARE II process, it was neither arbitrary nor capricious for the Forest Service to defer environmental analysis of site specific impact until a specific project was examined. In the meantime, defendants urge, the preparation of the programmatic RARE II EIS satisfied the requirements of NEPA. Defendants primarily rely upon Kleppe v. Sierra Club (1976) 427 U.S. 390, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 49 L.Ed.2d 576, and County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior (2nd Cir. 1977) 562 F.2d 1368, cert. den. 434 U.S. 1064, 98 S.Ct. 1238, 55 L.Ed.2d 764. Neither case supports defendants’ position. In the present case, unlike both Kleppe and Suffolk, the Forest Service has proposed major federal action, and insured that the environmental impact of its decision upon wilderness values cannot be assessed prior to development. It is a fundamental tenet of NEPA law that the filing of an environmental statement must precede rather than follow federal action. See, e. g. Cady v. Morton (9th Cir. 1975) 527 F.2d 786. In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court decision requiring a regional environmental impact statement prior to further development of coal reserves in the Northern Great Plains region. Although both a site specific and a nationwide programmatic environmental impact statement had been prepared, the Court of Appeals devised a balancing test to determine when, prior to a formal proposal for regional development, an environmental statement must be prepared for regional development. The Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ balancing test. NEPA, the Court explained, only requires an environmental statement when the agency makes a proposal for federal action. “The procedural duty imposed upon agencies ... is quite precise, and the role of the courts in enforcing that duty is similarly precise. A court has no authority to depart from the statutory language and, by a balancing of court-devised factors, determine a point during the germination process of a potential proposal at which an impact statement should be prepared.” 427 U.S. at 406, 96 S.Ct. at 2728. The Court found that no proposal for regional development had been made, and therefore no regional environmental statement was required. Id. 427 U.S. at 400, 96 S.Ct. 2718. Further, the determination of the necessity for, and the scope of a programmatic statement “requires the weighing of a number of relevant factors, including the extent of the interrelationship among proposed actions and practical considerations of feasibility. Resolving these issues ... is properly left to the informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies.” Id. 427 U.S. at 412, 96 S.Ct. at 2731. Thus the essence of Kleppe is no more than that the federal courts are without power to order an EIS prior to an actual proposal for major federal action. In contrast to Kleppe, however, in the present case there is an actual proposal for major federal action: the land use allocation decision made by the RARE II process. Thus the Forest Service has reached the “statutorily fixed point” when an environmental statement must be prepared. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Johnson (S.D.N.Y.1979) 476 F.Supp. 126, 128. Defendants argue, nonetheless, that they must be permitted to defer site specific analysis until such time as specific development plans are proposed. To rule otherwise, they insist, would require them to engage in speculation and “endless hypothesizing as to remote possibilities.” County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, supra at 1379. While it is true that NEPA does not require a “crystal ball inquiry”, Scientists’ Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm., supra 156 U.S.App.D.C. at 408, 481 F.2d at 1092, uncertainty or the necessity for forecasting environmental impact can not forever excuse environmental analysis. City of Davis v. Coleman (9th Cir. 1975) 521 F.2d 661, 676, see also State of Alaska v. Andrus (D.C.Cir.1978) 188 U.S.App.D.C. 202, 210, 580 F.2d 465, 473, vacated in part on other grounds 439 U.S. 922, 99 S.Ct. 303, 58 L.Ed.2d 315. Yet as I have noted, the RARE II process largely avoids site specific wilderness analysis of the areas allocated to nonwilderness while barring such analysis in the future during the forest planning process. NEPA does not require that complete information concerning the environmental impact of a project must be obtained before the action can be implemented. There may well be situations where the unavailability of information may require delays in the preparation of an impact statement “if the procedures of NEPA are to be conducted in a meaningful way.” Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Morton (9th Cir. 1973) 471 F.2d 1275, 1280-1281. If, on the other hand, the proposed action forecloses future consideration of an otherwise reasonable action or alternative then, at minimum, the environmental impact of the foreclosed action or alternative must be assessed. Simply put, the agency may not evade its duty. It must either assess the impact of the decision, or, if the factual situation will not permit that assessment (thus preventing the agency from performing its NEPA duties), the decision must be deferred until the agency has a sufficient factual basis to perform its environmental analysis. All significant environmental effects that can reasonably be expected to flow from the proposed major action, it should be remembered, must be assessed pri- or to implementing the major federal action. County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, supra at 1378. The fact that an agency elects a “programmatic” approach does not permit it to avoid the analysis that NEPA requires. Thus in the present case, no objection can properly be made to the Forest Service’s election of a programmatic approach provided that sufficient analysis of the environmental impact of the decision actually reached is performed. Since the RARE II decision, however, precludes future site specific analysis of the impact on the wilderness character of an area allocated to non-wilderness, NEPA requires analysis of that effect in the RARE II EIS. Defendants’ reliance on County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, supra, is misplaced. In Suffolk, a programmatic environmental statement concerning proposed oil and gas leases on the Outer Continental Shelf was challenged because it did not consider or project the environmental consequences of possible gas pipeline routes. The area involved covered two hundred and fifty square miles, and it was then unknown where or whether oil would be found and thus where or whether pipelines would be placed. Moreover, the Secretary of Interior planned to prepare a specific environmental statement when more definite information was available. The court found that nothing in the program committed the Secretary to specific modes of transportation or routes. In determining whether environmental analysis could properly be deferred under such circumstances, the court considered both whether obtaining information was “meaningfully possible” at the present time, and how important the additional information would be in determining whether or not to proceed with the project. Id. at 1378. The court specifically noted, however, that where the “major federal action under consideration, once authorized, cannot be modified or changed, it may be essential to obtain such information as is available, speculative or not, . . ..” Id. at 1378. Ninth Circuit cases are fully in accord with this view. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus (9th Cir. 1979) 596 F.2d 848 (per curiam), the Court considered whether or not an environmental impact statement was required for either an industrial water marketing program or for individual option contracts for water. The Court first distinguished Kleppe since in the case at bar both the overall marketing plan and the option contracts were proposals for major federal action and not mere “contemplation.” Id. at 851. The court specifically rejected the claim that uncertainty about industrial use of the water when and if the options were exercised excused environmental analysis until the options had been exercised. “Any uncertainty about the details of subsequent use of the diverted water does not obviate the importance of the decision to divert and the necessity to evaluate the environmental consequences of that decision.” Id. “[T]he government cannot unilaterally change its mind For the term of the contract, it is an ‘irreversible and irretrievable commitment of the availability of resources.’ As such, it is a major federal action requiring an EIS.” Id. at 852. See also Port of Astoria v. Hodel (9th Cir. 1979) 595 F.2d 467, 478.’ Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus squarely controls in the present case. Since by virtue of RARE II and its implementing regulations the Forest Service is now making a decision that limits its discretion in the future and prevents later environmental assessment of wilderness values, it must assess the environmental consequences of its actions now. Thus, the validity of the RARE II EIS must be tested by whether or not its environmental-analysis of both the overall program and specific area designations is NEPA sufficient. See NRDC v. Administrator (D.D.C.1978) 451 F.Supp. 1245, 1258-1260; Kelley v. Butz (W.D.Mich.1975) 404 F.Supp. 925, 935; NRDC v. Morton (D.D.C.1974) 388 F.Supp. 829, 838-840, aff’d without opinion (D.C. Cir.) 174 U.S.App.D.C. 77, 527 F.2d 1386, cert. den. 427 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 3201, 49 L.Ed.2d 1204. IV THE RARE II EIS DOES NOT ADEQUATELY ANALYZE OR DISCLOSE THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF ITS NONWILDERNESS DESIGNATIONS A. General Principles The court’s role in enforcing NEPA is limited and precise. The court “should [not] substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of its actions. The only role for a court is to insure that the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences . .” Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra 427 U.S. 410, n. 21, 96 S.Ct. at 2730. The vehicle which is established by NEPA to insure that the agency has taken a “hard look” is the environmental impact statement. The National Environmental Policy Act requires every major federal action to be accompanied by a “detailed statement” that analyzes: (i) The environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) An environmental impact statement serves two purposes. First, it requires decisionmakers to examine and consider environmental factors before acting. Secondly, it acts as an environmental “full disclosure” statement, permitting other officials, Congress, and the public to evaluate the environmental consequences on their own. Trout Unlimited v. Morton (9th Cir. 1974) 509 F.2d 1276, 1283, see also State of Alaska v. Andrus (D.C.Cir.1978) 188 U.S.App.D.C. 202, 211, 580 F.2d 465, 474 vacated in part on other grounds, 439 U.S. 922, 99 S.Ct. 303, 58 L.Ed.2d 315; Silva v. Lynn (1st Cir. 1973) 482 F.2d 1282, 1284-1285. By requiring a hard look, the Act insures the integration of environmental considerations into the decision making process. The environmental statement is the “outward sign that environmental values and consequences have been considered during the planning stage of agency actions.” Andrus v. Sierra Club (1979) - U.S. -, -, 99 S.Ct. 2335, 2337, 60 L.Ed.2d 943, 947. Thus NEPA is a deliberate command to consider environmental factors, and not shunt them aside in the “bureaucratic shuffle.” Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n (1976) 426 U.S. 776, 788, 96 S.Ct. 2430, 49 L.Ed.2d 205. As noted, the statement is the vehicle to test agency compliance. Accordingly, “[j]udicial enforcement of NEPA includes strict compliance with the disclosure and procedural provisions of the Act. Nevertheless, the test of EIS adequacy js pragmatic and the document will be examined to see if there has been a good faith attempt to identify and to discuss all foreseeable environmental consequences.” Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble (9th Cir. 1977) 565 F.2d 549, 552. The “action forcing” procedures at the heart of the NEPA statement process require a “finely tuned and ‘systematic’ balancing analysis” by the agency. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm. (D.C.Cir.1971) 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 37, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113. A mere admission that the proposed action will have adverse impact, without detail concerning the scope or extent of that impact or a weighing of environmental benefits versus economic.costs, does not comply with this mandate. National Wildlife Federation v. Andrus (D.D.C.1977) 440 F.Supp. 1245, 1252-1253; Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA (E.D.Tenn.1972) 339 F.Supp. 806, aff’d. 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972); see also Chelsea Neighborhood Assoc. v. U. S. Postal Service (2nd Cir. 1975) 516 F.2d 378, 388. It is against these demanding standards that the RARE II EIS must be measured. B. Assessment of Individual Areas The Environmental Statement acknowledges that, generally, areas with proven resources were designated for nonwilderness, regardless of wilderness qualities present, or the lack of any specific development plans for the area (FES 95). At oral argument, the Forest Service explained that by designating an area for nonwilderness, the -Forest Service determined that it was willing to forego the wilderness option in order to maintain the opportunity for development. The environmental statement' rationalizes, however, that since the actual course of development for a particular area is presently unknown, it is impossible to analyze specific environmental effects of development. Accordingly, the effect of development was not “an analysis factor” in the environmental statement. (FES 40,106 com. 23, 24,107 com. 28). As I have indicated, the RARE II allocation decisions are themselves major federal actions requiring an impact statement. Further, since later planning will not consider wilderness as an alternative land use, the NEPA sufficiency of the RARE II EIS must be tested by its analysis of wilderness issues. I now turn, first, to a discussion of what type of site specific analysis is required by NEPA. 1. Necessity of Site Specific Discussion The nature and scope of the proposed action will, of course, determine the extent of detailed analysis required in an environmental statement. Atlanta Coalition v. Atlanta Regional Comm. (5th Cir. 1979) 599 F.2d 1333, 1344. At the very least, however, a discussion of the factors listed in NEPA is required, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). The examination of these factors must be conducted in a manner calculated to advance the dual interests of public disclosure and agency consideration of environmental factors. Regulations promulgated by the Council of Environmental Quality specify the type of data and analysis required. The statement must provide a “description of the proposed action, a statement of its purposes, and a description of the environment affected, including information, summary technical data, and maps and diagrams where relevant, adequate to permit an assessment of potential environmental impact by community agencies and the public . . . The statement should also succinctly describe the environment of the area affected as it exists prior to the proposed action. . . .”40 C.F.R. 1500.8(a)(1). (italics added). The statement must disclose the probable impact of the proposed action, including direct and secondary or indirect effects, 40 C.F.R. 1500.8(a)(3), and the extent to which the proposed action forecloses future options. 40 C.F.R. 1500.8(a)(6). Site specific analysis is essential to meaningful environmental analysis. Broad, generic statements neither inform the public of the environmental consequences of action, nor require the agency to take a “hard look” at environmental factors. See e. g. National Wildlife Federation v. Andrus (D.D.C.1977) 440 F.Supp. 1245, 1252-1253; Kelley v. Butz (W.D.Mich.1975) 404 F.Supp. 925, 935; NRDC v. Morton (D.D.C.1974) 388 F.Supp. 829, 838-840, aff’d without opinion 174 U.S.App.D.C. 77, 527 F.2d 1386, cert. den. 427 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 3201, 49 L.Ed.2d 1204; Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA (D.C.Tenn.1972) 339 F.Supp. 806, 809, aff’d 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972); See also Chelsea Neighborhood Assoc. v. U. S. Postal Service (2d Cir. 1975) 516 F.2d 378, 388. Site specific information is especially vital in considering wilderness issues. The “value” of wilderness is not easily reduced to objective or quantitative terms. ■ Wilderness is a finite resource that exists in many forms. Just as land is considered unique before the law, so too is wilderness: each area is composed of unique features of topography, vegetation, flora and fauna, scenery, opportunities for solitude and recreation, and scientific and cultural interest. The Craters of the Moon, Glacier Peak, Lassen Volcanic, John Muir, Great Sand Dunes, and Dome Land Wilderness areas, for example, are each composed of distinct and unique features that are not easily compared, much less are they capable of being reduced to generic terms. 2. Content of EIS The EIS does not comprehensively describe any of the RARE II areas. In response to comments on the draft statement noting this deficiency, the Forest Service asserted that “individual descriptions . . . would produce an extremely voluminous document. . . . The public [is] . . . encouraged’ to get on the ground in these areas to learn more about them." (FES 108 com. 35). In a series of computer printouts contained in the EIS, some site specific information is listed for each area. In these printouts, information is listed as to: (1) the acreage and location of the area; (2) its classification as one of forty basic landform types; (3) its Bailey-Kuchler classification as to ecosystem type (the Bailey-Kuchler classifications do not identify ecosystems covering less than 50,000 acres); (4) the number of wilderness associated wildlife species in the area (but not the type or quantity of each); and (5) a competitive rating score of each area’s wilderness attributes (see infra). In addition, the EIS includes a map of the United States indicating the accessibility and distribution of the RARE II areas. By contrast, a comparative wealth of information is provided concerning development potential and resource output. Each area is given a rating for development potential which measures optimum resource potential versus cost of development. Maximum yield estimates are given for timber, mineral, gas, oil, uranium, coal, geothermal potential, grazing, and recreational use. Multi-county analysis of the economic impact of designations are included in supplements to the draft statement. It is important to understand what the statement does not consider. CNowhere is there a description of the presently existing wilderness characteristics of each area. It does not identify any unique characteristics of any area, whether it be notable scenic landmarks, or rare and endangered populations of wildlife. Although the statement briefly discusses the broad generic values of wilderness, it never considers the specific values of each area. Moreover, in its discussion of the generic values of wilderness, it never examines the economic and beneficial environmental values of wilderness: tourism, sales of wilderness-oriented recreational equipment, conservation of wildlife and flora populations, soil conservation and stability, watershed protection, clean air and water, and like values. The statement never examines the impact of nonwilderness designations upon each area’s wilderness characteristics and values. Instead, the statement merely states that development plans are unknown at the present time and thus developmental impact cannot be projected. The result is classically Catch 22. The development effect on wilderness is not considered now and it is unlikely that any environmental statement in the future will discuss it. Thus the impact of development on the wilderness values of a'particular area (e. g. this scenic area lost) or the secondary effect of the loss of wilderness (e. g. impact on water quality or wildlife, etc.), or mitigation measures that might protect wilderness values despite development plans (e. g. confining development to a specific area or limiting the types of development allowed) will most likely never be considered. Finally, the statement never considers the effect of development on future opportunities for wilderness classification, namely, the effect on the “benchmark” characteristics identified in the Wilderness Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). If the Forest Service is willing to forego wilderness values without considering, how else the land should be utilized, it must at least clearly describe in detail what it proposes to give up. As I explained earlier, uncertainty as to the course of future development is no excuse for abandoning environmental analysis, especially when irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources are presently made. Instead of examining the impact of the loss of wilderness attributes and the loss of the option to classify an area formally as wilderness, the Forest Service chose to examine only the costs of foreclosing development. Since neither the values gained by wilderness classification, nor the values lost by development were ever explored in the EIS, it failed to fulfill the twin NEPA goals of disclosure and demonstrated agency consideration of environmental factors. Defendants argue, however, that material incorporated by reference in the EIS met the burden of site specific examination of environmental factors. Specifically, they argue that the “worksheets” prepared to rate each area’s wilderness attributes adequately describe each area as well as disclose the potential impact of nonwilderness designation. As I explained above, each area was given a wilderness attribute rating. The wilderness attribute rating system (WARS) purports to give each area a rating based on the attributes of wilderness listed in the Wilderness Act. Although only a single score is listed in the EIS, the worksheets prepared by Forest Supervisors scored the areas competitively on their naturalness, apparent naturalness, opportunity for solitude, and opportunity for primitive recreational experience. • In addition, supplementing scores on ecological, scenic, geographic, and cultural values were utilized to break “ties” between areas. Only the final ratings were listed in the EIS. The actual worksheets were only available at local regional Forestry offices for the region' in which a specific area was situated. Under certain circumstances the law permits incorporation by reference; three doctrines, however, limit an agency’s attempt to incorporate material by reference. First, the material must be “reasonably available for inspection by potentially interested persons within the time allowed for comment.” (40 C.F.R. 1502.21 (1978)). Second, the statement itself must still be understandable without undue cross reference. 40 C.F.R. 1500.8(b) (1976). Finally, the appropriateness of incorporation by reference must be judged by a rule of reason. Life of the Land v. Brinegar (9th Cir. 1973) 485 F.2d 460, 468, cert. den. 416 U.S. 961, 94 S.Ct. 1979, 40 L.Ed.2d 312. Although in the past, supporting technical material or studies have been permitted to be incorporated by reference into an environmental statement (See e. g. Trout Unlimited v. Morton (9th Cir. 1974) 509 F.2d 1276, 1284; Life of the Land v. Brinegar, supra; American Timber Co. v. Berglund (D.Mont.1979) 473 F.Supp. 310, 314), this Court has found no case allowing material central to the adequacy of an environmental statement to be incorporated by reference. As I explained, absent the WARS worksheets, the EIS is fatally deficient in site specific analysis. Further, the worksheets were not located in a single location, but were scattered across the United States. I doubt whether the widely dispersed records were “reasonably available for inspection.” I do not find it necessary to reach this issue, however, because even assuming arguendo that the WARS worksheets are part of the EIS, they do not supply the type of site specific analysis required by NEPA. Each worksheet is composed of separate rating forms for each attribute rated. Each rating form includes check boxes to indicate the present existence of types of man-made structures or facilities in each area (e. g. roads, fences, reservoirs) and rating boxes for the effect of such structures on the attribute being scored. Additional rating boxes were provided for broad, generic qualities of landform, topography and the like, and their effect on the attribute being scored. A brief space is provided for comments. I have examined the completed worksheets for the areas in dispute. New specific or unique characteristics of any area are even noted. The reader of these worksheets is not left with any concrete description of any area. The WARS worksheets do not comprehensively describe the environment of the affected areas. WARS is a selective, non-descriptive scoring system that does not consider an area’s inherent wilderness values, only its comparative score on generalized attributes. Little in the way of specific information is included: neither the flora and fauna nor the distinctive characteristics of a particular area are examined or even identified. No mitigation measures are considered that would reduce the impact of development on wilderness values.. Most importantly, the WARS system utterly fails to consider the impact of nonwilderness designation on the wilderness attributes it purportedly rates. The environmental statement never explains the justification for its comparative evaluation of wilderness attributes, a failure all the more serious because economic and resource values were not competitively rated but given absolute values with a result that an area with low WARS scores was placed in nonwildemess regardless of its economic or resource values, while an area with very high WARS scores might still be placed in nonwilderness if the area had potential resources. Thus the WARS ratings introduce an unexplained and thus unjustified bias that preselected against wilderness: areas with comparatively “low” scores were automatically placed in non-wilderness. The result is amply demonstrated by the areas in dispute in this lawsuit: the majority of the areas either had very high WARS scores or development ratings that indicate that the cost of development exceeds the anticipated return in resources. Nevertheless they were all designated nonwilderness. While this approach appears to contravene NEPA because the justification for the bias is not articulated, it also appears to undercut the policies enunciated in the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq. The Wilderness Act does not spe