Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER MILES W. LORD, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Before the Court are parties’ motions and cross motions for summary judgment in three separate lawsuits challenging Congress’ most recent legislation concerning the Boundary Waters Canoe Area. In National Ass’n of Property Owners v. United States, Civil 5-79-95 (D.Minn.1979), plaintiffs challenge certain provisions of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act (BWCAW Act), Pub.L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (October 21, 1978). This particular action raises five key issues: 1. Did Congress unlawfully delegate authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to draw the boundaries of the new Wilderness Area? 2. Does the Act, by limiting motorboat and snowmobile use in the Wilderness, discriminate, unconstitutionally, against the class of all handicapped persons and the class of all persons less physically fit? 3. Do §§ 4, by limiting motorboat and snowmobile use in the Wilderness, and 5, containing provisions for the purchase of properties around the BWCAW, of the BWCAW Act infringe plaintiffs’ Ninth and Fifth Amendment rights? 4. Does the BWCAW Act conflict with the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842? 5. Does alleged selective enforcement of the Act by the United States Forest Service give rise to any rightful claims by these plaintiffs? In Minnesota v. Bergland, Civil 5-79-178 (D.Minn.1979), the state and plaintiff-intervenors challenge the constitutionality of the BWCAW Act; their claim is essentially that the federal government has power to regulate only those lands and waters that it owns. Plaintiffs assert that certain sections of the Act, to the extent that they regulate lands and waters not owned by the federal government, violate the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The sole issue raised in this lawsuit concerns whether Congress is constitutionally empowered to regulate those surface waters and lands within the Wilderness Area not owned by the federal government. In National Ass’n of Property Owners v. Bergland, Civil 5-80-25 (D.Minn.1980), plaintiffs seek to enjoin the Secretary of Agriculture and the United States Forest Service from enforcing the 1978 Act. Plaintiffs allege that implementation of the legislation constitutes a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, within the meaning of § 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act, (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976), necessitating the filing of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The sole question raised in this cause concerns whether NEPA, in fact, requires these federal defendants to file an EIS prior to enforcing the BWCAW Act. All issues have been extensively briefed and the Court has entertained counsel’s oral presentations at two. full days of hearings. Now, after careful review of all the files, all memoranda and counsel’s oral argument, the Court is prepared to rule. II. THE BOUNDARY WATERS CANOE AREA WILDERNESS A. The History of the Area to 1978 The BWCAW rests along the Minnesota-Canada border for 110 miles. The Wilderness encompasses 1,075,000 acres. East of the Rockies, it is the largest unit of the National Wilderness Preservation System; it is the second largest unit in the entire system. The BWCAW is the only lakeland canoe area in the entire nation. The area is made up of over 1,000 lakes, joined together by streams and portages. This area was the only means of travel for the legendary fur traders who navigated water routes pioneered by the Sioux and Chippewa. Notwithstanding the fact that extensive logging has occurred in the Wilderness Area, it still offers sanctuary to over 540,-000 acres of virgin forests. This Wilderness is home to hundreds of species of unusual birds, plants and animals settled in scores of ecological communities. The area harbors such wildlife as the bald eagle, osprey, otter, beaver, moose, deer, snowshoe hare, porcupine, eastern timber wolf, pine marten, fisher and lynx. The boundary waters support sturgeon, pickerel, suckers and lake trout. Nearly every lake is populated by loons. The dark forest is the keynote to the Wilderness, filled with jackpine and balsam fir. The forest is accented with feather mosses, stunted black spruce, labrador tea, swamp laurels and pitcher plants. The extent to which the federal government has extended its protection over the Wilderness has varied for over 75 years. The history of federal involvement began back in 1902, 1905 and 1908, when the federal government set aside over one million acres of land as a federal forest reservation. In 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt established, by proclamation, the Superior National Forest. In 1926, Secretary of Agriculture William M. Jardine created the first Superior Wilderness Area, assuring that no roads would be constructed in at least 1,000 square miles of the best canoe country. In 1930, Congress enacted the ShipsteadNewton-Nolan Act, 16 U.S.C. § 577 et seq. (1976), which prohibited logging within 400 feet of any lakeshore, and regulated the waters and water levels within the Superior National Forest. In 1948, Congress enacted the Thye-Blatnik Act, 16 U.S.C. § 577c (1976), which directed the Secretary of Agriculture to acquire lands, or interests in lands, for the purpose of extending the wilderness canoe country. Also in 1948, the Forest Service established the Superior, Little Indian Sioux, and Caribou Roadless Areas, along with authorizing road construction and pulpwood timber sales in large areas previously promised to be kept free of roads by Secretary Jardine. In 1949, President Harry Truman issued Executive Order No. 10092 which established a 4,000 foot airspace reservation over the Wilderness. In 1956, Congress authorized the appropriation of $9 million for the implementation of the Thye-Blatnik Act. See the Humphrey-Thye-Blatnik-Andresen Act of 1956, 16 U.S.C. §§ 577d-l, 577g-l and 577h (1976). In 1964, Congress passed the Wilderness Act of 1964, which forbade the use of motorized vehicles in almost all Wilderness areas. The Act, however, specifically excepted the BWCA from full Wilderness status. Section 4(d)(5) provided: Other provisions of this Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the management of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area ... shall be in accordance with regulations established by the Secretary of Agriculture in accordance with the general purpose of maintaining, without unnecessary restrictions of other uses, including that of timber, the primitive character of the area, particularly in the vicinity of lakes, streams, and portages: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall preclude the continuance within the area of any already established use of motorboats. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) (1976). The original 1956 version of the Wilderness Act did not include this provision. In 1965, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman promulgated a management plan for the BWCA pursuant to the directive in § 4(d)(5) of the Wilderness Act. The Secretary designated 19 routes, covering over 100 lakes and 60 per cent of the area’s surface water for both motorboat and snowmobile use. Secretary Freeman divided the BWCA into an Interior Zone and a Portal Zone, closing all logging in the former and allowing such in the latter. In 1978, Congress enacted the BWCAW Act, Pub.L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (October 21, 1978); plaintiffs in the instant actions challenge certain provisions of this Act which is Congress’ last word on the BWCA. B. The 1978 Act The new Act redesignates the BWCA as the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness. The three units of the Wilderness are linked by a Mining Protection Area, which offers protection from the adverse effects of mining in the area. While the Act restricts motor usage in the Wilderness, the final version of the bill allows about half of the pre-Act motorboat usage to continue. About one-third of the water area of the BWCAW is now open to motorboat use. The 1978 Act lifts the snowmobile ban by authorizing the Secretary to permit snowmobile usage on two designated trails indefinitely and on three trails for up to five years. The Wilderness’ boundary is extended in the new Act by the addition of 45,500 acres. The Act also provides that qualifying resort owners may force the purchase of their property by the Secretary through September 1985. The Secretary, under certain conditions, is also granted the right of first refusal to acquire specified lands. The 1978 Act phases out timber harvesting and maintains existing small dams in the area if necessary to protect wilderness values or public safety. The specific provisions challenged in the instant actions are more fully explored throughout the remainder of this Order. III. THE CASES THE FIRST CASE A. National Ass’n of Property Owners v. United States, Civ. 5-79-95 1. Facts a. Parties The plaintiffs include two national organizations: the National Association of Property Owners, headquartered in San Antonio, Texas, and the National Parks Inholders Association, headquartered in Tahoe, California. These two plaintiffs object to the 1978 Act as it allegedly restricts the rights of their members to own, use, control, and dispose of their property. Local plaintiffs include the Ely-Winton Boundary Waters Conservation Alliance; the Crane Lake Commercial Club, Inc.; Local 4757, United Steelworkers of America; Virginia Area Chamber of Commerce; Minnesota Arrowhead Association; Ely Chamber of Commerce; Border Lakes Association of Crane Lake; Crane Lake Voyageur Snowmobile Club, Inc.; Crane Lake Sportsmen’s Club, Inc.; and Ash River Namakan Lake Association; which are all organizations based in northern Minnesota consisting of individuals who use the BWCAW or who own businesses on the periphery of the BWCAW. Plaintiff Carol M. Fisher is a handicapped individual from Ely, Minnesota, who uses the BWCAW, and plaintiff Charlotte Ekroot is the owner of a resort on. the Gunflint Trail near the BWCAW who claims the 1978 Act has injured her business. Two plaintiffs own resorts in Canada. Plaintiff Robert J. Handberg is a resort owner on the north side of Lac La Croix, in Canada; and plaintiff Lac La Croix Indian Band consists of 240 individuals, some of whom are tourist guides on Lac La Croix, who are located, like Handberg, on the Canadian side of Lac La Croix. Defendant Bob Bergland is the Secretary of Agriculture and, along with others, is charged with the implementation of the 1978 Act. The United States of America is the other federal defendant. Defendant-intervenors Sierra Club; Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness; League of Women Voters of Minnesota; Izaak Walton League of America, Inc.; Minnesota Rovers; Wilderness Inquiry II; Minnesota Environmental Control Citizens Association; the Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth Chapters of the National Audubon Society;. the Minnesota Ornithologists’ Union; and The Wilderness Society are all organizations whose members use the BWCAW. These groups were active in the passage of the 1978 Act. Many of the groups, including the Sierra Club, the League of Women Voters, the Izaak Walton League and The Wilderness Society, have been involved in preserving the wilderness aspects of the BWCAW from the early days of this century. Defendant-intervenor Wilderness Inquiry II provides canoe trips into the BWCAW for handicapped individuals. b. Procedural Posture This action was initially filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. On July 17, 1979, plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order was heard by the Honorable Harold H. Greene, who denied that motion. Plaintiffs then dismissed their action without prejudice and refiled it in Minnesota. On August 7, 1979, Magistrate Judge Patrick J. McNulty heard plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and the defendant-intervenors’ motion to intervene. On August 9, 1979, he granted the motion to intervene and recommended to this Court that the motion for a restraining order be denied. This Court denied the motion for a restraining order on August 28, 1979. The defendant-intervenors moved to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on August 6, 1979. On August 24, 1979, the federal defendants followed suit. Arguments were heard by Magistrate Judge McNulty on September 10, 1979. The plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint on September 28, 1979. The parties consented to amendment and the defendant-intervenors and federal defendants moved again for summary judgment. On October 29, 1979, the parties agreed that all the pending motions were submitted. Counsel for plaintiffs suggested that the Court delay resolution of this action as another action was to be filed by the State of Minnesota. On December 27, 1979, the State of Minnesota filed a companion action challenging the constitutionality of the 1978 Act as an infringement of state water rights. State of Minnesota v. Bergland, Civil 5-79-178 (D.Minn.1979). On January 18, 1980, a third action was filed by the National Association of Property Owners and others contending that the Secretary of Agriculture is required to promulgate an Environmental Impact Statement on implementation of the 1978 Act and asking that defendant Bergland be enjoined from implementing the 1978 Act. National Ass’n of Property Owners v. Bergland, Civil 5-80-25. This Court formally referred all three actions to Magistrate Judge McNulty for hearing on March 27,1980. At the request of counsel for plaintiffs in this action and counsel for the State of Minnesota, however, the Court recalled the three actions and set them all for hearing on April 17, 1980, and May 2, 1980. On April 25, 1980, the State of Minnesota moved to intervene in the first action, Civil 5-79-95, on behalf of the National Association of Property Owners and the other plaintiffs. That motion was granted. At the time of hearing, on May 2, 1980, the plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment in this action. There being no objection from the defendant — intervenors or the federal defendants to the plaintiffs filing their motion at that late date, the issues involved in this action are deemed submitted on cross-motions for summary judgment. c. Plaintiffs’ Complaint The plaintiffs challenge the 1978 Act on numerous bases. Their challenges and the facts relevant to these challenges follow: (1) The First Cause of Action : The Map In plaintiffs’ first cause of action, they state that Section 3 of the Act grants the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to establish boundaries and publish a map and legal description of the BWCAW. They then allege an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. Section 3 of the Act itself states: The areas generally depicted as wilderness on a map entitled “Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness and Boundary Waters Canoe Area Mining Protection Area” dated September, 1978, comprising approximately one million and seventy-five thousand five hundred acres, are hereby designated as the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness .... The map of the wilderness shall be on file and available for public inspection in the offices of the Supervisor of the Superior National Forest and of the Chief, United States Forest Service. The Secretary of Agriculture ... shall, as soon as practicable but in no event later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, publish a detailed legal description and map showing the boundaries of the wilderness in the Federal Register. . . . Such map and description shall be filed with [the appropriate congressional committees] .... Such map and description shall have the same force and effect as if included in this Act. Pub.L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649, 1649-50 (1978). Section 3 states that Congress had reference to a map-the map of September, 1978-when the Act was enacted; the Act denominates the areas on that map as the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness. Changes from the boundaries existent prior to the Act were described in great detail during the congressional consideration of the bill. The Report of the House Committee illustrates the care with which Congress addressed possible boundary problems: The Committee notes that there has been much concern regarding the drawing of the exact boundaries of the wilderness. In order to eliminate any misunderstanding as to the location of the boundary, the Committee has supplied the United States Forest Service with detailed maps of the changes in the original BWCA boundary. These maps are to be used by the agency in preparing the final official boundary map for the wilderness. The Committee has also supplied the agency with detailed maps that make clear the points at which motor use is to be terminated on various lakes. Legislative History of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness (Pub.L. No. 95-495) at page 79 (December. 1978) [hereinafter Legislative History]. This care extended to remedying technical problems with the pre-Act boundaries which had been brought to Congress’ attention: The Committee has held to the principle of making no deletions from the established boundaries of the existing Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness as created by the 1964 Wilde, ness Act. However, five minor flaws in the existing boundaries were brought to the Committee’s attention. These have been corrected by small technical deletions. Three other small technical deletions were required to develop consistent and reasonable motorboat restrictions. These eight technical deletions are listed and described herewith .... See Legislative History at 79-80. This deliberateness continued in the Senate. The Report of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources noted that six changes were made in the boundaries proposed by the House and described those differences in detail. See Legislative History at 240. Even as late as the debate on the conference report, the bill’s sponsors took pains to avoid any confusion about the boundaries. Congressman Burton, the floor manager of the bill in the House, stated during the debate: Certain other larger additions also include 400-foot shoreline additions along a portion of their perimeters to include all of the following lakes and river .... Detailed U. S. Geological Survey quadrangle maps showing each of these 400-foot lakeshore additions have been placed on file with the Chief, U. S. Forest Service, Washington, D.C., but, of course, it was difficult to accurately depict the 400-foot strips because of the limitations of map scales. The Senate report on H.R. 12250 already mentions these additions briefly, but I think it is important to describe the rationale and records involved in more detail so that there will be no confusion about them. Legislative History at 299. While the plaintiffs’ first cause does not appear to challenge the location of motorboat and snowmobile routes-which are unlikely to be characterized as “boundaries”the Court notes that such standards were provided by the statute and legislative history with equal, if not greater, clarity and detail. See § 4 BWCAW Act, Pub.L.No.95-495, 92 Stat. 1649, 1650-52 (1978). See also Legislative History at 78, 135, 145, 148-49, 231-32, 256-57, 261, and 267-69. The device of establishing legal boundaries through a map reference has been utilized frequently by Congress. A review of recent park and Wilderness laws reveals an approach virtually identical to that taken by § 3 of the BWCAW Act. See, e. g., The Absaroka-Beartooth Wilderness, Custer and Gallatin National Forest Act, Pub.L. No.95-249, 92 Stat. 162 (March, 1978); Chattahoochee River National Recreation Area Act, Pub.L.No.95-344, 92 Stat. 474 (August, 1978); Eleanor Roosevelt National Historic Site Act, Pub.L.No.95-32, 91 Stat. 171 (May, 1977). (2) Amended Count One-The Map In amended count one, the plaintiffs allege that the Secretary has failed to provide the map of September, 1978 for public inspection and is attempting to publish an incorrect detailed map in the Federal Register. However, Betty Salerno, a member of the plaintiff Ely-Winton Boundary Waters Conservation Alliance, viewed the map of September, 1978 in Washington, D.C., on July 11, 1979. See Affidavit of Betty Salerno, Civil 5-79-95 (D.Minn. August 29, 1979). (Exhibit 3A of Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint.) The Secretary tardily published the legal description of the BWCAW and a map, consisting of 21 detailed map sheets, in the Federal Register on April 6, 1980. The Federal Register stated that copies of the map sheets were available for purchase. In this action, there are no allegations concerning boundary errors and no parties before the Court who claim to have property affected by an incorrect boundary designation. In § 3 of the new Act, Congress itself designated the boundaries by use of the map of September, 1978. Congress then required the Secretary to publish a legal description and map for the public in the Federal Register and make the legal description and maps available for public inspection. That has been done. (3) The Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action: Motorboat and Snowmobile Restrictions The second, third, and fourth causes of action challenge those provisions of the 1978 Act regulating: (1) the lakes upon which motorboats may be used, (2) the horsepower limitations on lakes where motors may be used, and (3) snowmobile use in the Boundary Waters Wilderness. The regulation of motorized use is allegedly illegal because it: (1) violates the right to travel guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, (2) disparages personal rights guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment, and (3) violates a treaty in force between the United States and Canada-presumably the Webster — Ashburton Treaty of 1842. The 1978 Act purposefully and clearly regulates the use of motorboats and snowmobiles in the BWCAW. Congress’ rationale for regulating motorized use, gleaned from the legislative history of the 1978 Act, follows. Under the 1964 Wilderness Act and Department of Agriculture’s Orders, and prior to the 1978 Act, designated motorboat and snowmobile routes included sixty percent (60%) of the BWCAW’s water surface; paddling canoeists, skiers, hikers, and snowshoers had to compete with gasoline engines during at least part of their wilderness trips. Seventy percent (70%) of visitor use was by those who traveled by canoe, ski, or foot. For those who sought the enjoyment of an environment free from the intrusion of machines, encounters with motors could have been more than simply annoying. Numerous witnesses testified before the Congress on the shattering effect of motors on the solitude of the Wilderness and a wilderness experience. There was sufficient testimony before the Congress for it to conclude that the whine or roar of motors within a Wilderness destroys solitude. See Legislative History at 3, 11, 110, 112, 114, 116, 119, 128, 129, 131, 132, and 140. For people who wish to use motorboats, dozens of large lakes are available to them immediately outside the BWCAW, among them Crane, Vermilion, Rainy, and Gunflint Lakes. Similarly, snowmobilers can legally travel on national and state forest lands, on state lakes, in many state parks, and on thousands of miles of private and state trails. In contrast, those who desire to travel in a primitive, motor-free setting have only the BWCAW open to them. Bee Legislative History at 3. While the 1978 Act does not completely ban motorboats and snowmobiles, it brings the BWCAW into line with other Wilderness areas where motorized uses are prohibited. Further, it brings the BWCAW into line with regard to the broad precepts set forth in the Wilderness Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1976). (4) Amended Count Three-Motorboat Restrictions Plaintiffs also assert that the selection of lakes where motorboat use is permitted is arbitrary and capricious. Congress’ rationale was to continue motorized uses on the most heavily used and long established routes by resort guests; the selection was the result of much debate and compromise. See generally Legislative History at pages 119, 123, 129, 131, 140, 143-49, 248-49, 260-63, 279-80, and 302. (5) The Fifth Cause of Action: The Webster-Ashburton Treaty In their fifth cause of action-and apparently, in their fourth-plaintiffs raise claims under the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. In their fourth cause of action, plaintiffs allege that the Act’s prohibition of snowmobile use and imposition of motorboat horsepower restrictions for specific lakes deprive them of their “absolute” right to travel internationally and violate “a treaty in force”-apparently the Webster-Ashburton Treaty-between the United States and Canada. In their fifth cause of action, plaintiffs again cite their “absolute” right to travel and allege that § 17 of the new Act, which provides that the Act shall not affect the provisions of any treaty now applicable to the Boundary Waters Wilderness, violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. They further allege that the Act directly conflicts with the WebsterAshburton Treaty. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 8 Stat. 572 (1842), was negotiated by Daniel Webster and Alexander Lord Ashburton to establish the boundary line between the United States and Canada. Article II of the Treaty, which describes the boundary for the area of Minnesota in question, concludes with the following provision: it being understood that all the water communications and all the usual portages along the line from Lake Superior to the Lake of the Woods, and also Grand Portage, from the shore of Lake Superior to the Pigeon river, as now actually used, shall be free and open to the use of the citizens and subjects of both countries. 8 Stat. 572, 574 (1842). Facts relevant to this claim include the following: Congress was aware that the province of Ontario had itself barred motorboats and snowmobiles in the Quetico Provincial Park, which adjoins the BWCAW along an extensive portion of the international boundary, with the exception of a few lakes where motors can be used by the Lac La Croix Indian Band. See Legislative History at 1-2, 89, 113, 124, and 140. In addition, before passage of the Act, Congress sought and received advice from the State Department concerning the disputed provision of the treaty. In response to Congressman James Oberstar of Minnesota, Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, unequivocally maintained that “[w]ith respect to your question on the use of mechanized transport on these waters, the WebsterAshburton Treaty is clearly silent.” Letter from Robert J. McCloskey to Hon. James L. Oberstar, Exhibit 7B to Affidavit of Dr. Miron L. Heinselman, National Ass’n of Property Owners v. United States, (D.Minn., July 28, 1979). Mr. McCloskey stated: At the time, the Webster-Ashburton treaty was signed, the waterways and portages of this area were an important route to the West. We believe that the intent of the “free and open” provision for these waters was to ensure that this important route remained open, on an equal basis, to the nations of both countries. It would not be correct, however, to interpret “free and open” so broadly as to prohibit either United States or Canadian authorities from imposing any limitation upon the manner in which such waterways and portages may be used. In agreeing to free and open use of these waterways and portages, neither party intended to relinquish its sovereign role of imposing statutory limitations on behavior which would not be in the best interest of the respective country. Id. (6) The Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action: Sales of Resorts to the Federal Government Section 5 of the Act provides for the following: If an owner of a resort on certain lakes denominated in the Act so desires, he may require the federal government to buy his property at fair market value as of July 1, 1978, or as of the date the owner gives notice to the Secretary. If the government is required to buy the resort, other lands on the lake may not be sold unless the lands are first offered to the Secretary. The Secretary has 100 days to decide whether to purchase the other land. If the Secretary decides not to purchase the other land at the offered price, it may not be sold to a third party at less than the offered price, unless it is first reoffered to the Secretary. An owner of a resort who requires the federal government to buy his land may retain three acres for his residence. The lakes to which the reoffer provision applies include thirteen lakes partly in and out of the BWCAW and two adjoining lakes. The plaintiffs challenge (1) the right of first refusal provision on two grounds: first, as an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to an owner of a resort who requires the federal government to purchase his resort thereby activating the right of first refusal and, second, as a taking of property without just compensation (count six); (2) the reoffer provision as being vague, that is, plaintiffs are unsure if there is a 100-day limit on the reoffer provision (count seven); and (3) the three-acre provision as being arbitrary (count eight). The legislative history reflects the fact that Congress was very much concerned with the welfare of the local inhabitants. The Act thus contains provisions to assist the local population in adjusting to any inconveniences brought about by the Act’s provisions. §§ 5 and 19 BWCAW Act, Pub. L.No.95-495, 92 Stat. 1649, 1652 and 1659 (1978). Addressing this concern, Senator Wendell Anderson of Minnesota stated that: “Many of the provisions of [the Act] are specifically geared toward assisting local businesses in adjusting to the new management plan.” Legislative History at 307. Section 5(a) of the 1978 Act is unique in American law in that it gives a resort owner whose business may be affected by the Act the right to require purchase by the federal government. Original versions of the 1978 Act placed all property on the designated lakes under a right of first refusal from the date of passage of the Act. See Legislative History at 54. The provision was eventually softened so as to trigger the right of first refusal only after the government invested in an initial resort; the government had no need for a right of first refusal until it had an investment in the land around a lake. Further relevant facts have been introduced during the course of this litigation; the federal government has informed the Court that it intends to construe the reoffer period as limited to 100 days. Second, the government has informed the Court that it presently has no intention to exercise its right to first refusal on Fall Lake or Moose Lake, two designated lakes, allaying the fears of local property owners. (7) Amended Counts Six and Seven-Purchase Provisions The major contention in the added claims concerning § 5 of the Act is that the selection of lakes subject to the favorable buyout provision is arbitrary and capricious. Congress, however, debated hard and long before it settled on the present language of §5. The House bill originally afforded thirteen lakes the favorable provisions. Each of the lakes was one on which motorboat restrictions were either to be imposed or which would be impacted. See Legislative History at 54. As to these lakes, the basis for selection is clear. With regard to the two lakes added to the original list of thirteen, Congress’ rationale is likewise clear; the Act was intended to expand the boundaries of the Wilderness to include Wood Lake and the North Kawishiwi River, formerly outside the boundaries. Congress was concerned about the impact of the addition of these lakes on resorts that in the past had made a practice of storing boats for use by their customers on Wood Lake and the North Kawishiwi River, a practice banned within the boundaries: In several of the additions to the wilderness made by H.R. 12250 there has been limited seasonal and/or year-round storage of “cached” boats on lakes or rivers at sites that will be within the wilderness upon enactment. Storage of boats of all types not being used in connection with a current visit is currently prohibited on Federal land within the BWCA by the Secretary’s regulations, and on State land or water under Minnesota Department of Natural Resources regulation 1,000. Such storage of cached boats or canoes is clearly out of keeping with the purposes of the Wilderness Act, and it is our intention that such practices be prohibited within the additions to the wilderness made by H.R. 12250. Storage of canoes just outside the wilderness boundary near certain lakes could be permitted by the Secretary as a means of facilitating appropriate wilderness use of such lakes by the guests of nearby resorts. In some cases such resort guests were the principal users of the cached boats within certain new wilderness additions. Wood Lake and the North Kawishiwi River are examples of situations where canoe storage just outside the wilderness might help the resort economy and give resort guests an opportunity to fish in the wilderness with little portaging. Legislative History at 300 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Senate added to § 5 the two nearby lakes that supported resorts which had been storing boats on Wood Lake and on the North Kawishiwi River: Jasper and Ojibway. See Legislative History at 233. Plaintiffs have come forward with no parties or affidavits by parties who claim they are resort owners on non — buy-out lakes who want to avail themselves of the favorable buy-out provision in § 5. There is also an added claim by plaintiffs to the effect that the Act, by failing to define “resorts,” does not treat individuals on the § 5 lakes fairly, arguing that those property owners do not know whether their land is a qualifying “resort.” However, presently no named plaintiff has come forward stating that he has approached the government pursuant to the Act’s buy-out provision and that the government has told him he cannot avail himself of its provision because his land is not a resort. (8) Amended Count Seven — Additional Allegations Concerning the Right of First Refusal With regard to plaintiffs’ other claims, they center upon impairment of property values. There is presently no party before the Court alleging that his or her property values have been impaired and asking for monetary relief. (9) Ninth Cause of Action: Allegations Concerning the Handicapped Plaintiffs claim that the Act violates Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and § 504 of the 1973 Vocational Rehabilitation Act, and constitutional rights of the handicapped, as the handicapped need the assistance of motors to enjoy the BWCAW. The debate surrounding passage of the 1978 Act addressed the practical concerns of the handicapped. One of the sponsors of the Act, Representative Fraser, introduced into the Congressional Record a letter that underscored the crux of this issue; that letter stated: The handicapped are no different from the rest of us .... To assume that only people with motors or hearty people need the solitude and peace of the true wilderness is a terrible injustice-a slam against the recreational and spiritual needs of all people. Cong.Rec. E227 (daily ed. January 30, 1978). The 1978 Act moves beyond the previous management scheme governing the Boundary Waters Wilderness in furnishing handicapped persons with greater opportunities. By eliminating motorboat use from some border lake chains, the Act in effect brings the wilderness-in the sense of a canoe-only zone-to the very edge of the BWCAW. A handicapped individual now has several routes on which the first lake is limited to non-motorized travel. Without motor restrictions, the handicapped are forced to travel across several lakes and portages to reach the solitude of wilderness. Programs are presently in operation that promote the use of the Wilderness by persons with handicaps. These programs help train the handicapped person in planning and executing trips into the Wilderness. In a statement made in the House of Representatives, Congressman Fraser called attention to one program of this kind operated by the Minnesota Outward Bound School. See Cong.Rec. H3161 (daily ed. April 6, 1977). Involving a ten-day course in which physically disabled and able-bodied persons participated in a rigorous regimen of “canoeing skills, expedition planning, physical conditioning, ropes course, wilderness emergency care, search and rescue training, rock climbing, and ecology,” Id. at H3161, the program sought both to help handicapped individuals fully enjoy a wilderness trip and to “assist organizations, facilities, and agencies serving the physically disabled to establish outdoor adventure programs for their clients.” Id. During the House floor debate on the House Interior Committee bill, Congressman Nolan, a sponsor of the bill, described a second program structured to meet the recreational needs of handicapped individuals: I should like to briefly describe an organization whose expressed mission is to provide access to such wilderness areas to the handicapped. This organization calls itself the Wilderness Inquiry II and is one of three affiliate groups under the parent organization, the Wilderness Inquiry Association. Wilderness Inquiry II is designed to meet the recreational needs of the handicapped by providing access into such areas. It is intended that such excursions may be employed to assist handicapped individuals in coping with their disabilities by using the Wilderness as a means of developing self-confidence in themselves. Legislative History at 128. Wilderness Inquiry II is a defendant-intervenor in this lawsuit. The BWCAW Act also authorizes the Secretary to expand even further the opportunities for handicapped persons to use the Wilderness; § 18(d) of the Act provides: The Secretary in cooperation with the State of Minnesota and other appropriate groups, consistent with the purposes of this Act, is authorized and directed to develop a program providing opportunities for a wide range of outdoor experiences for disabled persons. § 18(d) BWCAW Act, Pub.L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649, 1658-59 (1978). That the drafters of the legislation felt this to be an important provision is indicated by Congressman Burton’s remarks during the House floor debate on the Interior Committee bill: “I have been pushing the Department generally, and do intend to produce effective policy to the end that these experiences are made more relevant to those with physical handicaps.” Legislative History at 126. Even though handicapped persons do use the Wilderness and even though programs do exist which are designed to foster even greater handicapped use, certain portions of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness will remain inaccessible to some of the handicapped. Any wilderness, however, affords a continuum of recreational experiences; although some areas are easily reached by even the most uninitiated wilderness traveler, others can be visited only by those possessing consummate back-country skills. In this respect, the handicapped and non-handicapped stand on equal terms-both groups must tailor their expectations to the requirements of the terrain in which they intend to travel. To protect and preserve the Wilderness, the 1978 Act sets out a management strategy under which no special dispensation is made for handicapped individuals; this strategy represents an approach that will guarantee to the handicapped individual the same opportunity provided the able-bodied, i. e., the chance to participate in a lakeland canoe wilderness experience, an experience unique to the BWCAW. (10) The Tenth Cause of Action: Discrimination Against the Less Physically Fit In this count, plaintiffs claim that the provisions of the Act regulating motorboat use allow only those who are in excellent physical condition and who are able to paddle a canoe to use the Boundary Waters Wilderness. Accordingly, plaintiffs claim the Act violates the equal protection guarantees in the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution and the motorboat restrictions are in conflict with the purposes of the Act. (11) The Eleventh Cause of Action: Alleged Selective Enforcement The plaintiffs last allege that certain prohibitions in the Act are being selectively enforced-specifically, one individual has been cited for violating motorboat restrictions while other motorboat violators have not been cited. This is claimed to be a violation of plaintiffs’ equal protection rights. There is no plaintiff in this action that is the subject of a citation. 2. Discussion The United States, the defendant-intervenors, and the plaintiffs have all moved for summary judgment in National Ass’n of Property Owners v. United States, Civil 5-79-95 (D.Minn.1979). This particular action raises numerous challenges to the present Act. The parties have exhaustively researched the relevant issues and have submitted scores of memoranda and affidavits both in support and in opposition to the pending motions and cross-motion. After careful review of the entire file, all moving memoranda and counsel’s oral presentations, the Court determines that this action presents an appropriate case in which to order summary judgment; defendants’ and defendant-intervenors’ motions are granted; plaintiffs’ motion is denied. a. The Map Plaintiffs’ first cause of action raises two questions. The first question does not rise to a constitutional challenge. The second question raises a significant constitutional issue; however, it was resolved long ago and against the plaintiffs’ favor. (1) Which Map Establishes the Boundaries of the BWCAW? Plaintiffs have maintained that there is so much confusion concerning the actual boundaries of the Wilderness that the Act must fail. They hypothesize the possibility that Congress had before it a map other than that one designated in § 3 of the Act as establishing the official boundaries of the Wilderness. In support of this postulation, plaintiffs’ lead counsel, Mr. Wallis, has stated that he travelled all the way from San Antonio, Texas, to Washington, D.C., in order to view the official map. Once in Washington, Mr. Wallis spoke with two secretaries. He spoke with Ms. Holliday, secretary to the Deputy Chief of the Forest Service, and Ms. Clark, secretary to the Chief of the Forest Service. Neither Ms. Holliday nor Ms. Clark was able to satisfy Mr. Wallis’ request; discontented, Mr. Wallis chose to leave. More patient men would have persevered, for the map was there. Since January 1979, the official map has been retained by Messrs. Leasure and Joy of the Recreation Management Division of the United States Forest Service; since that time it has been available for inspection. Immediately after his short visit to the offices of Mses. Clark and Holliday, Mr. Wallis was informed by letter where he could view the map. Apparently, Mr. Wallis has not actively sought to view the official map subsequent to his September trip to the nation’s capital. It appears to the Court at this time that he’d rather curse the darkness than light a candle. Congress identified the official map as that map entitled “Boundary Waters Canoe Area Mining Protection Area” dated September 1978. This map has been in the custody of the United States Forest Service since the enactment of the 1978 Act. It is available for Mr. Wallis’ inspection. Furthermore, this “official map” and its more practical counterpart, published at 45 Fed. Reg. 23,006-23,040 (1980), are the only maps before the Court cloaked with statutory significance. When reviewing any congressional Act, this Court must presume that each public official who took part in the legislative process has does his duty properly and that the administrators have faithfully and effectively carried out the mandate of the Congress. Mr. Wallis’ short trip to Washington and his brief inquiry there does not approach a showing which would amount to overcoming this presumption. See Chacon v. Granata, 515 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930, 96 S.Ct. 279, 46 L.Ed.2d 258 (1975). (2) Has Congress Unconstitutionally Delegated Its Power to Establish The Boundaries of The Wilderness? Plaintiffs contend that there has been an improper delegation by the Legislature to the administrator of the Act because there are no adequate statutory standards set out in the Act to guide the administrator. Plaintiffs assert that § 3 of the Act is an unconfined and vagrant abuse of the delegation power of Congress. In support of this proposition, plaintiffs urge a revitalization of the Panama-Schechter Anti-Delegation Doctrine. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935). This doctrine was laid to rest in 1944 when the Court issued its ruling in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944). Since the Panama and Schechter cases, supra, federal delegations have been uniformly upheld. An extremely broad delegation which reached the Court after Panama and Schechter concerned the delegation contained in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 901, et seq. The Act authorized the Price Administrator to set maximum prices which in his judgment would be generally fair and equitable and would effectuate the purposes of the Act. This delegation was challenged under the Panama-Schechter Doctrine; the Court, however, sustained the statute, reasoning that sufficiently precise standards were outlined in the Act. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944). Dissenting, Mr. Justice Roberts noted that the standards articulated in the Act challenged in Yakus, supra, were no more precise than those struck down as limitless in Panama and Schechter. Justice Roberts concluded the Yakus, supra, overruled the Panama-Schechter Doctrine. 321 U.S. at 452, 64 S.Ct. at 680. In Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F.Supp. 737 (D.D.C.1971), a three-judge District Court considered the constitutionality of the delegation contained in the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 796 (1970). The Act authorized President Nixon to issue appropriate orders effectuating the'stabilization of prices, rents, wages and salaries at levels less than those prevailing on May 25,1970. The Act’s delegation was standardless; nevertheless the court sustained the Act against the claim of an improper delegation. 337 F.Supp. at 747-49. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, supra, is the culmination of the federal delegation cases; it assuredly indicates that with regard to delegation cases generally, the Panama-Schechter Doctrine is no more. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, supra, further ruled that the party who chooses to challenge Congress’ choice of means for effecting its purpose shoulders the burden of persuasion which is met “[o]nly if we could say that there is an absence of standards for the guidance of the Administrator’s action, so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed.” 337 F.Supp. at 746 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. at 426, 64 S.Ct. at 668). A heavier burden is hard to imagine. Where fundamental personal rights are involved, it appears that a stricter standard of review is required by the courts in evaluating legislative delegations. In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958), the Court reasoned that a delegation of lawmaking power to an administrative agency which affects a person’s fundamental right to travel abroad must be reviewed by the courts under the appropriately strict standard. Id. at 129, 78 S.Ct. at 1119. Typically, this situation would arise where an agency is authorized to issue permits for exercising associational rights protected under the First Amendment; this would include activities akin to parades and demonstrations. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham 394 U.S. 147, 151, 89 S.Ct. 935, 938, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). In Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 325 F.Supp. 1019 (S.D.Tex.1971), Judge Bue noted that while general grants of power to administrative agencies are permissible to regulate many forms of activity, certain types of activities may only be regulated pursuant to the lawmaking functions of a legislature-particularly where the activity regulated concerns the public’s “personal liberties.” The District Court reasoned that “[i]f that power is delegated, then there must be acceptable standards included within that delegation so that the agency can follow the policy of the statute.” Id. at 1021 (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958)), vacated, 468 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1972). Essentially, Judge Bue’s decision rests upon the premise that where “personal rights” are affected, the legislature must determine the basic policy of the law; it is the power to set policy that may not be delegated to an agency. 325 F.Supp. at 1021. In the case before this Court, there are two distinct rationales for rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument: 1. Congress did not delegate policy making power to the Secretary in § 3 of the Act; and 2. Even if § 3 delegates authority to the Secretary, it is not standardless under the applicable case law. Section 3 of the BWCAW Act provides: Sec. 3. The areas generally depicted as wilderness on the map entitled “Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness and Boundary Waters Canoe Area Mining Protection Area” dated September 1978 comprising approximately one million and seventy-five thousand five hundred acres, are hereby designated as the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness (hereinafter referred to as the “wilderness”). Such designation shall supersede the designation of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area under section 3(a) of the Wilderness Act (78 Stat. 890) and such map shall supersede the map on file pursuant to such section. The map of the wilderness shall be on file and available for public inspection in the offices of the Supervisor of the Superior National Forest and of the Chief, United States Forest Service. The Secretary of Agriculture, hereinafter referred to as “The Secretary,” shall, as soon as practicable but in no event later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, publish a detailed legal description and map showing the boundaries of the wilderness in the Federal Register. Such map and description shall be filed with the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the United States Senate. Such map and description shall have the same force and effect as if included in this Act. Correction of clerical and typographical errors in such legal description and map may be made. § 3 BWCAW Act, Pub.L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649, 1650 (1978). This section does two things. It establishes the boundaries of the Wilderness by reference to the map Congress had before it, and it directs the Secretary to publish a legal description and more practical map in the Federal Register. This section also authorizes the Secretary to make clerical and typographical corrections with regard to any errors in the description and the map. It seems clear that this section of the Act does not delegate any authority to the Secretary; it merely directs the Secretary to publish a map of the boundaries already established by reference in the Act. Congress has determined the boundaries; the Secretary’s only duty outlined in § 3 is to publish the map of the boundaries. If § 3 were construed as a delegation, as opposed to a plain congressional directive, it still remains that the section does not regulate “personal liberties”; accordingly the standard by which it must be judged is governed by Yakus v. United States, supra, and Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, supra. Accordingly, such a delegation will be overturned only if this Court determines that it is impossible to ascertain whether the administrator’s actions obey the will of Congress. I cannot conclude, by any stretch of the imagination, that § 3, if it delegates at all, delegates to the extent that it is impossible for the Secretary to perceive Congress’ will. b. Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claims Regarding the Handicapped and the Less Physically Fit Plaintiffs allege that § 4 of the Act, regulating the use of motorboats and snowmobiles in the Wilderness, is unconstitutional to the extent that it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the equal protection principles inherent in that constitutional guarantee; and further that it infringes plaintiffs’ Ninth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs assert in the alternative that the 1978 Act conflicts with Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. (Supp.1980), and that this conflict necessitates a determination by this Court that § 4 can not be lawfully enforced. The Court finds that plaintiffs’ ninth and tenth causes of action, raising these questions, fail to state claims for which relief may be granted, and, that as a matter of law, defendants and defendant-intervenors’ motions for summary judgment must be granted. Plaintiffs’ claims necessitate a three-part analysis of the challenged section. First, is the end constitutional; is Congress empowered to pursue the legislative goals sought through § 4? Second, are the means chosen to effectuate these goals reasonably related to such a constitutionally permissible end; is there a rational basis for the means chosen by Congress? Third, does the challenged section violate another part of the Constitution? It seems a matter well decided that Congress is constitutionally empowered to pursue the ends sought? to be achieved in the 1978 Act. Congress outlined these goals in § 2 of the Act; it sought to provide for such measures as would: (1) provide for the protection and management of the fish and wildlife of the wilderness so as to enhance public enjoyment and appreciation of the unique biotic resources of the region, (2) protect and enhance the natural values and environmental quality of the lakes, streams, shorelines and associated forest areas of the wilderness, (3) maintain high water quality in such areas, (4) minimize to the maximum extent possible, the environmental impacts associated with mineral development affecting such areas, (5) prevent further road and commercial development and restore natural conditions to existing temporary roads in the wilderness, and (6) provide for the orderly and equitable transition from motorized recreational uses to nonmotorized recreational uses on those lakes, streams, and portages in the wilderness where such mechanized uses are to be phased out under the provisions of this Act. § 2 BWCAW Act, Pub.L. No. 95-95, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978). Congress may constitutionally seek to achieve these goals; it may create and regulate Wilderness areas for recreational purposes for the public. Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 353 F.Supp. 698, 710 (D.Minn.1973), rev’d on other grounds, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974); Parker v. United States, 309 F.Supp. 593, 597-98 (D.Colo.1970), aff’d 448 F.2d 793, 795-96 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1252, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972); McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir. 1965). See also United States v. Gregg, 290 F.Supp. 706, 707-08 (W.D.Wash. 1968). Judge Neville, in St. Clair, supra, characterized the mining prohibitions in the Wilderness Act of 1964 as something in the nature of a zoning regulation. Judge Ne-ville stated: “This court is satisfied, if it can be said that Congress intended to bar all mineral activities in the BWCA, that it has the power and prerogative so to do.” 353 F.Supp. at 707. The District Court reasoned that the “Wilderness purpose” is a public one, and that the congressional proscriptions and regulations there involved were reasonable. Id. Judge Neville concluded that “Congress clearly had the power to zone the BWCA in view of the public purpose to keep it virginal and untrammeled.” 353 F.Supp. at 710. Accordingly, this Court determines that Congress has the power to designate the Boundary Waters as a Wilderness area, and to protect the “special qualities of the area as a natural forest — lakeland wilderness ecosystem”. § 1 BWCAW Act, Pub.L. No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978). The Court further determines that the proscriptions enumerated in § 4 of the Act, prohibiting or otherwise restricting the use of motorized vehicles in the Wilderness are reasonably related to creating and protecting the wilderness qualities of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area. The provision in the Act regulating the use of motorboats and snowmobiles has a rational basis, and is reasonably related to a constitutionally permissible end. Plaintiffs assert that § 4, which prohibits the use of motorized vehicles in the BWCAW, discriminates against the handicapped and the less physically fit in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the equal protection principles inherent in that clause. Practically, every statute discriminates in one way or another against some classes of people or infringes in some manner upon the rights or privileges of individuals or classes. For purposes of analysis, the Court must determine whether § 4 discriminates against any “suspect” classes, or whether it infringes any person’s “fundamental” rights; only after this initial determination is made, can the Court choose the appropriate standard of review. This Court finds that the present case does not involve the aforementioned “suspect criteria.” Statutes which allocate burdens upon, or otherwise discriminate against, blacks as a racial group have always been “suspect,” and subject to strict judicial scrutiny. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967). The number of “suspect classes” has grown in recent years to include other ethnic groups and aliens. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 65 S.Ct. 193, 194, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1851-1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971). See also Developments in the Law — Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065, 1087-1127 (1969); Note, 11 Creighton L.Rev. 609, 611 — 16 (1977). See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreward; In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 1 (1972). Where a statute discriminates against one of these “suspect classes,” it is subjected to strict review by the courts; judicial scrutiny under this standard requires that the challenged statute must further some compelling interest or be necessary to further an overriding purpose. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967). Pew such statutes have survived this rigorous reviewing standard. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1013-1014, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The present case involves a situation where the handicapped and less physically fit are somewhat burdened by the restrictions of § 4. However, these classes of individuals are not “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.” San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). This Court finds that the individual members of these classes of people do not constitute a “discrete and insular minority.” See Johnso